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U.S. ARMY. I CORPS.

HISTORY OF THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION.

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OF THE

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OPERATION



RECKLESS TASK FORCE

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HISTORY OF THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION

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NARRATIVE

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INTRODUCTION

The general line held by the American and Australian forces in the South-west Pacific Area prior to the Hollandia operation is indicated on Map No. 1. The decision was made to launch a major attack against the Humboldt Bay-Tanahmerah Bay area with a lesser landing at Aitape. The success of such an enterprise would isolate the defending forces along the coast from Astrolabe Bay to Wewak, would place all of north-eastern New Guinea under Allied domination, and would afford air and naval bases for future operations against the remainder of Dutch New Guinea or other subsequent objectives which might be selected to the north and west. Control of this portion of the New Guinea coast also would provide security against any enemy counter-blow aimed from the west at the supply lines and positions of friendly forces occupied in consolidating their gains in the Bismarck Sea area. The magnitude of the plan, compared to other operations in the area, called for new logistics and planning, and for the most complete cooperation between ground, air, and naval forces.

The Hollandia Task Force (Code Name: Reckless Task Force) was created by command of Lieutenant General Krueger, Commanding General, Sixth Army, in a tentative plan dated 11 March 1944, although verbal instructions had instituted planning as early as 6 March 1944. Command of the Hollandia Force was vested in Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, U.S.A., Commanding General I Corps, with the effective date of organization 15 March 1944. The command tentatively consisted of the 24th Infantry Division and the 41st Infantry Division (less one regimental combat team), plus twenty eight complementary combat units and a complete array of service units. Total strength of the Hollandia Force was established as 37,527 combat troops and 18,184 service troops. The majority of the included units were assigned Goodenough Island and Finschhafen as staging areas, although various service units were to be located at Milne Bay, Lae, Cape Gloucester, Saidor, and Sydney.

For planning purposes, D-Day was set as 22 April 1944 and H-Hour 0715K.

For mission and troops, see Reckless Task Force Field Order No. 1, attached.

The Tanahmerah Bay Landing Force (Code Name: Noiseless Landing Force) was placed under the command of Major General Frederick A. Irving, U.S.A., and the Humboldt Bay Landing Force (Code Name: Letterpress Landing Force) command was given to Major General Horace H. Fuller, U.S.A.

Hollandia, on the northeast coast of New Guinea, lies between the 140th and 141st degrees East of longitude, and is approximately on the 3rd degree South parallel of latitude. In terms of natural boundaries, Hollandia is the area bounded by the Tami River on the east and by the Sermo River on the west. It extends from the coast inland some thirty or forty miles to a largely unexplored mountain range. The area was occupied by the Japanese on 19 April 1942.

The dominating feature of the entire area is a ridge of mountains named the Cyclops Range. This range extends along the coast from Tanahmerah Bay to Humboldt Bay. The entire coast line is the steep and rugged terrain characteristic of the northeast coast of New Guinea.

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The Cyclops Range and other formations form a continual band of high ground completely cutting off the coast from the interior. Most of this ground is passable for small patrols but the only feasible approaches for considerable bodies of troops lie along the valleys extending inland from Tanahmerah and Humboldt Bays. Each of these approaches was considered passable for foot troops and tanks, with the Tanahmerah Bay passage the more favorable of the two. At least one road suitable for heavy wheeled vehicles was believed to exist between Humboldt Bay and the Sentani Lake area.

The valley south of the Cyclops Range is extensive, fairly level and well drained. Sentani Lake affords an excellent site for a seaplane base. At least three air strips, two bomber and one fighter, were known to be near the lake and in operation during March, 1944. Additional strips were being constructed and improvements made on the existing ones.

South and west of the valley lie the Tami and Grime swamps.

At Humboldt Bay, the available reef-free landing beaches are confined to a very narrow hard sand beach which extends along most of the south and southwest shores of the bay and a narrow beach, incapable of supporting heavy vehicles, in the immediate vicinity of Hollandia.

Within Tanahmerah Bay, there are two available beaches. One is located two miles southeast of the protecting cape, while the other, some 400 yards long, is across the sheltered cove to the south.

The vegetation in the area is primarily rain forest and swamp forest. There are some patches of moss forest and a few grassy areas. Most of the grass lands are the result of abortive efforts at cultivation and subsequent fires. Undergrowth throughout the area is dense but not impenetrable.

The days in Hollandia are humid and enervating but the nights are cool because of down drafts from the Cyclops Range. The climate is neither particularly unhealthy nor unattractive.

Heavy rainfall is characteristic and the water supply is plentiful, though all water must be boiled or chlorinated.

Malaria is prevalent in the area, its incidence before the war ranging from 74 to 100 per cent. Scrub typhus had never been reported but is existence was expected, since mites were known to exist.

Other common diseases and infections which the force expected to encounter included dysentery, ulcers, framboesia, pneumonia, and filariasis.

Fish abound in the lakes around Hollandia, particularly in Sentani Lake, and they form a staple of the native diet. Land turtles are common but one variety is inedible.

Crocodiles up to thirteen feet long are encountered in the rivers. Snakes of the constrictor type are not rare and there is a death adder which is numerous throughout the area. Less dangerous but more annoying are mosquitoes, sand flies, flies, and leeches.

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PREPARATION

The Task Force was activated 23 March 1944, and General Order Number 1, Headquarters U. S. Forces, APO 565, dated 27 March 1944 announced the complete list of landing force commanders and the task force staff. A copy of this order is an inclosure to this report.

The period of preparation was one of planning and training. The salient features of these activities are contained in the summary of lessons learned. Further and more detailed accounts of the preparation stage are found in the detailed reports of the general staff sections.

The G-4 aspects are amplified in "Logistics and Construction", page 17. Staff conferences were held with great frequency. Meetings with staff officers and commanders with all echelons were held. Navy representatives were constantly on hand to advise and coordinate with the Task Force staff. The Commanding General of the Task Force had numerous conferences with the commander of the Navy forces concerned. Before orders were issued, carefully worked out plans were published and thoroughly digested by all concerned.

Training

The general training of units was continued and included physical hardening, small unit tactics, generalized amphibious work, and in addition to this, certain specialized training was given. Naval shore fire control parties worked extensively with artillery personnel to obtain the maximum coordination with artillery fire and the use of naval gun fire on land targets. Full dress rehearsals for both landing forces were planned, although these were not carried out without entire satisfaction. Time did not permit repetition. The rehearsal included some practice in unloading. Need for more extensive training in this particular was apparent.

Supply, Evacuation, and Transportation

Immediate steps were taken to fill existing shortages of equipment. All units were to be accompanied by 15 days of supply, Classes I-IV, inclusive. Combat units were to be accompanied by an average of 5 U/F of ammunition; all other units, 3 U/F. Resupply was to be the responsibility of Sixth Army, with base at Finschhafen. Evacuation was to be by returning supply ships. A Transportation Special Staff Section was organized to handle discharge of shipping at the objective area. For details of planning, see Page 17.

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MAP # 1
ORIENTATION MAP FOR HOLLANDIA OPERATION

Scale 1 / 3 950 000 (Approx.)

1 Inch = 62 Miles

20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Miles

ATTACK GROUPS OF THE RECKLESS TASK FORCE ARRIVED AT THE SEPARATION POINT AND DEPARTED FOR OBJECTIVE AREAS AT 0130 D-DAY

POINT REACHED AT 1900 D-1. EASTERN ATTACK GROUP PROCEEDED INDEPENDENTLY TO ITS OBJECTIVE AREAS

RENDEZVOUS POINT FOR ALL ATTACK GROUPS. TIME OF ARRIVAL AT THIS POINT - 0700 D-2

ATTACK GROUPS ARRIVED AT THEIR TRANSPORT AREAS AT 0500 D-DAY

LINE OF FURTHEST ADVANCE AS OF 17 APRIL 1944

ASSAULT TROOPS OF THE 41ST DIV. DEPARTED FROM CAPE CRETIN AT 1800K D-4

ASSAULT TROOPS OF THE 24TH DIV. DEPARTED FROM GOODENOUGH ISLAND AT 1200K D-5

UNITS OF THE TASK FORCE STAGED AT CAPE SUDEST DEPARTED FROM THAT AREA AT 2400K D-5

PACIFIC OCEAN

CORAL SEA

BISMARCK SEA

NEW GUINEA

NEW BRITAIN

NEW IRELAND

PAPUA

Hollandia
Sentani Lake
Idenburg River
Tami River
Dutch New Guinea
Central Australian Range
Mandate Territory
Fly River
Gulf of Papua
Fredrik Hendrik Island
Merauke
Yaninio
Aitape
Yakamul
Wewak
Cape Girgir
Sepik River
Nubia
Manam Is.
Hansa Bay
Karkar Is.
Cape Croisilles
Alexishaven
Madang
Astrolabe Bay
Bogadjim
Saidor
Long Is.
Manus Is.
Rooke Is.
Sio
Finschhaven
Lae
Hopi
Cape Cretin
Huon Gulf
Salamaua
Mubo
Wau
Morobe
Cape Sudest
Oro Bay
Port Moresby
Owen Stanley Mountains
Collingwood Bay
Cape Vogel
Goodenough Bay
Goodenough Is.
Fergusson Is.
Normanby Is.
Woodlark Is.
Milne Bay
Nelson
Talasea
Cape Gloucester
Cape Hoskins
Arawe
Gasmata
Jacquinot Bay
Open Bay
Wide Bay
Cape St. George
Borpop
Rabaul
Kavieng
New Hanover

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ATTACK PHASE

Task Force Advance

The various elements of the Task Force left staging areas as shown on Map No. 1. The Task Force Headquarters of the Tanahmerah Landing Force had staged at Goodenough Island while the principal elements of the Humboldt Landing Force staged at Finschhafen. These two convoys united in the vicinity of the Admiralty Islands as is shown on the map together with Aitape Landing Force which also came from Finschhafen. After leaving the Admiralty Islands area, the Aitape Landing Force left the Task Force convoy and proceeded to its objective. The Task Force convoy proceeded to move to the Hollandia area and divided, the Humboldt Bay Force continuing toward Humboldt Bay and the Tanahmerah Bay Force toward Tanahmerah Bay. The course and timing of the convoy is shown on Map No. 1. Air cover during the voyage was provided by carrier based navy fighters. Following a carefully coordinated naval gunfire support plan, cruisers and destroyers shelled designated areas in Humboldt and Tanahmerah Bay as a preparation for the landing of assault waves. Rockets from LCIs and LCMs supplemented the naval barrage.

Field Order Number 1, Task Force, gives the plan of maneuver of the landing forces. In both areas, LVTs were used to carry assault elements into tactically advantageous beaches which were inaccessible to other types of landing craft. Scheduled air strikes in the Tanahmerah Bay area were omitted because of the heavy overcast.

Tanahmerah Bay

Following a naval gun fire barrage delivered by cruisers and destroyers, elements of the 19th and 21st Infantry Regiments made landings on Red Beach #1 and Red Beach #2. The scene of maneuver during the landing and after the troops were ashore is shown on Map No. 2. By 0800 hours, the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 19th Infantry, had landed on the left half of Red Beach #2 and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 21st Infantry, landed on the right half of Red Beach #2. The 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, had pushed into Red Beach #1 in 14 LVTs followed by LCVPs and made a successful landing.

A waist-deep swamp behind Red Beach #2 prevented traffic inland until engineer units with bulldozers landed to push roads to the interior high ground from both ends of the beach.

Elements of the 21st Infantry began to move from Red Beach #2 overland to Depapre but since the 1st Battalion had been successful in occupying Depapre the remainder of the 21st Infantry was ferried from Red Beach #2 to Red Beach #1 in LCVPs. Landings at Red Beach #1 were limited due to a coral shelf which blocked the beach at low tide. Company E, 21st Infantry, continued overland from Red Beach #2 and arrived in Depapre in 24 hours.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 19th Infantry, landed on the northern half of Red Beach #2 and proceeded to carry out assigned missions. The

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APRIL 24,1944

RATIONS, SUPPLIES AND GAS DRUMS ON TANAHMERAH BEACH.

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1st Battalion established a beach perimeter and sent patrols to Cape Tanahmerah and to the north. The 3rd Battalion was held in division reserve in the rear of Red Beach #2.

All landings were unopposed and no resistance was encountered at either beach after the landings were made. At the end of D-Day, the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, had advanced six miles inland from Depapre where it halted to reorganize and to permit the establishment of an effective reserve and a protected line of supply. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 21st Infantry, less Company E, had started movement by water to Depapre.

During this period, the 3rd Engineer Battalion was engaged in constructing exits from Red Beach #2, while the 339th Engineer, having landed at a point between Red #1 and Red #2, was exploring the possibilities of pushing a road between the two beaches. Since it was estimated that it would take two weeks to construct such a road, it was decided not to attempt this project and plans were made to shuttle supplies and equipment into Depapre from Red Beach #2.

On D + 1, the 21st Infantry had completed its move to Depapre and in column of battalions advanced to Sabron where it halted to await supplies. The 1st Battalion continued to lead the advance. The 3rd Battalion was moved forward to pass through the 1st Battalion to relieve it as the spearhead. The 2nd Battalion was moved up the Depapre trail behind the 1st and 3rd Battalions.

Supplies for these forward elements had to be hand-carried from Depapre over the steep and muddy trail which led over the ridges to the drome area. The 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry, was brought into Depapre as division reserve and was utilized to carry supplies forward.

On D-Day, General Irving had landed and assumed command of forces ashore at about 1030K. On D + 1, he moved his CP to a location approximately 300 yards inland from Depapre on the Depapre-airdrome road.

Alamo Scouts had been put ashore in rubber boats at Demta, 15 miles northwest of Demengong Bay to patrol the various tracks in the area and in order to discover signs of reinforcements or withdrawal. A few scattered enemy were found but they encountered no organized resistance.

Because of the impracticability of constructing a road between Red Beach #2, which was the only beach usable for LST's and LCI's, and Red Beach #1, and because of the lack of landing facilities on Red Beach #1, the question arose as to the advisability of putting additional troops and supplies in the Tanahmerah area. Weighing the obvious logistical difficulties against the tactical advantages of a push from Tanahmerah Bay, the Task Force Commander decided to divert certain supply vessels, service units, and the Task Force Reserve (34th RCT) to Humboldt Bay. On D + 1, a message was sent to order the D + 2 convoy designated for Tanahmerah into Humboldt Bay. The elements of the I Corps Headquarters which had landed on Red Beach #2 were reloaded on an LST and departed for Humboldt Bay with the view of establishing the Task Force CP in that area.

On D + 2, the advance elements of the 21st Infantry were ordered to remain in the vicinity of Sabron in order that supplies might be built up. The enemy resistance up to this time had been slight and except for

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the very difficult terrain leading from Depapre, this regiment pushed on rapidly to the airdromes.

The supply problem, particularly rations, became critical as the supply line was extended. All essential materials were landing on Red Beach #2 and were being transshipped by all small craft whenever the tide permitted access to Red Beach #1. From Depapre inland, the track was muddy and subject to landslides preventing even jeep traffic. The supply chain had to be continued by hand carrying, the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, furnishing the carrying parties.

On the next day, D + 3, the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, advanced 2 miles from Sabron meeting and eliminating sporadic enemy resistance. By D + 4, the 1st Battalion and 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, were moving astride the Depapre-Hollandia Drome road occupying Juliandorp and a Japanese encampment. On the next day, the occupation of Hollandia Drome was completed by the 21st Infantry. Patrols of the 21st Infantry and 186th Infantry met at the northeast corner of the strip at 1645K. Mopping up and patrol activity then began.

The difficult terrain greatly hampered the mobility of supporting artillery. On D-Day, one battery of the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion was in position at the south end of Red Beach #2 by 1655K to support the advance of the 21st Infantry. By D + 3, elements of Division Artillery were firing on and neutralizing Japanese positions in the drome area. Intermittent fire was place on Hollandia Drome. Moving to Depapre, the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion continued to support the advance of the 21st Infantry toward Hollandia Drome. During the advance, additional artillery support was derived from use of antiaircraft 90mm guns which fired on ground targets.

Following the capture of Hollandia Drome, the 21st Infantry organized a perimeter and sent patrols out to locate and block escape routes. The perimeter was subjected to a number of unimportant suicidal attacks, all of which were easily repulsed.

Patrols moved out to Swarekus, Ploev, and Passanggrahn. Trail blocks were established with satisfactory results. A relatively strong enemy position, consisting of three emplacements, was reduced on 3 May. Fifty Japs, with machine guns emplaced two miles north of Hollandia Drome, opened fire on a patrol on the same day. The position was overrun on 4 May by a company of infantry following an artillery and mortar barrage. Patrolling continued throughout this entire area until 6 June, the date on which the combat phase terminated.

The 19th Infantry patrolled the coast east and west of Tanahmerah Bay. On 28 April two companies, reinforced, moved 25 miles by water and landed at Demta where they contacted an Alamo Scout Team. In an effort to block all escape routes toward Sarmi, patrols pushed inland, making their main contact at Barep. To the north, patrols located enemy groups at Wari, on Torare Bay, at Dosojo, Doromena, and at other native villages throughout the regimental area. At least 104 enemy were killed in patrol clashes and 93 prisoners taken.

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Humboldt Bay

The assault waves landed at White Beaches 1 and 2 at 0700K. The entire 162nd Infantry landed onto White Beach 1 without opposition. The regiment immediately formed for the attack and pushed inland, moving north to cut the Hollandia-Pim track and screen the main effort being made at Leimok Hill. Advancing rapidly with battalions in column, 1st Battalion leading, the troops swept forward against minor resistance and seized their first objective, the heights overlooking Hollandia Town, at 1600K. The regiment deployed across the high ground on a 1200 yard front, two battalions abreast. The 2nd Battalion was astride the track, with the 3rd Battalion formed on the right. The 1st Battalion, constituting part of division reserve, occupied a position on Pancake Hill, just north of White Beach 1.

The 146th Field Artillery Battalion was successful in gaining the firm ground north of the beach. Strenuous efforts placed the unit in a position on the Pancake Hill track from which it could support the attacking elements.

Meanwhile, 4.2" chemical mortars laid a smoke screen across Jautefa Bay. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, using Buffaloes, LVTs, passed through the narrow channel between Cape Pie and Cape Tjeweri and landed at the foot of Leimok Hill. The hill proved too steep for the Buffaloes but the troops unloaded, fanned out, and advanced up the slope without opposition.

Elements of the 3rd Battalion, 186th Infantry, moved by LVTs from White Beach 2 around Cape Pie and through Jautefa Bay to effect a landing at Pim. This landing was unopposed. Map No. 3 shows the D-Day situation, including points of landing and the movement of units ashore.

The regiment was supported in its movements by the concentrated fire of the 205th Field Artillery Battalion, one battery of the 218th Field Artillery Battalion, and 641st TD Battalion, less Companies A and B. All artillery units were necessarily concentrated on Cape Pie, which offered the only suitable observation point and firing positions.

The 165th AAA Battalion (Gun) and Battery D of the 163rd, plus AW and SL units, landed on White Beaches 1 and 2. Several of these organizations had been diverted from the Tanahmerah Bay area. Egress from the beaches being blocked, except for barge movements to White Beach 3, all batteries went into positions along the shore line.

Company I of the 186th moved into White Beach 3, closely followed by the regimental Cannon Company. With the Cannon Company blasting the slight resistance offered by three enemy positions, I Company swung south along the beach, advancing to a point two miles from Cape Tjeweri and bagging some prisoners.

Our total casualties in the Humboldt Bay area were six men killed and 16 wounded. 48 of the enemy were killed and an undetermined number of prisoners were captured.

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Immediately upon landing the 116th Engineers set to work clearing exit roads from White Beach #1, moving vehicles off the beach, and attempting to tie in with the Hollandia - Pim track according to plan. The combination of rugged terrain and swamp quickly proved impossible for rapid road construction, and the road-building program was temporarily abandoned. The small boats and shore party on White Beaches #1 and #2 were handled by the 532d EB and SR, reinforced by combat troops.

General Fuller landed and assumed command of the operation in this area at 1005K.

On 23 April Hollandia Town was subjected to an air bombardment, which was followed by an artillery preparation laid down by the 146th and one battery of the 218th Field Artillery from the heights to the south. Following the barrage the 162d Infantry launched a coordinated attack, capturing the town by 1200K and progressing to the high ground west of Imbi Bay. Very little resistance was encountered, most of the enemy emplacements being found deserted. The regiment prepared its defensive position along the second White phase line and began patrolling the area north of Imbi Bay. Consolidation and vigorous patrolling occupied the regiment until 28 April.

To the south the 186th proceeded down the Pim track, supported by the 205th FA and one battery of the 218th. Chemical mortars were called upon to eliminate one strong machine gun emplacement. Friendly air strafed ground targets which were indicated by 81 mm. morter smoke shells. The 3d Battalion spearheaded this advance, which was made in a column of battalions. By 1800K on the 23d the 3d Battalion, brushing aside the few enemy disposed to dispute its progress, was a mile beyond Brinkman's Plantation. At that point the battalion was rejoined by I Company, whose position on the Cape Tjeweri Spit had been taken by the Division Reconnaissance Troop.

The 1st Battalion closely supported the attack and went into position two miles northwest of Brinkman's Plantation. During the afternoon Companies A and C repulsed a series of counterattacks launched against the perimeter by a force estimated at 150 Japs.

On the 24th of April the regiment resumed its advance, winding its way into the rugged hills east of Sentani Lake. Supporting artillery displaced forward as closely as the terrain would permit. This terrain was extremely favorable to defense, but the completely demoralized enemy made small use of it. Such defensive positions as were encountered consisted of locally organized centers of resistance, based on dugouts and pillboxes. These isolated positions fell readily to combined artillery and infantry action, and by 1800K the 3d Battalion had reached Koejaboe, on the eastern tip of the lake. One battery of the 168th Field Artillery Battalion was advanced to a position where it could open fire on Cyclops drome.

The first hostile air reaction to the invasion of Hollandia occurred at 1940K on the 23d. A single enemy bomber slipped in through the mountains and suddenly appeared over White Beach #1 without having been detected. Guided in part by the fires of burning Jap dumps, and knowing the exact location of his target, the pilot made a single run and a stick of four bombs was released. Three resulted in great geysers of sand and water, but the fourth scored a direct hit on a Japanese ammunition dump near Pancake Hill. The resulting explosions ignited a gasoline

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dump located nearby, and huge fires swept White Beaches #1 and #2. The intense heat drove back all efforts to salvage supplies. A large part of the bulk supplies landed by LST's on D-Day and D + 1 were a total loss. 24 soldiers were killed and 100 wounded, mostly as a result of the explosions of ammunition dumps.

The 34th Infantry Combat Team went ashore in the Humboldt Bay area on 24 April to act as a reserve for the landing force. The 1st Battalion formed a work party on White Beach #3 and assisted in the unloading of supply ships. This beach was being used to maximum capacity due to the diverting of shipping originally intended for Tanahmerah Bay and the fires on White Beaches #1 and #2, and it was vital that supplies be dispersed and vessels permitted to put back to sea in minimum time. The 2nd Battalion moved to Hollekang, on the south shore of Humboldt Bay, to secure the flank of the entire landing force, and the 3d Battalion formed Corps Reserve at Pim. On the 25th, the 2d Battalion relieved the 41st Division Reconnaissance Troop, which had moved from White Beach #3 as far as the Laho River.

On the 25th, rather than pound its way through the alternate swampy and rugged terrain, the 186th resorted to amphibious tactics. Using Buffaloes, the 2d Battalion moved across the northern part of Lake Sentani and landed at Nefaar, southeast of Cyclops Drome, on the flank and rear of the defensive positions barring the approach to the drome. The remaining battalions continued their overland movement along the shore road against steadily diminishing resistance.

On D + 3, General Eichelberger landed at Pim and assumed command of the operation ashore at 1300K. The Task Force CP was located at Brinkman's Plantation.

By morning of the 26th on the airdrome area, the entire 186th Infantry was in position for the final assault. The 205th and 218th Field Artillery Battalions were in direct support, smashing at every enemy effort to make a defensive stand. One battery of the 186th, from a particularly favorable position on Red Beach #2, successively engaged targets on each of the three strips.

Cyclops Drome was allotted to the 1st Battalion. The 2d Battalion swung down the lake shore to strike at Sentani Drome from the southeast, and the 3d was held in reserve. The 1st Battalion moved onto Cyclops Drome and completed its occupation by 1040K. Sentani Drome was occupied shortly afterward by the 2d Battalion. In each case, only minor resistance was encountered.

The regiment immediately began the defensive organization of the two fields and sent patrols forward toward the Hollandia strip. These patrols reached the corner of Hollandia Drome at 1645K and contacted units of the 24th Division. The pincer movement was completed and all primary objectives had been attained.

The 25th of April found the 162d Infantry Regiment consolidated in the area surrounding Hollandia Town. The 1st Battalion, which was located the farthest south along the Hollandia-Pim track, was in position as division reserve. The remaining battalions, located so as to be capable of defending Hollandia Town were supported by the 146th Field Artillery Battalion. One platoon had been dispatched to guard the sawmill and machine shop west of Pim.

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MAY 2 - BRINKMANS PLANTATION

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On the following day, 26 April, after a short artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion made a shore to shore movement across the mouth of Imbi Bay against Cape Soedja. Companies A and C, landing abreast, found no resistance. By 1045K hours, Company C had crossed the cape, killed four enemy at Hill 640 and occupied the hill. The battalion swung to the north along the peninsula, eliminating scattered small enemy groups and occupying a field hospital. Patrols continued to function northwest along the coastal track.

The division CP opened at Hollekang and the component and complementary elements were moved to that staging area as rapidly as they could be relieved by the 24th Division. Pursuant to instructions from Sixth Army, the 41st Division was withdrawn from task force control at 0001K hours, 6 May 1944.

The 34th Infantry, on 27 April, had one battalion acting as labor troops, one battalion at Pim, and one battalion at Hollekang securing the left flank of the Task Force. Elements of this regiment were used in mopping-up throughout the entire area between Sentani Lake and Tami Drome.

[redacted]

APRIL 25,1944

INDIANS CAPTURED BY THE JAPS AT SINGAPORE AND RELEASED BY THE AMERICANS AT HOLLANDIA.

MAP NO. 2
D-DAY SITUATION
TANAHMERAH BAY AREA

Scale 1/20000 (Approx)

1000 0 1000 Yds.

1/2 0 1/2 Mi.

REPRODUCED BY 67TH ENGR. TOPO. CO., CORPS

LEGEND

- Buildings or huts
- Streams
- Gardens
- Depression
- Boundary of flat area

Shore is a succession of bold, rocky capes with steeply shelving sandy beaches at inlets. Only means of travel along coast is by water.

PACIFIC OCEAN

COAST EXPOSED TO NORTHWEST MONSOON

Remained in Division reserve and landed D+1 on Red Beach 2.

Co. led the way to Red Beach 1 in LVT's.

Remainder of Bn. followed LVT's.

Red Beach 2 found unsuitable for large scale movement. The 21st Inf. less the 1st Bn. and one Co. made a shore to shore movement to Red Beach 1.

1st Bn. set up beach defense and sent Patrols north to Cape Tanahmerah. 3rd Bn. went into Division reserve.

Line indicates limit of secured beach-head at H+2.

Co. 21st Inf. made march in 24 hours.

Red Beach 1.

1st Bn 21st Inf. advanced 6 miles inland from Depapre by 1800K 22 April. The 2nd and 3rd Bn's followed up the advance.

TANAHMERAH BAY

DEMENGONG BAY

DEPAPRE BAY

Cape Tanahmerah

Jafase

Tablasoefa

Temingoh

Nipa

Lagoon

Depapre

MT DEPABEMOKO 935

MT SIAKAMMOKO 1345

Red Beach 2

CLOUDY

PHOTOGRAPHS

Probable elevation of this area ranges from 2200 to 3500 feet.

To Wasamen

[redacted]

Tami Drome Area

The air field known as Tami Drome, lying east of Humboldt Bay, was a secondary objective of the Task Force. Located on a coastal flat, the drome area was cut off from the Hollandia area by the Djar Mountains and by the swamps around Hollekang. These terrain features made activities in the sector more in the nature of a separate minor operation than a part of the main effort.

Two Alamo Scout Teams entered the area on reconnaissance missions on 24 April 1944 (D + 2). During a two day period, several scattered enemy groups were located throughout the area, most of them disorganized and apparently interested only in evacuating the area. Only one sizable unit, estimated at 400, was contacted. A party of 125 missionaries, former Japanese prisoners, was located at Goya and arrangements were made for evacuation.

The air field was found to be non-operational and the scouts contented themselves with keeping it under surveillance. On 26 April, a company from the 34th Infantry outposted the entire area, reporting only a few enemy snipers.

Company G (reinforced), of the 162nd Infantry, made an overwater movement from Hollandia Town to the beach north of the airdrome on 27 April. The company swept the area toward the field without meeting any enemy. Security was established for engineer units which moved in to complete construction of the strip. On 1 May, enemy harassing forces, composed largely of individual snipers, became very active and the troops available were unable to provide adequate protection for the work details. The 2nd Battalion, 34th Infantry, relieved G Company on 2 May and cleared the area by vigorous patrolling. By 3 May, a 3800 foot runway was completed and ready for use by transports.

Subsequent patrols operating as far east as Bougainville Bay contacted small enemy parties and marked their escape routes. A group of Indian and Netherlands East Indies military personnel who had been left behind by the Japanese was located and evacuated.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Mopping-Up

The occupation of the Cyclops and Sentani airdromes by the 186th Infantry on 26 April 1944, marked the completion of the attack phase for the 41st Division. The two regiments with their supporting units took up the task of clearing the sector of scattered enemy groups and of consolidating for defense.

The strip at Cyclops was found serviceable for light planes, with possibilities of expansion. Sentani Drome was found badly cratered by our bombs and was completely useless at this time. The barracks in the area had been largely destroyed by our bombers. Hollandia Drome apparently had not been operational for some time.

Patrols of the 186th fanned out around the captured air fields, clearing the area of stragglers and isolated groups. Junction between the two divisions was effected on 27 April, at 0830K hours, when patrols from the 186th encountered units of the 21st Infantry at the northeast corner of Hollandia Drome. Company K, operating in Buffaloes, made a comprehensive patrol of Sentani Lake, putting parties ashore to investigate Poegi and Ase Islands and the vicinity of Ajapo, on the south shore of the lake, without finding any enemy. Complete coordination was established between the 186th and 21st on 28 April, resulting in integration of patrolling activities along the landing forces' common boundary.

On 27 April, an estimated 400 Japs had been reported in a strong defensive pocket on Hill 1000, northeast of Cyclops Drome. Two companies of the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, attacked the position on 28 April, but were repulsed. Fifty enemy were estimated to have been killed. The units withdrew while the 205th Field Artillery Battalion fired 350 rounds against the enemy pill-boxes and dugouts. Following the barrage, the companies reoccupied their original positions on the south and west slopes of the hill.

On 29 April, after five artillery concentrations, the entire 1st Battalion launched a determined assault against the Japs and over-ran the position. An estimated 72 enemy were killed by rifle fire and an unknown additional number by the artillery. Revised estimates placed 150 hostile troops on the hill, many of which had formerly been stationed in Hollandia Town. The attack was driven 1000 yards beyond Hill 1000 and all remaining enemy were dispersed. Our casulaties in the action were one officer and two enlisted men killed, two officers and five men wounded. The battalion, less Company A, returned to the regiment's perimeter, while Company A set up a defensive position on the south slope of the hill. Patrols from Companies A and B searched the area to the north on the following day, killing one Jap and taking some prisoners.

The 24th Division, after consolidating the area about Hollandia Drome and securing its supply lines to Tanahmerah Bay, sent patrols south of Lake Sentani into the Grime Valley and through the Cyclops Range to search the seacoast for possible Jap hideouts. Japanese escapees were killed by the hundreds and the division prisoner of war stockade at Tanahmerah Bay was kept filled.

[redacted]

MAY 3 - JAPANESE SURRENDER AT NEEFAR


MAP NO. 3
D-DAY SITUATION
HUMBOLDT BAY AREA
Scale 1/20000 (Approx)
REPRODUCED BY 67TH ENGR. TOPO. CO., CORPS
LEGEND
Buildings or huts
Mangroves
Gardens
Sand
Hachures
Route of advance of the 2nd Bn. 162
1st Bn. 162 landed on White Beach 1 and was held in Div. reserve
One Co. 2nd Bn. 162 landed at H-Hour with the 3rd Bn. 162 suceeded in cutting the Pim-Hollandia road
2nd Bn. 186 (-1 Plat.) landing at White Beach 1 marched overland and assembled in Div. reserve
Elements of the 3rd Bn. 186 landed initially at White Beach 2 in LVT but finding it impossible to cross the spit into Jautefa Bay, withdrew from the beach and proceeded around Cape Pie through the bay and landed at Pim
186 less 2 Bns. moved overland from White Beach 1 and occupied Pim by 1100K. Line shows limit of advance at 1800K 22 April
Route of advance of the 3rd Bn. 162
3 162 (+1 Co. 2D Bn. 162) (H-Hour)
2 162 (-1 Co.) (H+35)
1 162 (-1 Reinf. Platoon) (H+65)
186 (-2 Bns. & Dets.) (H+50)
2 186 (-1 Platoon) (H+80)
162 (1st Bn.) (H-Hour)
3 186 (-1 Co.) (H+25)
186 (3D Bn.) (H-Hour)
1 162
2 186 (-1 Plat)
ROAD CLASSIFICATION
Road, 2 Track, M.T.
Road, 1 Track, M.T.
Jeep Road
Trail
Trail Probable
A Road, 2 Track
B Road, 1 Track
1 Suitable for heavy M.T.
2 Suitable for light M.T.
3 Suitable for jeeps
4 Pack transport or trail
( ) Wet weather classification
Road classification from information by AGS and CIU, Mar 1944, Terrain Study No 81 and interpretation of large-scale photography flown in Feb 1944. Roads mainly unformed dirt roads unless indicated otherwise.
HOLLANDIA BAY
HUMBOLDT BAY
JAUTEFA BAY
HOLLANDIA TOWN
CHALLENGER COVE
Fringing reef can be crossed by shallow craft
Streets subject to flood during very heavy rain
MAGDALENA ISLANDS
Entsjau Island
Madoerau Island
Cape Jogoer
Cape Tjoberi
Hamadi Island
Cape Pie
Cape Tjeweri
Metoe Debi Island
Engros
Tobadi
LEIMOK HILL
Sago Swamp
To Sentani Drome
Waab (Nafri)
Swamp Forest
Sandy beach can be traversed by foot
Heavy surf in northwest season
NOTE: Dotted blue lines indicate outline of underwater features appearing on photographs. Depths, composition and completeness of information uncertain
Soundings are shown in feet. Depths over 35 feet are not shown. Datum is low water tide (3 feet beneath mean sea level). Source of information Dutch Chart 379, dated 1933.
Approx mean decl 1944 Nearly stationary
Grid & True North
Mag North
Approx 35 foot depth line

[redacted]

LOGISTICS AND CONSTRUCTION

History of G-4 Activities

Section I: Planning and Preparation.

On 3 March 1944, a small planning group reported to Sixth Army Headquarters where they received the initial directive and the tentative supply plan for Operation "G". Planning was hampered by the widely scattered location of the various headquarters involved. Dissemination of orders and instructions was most difficult due to the fact that units concerned were located throughout the area Sydney, Milne Bay, Cape Gloucester, Lae, and Finschhafen.

Movement of troops and supplies was to be over water by APAs, AKs, and all types of Navy landing craft. Troops were to be staged at Goodenough Island and at Finschhafen, the 24th Division (Noiseless Landing Force) at the former and the 41st Division (Letterpress Landing Force) at the latter. Commanding General, Task Force, was made responsible for the initial equipping of all units, to include maintenance supplies accompanying troops to the objective area, for loading at staging areas, and for unloading all troops and supplies at objective areas. Initial supply bases were at the respective staging areas. Sixth Army was to be responsible for resupply from Finschhafen, utilizing Navy and USASOS shipping. Supply by air was not contemplated except in emergency. Evacuation was to be by returning supply ships to Finschhafen, with emergency cases by air on call to Sixth Army. Service troops included all types sufficient to make each landing force self-sustaining. Additional service troops were retained under the control of Commanding General, Task Force. Each landing force was made responsible for operation of all supply, evacuation, transportation, and construction activities in its respective area until such time as sufficient Task Force service troops arrived to take over these functions. Since plans contemplated establishment of a major supply base, port facilities, and a staging area for 80,000 troops, the Commander and Staff of USASOS Supply Point, APO 565, were to accompany the Task Force in order to be prepared to take over SOS functions by D ∕ 45. Naval construction personnel were to arrive early in the operation to establish minor Navy port facilities. Although installations to accommodate initially three fighter groups and one night fighter squadron were planned, vitally needed logistics concerning movement of Air Force personnel and supplies into the area and subsequent Air Force requirements, were not furnished the Commanding General, Task Force, prior to the operation. Although operating under Sixth Army as a reinforced Corps, the Task Force was actually a small army with all the resultant supply responsibilities. To meet the increased requirements of this situation, Task Force Headquarters was augmented by attachment to the various staff sections of personnel from the staff of USASOS Supply Point, APO 565. Units landing D to D ∕ 20 were to take the minimum in supplies and equipment to successfully accomplish the mission. Rations and ammunition that were not physically with each unit were to be distributed on LSTs accompanying each echelon. Units arriving after D ∕ 20 were to bring in all authorized equipment and the remaining equipment of the leading units was to arrive by D ∕ 44. Units landing D to D ∕ 2 were to be accompanied by 6 U/F (5 U/F for small arms), 20 days Class I, and 15 days of supply Classes II, III, and IV. Units arriving after D ∕ 2 were to bring 3 U/F and 15 days supply, all classes. Supply levels were to be built up to 30 days as rapidly as water transportation would permit. Units remaining at Goodenough after D ∕ 12 were to be moved to Finschhafen to come forward with units staged there. The

[redacted]

[redacted]

turn around time from Goodenough was 12 days and from Finschhafen 8 days. After D + 2, troops and supplies were to arrive on D + 8, D + 12, D + 20, D + 28, D + 36, and D + 44. The supply plan involved moving ships pre-loaded at San Francisco direct to the operational area. In general, the above plan was carried out, with many minor changes being effected prior to departure for the operational area. While the Commanding General of the Task Force was responsible for loading all personnel and supplies accompanying troops, Sixth Army, in general, directed how loading would be accomplished.

Section II: Execution.

On D-Day, 22 April 1944, successful landings were effected by both landing forces.

At Tanahmerah Bay, unopposed landings were made at Red Beach 1 (Depapre) and Red Beach 2 (beach South of the mouth of Amaboe River). At low tide Red Beach 1 was accessible to Buffaloes only. Adequate dispersal areas were available in rear of the beach. Red Beach 2 was excellent for all types of landing craft. However, the beach was approximately 1000 yards long and 50 yards wide with an impassable swamp in rear, a river on the north side, and at the south side a hill covered with dense jungle growth. The beaches were not connected by a usable road nor were there any usable exit roads from either beach. Due to the inaccessibility of Red Beach 1, all vehicles, heavy engineer equipment, and bulk supplies were unloaded at Red Beach 2. Road construction and clearing of storage areas started immediately but by night fall, the beach was congested so that vehicles could not move therefrom. From the north end, a road was started leading to the rear of the swamp where small dispersal areas were available. At the south end, a road was started inland to dispersal areas on the side of the hill and another road was started towards Depapre.

At Humboldt Bay, landings were successfully made against little opposition at the following points: White Beach 1 (West of Hamadi Island), White Beach 2 (extending from White Beach 1 to Cape Pie), White Beach 3 (extending from Cape Tjeweri about 2 miles southeast) and White Beach 4 (on the west side of Jautefa Bay in the noves north and south of Suikerbrood Hill). (Note: No Task Force G-4 representative was present at the D-Day and D + 1 landings in Humboldt Bay due to the fact that the G-4 Liaison Officer assigned to 41st Division (Noiseless Landing Force) did not arrive until D + 2. Reports on conditions existing on the first two days are therefore necessarily based on reports of other observers.) Vehicles, heavy equipment, and supplies were landed at White Beaches 1, 2, and 3. White Beach 3 had a small amount of Japanese supplies at the north end and these had been almost completely destroyed by our bombings and Naval gun fire. Most of White Beaches 1 and 2 were covered with destroyed Japanese supplies (including ammunition), that in some spots were still smoking. The presence of these Japanese dumps caused considerable congestion which was amplified by the fact that land exits from the beaches were to the North only (for White Beaches 1 and 2) and to the South only (for White Beach 3). On the latter beach, the congestion was somewhat relieved by expansion to the South. No usable roads led inland from here and plans were made to move vehicles and supplies by landing craft as soon as the tactical situation permitted. On White Beaches 1 and 2, expansion was to the North and some of the personnel, vehicles, and supplies were moved to Pancake Hill just north of White Beach 1. These three beaches were 50 to 100 yards wide with swamps in rear and no usable exit roads inland.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Both here and at Tanahmerah Bay, the deep soft sand made travel difficult for vehicles and this caused delay in clearing and organizing the beaches. Work was started immediately on an inland access road from Pancake Hill. By nightfall, the majority of the vehicles and supplies were bunched at White Beaches 1 and 2.

At 0700K D / 1, 23 April 1944, troops, vehicles, and supplies began pouring in to the beaches at both areas. Slow progress was being made on exit roads and congestion increased rapidly.

About noon, it was decided at Tanahmerah to cease construction of the road from Red Beach 2 to Depapre and to blast a channel to permit continuous access to Red Beach 1 by LCTs and smaller craft, inasmuch as it was considered the road leading inland from Depapre could be made jeepable only by intensive engineering effort. At the same time, Commanding General, Task Force, decided to move his headquarters to Humboldt Bay that day and to divert all future shipping to the latter area due to congestion and non-existence of dispersal areas in the Tanahmerah Bay which made it impossible to accept and discharge additional cargo. About 2000K, a Jap plane dropped bombs on White Beaches 1 and 2 which started fires and explosions lasting three days and which destroyed some 50 vehicles and heavy engineer equipment and about 60% of bulk stores there. A message was sent to Sixth Army immediately requesting duplication of all bulk stores which accompanied the 41st Division (Noiseless Landing Force) on LSTs on D-Day and D / 1 by the most expeditious means.

Early on D / 2, 24 April, Task Force Headquarters arrived by LST at Humboldt Bay and that afternoon the G-4, Headquarters Commandant, and Signal Officer were dispatched to locate a CP in the vicinity of the road leading inland from Pim. This road was in fair condition for light traffic, with a few bad spots caused by swamps and bomb craters. Early this same date, the Task Force Reserve arrived together with troops and supplies scheduled for both forces. By nightfall, it was decided to unload these arrivals at White Beach 3 the next morning. Throughout the day, troops, vehicles, and supplies were moved by lightering craft from White Beaches 1, 2, and 3 to Pim and thence inland.

On D / 3, 25 April, all LSTs at Humboldt Bay were discharged at White Beach 3, after overruling the Navy's objection to beaching LSTs there. Task Force Headquarters moved to Brinkman's Plantation and the Task Force Transportation Officer took over control of all landing craft activities on 29 April. Report was received that the two Landing Forces had met at Hollandia Drome and were engaged in wiping out small pockets of resistance and in mopping up. It was decided to move troops and equipment remaining at Tanahmerah Bay to Humboldt Bay by water.

On succeeding days, organization and clearing of the beaches continued. A force which had been sent to the Tami Drome had the strip ready for operation by 27 April.

All movements inland towards the dromes were bottle-necked at Pim where there were extremely limited facilities for receiving and storing supplies. This was further aggravated by the condition of the Pim-Airdromes road which was being ruined by the heavy traffic over it. Rains made the road impassable in many spots and frequently traffic was completely stopped. Demands for use of lightering craft were far in excess of the number available. This was further complicated by lack of cooperation by the Navy and ESB units regarding use of their craft. Casualties from forward areas had to be transported overland to Pim, thence by

[redacted]

APRIL 28 - SENTANI AIR DROME

[redacted]

lighter to one of the beaches, and again by lighter to returning supply ships. Clearing stations were established along the main supply road and on the beaches. The 92nd and 36th Evacuation Hospitals set up on the beaches also.

On D + 8, 30 April, another convoy of 16 LSTs and 10 cargo ships carrying troops and supplies arrived and were discharged at White Beach 2 Included were Air Force units concerning whom no logistical details were available. Operation of the dromes was of primary importance but due to the need for moving rations, communication materials, and engineer equipment, it was impossible to move these units immediately to the dromes, despite the frantic demands of the Air Corps representatives.

On 25 April on the Tanahmerah side, the road from Depapre inland became impassable to jeeps due to torrential rains causing landslides. Supply by hand carry was resorted to but the demand soon exceeded supplies coming over the road and it became necessary on 26 April to request that supplies be dropped by air. Reports indicated about 80% recovery.

Construction of the road from Pancake Hill to Pim was progressing very slowly. The road Pim-Airdromes, in spite of continuous engineer work, could not stand the heavy traffic and finally had to be closed to traffic between two points. In the meantime, supplies were being lightered to the mouth of the Tami River, hauled by truck to Tami Drome, and thence taken by C-47 to Hollandia and Cyclops Dromes which had been in operation since 1 May and 27 April, respectively. Small storm boats and amphibious craft were moved to Sentani Lake to haul supplies across the lake from the vicinity of Koejaboe to Nefaar, but this was not adequate to meet demands in the Hollandia Drome area. Consequently on 4 May, it was requested that 20,000 rations daily be flown in until need therefore no longer existed.

The dromes and what few roads existed required considerable work to make them usable due to the poor construction and maintenance by the Japanese.

On 3 May (D + 12), another convoy arrived and congestion increased. Proper planning for the reception of these convoys was hampered by lack of information concerning changes in personnel and supplies scheduled to arrive. This convoy consisted of 19 LSTs and 5 merchantmen, none of the latter having any manifests. Only 2 merchant ships were scheduled to arrive.

On 6 May, it became necessary in order to control all activities at Tami to establish a sub-sector there under command of the Senior Officer in the area. Two days later, similar sectors were established at Cape Pie area, Cape Tjeweri area, and in the Pim area. Sector commanders were appointed to organize and control all activities in order to clear the beaches, insure efficient use of lightering craft, and speed the flow of supplies and personnel to proper destinations.

[redacted]

HOLLANDIA TASK FORCE DISPOSITIONS AS OF 1800 K 26 APRIL 1944

Scale 1/125000 1 inch = 2 miles (Approx.)

0 1 2 3 4 5 Miles

PACIFIC OCEAN

TANAHMERAH BAY

TORARE BAY

HOLLANDIA BAY

HUMBOLDT BAY

SENTANI LAKE

DEJAOE PLAIN

BEKOLIE PLAIN

CYCLOPS MOUNTAINS

JAUBUSA BAY

PATROLS

USED AS CARRIERS

ROUTE OF ADVANCE OF THE 21st INF

1st BN 21st INF LED THE ATTACK TO THIS POINT AT 1350 26 APRIL THE 3rd BN 21st INF PASSED THRU THE 1st BN AND OCCUPIED HOLLANDIA DROME BY 1440 WITH MINOR RESISTANCE

CONTACT MADE BETWEEN 41st DIV AND 24th CORPS AT 1645 26 APRIL

3rd BN LED THE ATTACK TO THIS POINT

ROUTE OF ADVANCE 41st INF. DIVISION

DIV RESERVE

CORPS RESERVES

USED AS LABOR TROOPS TO ASSIST IN UNLOADING LST'S

ONE COMPANY OF THE 2nd BN. 34th INF. SENT TO TAMI ON 26 APRIL

ALAMO SCOUTS 24 APRIL

THE 2nd BN 186 INF MADE A SHORE TO SHORE LANDING ON 26 APRIL AND OCCUPIED SENTANI DROME WITH LITTLE OPPOSITION

MOVEMENT OF 2nd BN 186 INF. ON 25 APRIL

BN ACTING AS SECURITY FOR THE SOUTH FLANK

SHARP RIDGE RISING TO ABOUT 1700 FEET

ROUGH BROKEN TERRAIN DRAINAGE INDEFINITE

LOW UNDULATING HILLS

PROBABLE ELEVATION 800 FT.

SKO COASTAL PLAIN

SKO VILLAGES

TAMI DROME (under construction)

TAMI SWAMP

MOUNTAINS

Shore is a succession of bold, rocky capes with steeply shelving sandy beaches at inlets. Only means of travel along coast is by water. Coast exposed to Northwest monsoon.

Only means of travel along coast east of Sepani is by water

LEGEND

- Village
- Buildings or huts
- Streams
- Rain forest
- Secondary growth
- Boundary of flat area
- Mangroves
- Plantations
- Gardens
- Sand
- Scattered trees

REPRODUCED BY 677TH ENGINEER TOPOGRAPHIC COMPANY, CORPS

ROADS IN HOLLANDIA AREA

APRIL 22 - PAN CAKE HILL

APRIL 25 - INDIAN TROOPS, RELEASED PRISONERS,
WORKING ON ROAD.

[redacted]

Engineer Construction

During the entire period from 22 April to 6 June 1944 construction projects were of primary importance. Even during the early combat phases the engineering projects were receiving high priority.

The first and greatest task confronting the engineer units was the construction of dispersal and storage areas and the forcing of exits from the congested beaches. In connection with the transshipment of supplies to Depapre it was necessary to blast a 900 foot channel through a coral reef so LCM's could land regardless of tide levels.

Despite swamp and rugged terrain limited dump areas were built and roads were constructed to favorable artillery positions. The supply track from Depapre to the dromes was initially improved to a degree permitting utilization by ½-Ton trucks, while another road was pushed inland from Pim. This road was open to traffic as far as Cyclops drome by the time the drome area was captured.

Despite continuous maintenance heavy rains caused the temporary closing of both the Pim - Airdromes and Depapre - Airdromes roads for a short period early in May. During this period some supplies were lightered from White Beach #1 and #2 to the beach near Tami Drome, moved to the airfield by truck and then flown to the Cyclops and Sentani strips. Other supplies, particularly rations, were flown in directly from supply bases in rear areas.

For major construction the entire Hollandia area was divided into the Hollandia, Sentani, Tanahmerah, Tami and Dock Sectors. Permanent facilities included docks and storage areas, the completion and improvement of the road net to connect all beaches with the airdrome area, and the rapid repair and subsequent improvement of the captured airdromes. Water supply facilities were improved and fuel pipe lines laid.

As roads were improved and building materials became available the emphasis shifted to the construction of hospitals, camp and headquarters areas, and storage warehouses.

A complete discussion of Engineer activities is contained in the Engineer Annex to the G-4 lessons which follow. (See page 51).

[redacted]



APRIL 25 - ROAD TO DROME



APRIL 27 - ROAD TO DROME

LESSONS

[redacted]

G-1 LESSONS - HOLLANDIA OPERATION

1. In preparation for the operation, the following steps of interest were taken:

a. An estimate was prepared of the number of officers and enlisted men necessary to augment the Headquarters and Headquarters Company. Some of them were procured from the troops already assigned to I Corps. Others were secured through the Sixth Army, but not enough to fulfill the requirements of the estimate. These shortages, together with the doubtful efficiency of some of the personnel secured, left several sections manned to a less adequate degree than desired.

b. Promotions were held in abeyance with a view to creating vacancies that could be filled with those who had demonstrated their capacities for increased rank during the operation.

c. An estimate was made on the basis of existent tables as to the number of replacements that might be necessary for this operation. This estimate totaled 8500 officers and men. However, no actual machinery for the securing of these replacements was established, a sufficient number not being available to the Sixth Army.

d. A unit of the postal service was secured to take care of the overall handling of the task force mail.

e. The plan for submission of G-1 reports, strength reports, casualty reports and prisoner of war reports, as well as other data relating to personnel, was included in Administrative Order No. 1.

f. A Netherlands East Indies Civil Administration detachment was organized by higher headquarters. This detachment contained 1 officer and 36 men to work with G-2 and an additional 62 officers and men to establish a civil administration in the conquered territory.

g. In the interest of discipline, officers were ordered to wear darkened insignia and enlisted men stenciled rank insignia. This system was proved inadequate and it cannot be too strongly insisted that all officers and men wear insignia and markings so that even at some little distance an immediate identification with the unit to which they belong is apparent.

2. Following the landing, the following G-1 problems are deemed worthy of mention:

a. Due to the nature of the progress of the operation, communication and circulation conditions, it was found impossible to maintain a correct station list from day to day and it was not until D/12 that this was possible. For a similar reason, reports were delayed. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that their submission could have been expedited under the circumstances.

[redacted]

[redacted]

G-2 LESSONS - HOLLANDIA OPERATION

1. The training and organization of the G-2 Section for the operation was satisfactory as was proven by its successful accomplishment of its mission. Yet, no operation is barren of that which makes experience the best teacher; the particular application of long-proven principles to a particular situation.

2. This being true, it is the details and even the obvious which in the focus of our operation called for correction, a new emphasis and/or a new method of handling. A summary of these are listed below as "lessons learned".

a. Planning Phase:

(1) Security: Following on the heels of the mission came a great influx of visiting officials, observers, newly assigned or attached officers, couriers, etc. In order to assure a maximum of security under these conditions, all visitors, etc., were required to report first to a reception officer where their credentials were checked by CIC and passes classified "Operational" or "Non-Operational" - were issued. CIC checks were made throughout the headquarters from time to time to assure no breaches in AR 380-5. All maps were kept covered when not in use and maps of HANSA BAY were left partially exposed. Frequent security speeches were made and all other routine security measures were taken. Even though the above program, plus the careful control of official dissemination of information down to units, was stringently carried out, persistent rumors of the operation were heard throughout the theater.

(2) C.I.C: The work of the CIC was invaluable both during the planning phase and the operation itself. However, the Corps Detachment of ten men was NOT big enough for the accomplishment of the best results. Security and combat training during the planning phase, and the searching of captured areas and security checks on natives during combat were tasks which could have employed to good advantage a detachment of three officers and 30 enlisted men. The importance of security, indoctrination of troops BEFORE COMBAT and CIC searching, locating, delivering captured documents and material to proper authority cannot be underestimated. Beside the lesson of using a larger CIC detachment for similar Task Forces, there is the less of (1) landing this detachment as soon as possible, and (2) having a prepared CIC plan of operation and coordination to follow. Lastly, transportation for CIC in combat areas is vitally important if captured dumps, etc., are to be properly searched and guarded.

(3) American PWs: Captured documents disclose that American prisoners have been made to talk by the enemy. Apparently, such incidents are not the exception. Therefore, it is believed vitally important that no person informed of a pending operation, be permitted to expose himself to capture. GHQ has taken steps to cover this situation and mention is made here only for the purpose of expressing, (perhaps unnecessarily), complete understanding of the importance of pertinent regulations.

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(4) Alamo Scouts. The more detailed and complete the advanced planning of Alamo Scouts employment, the better their success. This advance planning should include both administrative and operational details. The idea of assigning an Alamo Scout contact officer is sound. His appreciation of the training, limitations and administrative needs of scout teams is a great asset to their employment.

(5) The administrative details of keeping track of individuals in the section, details of packing, transportation assignments, etc., is a full time job for one officer. This officer should be designated early in the planning phase.

b. Combat:

(1) Communications:

(a) Communications were a constant source of concern during the operation. Though this complication was foreseen, intelligence radio nets were not as thoroughly developed as was needed. Because of the importance of space and weight in amphibious operations, SCR-300s were used. They might have proved satisfactory had the tactical situation developed more slowly; however, since the enemy panicked and our forces advanced as rapidly as the terrain would permit, SCR-300 proved to have too short a range (normal range being pared by the rugged nature of the terrain). In similar future operations, it is believed advisable to have a liaison officer with SCR-300s with each landing force and so organized, that if one set becomes unserviceable and/or the advance is rapid, replacement or relay sets can be entered in the net. Lastly, intelligence nets should not be shared with other agencies except in emergencies.

(b) Because the flow of information from forward units was slow in filtering back to rear echelons, the collection of intelligence for relaying to higher headquarters (Sixth Army) was equally slow. Further radio nets south were too heavily loaded to handle comprehensive reports. It is believed, however, had a Catalina been available for a daily round trip, the problem of communication to higher headquarters would have been solved to the satisfaction of all concerned.

(c) Because of the large areas retaken from the Japanese in a minimum amount of time, movement of personnel (CIC, etc.) in the area was greatly restricted by a shortage of transportation. The section operated between D-Day and D + 12 with one 3/4 ton truck. This was not adequate.

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(2) Codes: During the active phase of operations, codes should be employed.

(3) Flak Boats: The assignment of a Flak Boat for patrol missions, to the AC of S, G-2, was highly successful. It was used for transportation of Alamo Scout teams to and from missions and as a relay point in the maintenance of radio contact with those patrols, as well as patrol missions.

(4) Tag System: The adoption of a system of tagging captured material proved of great value. These tags included a receipt for the capturer if the item in question had to be cleared through intelligence channels outside the combat zone. While there were many incidents of souvenir hunting, it is believed a comprehensive educational program (even more thorough than the current CIC program) in which the Tag System is explained, will materially improve this situation. There were hundreds and even thousands of small dumps spread over an extent of 50 miles. It is obviously impossible to use combat troops during action to guard all these dumps. To do so might even imperil the success of the operation.

(5) It is important that the G-2 Section be allotted sufficient shipping space to bring necessary files of intelligence summaries, etc., should the mission be changed or a new mission be assigned upon the immediate completion of the original.

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G-3 LESSONS - HOLLANDIA OPERATION

The Hollandia Task Force accomplished its mission. The landings in both Tanahmerah and Humboldt Bays were at least satisfactory and the objectives of each landing force were reached with remarkable speed, even allowing for the slight resistance offered by the enemy. Lessons derived from this operation, then, must be predicated on the fact that, whatever wisdom hindsight may produce, the things that were done in planning and in execution bore fruit in success.

This operation was a water borne operation utilizing all types of landing craft from dispersed staging areas. As a result, it was necessary to compute the logistics from each area and to integrate the many elements into a single operation.

I. Planning.

1. Probably the outstanding lesson in the planning phase was the benefit derived from close association between the Task Force headquarters and subordinate headquarters. The commanding generals of the two landing forces and key members of their staffs visited Task Force headquarters, attending conferences and working with the appropriate Task Force staff sections until they became thoroughly oriented. The results were close coordination and clear understanding by all concerned as to the projected operation. Close liaison with the Navy is also productive of great benefits. Each landing force had direct contact with appropriate naval officers so that each of them would obtain the closest possible coordination with their particular naval support and transportation. The lack of conferences with naval air force personnel resulted in lack of a complete understanding of the Navy air force problem. Fortunately, close air support was not a vital factor in this operation.

2. It is obvious that close geographical association of the component units of a task force facilitates planning and training for an operation. It is at least very desirable that all of the components of each landing force be assembled as early as possible. This operation, however, demonstrated that coordination is possible by extensive staff visits and intelligent liaison even though units are scattered. On the other hand, every effort should be made to avoid the great difficulties arising out of such conditions by more logical staging.

3. In the planning phases, it became evident that oblique as well as low level vertical photographs of the operational area are of great value. Copies of obliques should be furnished sufficiently early to allow distribution down to platoons. Their value in orienting all personnel and thus expediting control can not be over-emphasized. In this connection, it was discovered that assumptions as to beaches and other terrain features should be made with caution and not adopted unequivocably without definite proof.

4. It was apparent throughout the planning phase that the G-3 and G-4 sections had to work in constant coordination. The logistical and transportation problems were practically inseparable from the G-3 problems of organization and loading.

4. Experience indicated that a time schedule for planning should be established, using D-Day as a base. Certain deadlines must be set for the various phases of planning.

II. Training.

1. One complete dress rehearsal of all D-Day troops should be

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held to include the complete unloading of all equipment to be landed on D-Day. The confusion resulting on the beaches in this operation could be partially attributed to unfamiliarity with the total unloading and handling of all supplies and equipment. If time does not permit the tactical phase of the rehearsal, it might be dispensed with, but the unloading practice is essential. Wear on equipment incident to loading and unloading can be reduced by starting the operation from the rehearsal area.

2. In training for a particular operation as distinguished from general amphibious training, little time should be devoted to climbing of nets and in actual traveling in landing craft. Training should be concentrated on a carefully supervised practice operation on land. The shore line should be designated, troops formed in echelons corresponding to landing waves and maneuver from the shore line as if a landing had taken place. Starting with slow motion action, the rehearsals should speed up and expand as the men become more familiar with the parts they are to play. This training should be made as realistic as possible by establishing proper time intervals between the waves and should include the unloading of motor vehicles and equipment. The slot loading system of LSTs and of AKAs and AKs can be combined on the beach to simulate the landing of these craft followed by the movement of supplies from the slot to the appropriate dump.

3. Due to the absence of determined enemy resistance, the operation did not provide any real test of the conduct of troops under fire. However, the rapidity of advance and the presence of innumerable dumps of enemy supplies of all classes created a strong temptation for men to depart from proper military conduct and for officers to relax control. Troops in the rear areas were the worst offenders. Combat troops who had previously been in battle had the best record in this regard. It is believed that in training more attention should be paid to discipline of troops, particularly service troops.

III. Execution.

1. The apparent confusion after the landings had been made could have been reduced by increasing the knowledge of all personnel as to the scheme of maneuver.

2. Certain confusion on the beaches was due to a misconception of the formation of the beaches and particularly the terrain in rear of Red Beach 2. Last minute change in plans resulted in inefficiency of execution. Time tables should be regarded as flexible.

3. A large part of the success of this operation was due to the speed and energy with which the various commanders carried out their part of the operation. The push inland from both Tanahmerah Bay and Humboldt Bay was so vigorous that the enemy had no time to utilize any of his prepared positions. On D-Day, elements of the 21st Infantry pushed into Depapre on LVTs and a battalion advanced so rapidly up the trail that is was eventually forced to pause to allow supplies to catch up. In the Humboldt Bay area, the 186th Infantry moved forward with great dispatch using LVTs on Lake Sentani to envelope enemy positions and speed up the advance.

4. Experience showed that troops must not confine themselves entirely within a perimeter when stopping for reorganization or rest. It is advisable to establish perimeter defenses but in addition, outposts should be maintained and carefully planned patrols sent out both night

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and day. This patrolling activity will tend to restrict the customary Japanese night movements.

5. Patrolling itself is merely a means to an end. To be of value, it must be followed up. Too many times a patrol would move over terrain, find it unoccupied and return to report that fact. Their movements were usually observed by the Japanese who, forewarned, moved in themselves. When the main body arrived, it was to be met with opposition causing casualties which might have been avoided.

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ANNEX NO. 1 TO G-3 LESSONS:

ARTILLERY LESSONS - HOLLANDIA OPERATION

1. While still in the staging area, the following special training measures and preparations were undertaken.

a. Naval Shore Fire Control Teams from each light and medium battalion were trained by Naval Shore Fire Control Officers. This Training included actual firing by destroyers and cruisers.

b. Two LVT 2's were assigned to each light artillery battalion and four to each medium and heavy field artillery battalion. Mechanics and drivers for these vehicles were given a short course in their operation and maintenance.

c. Arrangements were made for adjusting long range artillery fire using observation from P-39 airplanes. Practice adjustments with the planes and artillery units to be used were made with excellent results.

d. Two sets of floats for L-4 Liaison airplanes were made available to the NOISELESS Landing Force.

e. Arrangements were made for Navy VTB's to be available on call for the adjustment of artillery fire of each landing force should other means fail.

2. a. Maps and photographs were made available as rapidly as they were produced. About a week before departure excellent photographs of the entire area were on hand. These were distributed down to battalions. In addition, lithograph copies of selected photographs were made by the 69th Engineer Topographic Company and were distributed to battalions for use by forward observers. 1/63,360 and 1/20,000 scale maps bearing a 1000 yard grid were available in sufficient numbers. A photomap was printed on the reverse side of the 1/20,000 maps.

b. Photo and map studies were made of possible targets, position areas, fire possibilities and routes of approach. Concentrations were selected from the map and numbered and initial survey plans formulated.

c. Since the accuracy of the maps was questionable, radial line templates were prepared of the photographs covering the operational area. Once ground survey control was established, it was planned to use these templates to locate the center of each photograph of the firing chart. This allowed rapid radial line restitution of targets located on the photographs.

3. Radios: Radio communication between the two forces was impossible except by Navy relay. At one point in the NOISELESS area it was necessary to establish 6 relay stations to obtain radio communication over 3000 yards with the 600 series radio. Radios were in good condition and were correctly operated but reception was poor due to the influence of the terrain. There was noticeable jamming of communications by enemy radio until D + 3 when the interfering station was silenced by artillery fire.

4. Vehicles:

a. The LVT 2's (buffalo) proved very effective in negotiating the poor roads and in getting on the beaches over coral construction.

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Most of these vehicles were diverted from the artillery for use in transporting the infantry.

b. The M-4 Tractor proved unsatisfactory as prime movers for medium artillery in the soft going on the LETTERPRESS side. It was effective in drawing the 155mm gun over a prepared roadway on the NOISELESS side. The D-8 Tractor is believed better for heavy artillery.

c. The D-6 Tractor, with winch, proved effective as a prime mover for medium artillery.

d. The TD-9 Tractor was fairly satisfactory for light artillery except in heavy sand.

e. Dual wheeled 1-ton trailers were unsatisfactory in heavy mud or deep soft sand. Mud piled up between the two tires and forced the body from the chassis or locked the wheels. It is believed a track laying trailer which could be used as a limber or towed in train, would be much more satisfactory for transporting artillery ammunition.

5. Liaison Airplanes: Pontoon floats for L-4 liaison planes proved very satisfactory in quiet water and allowed these planes to get into the air before a strip could be prepared on shore. Eventually strips were prepared and the beaches utilized so that ordinary liaison planes could be used. By this time the artillery action was over. Nevertheless, these planes proved to be invaluable in transporting key personnel, messages, small items of critical supplies and for reconnaissance throughout the area.

COMMENTS

6. a. For artillery purposes the maps, photomaps, single verticals, and obliques furnished for this operation were excellent.

b. Because the RECKLESS operation was conducted by two widely separated task forces and moved very rapidly there was no opportunity or need for the employment of Corps Artillery.

c. The 90mm antiaircraft gun is effective for fires against terrestrial targets particularly for long range fires. For indirect fire field artillery should furnish survey to tie in with artillery firing charts.

d. No reason for any changes in artillery technique was indicated as a result of this operation. It is believed that the procedure as contained in the appropriate manuals is sound and can be applied to situations such as arose in this operation.

e. In the early stages of landing operations general purpose vehicles should be limited to 3/4-ton and less. Tractors for prime movers and for hauling ammunition trailers are the backbone of artillery transportation in this theater.

7. The value of long range artillery to give supporting fires when divisional artillery is unable to advance was demonstrated in this operation. The heavy artillery was able to get into position near the beach late on D + 1 after engineers had prepared a roadway. Displacement was unnecessary as the most distant targets were within range.

8. Pack artillery would have been able to accompany the infantry where tractor drawn artillery was unable to advance. Inasmuch as pack

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artillery in our service was first developed out of necessity in the Philippines, it would seem advisable to have at least one battalion of pack artillery available to a task force when terrain conditions similar to those at TANAHMERAH are encountered.

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ANNEX NO. 2 TO G-3 LESSONS:

ANTI-AIRCRAFT LESSONS - HOLLANDIA OPERATION

1. Close liaison was established between the anti-aircraft artillery and the air warning service prior to the operation. An officer of the 31st Fighter Sub Sector joined the AA Section of the I Corps Staff and remained with the section after it was constituted as the provisional groupment headquarters. This liaison made possible the elimination of radar interference and the coordination of procedure. All failures of the warning service may be charged to:

a. Logistical difficulties involved in moving to correct positions.

b. Difficulty in establishing and maintaining wire communication.

2. Radio communication in both the air warning net and the anti-aircraft net operated with remarkable efficiency.

3. Both groups established AAAIS for local warning, the effectiveness of this system being limited by the difficulties in occupying correct positions and establishing and maintaining communications.

4. Too much ammunition (six units of fire) was brought in with the first AA elements ashore. Unloading of this bulk ammunition contributed to the paralysis of movement to positions. In future operations, it is recommended that only such ammunition as can be mobile loaded and not to exceed two units of fire, be brought in on D and D + 1, the stocks being brought up later to tactical requirements as part of the general supply plan, and at points at which they are required by the tactical situation.

5. The AA plan was too inflexible and was not readily adjustable to conditions resulting from enemy action and terrain. Only so much AA should be brought in on D Day as is required for immediate protection of the beach and the remaining anti-aircraft artillery should be so loaded as to readily permit its diversion to areas required by the tactical situation and permitted by the logistical conditions.

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ANNEX NO. 3 TO G-3 LESSONS:

CHEMICAL LESSONS - HOLLANDIA OPERATION

1. It was noted that enemy gas was not employed, that our troops carried masks in the assault, and many masks were abandoned. It is believed, however, that the carrying of masks in this operation was warranted and should be repeated in future similar situations.

2. Losses can be minimized by:

a. Requiring unit commanders to give prompt account and explanation of losses.

b. Organized dropping of masks by troops upon re-organization at first objective, if there is no indication of enemy intention to employ gas.

c. Prompt recovery and temporary storage of masks by Chemical Composite Unit details attached to Landing Force.

3. 4.2" chemical mortar units did not have sufficient mobility to give continuous close support to infantry. Two LVTs per company would be adequate to provide requisite mobility.

LIBRARY
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

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G-4 LESSONS - HOLLANDIA OPERATION

1. Organization and Training of Task Force Staff.

a. The G-4 section should be organized into subsections, each with clearly defined duties and responsibilities, capable of functioning throughout all phases of an amphibious operation with the maximum efficiency. (See proposed organization and duties of a Corps G-4 Section, attached hereto as Inclosure No. 1.)

b. If not authorized by T/O a provisional Transportation Section should be added to the Task Force staff. (See proposed organization and duties of a Corps Transportation Section, attached hereto as Inclosure No. 2.)

c. When a supply base is to be established at the objective, members of the base commander's staff should accompany the Task Force staff, attached to appropriate sections for duty, in order to effect turnover of logistic support responsibilities from Task Force to Base without interruption of operations.

d. When a particular operation involves movement and supply of Air Force units, a well qualified air liaison officer should join the Task Force staff as early as possible in the planning phase and he should remain with the staff throughout the operation. This officer should have complete information on logistics and supply requirements of the Air Force units concerned. He should also have rapid and reliable communication with his own headquarters in order to keep abreast of changes. In Operation "G", much smoother coordination with the Air Force units was effected after an Air Liaison Officer joined the Task Force G-4 section.

e. Similarly, it is vitally important that a well qualified and fully informed Naval Liaison Officer be attached to the Task Force Transportation Section.

f. Prior to conducting amphibious operations, the staff should have frequent exercises covering all phases of such an operation. Based on these exercises and lessons learned from actual operations, each section of the staff should develop a standard operating procedure for conduct of an operation. A thorough study should be made to determine the numbers of each type of service unit needed to support task forces of sizes appropriate to the headquarters concerned. It is believed that some sections of the Task Force headquarters gave insufficient study to the problem with which they were confronted and that they did not fully realize the extent and limitation of their particular responsibilities. This surmise seems to be borne out by the frequency with which plans and directives were changed, such changes not being necessitated by revisions from higher headquarters. While changes in directives are inevitable, they should be cut to a minimum by a thorough and exhaustive study of all considerations before telling a unit what is expected of it. This observation applies equally from the highest staff to the lowest.

2. Planning.

a. Sequence. Assuming that the initial, or warning order, includes objective, mission, strength, and composition of force, shipping and landing craft available, quantities of supplies to accompany

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troops, resupply plan, shipping schedule, and target date, the G-4 should organize his planning as follows:

(1) Request all units to submit the logistical data listed on form attached hereto as Inclosure No. 3.

(2) Pending receipt of information requested in paragraph 2 a (1) above, he should immediately begin compilation of the necessary data based on the T/O & E's or T/BA's of the types of units involved.

(3) Concurrent with activities included in paragraphs 2 a (1) and 2 a (2) above, he should:

(a) Compute tonnages and cubages of bulk supplies to accompany troops and that are required for resupply.

(b) Determine the shipping space required for these supplies and make adjustments to fit in with the G-3's tactical plan.

(c) Make a thorough study of the landing beaches, possible port facilities, the road net, and the terrain in the objective area.

(d) Confer frequently with Task Force Supply, Evacuation, Engineer, and Transportation Sections and develop detailed plans for loading, unloading, and operation of all supply, evacuation, and transportation activities including discharge of lightering craft and cargo ships and re-staging and supplying units of other task forces.

(e) As early as possible issue warning orders, including as much of the plan as possible to all subordinate units.

(f) Publish the Task Force Administrative Order at the earliest possible date and require submission of subordinate unit's Administrative Orders within a reasonable time.

(g) Arrange to have representatives of the G-1, G-3, G-4, Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Engineer in the rear echelon to handle forward movement of troops and supplies remaining after the forward echelon departs.

b. It is felt that the Task Force headquarters, once it is given a clear cut and definite assignment, should be given full latitude to develop and execute its task without the benefit of innumerable liaison officers and advisors from other headquarters.

c. While frequent changes in basic plans may be necessary, information was not always promptly transmitted to the Task Force which resulted in confusion and duplication of effort. Difficulty was experienced also in the expeditious dissemination of information from Task

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Force headquarters to assigned and attached units and receipt of reports therefrom because of the many staging areas in which troops were being assembled. Much wasted effort and confusion could be avoided if the entire task force were staged in not more than two areas. This would simplify communications, supply, and visits of inspection by staff officers concerned.

d. It is felt that units were unnecessarily harrassed and confused by the many orders, directives, and requests for various and sundry reports. While it is realized that it would be impracticable to put into one document all instructions and directives to subordinate units, it is believed that more consolidation could be effected with a resultant saving of time and effort.

e. The policy of having the special staff sections concerned with supply be responsible for the assurance that all units are fully equipped with supplies and equipment of their particular branch is believed sound. However, full advantage was not taken of this procedure for two reasons: First, the wide dispersion of staging areas mentioned above, and second, the lateness with which this policy was approved and put into effect. If the suggestions already made were followed, this condition would be corrected.

3. Execution.

a. Combat Phase. While the beachhead is being secured by the combat troops, an advance element of the shore party should be rapidly organizing installations for reception of supplies and equipment. Erection of large, easily discernible location and direction signs helps greatly in eliminating confusion and congestion. If possible, these signs should be portable ones constructed prior to embarkation. An adequate force of guides and Military Police is highly essential. Construction of dispersal areas and exit roads must be started at the earliest possible moment. Sufficient labor must be readily available to clear the beach of supplies as rapidly as they are unloaded. When the road net is adequate, all supplies possible should be mobile loaded, since this method permits more rapid clearing of the beach. Operation G almost completely "bogged down" due to the fact that in both objective areas many more vehicles, pieces of heavy equipment, and supplies were landed on the first three days than could be cleared from the beaches. As a result of this congestion, many lives and millions of dollars worth of supplies were lost when a lone enemy plane dropped four bombs on one of the beaches. Had the enemy attack from the air been in force, the loss of life and property would have probably delayed the operation for a considerable period of time. It is believed that units landing on D-Day, D + 1, and D + 2 should carry only the minimum equipment and supplies necessary for efficient execution of their task for the period through D + 7, at which time some dispersion can be effected and full advantage can be taken of all items of equipment. In connection with the foregoing, it is felt that practically none of the units fully complied with the limitations imposed by the Task Force upon them regarding equipment to be landed with initial echelons. As a matter materially affecting morale, it is felt that all units should be considered alike as to the amount of housekeeping and comfort equipment taken into the combat area. This is a command function and some check of items loaded

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should be maintained during embarkation stages. It is vitally important that adequate and reliable communication be maintained between all echelons afloat and ashore.

b. Development Phase. The principal problems arising after the combat phase is ended are discharging of supplies and forwarding to appropriate dumps, maintenance of roads, and control of traffic thereon, reception and staging of incoming troops, and the establishment of a system for handling casuals and evacuation of personnel and equipment. The key operating agency involved in the solution of these problems is the Transportation Section and in addition to being well organized, it must develop detailed plans well in advance covering all of its functions. Reliable communications with the Navy and with the various other operating agencies is essential for efficient functioning. The system used must be flexible to permit adjustment to meet the frequent changes which invariably occur.

c. Functioning of Rear Echelon.

(1) The Reckless Task Force Liaison Group was a provisional group organized for the purpose of coordinating embarkation of echelons, subsequent to D + 2, which were composed almost entirely of Service Units staged at Finschhafen and Cape Cretin. This group consisted of two officers and one enlisted man of the G-4 Section and representatives of the Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Medical Sections.

(2) Lessons Learned.

(a) That there was a definite lack of appreciation of the importance of the rear echelon and a lack of understanding of the magnitude of the duties which it was required to perform.

(b) That an insufficient staff was provided and that there should be, in future operations, representatives of the G-1, G-3, and AG Sections and the Signal Section, in addition to those mentioned in paragraph 1, above. (See proposed rear echelon plan attached hereto as Inclosure No. 4.)

(c) It is necessary that representatives of the general and special staff sections remain with the rear echelon until it is closed out.

(d) Sufficient enlisted personnel be assigned to the rear echelon staff to carry on the necessary clerical work.

(e) That the rear echelon staff should carry with it all necessary equipment, office and housekeeping, in order that it may rapidly set up and not count on drawing the above on arrival. It was found that Base supplies were limited as to typewriters, tables, phones, and transportation and there was a reluctancy on the part of Base supply agencies to issue that which they had available.

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(f) That a sufficient area be assigned to the rear echelon for the staging of units and the storage of organizational impedimenta remaining to be moved forward. Confusion and difficulty was encountered by having units and small remaining detachments scattered over an area of approximately forty-five miles with insufficient means of contact and communication.

(g) That much valuable time could have been saved and a better job of loading LSTs would have resulted if the staff had been able to have included in it, permanent loading officers as was originally planned. The results obtained by the training of inexperienced officers to make plans for and to load LSTs in a few hours were unsatisfactory. Furthermore, the rear echelon was deprived of the experience gained by these loading officers when they moved forward with the echelon they had loaded out.

(h) That a casual camp be maintained to care for personnel returning from hospital and furlough until they can be moved forward to join their units. Personnel returning on temporary duty from the forward areas, Military Police guards used to evacuate prisoners and safehand couriers could be accomodated in the above mentioned camp and not be left to shift for themselves. The system provided by Base for this purpose did not prove satisfactory.

4. General Comments.

a. It is estimated that over 1,000 dumps of Japanese supplies of all classes existed in this area. Many of these dumps were pilfered and looted before responsible personnel could take charge. Troops must be instilled with a greater respect for captured supplies and equipment. This lack of responsibility was not limited to enlisted men of forward elements but extended to nearly all ranks of all elements. Guards should immediately be established upon all captured dumps and installations and entrance permitted only to authorized representatives of the Task Force Commander.

b. Concerning evacuation, casualties were a minor problem. A much greater problem was created by Dutch and Australian citizens, missionaries, Sikhs, Javanese, prisoners of war and observers from the United States Army and the Armed Forces of Allied Nations.

c. Traffic control presented a very difficult problem and there was an acute lack of sufficient MP units. The entire operation would have moved much more smoothly had MP's in sufficient strength been available. Where road nets are inadequate (and in nearly every case they will be), the Provost Marshal must institute immediate and effective control over the movement of all vehicles in accordance with priorities established by G-3 and G-4. The Military Police did an excellent job under extremely difficult conditions but it is felt that their numbers were

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insufficient for the tasks assigned, particularly during the first two weeks after the initial landings.

d. Many units arrived with equipment far in excess of that authorized, including heavy equipment which added to the already serious congestion on the beaches and which immeasurably slowed the movement inland from the beaches. Many instances were observed where "luxury" items accompanied the assault units. Despite the amount of equipment landed, some units arrived in the operational area without jungle hammocks or mosquito bars with the result that men did not have adequate sleeping facilities and were unnecessarily exposed. All troops should carry their hammocks and not have them packed in operational bags for later shipment.

e. Massing a huge amount of supplies on small beach areas is wasted effort when movement of same forward is limited.

f. A more complete understanding and closer coordination must be maintained between ground, air, and naval forces.

g. The Task Force Commander should be in absolute command of all troops in the operational area, including air and naval forces. Otherwise he should not be held responsible for the success or failure of his mission.

h. Adequate and thorough advance planning must be made for evacuation of personnel (all categories) and captured equipment.

i. The Shore Party should be an extremely well-trained unit of adequate size to perform properly the tasks assigned it. In this operation, the shore parties were too small. A Boat and Shore Brigade is set up to support an Infantry Division in landing operation. The Task Force Commander was allocated but one regiment to handle each division.

j. No headquarters can expect to function properly in the field when it is top-heavy with staff personnel and sadly understrength in labor, construction, and housekeeping personnel. In operations of this type, a reinforced Corps Headquarters should have attached a platoon of Engineers with at least two dozers, at least a battalion of Military Police, a public relations department with adequate personnel and equipment to care for all observers and visitors, a section devoted exclusively to handling relations with the local administration and natives, and a section to handle all matters pertaining to evacuation of personnel and equipment. The Task Force Headquarters did not carry sufficient housekeeping personnel and equipment. The 16 duty men of the Headquarters Company were unable to perform the many tasks desired of them and the two cooks were preparing meals for 500 to 600 personnel. Sufficient housekeeping personnel should be landed with the Advance Echelon to perform all the necessary duties. Under the stress of work during initial phase of such an operation, the staff sections have neither time nor the means to attend to any functions not directly and urgently connected with their primary responsibilities.

k. Training should include more emphasis on conservation of all supplies and equipment. Outside the sphere of G-4 activities, constructive criticism can be directed at the lack of medical, dental, or

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special service facilities. It is felt that these services are more vitally needed with the headquarters than with a rear echelon at an established base.

l. All staff sections should plan completely in advance every single detailed phase of their operation under all conditions imaginable. Sections should be sub-divided into sub-sections with each individual given definite and well defined responsibilities.

m. Periodic Status of Supply Reports required by higher headquarters are worthless during the first ten days of an operation. Report of Critical Shortages only should be required.

n. Engineer construction activities must be given a high priority and nothing allowed to interfere with them except tactical considerations. Engineer recommendations concerning their responsibilities should also be given careful consideration and followed out wherever practicable. A great deal of delay and inconvenience was experienced with traffic tie-ups due to the fact that much heavy equipment was permitted to use roads that were not ready to receive it. A great deal of this traffic was unnecessary and someone must be in a position to side-track all except essential traffic until the road net is adequate to support heavy operations.

o. Insufficient small boats and harbor craft were provided for discharging of vessels and harbor activities. This problem was further complicated by many unanticipated demands such as the beach-to-beach movement of troops, supplies and equipment, and also the supply of scattered units. During the early phases of the operation, twice the available harbor facilities could have been used to good advantage. The proper allocation of boats was also rendered difficult by countless requests from everyone in the area for a specified size and number of craft to execute a particular mission. In most cases, these requests were made by persons who had very limited knowledge as to the abilities and sizes of the various type boats with the result that they invariably over-estimated their requirements. All requests for craft should merely state the number and type of supplies, equipment or personnel to be moved, together with tonnages, and deadline for movement, if any. A qualified transportation officer can then assign the proper craft in accordance with the need and existing priorities.

p. In this operation, there was a lack of information as to the requirements and expectations of the Air Force units concerned. The Air Force frequently made requests on one day which they expected to be executed the next and while their demands were usually met in a satisfactory manner by the Task Force, it was often done at the expense of our own plans and resulted in a great deal of inconvenience. This goes back to the old story of close liaison and the full dissemination of information concerning plans and intentions.

q. While steps have been taken to correct the situation, the Task Force was extremely handicapped by the lack of stowage plans and manifests on shipping in the harbor and awaiting call forward. This resulted in the loss of valuable time in unloading urgently needed cargo and the calling forward of most ships was like reaching in a grab-bag.

[redacted]

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r. Operation "G" was a logistical nightmare due primarily to the fact that too much was thrown too soon into too small an area. Under the circumstances, it is felt that the operation progressed far more smoothly than should reasonably be expected.

4 Incls.
Incl 1 - Proposed Orgn and Duties of a Corps G-4 Section
Incl 2 - Proposed Orgn and Duties of a Corps Transportation Section
Incl 3 - Logistical Data
Incl 4 - Proposed Rear Echelon Staff and Duties

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS I CORPS

ORGANIZATION OF G-4 SECTION

ADMINISTRATION AND PLANNING

1. Journal.
2. Records.
3. Reports.
4. Administrative Orders. (Coordinate with G-3, G-1, and appropriate Special Staff Sections.
5. Priorities.
6. Logistical Data
7. Administrative Map.
8. Interior Administration of Section.
9. Recommendations concerning protection of lines of communication and rear establishments. (Coordinate with G-3.)
10. Construction projects.
11. Recommendations as to location of rear boundaries and rear echelon of headquarters. (Coordinate latter with G-1.)
12. Planning Operations.

SUPPLY

1. Record of supply levels. (Charts and Graphs.)
2. Policies governing procurement, receipt, storage and issue of supplies.
3. Maintenance of equipment. (Coordinate with G-3 for priorities.
4. Recommendations on new types of equipment. (Coordinate with G-3.)
5. Allocation of supply, and maintenance installations, and service troop bivouac areas. (Coordinate with G-3.)
6. Property responsibility.
7. Funds and priority of expenditure.
8. Procurement of real estate, shelter, and facilities including their leasing, repair, maintenance and disposition.

Incl. No. 1

[redacted]

[redacted]

TRANSPORTATION

1. Supervision of all transportation activities (Water, land & air). (Coordinate with E & T Section & Transportation Special Staff Section).
2. Calling forward cargo vessels.
3. Records of tonnages discharged. (Graphs)
4. Record of vessels awaiting call, including manifests.
5. Movement of Service troops. (Coordinate with G-3 to avoid conflict with tactical moves).
6. Construction, operation, and maintenance of military railways and inland waterways.
7. Liaison with higher headquarters on all transportation matters.

EVACUATION AND TRAFFIC

1. Allocation of evacuation installations.
2. Evacuation and hospitalization of men and animals.
3. Collection and disposition of salvage and captured materiel. (Coordinate with G-2 for examination of captured materiel).
4. Traffic control and circulation map. Marking of routes, road signs and installations. (Coordinate with G-3 for tactical plan and secrecy).
5. Supervision of all motor maintenance (Graph of deadline vehicles).
6. Maintaining records of all vehicles available for formation of provisional motor vehicle pools and plans for formation of same.

Incl No. 1

[redacted]

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HEADQUARTERS US FORCES
Office of the AC of S, G-4

EF/hed

APO 565
7 July 1944

TRANSPORTATION SECTION

Functions and Duties of Transportation Section.

(See attached Operations Instructions No. 6 and diagram).

Transportation Section to be considered as a Special Staff Section operating under AC of S, G-4.

1. Transportation Officer.

   a. Chief of Section.

   b. Give technical advice and recommendations to the Commanding General and General Staff on all matters pertaining to transportation.

2. Executive Officer.

   a. Assistant to Transportation Officer.

   b. Acting Transportation Officer in absence of the Chief of Section.

   c. Coordinate functions of sub-sections.

   d. Responsible for procurement, training, and general supervision of section personnel.

   e. Perform such other duties as are assigned by the Transportation Officer.

3. Sub-sections.

   a. Administration and planning.

      (1) Supervise administration and execution of the policies of the Commanding General.

      (2) Regulate movement of shipping to forward areas.

      (3) Coordinate with Navy and Air Corps on matters pertaining to those services.

      (4) Keep all necessary records and forward required reports to the proper headquarters.

   b. Supply.

      (1) Responsible for procurement, storage and issue of Transportation Corps supplies.

Incl. No. 2

[redacted]

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c. Operations.

(1) Responsible for control and supervision of all operating agencies assigned or attached to the Transportation Section.

(2) Arrange for the evacuation of personnel and materiel.

(3) Arrange for dispatch of mail, coordinating with Postal Officer.

(4) Arrange for reception and staging of incoming units; coordination with the proper Task Force Staff Sections.

(5) Coordinate motor, air, and water transport.

4. Operating Sub-sections (under control of Operations Sub-section).

a. Troop movement.

(1) Receive and coordinate all requests for troop movements and act upon such requests in accordance with established priorities.

b. Cargo movement.

(1) Receive and coordinate all requests for cargo movements and act upon such requests in accordance with established priorities.

c. Traffic.

(1) Coordinate troop and cargo movements.

(2) Coordinate air, water, and motor transport.

(3) Operate pool of available motor transport; maintain bus schedules between key points; furnish motor transportation on call. (Motor Transport Officer)

(4) Discharge cargo and personnel from shipping; lighter cargo and personnel to shore; operate scheduled rations and ferry services; furnish landing craft for tactical uses; coordinate with Navy on assignment of berths and anchorages; coordinate and control all intra-harbor water traffic (Water Transport Officer).

(5) Arrange for booking all outgoing air freight and air personnel travel; receive, check, and notify consignees of all incoming air freight.

[redacted]

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HEADQUARTERS US FORCES
Office of the AC of S, G-4

EA/fs

APO 920
26 June 1944

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS)
:
NUMBER.....6)

TRANSPORTATION SPECIAL STAFF SECTION

1. Attention is directed to the following which sets up for the Task Force a Special Staff Section to be known as the Transportation Special Staff Section. Colonel C. B. Fowlkes, Jr., CE, Commanding Officer, 542d Engineer Boat & Shore Regiment is Chief of Section. Phone -- Lake Exchange.

2. The Transportation Officer will be responsible for:

a. Discharge of all cargo and equipment and debarkation of all troops from ships, landing craft, barges, lighters, etc.

b. Transportation of all cargo and equipment from beach jetties or dock to the Task Force dumps or depots. Depot and dump commanders are responsible for the prompt unloading and return of such transportation, unloading to be done by personnel under their control.

c. Providing necessary water transportation for supply of outlying areas as may be directed by Commanding General, US Forces, APO 920.

d. The operation of all harbor craft; maintenance, repair and salvage of all 2d ESB craft; assist within capabilities in maintenance and repair of Navy and other harbor craft.

e. The assignment of berths and anchorages.

f. Requisitioning such additional harbor craft, lighters, tugs, stevedore gear, and other Transportation Corps equipment as may be necessary.

g. Furnishing such landing craft and other facilities as may be needed for tactical use, when directed by the Commanding General, US Forces, APO 920.

h. Arranging for evacuation of the sick and wounded; maintain close liaison with Surgeon, US Forces, APO 920, for this purpose.

i. Operating pool of available motor transportation; working in close cooperation with Special Staff Sections concerned with supply, US Forces, APO 920, to insure efficient use.

j. Receiving, checking, and notifying consignees of all incoming air freight; booking all outgoing air freight and

Incl. No. 2

[redacted]

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arranging for shipment; booking outgoing personnel and arranging air transportation.

k. Coordinating with Navy Port Director to arrange for routing of shipping; reporting arrival and departure of shipping to Headquarters Alamo Force.

l. Report daily by radio to Headquarters Alamo Forces (two copies to AC of S, G-4, US Forces, APO 920) tonnages discharged, tonnages remaining to be discharged and estimated date of completion.

m. Arrange for water and air transportation for troop movement and for evacuation of prisoners of war and allied nationals.

n. Book and furnish transportation for visiting personnel and luggage to and from dromes, and from this area.

o. Arrange for evacuation of captured materiel and salvage; coordinate with G-2 and Special Staff Sections concerned with supply, US Forces, APO 920.

p. Arrange for dispatch of mail; coordinate with Postal Officer, APO 920.

q. Arrange for reception and staging or restaging of incoming units, coordinating with the proper Task Force Staff Sections.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

G-4

[redacted]

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PROPOSED
TRANSPORTATION CORPS
SPECIAL STAFF SECTION



Officers

1 Col - Chief of Section
1 Lt Col- Executive
1 Lt Col- Operations
1 Maj - Adm and planning
1 Maj - Traffic
1 Capt - Supply
1 Capt - Troop Movement
1 Capt - Cargo Movement
1 Capt - Motor Transportation
1 Capt - Water Transportation
1 Lt - Air Transportation
1 WO - Chief Clerk

12

Enlisted Men

1 M/Sgt - Asst Chief Clerk
1 M/Sgt - Operations
1 T/Sgt - Adm and planning
1 T/Sgt - Supply
1 S/Sgt - Traffic
7 Sgts - Clerks, general
5 - Stenographers
6 - Typists
3 - Clerks, general
1 - Draftsman
2 - Clerks, supply

29

Incl No. 2

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS US FORCES
APO_____

_____194_

SUBJECT: Logistical Data.

TO _____.

1. It is directed that you furnish this headquarters (marked "Attention G-4") by _____the logistical data indicated in paragraph 2 below for each of the units listed herewith:

2. a. Strength.

b. Total number of vehicles (wheeled and tracked) and wheeled weapons.

c. DWT of heaviest lift.

d. DWT and cubage of 1 U/F.

e. Cargo capacity in DWTs of organic vehicles (based on 60% overload) remaining after all organization equipment is mobile-loaded. If all organization equipment cannot be mobile-loaded on organization vehicles, indicate DWT and cubage for which cargo capacity is lacking.

3. Remarks.

By command of _____:

G-4 Form #1.

Incl No. 3

[redacted]

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PROPOSED REAR ECHELON STAFF AND DUTIES

1. Commanding Officer, Rear Echelon *

He will act as the representative of the Task Force Commander and will command the Rear Echelon and act as Liaison Officer between higher headquarters, Rear Echelon units, and the forward elements of the Task Force.

2. Executive Officer *

He will assist the Commanding Officer of the Rear Echelon in carrying out his assigned duties.

3. Representative of AG Section

a. He will function and carry out the normal AG duties as pertains to the Rear Echelon.

b. Prepare passenger lists.

4. Representative of G-1 Section

a. He will function and carry out normal G-1 duties as pertains to Rear Echelon; direct and supervise casual camp.

b. Supervise preparation of passenger lists (coordinate with G-3)

5. Representative of G-3 Section

a. Will arrange for the movement forward of all units subsequent to the departure of the assault elements.

b. Receive and stage all incoming troops and casuals.

c. Arrange for consolidation of troop area, messes, and organizational equipment storage; coordinating with G-1 and G-4 representatives.

d. Provide necessary logistics for troop movements. (coordinate with G-4)

e. Provide from Rear Echelon units the necessary labor details for loading out on call from G-4 representative.

6. Representative of G-4 Section

a. Supervise and coordinate all activities of the special staff sections, namely Quartermaster, Signal, Ordnance, Engineer, Medical and Transportation, as pertains to the equipping of units and re-supply.

b. Acts as Liaison between Task Force forward elements, Navy and all Base supply agencies.

c. Supervise and direct the loading out of all troops and impedimenta and re-supply.

d. To have direct control of all motor transportation (unit vehicles less necessary administrative requirements are to be pooled).

7. Transportation Officer - under G-4

Will operate all pooled vehicles mentioned above, maintain service

[redacted]

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of same and have direct supervision of drivers and assistant drivers, and the dispatching of all vehicles as required.

8. Chief Loading Officer # - under G-4.

a. Will be responsible for the loading of all troops, organizational equipment and re-supply.

b. Prepare manifests of all shipping.

c. Coordinating all activities with the Navy in the beaching and retracting of craft.

* To be selected from officers listed in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.

To be selected from one of the units remaining at the staging area.

Incl #4

[redacted]

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ANNEX NO. 1 TO G-4 LESSONS

ENGINEER LESSONS

I. PREPARATION AND ORGANIZATION FOR TASK.

A. The Task Force Engineer Staff originally consisted of 3 officers and 2 enlisted men on temporary duty at Headquarters Sixth Army, from GHQ and various USASOS sections, and 9 officers and 25 enlisted men of 1002nd Communication Zone Section.

On 10 March 1044, the Task Force Engineer Staff was directed to proceed with planning for the Hollandia Operation. The directive covering the occupation and development of the Humboldt Bay-Tanahmerah area was contained in letter from General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, dated 6 March 1944, Subject: Base Development of Humboldt Bay-Tanahmerah Bay. The staff, upon receipt of these instructions, immediately proceeded with planning for the operation. This work was continued at Sixth Army Headquarters until 29 March 1944 when the staff was moved to I Corps Headquarters and was combined with the I Corps Engineer Section consisting of 3 officers and 5 enlisted men. The planning phase was completed, coordinated with Division planning of the 24th and 41st Divisions, and the staff was prepared for movement on D minus 6 Additional personnel assigned to the staff for the operational phase included 10 officers and 20 enlisted men of the 1001st Communication Zone Section and 14 enlisted men from the 2nd Port Headquarters, who were placed on DS with the 1002nd Communication Zone Section.

B. The work of the Task Force Engineer Staff during the planning phase included the following major items:

1. Thorough study of intelligence reports, maps, charts, and aerial photos, insofar as they were available, for the areas in and adjacent to Humboldt Bay-Tanahmerah Bay section of Dutch New Guinea.

2. Coordination with engineer units assigned to the 24th and 41st Divisions and preparation of bills of materials and requisitions for the assault and reinforcing engineer supplies.

3. Plans for initial employment of engineer units during the assault.

4. Preparation of tentative layout plans for the entire area and detailed plans of individual areas selected for development.

5. Preparation of standard plans for buildings, roads, bridges, docks, and airdromes.

6. Preparation of bills of materials and requisitions for all engineer supplies required for the ultimate development, with shipping schedules in accordance with the tentative progress schedule established.

7. Follow up on supplies by representatives stationed at the main supply points to insure availability and proper loading of all supplies.

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8. Determination of engineer effort required to complete construction of required facilities, engineer troops needed, and schedule of arrival of units and equipment.

9. Conferences with commanders of engineer units assigned to determine their status, capability, and to outline initial tasks and assignments. Every effort was made to prowide equipment authorized under unit T/BA's and special equipment to expedite the work assigned to various units.

10. Procurement, preparation, and delivery to engineer units of maps, plans, operationg instructions, and standard operating procedure for reports and engineer supplies.

11. Conferences with Navy and Air Force representatives in regard to plans for their installations.

12. Organization of the staff for the operational phase.

II. LOADING OF ENGINEER PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES, AND EQUIPMENT.

A. The Task Force Engineer Staff moved to the operating area as follows: D-Day - 6 officers and 4 enlisted men, who went ashore with the second wave. D + 1 - 2 officers and 4 enlisted men. D + 2 - 4 officers and 8 enlisted men. The balance of the staff, with the exception of 7 officers and 19 enlisted men of the 1001st Communication Zone Section, arrived in the area on D + 8 and D + 12. The advance party landed on Red Beach 2 at Tanahmerah Bay and set up Headquarters with I Corps. The staff moved by LST to Humboldt Bay on the night of D + 1, with I Corps Headquarters. Due to the fire on White Beach 1, a landing was not made until the morning of D + 3, when headquarters were established in the I Corps area in Brinkman's Plantation.

B. The engineer assault and reinforcing supplies consisting of approximately 1950 tons were loaded in a number of ships of the convoy to reduce the hazard of loss of all of the supplies. The split loading created a considerable problem on the beaches in the effort to locate and transport these supplies to a central dump.

C. Plans for loading the various engineer units were carefully worked out and were followed closely as the loading proceeded. All engineer units were restricted to shipment of essential engineer equipment only to arrive on D-Day, D + 1, and D + 2. Certain units were strengthened by transfer of equipment from units scheduled to arrive at later dates.

D. The schedule for shipping of construction materials presented a major problem due to the limited amount of shipping available; however, by careful planning, the schedule adopted provided ample quantities of construction materials required for the early phases.

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III. LANDING OF ENGINEER UNITS AND SUPPLIES.

A. The combat engineer units assigned to the 24th Division (Noiseless Landing Force) consisted of the 3rd Engineer Battalion (C), the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, and Company "B" of the 239th Engineer Battalion (C). To reinforce and assist the 3rd Engineer Battalion (C), the 339th Engineer Regiment (GS), less one battalion, landed on D-Day in Tanahmerah Bay. A survey detachment of the 67th Engineer Topo Company (Corps) also landed on D-Day to establish base line and sound range control for the artillery.

B. The combat engineer units assigned to the 41st Division (Letterpress Landing Force) consisted of the 116th Engineer Battalion (C), (less 1 company), the 79th Engineer Battalion (C), the 239th Engineer Battalion (C), (less 1 company), and the 532nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment (less 2 boat companies. A detachment of 113th Combat Group (Corps) also landed on D-Day. To reinforce and assist these combat units during the initial phase of the assault, the 1881st Engineer Aviation Battalion landed on D-Day. A survey detachment of the 67th Engineer Topo Company (Corps) also landed for the purpose of providing assistance to the artillery.

IV. COMBAT ENGINEER MISSIONS.

A. The extremely limited area available on all the landing beaches, which had been apparent from the study of aerial photographs but was found to be worse than anticipated, provided an engineer problem of major proportions in the effort to move units with their equipment and supplies quickly from the beach areas. No particular difficulty was encounted in landing of LSTs on any of the beaches. Due to shoal water, landing of LCMs at Depapre was restricted to two hours at high tide until blasting of a 900 foot channel was completed.

At Tablasoefa Beach, the 3rd Engineer Battalion (C) immediately started work on a road to connect with the trail leading from Depapre Village to Hollandia Drome. Although this road was eventually abandoned due to the length of construction time required over the extremely rugged terrain, it provided access to the small bay just north of Depapre in which the 339th Engineer Regiment (GS) made their landing. It also provided access to limited area for dumps and artillery emplacements. One engineer platoon of the 3rd Engineer Battalion (C) attached to a battalion of the 21st Infantry aided the infantry overland from landing beach up the track behind Depapre, and one engineer platoon commenced construction of a road to move the artillery inland to battery positions.

A great deal of effort was involved in the construction of a second loop and artillery road near the north end of Red Beach 2. This involved crossing a creek and an unstable swamp immediately back of the beach.

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The 3rd Engineer Battalion (C), landing early on D-Day together with the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment performed a highly creditable job on this important phase of the assault. The 339th Engineer Regiment (GS) landed on the small beach described above, at approximately H + 2 hours. The landing, as on all of the other beaches was practically unopposed. This unit proceeded immediately on the construction of a road to connect with the work of the 3rd Engineer Battalion (C). Although essentially a service organization, this unit deserves high commendation for their excellent work during and following the assault. As the 3rd Engineer Battalion (C) moved forward with the assaulting infantry, work on the rear end of the track was taken over by the 339th Engineer Regiment (GS). Sections of the track from Depapre to the air fields had to be corduroyed in some places over a half mile long before jeep traffic could pass over it with food and ammunition.

In protection of an engineer platoon working party, a lieutenant and two sergeants of the 3rd Engineer Battalion (C) followed Jap tracks into the jungle and came upon a party of 14 armed Japs. The patrol killed the entire Jap party with no casualties to themselves. During the initial phases of the engineer task, the 3rd Engineer Battalion (C) killed 108 and captured 28 of the enemy.

B. In the Humboldt Bay area, the 116th Engineer Battalion (C) landed on White Beach 1 on D-Day. One platoon of Company "B" landed at H + 10 minutes and the balance of the company landed at H + 35 minutes and immediately started improvement of the track from the beach to the Hollandia-Pim track. The balance of the battalion landed at H + 80 minutes and immediately followed the initial company, widening the track, constructing dispersal areas and otherwise assisting the forward movement of the division. As this track was through swamp and rugged terrain, the 79th Engineer Battalion (C) and the 1881st Engineer Aviation Battalion followed up with the improvement of this track as the 116th Engineer Battalion (C) assisted with the movement of the division from Pim to the air fields. The Pim-Air Field Road became impassable where it crossed the sago swamps when two bridges and several culverts which were constructed by the Japanese failed. This section of the road was then turned over to the 79th Engineer Battalion (C) for improvement and maintenance. However, due to bad weather and heavy traffic, several pieces of heavy equipment became mired so deeply and so close together that it was necessary to build a corduroy detour around same and one platoon of the 116th Engineer Battalion (C) worked around the clock to complete this detour while another platoon built a new bridge alongside of the Japanese bridge which was about to collapse. The main road was open for traffic at daybreak on the following morning and the 116th Engineer Battalion (C) completed the opening of the remaining ten miles of road to the Cyclops Drome. Later on, the battalion re-located about 200 yards of road to avoid a sago swamp and rebuilt several bridges and culverts. On the landing beach, there was a large swamp adjacent to same with a narrow neck of spongy ground between the swamp and the beach. The water from the swamp had been seeping through to the sea and about one-quarter mile of road had to be built on this narrow strip. A sea wall was first built along this strip of road and sand bags placed on the road side of the wall to prevent the beach sand from being washed away by the surf, after which a sand fill about two feet deep was placed back of the sea wall. All of this stretch had to be built under very difficult conditions; however, same was completed in a very short time and traffic began moving over it without further difficulty. During this phase of the operation, it was necessary to obtain water supply from the muddy swamp at the rear of the beach, a large quantity of chemicals being used in this connection as the heavy demand for potable water on the congested beach was very high. The engineer combat battalions assisted by the engineer aviation battalions in this operation deserve high commendation for the many difficult tasks performed in the face of the enemy.

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V. INITIATION OF HEAVY CONSTRUCTION.

A. Because of the extended area covered by the operation, it was found necessary to divide the area for construction purposes into five sectors, to which engineer units were assigned. Each of these sectors being placed in charge of a sector engineer to whom all directives, work orders, plans, and specifications were transmitted.

B. Initially the sectors established and engineer units assigned to each were as follows:

TASK FORCE ENGINEER

I Corps Engineer Section

1002nd Engineer Communication Zone Section

67th Engineer Topo Company (Corps)

464th Engineer Depot Company

HOLLANDIA SECTOR

1113th Engineer Combat Group Headquarters

79th Engineer Battalion (C)

339th Engineer Regiment (GS), (1st Battalion)

1881st Engineer Aviation Battalion

842nd Engineer Aviation Battalion

198th Engineer Dump Truck Company

490th Engineer Equipment Company

Company A, 796th Engineer Forestry Battalion

SENTANI SECTOR

239th Engineer Combat Battalion

865th Engineer Aviation Battalion

931st Engineer Aviation Regiment (less battalions)

TAMI SECTOR

1879th Engineer Aviation Battalion

TANAHMERAH SECTOR

339th Engineer Regiment (GS) (less 1 battalion)

781st Engineer Petroleum Distributing Company

DOCK SECTOR

1052nd Port Construction and Repair Group

[redacted]

[redacted]

C. Work proceeded on the construction of permanent facilities, including docks, storage areas, roads, airdromes, water supply, Avgas, and MT fuel supply, hospitals, and camp and headquarters areas as rapidly as the engineer units assigned to these tasks could be disembarked and moved to their respective areas. There was some delay due to the limited facilities available for unloading heavy equipment from larger vessels. Due to the necessity for maintaining heavy traffic over the Pim-Airdrome Road, the work of widening and improving this road was extremely difficult.

D. The Task Force Engineer Staff engaged in active and aggressive reconnaissance and proceeded at once with preliminary surveys required to supplement and verify information gained from intelligence and aerial photos prior to the operation.

E. A negligible amount of native labor was available.

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SUMMARY OF LESSONS

1. All key engineer staff personnel to be involved in the task force landing operation and subsequent engineer tasks should be involved in the original planning operation as the Task Force Engineer Staff was constituted from various engineer headquarters which resulted in the different staff officers having to familiarize themselves with the plans for engineer work while the operation was in progress. This would tend to smoothe engineer staff work and thereby avoid some misunderstanding between all staff sections.

2. a. Engineer units involved in the task force operation should be allowed adequate time during the staging period to completely overhaul and repair their equipment. The working of engineer equipment on Base and other projects just prior to the loading of same for embarkation resulted in frequent breakdowns during the initial operation. This is especially true when it is considered that landing operations impose a greater wear and tear on equipment than is normal.

b. Although certain heavy engineer equipment is essential and must be landed on D-Day, there are certain pieces of engineer equipment that could be brought in subsequent to D-Day, i.e., 8-ton low bed trailers, 16-ton flat bed trailers, 2½-ton two-wheel pole type trailers, and the 4 and 6-ton trucks, etc. However the engineer motorized shop, all tractors with angledozers, the 4-ton wrecker and the air compressor should be landed on D-Day.

c. Spare parts for engineer equipment was a serious problem. This is especially true of tractor parts. A complete supply of second echelon parts should be issued to all engineer units prior to embarkation.

d. There was a definite shortage of engineer demolition materials which in some cases caused serious delays in carrying out engineer tasks. The use of captured enemy demolition materials should not be depended upon for demolition work as in several cases the use of Jap demolition materials resulted in dangerous misfires. All engineer units should carry an ample store of demolition materials mobile loaded.

e. All units involved in the task force landing operation should be issued sand bags, and perhaps barbed wire and pickets prior to embarkation. Certain units, i.e., anti-aircraft, field artillery, signal and hospital units are users of a large number of sand bags, and these units should carry sufficient sand bags with them to provide themselves with emplacements, at least during the initial phases of the operation.

f. Due to the demand for large quantities of potable water, a large quantity of water supply chemicals should be brought in by all engineer units. One of the engineer battalions was unable to secure even the normal supply of water purification chemicals prior to embarkation. This could have resulted in a serious situation had this battalion been unable to call upon and obtain from other engineer units the vital and necessary water purification chemicals. All operators of engineer water supply purification units should be carefully and thoroughly instructed in the proper use and conservation of water purification chemicals.

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3. Ration allowances for engineer units engaged in operating on twenty-four hour basis should be increased by an additional amount, (approximately twenty-five percent).

4. a. Whenever unskilled troop or native labor is used on engineer tasks, it should be employed under competent engineer supervision so that the work being done will fit into the engineer plan and therefore prevent a waste of engineer working hours if the work has to be done over again.

b. All units engaged in a landing operation should be previously instructed and should have trained crews to manhandle vehicles when disabled thereby eliminating the necessity for calling engineer equipment from vital engineer work to assist them with their minor difficulties. The frequent calling upon engineer equipment for assistance to special units has resulted in serious losses of engineer work accomplishments. All special staff sections of the task force should be informed that the frequent calling upon the engineer section for work or materials should be routed through G-3 or G-4 who after consulting with the Engineer will determine priority of such demands. It is recommended that variation from approved priorities be authorized only in emergencies.

5. All engineer units should have sufficient training under competent instructors so as to enable them to have a large number of reserve operators for heavy equipment for working on a twenty-four hour basis. Two of the engineer battalions engaged in this operation were seriously handicapped due to the lack of sufficient trained equipment operators.

6. a. It was found that the survey platoon of the Topo Company (Corps), was very useful in assisting the artillery organizations in the establishment of base lines and sound range control. However these survey units should be released immediately from division and Corps Artillery control upon completion of stated survey mission so that they may assist with the great amount of other survey work required for layout and construction activities and the checking of maps made and issued prior to the landing operation. It is recommended that two (2) additional twenty inch engineer transits complete with rods and stadia boards and two (2) additional complete planetable sets be issued for the large amount of road location, construction and depot area work required by the task force as the tactical situation permits.

b. It was found that the Combination Section "A" 10-Ton Van on semi-trailer issued to the Topo Company (Corps), is definitely not suitable for amphibious operations. The extreme height of the van makes loading and unloading on an LST exceedingly difficult and bulldozers had to be used to aid in both operations. This is particularly true in disembarking on a sand beach and in this Operation it was necessary to tow the Combination Section "A" a distance of three miles before ground was reached where it could operate on its own power.

c. (1) The Motorized Camera and Motorized Press Section are far superior for amphibious operations.

(2) Recommendations for improvement in the reproduction equipment of the Topo Company (Corps), for amphibious operations are as follows:

(a) Replacing of Combination Section "A" with a Motorized Press Section and a Motorized Plate Process Section, and Motorized Laboratory Section.

[redacted]

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(b) The loss of the Heubner Vertical Camera could be met by installing an Eastman Enlarger in the Laboratory Section as the majority of work with this instrument is enlarging aerial photographs.

(c) All motorized sections be mounted on the 4-ton chassis.

7. Summary.

a. All engineer tasks should have thorough and competent planning prior to operation.

b. Continued and thorough supervision by competent instructors in the training of mechanics and operators for all types of engineer equipment is most essential.

c. All engineer units should be completely equipped, and all equipment in serviceable condition prior to embarkation with the task force.

d. Careful consideration should be given to engineer stores and supplies accompanying all units of the task force.

e. Sufficient spare parts for engineer equipment must be carried in on D-Day.

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ANNEX NO. 2 to G-4 LESSONS:

QUARTERMASTER LESSONS - HOLLANDIA OPERATIONS

1. Lengthy disclosures can be made on mistakes of recent operations from the Quartermaster standpoint. However, most of these conditions, such as overcrowding at the beaches, and too much of one supply and too little of another, have been touched upon so many times in prior communications on this subject that the Quartermaster will refrain from again bringing them up.

2. It is believed that the few worthwhile observations not heretofore touched upon, at least specifically, will be of value at this time. First, the matter of individual equipment, both worn on the person and carried in packs, and that following in operational bags must be carefully analyzed as to weight, priority of needs, and time of arrival. In the past operation at least two very much needed items, jungle hammocks and/or mosquito bars, and blankets were left in the rear area by many units. By publishing a specific list of equipment to be worn, carried, etc. many similar future mistakes may be avoided. There follows, a recommendation as to (a) equipment and clothing worn, (b) equipment and clothing carried in jungle packs, (c) equipment and clothing to follow in operational bags.

(a) Equipment and Clothing Worn

Jungle Boots
Gas Mask
Drawers
Socks
Undershirt
Helmet, complete
Suit, HBT
Handkerchief
Cartridge Belt
Hunting Knife
Identification Tags
Canteen, complete
Medical Kit
Rifle and 50 rds ammo

Total weight of this clothing and equipment on the soldier is 27 lbs and 12 ozs.

(b) Equipment and Clothing Carried in Jungle Pack

Belt
Cap, HBT
Jacket, HBT) or suit, HBT
Trousers, HBT)
Suit of Underwear (1)
Handkerchiefs (2)
Service Shoes, 1 pr
Leggins, 1 pr
Socks, 2 pr
Cigarettes, 1 carton
Blanket
Jungle Hammock

[redacted]

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Poncho or Raincoat
Mess Equipment
Towel
Toilet Articles
Machete

The total weight of this equipment including jungle pack is 30 lbs and 9½ ozs. It will be noted that the jungle hammock is included and it is believed that a combat soldier in good physical condition can go into operations with a pack not exceeding this weight.

(c) Equipment and Clothing to Follow in Operational Bags or "B" Bags

Cap, garrison
Underwear
Handkerchiefs
Shoes, 1 pr
Socks
Khaki pants and shirt, 1 ea
Mosquito Bar
Blanket
Towels (2) and additional toilet articles
Personal items

The total weight of this pack is estimated at about 25 lbs. It should come in plainly marked with the name, company, and regiment, unless it is a separate unit. This must be done in order to provide an easy breakdown at the beach at the time the equipment is unloaded. If codes are used, the chances are great that the service personnel will not understand and consequently many bags will be lost or delayed.

3. The operation proved conclusively that in the future, units (especially small ones) should not attempt to take in maintenance equipment. This resulted in a great deal of work, confusion, etc., in the rear area, yet upon arrival at the operational beaches practically all of this equipment was pooled into a common dump. It would be much easier for a task force quartermaster to provide maintenance II and IV for the overall group and it would save a large amount of shipping space inasmuch as better and more consolidated packing would be maintained. It is further believed this maintenance should be held in floating reserve until adequate preparation on the beach has been made to receive it. The danger of loss by sinking is probably much less than the corresponding danger of loss on the beach by bombing, fires, pilfering, and such. There is no additional ship tie-up as the ships would have to stand by anyway.

4. It is not yet understood why such insistence was placed on having 100 octane gasoline on beaches during the first stages of the operation when it was known that several days would elapse before the air field could possibly be put into operation.

5. Command post tents should be eliminated from Quartermaster equipment in tropical zones for they give no greater protection than a tent fly, which is much lighter and easier to pitch or strike and require less shipping space both in ship-tons and DWT. New type squad tents should be utilized for large headquarters.

6. It is also believed that many items of Quartermaster Class II and IV equipment should be eliminated for at least the first 30 day period of an amphibious operation. These items, such as files, flags, locks, cards, guides, etc., clips, books, folders, many kinds of inks,

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etc., tend to harass those responsible for supplies and accomplish little good as far as equipping the troops is concerned. Emphasis on replacement must be on that clothing and equipment which is actually needed.

7. Rations on the recent operations were entirely inadequate. The fact that this inadequacy was attributal mainly to excessive losses from fires, and drains of the quick requirements of a task force does not compensate for the fact that for a period of time the troops did not receive a ration conducive to strength building and morale. For future operations, emphasis should be placed on 10-in-1, "C", and "J" rations for the initial stages, and a full "B" ration as early as the situation will permit. It is believed the best method of supplying the rations would be to send in five days supply with the troops, divided - 2 days of "C" and "J" on the soldier, and three days 10-in-1 in reserve. A 10 days supply of packaged rations should be held in floating reserve until facilities are adequate to receive them. On D + 10 it should be planned to bring in a block-loaded ship fully loaded with Quartermaster supplies. Thereafter, such ships should be evenly spaced so that dangerously low levels such as existed in this operation would not exist and transportation could feasibly handle the discharge.

8. Officers, preferably of field grade, must be attached to the beach operational groups in order to coordinate the Quartermaster supplies and equipment. It will be recalled that in the early phases of this operation the TFQM organized such a group on each of the beaches and Pim Jetty and a very material increase in efficiency in the receipt, handling, and issue of Quartermaster supplies was immediately noticeable.

9. Finally, all key Quartermaster personnel must be conversant with the fact that no matter how carefully laid the plans may be, the varying combat conditions will cause many and sometimes entirely new adjustments to be made. Therefore, a plan that is not fluid and well-rounded will in all probability fail to accomplish the desired results which is to supply troops at the earliest possible time with the things they need the most.

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ANNEX NO. 3 to G-4 LESSONS:

TRANSPORTATION LESSONS - HOLLANDIA OPERATION

1. A large number of ships arrived in the Humboldt Bay area with no advance notice. Most vessels arrived with no advice in advance as to the units and cargo aboard. Only preliminary arrangements should be made for reception of units and cargo due to the absence of this information.

2. It was necessary to make a continuous and exhaustive reconnaissance of possible jetty, landing craft landings, dumps, and storage sites in the Humboldt Bay area in order to utilize small craft at the maximum efficiency.

3. It would be desirable to distribute bulk stores on LSTs so as to avoid concentration on one vessel or group of vessels.

4. Most motor vehicles were too heavily loaded and not equipped with chains on all four wheels. This resulted in bogging down on soft beaches. It is essential to keep loads within limits.

5. Ships pre-loaded for an operation must have complete detailed manifest and storage plans with the vessel and landing forces. The same applies to subsequent arrivals in order to permit intelligent calling forward of vessels.

6. It is a waste of valuable fast shipping tonnage to use troop transports or fast ships, such as the Poland Victory, for resupply vessels. Resupply vessels should be considered as floating storage. On the Poland Victory (the vessel arrived directly from the United States) there was far too much tonnage, shoring, and separation by aisles in the cargo loading.

7. In this operation, only about 10 days were available for planning and organization by the task force transportation section. It is recommended that in future operations more time should be allowed for administrative organization and preparation of the transportation plan for the task force.

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ANNEX NO. 4 to G-4 LESSONS:

ORDNANCE LESSONS - HOLLANDIA OPERATION

In planning for this operation, the ordnance problem was complicated by release of units to Corps control late in the staging period and changing directives as to how much ammunition should accompany the assault units. While it was known what troops were to be assigned for the task, prior to Corps gaining control of them, inspection had to be made by courtesy and determination of critical shortages by suspicion.

More ordnance troops by percentage were involved than ever before in an operation in this theater and consisted of the Hq and Hq Det, 194th Ord Maint Bn, 287th and 410th Ord MM Cos, 642d and 649th Ord Ammunition Cos, and 171st Ord Depot Co, 2 Tank Maint Dets, 4 AA Repair Teams and 2 Bomb Disposal Units.

PLAN

After the Task Force took over the supply, an Ordnance Maintenance Battalion became the administrative and supply headquarters for all units. It consisted of the units listed above.

EXECUTION

The main staging areas were Goodenough Island and Cape Cretin, the latter adjacent to Base "F" at Finschafen and Army Headquarters. The latter staging area was the larger and also the main base for resupply. The final equipping of the Task Force troops presented no difficulties not unusual in this theater. At Base "F" it became necessary to send ordnance personnel of the Task Force into the Ordnance Depot to assist in obtaining essential items required for the Force.

Approximately 75% of the Ordnance Section formed part of the Task Force Liaison Group at Base "F" for the purpose of equipping and resupply, the advance elements arriving there on D - 16. It was expected if assault forces met serious resistance the resupply problem would be of major importance. By reason of lack of enemy resistance the only interesting instance of resupply developed through enemy action in destroying the supplies from 11 LSTs at White Beach 2. When instructions reached Task Force Liaison Group that these supplies would be replaced on the D + 8 shipment, the normal loading of that shipment was in progress. It became necessary to eliminate organizations from the allotted shipping and substitute supplies and ammunition to the extent necessary to reach the above requirement. The resulting confusion showed a lack of the following essential features at the resupply base:

a. Traffic control.

b. Ammunition data except for the dead weight tonnage.

c. An understanding of the problem as what was required to make a change of that nature in relation to the time and space factor.

As a result, it was not possible to learn what ammunition went forward in the D + 8 shipment, but it is reasonable to assume that the losses of the ammunition on the 11 LSTs was totally replaced through the

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D + 12 shipment. The cessation of hostilities eliminated the resupply problem.

The other 25% of the Ordnance Section went in on D Day with the advance echelon of Task Force Command. Its purpose was to assist the ordnance officers of both landing forces and to coordinate the ammunition resupply requirements for prompt transmission to the supply base at Base "F". The principal jobs of this group turned out entirely different than expected.

The operational area proved to be a huge enemy supply base with no resistance offered. Allied aerial and naval bombardments left many duds, both Allied and Enemy, in the area. Bomb disposal, particularly of enemy incendiaries, became an immediate problem. In two days, one officer disposed of over 100 incendiaries, many of them burning. Separate bomb disposal squads should be used. Effort to make bomb disposal a secondary function of an ammunition company is not successful.

The other problem was the collection of several hundred tons of enemy ordnance material, exclusive of still undetermined quantities of ammunition. No skilled salvage personnel was available.

The operation proceeded to be a battle of terrain not of enemy. Consequently, little trouble was experienced with armament problems. Motor maintenance problems occurred due to continual use of vehicles in salt water or mud of axle depth. Ordnance MM Companies going into future operations should be supplied with a pressure water pump of sufficient size to wash quickly salt water, muck, etc., from vehicles.

Ammunition expenditure from firing was negligible. However, severe losses occurred due to enemy bombing of extremely congested beaches.

Less ammunition should be used in assault phases. The ultimate level should not be put in with the assault troops. It cannot be handled on the beaches. The levels should be built up gradually by resupply based solely on expenditures.

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ANNEX NO. 5 to G-4 LESSONS:

MEDICAL LESSONS - HOLLANDIA OPERATION

1. Supplies for all medical units to meet the situation were available in adequate quantities at the medical supply point for each force. However, had the opposition been greater than that encountered, it would have resulted in a serious shortage of supplies throughout the operational area, due to the losses sustained in the bombing and subsequent fire which occurred on the night of D + 1. The 19th and 21st Regimental Combat Teams had difficulty in getting replacement supplies over the trails, hence they tried to employ packboards to carry all of their medical supplies, but unfortunately many loads were dumped along the route of march as the carriers became exhausted. Further, it is to be noted that the recovery of air droppings by these units was not very successful for it is estimated that only 5 to 10 per cent of the items were available for use, due to the damage which resulted from ground contact, to the inaccessible areas in which supplies landed, and to substitutive measures employing artillery liaison planes and untrained individuals rather than well-trained personnel.

2. The characteristics of the terrain and the tactical disposition of troops presented very definite obstacles to evacuation. It was necessary to employ hand-carry, litter-bearer, jeep-ambulance and various types of small boats as methods of evacuating casualties from the places where combat elements were in contact with the enemy. Further evacuation from one medical installation to another included, in addition to those measures already described, the use of small liaison planes, the standard 3/4-ton ambulance and all other types of vehicles. The casualties and non-battle cases which were estimated to require more than 15 days for recovery were evacuated by air transport and by returning LSTs, the latter were staffed by naval personnel consisting of 3 medical officers and 13 Corps men.

3. As the situation has developed, it is evident that there were several medical units present in the area which were not required; however, it was anticipated that the landing forces would meet more opposition than they did. Such a situation would have produced many more casualties, hence the basic plan was adequate and well-balanced to meet all expectancies and it has been flexible and capable under all of the conditions encountered.

4. In the future, air evacuation could be facilitated by having the air evacuation officer fly into the area on one of the first troop carriers and then having him remain in the area, rather than having him come in at an early date by boat and then leave the area by air when air transport facilities have finally been established.

5. A great quantity of medical supplies were found in captured Japanese dumps, the quality of which appeared to meet well recognized standards. Many of the items in satisfactory condition were taken over by the medical supply establishments in the area and they will be issued whenever possible.

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ANNEX NO. 6 to G-4 LESSONS:

SIGNAL LESSONS - HOLLANDIA OPERATION

1. Conferences with Sixth Army relative to the supply of signal equipment and materiel for Operation "G" began as early as 2 March 1944. The supply section of Signal Office, Sixth Army, prepared total list of requirements to cover initial depot stock as well as the considerable quantity of Class IV signal equipment designated for the advance projects contemplated. Army assumed responsibility for accumulating the above at Base "F" and for shipping based upon Task Force priorities to the operational area.

2. With the exception of a certain few specialized items of equipment, no critical shortages of signal supply have been revealed up to the present date. The exception mentioned concerned Radar parts which were required by anti-aircraft due to unforeseen failure.

3. In common with all other services, inability to move supplies from temporary beach dumps to units and projects requiring them has created a serious impediment in the progress of signal communication activities.

4. Higher priorities on engineer troops, gasoline, and rations prevented the completion of movement of signal troops from the beach to assembly areas

5. Use of small craft to move emergency needs for signal supplies, both for organizational needs and project requirements, has proven to be vital and, in fact, certain phases of communications would have come to a complete standstill without the employment of this expedient.

6. Signal troops and supplies must be given a high order of priority to insure their early operational status. The entire logistical functioning is dependent in large measure upon good communications and its efficient operation can only be effected by giving necessary precedence to the personnel and supplies needed to make communication function at the earliest possible moment.

7. Adequate experienced supply personnel must be made available to Task Force Signal Officer well in advance of the planning phase of an operation.

8. Careful prior planning for and the provision of adequate protective materials for signal supplies must be accomplished. This applies not only to protective cover for equipment and supplies taken ashore by troops in the assault phase but also to large tarpaulins, lumber, and other materials required to protect supplies and equipment in temporary dumps until permanent facilities can be arranged.

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INCLOSURES

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I N D E X

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HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
A.P.O. 565
1200 K 27 March 1944

FO 1

Maps: SPAVIN Aeronautical Series, Sheets A-6, A-7, A-8, B-6, B-7, B-8. Small scale - 1:1,000,000.
ABATTOIR Series, Sheets, RECKLESS, CORDIAL, ORDERLYTENT, ADRIENE. Intermediate scale - 1:250,000.
Provisional Map, RECKLESS, Intermediate scale - 1:253,440.
Special Map, LETTERPRESS to NOISELESS, 2 sheets, Medium scale - 1:75,000.
Provisional Map, RECKLESS. Medium scale - 1:63,360.
Special Map, RECKLESS. Large scale - 1:20,000.

1. a. G-2 Intelligence Summary. (See Annex 1)

b. (1) Allied forces of the Southwest Pacific continue offensive operations against the enemy with strategical support of land, air, and naval forces of the South Pacific.

(2) The following missions have been assigned by General Headquarters, SWPA:

(a) The ALLIED AIR Forces will:

1. Support the operation by:

Providing aerial reconnaissance and photography as required.

Attacking enemy air bases along the northern coast of CENTRAL to include PERSECUTION; and RECKLESS prior to D-1 and after FIFTH FLEET leaves that area. While fast carriers are in close support of the LETTERPRESS-NOISELESS assault, ALLIED AIR Forces attacks will be confined in this area to the hours of darkness.

Attacking hostile air installations in the BREAKFAST and western CENTRAL, with special emphasis on airfields in the LUXURIANT and in the vicinity of STIRRUPPUMP.

Providing fighter cover for convoys within range of land-based fighter aircraft.

Providing heavy bombardment as practicable of enemy ground defenses in the PERSECUTION-RECKLESS-LETTERPRESS-NOISELESS areas prior to D-1.

Providing close support as practicable upon request of Commander, ALAMO Force, in the PERSECUTION area, and in RECKLESS area after the departure of the FIFTH FLEET.

2. Continue to:

Deny the movement of hostile water-borne supply

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and reinforcement along the northern coast of CENTRAL.

Attack hostile naval vessels and shipping within range and outside of bombing restricted areas.

Support operations in the BREWER, ARABIC, and eastern CENTRAL.

3. Establish one group of fighters at PERSECUTION and three groups of fighters and one squadron of night fighters at RECKLESS at the earliest practicable date.

4. Provide air support of naval operations as arranged with Commander, ALLIED NAVAL Forces.

5. Provide "TOMCAT" cooperation of naval air, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, with cruiser covering forces as requested by the Commander, ALLIED NAVAL Forces.

6. Prepare to assist in the air neutralization of ANACONDA, FULLCRY, western CENTRAL and FEARSOME.

(b) The ALLIED NAVAL Forces, reinforced, will:

1. Support the operation by:

Transporting and landing elements of the assault and supporting forces and their supplies as required by the Commander, ALAMO Force, and furnishing the necessary naval protection therefor.

Providing escort carrier-based aircraft cover for overwater movements when beyond the range of land-based fighters until land-based fighters are established at PERSECUTION AND RECKLESS. (Escort carriers are to be released from operation not later than D + 19).

Providing close air support for the assault landing at PERSECUTION.

Being prepared to provide close air support to ground forces in the PERSECUTION Area as practicable.

After fast carriers leave the area, providing cover for landing and close air support as practicable to ground forces in the LETTERPRESS and NOISELESS areas.

Providing close naval support for landing operations.

Providing minesweeping and hydrographic survey of harbors and approaches.

2. Continue to:

Support the operation of ALAMO and CENTRAL

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[redacted]

Forces in the defense of occupied areas and forward bases in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.

Protect sea lanes of communication.

Deny seaborne reinforcement and supply within occupied hostile areas by destruction of hostile naval forces and shipping within range.

Provide offensive submarine reconnaissance.

3. Establish light naval forces at PERSECUTION and in the RECKLESS-NOISELESS areas at the earliest practicable date.

2. a. RECKLESS Task Force, supported by ALLIED NAVAL Forces, ALLIED AIR Forces and the FIFTH FLEET, making its main effort at NOISELESS will:

(1) By simultaneous landings within LETTERPRESS and NOISELESS seize and occupy those areas and rapidly exploit the success of the landings by seizing and occupying the RECKLESS airdrome areas.

(2) Prepare at the earliest practicable date installations to accommodate three fighter groups and one night fighter squadron.

(3) Assist the Commander, ALLIED AIR Forces in the establishment of the necessary air warning and radio navigational facilities.

(4) Establish additional airdrome facilities in the area as subsequently directed by ESCALATOR.

(5) Establish naval, port and base facilities in the objective areas as directed by ESCALATOR.

b. (1) D-Day — 22 April 1944 (Target Date)

(2) H-Hour — 0700K

c. Landing Forces:

(1) NOISELESS Landing Force:

(a) Commander:

Major General Frederick A. Irving, U.S.A.

(b) Effective date of organization:

23 March 1944

(c) Units and Staging: (Annex 2 a.)

(2) LETTERPRESS Landing Force:

(a) Commander:

Major General Horace H. Fuller, U.S.A.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(b) Effective date of organization

23 March 1944.

(c) Units and Staging: (Annex 2 b.)

(3) RECKLESS Task Force Reserve:

(a) Commander:

Colonel William W. Jenna, Inf.

(b) Effective date of organization:

23 March 1944

(c) Units and Staging: (Annex 2 c.)

(4) This operation will be divided into two phases:

(a) Phase One: Simultaneous landings in the LETTERPRESS-NOISELESS area by RECKLESS Task Force; seizure of beachheads, exploitation of landing successes, capture of RECKLESS airdromes; establishment of control and defense of areas occupied. Objective and phase lines shown on ANNEX 5 - OPERATIONS MAP.

(b) Phase Two: Consolidation, land and seaward defense of areas occupied, and the execution of the construction missions assigned by ESCALATOR.

3. a. NOISELESS Landing Force will:

(1) Land on D-Day in the AMMETER-AERIALIST area, advance and rapidly seize control of its First Phase Line.

(2) Establish control over the ALARMIST area and neutralize located enemy installations threatening ANF shipping entering NOISELESS.

(3) Advance, on orders from the Commander, NOISELESS Landing Force, and seize successively its Second Phase Line, its Third Phase Line, and Force Objective.

(4) Extend control over the area which it occupies to prevent enemy ground interference with the construction and operation of air, naval and supply facilities within these areas.

(5) Consolidate and defend all occupied areas.

(6) Not advance beyond First Red Phase Line prior to 0945K and not advance beyond Second Phase Line prior to 1045K.

b. LETTERPRESS Landing Force will:

(1) Land on D-Day on the west side of LETTERPRESS, advance and rapidly seize control of its First Phase Line.

(2) Advance, on orders of the Commander, LETTERPRESS Landing Force, seize control of successive phase lines, and assist NOISELESS Landing Force in seizing the Task Force Objective.

(3) Neutralize located enemy installations threatening ANF shipping entering LETTERPRESS.

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(4) Extend control over the area which it occupies to prevent enemy ground interference with the construction and operation of air, naval, and supply facilities within these areas.

(5) Consolidate and defend all occupied areas.

(6) Not advance beyond First White Phase Line prior to 0945K and will not advance beyond the Second White Phase Line prior to 1030K.

c. RECKLESS Task Force Reserve:

(1) Will land on D plus 2 in either the NOISELESS or RECKLESS area as directed by the Commander, RECKLESS Task Force, prepared to:

(a) Reinforce the NOISELESS Landing Force.

(b) Move into assembly position in the NOISELESS area as reserve for NOISELESS Landing Force.

(c) Reinforce LETTERPRESS Landing Force.

(2) The Commanding Officer, RECKLESS Task Force Reserve, will familiarize himself with the plans of the NOISELESS and LETTERPRESS Landing Forces and in conjunction with them prepare plans for the possible employment of his force. A liaison officer from his headquarters will land with each Landing Force commander.

x. (1) The Commanders, Landing Forces and Task Force Reserve, will submit their respective field orders to this headquarters on or before 5 April 1944.

(2) The commander of each close support naval force will be in control of amphibious operations within his area of operation. Control of forces ashore will be assumed by the respective landing force commanders upon their arrival ashore, and after notifying the commander of the close support naval force that he is ready to assume command of the forces ashore. Each landing force commander will promptly inform the Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force, by the most expeditious means upon his assumption of command of the forces ashore.

(3) Landing Force commanders will make frequent and prompt radio reports to the Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force, on the situation and the number of casualties. These reports to be in addition to the periodic reports required as of 1800K daily.

(4) When an enemy invasion in any of the objective areas occupied by RECKLESS Task Force is imminent, or in progress, the control of all forces in the threatened area will pass to the senior ground force commander in the threatened area.

(5) Units attached to landing forces will revert to the control of the RECKLESS Task Force upon order of its Commanding General.

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(6) All persons will observe the greatest secrecy in all phases of planning for this operation. Distribution of orders will be limited strictly to those who must know the complete operational plan. Each echelon will divulge only such parts of its instructions and at such times as deemed essential for action by next subordinate units.

(7) Pursuant to instructions from GHQ, coordination of air operations during the overwater movement and over the target areas will be effected generally as follows:

(a) Senior Allied Air Force controllers and Naval air support commanders will report to the Commander, Naval Attack Forces, for duty as follows:

1. They will accompany Naval Attack Force Commanders, advise them concerning the capabilities of supporting aircraft, and control the action of the planes of their respective services. If the fast carriers are still providing close support when the Landing Force Commanders assume command ashore, senior Naval controllers will accompany Landing Force Commanders ashore and continue to act in the same capacity as while aboard ship.

2. Fighter Control Groups and Air Liaison Officers from Allied Air and Allied Naval Forces will be aboard Fighter Director Ships at each of the two landing areas. Air Liaison Officers from Allied Air and Allied Naval Forces will accompany Landing Force commanders ashore and act as advisors with respect to the close air support to be provided. Fighter Director Groups aboard ship will control fighter aircraft in the vicinity until Fighter Director facilities can be established ashore.

Administrative Order 1.

a. See Annex 7 - Signal Orders.

(1) Radio silence will be observed by all elements of this command effective when the troops are embarked.

(2) Radio silence will be lifted:

(a) When attacked by the enemy or when the element of surprise has been lost.

(b) For voice operated radios of less than 15 watts output when the leading wave of troops crosses the line of departure.

b. Command Posts:

(1) ESCALATOR: SHAGGY

Advance echelon (temporary): Enroute to objective area

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[redacted]

and during landing operations on destroyer with Naval attack force supporting RECKLESS Task Force. Subsequently: to be announced.

(2) RECKLESS Task Force: MICROCOSM:

With commander of supporting naval task force enroute and during landing operations. Subsequently: to be announced.

(3) NOISELESS Landing Force: MICROCOSM

With commander of close support naval task force enroute and during landing operation. Location ashore to be reported.

(4) LETTERPRESS Landing Force: SHAGGY

With commander of close support naval task force enroute and during landing operation. Location ashore to be reported.

(5) RECKLESS Task Force Reserve: MICROCOSM

Enroute and during landing operation on board naval transport carrying reserve. Location ashore to be reported.

s/ R. L. Eichelberger
t/ R. L. EICHELBERGER
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army
Commanding

1 Incl: Code Names

ANNEXES:

1 - Intelligence
2a - Units and Staging - NOISELESS Landing Force
2b - Units and Staging - LETTERPRESS Landing Force
2c - Units and Staging - RECKLESS Landing Force Reserve
2d - Units and Staging - Units destined to go into NOISELESS area
2e - Units and Staging - Units destined to go into LETTERPRESS area
3 - Loading and Embarkation Schedule (Not included)
4 - Anti-aircraft Artillery
5 - Operation Map (NOISELESS-LETTERPRESS area)
6 - Assignment of Shipping
7 - Signal
8 - Engineer (Not included)
9 - Artillery
10 - Chemical

DISTRIBUTION:

ESCALATOR - 3
C.T.F. 76 - 3
CG Advon 5 - 8
CG NOISELESS Landing Force - 3
CG LETTERPRESS Landing Force - 3
CO RECKLESS Task Force Reserve - 2
C/S RECKLESS - 1

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DISTRIBUTION: (Cont'd)

G-1 RECKLESS - 1
G-2 RECKLESS - 1
G-3 RECKLESS - 20
G-4 RECKLESS - 4
F.A. RECKLESS - 1
A.A. RECKLESS - 1
A.G. RECKLESS - 1
Q.M. RECKLESS - 1
ORD. RECKLESS - 1
SURG. RECKLESS - 1
SIG. RECKLESS - 1
ENGR. RECKLESS - 1
CML. RECKLESS - 1
AIR LIAISON - 1

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HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
APO 565
1200K 27 March 1944

ANNEX 1 to FO 1, INTELLIGENCE

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION:

See current intelligence summaries and estimates.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION:

a. What is the strength, composition and dispositions of enemy forces in the LETTERPRESS - NOISELESS area?

b. Will the enemy attempt reinforcement of the LETTERPRESS - NOISELESS area? If so, when, where, in what force, from what bases and by what means?

c. Will the enemy interfere with our concentration of troops, supplies and transportation by aerial and naval attacks on our staging areas? If so, when, where, in what force and from what bases?

d. Will the enemy attempt to interdict our water-borne movement toward the LETTERPRESS - NOISELESS area by aerial and naval attack? If so, when, where, in what force and from what bases?

e. To what extent will the enemy defend the LETTERPRESS - NOISELESS area? Where, in what strength and how will he dispose his forces?

f. Will the enemy launch a counter-offensive to retake LETTERPRESS and NOISELESS, and attempt to reestablish his control over the area? If so, when, where, in what force and from what bases?

g. Does the enemy have any knowledge of our plans? If so, to what extent? How, when and where will he react?

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS:

a. As soon as practicable after landing the Commanders of the LETTERPRESS and the NOISELESS landing forces will recruit and organize appropriate detachments of native scouts for reconnaissance purposes under the direction of the RECKLESS Task Force Commander and with the supervision of the Netherlands personnel attached for that purpose.

b. The responsibility for reconnaissance of the coastal area between WROUGHTIRON - NOISELESS and LETTERPRESS and to point twenty miles east of SPEEDWAY will be assumed by the Task Force Commander, and coordinated with Commanders Allied Air Forces and Allied Naval Forces.

c. Landing Force Commanders will arrange for vigorous ground patrolling throughout the area of their operations, with especial attention to location of defensive installations, artillery, air warning installations, ammunition and other dumps, location of reserves and troop movements.

d. Commander NOISELESS Landing Force will:

(1) Conduct vigorous reconnaissance along the following tracks;

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and establish and maintain outposts thereon:

(a) AMMETER - BALBRIGGAN - BAGPIPE.
(b) ALARMIST - AERIALIST.
(c) ALARMIST - BANDORE.
(d) BARRACUDA - BEGONIA.
(e) BESHAWL - KOHIRABI.

(2) Conduct vigorous reconnaissance in the vicinity BAROSCOPE. Special attention to any enemy movements in strength toward this area.

e. Commander LETTERPRESS Landing Force will maintain observation along the following tracks:

(1) SIDEBURN - RINGLEADER.
(2) SIDEBURN - SKYROCKET.

Special attention to enemy activities and direction of troop movements.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS:

a. See Par. 4, SOP (Intelligence) I Corps, dated 14 March 1944.

b. Interrogation teams will be attached to the RECKLESS Task Force, the NOISELESS Landing Force and the LETTERPRESS Landing Force.

c. Task Force Headquarters will make the necessary administrative arrangements with the Netherlands personnel previous to D-Day.

5. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS:

a. Maps:

(1) Small Scale:

(a) 1:1,000,000 SPAVIN Aeronautical Series, sheets: A-6, A-7, A-8, B-6, B-7, B-8.

(2) Intermediate Scale:

(a) 1:250,000 ABATTOIR Series, Sheets: RECKLESS, CORDIAL, ORDERLYTENT, ADRIENE.

(b) 1:253,440, Provisional.

(3) Medium Scale:

(a) 1:75,000, Special Map, LETTERPRESS to NOISELESS, in two sheets.

(b) 1:63,360, Provisional map, available about 7 April, 1944. sheets: AVOCADOS, BALERINA, NOISELESS, BARONESS, CRAWFISH, CELESTA, SPEEDWAY.

(4) Large Scale:

(a) 1:20,000, Special Map.

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(5) Place names and localities included within the areas covered by the 1:20,000 line and photo maps of NOISELESS - LETTERPRESS will be referred to as designated thereon, regardless of variance from any other maps. Place and locality names on existing maps will be used as shown. Local place names will not be used in lieu of approved names. In the event a village or other locality is found to be located in a place different from that shown on maps, or a new village or other locality is found bearing the same names as one shown on maps, then the new village or other locality will be referred to as - Village (giving name) #2, #3, etc. If reference is made to a place name not shown on prescribed maps, such reference will include coordinates and map used.

b. Photographs:

See Par. 5, SOP (Intelligence) I Corps, dated 14 March, 1944.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

See Par. 6, SOP (Intelligence) I Corps, dated 14 March, 1944.

7. PROPAGANDA:

Activities will be under control of the RECKLESS Task Force Commander.

8. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION:

See SOP (Intelligence) I Corps, dated 14 March, 1944.

9. REPORTERS, PHOTOGRAPHERS, OBSERVERS, AND RADIO BROADCASTERS:

See Par. 8, SOP (Intelligence) I Corps, dated 14 March, 194

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS,
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

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HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
APO 565
1500K 14 April 1944

ANNEX NO. 2 to FO 1 - TROOP ASSIGNMENT.

1. The organizations listed in Annexes 2a and 2b are under the operational control of the Commanding Generals of the respective landing forces until relieved by the Commanding General, Reckless Task Force.

2. The organizations listed in Annex 2c are under the operational control of the Reckless Task Force Reserve until relieved by the Commanding General, Reckless Task Force.

3. The organizations listed in Annexes 2d and 2e and not included in Annexes 2a, 2b, or 2c, are under the operational control of the Commanding General, Reckless Task Force.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

Bowen
G-3

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HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
APO 565
1200K, 27 March 1944

ANNEX 2a to FO 1 - TROOP ASSIGNMENT

UNITS OF THE NOISELESS LANDING FORCE

Unit	Staging Area
24th Infantry Division (less 34th Combat Team)	MICROCOSM
Hq. 24th Inf Div	"
Hq Co, 24th Inf Div	"
24th MP Plat	"
24th Inf Div Band	"
24th Sig Co	"
24th Med Bn	"
24th Cav Recon Troop	"
24th QM Co	"
724th Ord LM Co	"
3rd Engr Bn (C)	"
Hq, 24th Div Arty	"
Hq Btry, 24th Div Arty	"
Med Det, 24th Div Arty	"
11th FA Bn	"
13th FA Bn	"
52nd FA Bn	"
19th Inf	"
21st Inf	"
7th Port Surg Hosp	"
16th Port Surg Hosp	"
2nd Plat & Det 1st Plat, 36th MP Co	"
168th FA Bn (less Btry A)	"
1st Sound Ranging Plat	"
Hq & Hq Btry, 94th AAA Gp	"
163rd AAA Gun Bn	"
104th CA Bn (AA)(AW) (less Btry C)	"
Btry A, 227th AAA SL Bn	"
Co A, 641st TD Bn	"
Co A, 1st Tank Bn, 1st Marine Div	"
542nd Engr B & S Regt (less Co B & Regtl Hq Co (less Dets))	"
239th Engr Bn (C) (less Co A)	"
Survey Plat (less Survey Det), 67th Engr Topo Co	"
1 Det, Tank Maint	"
Co C, 262nd Med Bn	"
604th Med Clr Co	"
642nd Ord Am Co	"
2 AA Repair Teams, 253rd Ord Maint Co	"
362nd QM Service Co	"
357th QM Service Co	"
2nd Plat, 1998th QM Trk Co	"
1 Plat, 601st QM GR Co	"
Weather Station Section	"

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS,
Brig Gen, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Bowen
G-3

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HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
APO 565
1200K, 27 March 1944

ANNEX 2b to FO 1 - TROOP ASSIGNMENT

UNITS OF THE LETTERPRESS LANDING FORCE

Unit	Staging Area
41st Infantry Division (less 1 RCT)	REDHERRING
Hq, 41st Inf Div	"
Hq Co, 41st Inf Div	"
41st MP Plat	"
41st Inf Div Band	"
41st Sig Co	"
116th Med Bn (less Co B)	"
41st Cav Recon Tr	"
41st QM Co	"
741st Ord LM Co	"
116th Engr Bn (C) (less Co A)	"
Hq, 41st Div Arty	"
Hq Btry, 41st Div Arty	"
Med Det, 41st Div Arty	"
218th FA Bn	"
146th FA Bn	"
205th FA Bn	"
162nd Inf	"
186th Inf	"
947th FA Bn	"
Cos C & D, 641st TD Bn	"
Hq & Hq Btry, 116th AAA Gp	"
Btry B, 227th AAA SL Bn	"
165th AAA Gun Bn	"
469th AAA AW Bn	"
603rd Tank Co (less 1 Plat), 1st Cav Div	"
1 Survey Det, 67th Engr Topo Co	"
79th Engr Bn (C)	"
92nd Evac Hosp	"
12th Port Surg Hosp	"
26th Port Surg Hosp	"
Co B, 262nd Med Bn	"
287th Ord MM Co	"
649th Ord Am Co	"
2 AA Repair Teams, 253rd Ord Maint Co	"
1 Det, Tank Maint	"
AMF Pigeon Det	"
Co B (less Det), 442nd Sig Const Bn	"
993rd QM Service Co	"
4189th QM Service Co	"
3522nd QM Trk Co	"
1 Plat, 2058th QM Trk Co (Avn)	"
601st QM Graves Reg Co (less Dets)	"
532nd Engr B & S Regt	"

By Command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:
/s/ Bowen G-3

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HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
A.P.O. 565
1200K, 27 March 1944

ANNEX 2 c to FO 1 - TROOP ASSIGNMENT.

RECKLESS TASK FORCE RESERVE

	Unit	Staging Area
1.	34th Inf RCT	MICROCOSM
	34th Inf	"
	63rd FA Bn	"
	10th Port Surg Hosp	"
	Btry C, 104th CA AA (AW)	"
	407th Medical Coll Co	"
	Co A, 239th Engr Bn (C)	"

2. The commanding officer of the Task Force Reserve will be prepared, in the event of an independent landing by the Reserve, to use part of his forces as a small beach party to unload the necessary supplies and equipment. Shore installations will be developed to handle resupply by small boats until such a time as the Reserve forces can be supplied from the main beachhead installations.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS,
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

s/ Bowen

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HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
APO 565
1200K, 27 March 1944

ANNEX 2d to FO 1 - TROOP ASSIGNMENT

UNITS OF THE RECKLESS TASK FORCE

DESTINED TO GO INTO THE NOISELESS AREA

Unit	Staging Area
Hq & Hq Co, I Corps	MICROCOSM
Hq & Hq Btry, I Corps Arty	"
58th Sig Bn, I Corps (less Cos A & C)	"
442nd Sig Const Bn Avn (less Co B (less Det))	REDHERRING
Det, Co B, 442nd Sig Const Bn	MICROCOSM
8th Radio Sta Sec, 832nd Sig Service Co	"
21st Radio Sta Sec, 832nd Sig Service Co	REDHERRING
Hq & Hq Btry, 227th AAA SL Bn	MICROCOSM
36th MP Co (less 3 Plats)	"
181st FA Bn	REDHERRING
Btry A, 168th FA Bn	"
720th CA Btry (155)	BENEVOLENT
408th Med Coll Co	MICROCOSM
54th Mal Cont Unit	"
55th Mal Cont Unit	"
6th Mal Surv Unit	"
36th Evac Hosp	"
21st Med Sup Plat (Avn)	REDHERRING
Hq & Hq Det, 194th Ord Bn	"
410th Ord MM Co	MICROCOSM
171st Ord Depot Co	REDHERRING
Unit 4, 94th Cml Comp Co	MICROCOSM
1 S & I Sec, 201st Sig Depot Co	REDHERRING
2nd Radio Rep Sec, 176th Sig Rep Co	"
Co B & Regtl Hq Co (less Dets) 542nd EB & SR	"
Co B, 562nd Boat Maint Bn	"
339th Engr Regt (GS)	BENEVOLENT
860th Engr Avn Bn	MICHAELMAS
841st Engr Avn Bn (less Co B)	BACKHANDER
Co B, 841st Engr Avn Bn	REDHERRING
842nd Engr Avn Bn	SCHOOLBOY
836th Engr Avn Bn	TEACUP
576th Engr Dump Trk Co	REDHERRING
198th Engr Dump Trk Co	BENEVOLENT
490th Engr Base Equip Co	"
492nd Engr Base Equip Co	MICHAELMAS
Plat, 464th Engr Depot Co	BENEVOLENT
1 Plat, 477th Engr Maint Co	BACKHANDER
477th Engr Maint Co (less 2 Plats)	REDHERRING
1002nd Engr Hq (CZ Sec)	"
67th Engr Topo Co (less Survey Plat	MICROCOSM
3527th QM Trk Co	REDHERRING
3876th QM Gas Supply Co	MICROCOSM
609th Port Co	REDHERRING
2 Plats, 109th QM Bkry Co	"
1 Plat, 342nd QM Depot Co	MICROCOSM
2nd & 4th Plats, 5th Sp Serv Co	"
565th Army Postal Unit	"
11th Air Liaison Party	"

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Unit	Staging Area
13th Air Liaison Party	MICROCOSM
16th Air Liaison Party	"
31st Fighter Sub-Sector Units	"
Assault Ech Det, Co D, 583rd Sig AW Bn	"
21st LW Rep Plat, Co D, 583rd Sig AW Bn	"
22nd LW Rep Plat, Co D, 583rd Sig AW Bn	"
23rd LW Rep Plat, Co D, 583rd Sig AW Bn	"
24th LW Rep Plat, Co D, 583rd Sig AW Bn	
Plot Sec, Co D, 583rd Sig AW Bn	"
Adv Ech, Hq Plat, Co D, 583rd Sig AW Bn	"
Rear Ech, Hq Plat, Co D, 583rd Sig AW Bn	"

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Bowen
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HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
A.P.O. 565
1200K, 27 March 1944

ANNEX 2e to FO 1 - TROOP ASSIGNMENT

UNITS OF THE RECKLESS TASK FORCE

DESTINED TO GO INTO THE LETTERPRESS AREA

Unit	Staging Area
Det, Hq. I Corps Arty	REDHERRING
Hq. & Hq. Co. 641st TD Bn	"
718th CA Btry (155mm)	"
Co B(Coll), 135th Med Regt	"
409th Med Coll Co	"
605th Med Clr Co	"
29th Malaria Survey Unit	"
5th Malaria Control Unit	"
56th Malaria Control Unit	"
27th Med Supply Plat (Avn)	"
Unit 2, 94th Cml Comp Co	"
Hq. & Hq. Co, 1113th Engr Combat Group	"
46th Engr Regt (GS)	ACACIA
240th Engr Bn (C)	REDHERRING
931st Engr Avn Regt(less 3 Bns)	"
870th Engr Avn Bn	"
1879th Engr Avn Bn	"
1881st Engr Avn Bn	SCHOOLBOY
1913th Engr Avn Bn	BACKHANDER
865th Engr Avn Bn	REDHERRING
617th Engr Base Equip Co	TEACUP
414th Engr Dump Trk Co	REDHERRING
Hq & Hq Co, 1052nd Port Const and Rep Gp	"
736th Engr Heavy Shop Co	"
Co. A, 796th Engr Forestry Bn	"
464th Engr Depot Co (Avn)(less 1 Plat)	BENEVOLENT
1 Plat, 477th Engr Maint Co	SCHOOLBOY
781st Petrol Dist Co	REDHERRING
3818th QM Gas Supply Co (less 1 Plat)	"
296th Port Co	"
1 Plat, 244th Port Co	"
109th QM Bkry Co (less 2 Plats)	"
342nd QM Depot Sup Co (less 2 Plats)	"
14th Air Liaison Party	"
31st Fighter Sub-Sector Units	"
Det 15, Rep Plat, Co E, 565th Sig AW Bn	"
19th Rep Plat, Co D, 583rd Sig AW Bn	"
20th Rep Plat, Co D, 583rd Sig AW Bn	"

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS,
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:
/s/ Bowen
G-3

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ANNEX 3a to FO 1 - RECKLESS TASK FORCE

LANDING SCHEDULE OF
UNITS DESTINED TO GO INTO NOISELESS AREA
SUBSEQUENT TO D / 2

D / 8

UNIT	LOADING AREA
842 Engr Avn Bn	SCHOOLBOY
Det, 1002 Engr Hq (CZ)	"
Hq Det, 931 Engr Avn Regt	"
181 FA Bn (- Rr Ech)	REDHERRING
36th Evac Hosp (- Rr Ech)	"
2nd Plat, 723 Sig AW Bn	"
S&I Sec, 201st Sig Dep Co	"
21st Radio Sta Team	"
21st Med Sup Plat	"
609th Port Co (- Rr Ech)	"
2 Plats, 109th QM Bkry Co	"
1 Plat, 342nd QM Dep Co	"
6th Malaria Survey Unit	"
442nd Sig Const Bn (- Det)	"
Det, QM Sec, I Corps	"

D / 12

Hq & Hq Co, I Corps (-Rr Ech)	MICROCOSM
Hq & Hq Btry, I Corps Arty (- Rr Ech)	"
Rr Ech, 583rd Sig AW Bn	"
Unit 4, 94th Cml Comp Co	"
Det, 1002 Engr Hq (CZ)	"
3876 QM Gas Sup Co (- Rr Ech)	"
58th Sig Bn & Det, 442nd Sig Const Bn (- Rr Ech)	"
Hq & Hq Btry, 227th AAA SL Bn (- Rr Ech)	"
408 Med Coll Co (- Rr Ech)	"
54th Malaria Control Unit	"
55th Malaria Control Unit (- Rr Ech)	"
410th Ord MM Co (- Rr Ech)	"
67th Engr Topo Co (- Survey Plat & Rr Ech)	"
2nd & 4th Plats, 5th Sp Serv Co	"
Kitchens of Noiseless Landing Force (45 - 2½ ton Trucks)	"
Det, 36th MP Co	"
565th Army Postal Unit	"
2nd Radio Rep Sec, 176th Sig Rep Co	REDHERRING
Co B, 562nd Boat Maint Bn	"
Det, 442nd Sig Const Bn (- Rr Ech)	"
2 Plats, 3527th QM Truck Co	"
Co B & Regtl Hq, 542nd EB & SR (- Rr Ech)	"

D / 20

836th Engr Avn Bn	TEACUP
Det, 171st Ord Dep Co	REDHERRING
477th Engr Maint Co (- 2 Plats & Rr Ech)	"
181st FA Bn (- Rr Ech)	"
Hq & Hq Det, 194th Ord Bn	"
3527th QM Truck Co (- 2 Plats & Rr Ech)	"

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UNIT	D / 28	LOADING AREA
860th Engr Avn Bn		MICHAELMAS
Rr Ech, 19th Inf		MICROCOSM
Rr Ech, 21st Inf		"
Rr Ech, 34th Inf		"

D / 36

492nd Engr Base Co	MICHAELMAS
171 Ord Dep Co (- Det)	REDHERRING
576 Engr Dump Truck Co	"
Rr Ech, 104th CA Bn AA AW	"
Rr Ech, 477 Engr Maint Co	"
Rr Ech, 181 FA Bn	"
Rr Ech, 542nd EB & SR	"
Rr Ech, 609th Port Co	"
Rr Ech, 36th Evac Hosp	"
Rr Ech, Co B, 562nd Boat Maint Bn	"
Rr Ech, 3rd Engr Bn	MICROCOSM
Rr Ech, 24 QM Co	"
Rr Ech, 542nd EB & SR	"
Rr Ech, Hq & Hq Btry, 24th Div Arty	"
Rr Ech, 11th FA Bn	"
Rr Ech, 13th FA Bn	"
Rr Ech, 52nd FA Bn	"
Rr Ech, 63rd FA Bn	"
Rr Ech, Hq & Hq Co, I Corps	"
Rr Ech, Hq & Hq Btry, I Corps Arty	"
Rr Ech, 58th Sig Bn	"
Rr Ech, 24th Cav Rcn Tr	"
Rr Ech, Hq & Hq Co, 24th Div	"
Rr Ech, 24th Sig Co	"
Rr Ech, 724th Ord LM Co	"
Rr Ech, 24th Med Bn	"
Rr Ech, Hq & Hq Btry, 94th AAA Group	"
Rr Ech, 1002nd Engr Hq (CZ)	REDHERRING
Rr Ech, 3527th QM Truck Co	"
Rr Ech, 442nd Sig Const Bn	"
Rr Ech, 163rd AAA Gun Bn	MICROCOSM
Rr Ech, 362nd QM Serv Co	"
Rr Ech, 357th QM Serv Co	"
Rr Ech, 601st QM GR Co	"
Rr Ech, 604th Med Clr Cc	"
Rr Ech, Co A, 641st TD Bn	"
Rr Ech, 3876 QM Gas Sup Co	"
Rr Ech, Btry A & Hq & Hq Btry, 227th AAA SL Bn	"
Rr Ech, 408th Med Coll Co	"
Rr Ech, 67th Engr Topo Co	"
Rr Ech, 410th Ord MM Co	"
Rr Ech, 168th FA Bn	"
Rr Ech, Co A, 1st Tank Bn, 1st Mar Div	"
Rr Ech, 55th Malaria Control Unit	"

D / 44

841st Engr Avn Bn (- Co B)	BACKHANDER
1 Plat, 477th Engr Maint Co	"
Co B, 841st Engr Avn Bn	REDHERRING

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ANNEX 3b to FO 1 - 'RECKLESS TASK FORCE

LANDING SCHEDULE OF
UNITS DESTINED TO GO INTO LETTERPRESS AREA
SUBSEQUENT TO D/2

D / 8

UNIT	LOADING AREA
1879th Engr Avn Bn	REDHERRING
Det, Hq & Hq Co, 1113th Engr Gp	"
Det, 781st Petrol Dist Co	"
27th Med Supply Plat Avn	"
296th Port Co (- Rr Ech)	"
605th Med Clr Co (-Rr Ech)	"
Unit 2, 94th Cml Comp Co	"
3818th QM Gas Sup Co (- 1 Plat & Rr Ech)	"
409th Med Coll Co (- Rr Ech)	"
342nd QM Depot Co (- 2 Plats)	"
931st Engr Avn Regt (- 3 Bns)	"
109th QM Bkry Co (- 2 Plats & Rr Ech)	"
29th Mal Survey Unit	"
Det, Co B, 442 Sig Const Bn	"
Det, QM Sec, I Corps	"
532 EB & SR	"

D / 12

781st Petrol Dist Co (- Advance Det & Rr Ech)	REDHERRING
865th Engr Avn Bn	"
Co B, 135th Med Regt (- Rr Ech)	"
Letterpress Landing Force Kitchens	"
5th Malaria Control Unit	"
56th Malaria Control Unit	"
Co A, 796th Forestry Bn (- Rr Ech)	"
1 Plat, 244th Port Co	"

D / 20

870th Engr Avn Bn	REDHERRING
532 EB & SR	"
718 CA Btry	"
931st Engr Avn Regt (- 3 Bns)	"
Det, Hq & Hq Co, 41st Div	"
Hq & Hq Det, 1113 Engr Group	"

D / 28

617 Engr Base Equip Co	TEACUP
240th Engr Bn (C)	REDHERRING
Rr Ech, 239th Engr Combat Bn	"
Rr Ech, 947th FA Bn	"
Rr Ech, Btry B, 227 AAA SL Bn	"
Rr Ech, Cos C & D, 641st TD Bn	"
Rr Ech, 116th AAA Gp	"
Rr Ech, 79th Engr Bn (C)	"
Rr Ech, Co B, 442nd Sig Bn	"

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UNIT	D / 28 (contd)	LOADING AREA
Rr Ech, 649th Ord Am Co		REDHERRING
Rr Ech, AA Repair Teams		"
Rr Ech, 993rd QM Serv Co		"
Rr Ech, 4189th QM Serv Co		"
Rr Ech, 2058th QM Trk Co		"
Rr Ech, 601st QM GR Co		"

D / 36

1913th Engr Avn Bn	BACKHANDER
736th Hvy Shop Co	REDHERRING
414 Engr Dump Truck Co	"
1 Plat, 477 Engr Maint Co	"
Hq & Hq Co, 641st TD Bn	"
Rr Ech, 41st MP Plat	"
Rr Ech, 41st Sig Co	"
Rr Ech, 41st Rcn Tr	"
Rr Ech, 41st QM Co	"
Rr Ech, 116th Engr Bn	"
Rr Ech, 41st Div Arty	"
Rr Ech, 218th FA Bn	"
Rr Ech, 146th FA Bn	"
Rr Ech, 205th FA Bn	"
Rr Ech, 603 Tank Co	"
Rr Ech, 92 Evac Hosp	"

D / 44

Rr Ech, 162nd Inf	REDHERRING
Rr Ech, 186th Inf	"
Rr Ech, Hq & Hq Co, 41st Inf Div	"
Rr Ech, 741st Ord LM Co	"
Rr Ech, 116th Engr Bn	"
Rr Ech, 605 Med Clr Co	"
Rr Ech, 296 Port Co	"
Rr Ech, 3818 QM Gas Sup Co	"
Rr Ech, 409 Med Coll Co	"
Rr Ech, 718 CA Btry	"
Rr Ech, 287 Ord MM Co	"
Rr Ech, 781 Petrol Dist Co	"
Rr Ech, Co A, 796 Forestry Bn	"
Rr Ech, Co B, 135 Med Regt	"
Rr Ech, Co B, 262 Med Bn	"
Rr Ech, 12 & 26 Port Surg Hosps	"
Rr Ech, 165 AAA Gun Bn	"
Rr Ech, 469 CA Bn (AA) (AW)	"

C. E. BYERS,
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Bowen
G-3

[redacted]

[redacted]

ANNEX 3c to FO I - RECKLESS TASK FORCE

UNITS DESTINED TO GO INTO
NOISELESS AND LETTERPRESS AREAS
BY USASOS SHIPPING

NOISELESS AREA

720th CA Btry

339th Engr Regt (GS)

198th Engr Dump Trk Co

490th Engr Base Equip Co

Plat, 464th Engr Depot Co

LETTERPRESS AREA

46th Engr Regt (GS)

464th Engr Dep Co (Avn) (-1 Plat)

1881st Engr Avn Bn

Hq & Hq Co, 1052nd Port Const & Rep Gp

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS,
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Bowen
G-3

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
A.P.O. 565
1200K, 27 March 1944

ANNEX 4 to FO 1 - ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY

1. Mission.

a. Assist in the AA defense of elements of the RECKLESS Task Force while afloat.

b. Provide AA defense for landing of forces.

c. Provide AA defense of beaches, docks, dromes and other vital areas.

2. Organization for Combat.

a. LETTERPRESS Landing Force.

116th AAA Group
166th AAA Bn (GUN)
469th AAA Bn (AW)
Btry B, 227th AAA SL Bn

b. NOISELESS Landing Force.

94th AAA Group
163rd AAA Bn (GUN)
104th CA Bn (AW)
227th AAA SL Bn (less Batteries B and C)

3. Special Instructions.

a. Augment AA Defense of vessels during overwater movement to objective employing the maximum number of automatic weapons on the weather decks of vessels.

b. Provide AA protection during unloading of vessels.

c. Be prepared to augment field artillery with AA weapons against ground and water borne targets. Air borne targets will have priority. Discretion as to the employment of AA weapons in the event of conflicting targets rests with the AA Commander.

e. Where practicable site searchlights to provide illumination for Seacoast Artillery. The employment of searchlights used in the combined LETTERPRESS and NOISELESS Landing Forces will be coordinated to provide maximum coverage.

f. Establish AAAIS and coordinate with Signal Air Warning and Fighter Sector.
Yellow alert will be given when an enemy or unidentified flight approaches within twenty minutes flying time of the area. Red alert will be given when such a flight approaches within ten minutes flying time.
Yellow alert will be telephoned to all AAA units, Air Corps and RECKLESS Task Force Headquarters only. Red alerts will be telephoned to same and will be supplemented by three blasts on a siren if available and three shots fired at five second intervals by a designated battery.
All Clear will be given by telephoning to switchboards.

[redacted]

[redacted]

The AA units will establish radio communication between forces for air warning intelligence. Frequency to be set in SOI.

g. Establish and operate AAOC and coordinate with 31st Fighter Sub-sector.

h. Coordinate AA fire of all units.

i. Common survey control and an official grid will be established by Landing Force Commanders. All orientation data will be corrected to conform with this official grid.

j. (1) Radar frequencies are assigned as follows:

Bun battalions:	199 mgs	Searchlight batteries:	199 mgs
	204		204
	206		206
	208		208
			210
			212

(2) Duplicating frequencies will be staggered at time of arrival on the beach and will be separated as much as tactical situation will permit.

(3) Frequencies 200 mgs. to 203 mgs. incl., are reserved for AWS.

k. 32nd AAA Brigade SOP will govern the operation of AA units.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Bowen
G-3

[redacted]

ANNEX 5 TO FIELD ORDER #1

OPERATIONS MAP

By Command of Lt. Gen. EICHELBERGER

C. E. BYERS.
Brig. Gen., GSC.
Chief of Staff

LEGEND

- Village
- Buildings or huts
- Streams
- Rain forest
- Secondary growth
- Boundary of flat area
- Mangroves
- Plantations
- Gardens
- Sand
- Scattered trees

PACIFIC OCEAN

TANAHMERAH BAY

TORARE BAY

1st RED PHASE LINE

2nd RED PHASE LINE

MOUNTAINS

CYCLOPS MOUNTAINS

DEJAGE PLAIN

SHARP RIDGE RISING TO ABOUT 1700 FEET

TASK FORCE OBJ

3rd WHITE PHASE LINE

2nd WHITE PHASE LINE

1st WHITE PHASE LINE

HUMBOLDT BAY

SENTANI LAKE

SEKOLIE PLAIN

ROUGH BROKEN TERRAIN DRAINAGE INDEFINITE

LOW UNDULATING HILLS

PROBABLE ELEVATION 600 FT

SKO COAST

SKO VILLAGES

TAMI DROME (under construction)

TAMI SWAMP

REPRODUCED BY 67TH ENGINEER TOPOGRAPHIC COMPANY, CORPS

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
A.P.O. 565
1200K, 27 March 1944

ANNEX 6 to FO 1 - ASSIGNMENT OF SHIPPING

D - DAY

NOISELESS

	Troops	Tons
3 APA	4000	1500
1 LSD	700	500
15 LCI	2800	
7 LST	3500	4900
1 AK	500	1000
	11,500	7,900

(LSD carries 14 LCMs,
11 LVTs and 2 LCV(P)s (Rocket)
LSTs carry 10 LCV(P)s
APAs carry 50 LCV(P)s
3 LCSs and 7 LCMs)

LETTERPRESS

	Troops	Tons
1 APA	1000	500
5 APD	720	
1 LSD	700	500
15 LCI	2800	
7 LST	3500	4900
1 AK	500	1000
	9,220	6,900

(LSD carries 14 LCMs,
11 LVTs and 2 LCV(P)s (Rocket)
LSTs carry 9 LCV(P)s
APA carries 15 LCV(P)s,
1 LCS and 2 LCMs)

D + 1 DAY

NOISELESS

	Troops	Tons
7 LST	3500	4900
1 AKA	1000	1000
	4,500	5,900

(LSTs carry 10 LCV(P)s.
AKA carry 3 LCMs)

LETTERPRESS

	Troops	Tons
5 LST	2500	3500
	2,500	3,500

(LSTs carry 7 LCV(P)s)

D + 2 DAY

NOISELESS

	Troops	Tons
5 LST	2500	3500
	2500	3500

(LSTs carry 7 LCV(P)s)

LETTERPRESS

	Troops	Tons
5 LST	2500	3500
	2500	3500

(LSTs carry 7 LCV(P)s

RECKLESS TASK FORCE RESERVE

	Troops	Tons
2 LST	1000	1400
2 APA	3000	1000
	4000	2400

(LSTs carry 9 LCV(P)s; APA carry 30 LCV(P)s and 4 LCMs)

[redacted]

[redacted]

TOTAL 3 DAYS

	Troops	Tons
NOISELESS LANDING FORCE	18,500	17,300
LETTERPRESS LANDING FORCE	14,220	13,900
RECKLESS TASK FORCE RESERVE	4,000	2,400
	36,720	33,600

Ships

38 LST
5 APD
6 APA
2 LSD
30 LCI
1 AKA
2 AK

REINFORCING & GARRISON

	NOISELESS	LETTERPRESS
D + 8	6 LST	3 LSD (carries 42 LCMs) 6 LST
D + 12	6 LST	6 LST
D + 20	6 LST	6 LST
D + 28	6 LST	6 LST
D + 36	6 LST	6 LST
D + 44	6 LST	6 LST

1. If any part of these echelons is diverted for loading at places other than SHAGGY (or places of equivalent sailing time), it may be necessary to delay the date of landing, as all ships must sail in one echelon. In the echelon on D+12, time has been allowed for six LSTs to load at MICROCOSM and sail with the ten LSTs loading at SHAGGY.

2. LSTs will normally retract by 1800 hours on the day of arrival.

3. AKs to NOISELESS and LETTERPRESS on D-Day, will depart by 1800 on D+2. These are allocated to RECKLESS Task Force Engineer.

4. AKA on D+1 echelon to NOISELESS, will depart by 1800 on D+2.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS,
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Bowen
G-3

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE,
A. P. O. 565,
1200K 27 March 1944.

ANNEX NO. 7 to FO 1 - Signal Orders

1. a. (1) For information as to enemy dispositions see current RECKLESS Task Force situation reports and intelligence bulletins.

(2) Available information relative to enemy signal communications and signal intelligence service indicates that he will take advantage of every violation of security on the part of our troops. He may resort to jamming and/or transmission of false messages.

b. (1) In accordance with provisions of Operations Instructions 46, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, 18 March 1944, supporting forces will carry out assigned tasks as follows:

(a) The Commanding General Allied Air Forces will:

1 In coordination with Naval Air Forces and assisted by Ground Forces, install, maintain and operate all radio facilities, and operate all wire facilities in the RECKLESS area which pertain to the control and operation of aircraft, including facilities for air raid warning and telling nets.

(b) The Commander Allied Naval Forces will:

1 Provide naval signal communication equipment and personnel required for the overwater movement for the assault phases of the RECKLESS operation.

2 Install, maintain and operate in the RECKLESS area such signal communication facilities as may be required for naval installations thereat.

(c) Allied Air Forces and Allied Naval Air and Surface Forces will provide and coordinate communications for the close support of RECKLESS Task Force during the overwater movement and assault phases of the landing operation.

1 Information covering call signs and frequencies for radio nets involved in Air Support Plan and Naval Fire Support to be furnished.

c Command Posts

Headquarters	Location	Opening
ESCALATOR	SHAGGY	Now open
Adv Ech ESCALATOR	To be announced	To be announced
Adv Ech 5th Air Force	AUTOMOBILE	Now open
USASOS	AMATORY	Now open
Adv Ech, USASOS	CARAMEL	To be announced
Intermediate Ech, USASOS	CELLULOID	Now open
RECKLESS Task Force		
Initial	MICROCOSM	Now open
Subsequent	To be announced	To be announced

[redacted]

[redacted]

LETTERPRESS Landing Force		
Initial	SHAGGY	Now open
Subsequent	To be reported	To be reported
NOISELESS Landing Force		
Initial	MICROCOSM	Now open
Subsequent	To be reported	To be reported

2. Continuous communication between RECKLESS Task Force and subordinate units is of primary importance. Facilities required at all headquarters will be completed as rapidly as the tactical situation permits.

3. a. The 58th Signal Battalion, assisted by such other Signal Corps units as may be attached for the operation will install, operate and maintain such facilities as required for the RECKLESS operation as follows:

(1) Provide necessary signal communication facilities for RECKLESS Task Force rear echelon at MICROCOSM.

(2) Provide necessary wire, radio, message center, and messenger services to all Task Force units, including AA defense, harbor defense, and base and port units, when directed by the Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

(3) Radio

(a) Report into Net BB, furnishing an SCR-284 and one operator for this purpose, as soon after "H" hour as the situation permits (See Appendix 1 hereto), and thereafter maintain listening watch except for such emergency traffic as is required to be transmitted. It is agreed that the Navy will do likewise on Net AA, utilizing ship's radio facilities reserved for use in Army channels.

(b) Upon arrival ashore establish without delay the following nets (See Appendix 3 hereto). It is of primary importance that the nets listed in 1, 2 and 3 below be established as soon as possible after "H" hour; those listed in 4 and 5 below will be established as soon as practicable after "D" day.

1 Net EE: RECKLESS Task Force (DR48) — ESCALATOR (6CU) (Radio Set AT-20).

2 Net GG: RECKLESS Task Force (DR 48) — BREWER Task Force (JH21) — PERSECUTION Task Force (YN68).

3 Net DD: RECKLESS Task Force (DR48) — LETTERPRESS Landing Force (MH3) — NOISELESS Landing Force (8MA) — RECKLESS Task Force Hq. Ship (DR48R) (SCR-299). It is expected that LETTERPRESS Landing Force and NOISELESS Landing Force will already have established contact on this net, and that RECKLESS Task Force Hq. Ship station (operated by Navy) will enter this net.

4 Net FF: RECKLESS Task Force (DR48) — ESCALATOR (6CU) (Radio Set AT-20).

5 Net HH: RECKLESS Task Force (DR48) — Small Ships (Radio Set TW-12).

[redacted]

[redacted]

(4) In addition to normal tactical wire requirements initiate as soon as forward movement of Hq. NOISELESS Landing Force permits, construction of a spiral-four line from NOISELESS to LETTERPRESS.

(5) Establish and operate Task Force Signal Dump when directed by the Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

(6) Perform such other signal missions as directed by Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

b. The 442nd Signal Construction Battalion (Avn) will:

(1) In the initial phases of the operation furnish reinforcing personnel as follows:

(a) Det. Company "B" (2 officers and 80 enlisted men) to RECKLESS Task Force.

(b) Company "B", less detachment, to LETTERPRESS Landing Force.

(2) Install such initial permanent wire facilities in the NOISELESS, LETTERPRESS and CAPSULE - BURDOCK - BUCKBOARD areas as directed by Commanding General RECKLESS Task Force. Appendix 4 hereto, covering schematically the general installation, will be used as a guide for planning purposes.

c. The Commanding General LETTERPRESS Landing Force will:

(1) In addition to normal tactical signal mission perform the following:

(a) Coordinate plans for and supervise installation of all communication facilities in LETTERPRESS area including requirements of ground, AA defense, harbor defense, and base and port facilities until otherwise directed by Commanding General RECKLESS Task Force.

(b) Cause stations to enter the following radio nets without delay upon arrival ashore of Hq. LETTERPRESS Landing Force.

1 Net DD (See Appendix 2 hereto): Hq. LETTERPRESS Landing Force (MH3) — Hq. NOISELESS Landing Force (8MA) (Radio Set SCR-299). Establishment of this net is of primary importance. Hq. NOISELESS Landing Force will be NCS until Hq. RECKLESS Task Force enters the net and assumes Net Control.

2 Net CC (See Appendix 2 hereto): LETTERPRESS Landing Force (MH3) — Hq. Ship RECKLESS Task Force (DR48R) -- Hq. NOISELESS Landing Force (8MA).

(c) Make available necessary radio equipment (SCR-284 or equivalent) and operating personnel on board LETTERPRESS Landing Force Hq. Ship for operation in Net AA (See Appendix 1 hereto) in the event the Navy is unable to provide the necessary facilities.

(d) Cause Hq LETTERPRESS Landing Force Command Net (Net AA in Appendix 1 hereto) to operate on Frequency of 4460kc.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(e) Initiate as soon as the tactical situation permits, construction of a spiral-four line from LETTERPRESS toward NOISELESS.

(f) Assume responsibility for signal supply of all troops assigned or attached to LETTERPRESS Landing Force until this function is taken over by Hq RECKLESS Task Force.

(2) Be furnished additional personnel and equipment to augment LETTERPRESS Landing Force organic communication facilities.

d. The Commanding General NOISELESS Landing Force will:

(1) In addition to normal tactical signal mission perform the following:

(a) Coordinate plans for and supervise installation of all communication facilities in NOISELESS area, including requirements of ground, AA defense, and base and port facilities until otherwise directed by Commanding General RECKLESS Task Force.

(b) Cause the following radio net to be established without delay upon arrival ashore of Hq NOISELESS Landing Force:

1 Net DD (See Appendix 2 hereto): Hq NOISELESS Landing Force (8MA) — Hq LETTERPRESS Landing Force (MH3) (Radio Set SCR-299). Hq NOISELESS Landing Force will be NCS until Hq RECKLESS Task Force (DR48) enters the net and assumes Net Control.

(c) Cause a radio station to enter net CC (See Appendix 2 hereto) without delay upon arrival ashore of Hq NOISELESS Landing Force: Hq NOISELESS Landing Force (8MA) — Hq Ship RECKLESS Task Force (DR48R) — Hq LETTERPRESS Landing Force (MH3).

(d) Make available necessary radio equipment (SCR-284 or equivalent) and operating personnel on board NOISELESS Landing Force Hq Ship for operation in net BB (See Appendix 1 hereto) in the event the Navy is unable to provide the necessary facilities.

(e) Cause NOISELESS Landing Force Command Net to operate on frequency of 3875kc.

(f) Furnish Commanding Officer RECKLESS Task Force Reserve with radio set SCR-299 and insure that necessary cryptographic facilities are provided.

(g) Assume responsibility for signal supply of all units assigned or attached to Hq. NOISELESS Landing Force until this function is taken over by Hq. RECKLESS Task Force.

e. The Commanding Officer RECKLESS Task Force Reserve will:

(1) Upon establishing headquarters ashore cause a radio station (SCR-299) to enter RECKLESS Task Force Command Net (Net DD in Appendix 3 hereto) unless otherwise directed by Commanding General RECKLESS Task Force.

[redacted]

[redacted]

x. (1) Commanders of subordinate units will:

(a) Cause all personnel concerned to be thoroughly acquainted with and to adhere to the provisions of Hq. RECKLESS Task Force Communications Directive and Signal Operation Instructions.

(b) Prior to embarkation, cause dial settings of transmitters and receivers to be determined for the frequencies on which these items of equipment will be operated in the initial phases of the operation. These settings will be plainly and indelibly written on tags which will be securely fastened to the equipment. Except for crystal controlled apparatus, these settings will be determined by the use of an accurately calibrated frequency meter.

(c) Provide for:

1 Continuous liaison between signal and communication officers of all elements of all forces involved in their respective operations.

2 Joint training of all communications personnel prior to "D" day to include:

Command Post exercises.

Waterproofing, loading, and unloading of signal equipment.

Familiarization with signal equipment to be operated.

3 Combat loading of all signal equipment and personnel and dispersal of same throughout the convoy so that loss of one ship will not seriously disrupt communications either during or after landing operations.

(d) 1 Arrange for suitable couriers to accomplish the dispatch of official documents and packages to this headquarters by whatever means are available.

2 Cause maximum use to be made of available shipping in the dispatch of long and/or bulky messages as well as communications which can be appropriately deferred.

(e) Utilize pigeons insofar as possible, especially for patrol work.

(f) 1 Cause radio silence to be observed by all elements of their commands effective when the troops are embarked.

2 Beginning at "H" hour, cause frequencies assigned to all nets to be monitored on the assumption that radio silence will be lifted at any time after "H" hour.

3 Cause radio silence to be lifted:

When directed by Commander Task Force 76.

For voice operated radios of less than 15 watts output when the leading wave of troops crosses the line of departure.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(g) Be prepared to install, operate and maintain additional radio nets as directed by this headquarters.

(h) 1 Instigate such additional wire facilities as directed by this headquarters at a later date.

2 Submit line route maps and circuit diagrams to this headquarters without delay.

(i) Cooperate in the installation and operation of such signal intelligence activities as this or higher headquarters may locate within their areas of operation.

(j) Cooperate in signal photographic activities in their respective areas. Special attention will be given to the rapid dispatch of exposed film.

(2) Codes and Ciphers

(a) Current cryptographic systems are prescribed in RECKLESS Task Force Signal Operation Instructions.

(b) Only the following editions of systems for the M-209 and strip devices will be taken into the operational area initially:

SIGTRI (CSP 1607) for use as necessary with the Navy
Hazardous Duty Strips
Hazardous Duty "Pin and Lug" Tables
Unit "Pin and Lug" Tables

(c) SIGABA with associated systems and equipment will not be taken into the operational area until authorized by the Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

(d) 1 Maximum use will be made of brevity codes, especially during the initial phases of the operation.

2 Brevity code use on Net CC (See Appendix 2 hereto) will be that prescribed in RECKLESS Task Force Signal Operation Instructions.

(3) Clear language may be used in the initial phases of the operation as authorized by subordinate commanders. EXTREME caution in the discreet use of clear language in any circumstances is emphasized. (See paragraph 1. a. (2), above).

(4) Authentication

(a) Message and station authentication between ground troops will be as prescribed in RECKLESS Task Force Signal Operation Instructions.

(b) For operation with the Navy, the following authentication systems are prescribed:

1 On W/T: SISM 10

2 On R/T: CCBP 0122-D2

(5) Time

(a) Local time will be "K" time. See inclosure #13, RECKLESS Task Force Communications Directive.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(b) Watches will be synchronized with ship's clocks prior to debarkation.

(6) Countermeasures

(a) The jamming of radio and/or radio channels or the transmission of false messages will be resorted to only upon specific approval of GHQ, SWPA.

(b) See Inclosure #5, RECKLESS Task Force Communications Directive for procedure to be adopted in the event of enemy jamming.

4. Supply

a. The Commanding Generals of LETTERPRESS Landing Force and NOISELESS Landing Force will be responsible for signal supply within their respective commands until establishment of RECKLESS Task Force Signal Dump.

b. It is expected that the RECKLESS Task Force Signal Dump will open at some time during the period D plus 9 to D plus 13 at NOISELESS.

5. See current Index to RECKLESS Task Force Signal Operation Instructions and Communications Directive.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS,
Brig. Gen., GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Bowen
G-3

Appendix 1 - Schematic Diagram, Primary Army Radio Nets Phase I.
Appendix 2 - Schematic Diagram, Primary Army Radio Nets Phase II.
Appendix 3 - Schematic Diagram, Primary Army Radio Nets Phase III.
Appendix 4 - General Wire Installation RECKLESS-NOISELESS Area (Tentative Plan).
Appendix 5 - Tentative Initial Task Force Circuit Diagram, D-Day.

[redacted]

[redacted]

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM

PRIMARY ARMY RADIO NETS

HQ RECKLESS TASK FORCE
A.P.O. 565
1200K 27 March 1944

PHASE I

(Begins with arrival ashore of RCT's)



NOTES

In this phase, the Hq. Ship stations serve primarily as listening stations

NET	FREQUENCY
AA	4460 kc
BB	3875 kc

Appendix 1 to Annex 7 to
FO 1 - Signal Orders

[redacted]

[redacted]

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM

PRIMARY ARMY RADIO NETS

HQ RECKLESS TASK FORCE
A.P.O. 565
1200K 27 March 1944

PHASE III

(Begins with arrival ashore of Adv. CP RECKLESS Task Force)



NOTES

1. RECKLESS T.F. Adv. CP moves ashore and establishes nets EE, FF, GG, HH and assumes NCS of DD.

2. This phase assumes CG RECKLESS T.F. still afloat. Station on ship enters net DD with call sign DR48R. Net CC goes out of existence.

3. NET FREQUENCY

DD 4585 kc (day)
2620 kc (night)
5700 kc (alternate)

EE 8130 kc (day)
4095 kc (night)
2585 kc (stand by)

FF 8325 kc (day)
4020 kc (night)

NET	FREQUENCY
GG	5985 kc (day)
	2915 kc (night)
	7295 kc (stand by)

NET	FREQUENCY
HH	5440 kc (basic)
	7250 kc (alt. day)
	3625 kc (alt. night)

[redacted]

Appendix 3 to Annex 7 to FO 1 - Signal Orders.

[redacted]

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM

PRIMARY ARMY RADIO NETS

HQ RECKLESS TASK FORCE
A.P.O. 565
1200K 27 March 1944

PHASE II

(Begins with arrival ashore of NOISELESS L.F. and LETTERPRESS L.F. Hqs.)



RECKLESS TASK FORCE
HQ. SHIP

NOTES

1. Upon establishing CP's ashore, NOISELESS and LETTERPRESS Landing Forces will promptly enter Net CC.

2. Net DD will be opened by NOISELESS L.F. (NCS). LETTERPRESS L.F. will monitor assigned frequency on DD until net is opened. The early establishment of this net is of highest importance.

3.

NET	FREQUENCY
CC	4090 kc 2025 kc (alternate)
DD	4585 kc (day) 2620 kc (night) 6525 kc (alternate)

Appendix 2 to Annex 7 to
FO 1 - Signal Orders

[redacted]

GENERAL WIRE INSTALLATION
RECKLESS-NOISELESS AREA

(Tentative Plan)

HQ RECKLESS TASK FORCE
A.P.O. 565
1200K 27 March 1944



- - - - - - COPPER WIRE

———— LEAD CABLE

Appendix 4 to Annex 7 to
FO 1 - Signal Orders

[redacted]

TENTATIVE INITIAL TASK FORCE

CIRCUIT DIAGRAM

D - Day

HQ RECKLESS TASK FORCE
A.P.O. 565
1200K 27 March 1944



- - - - Indicates probable Landing Force wire.

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS



(1) Dotted Lines indicate Listening watch, prepared to transmit.
(2) Communications will be initially established on voice (R/T). If necessary, due to the distance between shore and ship, shift to transmit on CW (W/T).

Appendix 6 to Annex 7 to
FO 1 - Signal Orders

[redacted]

HQ RECKLESS TASK FORCE
A. P. C. 565,
1200K 12 April 1944.

AIR SUPPORT COMMUNICATION PLAN

1. The following pertinent data from Air Support Communication Plan for the areas indicated below is published for information:

HQ. RECKLESS Task Force

Station	Call Signs W/T	R/T
15th Air Liaison Party	3SX5	NECKLET
16th Air Liaison Party	WY61	KERSEY

HQ. NOISELESS Landing Force

Net	Frequency
Support Air Request	4335kc (P) 4615kc (S)
Support Air Direction	6870kc (P) 4475kc (S) 140.58mc (Emergency)

Station	Call Signs W/T	R/T
13th Air Liaison Party	FB6	PARTAKE
Support Aircraft Controller Afloat	LX6N	TERRIFIC
Airborne Liaison Officer	LX1S	OXFORD
Airborne Air Coordinator	LW9R	LIBERTY

HQ. LETTERPRESS Landing Force

Net	Frequency
Support Air Request	4305kc (P) 4615kc (S)
Support Air Direction	6920kc (P) 4475kc (S) 140.58mc (Emergency)

Station	Call Signs W/T	R/T
14th Air Liaison Party	H85	OINTMENT
Support Aircraft Controller Afloat	LX59	TAPROOM
Airborne Liaison Officer	LXØR	MONDAY
Airborne Air Coordinator	LW82	WIMPY

Appendix 7 to Annex 7 to
FO 1 - Signal Orders

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
A.P.O. 565
1200 K 27 March 1944

ANNEX No. 8 to FO 1, ENGINEER.

1. GENERAL

a. Available information indicates that the enemy may make extensive use of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines and booby traps.

b. See the following documents:

(1) Allied Geographical Terrain Study No. 78.

(2) Engineer Report on RECKLESS Area, OCE, GHQ, SWPA, filed 323.42 (26 Jan 44)C.

(3) Special Report No. 34, Part A, Allied Geographical Section, SWPA.

(4) Engineer Annex 61A to Allied Geographical Terrain Study No.61.

(5) Terrain Analysis No. 10, OCE, GHQ, SWPA.

c. Vigorous and systematic Engineer reconnaissance will be conducted to provide the information necessary for tactical and technical planning.

2. LABOR

a. Troop labor will be furnished for Engineer work to the maximum extent consistent with the tactical situation.

b. Native labor will be controlled by RECKLESS Task Force Commander, and will be used on construction to the maximum. Supervision of native labor will be as later designated.

c. Use of Engineer troops for construction of defensive works, including camouflage, will be limited to highly specialized construction and supervision.

3. MAPS.

Topographical maps (photomap on reverside side) of the RECKLESS Area published by GHQ, SWPA, will be used by ground forces in this operation. Air and Naval forces will use these same maps in support of ground forces. Distribution will be made in ample time for operational use. For further supply of maps see paragraph 3, Annex No. 4 to Administrative Order No. 1

4. SUPPLY AND CONSTRUCTION

Pertinent instructions relative to the following Engineer Supply and Construction matters are included in Annex No. 4 to Adm O No. 1.

a. Equipping of units prior to movement.

b. Movement of Engineer equipment.

c. Detection and removal of land mines.

[redacted]

[redacted]

d. Assault and reinforcing supplies.

e. Control of Engineer Supplies.

f. Utilization of local materials.

g. Requisitioning of Engineer equipment and supplies.

h. Operation of Engineer equipment pools.

i. Distribution of equipment reports.

j. Monthly inventories.

k. Water Supply.

l. Map supply.

m. Technical plans and reports.

n. Construction.

o. Priorities of Engineer work.

p. Assignment of work.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Bowen
G-3

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
APO 565
1200K 27 March 1944.

ANNEX NO. 9 TO FO 1

ARTILLERY

1. Field Artillery.

a. Mission - Support action of RECKLESS TASK FORCE.

b. Organization for combat: Annex - Distribution of troops.

c. Special Instructions.

(1) Coordinate field artillery employment with naval supporting fires.

(2) Furnish shore fire control parties.

(3) Coordinate employment of 4.2" chemical mortar fire with field artillery fires.

(4) Official Grid.

(a) Division organic artillery and attached artillery: Assume coordinates and direction, and initiate survey operations without delay.

(b) NOISELESS and LETTERPRESS Landing Force Commanders will establish the official grid for their respective forces referred to grid north of 1/20,000 map supplied for the operation, and furnish common survey control to organic and attached field artillery and seacoast and anti-aircraft artillery. (See Engineer Annex No. 8)

(c) Upon establishment of common control, critical locations will be referred to the official grid.

(d) Upon displacement, all units will carry common control forward.

(5) Division Artillery: Be prepared to deliver artillery fire from landing craft to provide close support during shore to shore operations.

(6) Artillery with NOISELESS LANDING FORCE will interdict BUCKBOARD, BURDOCK, and CAPSULE by D + 2.

(7) 1st Sound Ranging Platoon furnish sound ranging support for NOISELESS LANDING FORCE.

(8) Each Division: Furnish to the Navy two airborne liaison officers (best qualified liaison pilot observers) to assist in directing Navy planes on air strikes.

(9) All units: Be prepared to adjust fire with Army or Navy air corps high performance planes. Planes will be assigned by Commanding General, RECKLESS TASK FORCE ARTILLERY.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(10) All units: Be prepared to utilize LVT 2s for reconnaissance and transporting of guns and ammunition across swamp areas.

(11) Where position areas permit, all units will be prepared to fire on water borne targets.

(12) Ammunition: Renumerative targets only will be taken under fire.

(13) Units attached to landing forces will revert to control of Commanding General, RECKLESS TASK FORCE ARTILLERY upon order of Commanding General, RECKLESS TASK FORCE.

2. Coast Artillery.

a. Antiaircraft Artillery. (Annex 11 to FO 1)

b. Seacoast Artillery.

(1) Mission

(a) Provide defense by denying to the enemy the seaward approaches to the defended areas.

(b) Be prepared to reinforce the fire of field artillery on land targets as directed by the Corps Artillery Commander.

(2) Special Instructions.

(a) Coordinate with Navy Shore Detachment in the operation of Harbor Entrance Control Post and in recognition and identification of war vessels.

(b) Initiate survey referred to assumed coordinates and direction. Upon establishment of an official grid, critical locations will be referred to this grid.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS,
Brig. Gen., GSC,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Bowen
G-3

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
APO 565
1200K 27 March 1944.

ANNEX 10 to FO 1 - CHEMICAL

Maps: See Field Order.

1. Information.

a. Hostile chemical operations.

(1) Known operations.

(a) None.

(2) Expected operations.

(a) Enemy employment of smoke is a probable capability to:

1. Impede our operations.

2. Insure the success of his own operations.

b. Own chemical operations.

(1) Smoke operations (See par. 2 below).

c. Weather.

(1) Unpredictable from available data, in immediate vicinity of NOISELESS and LETTERPRESS areas.

(2) Expected, H-1 to H+1: Clear, humid. Wind direction, land breeze, S to SE (variable). Zero to 1.2 mph.

(3) General: April, May, light land breeze by day, sea breeze sunset to about 2200. Occasional brief, heavy rains averaging one every 2 to 3 days often reducing visibility to zero. RECKLESS area is subject to frequent, short, violent squalls with heavy rain of brief duration. Precipitation is mostly at night and normally decreases to a minimum in July.

2. Plans for Operations.

a. Initial requirements of commanders of landing forces for smoke screens and incendiary bombardment by air support or naval gunfire will be co-ordinated at joint Army, Navy and Air Force conference.

b. Subsequent requests will contain the following:

(1) Description of general location and physical characteristics of target to be screened or bombarded.

(2) Location of target by map co-ordinates and overlay.

(3) Priority, if more than one mission is requested.

(4) Requested time of establishment of screen or time of bombardment.

(5) Requested duration of screen or bombardment.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(6) Purpose of screen (screening or screening and casualty).

(7) Additional data, if any, in support of request for mission.

c. Plans for close-in flank protection of landings will include use of smoke pots and floating smoke pots. This will be co-ordinated with the commander, close naval support force.

d. Request for air support screening or incendiary action within capability of air forces will be transmitted to air liaison parties by commanding general of each task force.

e. Approval by the Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force will be obtained prior to the employment of smoke by NOISELESS Landing Force East of the second phase line, or by LETTERPRESS Landing Force West of the third phase line.

f. Methods of employment of smoke or other means to mark drop-strips, or positions of own troops, or to identify enemy targets for attack by close air support will be co-ordinated with the air liaison force through liaison parties.

3. Protection.

a. All personnel will carry their gas masks with canisters waterproofed during initial landing operation and until directed otherwise by Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

4. Supply and evacuation. Chemical Annex, Administrative Order No. 1, RECKLESS Task Force.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brig. Gen. G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Bowen
G-3

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS T. F.
A.P.O. 565
1200K, 27 March 1944

INCLOSURE NO. 1 to F O 1.

CODE NAMES FOR CURRENT OPERATIONS

GEOGRAPHICAL NAME	CODE NAME
ACONCHA	HELICON
AITAPE RIVER	STAMPEDE
AITERAP	TANTRUM
ALI IS	NARCISSUS
AMABOE RIVER	AMETHYST
ANGEL IS	MARIMBA
ARMOE RIVER	COMPOSER
ARSO	RINGLEADER
ARUEGO CREEK	TAMBOURINE
BANAKOA RIVER	COMMODE
BIRI RIVER	CORDIAL
BORNEO	BOTTLEBABY
CAPE BESAR	AVOCADOS
CAPE DJAR	SHUTTER
CAPE ENSAUCH	BIBCOCK
CAPE GERMANIA	SORGHUM
CAPE JOGOER	POMPANO
CAPE KASSOE	SHORTCAKE
CAPE ORMOE	CRAWFISH
CAPE PIE	DULCIMER
CAPE SOEADJA	SHAMROCK
CAPE TANAHMERAH	ACCESSORY
CAPE TJEWERI	DRAWKNIFE
CAPE TJOBERI	POKEWEED
CAPE WANJA	ABDOMEN
CYCLOPS DROME	CAPSULE
DAZAI	BARRACUDA
DEJAOE RIVER	BASCULE
DEMENGONG BAY	AERIALIST
DEMOEI	ACORN
DEMTA	BAROSCOPE
DEPAPRE	ALARMIST
DEPAPRE BAY	AFFIDAVIT
DERSARI RIVER	BARNACLE
DERORIE RIVER	CRESCENT
DOJO	BLINDFISH
DOROMENA	BEGONIA
DOSOJO	BIRETTA
DRINIUMOR RIVER	BEDMATE
DUTCH NEW GUINEA	ABATTOIR
GENJEM	EAGLESTONE
GRIME RIVER	BARONESS
GUBUN	CONFESSOR
HAMADI IS	PARAKEET
HAPAKARI RIVER	DILIGENT
HOLLANDIA BAY	SCULPIN
HOLLANDIA DROME	BUCKBOARD
HOLTEKANG	SIDEBURN

CODE NAME	GEOGRAPHICAL NAME
ABATTOIR	DUTCH NEW GUINEA
ABDOMEN	CAPE WANJA
ACADEMY	NASOENA
ACCEPTOR	KANTOOM
ACCESSORY	CAPE TANAHMERAH
ACCORDIAN	KWAKEBOH IS.
ACORN	DEMOEI
ACROBAT	TEMINGOH
ADONIC	WANDADA
ADRIENE	IDENBURG RIVER
AERIALIST	DEMENGONG BAY
AFFIDAVIT	DEPAPRE BAY
AILMENT	KAFA
AIRMAIL	JANGKENA
ALARMIST	DEPAPRE
AMBROSIA	KLIFON RIVER
AMETHYST	AMABOE RIVER
AMMETER	TABLASOEFA*
AVOCADOS	CAPE BESAR
BAGPIPE	JAONA
BALBRIGGAN	JAFASE
BALERINA	MT NAMSOEALI
BANDORE	JAKONDE
BARNACLE	DERSARI RIVER
BARONESS	GRIME RIVER
BAROSCOPE	DEMTA
BARRACUDA	DAZAI
BASCULE	DEJAOE RIVER
BEAGLE	SAPARI
BEDMATE	DRINIUMOR RIVER
BEESWING	NEW LAVITI
BEGONIA	DOROMENA
BESHAWL	NEFAAR
BIBCOCK	CAPE ENSAUCH
BIRETTA	DOSOJO
BLINDFISH	DOJO
BOTTLEBABY	BORNEO
BUCKBOARD	HOLLANDIA DROME
BUDDHA	LUPAI
BURDOCK	SENTANI DROME
CAPSULE	CYCLOPS DROME
CARABAO	JABE
CELESTA	LAKE SENTANI
CHAMOIS	TORARE BAY
COLANDER	KARATI
COMEDIAN	NAIKOEPI
COMMODE	BANAKOA RIVER
COMPOSER	ARMOE RIVER
CONCERT	MARNEDA
CONCLAVE	YALINGI RIVER

[redacted]

[redacted]

GEOGRAPHICAL NAME	CODE NAME
IMBI BAY	SHACKLE
IDENBURG RIVER	ADRIENE
JABE	CARABAO
JAFASE	BALBRIGGAN
JAKONDE	BANDORE
JANGKENA	AIRMAIL
JAONA	BAGPIPE
JAUTEFA BAY	DECAGON
KAFA	AILMENT
KALTUL CREEK	ERMINE
KAMTI	FUCHSIA
KANTOOM	ACCEPTOR
KARATI	COLANDER
KIU	TEAMSTER
KLIFON RIVER	AMBROSIA
KOEJABOE	CORNSTARCH
KOEJABOE RIVER	COUPLING
KORAKO	JAGUAR
KWAKEBOH IS	ACCORDIAN
LAHO RIVER	SKULLCAP
LAKE SENTANI	CELESTA
LAPAR PT	STEVEDORE
LUPAI	BUDDHA
MADOERAU IS	PRONGHORN
MAIOL	COOTIE
MARNEDA	CONCERT
MARNGE	FLAMINGO
MAROE	SPINSTER
MATOMUTE	FILIGREE
MEERVIAKTE-OOST	ORDERLYTENT
MT. NAMSOEALI	BALERINA
NAIKOEPI	COMEDIAN
NASOENA	ACADEMY
NEFAAR	BESHAWL
NEW LAVITI	BEESWING
NIGIA RIVER	MALLARD
NOR	KESTREL
PIM	DEADEYE
PIMI CREEK	HAWTHORN
POEN IS	SHOPWORN
PRO	HENBANE
PRO MISSION	HOPLITE
PUAL	PURITAN
PULTALUL	STAGECOACH
RAI COAST	PRIMEMOVER
RAIHU RIVER	FENNEC
RELIA	LARKSPUR
RHAINBROM GOV'T PLANTATION	HUSHMONEY
ROHM PT	STONEWARE

CODE NAME	GEOGRAPHICAL NAME
CONFESSOR	GUBUN
COOTIE	MALOL
CORDIAL	BIRI RIVER
CORNSTARCH	KOEJABOE
COUPLING	KOEJABOE RIVER
CRAWFISH	CAPE ORMOE
CRESCENT	DERORIE RIVER
DEADEYE	PIM
DECAGON	JAUTEFA BAY
DICTIONARY	WAAB
DILIGENT	HAPAKARI RIVER
DRAWKNIFE	CAPE TJEWERI
DULCIMER	CAPE PIE
DUTYROSTER	VANIMO
EAGLESTONE	GENJEM
ERMINE	KALTUL CREEK
FENNEC	RAIHU RIVER
FILIGREE	MATOMUTE
FLAGON	TADJI
FLAMINGO	MARNGE
FUCHSIA	KAMTI
GAUNTLET	ST. ANNA MISSION
GOLDFINCH	TUMLEO IS.
GONDOLA	TUMLEO HAMLET
GRAMPUS	TADJI PTN.
GUILLOTINE	VOKAU
HAWTHORN	PIMI CREEK
HELICON	ALCONCHA
HENBANE	PRO
HOPLITE	PRO MISSION
HORSEFLY	WAITANAN CREEK
HUCKLEBERRY	WOM NO. 1
HUSHMONEY	RHAINBROM GOV'T PTN
JAGUAR	KORAKO
JONQUIL	WAPIL
KESTREL	NOR
KOHLRABI	WARI
LARKSPUR	RELIA
LOCOWEED	WALMEGOL CREEK
LUNKHEAD	SUAIN
MALLARD	NIGIA RIVER
MARGARINE	SELEO GARDENS
MARIMBA	ANGEL IS.
METRONOME	SELEO IS.
NARCISSUS	ALI IS.
ORDERLYTENT	MEERVLAKTE-OOST

[redacted]

[redacted]

GEOGRAPHICAL NAME	CODE NAME
SAPARI	BEAGLE
SELANI CREEK	THEATRIC
SELEO GARDENS	MARGARINE
SELEO IS	METRONOME
SENO	SKUNKWEED
SENTANI DROME	BURDOCK
SERMO RIVER	WROUGHTIRON
SERRA	UPPERCUT
SIBIR IS	SHOREBIRD
SKOMABO	SKYROCKET
ST. ANNA MISSION	GAUNTLET
ST ANNA PTN	TAILBOARD
SUAIN	LUNKHEAD
TABLASOEFA	AMMETER
TADJI	FLAGON
TADJI PTN	GRAMPUS
TAMI RIVER	SPEEDWAY
TEMINGOH	ACROBAT
TEPIER PTN	SPRINGTIDE
TORARE BAY	CHAMOIS
TUMLEO/HAMLET	GONDOLA
TUMLEO IS	GOLDFINCH
VANIMO	BUTYROSTER
VOKAU	GUILLOTINE
WAAB	DICTIONARY
WAITANAN CREEK	HORSEFLY
WALMEGOL CREEK	LOCOWEED
WANDADA	ADONIC
WAPIL	JONQUIL
WARI	KOHLRABI
WOM NO. 1	HUCKLEBERRY
WOM NO. 2	SNAPDRAGON
YALINGI RIVER	CONCLAVE

CODE NAME	GEOGRAPHICAL NAME
PARAKEET	HAMADI IS
POKEWEED	CAPE TJOBERI
POMPANO	CAPE JOGOER
PRIMEMOVER	RAI COAST
PRONGHORN	MADOERAU IS.
PURITAN	PUAL
RINGLEADER	AMSO
SCULPIN	HOLLANDIA BAY
SHACKLE	AMBI BAY
SHAMROCK	CAPE SOEADJA
SHIPWORM	POEN IS.
SHOREBIRD	SIBIR IS
SHORTCAKE	CAPE KASSOE
SHUTTER	CAPE DJAR
SIDEBURN	HOLTEKANG
SKULLCAP	LAHO RIVER
SKUNKWEED	SENO
SKYROCKET	SKOMABO
SNAPDRAGON	WOM NO. 2
SORGHUM	CAPE GERMANIA
SPEEDWAY	TAMI RIVER
SPINSTER	MAROK
SPRINGTIDE	TEPIER PTN
STAGECOACH	PULTALUL
STAMPEDE	AITAPE RIVER
STEVEDORE	LAPAR PT.
STONEWARE	ROHM PT.
TAILBOARD	ST. ANNA PTN.
TAMBOURINE	ARUEGO CREEK
TANTRUM	AITERAP
TEAMSTER	KIU
THEATRIC	SELANI CREEK
UPPERCUT	SERRA
WROUGHTIRON	SERMO RIVER

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS,
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Bowen
G-3

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
A.P.O. 565
0823K, 14 April 1944

C 2, Adm O 1 to Accompany FO 1.

1. Par 8d is changed to read as follows:

* * *

8. * * * *

d. G-4 Periodic Report. To be submitted by Commanding Generals, Landing Forces, by most expeditious means as of 1800K, daily, to Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force. Task Force units not assigned or attached to Landing Forces, will submit applicable portions of this report. Data indicated in (2), (3), (4)(a)2, (4)(b), (5) and (8) will be reported by radio daily and will be confirmed in the complete report which will follow by safehand delivery. This report pertains only to troops and supplies in objective areas and will include the following.

(1) Location of administrative troops and installations. After initial report only changes will be reported.

(2) Strength.

(3) Class I:

(a) Total balanced rations on hand, by type, in days of supply based on (2) above.

(b) Native rations in terms of days of supply for actual strength in the objective areas.

(4) (a) 1 Total number of each type of lightering craft on hand.

2 Number of each type of lightering craft unserviceable.

3 Number of each type of lightering craft being used for purposes other than discharging cargo and brief statement of how they are being used.

(b) Estimate of total deadweight tonnage discharged from USASOS-type shipping during the preceding 24 hours.

(c) Any matters of importance pertaining to motor, water, and/or air transportation.

(d) Construction status of landing facilities and dump areas.

(5) Status of evacuation (casualties only). Number evacuated during preceding 24 hours and number awaiting evacuation.

(6) Roads: General condition initially; thereafter, important changes only.

(7) Captured material. List and give disposition.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(8) Anything of particular importance or of unusual nature including items in which critical shortages exist.

2. Par 7d - Add the following:

"These reports will be submitted commencing at midnight the day of departure of the first troops of each unit for the area of operations.

3. Incl 3, Annex 6 (G-1 Periodic Reports).

a. Paragraph 1a is changed to read:

"A G-1 Periodic Report will be submitted as of 0001K each Wednesday in the form as shown in Inclosure 3a."

b. Paragraph 1b is changed to read:

"The initial report will be submitted as of 0001K, 12 April 1944, covering the period of the previous seven (7) days."

c. Paragraph 1c is amended by adding:

"A copy will be furnished this headquarters."

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

McCreight
G-4

DISTRIBUTION:
O-2 plus the following

ESCALATOR	3	G-4 RECKLESS Task Force	10
CTF 76	3	FA RECKLESS Task Force	1
CG ADVON 5	8	AA RECKLESS Task Force	1
CG NOISELESS Landing Force	10	AG RECKLESS Task Force	1
CG LETTERPRESS Landing Force	10	QM RECKLESS Task Force	1
CO RECKLESS Task Force Reserve	2	Ord RECKLESS Task Force	1
C/S RECKLESS Task Force	1	Surg RECKLESS Task Force	1
G-1 RECKLESS Task Force	1	Sig RECKLESS Task Force	1
G-2 RECKLESS Task Force	1	Engr RECKLESS Task Force	1
G-3 RECKLESS Task Force	4	Cml RECKLESS Task Force	1
		Air Liaison	1

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
A. P. O. 565

Ch 1, Adm O 1 to Accompany FO 1.

1. Par 3. "Resupply". Add to (1) (a) under "Class V":

"(One (1) U/F to Landing Force beach-heads on AKs on D + 8.)"

2. Par 5. "Traffic". Add the following:

"c. Transportation Corps Activities. (See Annex 7, Transportation Corps.)"

3. "ANNEXES". Page 9, Add:

"7. Transportation Corps Plan".

4. Incl 10. "ALLOCATION AND ATTACHMENTS - SERVICE TROOPS"

a. Par 1 - "Destination NOISELESS Area."

(1) Under "Engineer" delete "Co B & Regtl Hq Co (less Dets) 542d Engr B & S Regt."

(2) Under "Quartermaster" delete 609th Port Co".

(3) Add "Transportation Corps"
Co B and Regtl Hq Co (less Dets) 542d B & S Regt.
609th Port Co.

b. Par 1. "Destination - LETTERPRESS Area".

(1) Under "Quartermaster" delete "296th Port Co.", and "1 Plat 244th Port Co."

(2) Add "Transportation Corps"
296th Port Co
1 Plat, 244th Port Co

c. (1) Par 3. Under "Engineer" place an asterisk in front of "542d Engr B & S Regt (less Co B & Regtl Hq Co (less dets)"

(2) Par 4. Under "Engineer" place an asterisk in front of "532d Engr B & S Regt".

(3) At the end of Par 4, insert "*These units revert to control of CG, RECKLESS Task Force on order of CG RECKLESS Task Force".

5. Annex 1 - Quartermaster. Par 3a (1) should read:

"3. * * * *

a. * * * *

[redacted]

[redacted]

(1) * * * *

D	- 15 days
D ∕ 1	- 14 days
D ∕ 2	- 13 days

6. Annex 6 - G-1 Information and Reports.

a. Page 10 (Inclosure 3a(2)) Footnote (2) - Add the following:

"These totals are to be revised for all known changes in status of individual casualties. For example, of 5 reported MIA's, 3 are determined to be KIA's and 2 are WIA's. Accordingly, the accumulative total of MIA's is reduced by 5, the accumulative total of KIA's is increased by 3, and the WIA's by 2. Another example, 3 WIA's become DOW's; the accumulative total of WIA's is reduced by 3 and DOW's increased by 3. Erroneously reported casualties is another example: MIA's who are subsequently determined in a duty status with no intervening casualty classification such as WIA or KIA will be dropped from the accumulative total of MIA. Hospitalized casualties upon being released from the hospital to duty status will not be dropped from their previously reported casualty classification in determining accumulative totals".

b. Page 11 (Inclosure 3b) - Daily Casualty Logistics. Add this general note immediately below the table under "Notes": "General: This report will be initiated on the date D-? (to be announced) that troops actually begin overwater movement to the area of operations and will be closed upon receipt of notification from this headquarters".

c. Page 11 (Inclosure 3b) - Note, Column (2). Add as second sentence: "This total will show only that part of the Task Force committed to the area of operations".

7. Attached hereto is Annex 7 (Transportation Corps) which is to be attached to and become a part of Adm O 1.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

G-4

1 Incl:
Annex 7 to Adm O 1

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
A. P. O. 565
2047K, 3 April 1944

ADM O 1 to Accompany FO 1.

Maps: SPAVIN Aeronautical Series, Sheets A-6, A-7, A-8, B-6, B-7, B-8. Small scale - 1:1,000,000.
ABATTOIR Series, Sheets, RECKLESS, CORDIAL, ORDERLYTENT, ADRIENE. Intermediate scale - 1:250,000.
Provisional Map, RECKLESS, Intermediate scale - 1:253,440.
Special Map, LETTERPRESS to NOISELESS, 2 sheets, Medium scale - 1:75,000.
Provisional Map, RECKLESS, Medium scale - 1:63,360.
Special Map, RECKLESS. Large scale - 1:20,000.

1. GENERAL.

a. Commanding Generals, Landing Forces, for their forces and within their respective areas, are charged with initially equipping their units; with the loading and unloading of their units and their TO/E supplies and equipment and the supplies prescribed in paragraph 2 b., below; together with the dispersal, segregation, storage, and issue of all supplies unloaded in their respective areas.

b. It is expected that the Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force, will take over the operation of all beach supply and evacuation activities after D ∕ 8.

c. Service troops allocated to RECKLESS Task Force remaining in staging areas subsequent to D ∕ 2 will be available to Chiefs of Special Staff Sections, RECKLESS Task Force, concerned with supply, through coordination with G-3 and G-4 representatives of RECKLESS Task Force. These troops will furnish labor, transportation and administrative personnel, as required, for use in loading Task Force supporting units, equipment and supplies for movement to the objective area.

2. SUPPLY.

a. Bases
(1) Initially: At staging areas.
(2) Resupply : REDHERRING.

b. Levels
(1) To accompany troops landing on D, D ∕ 1, D ∕ 2:

(a) Class I (Minimum, exclusive of voyage rations) Type specified by Landing Force Commanders:

1. With each unit: . . . . . 5 days
2. On LSTs for total troops landing on days indicated: (In addition to 1 above)
D Day . . . . . 15 days
D ∕ 1 . . . . . 14 days
D ∕ 2 . . . . . 13 days

(b) Class II (Minimum). . . . . 15 days

(c) Class III (Minimum, for vehicles and equipment accompanying unit). . . . . 15 days

[redacted]

[redacted]

(d) Class IV (Minimum)

1. Engineer:

a. See par. 1.d.(1), Annex 4, Engr, for assault and reinforcing supplies to accompany RCTs.

b. See Incls 1 and 2, Annex 4, Engr, for additional assault and reinforcing supplies to accompany Landing Forces.

2. All other . . . . . 15 days

(e) Class V (Total)

FA, AA, 4.2" Mortar, grenades . . . 6 U/F
All other . . . . . 5 U/F

1. All units, except those moving on APDs and LCIs, will carry with them at least 2 U/F.
2. Units moving on APDs and LCIs will carry with them the maximum portion of 2 U/F considered practicable.
3. Balance of ammunition will be loaded on LSTs accompanying that echelon.

(2) Minimum levels to accompany units landing subsequent to D + 2:

(a) Classes I - IV, incl . . . . . 15 days

(b) Class V . . . . . 3 U/F

(3) Additional rations for hospital patients. (See par 3.c., Annex 1, Quartermaster.)

c. Dumps and ASPs: As specified by Commanding Generals, Landing Forces. (See par 1, above and Annex 2, Ordnance.)

d. Ordnance Procedure: (See Annex 2, Ordnance.)

e. Supply by air: (See Incl 2, to Annex 1, Quartermaster.) None until Fighter strength is established at PERSECUTION.

f. Water: Minimum - in addition to filled canteens:
1 qt per man per day . . . . . 3 D/S
(See Annex 4, Engr.)

3. RESUPPLY.

a. General

(1) By Commanding General, ESCALATOR, to beach-heads established by Commanding Generals, Landing Forces.

(a) Levels:

Classes I - IV, incl: 30 D/S
(Levels will not be permitted to fall below 5 days and will reach 30 days as rapidly as available shipping permits.)

Class V: 6 U/F
(One (1) U/F to Landing Force beach-heads on LSTs on D + 8)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(2) Supply demands other than automatic: By Commanding General, ESCALATOR, based on request of Commanding Generals, Landing Forces, through Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

(3) Tentative resupply echelons subsequent to D ∤ 2:

	NOISELESS	LETTERPRESS
D ∤ 8	6 LST	6 LST & 3 LSD (carries 42 LCMs)
D ∤ 12	6 LST	6 LST
D ∤ 20	6 LST	6 LST
D ∤ 28	6 LST	6 LST
D ∤ 36	6 LST	6 LST
D ∤ 44	6 LST	6 LST

(a) If any part of these echelons is diverted for loading at places other than SHAGGY (or places of equivalent sailing time), it may be necessary to delay the date of landing, as all ships must sail in one echelon. In the echelon on D ∤ 12, time has been allowed for six LSTs to load at at MICROCOSM and sail with the LSTs loading at SHAGGY.

(b) LSTs will normally retract by 1800 hours on the day of arrival.

EVACUATION

a. Casualties:

(1) By returning supply ships.

(a) ESCALATOR will provide medical care and attendance enroute on Naval transportation.

(b) USASOS will provide medical care and attendance enroute on other than Naval transportation.

(2) Emergency: By air on request to Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

(a) Allied Air Forces will provide medical care and attendance enroute.

(3) Commanding Generals, Landing Forces, will deliver casualties to water and air transportation.

(4) Casualties requiring hospitalization of fifteen (15) days or less will remain in operational area. Retention beyond fifteen (15) days authorized if beds are available.

b. Burials (See Incl 1, to Annex 1, Quartermaster.)

c. Salvage

(1) By Commanding Generals, Landing Forces, on returning supply ships.

d. Captured Materials

(1) Items that cannot be used in the forward areas: By Commanding Generals, Landing Forces, on returning supply ships.

[redacted]

[redacted]

e. Prisoners of War

(1) Collecting Points and Inclosures: As directed by Landing Force Commanders.

(2) Evacuation by returning supply ships to Commanding Officer, Base "F".

(3) Administrative Details and Reports: (See Annex 6).

f. Captured Official Documents

(See Annex 1, to FO 1, Intelligence)

5. TRAFFIC.

a. Circulation, restriction, and control in respective areas: As directed by Commanding Generals, Landing Forces.

b. Construction and maintenance of routes:

(1) Roads: As directed by Commanding Generals, Landing Forces.

(2) Shore, Port and Base Facilities:
(See Annex 4, Engr, par 2a, FO 1, and Annex 8 (Engr) to FO 1).

6. SERVICE TROOPS.

a. Attachments: (See Incl 10)

b. Bivouacs, reattachments, and movement: As directed by Commanding Generals, Landing Forces.

c. Service troops attached to Landing Forces will revert to RECKLESS Task Force control as directed by Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

d. Maximum use will be made of native labor.

e. To the extent necessary, combat units not charged with immediate tactical missions will be used to supplement service troops.

7. PERSONNEL.

a. Location of straggler lines and collecting points by Landing Forces.

b. Mail

(1) Receipt and distribution, collection, and dispatch of mail by Landing Forces. All U. S. Army units and personnel thereof will retain their permanent APO numbers — these APOs are changed only on the order of the theatre commander.

(2) Official mail for the Commander, RECKLESS Task Force, will be addressed: Commanding General, U. S. Force, APO 565. Official mail for the various units of the Task Force may be addressed to APO 565.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(3) Official mail for the Commanding Generals, LETTERPRESS and NOISELESS Landing Forces will be addressed: Commanding General, 41st Infantry Division, APO 41, and Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division, APO 24, respectively. Official mail for the various units of the respective landing forces may be addressed to the appropriate APO.

c. Assignment of bivouac areas by Landing Force Commanders, except any that may be reserved by this headquarters. General layout plan for permanent installations to be constructed in the NOISELESS - LETTERPRESS area will be furnished Commanders, Landing Forces, prior to D Day. In assignment of bivouac areas and in carrying out construction work, Commanders, Landing Forces, will, so far as the tactical situation permits, so locate camps and installations of their units as to insure non-interference with the eventual construction program.

d. Strength reports to this headquarters by 1200K, daily. (For form to be used see Annex 6.)

e. Replacements:

(1) Units will submit monthly personnel requisitions, in duplicate, for loss replacements, through this headquarters to the Commanding General, Sixth Army, APO 442, in accordance with provisions of letter, Headquarters Sixth Army, file AG 200.3 E, Subject: "Personnel Requisitions", dated 25 March 1944.

(2) Units may submit special requisitions direct to this headquarters as the situation dictates.

f. G-1 Periodic Reports:

Copies of G-1 Periodic Report will be submitted to this headquarters as specified in Annex 6.

8. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Rear boundaries as specified by Landing Force Commanders.

b. Administrative matters.

(1) Sanitation.
(See Incl 1, to Annex 3, Medical).

(2) Casualty Reports
Consolidated casualty reports will be submitted as required by Sixth Army Casualty Reporting Manual, 1 October 1943, as amended to include Change 5, 1 March 1944. One information copy to this headquarters and one direct to the Commanding General, Alamo Force, APO 712. These reports will be in addition to the frequent situation and casualty reports directed in par 3x FO 1, Headquarters RECKLESS Task Force.

(3) Relations with Civil Government.
In accordance with letter of instructions to be published later.

[redacted]

[redacted]

c. Payment of Troops.

(1) As directed by Commanding Generals, Landing Forces, for troops assigned and attached to their respective commands.

(2) All others, by Finance Officer, RECKLESS Task Force.

d. G-4 Periodic Reports.

(1) To be submitted by Commanding Generals, Landing Forces, by most expeditious means as of 1800K, daily, to Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

(a) Strength of Force, including attached troops in operational area.

(b) Class I: Total balanced rations on hand, by type, in days of supply based on (a), above, Include number of native rations on hand, or number of days of supply based on number of natives employed.

(c) Status of Evacuation (Casualties only).

1. Number evacuated during preceding 24 hours.

2. Number awaiting evacuation.

(d) Matters of importance pertaining to motor, water, and/or air transportation. Include -

1. Number and type of each craft used for lightering.

2. Number of each type deadlined.

3. Deadweight tons discharged from USASOS shipping during preceding 24 hours.

4. Construction status of landing facilities and dump areas.

(e) Roads: General condition initially; thereafter, important changes only.

(f) Captured Material: List and disposition.

(g) Any activities and/or information of particular importance including items in which critical shortages exist.

(2) Report called for in (1) above will be confirmed by safehand.

e. Allocation of Shipping.
(See Annex 6 to FO 1)

f. Equipment.

(1) Within applicable T/Es (or T/BAs) as modified by Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(2) Units landing on echelons to include D + 20 will be stripped of all clothing, individual and organizational equipment and vehicles not essential to the accomplishment of their mission. Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force, will establish priorities for shipment of equipment left in staging areas to include heavy tentage, cots, barrack bags, for the above units.

(3) Instructions as to equipment and vehicles to accompany units landing after D + 20 will be furnished at a later date.

(4) Equipment and vehicles not accompanying assault units will be left in staging areas under ample guard to be forwarded on call from Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

G-4

INCLOSURES:
Incl 1 - USASOS ltr, GSB 314.4, 23 Feb 43, sub: "Handling of Captured Enemy Equipment."
Incl 2 - Extract Cir #88, USAFFE, 20 Oct 43, amendment to Cir 31.
Incl 3 - Cir #31, USAFFE, 27 May 43, Disposition of Captured Enemy Equipment.
Incl 4 - Ltr, USAFFE, FEGB 386.3, 24 Jan 44, sub: "List of Captured Enemy Equipment Cleared by Intelligence."
Incl 5 - Sixth Army Casualty Reporting Manual (Not included, distributed by CG Alamo to all units RECKLESS Task Force)
*Incl 6 - USAFFE Reg. 80-40, 30 May 43, Processing Prisoners of War Captured by U.S. Forces and Disposition of Personal Effects of Enemy Dead.
*Incl 7 - USAFFE Reg. 80-40, C-1, 4 Jun 43.
*Incl 8 - USAFFE Reg. 80-40, C-2, 23 Jun 43.
*Incl 9 - USAFFE Reg. 80-40, C-3, 4 Aug 43.
Incl 10 - Allocation and attachments - Service Troops.
*Incl 11 - Cir #21, USAFFE, 5 Mar 44, Retention of Captured Materiel Trophies by Military Personnel.

*Not included. When distributed, to be attached to and made a part of this order.

ANNEXES:
1 - Quartermaster Plan, w/2 Incls
1 - SOP for burials and establishment of cemeteries.
2 - SOP for Air Supply.
2 - Ordnance Plan

[redacted]

[redacted]

ANNEXES (Cont):

3 - Medical Plan, w/1 Incl
    1 - Sanitation.
4 - Engineer Plan, w/2 Incls
    1 - Assault and Reinforcing Supplies,- NOISELESS Area.
    2 - Assault and Reinforcing Supplies,- LETTERPRESS Area.
5 - Chemical Plan
6 - G-1 Information and Reports, w/8 Incls (Blank Forms).

DISTRIBUTION:

O-2 plus the following:

ESCALATOR	3
CTF 76	3
CG ADVON 5	8
CG NOISELESS Landing Force	10
CG LETTERPRESS Landing Force	10
CO RECKLESS Task Force Reserve	2
C/S RECKLESS Task Force	1
G-1 RECKLESS Task Force	1
G-2 RECKLESS Task Force	1
G-3 RECKLESS Task Force	4
G-4 RECKLESS Task Force	10
FA RECKLESS Task Force	1
AA RECKLESS Task Force	1
AG RECKLESS Task Force	1
QM RECKLESS Task Force	1
Ord RECKLESS Task Force	1
Surg RECKLESS Task Force	1
Sig RECKLESS Task Force	1
Engr RECKLESS Task Force	1
Cml RECKLESS Task Force	1
Air Liaison	1

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
APO 565

1010K, 4 April 1944

ANNEX NO. 1 to ADM O 1, QUARTERMASTER PLAN

1. The QM RECKLESS TF, will:

   a. Attach personnel from his section to QM operating agencies as requested and when available.

   b. Assure supply of essential QM items and supplies to task force elements prior to embarkation.

   c. Co-ordinate and control QM resupply by liaison with QM, ALAMO FORCE.

2. SUPPLY INSTALLATIONS: (Par 2a Adm O 1)

   a. Initial supply bases: at staging areas.

   b. Resupply Base: REDHERRING

   c. Consolidation of QM establishments in the RECKLESS area will be effected under TFQM as soon as practicable, estimated at D ∕ 9. Pending consolidation, QM resupply will be segregated in the RECKLESS dumps insofar as practicable.

3. SUPPLY LEVELS: (Pars 2b and 3a, Adm O 1)

   a. To accompany troops landing D to D ∕ 2 inclusive:

      (1) Class I:

      With units - 5 D/S

      Additional on LST'S for troops landing:

      D - 10 days
      D ∕ 1 - 9 days
      D ∕ 2 - 8 days

      (2) Cl II - IV inclusive: 15 D/S

   b. To accompany units landing subsequent to D ∕ 2:

      Classes I - IV inclusive: 15 D/S

   c. The rations accompanying troops as prescribed in a above will include six (6) percent of the total in Hospital Field Ration H as prescribed in USASOS 30-16 dated 28 Feb 1944. Thereafter QM, RECKLESS TF, will maintain Hospital Field Ration H at a level based on estimated hospitalization of 5%.

   d. A thirty-day level, all classes, will be built up by D ∕ 30, and maintained at that minimum thereafter.

[redacted]

[redacted]

4. QM UNITS: (Incl 10 to Adm O 1)

a. Attached NOISELESS Landing Force:

357th QM Serv Co
362d QM Serv Co
2d Plat, 1998th QM Trk Co (Avn) (C)
4th Plat, 601st G R Co

b. Attached LETTERPRESS Landing Force:

993d QM Serv Co
4189th QM Serv Co
3522d QM Trk Co
1 Plat, 2058th QM Trk Co (Avn)
601st Graves Reg Co (- dets)

c. Destined for NOISELESS area, under RECKLESS control:

3527th QM Trk Co
3876th QM Gas Sup Co
1st & 2d Plats, 109th QM Bkry Co
1 Plat, 342d QM Depot Co
609th Port Co

d. Destined for LETTERPRESS area, under RECKLESS control:
3818th QM Gas Sup Co (- 1 plat)
109th QM Bkry Co (- 2 plats)
342d QM Depot Co (- dets)
296th Port Co
1 Plat, 244th Port Co

e. Attachments and relief from attachments on orders RECKLESS TF Comdr.

5. SUPPLY PROCEDURE:

a. Initial supply:

(1) Requisitions for all classes QM supplies to accompany troops will be consolidated by Div QM's and submitted as follows:

(a) For troops staging at MICROCOSM - to QM, RECKLESS TF.

(b) For troops staging at REDHERRING - to QM, ALAMO FORCE

(c) For troops staging elsewhere - To QM at staging area, copy to QM, RECKLESS TF.

(d) Requisitions will be drawn on Base QM's and supply will be distributed through Base QM's.

b. Replacement supply prior to embarkation: by requisitions on QM, ALAMO SUPPLY POINT NO 1 for units staged at MICROCOSM: on QM, Base F for units staged at REDHERRING; on QM of staging area for troops staged elsewhere.

[redacted]

[redacted]

c. Resupply: (Par 3 Adm O 1)

(1) From Base F on orders of CG, ESCALATOR, based on reports and requests from CG, RECKLESS TF.

(2) Classes I and III automatic; Classes II and IV on requisition to QM, ESCALATOR, through QM, RECKLESS TF.

d. Air supply:

(1) Emergency supply by air droppings will be by request from commanders NOISELESS and LETTERPRESS Landing Forces to RECKLESS TF commander. Organization requesting supply by air will be responsible that dropping parachutes and containers are salvaged and returned at earliest practicable time by watercraft proceeding to REDHERRING. Radio reports of salvaged chutes and containers to QM, RECKLESS TF.

(2) Procedure for air supply in emergencies is prescribed in Incl 2 hereto.

6. BURIALS AND CEMETERIES:

a. Cemeteries located and designated by commanders NOISELESS and LETTERPRESS Landing Forces for their respective areas. Report locations to CG RECKLESS TF.

b. Isolated burials will be avoided when possible.

c. Detailed procedure prescribed in Incl 1 hereto. Required reports, including GR Form #1, through QM, RECKLESS TF.

7. SALVAGE:

a. Commanders NOISELESS and LETTERPRESS Landing Forces are responsible for:

(1) Collection of salvage including unserviceable and abandoned equipment whether US or enemy.

(2) Augmenting available stocks with erviceable salvaged items.

(3) Evacuation of salvage to REDHERRING in returning watercraft.

b. Special efforts as prescribed above will be made in the case of steel drums, oxygen, nitrogen, and acetylene cylinder, containers used in air droppings, and parachutes.

c. Bulky items which require special handling equipment will be reported to the appropriate special staff section, RECKLESS TF. Locations will be specified.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

[redacted]

[redacted]

OFFICIAL:

G-4

2 Incls:
1 - SOP for Burials and Establishment of Cemeteries
2 - SOP for Air Supply.

(Incl 2: DIST ONLY TO:
CG RECKLESS TF
CG NOISELESS LF
CG LETTERPESS LF

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
APO 565

2100 K 3 April 1944

ANNEX NO 2 to ADM O 1, Ordnance PLAN

1. LETTERPRESS and NOISELESS Ordnance Officers are responsible to Commanding Generals, Landing Forces, for the entire ordnance effort of their forces until arrival of RECKLESS Task Force in combat area. This is not expected to occur until the forces join, and then on order, Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

2. SUPPLY.

a. Class II

(1) All units will carry their SNL authorized organizational spare parts and cleaning and preserving materials.

(2) Division ordnance light maintenance companies will carry 15 D/S for division troops.

(3) 410th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company will carry 15 D/S for non-divisional troops of NOISELESS.

(4) 171st Ordnance Depot Company will carry 30 D/S all units of NOISELESS.

(5) 287th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company will carry 15 D/S all non-divisional troops of LETTERPRESS, and 30 D/S all units of LETTERPRESS. On joining of the two forces, this company will turn over to the 171st Ordnance Depot Company 30 D/S all units of LETTERPRESS.

(6) Supply levels will be maintained at 30 D/S.

(7) Critical shortages will be reported at any time to RECKLESS G-4. After arrival of RECKLESS Ordnance Officer, to him instead of G-4. From RECKLESS G-4 or Ordnance Officer to ALAMO Ordnance Officer.

b. Class V

(1) Initially, LETTERPRESS and NOISELESS Ordnance Officers will be responsible for the location of the ammunition supply points for their respective forces.

(2) Levels:

(a) Units landing D Day, D ⁄ 1, D ⁄ 2.

(1) 6 U/F AA and Field Arty, Grenades.
5 U/F all other classes.

(b) Units landing subsequent to D ⁄ 2.

(1) 3 U/F all classes.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(c) Shipments will be made from REDHERRING to maintain a level of at least 6 U/F all classes.

(3) Re-supply:

(a) Will be round for round based on requisitions in form of expenditure reports.

(4) Reports:

(a) Will be daily as of 1800 hours to RECKLESS G-4. After arrival of RECKLESS Ordnance Officer, to him instead of RECKLESS G-4. From RECKLESS G-4 or Ordnance Officer to ALAMO Ordnance Officer. Critical shortages will be reported at any time.

(b) (AIC) will be used.

(c) Will be based on expenditure plus any other additional critical item.

3. ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE.

a. Organizations will make utmost use of the company artificer, battery mechanics, drivers and 2nd echelon mechanics.

b. Non-divisional units will evacuate to light maintenance companies until the arrival of medium maintenance companies. Division light maintenance companies evacuate to medium maintenance companies. Medium maintenance companies evacuate to REDHERRING.

c. Cannibalization of all items will be permitted.

d. Tank maintenance will be performed by division ordnance light maintenance company with attached tank maintenance detachment, until relieved by the medium maintenance company.

e. AAA will be performed by AA repair teams attached to AAA units.

f. Engineer dump trucks will not be loaded for dump above the rated capacity load.

g. Water-proofing:

(1) All vehicles and towed weapons of the assault groups, landing from small craft, will be water-proofed.

(2) Small arms will be lubricated with Oil, light, 340.

(3) Cases for sighting and fire control instruments will be water-proofed.

4. EVACUATION.

a. Same channels as prescribed for maintenance.

b. Captured material.

(1) Deliver to dumps established for enemy materiel. Location

[redacted]

[redacted]

of heavy equipment will be reported through usual intelligence channels for inspection and evacuation. Items to be tagged showing time, place and unit affecting capture.

(2) Usable items may be retained for combat purposes.

c. Salvage.

(1) Turn in to QM salvage points in manner prescrived in Annex No. 1, QM to Administrative Order No. 1.

5. SERVICE TROOPS.

a. Attached to LETTERPRESS Landing Force, until relieved.

(1) 649th Ordnance Ammunition Company - colored.

(2) 287th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company.

(3) 1 Tank Maintenance Detachment.

(4) 1 Bomb Disposal Squad - personnel and equipment to come from the attached Ammunition Company.

(5) 1 Ordnance Intelligence Unit.

b. Attached to the NOISELESS Landing Force, until relieved.

(1) 642nd Ordnance Ammunition Company - colored.

(2) 410th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company

(3) 1 Bomb Disposal Squad - personnel and equipment to come from attached Ammunition Company.

(4) 1 Tank Maintenance Company.

(5) 1 Ordnance Intelligence Unit.

c. Attached to RECKLESS Task Force.

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 194th Ordnance Maintenance Battalion. On arrival of this unit, all of the medium maintenance companies, ammunition companies, and the tank maintenance detachments will be assigned to this unit. If NOISELESS and LETTERPRESS have not yet joined, the ordnance units in LETTERPRESS remain under control of Commanding General, Landing Force, until orders issue from RECKLESS Headquarters.

(2) 171st Ordnance Depot Company attached to 194th Ordnance Maintenance Battalion.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ McCreight
G-4

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
APO 565
1055 K, 4 April 1944

ANNEX NO 3 to ADM O 1, MEDICAL PLAN

1. SUPPLY.

a. See paragraph 2 b, Adm O 1.

b. LETTERPRESS Task Force.

(1) Initially the 41st Division medical service will establish a medical supply point as directed by the Commander of the LETTERPRESS Task Force.

(2) The 27th Medical Supply Platoon (Avn) will take over the operation of the medical supply installation on or after D plus 9, on orders, Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

c. NOISELESS Task Force.

(1) Initially the 24th Division medical service will establish a medical supply point as directed by the Commander of the NOISELESS Task Force.

(2) The 21st Medical Supply Platoon (Avn) will take over the operation of the medical supply installation on or after D plus 9, on orders, Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

d. Supplies.

(1) For levels, see paragraphs 2 b and 3 a, Adm O 1.

(2) Normally, subordinate units in the LETTERPRESS and NOISELESS areas will draw supplies from appropriate supply points; however, in an emergency they may draw on an informal requisition to the next higher echelon (Bn Aid from Coll Co and Coll Co from Clr Co).

(3) All units in the chain of evacuation are enjoined to adhere strictly to the rule of property exchange.

(4) All units will carry syrettes of morphine, blood plasma sets, quinine and atabrine in sufficient quantities to provide for unexpected emergencies.

2. EVACUATION.

a. Casualties.

(1) By returning supply ships.

(a) ESCALATOR will provide medical care and attendance en-route on Naval transportation.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(b) USASOS will provide medical care and attendance enroute on other than Naval transportation.

(2) Emergency: By air on request to Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

(a) ALLIED AIR FORCES will provide medical care and attendance enroute.

(3) The Commanding General, Landing Forces, will deliver casualties to water and air transportation.

(4) Casualties requiring hospitalization of fifteen (15) days or less will remain in operational area. Retention beyond fifteen (15) days is authorized if beds are available.

(5) No patients or casualties will be placed aboard returning craft without an Emergency Medical Tag authenticated by a medical officer.

b. LETTERPRESS Landing Force.

(1) Attached Medical Units.

92nd Evacuation Hospital
3d Portable Surgical Hospital
12th Portable Surgical Hospital
26th Portable Surgical Hospital
Company "B", 262d Medical Battalion.

(2) Medical Units of the RECKLESS Task Force destined to go into the LETTERPRESS Area.

Company "B" (Coll), 135th Medical Regiment
Company "C" (Coll), 135th Medical Regiment
605th Medical Clearing Company
29th Malaria Survey Unit
5th Malaria Control Unit
56th Malaria Control Unit
27th Medical Supply Platoon (Avn)

c. NOISELESS Landing Force.

(1) Attached Medical Units

7th Portable Surgical Hospital
16th Portable Surgical Hospital
Company "C", 262d Medical Battalion
604th Medical Clearing Company

(2) Medical Units of the RECKLESS Task Force destined to go into the NOISELESS Area.

408th Medical Collecting Company
54th Malaria Control Unit
55th Malaria Control Unit
6th Malaria Survey Unit
36th Evacuation Hospital
21st Medical Supply Platoon (Avn)

[redacted]

[redacted]

d. RECKLESS Task Force Reserve.

(1) Attached Medical Units.

10th Portable Surgical Hospital
407th Medical Collecting Company

3. SANITATION.

See Inclosure 1 to Annex 3, Medical Plan.

4. REPORTS TO BE SUBMITTED.

a. Medical Annex to G-4 Periodic Report. See paragraph 8 d (1), Adm O 1.

b. Casualty Reports. See paragraph 8 b (2), Adm O 1.

c. Monthly Sanitary Report.

d. Weekly Abbreviated Statistical Report (by radio or courier) to the Surgeon, RECKLESS Task Force.

e. Weekly Report of the Amount of Atabrine in depot stocks to Commanding Officer, Base "F", (by radio).

f. Monthly Venereal Disease Statistical Report.

g. Monthly Statistical Report, MD Form 86ab.

h. Monthly Report of Sick and Wounded MD Form 51.

i. Monthly Report of Dental Service, MD Form 57.

j. Monthly Report of Essential Technical Medical Data from Overseas Forces.

k. Monthly Report of Medical Care of Foreign Personnel.

l. Quarterly History of Medical Activities.

m. Daily Admission and Disposition Sheet (for hospitals); one (1) copy to the Commanding General, USAFFE, APO 501; two (2) copies to the Commanding General, USASOS, APO 501; one (1) copy to the Surgeon, Headquarters RECKLESS Task Force; and one (1) copy to the Surgeon, Sixth Army.

n. Daily blotter for medical units smaller than hospitals (except battalion and regimental aid stations) by airmail courier to the Commanding General, USAFFE, APO 501.

o. Progress reports will be rendered by all hospitals on all casualties and seriously ill non-battle casualties which are hospitalized. Reports are to be sent to the Commanding General, USAFFE, APO 501, every fifteen (15) days (or more often as in the case of the initial report on a patient seriously ill). Normally, progress reports will be submitted on the 13th and 28th of each month.

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p. Information copies will be sent to the Surgeon, RECKLESS Task Force, of reports required in paragraphs 4 e, j and n.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ McCreight
G-4

1 Incl.
1. Sanitation

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SANITATION

1. Responsibilities.

a. Commanders.

Sanitation and individual hygienic measures within organizations and in areas occupied by organizations is the responsibility of the individual commanders.

b. Surgeons.

Unit Surgeons are responsible for investigating, reporting upon, and submitting recommendations concerning all matters pertaining to the health of the command. The Surgeons' commendations to the commander will include information as to the availability and desirability of special sanitary appliances.

c. Medical Inspector

The Task Force Medical Inspector under the Task Force Surgeon is charged with the supervision of sanitation and investigations concerning the local prevalence, mode of spread and prevention of disease likely to affect the health of the command. These investigations will form the basis of all sanitary reports to the commander.

2. Water Supply.

a. Commanders of all grades are responsible for investigating the source of drinking water being obtained by their units and will take every reasonable precaution to assure themselves that potable water only is being used for drinking and mess purposes.

b. Unit commanders will designate areas along streams for obtaining drinking water, bathing, laundering clothes, and washing equipment and vehicles. Such areas will be clearly marked and necessary measures will be taken to prevent contamination of these areas, either by troops or by native populations.

c. Training of all troop units will include instruction in water purification in order that each soldier will be able to select and purify his own water, using sterilizing bags or individual sterilization in canteens or other containers.

3. Food and Messes.

a. Foods will be secured from quartermaster sources, captured food from enemy stores will not be issued to, or consumed by troops, until adequate inspection has demonstrated its safety. The possibility of booby traps and deliberate poisoning must be borne in mind.

b. All food will be protected from dust, dirt, rain, flies, roaches, and rodents while in storage, in transit, after receipt, at kitchens, and during preparation and serving.

c. Consideration will be given to the rapid spoilage of foodstuffs under tropical conditions. Perishable food will not be issued to troops for consumption several hours after its preparation. This statement applies particularly to meat sandwiches and similar components of "sack lunches" frequently used in the temperate zone. In tropical areas imperishable rations and individual containers will be used whenever possible.

Incl 1 to ANNEX 3, MEDICAL PLAN

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d. Vitamin concentrates will be issued upon recommendation of the Task Force Surgeon.

e. Mess gear will be washed and sterilized by soap and successive rinsing in three (3) cans of hot water when circumstances permit. Chemical sterilization with strong hypochlorite solution may be used, but is effective only if preceded by physical cleansing. Cold water washing, using soap or sand scouring, is effective in preparing mess gear for chemical sterilization.

f. Permanent food handlers will be given preliminary and periodic physical examination as required by Army Regulations. Natives will not be employed in messes.

g. Unit commanders will take necessary steps to prevent troops from securing foods from native habitations.

4. Disposal of Waste.

a. Human Excreta.

(1) Box Latrines.
Units equipped with box latrines will see that they are so constructed and maintained as to be fly-proof and are mounded to prevent filling of the pit by surface washing. The contents of the pits, the sides of the pits, and the insides of the boxes will be sprayed with crude oil. The outside of the latrine will be scrubbed daily with soap and water. When a high ground water table precludes pit latrines, latrine buckets in fly proof latrine boxes will be employed.

(2) Trench Latrines.
Trench latrines that will accomodate ten per cent of the command at one time (allowing two (2) linear feet of trench per man) will be constructed. Earth will be piled at the end of the trench in order that each man may cover his own excreta. Trenches will be sprayed daily with crude oil, if available, in order to keep down flies. In certain areas, trench latrines may prove unsatisfactory due to heavy rainfall and high ground water. In such areas an excreta disposal site will be selected, taking account of surface drainage to preclude contamination of the drinking water source and mess area. At those sites shallow trench latrines will be used and the earth tightly packed and mounded over the old trenches as new ones are constructed. If available, a crude oil spray will be used daily to keep down flies. Abandoned trenches will be marked "Old Latrine".

(3) Latrine Screens.
Latrine screens will be provided for each latrine when the tactical and supply situation permits.

(4) Urinal Cans.
Urinal cans will be placed in company streets or convenient sites in the bivouac area at night. These will be removed at daylight and emptied into pits provided for this purpose. Cans will be washed with soap and water or sprayed with crude oil.

b. Kitchen Waste.
Solid garbage will be drained and incinerated or buried. Garbage cans will be scrubbed daily with soap and water and will be tightly covered

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while in use. Ground around garbage cans will be thoroughly tamped and, if possible, oil sprayed. Liquid kitchen waste will be disposed of in soakage pits. Rubbish will be incinerated or buried.

5. Shelter.

Not more than six men will be quartered in one pyramidal tent. All wall tents will be rolled for at least two (2) hours a day, weather permitting. Tents will be furled sufficiently often to keep the ground dry and free from odors. Tents will be well ventilated at night. All bedding will be removed from tents and sunned or aired for a period of at least two (2) hours once a week. Hammocks, cots, or improvised bunk platforms may be used under tentage or native-type huts. Huts formerly used by natives will not be occupied by troops. In general, native villages will be given a wide berth in selecting bivouac sites as they are reservoirs for all the diseases endemic in the area.

6. Insect Control.

a. Flies.

Kitchens, mess halls, and ration breakdown points will be kept free of flies. Screening, when available, will be protected and kept in good repair. Sources of fly breeding will be vigorously combatted.

b. Mosquitoes.

(1) Three major diseases in this theater are transmitted by mosquitoes. The first, malaria, is by far the most important. This disease is endemic throughout much of the theater and is hyperendemic in the equatorial belt. The second disease, dengue, is of less importance due to its low case fatality rate and its relatively short duration. Filaiasis, the third disease, is largely a problem for certain native populations, although a few cases may occur among military personnel.

(2) Measures for the control of malaria are the responsibility of the unit commander. These measures include:

(a) Destruction of mosquito larvae by oiling, poisoning, dusting, drainage, and filling.

(b) Prevention of man-made mosquito breeding places such as discarded cans, tire casings, wheel tracks, etc.

(c) Destruction of adult mosquitoes by hand killing and spraying with insecticides.

(d) Use of individual protective measures such as headnets, mosquito gloves, clothing, mosquito bars, and mosquito repellents.

(e) Long sleeve shirts and full length trousers will be worn at all times, except when bathing, dressing or under mosquito netting.

(f) Avoidance, whenever possible, of the proximity of native villages.

(g) Suppressive treatment consisting of 10 tablets of atabrine

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per week will be given to each individual. This will be done by roster under the supervision of a commissioned officer. This suppressive treatment will be continued until the area has been declared "controlled".

(h) Training and utilization of anti-malaria details.

(3) For further information on malaria control see USAFFE letter, file FEMD 710, Subject: "Sanitary and Prevention Measures for the Control of Malaria", dated 18 April 1943.

c. Ticks.

Ticks may act as vectors of disease. While operating in tick infested areas, troops will inspect each other from time to time to detect the presence of ticks. When an attached tick is found, it will be removed by touching the tick with a lighted match or flame and the skin area painted with iodine. Care will be taken to avoid crushing or detaching the head of the tick during removal.

d. Mites.

These insects, similar to the "chiggers" found in the southern portion of the United States, produce an intense itching. Scratching of the bites often leads to secondary infection. Certain of these mites are considered to be the carriers of Scrub Typhus, a serious disease endemic in tropical areas of this theater. Mites abound in kunai grass and dense vegetation; repellents such as powdered sulphur, soft soap, and mosquito repellents should be used liberally. Careful bathing with soap, shortly after passing through dense vegetation, will frequently serve to remove the mites. Clothing should be changed.

e. Fleas.

One form of typhus is transmitted to man by the bite of the rat flea. These fleas are also capable of transmitting bubonic plague and certain worm infestations. Rodent control measures will serve to control this insect problem. Such measures will include poisoning, trapping, rat-proofing and protection of foodstuffs to prevent rodent depredations.

f. All insect bites should be treated immediately by the application of iodine.

g. Snakes and Poisonous Insects.

Numerous poisonous snakes are found in the area, as well as poisonous spiders. Unit training will include first aid management of snake and spider bites. Whenever possible the snake or spider which has bitten should be brought to the medical officer as guide to treatment. The bite of certain highly poisonous spiders may be attended by very little pain. For this reason, all cases of spider bite should be reported promptly for medical attention.

7. Personal Hygiene.

a. The problem of hygiene is greatly magnified in the tropical belt. Emphasis must be laid on bathing, care of the feet, and the early recognition and treatment of fungus diseases of the skin. Wearing of protective clothing and equipment will often prove uncomfortable and troops have a tendency to discard such items unless they are thoroughly inculcated with the importance of the protection afforded.

b. Salt will be used freely in all tropical and sub-tropical areas to avoid chloride depletion.

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8. Venereal Prophylaxis.

a. All aid stations, collecting stations, clearing stations, and evacuation hospitals will immediately set up a venereal prophylaxis station, and will serve all applicants regardless of organization. A record will be kept giving the applicant's name, rank, and organization, time of exposure, description, name and location of the woman, and time of prophylaxis. This information will be forwarded to the unit concerned.

b. If and when venereal cases occur this information will be forwarded to the Task Force Surgeon, in order that he may investigate the circumstances and source of infection.

9. Accident Prevention.

a. Heat Exhaustion and Sunstroke.
Unit commanders will assure themselves that troops march properly covered and that march hygiene and water discipline is rigidly enforced.

10. Instruction.
Unit instruction will include frank and accurate discussions of disease and accident hazards peculiar to the tropics, with emphasis on prevention and the success of proper treatment.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ McCreight
G-4

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HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
APO 565
2210K, 5 April 1944

Annex 4 to Adm O No 1, Engineer Plan.

1. Engineer Equipment and Supplies.

a. Equipping of Units Prior to Movement.

(1) Every effort will be made by Landing Force Engineers and by the Task Force Engineer to provide each Task Force unit with all equipment authorized by T/E and T/BA prior to departure of the unit from the staging area. Requisitions for T/E and T/BA materials other than heavy equipment will be submitted to the Base Engineer (except Base "F") of the base at which a unit is staged, giving full information as to items on hand and enroute, authorized, and required. Units staging at Base "F" will submit requisitions direct to the Alamo Engineer Supply Officer, APO 712. Landing Force Engineers should make direct contact with units of the Force to assist them as necessary in procurement of T/E and T/BA items.

(2) Requisitions for heavy equipment and for all items in excess of T/E and T/BA which affect logistics of movement will be submitted direct to the Alamo Engineer Supply Officer, APO 712, giving information as to items on hand or enroute, authorized, required, and full basis for need for items requested in excess of T/E and T/BA.

(3) Construction materials and other expendable supplies carried by units will be kept to the minimum due to shortage of shipping space for movement of units to objective areas and to the fact that construction materials for authorized construction will be prepared and submitted by the RECKLESS Task Force Engineer. Requisitions for expendable supplies will be submitted to Base Engineer at staging areas, (to Alamo Engineer Supply Officer, APO 712, for units at Base "F"). (Basis: 15 D/S)

b. Movement of Engineer Equipment

(1) The 339th Engineer General Service Regiment, less one battalion, will move into the NOISELESS Area on D Day and 1881st Engineer Aviation Battalion will move into the LETTERPRESS Area on D Day. One AK is being made available for movement of the personnel and equipment of each of these organizations. Due to difficulties of unloading certain items of equipment of these organizations from AK's, Commander, Landing Force NOISELESS and Commander, Landing Force LETTERPRESS will make available on LST's, space for the following organizational equipment with operating personnel to be transported on D Day or D + 1 to each of their respective areas:

6 each Tractors, D-7 or D-8.
1 each Shovel 1/2 to 3/4 yd w/shovel and boom.
1 each Shovel 1/2 to 3/4 yd w/piledriving leads & hammer.

(2) Equivalent space to that provided in compliance with this directive will be made available on the AK's for equipment and personnel of organizations to be determined by Commanders, Landing Forces. Equipment loaded on AK's will be such that unloading can be easily accomplished with the means available.

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(3) The 339th Engineer General Service Regiment (less one battalion) and the 1881st Engineer Aviation Battalion are attached respectively to Commander, Landing Force NOISELESS, and Commander Landing Force LETTERPRESS for movement to the objective area. These organizations will revert to control of the Commander, RECKLESS Task Force on his order or approximately D + 2.

c. Detection and Removal of Land Mines.

Commanders, Landing Forces will ensure that engineer units are properly equipped with mine detectors and are trained and prepared to carry out land mine removal operations as may be required.

d. Assault and Reinforcing Supplies.

(1) Issue of engineer assault supplies to units prior to their departure for objective areas will be made as directed by the Landing Force Commanders concerned; however, necessary action will be taken by Landing Force Commanders to make certain that at least the following assault supplies are delivered to the objective areas on D Day for each reinforced Regimental Combat Team:

Item	Unit	Quantity	Wt. Lbs	Cubage
Axe, 4#	each	100	650	20
Bag, sand	each	100,000	33,000	1,200
Burlap, plain, 3' x 100 yd bolt	bolt	10	500	30
Caps #8, Electric	each	1,000	120	4
Caps #8, Non-electric	each	3,000	40	1
Chain Log, 5/8" x 14'	each	20	700	12
Cloth, red, 36" wide	yard	50	15	1
Cloth, white, 36" wide	yard	100	30	2
Detonators, Delay	each	200	200	6
Explosive TNT or Comp. C	lbs	6,000	7,200	180
Explosive, dynamite 60% or Gelignite	lbs	6,000	7,200	180
Explosive, Shaped charges	each	100	4,000	120
Fuse Lighters	each	1,000	15	1
Fuse Time	feet	3,000	75	2
Lumber 1" Random	bd ft	1,000	4,000	100
Lumber 2" Random	bd ft	1,000	4,000	100
Marline, 5 lb	coil	10	50	2
Machete	each	200	800	12
Mesh, ARC, 6' x 10'	sheet	150	9,750	300
Mesh Clips	each	1,500	200	3
Mesh Staples 18"	each	600	400	4
Mines AP M2	each	400	3,736	94
Mines AP M3	each	200	2,550	27
Mines AT	each	200	3,000	58
Nails 8d, 100# keg	each	4	440	6
Nails, 20d, 100# keg	each	4	440	6
Nails, 40d, 100# keg	each	6	660	9
Nails, 60d, 100# keg	each	6	660	9
Pick Mattock	each	100	700	33
Prima-cord, 100 ft spool	each	20	50	1
Rope, manila 1/2 " dia	each	3,000	210	8
Rope, manila 1" dia	each	2,000	520	26
Saw, Crosscut, 2 man	each	6	90	2
Saw, Portable gasoline driven	each	2	560	48
Shovel, round point, D-handle	each	200	920	100
Torpedo, Bangalore, 50' per box	box	10	2,250	40

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Item	Unit	Quantity	Wt. Lbs	Cubage
Tape Tracing, 3/4 ", 500' long	each	10	10	1
Wire Barbed, 100 lb coil, 420 yd	each	64	6,400	138
Picket, anchor, barbed wire	each	1,000	3,000	30
Picket, long, barbed wire	each	500	4,000	40
Wire, concertina	each	100	6,800	800
Wire, steel, galvanized #10	roll	20	2,000	40
Pins, drift, 12" 1/2"	each	300	200	3
Pins, drift, 18 " 5/8"	each	300	467	7
Materials for 100 ft. Timber Trestle Bridge:				
Stringers 6" x 12" x 16'	piece	50	14,400	400
Posts, 8" x 8" x 16'	piece	30	7,610	210
Caps 8" x 8" x 12'	piece	10	1,920	53
Sills 8" x 8" x 12'	piece	10	1,920	53
Decking 3" x 12" x 12'	piece	150	16,200	450
Braces 2" x 9" x 20'	piece	45	5,645	101
Bolts, drift 3/4" x 21"	each	150	400	6
Spikes, decking, 8"	each	600	150	3
Bolts, Machine Sq hd 5/8" x 12"	each	50	100	2
Firing Device, Pressure M1A1	each	200	100	3
Firing Device, Pull Type M1	each	200	100	3
Firing Device Release Type M1	each	200	100	3
			159,253	5,093

Landing Force Commanders will take necessary action to insure that the following assault and reinforcing engineer supplies are delivered to the objective areas not later than D + 2.

(a) NOISELESS Landing Force.

Including assault supplies listed above, all supplies listed in Inclosure No. 1, approximately 900 DWT.

(b) LETTERPRESS Landing Force.

Including assault supplies listed above, all supplies listed in Inclosure No. 2, approximately 1058 DWT.

e. Control of Engineer Supplies.

(1) Commanding General of LETTERPRESS Landing Force and NOISELESS Landing Force will be responsible for engineer supplies within their respective commands until establishment of RECKLESS Task Force Engineer Dumps.

(2) It is expected that RECKLESS Task Force Engineer Dump will open at some time during the period D + 9 to D + 13 at NOISELESS and at LETTERPRESS.

(3) All construction materials, except T/BA expendables authorized to be carried by units, will be turned over to the Task Force Engineer Supply Officer and will be utilized for duly authorized Task Force construction. Strict enforcement is enjoined.

f. Utilization of Local Materials.

Due to shortage of engineer materials in forward areas and shortage

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of shipping, full utilization of local materials is an absolute necessity. Engineer units charged with construction will make provisions for earliest utilization of local materials by planning early reconnaissance, and placing in operation on high priority, such equipment as sawmills, rock crushers, etc.

g. Requisitioning of Engineer Equipment and Supplies.

(1) After arrival of units in the objective area, all requisitions for engineer equipment and supplies will be submitted through the Task Force Engineer direct to the Alamo Engineer Supply Officer, APO 712, by radio or letter. Requisitions will not be submitted direct to USASOS agencies.

(2) Requisitions will be submitted by radio or letter depending on the urgency of need. Full use of engineer officer or enlisted couriers will be exercised in transmitting requirements to this Headquarters and to Alamo Force Headquarters.

h. Operation of Engineer Equipment Pools.

To supplement equipment authorized by approved T/E, Engineer Unit Commanders are authorized to requisition additional equipment which will be issued by the Task Force Engineer on memorandum receipt. Accurate records of use of this equipment must be kept and care taken to assure that it is properly maintained.

i. Distribution of Equipment Reports.

All units will be required to submit weekly distribution of equipment reports to the Alamo Engineer through the Task Force Engineer on the form prescribed by the Alamo Engineer.

j. Monthly Inventories.

Monthly inventories of engineer materials on hand will be submitted in duplicate by Task Force Engineer to the Alamo Engineer.

2. Water Supply

Water supply points will be established in sufficient numbers to provide five gallons of water per man per day, located in such places as to minimize the use of transportation and construction materials.

3. Map Supply

a. Requisitions for maps and photomaps in excess of those included in the initial issue will be submitted by units of Landing Forces to the Task Force Engineer who will in turn requisition on the Alamo Engineer.

b. The issue of new maps and photomaps prepared by the Alamo Engineer will be automatic.

c. Requests for preparation of any special map or photomap will be submitted through channels to the Commanding General, Alamo Force.

4. Technical Plans and Reports.

a. General layout and standard plans for construction will be furnished construction agencies by Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force on, or before their arrival in the objective area. Layouts and plans for construction

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will be forwarded promptly to Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force for approval. Construction will not be delayed pending submission of plans and review by the Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

b. Engineer, RECKLESS Task Force will furnish specifications for construction of airdromes, naval facilities, petroleum bulk storage facilities and such other special construction as required to accompany construction directives for work cited in paragraph 5 below.

c. Construction will be in accordance with the "Construction Policy" letter November 10, 1943, Headquarters Alamo Force and such revisions as may later be made therein.

d. Progress reports on major construction projects will be submitted weekly as of 2400 hours Saturday in the form directed by Engineer, RECKLESS Task Force.

5. Construction.

The following construction work is required:

a. LETTERPRESS - NOISELESS Area.

(1) Prepare at the earliest practicable date installation to accommodate three fighter groups and one night fighter squadron. Initial facilities will include not less than two Class D airdromes, a limited dispersal for all planes and required operational buildings. Subsequent facilities will be prescribed at a later date, but for planning purposes may be considered to be four separate airdromes, of which at least two shall be type E airdromes with total dispersals for 96 heavy bombers and 533 fighter and medium bomber dispersals.

(2) Assist the Commander, Allied Naval Forces, by performing the construction required to establish minor naval facilities in the LETTERPRESS - NOISELESS Area.

(3) Establish at the earliest practicable date two floating Liberty Ship docks in the LETTERPRESS Area and two floating Liberty Ship docks in the NOISELESS Area. Details of development of port facilities will be furnished at a later date, but for planning purposes this may be considered to include 16 Liberty Ship docks.

(4) Perform construction necessary to assist Commander, Allied Air Forces in the establishment of air warning and radio navigational facilities.

(5) Initiate the construction of bulk petroleum storage, water terminals therefor and distribution lines for all services. Detailed instructions will be issued at a later date, but for planning purposes, the installation may be assumed to provide for 118,000 barrels of storage, including that for aviation gasoline, motor fuel and diesel oil.

(6) Prepare plans for the construction of an Air Depot to provide for the operation of two Air Depot groups. Directives for this construction will be issued at a later date.

(7) Construct a supply base to handle 180 days supply of all classes for 200,000 troops. Directives for this construction will be issued at a later date.

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(8) Staging Area.

Staging areas for one hundred thousand will be selected and developed as directed. Additional camp facilities for ESCALATOR troops will be constructed as may later be directed.

(9) ESCALATOR Force Supply Point.

Construct a transloading and supply point with a capacity of 60 days supply of minimum combat requirements for a force of five thousand, capable of expansion to support 20,000 men, in accordance with directive to be issued. Supply point should preferably be based on expansion of Task Force dump areas.

(10) ESCALATOR Headquarters.

Construct headquarters office, communications shelter, and camp facilities for 350 officers and 1,000 EM for Headquarters ESCALATOR and attached liaison personnel in accordance with directive to be issued by this Headquarters.

(11) Other headquarters will be constructed as may later be directed.

6. Priorities of Engineer Work.

a. General priorities of engineer work [illegible] as follows:

First Priority: (To be executed concurrently)

(1) Initial beach landing and unloading facilities, including initial dump areas.

(2) Necessary engineer work in support of combat operation including water points, axial road and artillery road.

(3) Initial dock facilities.

(4) Initial road access from docks to supply establishments.

(5) Initial airdrome and dispersal facilities to provide in order:

(a) Landing strip for air transport.

(b) Landing strip for fighter operation with alert and limited dispersal facilities for one fighter group.

(c) Alert and limited dispersal facilities for two additional fighter groups and one additional landing strip.

(d) Completion of drome facilities as specified.

(6) Task Force dumps and ESCALATOR supply points.

(7) Light naval base facilities.

(8) Minimum storage, including an initial installation of bulk storage for petroleum products, generally consisting of from four to eight 2000-barrel bolted tanks and fueling jetty.

b. Second Priority: (Operations may proceed concurrently, but priority of effort will be in the following order):

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(1) Hospital facilities.

(2) Complete wharves and docks as prescribed.

(3) Complete water installations.

(4) Complete necessary runways and dispersal for fighter and heavy bomber operation, and necessary operational buildings.

(5) Complete roads and oil storage and distribution facilities.

(6) Complete warehousing.

c. Third Priority: Construction of minimum administrative and service installations, and utilities other than those included above which are determined to be essential.

7. Assignment of Work.

a. Commanding General, NOISELESS Landing Force, and Commanding General, LETTERPRESS Landing Force, are specifically charged with engineer construction listed in paragraph 6 a. (1) and (2) above.

b. Engineer units of the RECKLESS Task Force listed in paragraph 1, Inclosure #10 of Administrative Order #1 will render such assistance as is required by Commanders Landing Forces in support of combat operations. They will perform all construction not specifically charged to Commanders Landing Forces. Engineer units other than normally assigned divisional units will pass to control of the RECKLESS Task Force when tactical situation permits, upon order of the Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force. For planning purposes, this time is tentatively fixed at time of initiation of airdrome construction.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ McCreight
G-4

2 Inclosures:
Incl 1 - Engineer Assault and Reinforcing Supplies Required to be Delivered to NOISELESS Area by D + 2.
Incl 2 - Engineer Assault and Reinforcing Supplies Required to be Delivered to LETTERPRESS Area by D + 2.

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HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
APO 565
1110K 4 April 1944

ANNEX NO. 5, to ADM O 1, CHEMICAL PLAN

1. Supply.

a. Supplies and equipment carried.

(1) Individuals will land with gas masks, with canister fully waterproofed until required to be worn, and will carry them until directed otherwise by Commanding General.

(2) In unit supply:

(a) 4% (15 D/S) excess gas masks.

(b) 1 tube, protective ointment per individual plus 50% additional (15 D/S).

(c) Repair equipment and maintenance supplies (15 D/S) for above equipment and weapons specified below.

(3) Weapons. Flame throwers and 4.2" Mortars as authorized.

b. Supplies and equipment turned in:

(1) Units will turn in all other CWS protective supplies and equipment to chemical depots in staging areas.

(2) Protective covers and organizational and individual protective clothing in the hands of units will be turned in to QM depots at the staging area.

c. Chemical Ammunition.

(1) To accompany troops landing D, D/1, D/2:

(a) 4.2" Mortar: grenades: 6 U/F.

(b) All other CW ammunition (except smoke pots and floating smoke pots): 5 U/F.

(c) Smoke pots and floating smoke pots: In quantities requested by Landing Force Commanders; quantity to be carried by units, will be portion deemed practicable.

(d) All units moving on APDs and LCIs will carry with them the maximum portion of 2 U/F, considered practicable.

(e) All other units will carry with them 2 U/F.

(f) Balance of ammunition will be loaded on LSTs accompanying units.

(2) Minimum levels to accompany units landing subsequent to D/2: 3 U/F.

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d. Reports.

(1) Daily: Units will submit reports as of 1800 daily by type on CWS Class V through channels to this headquarters marked "Attention: Chemical Officer."

(2) Form.

(a) Initial Report.

(1) Ammunition accompanying troops to objective area.

(2) Ammunition received since arrival.

(3) Ammunition expended since arrival.

(4) Balance on hand.

(b) Subsequent Reports.

(1) Ammunition on hand, last report.

(2) Ammunition received since last report.

(3) Ammunition expended since last report.

(4) Balance on hand.

(3) All unexpended chemical ammunition issued to troops as well as that in unit supply, will be included in the balance on hand.

e. Maintenance: Equipment that cannot be repaired by 1st echelon maintenance will be replaced.

f. Requisitions and Correspondence.

(1) After D-Day, requisitions to maintain authorized levels for CWS supplies and equipment will be forwarded through Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force.

(2) All correspondence, except captured documents and intelligence reports, pertaining to chemical warfare will be marked "Attention: Chemical Officer.".

(3) All intelligence reports, captured documents and equipment pertaining to chemical warfare will be forwarded through intelligence channels to G-2, Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force. Information copies of reports will be forwarded to Chemical Officer, RECKLESS Task Force. See Incl. No. 2 ADM O No. 1.

(4) In case of emergency or when suitable storage facilities have been provided, supplies referred to in Par. 1b, above, will be requisitioned to complete T/BA and T/E plus 30 D/S.

2. Inspections: Protective equipment in the possession of troops will be inspected frequently and kept in the best possible condition.

3. Salvage: All units will upon landing be responsible for collection of

[redacted]

[redacted]

CWS salvage material and its delivery to appropriate dumps. After arrival of chemical composite units, such salvage will be delivered to and disposed of by these units.

4. Chemical Warfare Service Units: Units No. 2 and No. 4, 94th Chemical Composite Company, upon their arrival in the operational area, will furnish depot, supply, maintenance and repair, salvage and decontaminating services, respectively, to the Letterpress and Noiseless Landing Forces and also to such other Task Force units as may be directed.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

McCreight

G-4

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
A.P.O. 565

0830K, 6 April 1944

ANNEX NO. 6, to ADM O 1, G-1.

G-1 Information and Reports.

PRISONERS OF WAR.

1. Commanding Generals Noiseless and Letterpress Landing Forces responsible for establishment of enclosures and evacuation thereto.

2. Commanding Generals of the Landing Forces will report as of midnight daily the number of prisoners captured during the preceding 24 hour period.

3. A number will be assigned to each prisoner. This number will be placed on the container for his personal effects and also will be placed, together with the "hour of capture", on W.D., P.M.G. Form #1. For this purpose, the Noiseless Landing Force is assigned numbers 701 to 800; the Letterpress Landing Force 801 to 900.

4. The Commanding Generals Landing Forces will deliver prisoners of war and their personal effects to the Commander, Base "F", APO 322. Receipts for prisoners and their effects will be obtained. For the latter, W.D., P.M.G. Form #3 will be used. Guards furnished for this purpose will be returned promptly to their proper Landing Forces by the Commander, Base "F". Landing Force Commanders will submit timely reports by radio to the Commander, Base "F", showing the number of prisoners evacuated, means of transportation and estimated time of delivery at Base "F". An information copy will be sent to the Commanding General, Alamo Force, APO 712.

5. A detailed report of Prisoners of War will be rendered by Landing Force Commanders in sextuple for the period covered by the weekly G-1 Periodic Report. See Inclosure #1 to Annex 6. The original and two (2) copies of this report will be forwarded through the Commanding General, Alamo Force, APO 712, to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Headquarters USAFFE, APO 501 - two (2) copies will be attached to the G-1 Periodic Report.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/ McCreight

G-4

Inclosures:

1. Prisoner of War Report.
2. Daily Strength Report.
3. G-1 Periodic Reports,
   a. Form for G-1 Periodic Report, with Inclosures 3a(1) and 3a(2).
   b. Form for Daily Casualty Logistics.

[redacted]

S E C R E T

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT
(Accompanying G-1 Periodic Report # ___) PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES

From: _____ To: _____ _____ _____ _____
(Date & Hour) (Date & Hour) (Date & Hour of Issue) (Issuing Unit) (Place of Issue)

Date of Capture	Unit Making Capture	Place of Capture	Prisoners Assigned Number	Name*	Grade*	Organization*	Other Identifying Information*	Disposition (See Note "Over")

Total Number of Prisoners on this report _____. *If available.

Inclosure #1 to Annex #6

Note: "Disposition" of Prisoners of War. Under disposition will be shown the present status of prisoners; as, for example, evacuated, hospitalized, or dead to include the reason therefor. For evacuated prisoners date, means of Transport, and place of delivery will be shown. For deceased prisoners of war, complete information which may be furnished by the attachment of G.R.S. Form #1 will be shown as to date and cause of death, date of burial and location of grave, (over-lay if isolated burial or place of storage of ashes if cremated) and disposition of personal effects (if none, so state). If prisoners of war are killed, remarks should show cause of death; for examply, "killed by guard while attempting to escape".

[redacted]

DAILY STRENGTH REPORT

_____ LANDING FORCE

A. EFFECTIVE STRENGTH. Midnight _____ _____

B. LOSSES DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD ENDING, Midnight _____ _____

(1) KIA

(2) EVACUATED TO HOSPITAL

Sick _____

Wounded (to include injured) _____

(3) MISSING (all causes) _____

C. GAINS DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD ENDING, Midnight _____

(1) To "duty" from "hospital". _____

(2) To "duty" from "missing" (all causes). _____

(3) Replacements _____

D. REMAINING EFFECTIVE STRENGTH, Midnight _____ _____

(WIA during 24 hour period but not evacuated to hospital to be included under this heading).

E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

From, "missing" to "hospital" during the 24 hour period ending, midnight _____ _____

Inclosure #2 to Annex 6.

[redacted]

[redacted]

G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS

1. a. A G-1 Periodic Report will be submitted to this headquarters as of 0001K each Wednesday in the form as shown in Inclosure 3a.

b. The initial report will cover the period from 0001K, D-Day, to 0001K, the following Wednesday.

c. Reports will be submitted by the most expeditious means available and will be addressed to Commanding General, ALAMO FORCE, APO 712.

2. The initial report will be complete; each paragraph and subparagraph, as numbered in the form (Incl 3a), will appear even though no remarks thereunder are applicable. In subsequent reports only such paragraphs, numbered as in the form, will appear as are needed to convey information differing from that contained in the preceding report. For example, in a subsequent report only a few paragraphs and subparagraphs may appear; no reference need be made to omitted paragraphs and subparagraphs.

3. The attached report (Incl 3b) is to be submitted in duplicate with each weekly G-1 Report. The data required by this report should be entered daily.

2 Incls:
Incl 3a - Form for G-1 Periodic Report, with inclosures 3a(1) and 3a(2).
Incl 3b - Daily Casualty Logistics.

Inclosure #3 to Annex 6.

[redacted]

[redacted]

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

(To be submitted weekly)

From: _____
(Date & Hour)

To : _____
(Date & Hour)

_____
(Issuing Unit)

_____
(Place of Issue)

_____
(Date & Hour of Issue)

NO. ____

Maps: (Those needed for an understanding of the report).

1. STATION LIST:

Omit.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTALLATIONS FOR REPLACEMENTS:

Note: If applicable, indicate point of delivery for replacements to your command.

3. STRENGTH OF THE COMMAND:

Note: See Inclosure 3a(1) for form for rendition of this report.

4. CASUALTIES:

Note: Inclosure 3a(2) will be used for information required by this paragraph.

5. GRAVES REGISTRATION: (Status of burials, adequacy of GRS personnel and equipment and location of cemeteries).

Note: As cemeteries are established an overlay should show their location.

6. REPLACEMENTS:

Note: General comments may include, by organization, number of replacements received, status of equipment and condition of replacements, number under orders but not yet received and any other pertinent information.

7. PRISONERS OF WAR:

a. Captured (Since last G-1 Report). Give total and PW number of each prisoner, for example: 10 - (numbers 701 - 710 inclusive).

b. Evacuated or Died (Since last G-1 Report). Give total and PW number of each prisoner, for example: Evacuated - 5 (numbers 701, 705-708 inclusive); DOW - 2 (Numbers 702 and 709). Place to which evacuated should also be shown.

c. Nonevacuated. (Accumulative).

Show total of all prisoners of War by PW number not accounted for

[redacted]

[redacted]

in a and b, next-above, remaining with command pending disposition, for example: Sick - 3 (703, 704, and 710); held for further questioning - 4 (790, 795, 798, 800).

Note: Numbers referred to above are from block of numbers allotted to your command by par. 3, page 1, Annex #6.

d. See paragraph 5, page 2, Annex 6, (Report to Prisoner of War Information Bureau).

8. STRAGGLERS: Note: Give applicable comments.

9. MORALE: Note: Indicate morale of the force as a whole or, if not uniform, by specific unit. Comments on unsatisfactory morale are desired, for example: 999th Evacuation Hospital - Poor; this unit recently bombed and strafed by enemy aircraft.

10. RELATIONSHIP WITH NON-MILITARY POPULATION:

a. General Comments.
b. Unusual events incident to control and administration. (Include evacuation of casualties if applicable).
c. Use of native labor. (Labor details being performed by natives).

X. GENERAL COMMENTS.

This paragrpah will be used for comments on unusual incidents that may be of interest to higher headquarters which are not specifically covered in above-listed paragraphs.

Inclosure #3a to Annex 6.

[redacted]

_____ LANDING FORCE

STRENGTH OF COMMAND BY UNIT OR DETACHMENT (Date & Hour of Issue)

Units and/or Separate Dets Listed Separately	Authorized or T/O Strength		Present for Duty		ABSENT FROM DUTY				Total Present and Absent	
					Sick, Wounded and Injured		Other Causes			
	OFF	EM	OFF	EM	OFF	EM	OFF	EM	OFF	EM

Note: (1) Warrant Officers will not be included in this report.

(2) Strength of unit will include personnel assigned, plus any attached for duty. Do not include in this figure personnel attached for rations and/or administration only.

(3) Those elements of a given division, brigade, regiment, or battalion with a landing force will be consolidated into a single strength.

Inclosure 3a(1) to Annex 6.

I. Battle Casualties (1) _____ LANDING FORCE

A. New

ORGANIZATION	KIA			WIA						INJURED IN ACTION						MIA			Died as result of wounds or injuries received in action		
				Evacuated			Nonevacuated			Evacuated			Nonevacuated								
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
TOTAL																					
ACCUMULATIVE (2) TOTAL																					

II. Non-Battle Casualties

A. New.

ORGANIZATION	SICK						MISSING			DEATHS			(OTHER CAUSES)					
	Evacuated			Nonevacuated									Evacuated			Nonevacuated		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
TOTAL																		
ACCUMULATIVE (2) TOTAL																		

III. Accumulative Total Evacuated Personnel returned to duty (3)

ALL CAUSES

Footnotes: (1) Battle casualties "Captured" and "Gas" to be included where applicable and submitted in form similar to other battle casualties.

(2) The accumulative total will cover the period from Report No. 1 to last date of current report.

(3) Evacuated personnel are those individuals evacuated to medical installations outside of your operational area. Nonevacuated personnel are those individuals hospitalized within your command.

[redacted]

DAILY CASUALTY LOGISTICS

_____ LANDING FORCE

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Date	Strength of Landing Force (Nearest M)	Dead (all causes)	Hospitalized (all causes)	
			Evacuated	Nonevacuated
TOTAL				

Notes:

Column (1) Covering the same 7-day period as the G-1 Report. Each date of period will be listed separately.

Column (2) Strength of Landing Force as a whole will be reported to nearest M.

Column (3) Dead, all causes, to include KIA, DOW, deaths as a result of disease or accident, etc.

Column (4) Evacuated personnel are those individuals evacuated to medical installations outside of your operational area. Nonevacuated personnel are those individuals hospitalized within your command.

Inclosure 3b to Annex 6.

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS RECKLESS TASK FORCE
APO 565
1615K, 10 April 1944

ANNEX NO. 7 to ADM O 1, TRANSPORTATION CORPS PLAN

1. The Transportation Officer, RECKLESS Task Force will:

a. Attach personnel from his section to Landing Forces for the purpose of giving technical advice and assistance in the discharging of ships carrying heavy supplies and equipment arriving at NOISELESS and LETTERPRESS prior to the time the Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force takes over the operation of beach supply, and evacuation activities (estimated to be after D/8). Such personnel will be available to the Commanders of Landing forces for assistance in the discharge of ships, landing craft, lighters, etc., and to Engineer Representatives of RECKLESS Task Force, for technical advice as to the location of lighter jetties, floating docks and liberty docks.

b. Tow. Furnish personnel to supervise the loading and rigging of the barges, lighters, floating cranes, liberty docks, etc., now being assembled at Base "F" for tow to LETTERPRESS and NOISELESS. Such personnel will accompany tows to destination, reporting on arrival to Transportation Officer, RECKLESS Task Force.

2. At a date to be set by the Commanding General, Reckless Force and estimated to be D/8, the CG RECKLESS Force will take over the operation of beach supply and evacuation activities.

3. Subsequent to D/8 or as ordered by CG RECKLESS Task Force, the Transportation Officer will be responsible for:

a. Discharge of all cargo and equipment and debarkation of all troops from ships, landing craft, barges, lighters, etc.

b. Transportation of all cargo and equipment from beach jetties or dock to the dumps or depots. Depot and dump commanders are responsible for the prompt unloading and return of such transportation. Unloading to be done by personnel under their control.

c. The operation, maintenance, repair and salvage of all harbor craft

d. The assignment of berths and anchorages.

e. Requisitioning such additional harbor craft, lighters, tugs, stevedore gear, etc., as may be necessary.

f. Furnishing such landing craft and other facilities to CG's, Landing Forces as may be required for tactical use when directed by CG, RECKLESS Task Force.

g. Book all outgoing cargoes and personnel.

[redacted]

[redacted]

h. Allocate or re-allocate all harbor craft, barges, lighters, tugs assigned.

i. Act as liaison with Navy for the purpose of calling ships forward or changes in schedules of arrivals and departures as may be required.

j. Arrange for the evacuation of sick and wounded on returning supply ships or other means and maintain close liaison with RECKLESS Task Force Surgeon for the purpose of effecting this.

k. Request such motor transportation as may be required from RECKLESS Task Force Quartermaster. Such transportation when dispatched or allocated by the RECKLESS Task Force Quartermaster will be under the operational control of the RECKLESS Task Force Transportation Officer.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/ McCreight
G-4

3 Incls:
1- Duties of Sections & Sub-sections
2- Chart.
3- Init. Distribution of Harbor craft & lighterage.

[redacted]

[redacted]

DUTIES OF SECTIONS & SUB-SECTIONS

1. Assistant Task Force Transportation Officers at LETTERPRESS and NOISELESS will be the direct representative of the Task Force Transportation Officer and upon the assumption of beach supply and evacuations by the Commanding General, RECKLESS Task Force, will have full authority and responsibility for the operations listed in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Annex 7, Administrative Order 1.

2. Assistant Transportation Officers will organize their sections as indicated in the organization chart attached as Inclosure 2.

3. Duties of Sections and sub-sections will be as indicated below:

a. Assistant Transportation Officer, as authorized in par. 1.

b. Boat & Shore Regiment

(1) Operation and maintenance of all powered landing craft.

(2) Discharge of Navy Landing craft used for re-supply.

(3) Under supervision of and in cooperation with Task Force Engineer, assist in the preparation and maintenance of shore facilities such as landing craft slips, lighter jetties, etc.

c. Traffic.

(1) Breakdown manifests and notify chiefs of supply services or Commanding Officers of units of incoming cargo, equipment and personnel.

(2) Book all outgoing cargoes and personnel.

(3) Arrange for evacuation of patients.

(4) Obtain from the appropriate General Staff Section RECKLESS Task Force priorities for the discharge of cargo and personnel when necessary.

d. Water.

(1) Discharge of all ships at docks or by lighters.

(2) Supervision of all stevedore activities.

(3) Control, operation, and maintenance of all harbor craft except organic equipment of Boat & Shore Regiments.

e. Motor.

(1) Call on RECKLESS Task Force Quartermaster for such Motor Transp as may be required for the performance of his duties.

(2) Operate all motor transportation as may be assigned allocated or loaned.

(3) Responsibility for delivery of cargoes, equipment, and personnel to destination wherever motor transportation is indicated.

f. Air.

(1) Receive, check and notify consignee of all incoming air

[redacted]

[redacted]

freight.

(2) Book all outgoing air freight and arrange for shipment.

(3) Book outgoing personnel and arrange passage.

(4) Render every assistance to Task Force Surgeon in connection with air evacuation.

Incl. 1 to ANNEX 7 to Adm O 1,
Transp. Corps Plan

[redacted]

[redacted]

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION OF HARBOR CRAFT & LIGHTERAGE

1. Initial distribution of harbor craft and lighterage facilities will be as indicated below.

LETTERPRESS	NOISELESS
1. Organic Equipment, Engr. Spec. Brig. Boat & Shore Regt.	1. Organic Equipment, Engr. Spec. Brig. Boat & Shore Regt.
2. One 30-ton floating crane	2. One 30-ton floating crane
3. 15 - 80-ft. steel barges	3. 5 - 80-ft. steel barges.
4. 4 harbor tugs	4. 2 harbor tugs
5. 6 motor dories	5. 3 motor dories
6. Such additional equipment as may be allocated by RECKLESS Task Force Transportation Officer.	6. Such additional equipment as may be allocated by RECKLESS Task Force Transportation Officer.

2. Changes in above and assignment of such additional craft as may become available will be as directed by RECKLESS Task Force Transportation Officer.

Incl. 3 to Annex 7 to Adm O 1,
Transp. Corps Plan