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Cannoneers from Battery A, 1st Battalion, 6th Field Artillery Regiment, Task Force Centaur, fire maximum charge 8 from their M119A2 howitzer in support of operations in Khost Province, Afghanistan, 21 July 2011. (U.S. Army, LTC James W. Vizzard).



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The Military-Media Relationship

An Exercise in Strategic Patience

Colonel Steven A. Boylan, U.S. Army, Retired

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN the military and the media is very much akin to a marriage. The honeymoon is long since over and both of us have seen the best and worst of each other. The partners cannot divorce or even think of asking for a permanent separation. They are forever linked and stay together for the sake of the children.

There is friction in any relationship, and this includes the military-media relationship. Some friction is healthy and good, but as we know, too much of it, and the relationship tends to sour. We see this in statements such as General Robert E. Lee's in 1863:

It appears we have appointed our worst generals to command our forces, and our most gifted and brilliant to edit newspapers! In fact, I discovered by reading newspapers that these editor-geniuses plainly saw all my strategic defects from the start, yet failed to inform me until it was too late. Accordingly, I'm readily willing to yield my command to these obviously superior intellects and I'll, in turn, do my best for the cause by writing editorials—after the fact.

There have been numerous studies and articles written on the ever-evolving and changing relationship between the two. At times, they seem to be polar opposites. The Mexican-American War saw the first professional journalists sent to cover a war and military operations. Since then, journalists have covered every conflict, including the Civil War, both World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (renamed New Dawn), and operations over Libya, not to mention covering the military from the small unit to the national policy level in times of peace.

Most consumers of news, both in and out of the military, at times forget that the business of news is just that—a *business*. For example, in 2009, 104 newspapers closed for financial reasons.¹ Many were local papers, but some were major regional newspapers such as the *Rocky Mountain News*, *The Christian Science Monitor* print edition, the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, and others. These were major regional and local publications that would never have been considered to be at risk before the explosion of new media

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PHOTO: GEN David Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, is being interviewed by Terry McCarthy (then from ABC News) at Patrol Base Murry, south of Baghdad, Iraq, 11 July 2007. (photo courtesy of author)

and the proliferation of free news available via the Internet. The president and CEO of the Associated Press (AP), Tom Curley, tells us that AP had to find a new business model to survive an age of universal access to their content via the web. He implied that consumers now question why they should have subscriptions to various newspapers or other media outlets when they can get the news at no cost on the Internet.

This is a monumental problem for media organizations today. The economic issues that have recently plagued the media could explain the reasoning behind the types of coverage we see in print, broadcast, or radio. It is doubtful that anyone within the media will say that business decisions drive coverage, but the media are in the business of reporting what sells. Without viewers, listeners, or readers, they cannot sell advertising space and will go out of business.

Military versus Media Expectations

The military expects the media to be accurate and to characterize the events covered in the proper context. In turn, the military provides access and timely information. The first media organization to report on the events drives recognition and dollars. The media must recognize that the earlier information about complex and dynamic events is released, the more likely the information will have errors. The media does not make errors on purpose, but due to the dynamics of combat or a crisis, errors will occur when information is provided before all the facts are in. The military has to do the best it can, and the media must be aware that truth changes as events become clearer. To mitigate some of these issues, the military must rely on trust and relationships between its spokespersons and reporters. Reporters have to understand that the military is putting out the best information it has at that time.

. . . the military must rely on trust and relationships between its spokespersons and reporters.

In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall. The media covered this event 24/7 for weeks. Stories on Katrina filled the available news hole. At the time, I was the director of the Combined Press Information Center (CPIC), Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). I contacted all the news bureaus operating in Baghdad to determine what coverage coalition operations were receiving, if any. They informed me that until further notice, there would be limited U.S. news coverage from Iraq due to the hurricane. When I asked if there would be any coverage if we captured Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, I was told that would not make the news. I pushed further to find out whether we would get coverage if we captured Osama Bin Laden and Zarqawi together, in a meeting with others planning an attack. I was informed that perhaps we would get 30 seconds of news time.

The 2 May 2011 killing of Osama Bin Laden is an example of the changing face of military news. Initial reports came out hours after the operation, followed by more and often conflicting information. Multiple briefers delivered the information, using their own filters, and as the information matured, more clarity emerged that changed the original narrative.

The media must bear that in mind and update stories to correct errors when they occur. In fact, the media do correct errors, but not automatically. Sometimes it is a lengthy process to get corrections made after mistakes come to their attention, and most of the time, the public never sees the correction. Depending on the story, readers barely notice corrections on page two in the bottom corner of a one-inch by one-inch box. For a story with a greater impact, the media may issue a larger correction more easily seen and heard. This is a nuanced understanding the media may have, but one the public may not share.

The hardest part for the military is understanding what the news is and that what we say will not always resonate and break through all the other news of the day. According to “The State of the News Media 2011” by the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, the number-one story of the past year was the weakened state of the U.S. economy. It accounted for up to 17 percent of the overall coverage for each quarter of 2010. This does not take into account spiking or breaking news

events such as the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico or election coverage. The coverage of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars accounted for only four percent of all news studied in 2010, actually down from five percent in 2009. This does not indicate that the military story is not important, but that news concerning the military must compete with all other types of news events.²

Time and expectation management are important. To change the public's perceptions or expectations takes time. There is no rule of thumb on how long it will take, only that it will take time. There is no silver bullet to make it happen as fast as the commanders or other senior leaders would prefer.

Having been deployed as a public affairs officer as the director of the CPIC, MNF-I for 18 months beginning in the summer of 2004, I witnessed firsthand the issues of perceptions and expectations from the media and indirectly the public. During those months, the mainstream media turned a blind eye to MNF-I news releases.

The challenge was how to get media outlets to open emails and read them. How many times will they read about an Iraqi water treatment plant opening or schools being built? Not many. To overcome this challenge, we developed new and innovative subject lines to gain the interest of the media. For example, when a new water treatment plant began operation where there had been no fresh water before, we exchanged the standard subject line. We changed it to "Got Water?" This was an attempt to get the media to open the emails and gain interest. It worked on a limited scale. We were attempting to change media expectations and perceptions about the importance of information we provided.

My next deployment to Iraq was as the public affairs officer to General David Petraeus, the new commander of MNF-I, on 10 February 2007. On the flight from Fort Leavenworth to Baghdad, we had time to think and reflect on the past and current state of military-media relationships, specifically in Iraq, and how to conduct our media relations and operations.

I provided several overarching recommendations to Petraeus. First, we needed to reestablish our credibility with the Baghdad-based media. Second, access was going to be critical—we needed to give the media access to commanders. Third, we needed to facilitate the stories the media wanted as well as

those we desired. This last point became known as Battlefield Circulation (BFC). During BFC, the media would accompany Petraeus during the day with an opportunity to interview him at the end of the day.

Based on my observations and discussions with many members of the media, I sensed that they did not take what MNF-I was saying at face value or as credible. This was a major concern. If the command was not considered a credible source, getting the information to the public would be doomed to failure before it had a chance to succeed.

Perception and Expectation Management

Correcting this perception would take time. The media would not change their perspectives or expectations overnight. The approach to change was simple: provide timely and accurate information, provide access to the command at all levels, provide new guidance from the MNF-I commanding general to all multi-national division commanders, and hold the media accountable for their articles.

We knew that to change the media's expectations we would have to change our approach. This is where the BFC approach proved valuable. The reporters would have direct access to Petraeus and hear, see, taste, and smell the same things he and the staff were seeing at the same time. There would be nobody standing behind the curtain, no rosy adjectives describing what was happening. Reporters would have access to those who were briefing Petraeus and his staff and be able to ask questions of the units on the ground as well as Iraqis that were nearby.

Battlefield circulations allowed the media to draw their own conclusions, to see that we were telling them the facts as we knew them at the time. Circulations provided access so journalists could report on events, and more importantly, they changed the expectations and perceptions of the command.

The first indication that the new approach was working came from Terry McCarthy, then of ABC News in Baghdad. In April 2007, during the buildup of forces for the "surge," McCarthy took his own television crew out in the streets of Baghdad where previously there had been huge clashes between coalition forces and insurgents. He was able to go out on his own without support from coalition forces



(photo courtesy of author)

GEN David Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, greets Terry McCarthy, then from ABC News, Forward Operating Base Kalsu, 11 July 2007.

and report what he was seeing. McCarthy went out on a limb and was the first reporter to announce that the surge was indeed working.³

Over time, the BFCs proved their value in improving overall news report accuracy. Context and characterization of reporting coming from Iraq changed from that of skeptical, cynical, opinion-based reporting to that of more factual and nuanced understanding. The intended results were to have an informed public that could make informed decisions. Some may infer that it was “influence operations,” and to some degree, it was. However, our media strategy was not nefarious and underhanded, but above board using candid, factual information. Easily understood facts and figures allowed the media to see for themselves the ground truth, and they were influenced to better report what was occurring in Iraq.

Not an Issue of Control

Many within the military, from privates to senior leaders, desire to control the media. This desire encourages a strained relationship between the media and the military. We know from history that the relationship has always been rocky and has

nothing to do with control, or as the media may call it, censorship:

The basic explanation is that the natures and goals of the two institutions are fundamentally in tension. For its part, the military, like most bureaucracies, prefers to do its business behind closed doors—all the more so because the nature of its business is so often shocking to the sensitivities of the public, on whose support it must rely. Therefore, the military inherently sees the media as a subversive, rather than a positive, element. The press, however, responds to the requirement of democracy to expose the actions of the government—including, especially, the military—to public scrutiny.⁴

Given this premise, the military must understand the media and not attempt to control it. Should control be attempted, the outrage from the media declaring censorship will overshadow events and call into question the motives of such an attempt. The news then changes from your intended message to that of control and censorship.

Each entity has a specific job and goal in mind, and often the two are at odds. However, as we know, both parties must understand the relationship and find ways to work with each other. The media is part of the landscape in which we operate, and soldiers have to learn to deal with it and all of its unique characteristics.

Embedded Media Works

In the past 10 years, perhaps the most effective program to foster the military-media relationship has been the embedded media program. This single program has afforded the opportunity for the military to learn about the media and for the media to learn about and report on the military. The type of reporting that has come out of this program is reminiscent of that by Joe Galloway during Vietnam in his coverage with UPI.

Debates concerning the usefulness of this program continue both in and out of the media. Over the years, many have claimed that reporters lose balance and objectivity by being too close to the military that they are covering. Having run the embed program for MNF-I for 18 months and having seen it work again for 20 months in Iraq, I have no doubts about the media's collective ability to be objective and to report on the mistakes, missteps, and tragic events taking place in and around deployed forces.

To be fair, the embed program is not perfect. It will not always meet the needs of the media or the military. At times, the media will be frustrated with logistical issues, namely the lack of transportation in and around the area of operations. In Iraq, one way around this was to increase their priority of airlift. This was justified due to the importance MNF-I placed on the media getting information to the public.

Not all commands will have the flexibility to establish priorities for media support. This lack of resources will require patience by both the military and the media. In the end, reporters who have taken advantage of the embed program will have had an opportunity that few get to bring to their readers, viewers, and listeners. The military also has enjoyed

coverage that would not have been possible without the embed program. Embedded reporters have revealed all that is courageous about the military as well as some failings. In the end, we should count this as a win for both the military and the media and a bigger win for the public, who now have an inside view of an institution that so few understand.

Recent Viewpoints

In June 2009, *Rolling Stone* magazine published "The Runaway General," an article profiling General Stanley McChrystal, commander of the International Security Force Assistance Command (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Some say the article led to the removal of McChrystal from command. Many blame Michael Hastings, the reporter embedded with McChrystal and his staff while in Paris, for having violated established ground rules specifying that many of the comments made were off-the-record, meaning the statements could not be used. An inspector general report from the Department of Defense found no evidence of any wrongdoing on the part of McChrystal or his staff in the execution of that interview. In an interview with CNN, Hastings said, "It was all very clear it was on the record. I had a tape recorder and a notepad in my hand most of the time."⁵

To date there has not been any evidence made public on what was actually said or what rules were established. Hastings is releasing a book, which might shed additional light on the subject. Somewhere in the middle, the truth should be found.

In the end, the article itself should not be blamed for the removal of McChrystal, nor should the reporter. If we take what Hastings wrote at face value and consider the lack of statements from anyone clearly refuting the article, then the article stands as written. Interestingly, many in the media came out against the article claiming it would negatively affect military-media relations for "beat" reporters. How they get information from the military, especially the senior leaders, was in jeopardy, so these claims said.

During an interview on the *Hugh Hewitt Radio Program*, John Burns of the *New York Times* made

To be fair, the embed program is not perfect.

several remarks relating to the military-media relationship. He remarked, “I think it’s very unfortunate that it has impacted, and will impact so adversely, on what had been pretty good military/media relations.” Burns went on to say:

My unease, if I can be completely frank about this, is that from my experience of traveling and talking to generals—McChrystal, Petraeus and many, many others over the past few years—the old on-the-record/off-the-record standard doesn’t really meet the case, which is to say that by the very nature of the time you spend with the generals, the same could be said to be true of the time that a reporter spends with anybody in the public eye. There are moments which just don’t fit that formula. There are long, informal periods traveling on helicopters over hostile territory with the generals chatting over their headset, bunking down for the night side-by-side on a piece of rough-hewn concrete. You build up a kind of trust.⁶

Burns continued with comments on trust and responsibility:

It’s not explicit; it’s just there. My feeling is that it’s the responsibility of the reporter to judge in those circumstances what is fairly reportable, and what is not, and to go beyond that, what it is necessary to report. I think that much of what we learned about General McChrystal, in what was really a very powerful *Rolling Stone* article, and the general feeling of unease and disrespect towards the administration in Washington, could have been done without directly quoting things that were said, and I would guess, in a very ambiguous kind of circumstance, mostly by the general’s aides, which they could not have, I think, reasonably expected to end up being quoted as saying.⁷

Burns explains the debate on what is on- and off-the-record, in terms of the interests of what the public has a right to know, occurs in his own publication between the editors and the reporters. They debate what is off-the-record, what should be



(photo courtesy of author)

GEN David Petraeus talks with local Sheiks from Taji and the surrounding areas. Accompanying GEN Petraeus is Lara Logan (CBS News), Taji, Iraq, 12 March 2008.

used when agreements are made, and when agreements can be violated. Such debates go directly to understanding the issues of attribution; what is on-the-record, off-the-record, and the background of the situation (e.g., not for attribution).

In April 2011, Peter Slavin of the *Washington Post*, who is on sabbatical to Northwestern University, asked me to speak to his class of approximately 20 journalism students. During the course of the three-hour seminar, the discussion of these same issues arose. There were many in class that felt that if the statements in the *Rolling Stone* article were fact, it was okay to violate the off-the-record agreements in the public interest. The difficult part of this is who determines what is in the public's interest? Is it the reporter? Is it the editor? Is it a conversation between the reporter, editor, and the original source? The risk is, if this agreement is violated, what are the second-and-third-order effects?

Should that trust be violated, it would be expected that individuals will not speak with the reporter and perhaps the publication in the future. Depending on the outcomes, they may take that attitude to the extreme of not engaging with any media. Trust between a military member and a reporter is hard to earn and easily lost when the damage can ruin careers. The far-reaching impacts are such that they undermine the legitimacy of the media and foster distrust between the military and the media, as they are already wary of each other.

Some within the media do not agree with how Hastings wrote the article, how he came by the information, or with the decision to print what amounts to personal opinions. Lara Logan, CBS News chief foreign correspondent, while appearing on *Reliable Sources*, a CNN program, cast doubt on Hastings's claim that his interviews with McChrystal and his staff were all on-the-record. When asked if she would have published the same comments about President Obama and Vice President Biden as Hastings had, Logan said, "It really depends on the circumstances."⁸ According to Logan, what she found damaging to the military-media relationship was Hastings' description of his own style, pretending to build an illusion of trust. Logan said, "That is exactly the kind of damaging type of attitude that makes it difficult for reporters who are genuine about what they do."⁹

In a different interview on CNN, Hastings said that beat reporters like Logan, specifically assigned to cover the military, do not publish negative pieces about their subjects in order to assure continued access. Logan refuted that statement saying:

I think that's insulting and arrogant, myself. I really do, because there are very good beat reporters who have been covering these wars for years, year after year. Michael Hastings appeared in Baghdad fairly late on the scene, and he was there for a significant period of time. He has his credentials, but he's not the only one. There are a lot of very good reporters out there. And to be fair to the military, if they believe that a piece is balanced, they will let you back.¹⁰


In a statement issued by McChrystal, the former IASF commander said:

It was a mistake reflecting poor judgment and should never have happened. Throughout my career, I have lived by the principles of personal honor and professional integrity. What is reflected in this article falls far short of that standard. I have enormous respect and admiration for President Obama and his national security team, and for the civilian leaders and troops fighting this war, and I remain committed to ensuring its successful outcome.¹¹

In an article in the April 2008 issue of *Esquire*, "The Man Between War and Peace," Thomas Barnett reported conversations that were on-the-record between him and Admiral Fox Fallon, then-Commander, U.S. Central Command. This article had the same impact as the *Rolling Stone* article. The statements pitted Fallon against President Bush.¹²

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reluctantly accepted Fallon's resignation in which the admiral cited "the current embarrassing situation of public perception of differences between my views and administration policy and the distraction this causes from the mission."¹³

The *Esquire* article, and other press reports, suggested there were differences between administration policy at the time and Fallon's reported thoughts on policy toward Iran. Based on discussions with individuals, it was clear that the public affairs officer was kept out of the discussions and



was unable to advise his commander on the use of ground rules that contributed to the statements appearing in the article.

However, not all profile articles are detrimental to a senior leader’s career if conducted properly. Two examples come from *Esquire* and *Vanity Fair* magazines. The first is “The Monks of War,” from *Esquire*, a profile of then-Lieutenant Generals James Mattis and David Petraeus and General William Wallace. The profile, also by Barnett, shows that with proper preparation and understanding of the ground rules, potentially critical mistakes can be avoided.¹⁴

The same holds true of the *Vanity Fair* profile on Petraeus, “The Professor of War,” in May 2009. Senior leaders who have a clear understanding of the ground rules, topics the reporter wishes to engage, and what the second-and third-order of effects of personal opinions and offhand comments can make, continue to have successful relationships with the media and can greatly enhance their ability to inform the public at large.¹⁵

Preparing for a Media Engagement

General Petraeus gave some sage advice to his subordinates during his battle update analysis on 21 March 2008:

Just a reminder to all those who are out there doing these [interviews]. Do a very quick “murder board” to get your head into the game before you do this, with a PAO who has pulled the latest news clips right off the wire, has kept up with what that particular journalist’s particular bent is, and all the rest of that. I think on the occasions I felt like I really had my game all together and blew off a murder board, that was exactly when it turned out that I didn’t have my game together, and I didn’t have my head in it and fumbled around. So you never get so comfortable with this stuff that you can walk right into it without some focused prep and again, some G2 by the PAO.¹⁶

How to Move Forward

What we must guard against is an emotional reaction to articles or events precipitated by media reports. When we have that “knee-jerk” reaction and shun the media, not allowing them access and refusing their requests for information, all we do is limit our abilities to succeed in mission accomplishment.

We should not interpret recent events as chilling to the relationships we currently share and will share in the future with the media. Leaders at all levels have an obligation to tell the public what is happening with their sons, daughters, husbands, and wives. We should not use articles like the Hastings piece to make the argument that the media cannot be trusted. Nor should it be an excuse for avoiding needed engagements.

Those who will use the *Rolling Stone* article to avoid doing interviews are doing a disservice to the military and the public. Without the willingness to engage the media, the stories and events concerning soldiers and units will not get to the public. If that occurs, the Army will fail in its mission and its obligation to have an informed public. Others understand what we have to do and will use such occurrences to help make themselves better prepared to work with the media. Those two groups already have their minds made up. The group I am most concerned with is the group on the fence. These individuals can fall to either side and can either proactively engage with the media or withdraw. Our responsibility as leaders, mentors, educators, and professionals is to ensure that they land on the side of the fence that helps them understand the issues. Officers and other Army

leaders need to learn how to engage with the media properly and with minimal risk and to ensure they set themselves up for success. Only then will we as an institution truly get beyond the perception that the media is out to get the military.

Using ill-informed sources and misinformation is far more dangerous for the military-media relationship than is clear, accurate, in-context, and properly characterized reporting. However, this is where the media can help themselves. The media are fragmented, competitive, frequently ignorant of the military, and they constantly vacillate between the demands of the market and those of journalistic ethics. Military perceptions will always favor more and better coverage, even knowing it is an uphill battle.

We have seen the media landscape change in today’s market. Unprepared reporters tend to move from crisis to crisis, unaware of the issues. They do not know how the military functions and how it attempts to frame complex events in simplified ways. They often gravitate toward sensational journalism (focusing on errors, misstatements, and spectacular events).

Nevertheless, ultimately, the military owes access to the public; it owes timely and accurate information. The audience includes military members themselves, their families, taxpayers, and Congress. The military needs to get its story out, knowing that it will be competing with other groups, events, and its enemies who are eager to give their take on events. To succeed, the military and the media need each other, no matter how good or strained the relationship. **MR**

NOTES

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2. Mark Jurkowitz, Tom Rosenstiel, and Amy Mitchel, “A Year in the News 2010,” <stateofthemediamedia.org/2011/mobile-survey/a-year-in-the-news-narrative>, Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, 21 March 2011.

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6. *Hugh Hewitt Radio Program*, 6 July 2010, transcript, <www.hughhewitt.com/transcripts.aspx?id=9a1c8a02-6193-4a47-9513-02d499f79cad>.

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13. See <www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123089794>, 11 March 2008.

14. Thomas P.M. Barnett, “The Monks of War,” *Esquire*, March 2006.

15. Mark Bowden, “The Professor of War,” *Vanity Fair*, May 2010.

16. GEN David Petraeus, 21 March 2008 Battle Update Assessment in Iraq.

Preparing for a Media Engagement

Commanders and staff find checklists useful as quick reference tools. The difficult part of working with the media and the art of interviews is simply that—it is an art. It does not lend itself to checklist type of planning. However, some simple tasks and things to consider are common to most media engagements. Here are several to think about:

Questions for you (the leader):

- What is your intent for the information line of operation or effort?
- How will you condition your team, get feedback, provide feedback, and gauge levels of effort?
- How personally involved will you be?
- How will you create a climate where speed of action is the focus?

Communication and why it works:

- Commander-centric.
- Personally and continuously involved (not micromanagement).
- Willingness to accept risk (not everyone will get it right all the time).
- Skills in public affairs, information operations, political-military, civil-military.

What matters to the military:

- Accuracy.
- Context.
- Characterization.
- Speed.

What to consider:

- Adversary's use of information.
- Speed of information.
- Media expectations.
- Certainty, risk, opportunity.
- Public affairs officer.

Strategic communication: Orchestration of our actions, words and images—

What Enables Strategic Communication

- Expert knowledge.
- Unity of effort—strategic context understood by all.
- Different approaches to risk acceptance—delegation of authority.
- Comfort and confidence at high speed.

How to prepare for an interview:

- Write it down.
- Rehearse it.
- Time it.
- Have an open and frank after action review.
- Redo until comfortable.
- Build a rapport/relationship with the reporter.
- Be truthful!



Inside the Wire at Camp Taji

A Counterinsurgent's Experience

Latham Fell

THE U.S. ARMY designed the Taji Theater Internment Facility and Reconciliation Center to be the most modern, secure, and comfortable U.S. detention facility in Iraq. Built for \$107 million in the fall of 2008, it contains medical, educational, and judicial facilities, as well as a carpentry shop and a brick factory, and can hold up to 4,500 occupants. U.S. forces ran the facility for 15 months, and then transferred operations to the government of Iraq in March 2010.

During U.S. tenure, violent incidents among detainees decreased by 76 percent, even as the size of the population remained essentially unchanged (Figure 1). From a peak of one incident per day, violence declined to a rate of one incident per week. This article explores how this was accomplished.

Protecting and Controlling

The facility received its first detainees in January 2009 as they flowed in from two other U.S. detention facilities, Camp Bucca in southern Iraq and Camp Cropper at the Baghdad International Airport. Over 4,500 detainees arrived during the spring and summer of 2009.

As a contracted intelligence analyst attached to the U.S. Army 508th Military Police Battalion, out of Fort Lewis, Washington, I arrived at Taji on 1 August 2009, just as the facility reached its full population level. Although I had no experience with detainee operations, the environment at the facility was familiar to me: the 508th Military Police Battalion was engaged in counterinsurgency.

Insurgency expert David Kilcullen has said, “In counterinsurgency, the population is the prize, and protecting and controlling it is the key activity.”¹ We found this to be true in the detainee facility. However, we had to redefine what population we were protecting. Every detainee in our facility was a known insurgent—but most required protection from an organized minority of ideologically extreme detainees.

A vigorous counterinsurgency campaign was necessary to prevent the spread of violent ideology, extremist recruitment, and physical “punishments.” As

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PHOTO: Detainees perform their daily prayers at the U.S. detention facility at Camp Cropper in Baghdad, Iraq, 10 November 2008.




Figure 1

in any counterinsurgency campaign, “soft” information operations and human intelligence were just as valuable as compulsory operations, such as locking doors and using non-lethal munitions and riot control tactics.

Because of the heavy influx of detainees, the 508th found it difficult to screen and segregate them properly. Each detainee arrived with only a minimal background profile. The rapid population growth and the necessarily hasty segregation plan caused high levels of violence. In August 2009, an average of six violent “detainee versus detainee” incidents took place each week, a rate of nearly one per day. We soon found that the violence was not simply the flaring of tempers, but a deliberate campaign on the part of extremist elements to intimidate the entire detainee population.

Although every detainee was an insurgent, most were, in Kilcullen’s words, “accidental guerrillas.”² They had fought against coalition forces not on behalf of an abstract ideology, but for more prosaic reasons—for money, to defend their community, or out of desperation or fear. They had no hatred

of their U.S. or Iraqi guards, and simply wanted to return to their families.

This was the population we needed to protect—the “green” detainees, those with moderate political and religious views who were well behaved and cooperative and whose primary daily activities consisted of smoking, sleeping, and watching TV.

However, some detainees had an agenda. These were the “red” detainees, the extremists, the true insurgents in our counterinsurgency microcosm. They were committed warriors, aligned with various extremist groups. The Sunnis among them aligned themselves with Al-Qaeda, Jaish al-Islam, and Ansar al-Sunna, and the Shi’a sided with Jaish al-Mahdi, Asaba al-Haqq, and Kataib Hezbollah.

The uncommitted green detainees were an irresistible target for the red detainees, and the extremists aggressively promoted their ideology through persuasion and fear, operating like a paramilitary organization with a strict leadership hierarchy.

We segregated detainees based on four factors: **Religion (Sunni or Shi’a)**. This distinction was basic. Any combination of Sunni and Shi’a detainees

resulted in violence almost immediately. Even placing them in adjacent cells inevitably resulted in a shouting match.

Home province. There were two schools of thought regarding segregation by province. The first believed that we should separate detainees from the same province from each other to prevent collaboration on “outside the wire” attacks. The other school held that we should place detainees of the same province together to prevent cross-pollination of tactics between detainees from different provinces. In the end, we settled on concentrating detainees from the same provinces together, largely for population stability reasons. Placing detainees among familiar faces had positive effects, both for the guard force and the detainees. Detainees could easily share news of their families and hometowns, and were therefore generally happier and more cooperative.

Active membership in an insurgent group. “Active” was the key word here: if a detainee showed no signs of continuing association with

a violent group, we no longer treated him as a member of that group. This was the case for the majority of our detainees. We gleaned information on their continuing associations from intelligence reporting and the observations of the guards, (the latter was usually a critical component).

For example, the extremist Sunni religious code required a very specific mode of behavior and dress: hiked-up trousers, untrimmed beards, and most important, no smoking. While some devout but benign detainees also exhibited these rigid behaviors and dress, such appearance was usually a giveaway of extremist affiliation.

Behavior during the previous year. We assigned each detainee points based on his behavior. A minor disobedience, such as refusing to submit to a search, counted as one point. A major disobedience, such as threatening a guard, counted for five points. To give detainees a chance to reform their behavior, only incidents of misbehavior less than a year old counted. Thus, after one year, we could reclassify a misbehaving detainee who reformed his



(AP Photo/Maya Alleruzzo)

A detainee performs his daily prayers at the U.S. detention facility at Camp Cropper in Baghdad, Iraq, 10 November 2008.

The Single Scale

Multiple Assaults	AND/OR	Many reports indicating extremism
Assault/Major Disobediences	AND/OR	Some reports indicating extremism
Minor Disobediences	AND/OR	Lack of extremism

Figure 2

behavior and allow him to associate with other well-behaved detainees.

However, because of the extremists' campaign, the need to physically separate the red and green detainee populations was urgent. The battalion addressed the issue head on, despite having only a thumbnail sketch of the detainees. Its intelligence section devised a plan to properly segregate every detainee. It involved moving nearly every detainee in the facility, but it was a huge step forward. The battalion executed the plan during the first week of August 2009. Violence decreased immediately, to an average of 4.8 incidents per week, yet much remained to be done.

The Screening Process

The 508th returned home to Fort Lewis, and the 705th Military Police Battalion from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, arrived and got to work. Throughout August and September 2009, we

reclassified up to 100 detainees per day and moved them to different compounds.

The single-scale system. We had inherited a screening system known as the "single-scale" system (Figure 2). It was designed at Camp Bucca in 2006, and had worked well there. It was not perfectly suited to the environment at Camp Taji, so we modified it. The system's methodology was straightforward: tally a detainee's behavioral incidents plus any intelligence reports or other indicators demonstrating extreme ideology. The more points, the higher the detainee is on the scale. He was coded green for few points, amber for several points, and red for many points. (We segregated any amber-coded detainee in a special compound until we could tell for sure whether he was a moderate or an extremist.)

However, the single-scale system was too broad a brush for the Camp Taji environment. As is evident from Figure 2, a detainee could move up the

scale from green to red either by being disobedient or for extremism. This led us to place merely misbehaving detainees with extremists. The system also failed to distinguish between extremist leaders and their followers, lumping them both together as red detainees.

The dual-scale system. To fix this problem, we created the “dual-scale” system, which separated detainee point values into two categories: behavioral and ideological. This greatly improved our ability to segregate the population. The new scale’s most important feature was that it distinguished between extremist leaders and their followers: the grey category for followers and black for leaders. As we continued to screen and separate detainees under the new system, violence and extremist influence dramatically declined.

The use of two scales presented a much more accurate picture of an individual detainee. Previously, a misbehaving detainee with no insurgent affiliations appeared, on paper, identical to an extremist insurgent leader with a spotless behavioral record: both coded red. Housing these two types of detainees together, however, would predictably end with either the recruitment or beating of the non-extremist detainee.

Over the course of five months (from August to December 2009), violence among detainees fell by 70 percent, from the peak of nearly one incident per day to an average of one incident per week. Meanwhile, the size of the detainee population remained stable at roughly 4,000. A less quantifiable decline also took place in extremist activity and recruiting after we separated the moderates and extremists.

The Reactive Process

In addition to our “proactive” screening system, which sought to prevent incidents, we also had a robust “reactive” process that we used after violent incidents occurred. This process began with exhaustive background checks on all detainees involved in

Although our screening system was quantitative, we regularly incorporated qualitative judgments.

an incident. We also conducted interviews with the detainees themselves, with detainee witnesses, and with both Iraqi and American guards. Sometimes we found information that we should have picked up during the initial screening, such as previous indications of extremism. When this happened, we immediately reclassified the extremists and moved them to the proper section of the facility. We attached the results of the analysis to each detainee’s profile in our online system. As our proactive screening system steadily improved, the need for the reactive analysis decreased.

Although our screening system was quantitative, we regularly incorporated qualitative judgments. For instance, a detainee might have two reports indicating that he was a member of an extremist gang court. Normally, this would suggest we should categorize him as a member of an extremist group and segregate him as such. However, if the detainee in question smoked and enjoyed racy Turkish soap operas, we might discount the reports and keep him categorized as a moderate.

Did a detainee’s past segregation predict his future behavior? Nearly all of our detainees had come from Camp Bucca, where the idea to separate moderate and extremist detainees originated as a response to extremists intimidating or killing large numbers of moderates. The unit operating the facility divided the population into “Red Bucca” and “Green Bucca” and violence and recruiting declined sharply.

But how should we treat detainees arriving from Red Bucca who had no record of extremism? Some argued that any detainee arriving from Red Bucca must be an extremist. Others argued that many detainees from Red Bucca simply survived among the extremists by complying with their rules, and were not real extremists themselves. They believed these detainees might reclaim their moderate identities if we gave them a chance to do so. Ultimately, we decided to give each arriving detainee a clean slate, and used only newly documented reports of extremism as indicators of future behavior.

Each of our 11 compounds held about 400 detainees and had two full-time S2 representatives from the guard force. Known as “Compound S2s,” they were our direct liaison to the detainees. Each S2 brought a different perspective to his duties. One, with a sunny disposition, believed nearly every detainee in his compound was a “good guy” at heart and requested

to move them to moderate compounds. In fact, his compound was, by design, mostly extremist. Another Compound S2, who monitored an identical detainee population, felt that everyone in his compound was a “bad guy,” and resisted any attempt to move moderate detainees out of his compound. The S2s’ input was critical to our success, but it was our duty to fold their input into an objective measure of each detainee’s status.

Since many S2s were reservists, they brought valuable knowledge from their civilian jobs. (We even had correctional officers and crime analysts.) Some Compound S2s knew their population so well we trusted them to segregate the detainees as they saw fit, and we simply double-checked their work. Others were less adept at evaluating detainees, and in these cases, we created detention plans for them.

As we identified and separated extremists, their operations scaled down. They kept a low profile to keep us from removing them from the moderate population. The punishments they meted out to other detainees became rarer and stealthier. In desperation, some extremists even shaved their beards

and took up smoking. By November 2009, the only extremists still operating in moderate areas were skilled recruiters who drew no attention to themselves whatsoever. We were only able to identify them with intensive human intelligence work and deep background checks.

Handling senior insurgent leaders. We separated senior insurgent leaders from the other detainees and kept them in their own compound. There were two schools of thought regarding this. The first group believed we should keep the leaders with the followers because it often improved detainee behavior. (Leaders tended to police disobedient behavior and in-group conflicts.) It also prevented any “profusion of leaders” problem, in which the removal of one group leader resulted in the promotion of another. The downside, of course, was that the leaders’ presence in the compound greatly enhanced the capability of the group for recruiting, indoctrination, training, and coordinating outside-the-wire activities. The severity of major disturbances also increased, due to the enhanced planning and command presence



(AP Photo/Maja Alleruzzo)

Detainees are seen outside their cell block at the U.S. detention facility at Camp Cropper in Baghdad, Iraq, 10 November 2008.

of senior leaders, so we discarded this approach.

We adopted the second school of thought, which was to aggressively identify and separate extremist leaders from their followers or would-be followers. We found that as the “profusion of leaders” process proceeded to its logical conclusion, the quality of extremist leadership steadily declined. Ultimately, we separated virtually every leader with any real ability from his followers. There was another benefit, as well. The selection of a new top leader seemed to require about two weeks of consultation, debate, and even written examinations. During this period, the extremist organization was paralyzed. Each time we identified a new top leader and removed him from his followers, we gained two weeks of relative calm.

Leaders of increasingly lower rank and ability came forward until eventually there was no leader remaining who could command the loyalty of all the extremists at Taji. During the last few months, our reports indicated that the Takfiri wanted to mount major disturbances but were unable to coordinate them across the extremist population.

The increased quality in segregation both permitted and enhanced the other key aspect of our counterinsurgency strategy. The facility was divided into red, amber, and green compounds. We gave detainees in Green Taji privileges not available to those in other compounds: additional recreation time, extended TV and radio hours, more access to newspapers and other reading material, and access to vocational training. The guard force trusted them more. Green Taji quickly became the “destination of choice” for every detainee in the facility. This weakened the extremist leaders by undermining their rhetoric and unit cohesion. The extremists found it difficult to maintain an image of pure piety and strength while a good portion of their followers were jumping at any chance to enjoy the sinful indulgences of Green Taji.

The situation with the Shi’a detainees was much more difficult. Our counterinsurgency campaign

was not particularly successful among them. Less than 15 percent of our detainee population was Shi’a. With only two compounds of Shi’a (compared to eight for the Sunnis), our ability to separate extremists from moderates was limited. Only our use of a “senior-leader” compound prevented complete failure. Even though we quickly identified the highest-ranking Shi’a leaders and most aggressive agitators and moved them to the senior-leader compound, Shi’a extremists held greater sway over the Shi’a population than Sunni extremists did over the Sunni population, simply because their “span of control” was so much smaller.

Fortunately, the Shi’a extremists proved much less likely to carry out violent punishments than the Sunni extremists. However, they were very interested in recruiting, and by the time we turned Taji over to the Iraqi government, Shi’a extremist groups had recruited every Shia detainee, except those deemed too uneducated or unskilled even for the extremists.

The beginning and the end of our experience with the Shi’a population illustrated the value of separating leaders from their followers. Before we separated Shi’a extremist leaders, the Shi’a population conducted two large-scale, well-organized disturbances. From June to December 2009, we separated their leaders from the rest of the detainees, and although recruitment continued, no severe disturbances occurred, and the Shi’a were generally less organized. In early 2010, the Shi’a leaders reunited with their followers. It was like watching a broken toy magically put itself back together: once again, the Shi’a population was a united block.

We were alert to political and military developments in Iraq that might affect our population. For instance, during the second half of 2009, the Iraqi government cut the number of detainee releases by 50 percent, from 1,500 a month to 750 a month. This caused frustration and anger inside the facility. Also during this period, the Shi’a extremist

Leaders of increasingly lower rank and ability came forward until eventually there was no leader remaining who could command the loyalty of all the extremists at Taji.

group Asaba al-Haqq began a slow but steady process of reconciliation with the government, which resulted in the release of many of the group's detainees. This raised the group's profile and helped recruiting inside the facility, a phenomenon we were essentially powerless to stop. If a detainee agreed to join Asaba al-Haqq, he immediately began receiving a monthly stipend and could look forward to a quick release from detention, sometimes within weeks. This proved to be an irresistible offer.

Recommendations

In closing, let me add that the standard military police battalion is not designed to handle the

intelligence requirements of a counterinsurgency operation. Augmenting the battalion with additional intelligence analysts is a common practice in counterinsurgencies, and both the 508th and the 705th augmented their intelligence shops prior to deployment.

The 508th supplemented its S2 shop with additional personnel drawn from other units. The 705th operated an S2 shop twice as large as the standard, complete with a deputy S2 (a first lieutenant) and two civilian contractors. This was about the minimum number of personnel necessary to provide proper intelligence support for the battalion's counterinsurgency operations. **MR**

NOTES

1. David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 73.

2. *Ibid.*, 34.

ARMY360
MULTI-SOURCE ASSESSMENT AND FEEDBACK

ARE YOU HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION?


The Army 360 / Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback (MSAF) program helps ensure that you are. The program increases leader self-awareness and provides direction for leadership improvement and sustainment. Army 360 provides:

- Personalized and confidential feedback from traditional and non-traditional sources – superiors, peers, and subordinates.
- The opportunity to receive coaching from senior-level leaders who can aid in understanding feedback and taking action on it.
- Assessments for all AC/RC leaders – Civilians, Non-commissioned Officers, Warrant Officers, and Commissioned Officers.
- Individual or unit-level participation.
- Flexibility in use – post-deployment, following promotion, after assuming command, prior to a PME/CES course, after a training exercise, etc.

Army 360 supports the Army's strategy related to sustaining a force led by competent, confident, and adaptive leaders. The impact is a better-led force with leaders who understand leadership competencies and attributes, and are capable of leading across the full spectrum of operations.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LEADERSHIP, COMBINED ARMS CENTER



Colonel Paul C. Hastings, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Zubik, and Lieutenant Colonel Eric K. Little, Illinois Army National Guard

Experiences can be lost. That is dangerous and is a fault. They may also harden into dogma, and become a dead letter—that is no less dangerous and is an offense, for it is not the office of experience to conjure up the past, but to build for the future.

— Colonel Hermann Foertsch, *The Art of Modern Warfare*, 1940

THE 33RD INFANTRY Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), Illinois Army National Guard, completed its yearlong “reset” in September 2010 after what can be described as one of the most decentralized, geographically dispersed, nonstandard brigade-level missions in the current U.S. operations. The 33rd IBCT mobilized and deployed to Afghanistan over a four-month period from June to September 2008 as 38 separate force packages in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. To execute this deployment, the brigade reorganized into 44 police mentor teams, six embedded training teams, a counterinsurgency battalion, a force protection battalion, two companies of special purpose security forces, a logistics task force, a training advisory group, and a combined Joint task force headquarters. Almost 3,000 Illinois soldiers deployed.

Complicating matters was the fact that not all units worked for the brigade while deployed. Roughly one-third of the brigade was assigned to International Security Assistance Forces regional commands with the remaining two-thirds working for Major General Richard Formica, commander of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan. This nonstandard mission set required the brigade to cross-level most of its leadership and the majority of its personnel. Ultimately, this would have a profound effect on the 33rd Brigade’s reset.

Reset and the ARFORGEN Model

The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model has proved to be the ideal methodology to ensure the Army can provide a versatile mix of capability and capacity to the combatant commander when needed.

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Lieutenant Colonel Eric K. Little is director of property and fiscal operations, Illinois Army National Guard, Springfield, IL. He served as commander of the 634th Brigade Support Battalion, 33rd IBCT, during its deployment.

PHOTO: A U.S. soldier with the Illinois Army National Guard provides security during combat operations in Paktya Province, Afghanistan, 17 April 2009. (U.S. Air Force, SSgt Shawn Weismiller)




Figure 1. Commander's reset lines of effort

Arguably, reset—the reconstitution period after a deployment—is the most critical period within the ARFORGEN cycle. This is where units put the pieces back together—a daunting task because of the natural inclination to want to take a break after returning stateside. Most certainly, reset does not mean “relax.” Leaders cannot relax because their units will suffer. Soldiers cannot relax because most have returned to work, while simultaneously focusing on their family life. Or worse yet, they are wound too tight to assimilate back home or at work. Clearly, without a proper reset, a unit cannot effectively restore itself. Moreover, because the ARFORGEN timeline is often compressed and unforgiving, letting a year pass by without making substantial gains can be devastating.

Establish a Vision for Reset

Like all operations, reset begins with developing a detailed understanding of the situation and visualizing a desired end state. Our brigade understood the situation; 3,000 of its soldiers were coming off an intense deployment and trying to find balance in

their lives. They were dealing with harsh economic times, readjustment issues, and trying to reconnect at home, at work, and in the Army National Guard. The staggered, decentralized deployment also played havoc with logistics and accountability. Coupled with these obstacles, training and readiness indicators were weak at best. Given these interconnected issues, we had to analyze each area separately, and then synthesize our findings to develop a logical plan to restore the brigade. Our aim was to reestablish the 33rd as a premier IBCT in the Army National Guard, fully prepared to conduct “Training Year 1” of the ARFORGEN cycle. Our first challenge was to develop an orderly and easily understood methodology to accomplish the innumerable tasks that we needed to complete by 1 October 2010—one year after returning home.

Lines of Effort

To articulate our vision for reset, we used the Army's distinct and mutually supporting logical lines of effort: leading, training, maintaining, and caring.

Our lines of effort focused on areas for each level of command to address as they began to put their individual planning processes into motion. Figure 1 reflects in general terms the major themes within each line of effort. Figures 2 and 3 provide specific objectives for each line of effort.

The “leading” line of effort influences all other efforts and actions. From E5 team leader to brigade commander, each must provide requisite energy and focus to ensure units and the soldiers achieve the milestones set before them. The challenge, of course, is that the leaders themselves are mentally and physically spent from their yearlong deployment and are trying to achieve balance in their own lives. Add to the fact that most leaders in the

National Guard are traditional guardsmen who must reestablish their status with their fulltime employers and reconnect with their families while working to reconstitute the brigade.

Upon returning stateside, the 33rd IBCT’s immediate focus was to reestablish its chain of command. We took a hard look at our company commanders and first sergeants, as they are the ones who would set the tone. We looked at all 31 company command teams and determined whether to maintain them in their current positions. While some were ready to move due to a promotion, many needed to remain in position to see their units through the entire reset process. The decision on whether to change these key individuals resided


Commander’s LOE Key Tasks 			
LEADING	Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All leaders are trained on battle command (FY11) Leaders integrate battle command and ABCS (FY12) Identify future best BCT leaders for deployment 	
	OPD/PME	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PME (staff rides, officer calls, professional discussions) 100% leaders engaged in NGAI, NGAUS or PME Org (FY11) Drills incorporate OPD on COIN, battlemind, MDMP, or FSO 	
	Senior Grade Fill	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain 95% fill of all 271 officer and warrant officer positions Assess no less than 55 officers (FY11) 	
	Combat Leaders Selection Initiative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Within the next two years commission 75 lieutenants Conduct an NCO lead educational and selection process 	
TRAINING	Battle Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Leaders & staffs achieve proficiency in MDMP (FY11) Leaders & staffs integrate orders process @ ABCS (FY12) 	
	Framework Order	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yearly training order nested within three year training strategy. 	
	Readiness Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Achieve >95% DMOSQ, >95% End Strength <1% NOVAL, <2% Negative End Strength goals 	
	Full Spectrum Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> METL at all levels nested with BDE METL Units conduct FSO in a COIN environment 	
ABCS	Army Battle Command System	COIN	Counterinsurgency
DMOSQ	Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualification	FSO	Full Spectrum Operations
LOE	Lines of effort	MDMP	Military Decision Making Process
METL	Mission Essential Task List	NGAI	National Guard Association of Illinois
NGAUS	National Guard Association of the United States	NOVAL	No Validated Pay
OPD	Officer Professional Development	PME	Professional Military Education

Figure 2. Subtasks and objectives for leading and training lines of effort

with the battalion commanders and the brigade commander.

We also made it our priority to identify, empower, and hold all our front-line leaders accountable. Team, section, and squad leaders are always the first to know when a soldier is wearing thin under the pressure of reintegration. We directly empowered them to look after their soldiers between drills and to ensure that every soldier attended Illinois' reintegration program. While this may seem to be an obvious responsibility, the difficulty for these leaders lies in maintaining connection with geographically dispersed soldiers. As a brigade, we empowered these young leaders through armory visits, conference calls, written letters of encouragement, and clear directives.

The 33rd IBCT's leading went beyond reestablishing our chain of command and holding small-unit leaders accountable for their soldiers. As illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, other key components included implementing an effective officer professional development program and professional military education, filling senior grade vacancies created by personnel attrition, and developing an officer accession program (referred to as the Combat Leader Selection Initiative).

Training Line of Effort

Training does not get a pass during reset. A brigade must accomplish the bulk of it then, especially duty military occupational specialty qualification (DMOSQ) and schools needed for promotion. While still in theater, the 33rd IBCT operations officer, in close collaboration with the Illinois National Guard, secured sufficient funding for schools for hundreds of soldiers to attend. Where possible we sent our soldiers on Title X status, which meant that they reported to the schoolhouse from theater. While this extended their deployment by three to four weeks, it allowed our soldiers to meet mandatory military education requirements, opened up advancement opportunities and, more importantly, ensured there was no significant military related interruption in their reintegration to civilian life over the coming year. This process improved soldier morale and unit readiness and supported Illinois Guard and the IBCT's reintegration plan.

The next step in the "training" line of effort was to use our large number of combat veterans to help train the 500 new soldiers who had joined the IBCT

while we were deployed. To garner enthusiasm for training, the brigade command group went to the subordinate battalions to share our vision for reset and to educate them on General Casey's paradigm shift in training. We needed our veterans to leverage their experience to help develop soldiers for the future fight. We pressed our young captains, lieutenants, and sergeants to "own" their training and to push the envelope. Our purpose was to ensure our junior leaders think along our lines of effort and to demonstrate our respect for their experiences and capabilities.

Once the initial reintegration process was complete, we focused the company commanders and first sergeants on improving unit readiness indicators: strength, DMOSQ, AWOLs, school attendance, and negative end strength, key indicators for any Army National Guard unit. We fostered a mind-set across the brigade that this "report card" would directly affect our next deployment either as a stand-alone IBCT or as a brigade conducting various missions piecemeal. Simply put, we let the company commanders and first sergeants know they could not neglect these readiness indicators.

Another key component to success was junior leader development. We encouraged the battalions to develop flexible, adaptable leaders able to think quickly, understand, and react under the rigors of full spectrum operations. The brigade S3 and his staff studied General Casey's 2009 leader development guidance to master the paradigm shift in training of—

- Mass and compressed time versus complexity and extended time.
- Decentralization.
- Framing ill-defined problems.

A key event incorporating this training was the IBCT senior leader conference where leader development case studies were used involving real situations encountered by 33rd IBCT soldiers during their deployment. We shared these vignettes in small, tailored groups facilitated by combat captains and majors from the brigade.

Another fundamental question the brigade's trainers tackled was, "What separates one brigade from another?" The answer was clear: integrating and maximizing technology at the soldier and small-unit level. If a brigade cannot fully employ new technology such as Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS), Unmanned Aerial Systems (Shadow UAS),



33rd IBCT is the premier Infantry Brigade Combat Team in the ARNG, postured as the best Reserve Component unit for a deployment expeditionary force mission in FY 2013. I anticipate fighting a low-tech insurgent force that uses IEDs, indirect fires, and complex ambushes conducted in small-unit operations. The fight will be in rugged terrain over long distances in small villages among civilians. The IBCT will fight this enemy by developing small-unit leaders capable of convoy and air mobile operations, IED defeat, reacting to indirect fires, counter ambush, and cordon and search. Our commanders will support operations with decentralized planning; coordinated targeting, fires, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance); and plans, security, and sustainment operations. Battalions and the IBCT, as land owners, will excel at concurrent planning by integrating ABCS into all aspects of battle command. Integral to success is using our ISR assets to find specific high-value targets that will drive operations. IBCT leaders will be skilled at integrating effective information operations, interfacing with the local populace, and maximizing our efforts with our Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. At the individual level the foundation for this success is culturally aware, ethical, moral leaders who are cognitively astute to solve ill-defined problems in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment. Equally, they are resilient enough to withstand the rigors of combat operations during this long fight.

Figure 3. 33rd IBCT Commander's Training Vision

communications (WIN-T) and fires (M119A2 Field Artillery System), then its ability to execute full spectrum operations is impossible. Knowing this, we focused our energy on having these systems fully manned and operational within 6 to 12 months of fielding. We conducted new-equipment training for Shadow UAS, WIN-T, and M119A2 Howitzers. We began resource planning for mobile training teams for all of our ABCS, and scheduled participation in two full spectrum battle command exercises. In short, the IBCT's trainers ensured these newly fielded digital systems would be operational and exercised in a collective and multi-echeloned manner, thereby freeing our battalions and companies to train and develop lethal squads and platoons and meeting the commander's vision of stand-alone full spectrum operations during the next deployment.

To ensure all levels of command understood the message, the brigade hosted a leadership conference during which the brigade commander presented his vision statement along with the brigade's three-year training strategy to all the brigade leaders to ensure

they understood the way ahead and accepted it. Figure 3 is the commanders' training vision describing the conditions where and how the brigade will fight during its next deployment. A brigade and battalion S3 conference followed the leadership conference. This created a specific plan for our training vision, ensuring the brigade would be fully digital and all combat function enablers integrated and synchronized. To plan for anything less would defy recent history.

Maintaining Lines of Effort

The most labor-intensive challenge we faced upon redeployment was accountability and maintenance. Both fell squarely within our "maintaining" line of effort. Because the brigade deployed as 38 separate force packages, the doctrinal distribution of personnel and equipment simply did not apply. Literally thousands of pieces of equipment were laterally transferred throughout the brigade to meet mission requirements. In effect, the brigade was completely dismantled, thereby requiring a

significant logistical effort to reconstitute, all while performing framework operations. Additionally, the 33rd IBCT deployed without the benefit of established equipment accountability personnel and structure. This set the stage for a perfect storm of complicated tasks required within the one year reset, if not earlier.

Upon returning stateside and before formal equipment reset could begin, the brigade had to account for all sensitive items by unit. This was a significant task given that many of the items had been listed on the property books of hundreds of small teams spread across Afghanistan and were not merged into correct configurations upon return. This created confusion throughout the brigade. Close coordination with the Illinois National Guard G4, brigade S4, and the property book officers ultimately resolved this situation. The next task was to establish individual and unit equipment accountability. Each mobilized soldier completed a 100 percent post-mobilization inventory of his equipment. We used this inventory to identify shortfalls and normal wear and tear items requiring replacement or exchange. At the completion of the inventory, the brigade requested resupply for each loss, and we funded them through the reset program. Lastly, we took a 100 percent inventory of all forward and rear property immediately upon receipt of all in-bound equipment containers. During the inventory, we discovered that a number of these containers were broken into during passage back to the Port of Karachi, Pakistan, and a large amount of nonmission-essential equipment was stolen. This added yet another level of complexity to the accountability problems. After several months, we merged the forward and rear hand receipts and executed multiple financial-liability investigations of property losses to account for the shortfalls. At the conclusion of all the inventories, accountability was reestablished and formal equipment reset could begin.

A prerequisite to executing any lateral transfers back to the authorized configuration entails ensuring that 100 percent of equipment is nominated and entered into the national reset program. The Illinois Army National Guard operates a local reset operation funded from the National Guard Bureau. This program tracks and ensures we return all equipment to proper maintenance standards. While in theater, the 33rd IBCT dedicated resources in an effort to build a plan in the automated reset management tool.

Accountability must be a highly visible command priority.

Completion of this plan meant the stateside operation had a clear picture of what was coming back and what we would have to reset.

To fully support this process, a number of redeployed soldiers in the brigade returned to active duty in a Title 32 status to help account for, inspect, and submit all equipment into reset. Simultaneously, the 33rd IBCT S4 logistics officer, supported by the state G4, reconfigured the brigade from the 38 force packages and all of the associated rear-detachments into Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) configuration. We needed to complete this quickly to return the equipment to the correct unit to support emerging training plans. The G4 and S4 maintained a constant window into the reset status so that priorities of effort could shift to support training. For example, a simple training event such as range qualification became logistically complex. Before returning to the range, we needed to inspect, repair, and redistribute weapons and optics heavily used during a yearlong fight. Just-in-time support became more than a buzzword; it became the reality of managing equipment to support training. We aimed reset actions to minimize friction and fully support training plans.

Inspections became a vital tool to assess the brigade's progress in realigning to proper MTOE configuration. Success required close coordination, clear instructions, and execution at all levels from each soldier to the commander of the Illinois Army National Guard.

Ultimately, the brigade reestablished accountability, but at a heavy cost in time, energy, and effort. The biggest lesson learned was that every soldier must understand the importance of property accountability throughout deployment. Each soldier must not only carefully track his or her own assigned equipment, but must take ownership in the care and accountability of unit equipment. Accountability must be a highly visible command priority. If a unit has not achieved a high level of command supply discipline before its deployment, it certainly will not have it upon its return.

Caring Line of Effort

Without question, soldier care was the most immediate and pressing challenge for the brigade upon redeployment. Our soldiers had returned to harsh economic times. Some of our men and women lacked necessary coping skills to adjust to life after deployment. Each soldier had different experiences from different parts of Afghanistan. Soldier distress was increasing and manifesting itself in suicide, attempted suicide, spousal abuse, incarceration, and drug and alcohol abuse. The reality was that many of our soldiers were untethered with the wind taking them in many directions and to dangerous altitudes. Without question, the 33rd IBCT had to help restore each soldier's balance through an effective "caring" line of effort.

As with the training line of effort, the caring line of effort began when the brigade was still in theater. The rear detachment, its family readiness groups, and the Illinois Joint Force Headquarters (IL-JFHQ) Casualty Assistance Office teamed together with the state chaplain to lay the foundation for the caring line of effort. They supported the brigade during its most trying times when the brigade incurred casualties. Their actions initiated what would become long-lasting bonds between units, families, communities, other service providers, and the 33rd IBCT.

Additionally, the IL-JFHQ and the 33rd IBCT rear detachment organized, planned, and executed a four-stage reintegration program. The first stage was unit-level welcome home ceremonies performed immediately upon a unit's return to their armory. Although we initially contemplated a large brigade-level welcome-home event, we thought it best to have 32 different ceremonies at hometown armories across Illinois. These ceremonies lasted less than 20 minutes, allowing soldiers to get back home to their loved ones. The second stage of reintegration began at the 30-day mark, and included educational seminars where each soldier and his or her family participated. A wide range of services were offered from traumatic brain injury (TBI) screening, veterans benefits education, marriage and family counseling, financial management seminars, mental health counseling, a job fair, and meetings with college or university representatives. Although the command mandated some seminars such as TBI screening, many

were optional, and soldiers could choose which seminars to attend. Stage 3 was similar to stage 2 but began at the 75-day mark to catch issues that may have emerged after the 30-day program. The final stage was a formal event held at or near each armory. This allowed Illinois elected representatives, the adjutant general and assistant adjutant general, and brigade leaders and their subordinates to personally thank our soldiers, their families, their employers, and the communities for their service.

We also established an aggressive caring program for Gold Star Families and Wounded Warriors. Upon returning stateside, the IBCT command group stayed on Title X status for an additional 30 days to visit all 18 Gold Star Families and to visit our Wounded Warriors across the country. Once the entire brigade had returned home, the Illinois National Guard headquarters conducted a Gold Star Family event at McCormick Place in Chicago. Here, each Gold Star Family was honored with a special commemoration involving national celebrities and special guests.

Throughout reset, battalion and company leaders continued visiting their Gold Star Families and Wounded Warriors, inviting them to unit-level social events. While these efforts helped restore the brigade, many soldiers were not able to bridge the gap and cope. The 33rd IBCT and Illinois State Headquarters developed specific guidance to carry us through the reset to help mitigate potentially catastrophic problems. The guidance included:

- Embed chaplains throughout the brigade—"a chaplain will step foot into every armory at every drill, especially during range training."
- Develop a battalion-level methodology to teach coping skills without being intrusive or disruptive, using the chaplaincy, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and other key resources.
- Develop a linking diagram from soldiers with problems to those that are a positive influence in their lives.
- Mail soldier "help cards" and letters of encouragement to families and friends of soldiers in the brigade. Cards contained hotline numbers to call for help.
- Develop a leader-training program that teaches first-line leaders how to mentor and coach soldiers who are struggling to cope.

Commander's LOE Key Tasks			
M A I N T A I N I N G	Accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 100% positive control of sensitive and high value items • Maintain FLIPL losses to less than 2% 	
	Strength Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 120% End Strength and 95% DMOSQ • GRAP Enlistments + Recruitment > Losses, 15% increase per year-90% FY13 	
	OIP/CSDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organizational Inspection Program conducted yearly and deficiencies fixed within the following quarter • Command Supply Discipline Program done every three years 	
	Maintenance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Keeping OR rates at 95% • All equipment through reset NLT Apr 2011 	
C A R I N G	Resiliency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yearly training for mind and spirit: PTSD, suicide, drug prevention • PT, Leaders-250+ APFT, units - 220 + APFT 	
	Mentoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reducing delinquent OERs and NCOERs to near zero • Leaders conduct quarterly mentoring of all Soldiers 	
	Gold Star Families and Wounded Warriors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yearly event for fallen Soldier families • Regular communication with all GSF 	
	Family Readiness Groups and Employer Support to the Guard & Reserve	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community, Soldier, Family or Employer events quarterly • Fully staffed and trained FRG in place by FY12 	
APFT	Army Physical Fitness Test	FLIPL	Financial Liability Investigation of Property Loss
GSF	Gold Star Family	GRAP	Guard Recruiting Assistance Program
NCOER	Noncommissioned Officer Efficiency Report	PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
OR	Operational Readiness	OER	Officer Efficiency Report
PT	Physical Training		

Figure 4. Subtasks under Maintaining and Caring Lines of Effort

- Partner with Illinois National Guard Headquarters and other brigades in the state to leverage behavioral health support down to the battalions at every drill (especially during range fire). Our state headquarters provided full-time chaplaincy coverage, by zone, throughout the state.

- Achieve 100 percent response of health assessments.

- Train two soldiers per company in “resiliency.”

This guidance augmented our team leader and squad leader involvement with their soldiers. Our ultimate success in soldier care resided in our noncommissioned officer corps and the awareness of leaders at all levels.

Culmination

For the 33rd IBCT, reset culminated with the unveiling of the painting “Forever My Brother,” commemorating the brigade’s Operation Enduring Freedom deployment. The reset of the 33rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team was successful because of the exceptional support of the leadership of the Illinois National Guard and especially the hard work of the brigade’s soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and junior leaders. We were dedicated to seeing the 33rd IBCT fully restored. Our logical framework centered on four main lines of effort—leading, training, maintaining, and caring. We were able to well posture the 33rd IBCT to execute its next mission, whatever and wherever that might be. *MR*



Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Eastern Afghanistan

Utility as a Strategic Counterinsurgency Tool

Robert E. Kemp

The views represented in this paper are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. State Department or the U.S. government.

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PHOTO: U.S. Navy PO1 Brylan Riggins, corpsman with the Nuristan Provincial Reconstruction Team, crosses a temporary bridge on the Alingar River as U.S. Army 1LT Michael Lutkevich, Nuristan PRT security force platoon leader, stands guard in the Nurgaram District, 23 January 2011. (U.S. Air Force, CMSgt Richard Simonsen)

The United States and its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) partners have been engaging in counterinsurgency (COIN) in the area covered by Regional Command-East (RC-East) in Afghanistan for much of the last decade, with varying approaches, levels of resources, and results. One of the key players has been the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), civilian-military platforms designed to extend the reach of the government of Afghanistan and for other functions. While many are concerned about the Afghan government's capacity and negative trends in the counterinsurgency, RC-East has seen some notable successes. It forced insurgent groups to operate from outside of the area, and local government has taken root in many places.¹

What role have PRTs played in the positive COIN trends in this part of Afghanistan, and what have they done that may be detrimental? How do they fit into the recently modified COIN strategy? How might we apply them to insurgencies outside of Afghanistan?

This article has three sections and will focus primarily on the period from 2004 to 2008 (when I was there, with consideration of events since then). The first section will look at the utility of PRTs, focusing on governance, diplomatic efforts, and civilian-military coordination, with some observations on the strategic significance of these efforts. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, is a point of reference.² The second section examines the challenges the PRTs face in RC-East. The third section includes an overall assessment of their success or failure, and makes some recommendations on how they can operate more effectively.

Of course, PRTs are part of a larger coalition team. They operate in conjunction with battalions, brigades, and Special Forces units. While each of these units has its specific tasks, they often blend in with those of the PRTs, so that any assessment (and credit for success) applies to them as well. This article focuses on the political role of PRTs, rather than their military or development assistance efforts.

Utility of PRTs

This section examines the utility of PRTs from a political officer's perspective, particularly between 2004 and 2008, focusing on three main areas:

- Assistance in developing local governance.
- Reporting, analysis, and diplomacy.
- As a hub for coordination within the U.S. government, the government of Afghanistan (GoA), and international organizations.

Observations on the strategic value of these actions follow.

Developing local governance. The COIN manual notes, "The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government." How have PRTs contributed to this line of operation?

While most international civilian efforts immediately after the 2001 defeat of the Taliban sought to establish a functioning central government in Kabul, by 2004 more effort was being put into establishing and developing provincial-level governance. There was a need not only to build

up governance, but also to reestablish a functioning civil society whose fabric had been torn by a series of wars beginning in 1979. Provincial reconstruction teams were central to military, State Department, and to some extent U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs to improve governance.³ By 2007, more emphasis could be put on improving district-level government, along with some programs to build up municipal governments.

Initially, PRTs in RC-East worked in a fluid environment, with uneven GoA presence and considerable influence by informal power brokers, including tribal leaders, militia leaders, mullahs, and landowners. The insurgency was still in its nascent stages, allowing civilian and military coalition officers more opportunities to engage with Afghans. Many, perhaps most, Afghan civilians at this time were hopeful about the country's future and positive regarding coalition efforts. Taking advantage of these circumstances, the PRTs worked with maneuver units to move provincial government forward by providing Commander's Emergency Response

(French Army photo/Siaff Sergeant Romain Beaulinette)



U.S. Army SGT Patrick Reilly, Panjshir Provincial Reconstruction Team, gives a hand to local villagers while delivering materials for an irrigation canal in Shutol District, 20 December 2010.

Program (CERP) funds as well as mobility and security to governors and other officials. They also provided advice and assisted with information campaigns and interagency coordination within the Afghan government.

Working in conjunction with other coalition units and UN teams, the PRTs contributed significantly to the various rounds of elections by assisting with logistical support, planning campaigns to explain elections to the population (and to the candidates), and organizing security efforts. Team members also served as election observers. While far from perfect, these elections were important in putting at least some elected officials in place; the 2004 and 2005 elections, in particular, were seen as credible by many Afghans.

By 2005, several insurgencies were beginning to gain momentum in RC-East. This had multiple effects: shadow insurgent governments were established, GoA officials were targeted, coalition officers' freedom of movement and contact with Afghans were reduced, and more effort overall went into combat operations. At roughly the same time, popular support for local government began to wane as infrastructure and services improved only marginally, and the perception (or fact) of official corruption increased. This hindered PRT efforts to build up local government, although the teams' role in development increased as tens of millions of dollars of CERP funds became available to encourage the government to take more responsibility for planning, coordination, and security, and prodding informal actors to deal with the formal Afghan government.

Reporting, analysis, and diplomatic functions. Provincial reconstruction teams provided an important service by being the “eyes and ears” for policymakers and rear echelons. Much of this duty fell on State Department officers tasked with providing insights on political, social, and economic trends and the nature of rapidly morphing multiple insurgencies. This is important given that military

intelligence tends to focus on gathering counterterrorism and combat information.

Provincial reconstruction teams provided a steady stream of insights on local conditions to brigade and division commands and to NATO headquarters in Brussels. Since many viewed them as neutral actors, PRT officers were in a position to provide information and analysis with greater credibility to GoA officials and policymakers in Washington, an important function given the complexity of Afghanistan.

The PRTs also provided an opportunity to watch for corrupt officials, although the overall impact of this effort was marginal, given the difficulty of obtaining clear proof and Afghanistan's weak legal system. They also kept an eye on cross-border issues, including attacks and attempts to extend influence into Afghanistan. The teams were able to gradually build an understanding of tribal relations and disputes, a major issue in COIN operations. They disseminated current U.S. and ISAF policy positions and helped local government officials understand policy coming out of Kabul. Finally, PRT reporting was an extra “dissent channel” from the field, providing a sometimes needed reality check to policy.

PRTs and coordination. Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, notes, “The political and military aspects of insurgencies are so bound together as to be inseparable.” It adds, “The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful COIN operations. All efforts focus on supporting the local populace and host nation government. Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency.” Provincial reconstruction teams knitted together political and military lines of operation and coordinated with the GoA. They were a hub for coordination at several levels (although it should be noted that in RC-East, the PRTs were effectively run by the military). Within the PRT itself, military,

Provincial reconstruction teams provided a steady stream of insights on local conditions to brigade and division commands...

State Department, USAID, and U.S. Department of Agriculture officers exchanged information and synchronized projects. More importantly, they served as platforms to reach out to local leaders and functioned as neutral sites for dispute resolution between forces in local society. For example, PRT Ghazni engaged as a neutral party/honest broker between the Pashtuns, Hazaras, Tajiks, and the nomadic Kuchis in that province.

The teams and brigades also served as forums for coordination within the U.S. government inter-agency community. For example, in Nangarhar Province in 2008, the team coordinated counter-narcotics efforts between the military, USAID, the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and other players before further coordination with the Afghan government (although in this case much work was also done at the brigade level).⁴ The teams also functioned almost as embassies, providing the infrastructure and planning for high-level visitors, including congressional delegations, Afghan officials, and military officers.

Strategic benefits. As David Kilcullen notes, "In essence, effective counterinsurgency is a matter of good governance, backed by solid population security and economic development measures, resting on a firm foundation of energetic IO."⁵ As strategy continues to shift to a population-centric approach after the reviews of late 2008 and 2009 (coupled with years of practical experience), the PRTs' inherent purpose—to interact with the local population and build up government—makes them an important player. They help provide the operational foundations of this modified strategy in multiple ways: by building ties with the local population, by gaining knowledge of local politics and society, and by moving governance and basic justice systems forward. Although the results have been uneven, PRTs engage in public diplomacy campaigns, explaining the coalition presence in towns and villages and countering insurgent disinformation.

By supporting local government, PRTs contributed to the de facto decentralization of power in Afghanistan, with the strategic benefits of bringing decision making closer to the populations that the government intends to serve. This is not a defined



Afghan authorities and personnel from the Italian Provincial Reconstruction Team of Herat City celebrate the foundation stone ceremony of two new schools in Injil District, Herat Province, 12 June 2011. (Photo by Regional Command West PIO/Staff Sergeant Garcia, Spanish Army)

PRT goal but rather a byproduct of their work with local authorities.

While they are not cheap to operate, PRTs have the advantage of being less expensive than large combat units. As Afghan police and military units expand, PRTs provide an option to maintain a coalition presence at a somewhat reduced cost. This is particularly important because part of the Taliban's strategy is to outlast the international presence. Viable because their operating costs are only a fraction of ISAF's overall operating expenses, PRTs give countries with limited combat forces an opportunity to play a meaningful role. The successful New Zealand-led PRT in Bamian Province of RC-East is one example.

In their effort to expand governance, the teams benefit from the grassroots democracy present in Pashtun society. In local or regional shuras (councils), discussions can go on for hours or days, often reaching consensus decisions that are binding, such as embracing the outcome of the 2004 elections, the National Solidarity Program, and related development councils that have been successful in some areas. This cultural tendency toward local democracy strengthens the contention that PRTs

should carry on their long-term effort to build a viable democracy.

Eventually the teams will cease working in Afghanistan, the hope being that the Afghan government will independently carry out its functions (several provinces are approaching or have reached this state). As a subset of governance, PRT activities form the kernel of Afghan development at the provincial level by transferring expertise and establishing a framework of Afghan interagency coordination. Given the extremely low level of development in many areas, this is of strategic importance—there are decades of work ahead for the Afghan government and the international community. To prevent future insurgencies, Afghans must see improvement in their lives and see that their children have the possibility of a better future. Having a relatively competent indigenous development structure in place with an acceptably low level of corruption will allow foreign donors to provide development money with less expatriate staff and the resultant overhead costs.

Many Afghans expected the international community to bring concrete improvements to their lives, which was evident in the cautious optimism of 2003. By 2008 hope had drifted into disappointment, with foreign assistance providing only limited benefits. This change of mood is a serious matter for the counterinsurgency effort, and PRTs have a role to play in distributing development funds to benefit Afghans outside of major cities (while making sure the Afghan government gets much of the credit at the local level).

Provincial reconstruction teams also performed the less tangible function of providing an international presence at the local level. This is important in a tactical and strategic sense, in that many Afghans, particularly along the border with Pakistan, are

To prevent future insurgencies, Afghans must see improvement in their lives and see that their children have the possibility of a better future.

“fence sitters,” preferring to hedge their bets to see which faction will come out on top. Having a PRT presence can give the local population confidence to side with the government (as well as giving confidence to the local government) and makes it harder for insurgents to fill any vacuums, particularly as the Taliban establishes shadow local governments.

Challenges Facing PRTs in RC-East

Provincial reconstruction teams face a wide variety of challenges, some brought on by the complex environment they operate in, some by the weakness of Afghan organizations, and some a result of flawed tactics, a flawed strategy, or a flawed understanding of what is happening on the ground. In a sense, given the very low level of development of Afghanistan, the teams are involved in construction, not reconstruction, and are misnamed “reconstruction teams.” What are their challenges, and how can we meet them?

Provincial reconstruction teams in RC-East operate within a society that remains deeply traditional and conservative, particularly in Pashtun and Nuristani areas. The society is working through how it will adapt to encroaching modernity and outside influences, such as the role of women in society. The more conservative sectors of society want to put the brakes on change and, to some extent, development, which at times puts them in opposition to the PRTs, whose officers want to push development forward. Provincial reconstruction team officers’ relatively short tours of duty (12 or 15 months) exacerbate this situation, which puts pressure on them to get results quickly, despite the slow speed at which the Afghan society often works. Similarly, PRT efforts to build up government institutions encounter a system where personal relationships and personalities often matter more than institutions and formal structures.

Efforts to build up local governance in provinces along the border run up against a harsh reality. Insurgents can assassinate government officials or, at a minimum, hinder the steady development of local government. This clearly reduces PRT effectiveness. Similarly, if the insurgency is seen as one large (if loosely affiliated) movement active in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, PRTs have the extremely difficult task of carrying out a COIN campaign in which they can directly influence only half of the population.

(French Army, Staff Sergeant Romain Beaulinette)



Local villagers unload a truck full of materials delivered by a local contractor and the Panjshir Provincial Reconstruction Team for an irrigation canal in Shutol District, 20 December 2010.

Education is a key to maintaining democracy, countering the ideology of the Taliban and other insurgent groups, and creating a workforce with employable skills, not only within Afghanistan but also as expat workers in the Gulf and elsewhere. Education is critical to giving Afghan youths alternatives to radical madrassas and the insurgent life; much of the young population may be ready for positive social change. Aside from helping with infrastructure, PRTs have had only limited impact on the Afghan education system, which was almost nonexistent in 2001. There is a need to build up a body of teachers and administrators, a task which PRTs are not designed to do.

This author returned to Afghanistan four times between the spring of 2003 and the spring of 2010, and each time it was clear that increased security measures were in place to protect U.S. personnel. They included bigger and more heavily armed convoys with more armor and more restrictions on travel. In effect, the insurgents are achieving one of our COIN goals—separating us from the Afghans, through our reactive security measures.

Selecting the provinces in which to locate PRTs and determining the resources they receive has strategic implications. For example, the PRTs in Paktia and Ghazni Provinces initially covered Logar and Wardak Provinces as well. While this worked well while the insurgency had limited capacity, it worked poorly when the insurgents became active in the two provinces that abut Kabul. Eventually, a Czech PRT arrived in Logar, and a Turkish PRT in Wardak, but this caused challenges too. Kapisa, a province to the east of Kabul, also received only limited attention, and eventually had a hard-to-eradicate insurgency take root. The remote province of Nuristan presented different challenges. Its remoteness, harsh winters, small population, and rugged mountain terrain made both civilian and military leaders reluctant to deploy a PRT, although one was eventually established. Similarly, the remote province of Dai Kundi was judged to have such limited strategic significance that a PRT has yet to be established there, despite multiple requests from the governor.

A fundamental problem of U.S.-led PRTs (and battalions, brigades, and divisions) is the rapid

turnover of staff, and the knowledge lost as a result. The complexity of Afghanistan and the rapid changes in the Afghan government, society, and the insurgency have held back COIN advances. The rapid turnover of personnel has also led to too frequent changes of policies, as incoming officers make fundamental changes to their predecessor's policies and priorities. However, this situation has improved because many military and civilian officers have now served multiple tours in Afghanistan. The difficulty the central government in Kabul has in developing coherent national policies for a country as diverse and rapidly changing as Afghanistan remains a challenge for embassies and national-level military commands.

Perhaps more important was the imbalance of civilian versus military personnel in PRTs. In part, this reflected the vastly greater resources of DOD in comparison to the State Department and USAID—as Kilcullen notes, “the U.S. Defense Department is about 210 times larger than the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department combined.” In terms of staffing and funding the ratio is even greater. This held back COIN efforts. For example, in early 2005, I wore two hats, working for the brigade and the PRT in Khost Province while at times covering

Paktia and Paktika Provinces—a clear overstretch. With the appointment of Ambassador Holbrooke as the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, this situation significantly improved, but imbalances remain.

The PRTs are the counterinsurgency's “Swiss army knives.” While they do well operationally, they have produced uneven results in some areas. Beginning in 2006, the amount of CERP funds moving through the PRTs may have outpaced the teams' abilities to manage these funds. Some PRTs worked on women's rights issues, with less than desirable results—not surprisingly, given the extreme sensitivity of this issue, particularly in Pashtun areas. Although the PRTs had limited scope and legal authority to do so, they may have been better able to work more with the Afghan National Police. However, the shortcomings of the police, glaringly apparent by 2005, were beyond the scope of the PRTs to address in a significant way. This matters, in that the war in eastern Afghanistan between 2004 and 2008 was more a police war than an army war.

Similarly, the development of the judicial sector, an important part of defeating the insurgents and developing Afghan civil society, lagged badly. Finally, support for agriculture was weak, with limited U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) deployment and almost no funding. National Guard units focused on agriculture, and increased USDA deployments under Ambassador Holbrooke helped address this deficiency.

While difficult to precisely define and quantify, the limited attention paid to developing an overarching political strategy for RC-East and its provinces (in contrast to detailed military planning and strategizing) reduced the overall effectiveness of PRTs and the general COIN effort, at least until the last years of the decade. The time lost may be hard to recover.

As FM 3-24 notes, “PRTs were conceived as a means to extend the reach and enhance the legitimacy of the central government into the provinces of Afghanistan at a time when most assistance was limited to the nation's capital.” The teams have had some success in assisting the slowly forming central government reach the provinces, but they may encounter a problem: what if some Afghans do not want the central government to reach them,



Afghan workers dig trenches as part of a USAID public works project in the Nurgaram District, 23 January 2011. (U.S. Air Force, CMSgt Richard Simonsen)

because they are convinced that it is corrupt, inefficient, and dominated by members of a different ethnic group?

The COIN manual also notes, “The long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself. In the end, the host nation has to win on its own. Achieving this requires development of viable local leaders and institutions.” Due to a variety of factors, including years of war, massive casualties, and an ensuing exodus (plus the collapse of the education system under the Taliban), the base for a new civil service cadre is limited, and those who have the skills to run local government often prefer to live in Kabul or other large cities. Provincial reconstruction teams could do more to establish civil service academies at the provincial or regional level, but do the Afghans have the will to build a government capable of standing on its own, putting national interests ahead of personal, family, or tribal well-being? Will inherent divisions in Afghan society make any national cohesion or reconciliation impossible to achieve? And most unsettling of all, what if the international community, particularly the United States, wants this nation-building effort to succeed more than Afghans do?

Conclusions

Over the last eight years of their operations in RC-East, PRTs have been successful as joint civil-military hubs extending the reach of government, pushing out development funds and helping to stabilize many areas of Afghanistan. While they have had numerous flaws, with the lack of an adequate civilian presence being one of the most obvious, they have adapted, and the increased attention and resources given to Afghanistan under the Obama administration have only increased their utility. Clearly, PRTs contribute to stabilizing RC-East, and to what has been an overall successful COIN effort in RC-East. The fact that there was no large, internally based insurgency against the coalition and the Afghan government in RC-East, particularly between 2004 and 2008, underscores this success.

Provincial reconstruction teams also laid the foundation for the expansion of the civilian component begun under Ambassador Holbrooke in 2009. Not only was some of the necessary infrastructure already in place, but previous experience could be

brought to bear in terms of priorities, best practices, and Afghan acceptance of PRT methods. Similarly, the PRT presence helped the Afghan Independent Directorate for Local Governance, newly formed in late 2007, extend its operations to the provincial and district levels. Provincial reconstruction teams are also able to support the Afghan government’s sub-national governance policy.

Provincial reconstruction teams helped develop local leaders, an important initiative given the dearth of trained civil servants. This is mostly an ad hoc effort, but methods include funding the governor’s staff, providing transportation, training on basic administration, and giving advice as requested. One success story is the very capable Governor of Helmand Province, Gulab Mangal, who had worked closely with coalition forces previously in RC-East.

Provincial reconstruction teams help provide what the Taliban and other insurgent groups cannot offer—development projects, including major road projects, and a steady stream of improvement to infrastructure. This gives the coalition an “asymmetric” advantage, given the stark poverty of many areas. Small-scale projects carried out immediately after combat operations are also important COIN tools.

More important, the PRTs have helped with some stability and “breathing room” as local government establishes itself and begins to function. They were a relatively low cost presence in eastern Afghanistan until more resources were shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan.

The “ink spot” approach to counterinsurgency, in which security, governance, and development expand outward from a central location, pushing out the insurgents, has practical relevance in RC-East. In most cases, the center of any ink spot will be the provincial capital, usually the largest town and the economic and government hub. The teams locate in these capitals and offer money, political support, and to a limited extent, the security to fuel the expansion of the ink spot. Nangarhar Province is an example. It has gone from being mostly “red” in 2004 to being prosperous by Afghan standards in 2008, with a functioning government, greatly reduced narcotics trade, and an expanding economy. The PRT played a role in a COIN success that first took root in the capital city of Jalalabad, expanded

to surrounding districts and then to the neighboring provinces of Konar and Laghman.

The experiences in RC-East may have relevance for ongoing COIN efforts in Kandahar and precincts of Kandahar city. One of the reasons for PRT success in RC-East was a coherent chain of command, coupled with sufficient manpower and money. This is relevant to the precincts of Kandahar city, as well as the districts that surround the city. Perhaps more important are lessons learned in the control and auditing of development money, so that funds are efficiently and transparently spent, and the population sees this happening.

Recent developments have improved coalition efforts to support local governance. The deployment of district support teams has extended the PRT concept to the district level, an important step in building up local governance. The District Delivery Program, intended to build up local government in key districts, particularly after combat operations, is an important initiative to get the necessary resources to the district level. An RC-East senior civilian representative now coordinates civilian agencies, provides a comprehensive political strategy at the provincial/regional level, and manages critical civilian-military relationships. This is a step forward.

While the PRTs in eastern Afghanistan have made significant contributions, in the end success or failure depends on the Afghans. Will Afghans be able to stem corruption, develop credible leaders, heal rifts between ethnic and tribal groups, resist negative foreign influences, and put the good of the nation

above narrower interests—factors that outweigh any impact PRTs can make? This will obviously require a long-term effort by the Afghans, the coalition, and the international community.

PRTs in Other Places and Other Times

The basic concept of PRTs may be useful to other countries with insurgencies, where there is a need to extend the reach of the government and for civilian-military coordination. Indeed, the U.S. introduced the concept in Iraq after seeing how the PRTs had performed in Afghanistan. If PRTs reduce the need for the costly deployment of combat units, the teams make sense as a money-saving option. Partnered with police forces, PRTs are certainly cheaper than maneuver units and can stay in place for years. They may also have relevance for “nation-building” efforts that do not necessarily have an active insurgency to confront, or for post-conflict situations. Something similar to the PRT model could support elections in post-conflict countries.

Provincial reconstruction teams have provided practical (and hard-won) civilian and military officer expertise in how to conduct counterinsurgency. They are a valuable asset for the United States, and we should retain this expertise, whether through USAID, State, or parts of the military involved in future counterinsurgencies, such as Special Forces or the U.S. Marines Corps. As jihadists move to incite insurgencies in countries beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, we will need this experience. **MR**

NOTES

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5. David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla, Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).



The Road to Reconciliation

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

Captain Matthew Q. Rodano, New York Army National Guard

IRAQ HAS A COMPLEX BACKGROUND of ethnicities, religions, and tribes. In many cases, the differences between these groups have resulted in conflict, ranging from a reluctance to work together to open hostility and fighting. The process of reconciliation seeks to bridge these differences to ensure that groups can function alongside each other and underneath a legitimate, sovereign government.

After major conflicts, reconciliation can also refer to the process of incorporating fighting elements into a peace process. A thorough analysis of the “human terrain” is necessary to understand group interactions that facilitate successful reconciliation. Operations on this human terrain have become as critical as the tactical operations that characterized the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, if not more so.

In northern Iraq, Sunni Arabs are the key target population group for reconciliation programs. They make up most of the local population, but were not represented in the government following a boycott of the 2005 elections by many Sunnis across the country. Sunni Arabs also make up the majority of the insurgent population, fighting for groups based in Islamic extremism or nationalism. For the new Iraqi government to succeed, all ethnic, sectarian, and cultural groups must be able to participate in and support the central government. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) open the possibility for reconciliation to these insurgent fighters.

Reconciliation and Reintegration Models

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration refers to the process for collecting and disposing of weapons and ammunition, disbanding or transforming the opposing force, and assisting former combatants’ transition back into civil society. United Nations guidelines state that “disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants should take place in the earliest stages of the peace process.”¹ At the end of major combat operations in the first phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Republican Guard and much of the Iraqi military were disarmed and demobilized; however, reintegration proved to be more difficult. Rebuilding the Iraqi Security Forces continued at a slow rate, and many former military (and government) members were excluded

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PHOTO: Provincial Deputy Governor Haji Sattar, right, holds a rifle he received at a reintegration shura, or meeting, hosted by 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 7, Forward Operating Base Marjah, Afghanistan, 23 June 2010. (U.S. Marine Corps, CPL Justin D. Loyal)

from serving in the new government. This exclusion caused the new government to lose significant military expertise.

The UN concept for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration begins with a detailed disarmament plan, which includes measures for demonstrating transparency and accountability, a structured weapons management program that seeks to limit new weapons coming into the country, and security for former combatants. Demobilization is accomplished at secure cantonment sites that provide basic services while ex-combatants wait to be resettled. Reintegration programs assess the skills of ex-combatants, potential reconstruction plans, and funding available to create programs. Also required, and equally as challenging, are “significant changes in attitude on the part of the former combatants and the rest of the civilian population.”²

The enemy in the counterinsurgency environment, however, does not have a conventional, uniformed force that we can systematically disarm and demobilize. “Irregular armed groups and armed individuals” are targets for disarmament, but the widespread availability of weapons and ammunition in hidden caches or brought in from outside Iraq causes “incomplete disarmament.”³ Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration is not a one-time discrete process, but a continuous pipeline with individuals at various stages on the path towards reintegration.

Amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration, also referred to as “AR2,” is an alternate approach to the reintegration process. The key difference between the AR2 method and DDR is that “amnesty must be in place as a foundation before reconciliation or reintegration can take place.”⁴ It need not be unconditional, but is fundamental to the success of the other two phases. Analysis of the human terrain is again a key consideration, leading to “the discovery and understanding of the appropriate cultural narratives through which the aggrieved parties may frame their ability to reconcile.”⁵


The initial approach to DDR in Afghanistan had similar human terrain conditions as Iraq (in terms of disparate religious and ethnic groups). The program did address amnesty (though not a general amnesty), and the government’s Disarmament and Reintegration Commission ran it under the name “Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups.”

The program sought to influence fighters to disarm voluntarily, as opposed to offering monetary incentives for weapons turn-in. It offered incentives for communities, but not to the illegal armed groups themselves, in order to avoid the perception that the program directly aided criminal activity.⁶

Iraq

The 2006 Iraq study group report identified the absence of national reconciliation as “the fundamental cause of violence in Iraq.”⁷ During the 2007 increase in coalition troops (commonly known as the “surge”) and the subsequent reduction in violence, the strengthening of both the Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi government allowed a greater focus on reconciliation initiatives. The government, under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, established the Implementation and Follow-up Committee for National Reconciliation to pursue reconciliation at the national level, primarily through outreach to tribal leaders.

Coalition forces spoke with government and tribal leaders at the local level to pursue reconciliation.⁸



(U.S. Army, PFC Kaimana-Ipulani Kalaui)

Iraqi Interpreters, left, instruct former detainees on how to complete a reconciliation form at Forward Operating Base Warrior, At Tamim Province, Iraq, 12 April 2008.

Coalition forces recognized the potential security impact and began to develop contracts with tribal leaders...

However, no formal or informal disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program ensued. In Anbar Province, local Sunni leaders created the Awakening Movement, which consisted of Sunni males from the area standing up against insurgent groups to protect their local interests. Coalition forces recognized the potential security impact and began to develop contracts with tribal leaders to secure critical infrastructure, leading to the creation of the Sons of Iraq (SoI) program.

While not a DDR program by any previous definition, former fighters who joined the SoI program voluntarily disarmed themselves by getting rid of illegal weapons. The program provided employment opportunities for Iraqis who wanted to secure their local areas and provide information on weapons caches and insurgent activity. In the beginning, coalition forces called these groups “concerned local nationals” or “concerned local citizens,” and many groups named themselves after their neighborhoods (such as the “Ghaziliyah Guardians” and the “Baqubah Popular Committees” in Diyala Province). Some groups even kept the names of the insurgent groups they no longer supported. These groups were instrumental in reducing insurgent violence in their areas by providing information on weapons caches and becoming a visible presence protecting their neighborhoods by working with Iraqi Security Forces and coalition forces. At the end of 2008, in recognition of their contributions, the Iraqi government agreed to take control of and pay the Sons of Iraq, and promised to transition them to employment in the Iraq Security Forces or government ministries in a nonsecurity role. Thus, former fighters who had voluntarily disarmed (in that they no longer fought against the legitimate government) simultaneously demobilized and reintegrated into Iraqi society.

However, a true disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program for those still involved

in insurgent activity remained elusive. While responsible for the northern provinces of Iraq, Task Force Iron developed a program to receive insurgent fighters who wanted to stop fighting and become noncombatants.⁹ Fighters were required to provide their biometric data, as well as information related to insurgent activity or weapons caches, and then sign a pledge to cease attacks against the Iraqi government, Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi civilians, or coalition forces. In return, coalition forces ceased targeting these individuals as long as they did not return to insurgent activity. In some areas, the local government also agreed to honor the cessation of targeting. However, only the national government of Iraq can offer true amnesty, and this DDR program neither advertised nor promised amnesty to these fighters, only a cessation of targeting.¹⁰

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration framework, as conceived in the Multi-National Division-North area, was locally based. However, it had the potential to serve as an example for a nationally endorsed initiative and offered an alternative to low-level fighters who the insurgents were coercing or intimidating into supporting insurgent activity. The program was adapted from existing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs and initiatives that previous units had attempted. The increased stability and security in the area, coupled with a more capable Iraqi government and security force, set the conditions for a more successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program during Task Force Iron’s deployment.

This program was an integral part of the overall reconciliation effort, which included programs such as tribal engagement and the SoI. A “reconciliation cell” in each headquarters (down to at least the brigade level) helped coordinate processing of DDR petitioners and ensured that the program fit into the broader strategy for reconciliation as well as unit “effects” objectives. Although difficult to dedicate full-time resources to reconciliation (particularly at lower echelons, where available personnel are limited), the reconciliation cell works best with participation from the intelligence section and the (lethal and nonlethal) targeting section, as



(U.S. Army, LT Scott Marler)

Iraqi men gather outside of the Balad Joint Security Station to enter into a cease-fire agreement as part of the reconciliation process, 10 June 2008.

well as the information operations, engineering (or contract management), civil-military, and effects sections. Task Force Iron held reconciliation-specific coordination meetings every other week during its deployment, and the reconciliation cell participated in intelligence, effects, plans, and information operations working groups. When the DDR program began accepting petitioners, the scope of these meetings expanded to include tracking the program's progress; sharing best practices and tactics, techniques, and procedures for running screenings; and incorporating the local government and security forces into the screening and tracking process.

Also critical to building participation in this program was the coordinated use of information operations alongside traditional operations. Information operations influenced fighters to join the program and reduced their willingness to support the insurgency (or fear it). Conventional operations targeting insurgent fighters, followed by an increase of information about the DDR program, made it clear that if fighters did not give up their arms, Iraqi and coalition forces would continue to pursue them. This created the necessary motivation for fighters to seek reintegration.

The Process

The DDR process begins with a former fighter declaring his intent to enter the program. In some cases, fighters appear at unit-run screenings advertised in the community. Other fighters choose to send interlocutors to assess the situation before coming in themselves. Many were afraid that the screenings were a trap; treating all of the participants respectfully made those fighters more comfortable with the idea of coming forward. This allowed more mid-level fighters, or those who had committed attacks against coalition or Iraqi forces in the past, to join the program without fear of detention.

At the initial screening, we asked fighters to provide basic demographic information and then briefed them on the stages of the process and what we expected them to do to remain under the cessation of targeting agreement. Alternatively, a fighter could present himself to a joint security station or joint coordination center outside of a planned event. Following a screening, we allowed him to return to his home. If he chose to participate in the program, he went to a second event to sign the pledge to cease attacks, renounce affiliation

with any insurgent groups, and begin providing information about insurgent activity.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration participants provide details about their involvement in insurgent networks or previous activities and turn in or give the locations of weapons caches, completing the “disarmament” phase of the program. After the pledge is signed, the demobilization begins. Participants return to their daily lives during a monitoring phase. Because they have submitted their names and biometric information, coalition and Iraqi forces can determine if they return to insurgent activity. As a condition of the agreement, if this occurs, the cessation of targeting is no longer valid, and participants can be subject to detainment by coalition forces or arrest by Iraqi forces (as long as the respective conditions are met). However, in most cases, participants continue to provide information or turn in weapons and periodically check in with the joint security station or coordination center.

During this phase, coalition forces worked both internally and with the local government to develop job placement opportunities for the “reintegration” phase. The desired end state for reintegration was to have the participant enrolled in a government employment or training program. In addition to employment with the various government ministries, the Iraqi government also developed a vocational training program designed to teach various technical skills. Literacy programs allowed participants to meet the minimum requirements for many government jobs in the security sector. Reintegration was the most difficult aspect of the program to implement; many challenges remain.

Program and Reconciliation Challenges

Although the DDR contributed to a marked reduction in violence, it had a significant drawback—it was a coalition-led initiative. Local governments

Reintegration was the most difficult aspect of the program to implement; many challenges remain.

supported coalition efforts throughout our area of operations, but the lack of a nationally based initiative hindered the program from expanding as rapidly as it could have. Without national backing, the local Iraqi authority could only implement the cessation of targeting agreements with no guarantee that they would be honored across the rest of the country. While coalition databases facilitated the sharing of participant information among units, an agreement would not block a neighboring province from carrying out a valid arrest warrant, even if the participant had entered the program in his local area.

Although this situation never actually occurred, this conflict had the potential to affect the public’s perception of the program. The need to maintain the legitimacy of the Iraqi judicial process and rule of law remained the primary concern. For any reintegration program, “successful development depends on the ability of the host nation to reconcile with its past—determining whom to punish, whom to forgive, whom to exclude, and whom to accept within the new order of the state.”¹¹

One key consideration was how to deal with fighters who admitted to conducting attacks against Iraqis or coalition forces. The Iraqi National Amnesty Law excluded crimes of “terrorism” from the law; however, the law only applied to those who were in the Iraqi prison system at the time the law was published. The lack of a defined amnesty framework for non-incarcerated fighters (the pool of potential DDR participants) meant there was no clear distinction on what actions were too serious to allow a cessation of targeting.

Coalition units dealt with this issue on a case-by-case basis. They allowed fighters linked to attacks that occurred far in the past and who had not participated in any recent activity to enter into the program, but not fighters with recent Iraqi arrest warrants. A true amnesty program, administered by the national Iraqi government, would drastically increase the number of eligible fighters by clearly defining the guidelines and promising a full amnesty for previous actions.

The lack of employment opportunities affected reintegration of DDR participants and hindered other reconciliation programs. The opportunity to receive education, training, job placement, or employment by the government is a tangible sign

that reintegration is complete. However, the general high unemployment and underemployment rates across Iraq, coupled with the slow expansion of government agencies (including security forces), reduced the number of available avenues for reintegration. Developing gainful employment opportunities was one of the key measures of success for the reconciliation effort.¹²

A lack of national support to the program exacerbated the problem of limited employment programs. Iraqi-led employment programs developed slowly and targeted SoI members moving out of contracted security positions. Despite the government's commitment to transition, the SoI saturated the work force.¹³ DDR participants at the end of the demobilization phase did not have priority over SoI members, and this slowed the reintegration. As reintegration programs expand, more SoI and DDR participants will receive the skills they need to gain employment or utilize the various micro-grant and micro-loan programs to build their own businesses.

Potential for New Reintegration Efforts in Afghanistan

With the drawdown of coalition forces in Iraq following the transition to Operation New Dawn,

additional attention and resources now focus on Afghanistan. The Afghan government has had limited success reintegrating members of illegal armed groups and reconciling with certain Taliban fighters. The goal of the "Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups" program was to disarm and reintegrate 150,000 militiamen, but "these goals have not been met in part because armed groups in the south fear the continued Taliban combat activity and refuse to disarm voluntarily."¹⁴ In September 2007, Taliban leaders stated that they would reject offers from Afghan President Hamid Karzai to reconcile until "(1) all foreign troops leave Afghanistan; (2) a new 'Islamic' constitution is adopted; and (3) Islamic law is imposed."¹⁵

Changing tactics in Afghanistan might create the same opportunities for reconciliation that became available in Iraq. If the security situation improves and the local populace becomes more supportive of the central government, more fighters will be willing to participate in a DDR program. Because a government agency focused on reconciliation issues (the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission) already operates, a mechanism exists to obtain support from local security forces and the government and synchronize efforts. As long as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration



(U.S. Army, SSG Margaret Nelson)

Sixteen reconciliation petitioners returned for phase two processing during Operation Restore Peace VII, Forward Operating Base McHenry, Hawijah, Iraq, 1 June 2008.

are integrated into the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) reconciliation and information operations efforts, this program has the same possibility for success as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts in Iraq. "Sporadic . . . interim" efforts at the local level have already met with some success, but if the national government implements a more widespread program, ISAF and local leaders can leverage these early initiatives to increase participation.¹⁶

A Unique Solution

Because it creates a key mechanism to give current fighters a way to declare their intent to reconcile,

the DDR program remains a unique solution for a unique counterinsurgency. The government's support to the program, or to any reintegration program, demonstrates the intent to reconcile, and thus the two groups have the means to cease conflict and bring former fighters back into society. Although a national amnesty framework can be one way to begin this process, the coalition-initiated DDR program showed that the potential for reconciliation did exist and could significantly reduce violence from insurgent groups. As with all agreements, both parties must follow through on their promises and pledges to solidify the gains they have made. **MR**

NOTES

1. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations: *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines*, December 1999, 20.

2. *Ibid.*, 34-39.

3. *Ibid.*, 53-54.

4. Michael W. Mosser, "The 'Armed Reconciler': The Military Role in Amnesty, Reconciliation, and Reintegration Process," *Military Review* (November-December 2007).

5. *Ibid.*

6. Christian Dennys, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament?* 6 June 2005, <<http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament%20demobilization%20rearmament.pdf>>, 9.

7. James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton et al., *The Iraq Study Group Report* (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 30.

8. The use of the term "tribal leaders" is not meant to exclude other authority figures who are not part of the officially recognized government. For example, familial ties can frequently influence combatants or former combatants to adhere to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration or other agreements.

9. As Multi-National Division-North, Task Force Iron was responsible for Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah ad Din, and Diyala Provinces during its deployment from September

2007 to December 2008. Additionally, the division maintained relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government provinces of Dahuk, Irbil, and As Sulamaniyah, but did not conduct combat operations in the area. Neither the Sol nor the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program was active in the KRG.

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11. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 6 October 2008), 2-11.

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14. Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy* (Congressional Research Service, 30 April 2008), 14.

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GOING DUTCH

Counternarcotics Activities in the Afghan Province of Uruzgan

**Erik Donkersloot, Royal Netherlands Defense Force; Sebastiaan Rietjens, Ph.D.; and
Christ Klep, Ph.D.**

In fact, there has been only one society that has not engaged in the cultivation or development of intoxicants: the Eskimo.

— David MacDonald, *Drugs in Afghanistan*

This article is based on the master's degree research of Erik Donkersloot under supervision of both co-authors.

*A major European producer of synthetic drugs, including ecstasy, and cannabis cultivator; important gateway for cocaine, heroin, and hashish entering Europe; major source of US-bound ecstasy; large financial sector vulnerable to money laundering; significant consumer of ecstasy.*¹

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PHOTO: A U.S. Marine patrols through a poppy field in the Garmsir District, Afghanistan, 1 April 2010. (U.S. Navy, PO1 Mark O'Donald)

IN ITS RENOWNED FACTBOOK the CIA paints a grave picture of the Netherlands as almost a semi-narco state.² In fact, drugs are the first thing that comes to the minds of many Americans when they think of the Netherlands. In an ironic twist of history, both countries found themselves fighting drugs and criminal drug networks as contributors to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. This leads to an interesting question: how did the Dutch perceive the war against drugs in this Central Asian country? Could a specific “Dutch Approach” be discerned here?

Poppy production in Afghanistan creates an awkward dilemma. On one hand, it offers a stable income to Afghan farmers. Sociologist David MacDonald writes that it is “a cash crop with a hard currency value and easy to transport and sell [and] relatively drought resistant.”³ On the other hand, Afghanistan is responsible for 90 percent of worldwide poppy production and is the biggest exporter of this raw material for heroin and morphine.

The drug network is complex. Afghan farmers sell their poppy or opium through intermediates. Drugs are smuggled out of Afghanistan through bazaars, with the help of corrupt government officials and armed militia. Not until the year 2000 did the Taliban ban the growth of poppy, but the production has simply moved to areas that were outside Taliban control. Moreover, the resulting limited supply of poppy caused the farm-gate price to increase even further. More than ever, Afghanistan can be characterized as a mafia-like narco state, operated by domestic and international drug cartels.

The drug problem is one of the most important issues that the United States, UN, ISAF, Afghan government, and nongovernmental organizations have had to address to make their comprehensive approach succeed.⁴ In 2002, the United Kingdom was formally appointed as lead nation for the counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan. Yet, in 2007 opium production reached a high of 8,200 tons.⁵ In the last two years the total number of acres planted in poppy decreased. However, this was not the case in the unstable southern provinces, and it is precisely there that the insurgency is at its most severe. In fact, there is a surplus of opium in Afghanistan's south.

The negative effects are evident: social, economic, and political destruction, partly because the opposing militant forces gain up to 50 percent of their revenues from the drug trade.⁶ Corruption of government officials is endemic, and fueled by this drug trade. Politicians fear loss of popular support if they take strong measures against poppy production.

A very dedicated and robust counternarcotics strategy is needed to tackle this fundamental problem. In the past, many different strategies were developed to fight drugs in countries such as Colombia (cocaine) and Myanmar (opium). The number of international drug enforcement organizations, conventions, and treaties is steadily increasing, and many different methods have been investigated. For example, the think tank Senlis Council argues that Afghan drugs could be used for medical purposes.⁷

The Afghan Anti-Drug Policy

The official Afghan anti-drug policy is laid down in the 2006 National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS).⁸ Although the Ministry of Counter Narcotics is responsible for executing this strategy, the ministry depends on the Ministries of the Interior and Defense, as these run the Afghan Army; police, including the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan; and the Afghan Eradication Force, which is responsible for the destruction of poppy fields.



(U.S. Marine Corps, Sgt. Jesse Stence)

An Afghan National Security Force member eradicates poppy in northern Marjah, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 26 March 2011.

Afghan anti-drug policy has not yet led to satisfying results. The question arises as to where the bottlenecks are and what approach can lead to success. This article focuses on two important pillars of the NDCS—eradication and interdiction.⁹ Eradication includes the actual destruction of poppy fields, while interdiction focuses on eliminating drug traders and finding drug laboratories and the raw materials used in the production of heroin. Interdiction further includes anti-corruption activities and the establishment of special police units.

A comparison of both pillars is even more interesting if we take into account that since 2008, NATO has shifted its focus in Afghanistan from eradication to interdiction. The reasons for this become apparent when you look at the example of Uruzgan Province, where the Dutch had responsibility from the summer of 2006 to the summer of 2010.

Uruzgan Province remains a problematic province, despite a seven percent decrease in poppy production in 2009.¹⁰ The most important crop in Uruzgan is still poppy, which, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, overshadows all other crops in the province.¹¹ Almost two-thirds of the population earns part of its income from growing poppy. Dutch Task Force Uruzgan was not actively involved in the eradication of poppy fields, but the drug-related problems did have serious negative consequences for the Dutch mission.¹²

Eradication

“Why don’t you shoot us now? If you cut down my fields, we will all die anyway!”¹³

Most Afghan farmers do not want to depend on the central Afghan government for their means of existence. In their eyes, the government is corrupt and inefficient, while poppy provides a more or less stable revenue. Tradition and social status often strengthen this choice: poppy is not seen as

The most important crop in Uruzgan is still poppy, which... overshadows all other crops in the province.

something immoral. It is a hardy crop and easy to transport and store. Local tradesmen collect the poppy after the harvest, freeing the farmers from any further obligations.

Eradication is a so-called *drug-supply reduction tool* within the Afghan NDCS strategy and is effective because the threat of eradication stimulates farmers to choose legal crops. Aerial spraying with pesticides is the most cost efficient method for eradication. However, most ISAF countries refrain from using this method because of its negative propaganda effect and because it can decrease the fertility of the soil. Eradication on the spot is emphasized, either using bare hands and heavy tools, or simply through burning. As a rule, farmers do not receive any compensation (or in exceptional cases a small onetime payment) for their eradicated poppy: legal behavior is not rewarded. The NDCS also states that eradication should take place early in the season, before the poppy flowers, to enable farmers to plant other crops.

Most experts believe that eradication is inefficient and rather counterproductive.¹⁴ Farmers are simply too dependent on growing poppy. Only in a few cases do farmers allow their fields to be destroyed voluntarily. Almost all eradication is forced, an approach through which NDCS policy—urged on by ISAF—tries to give this instrument an “Afghan face.”¹⁵

It is therefore difficult to illustrate the “success” of the eradication approach in unambiguous numbers. The Afghan government and international community realize this. A sharp decrease in the number of acres planted in poppies, for example, may not be a true indicator of success. It is easy to relocate poppy to areas controlled by opposing militant forces. As expressed by leading Afghanistan experts Barnett Rubin and Jake Sherman, “Eradication promotes the geographical spread of cultivation.”¹⁶ Moreover, the amount of harvested poppy per acre may differ per season based on growing conditions. And then there is the problem that opium can easily be stored for long periods in time of overproduction. In seasons with a production shortage, the prices increase again. The crop is too dynamic to draw clear conclusions with regard to the “success” or “failure” of eradication.

The negative consequences of eradication are even more apparent. First, poppy prices increase



(U.S. Marine Corps CPL Aaron Rooks)

U.S. Marines assigned to Alpha Company, 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion, Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan, pour gasoline on bags of poppy seed before destroying them during Operation Butler at Salaam Bazaar, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 6 October 2009.

rather than decrease—scarcity leads to increased market value. This attracts new drug networks and creates conflicts between farmers, who can profit from eradicating the fields of rival farmers. Second, eradication further increases the debt burden of poppy farmers. They often contract considerable loans from drug lords that partly have to be paid off in poppy. Third, eradication strengthens opposing militant forces, not only financially, but also militarily and politically: they are the ones transporting and selling the drugs. As the U.S. special representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke observed, “Eradication might destroy some acreage, but it didn’t reduce the amount of money the Taliban got by one dollar.”¹⁷ Moreover, eradication stimulates farmers to join militant forces, simply because they do not have an alternative. Fourth, eradication fuels social unrest and tribal tensions. Farmers oppose the authorities and eradication teams, sometimes with deadly results. Some provincial governors profit from eradicating certain areas, while others, out of self-interest, do not do anything. The fields of strong local powerbrokers are often left alone. To “score,” local authorities eradicate poppy fields of smaller farmers, who can hardly defend themselves.

To what extent did these concerns apply to the “Dutch province” of Uruzgan? To begin with, the

Dutch government has never been very supportive of this short-term and unpopular instrument: eradication cannot, on its own and without alternatives, offer a long-term solution, and it clashes heavily with the hearts-and-minds approach and Afghan reconstruction.¹⁸ The Dutch government argues that ISAF troops are not tasked to destroy drugs. Therefore, Task Force Uruzgan did not want to dedicate scarce military resources to it. Taking this position, the Dutch contradicted American and British policies that were in favor of eradication.

Task Force Uruzgan could not avoid the problem entirely: eradication was an important pillar of the NDCS strategy, and the task force was ultimately there to support the Afghan government. The task force dealt very little with the eradication teams, which mainly consisted of Afghans and employees of the American firm DynCorp. In April 2007, the Dutch supported and protected an eradication team, but this was more or less it. The bulk of the eradication actions were assigned by provincial governor Asadullah Hamdam. Through its political advisors, Task Force Uruzgan consulted almost daily with the governor.

The Netherlands and Task Force Uruzgan conducted eradication as effectively and neutrally as possible to minimize damage to the small farmers. However, this did not always work out, and several incidents occurred. For example, while Chief of Police Juma Gul eradicated several poppy fields on a random basis, some eradication activities were not tribe-neutral. Task Force Uruzgan feared that the fields of the Popolzai tribe would not be touched because president Karzai was a member of this tribe. Indeed, only a fraction of the 2,000 acres of poppy fields intended for destruction was eradicated in the end.

The case of Uruzgan shows us that eradication is a drug-supply reduction tool that can cause far-reaching tribal and social problems, disturbing the fragile balance of power in the province. It is a means for power politics rather than to reduce the growth of poppy.

Interdiction

“It’s time to switch focus. We are looking too much at cultivation and not enough at the top of the drug networks.”¹⁹

From late 2008, the Afghan government and international community acknowledged that the

alternative strategy of a focus on interdiction could lead to faster results. This approach is not directly aimed at fighting the production of poppy itself, but focuses on paralyzing the trade in opium, heroin, and other drugs through localizing and destroying opium bazaars, warehouses, laboratories, and chemicals. Other means include the arrest of drug traders and enforcement of drug related corruption at all levels.

ISAF's role is mainly one of military support such as protection, intelligence, training, and logistics rather than combating drug-related corruption or proactively carrying out interdiction operations.

The trade networks at which interdiction is aimed are often complex and multilayered. Opium traders (often local warlords) loan money to farmers to make them financially dependent. So-called farm-gate traders (*kamishankars*)—often two to four per village—collect the poppy from the farmers. Usually they live in the same village and are well known to one another. The village traders sell their product at opium bazaars to local traders (area traders), who in turn sell it to provincial traders. These have close connections to international drug networks that process poppy extracts into

opiates (almost two thirds of the poppy is processed domestically into the much higher-valued heroin) and smuggle it to Pakistan, Iran, or the Central Asian republics (see figure). There are an estimated 1,000 traders active at the middle and higher levels of government and approximately 30 at Afghanistan's top level.²⁰ At all levels corrupt officials and militant forces facilitate the transport. The number of drug laboratories is estimated to be in the hundreds. They are often mobile, hard to pinpoint, and protected by hired insurgents. Processing is relatively simple, despite the need for an experienced "chef" to mix the so-called precursor chemicals.

Compared to eradication, interdiction is—at least on paper—less aggressive towards the Afghan population. It hardly touches Afghan farmers, and therefore creates less hostility among ordinary Afghans. The NDCS states that interdiction "will help to decrease pressure on poor farmers who may have no option but to grow poppy in order to feed their families."²² To support this, special police units and a counternarcotics tribunal are being set up, as well as several prisons.



Estimated heroin flows from Afghanistan²¹

Unfortunately, very little effort is put into fighting the often drug-related corruption in Afghanistan. Despite all promises made by the government of President Karzai and the NDCS policy, the speedy creation of an Afghan state framework is still more important than forceful control of corruption. At the time of this writing, the latter is still being postponed. In particular “functional corruption” at the lowest levels—such as bribing eradication teams to spare certain fields or underpaid local police to look the other way at their checkpoints—is endemic. Confiscated drugs still often make their way into the networks. At the highest level there is also a great deal of corruption. One of the most infamous corrupt politicians was Ahmed Wali Karzai (who was killed in July 2011), half brother of the president and head of the Kandahar Provincial Council.²³ Rubin and Sherman describe the complex corruption network as follows:

The small traders who come to the village have to pay the police (or bandits) whom they pass on the road, who pass a share up to their superiors. The police chief of the district may have to pay a large bribe to the Ministry of the Interior in Kabul to be appointed to a poppy production district; he may also have paid a member of parliament or another influential person to introduce him to the right official in Kabul. These officials may also have paid bribes (“political contributions”) to obtain a position where they can make such money.²⁴

Hardly any offender appearing before the counternarcotics tribunal is a truly important link in the drug chain. Many experts believe that one should not judge Afghan corruption by Western standards: it is “a way of life.” Despite this, eradication, more than interdiction, proves to be an instrument with potentially far reaching political and social consequences. It directly affects the gigantic financial flows and major political authorities. The Afghan government believes that at the moment the country is not safe enough to address the interconnected problems of drugs and corruption thoroughly.

Interdiction faces further bottlenecks, some of which also apply to eradication. First, the production of poppy itself is not reduced substantially. This is because the interception of drugs or the arrest of traders does not decrease the demand for poppy or

opium. Second, interdiction also facilitates power politics by powerbrokers: it is easily used to eliminate personal, tribal, or political enemies. Third, interdiction will most probably only strengthen opposing militant forces. The inconsequential and corrupt execution of interdiction produces a lot of propaganda that Taliban and other militant forces can use. A no-nonsense approach by the authorities would take away the incomes of many Afghans, thereby making them easy recruits for these forces. In addition, as the risk of poppy production and trade increases, it is easier for these forces to demand more money to protect smuggling routes and laboratories. A fourth bottleneck is that a repressive interdiction policy will evoke fundamental political resistance. Corrupt politicians are affected financially and could start aligning with opposing militant forces. Fifth, and closely connected to the previous bottlenecks, interdiction may have negative consequences for popular support of the counterinsurgency strategy. The local population will be less willing to share information with ISAF troops. A last bottleneck is the lack of military capacity to carry out interdiction operations fully. The sad truth is that in 2009 only one percent of the 1,300 tons of the precursor chemical anhydride acid was intercepted.²⁵

The interplay of bottlenecks—ranging from practical problems to fundamental resistance to engaging top officials—is also the case in Uruzgan Province. Little by little, Task Force Uruzgan increased its involvement in interdiction operations. However, the Netherlands has consistently emphasized that drug enforcement is primarily an Afghan responsibility and that interdiction can only succeed as part of a comprehensive drug strategy. From 2008 onward, cooperation between the task force and the other drugs enforcers such as the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration intensified. Also, starting in the summer of 2008, a Dutch civilian counternarcotics expert has been permanently deployed to the task force. A Dutch commander

...a repressive interdiction policy will evoke fundamental political resistance.



An OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter soars overhead near a poppy field during a mission, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, 24 April 2011.

remarked, “Interdiction is closely connected to intelligence activities. We did have good intelligence, but most information was not approached from a counter-narcotics perspective. Having this expert enabled us to do this.”²⁶ Although the Dutch government continued to support stronger interdiction, this hardly materialized in Uruzgan. Despite an intensified approach, the Afghan authorities and Task Force Uruzgan intercepted less than 1,000 kilos of opium in 2009. There were hardly any results from tracing and destroying opium bazaars (such as in the main population centers of Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawood), laboratories, and chemicals. Occasionally the task force discovered small amounts of poppy during combat operations, but this appeared to be mostly a matter of luck. A Dutch officer stated, “While searching for contraband, you also find poppy. We discovered a significant amount of kilograms, but this was only a fraction of the total amount.”²⁷ The policy is to destroy the found poppy on the spot. The population could otherwise start speculating that the poppy was to be resold again. Despite Dutch efforts, Uruzgan remained an important transit province to Helmand and Iran. The most important drug routes around Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawood and Shahidi Hassas were not touched. Laboratories were mostly located in areas that were outside the control of the task force,

i.e., outside the so-called “inkspots” or Afghan development zones. This makes them difficult to trace. As international affairs expert Fabrice Pothier writes,

The idea that some ISAF troops—mostly American, British, Canadian and Dutch—could engage only in “surgical interdiction strikes” against heroin labs and trafficking networks is more rhetorical than realistic. These facilities are embedded in a complex local environment, and any attacks will likely involve collateral damage.”²⁸

It is difficult to assess and predict the effectiveness of interdiction as a tool, as it is still only in the start-up phase. The Netherlands and Task Force Uruzgan have at least been aware of the bottlenecks. Arresting suspected key leaders, such as warlord Matiullah Khan, might well have created large-scale instability in the province. The political will to take these risks has been (and still is) lacking. This is understandable.

“The situation in Uruzgan is still not safe,” stated a Dutch officer in 2009, a year before the Dutch task force left. “To establish a safe environment we badly need the battle group [i.e., the infantry battalion within the task force]. This battle group has other priorities and cannot permit itself to actively deal with the drug problem.”²⁹

Eradication and Interdiction: A Comparison

The conclusion is obvious: eradication and interdiction are both drug-supply reduction tools with (potentially) major and unpredictable economic, political, social, tribal, and military consequences. Before 2008, the NDCS emphasized eradication. From 2008 onwards, the emphasis was mainly on interdiction. The Dutch government and Task Force Uruzgan also preferred the latter as the main drug enforcement instrument. At the same time, they were aware that interdiction launched too early would have negative results.

It makes sense to prefer interdiction to eradication, as the former touches upon the heart of the matter. To begin with, the interdiction instrument has a far smaller number of targets than eradication. Within the latter, all poppy farmers and fields are a target. Interdiction offers more possibilities for quick results through engaging traders and intermediaries, who benefit from instability.³⁰ Moreover, it is less advantageous to opposing militant forces as it ultimately alienates the population less. Interdiction is cheaper than the often-extensive eradication campaigns. This does require a well-functioning intelligence apparatus. Third, the traders and intermediaries collect over 75 percent of the drug revenues, while eradication mainly victimizes poor

farmers and forces up the prices. As a result, interdiction will lead to a quicker financial breakdown of the Afghan drug networks. Fourth, interdiction broadcasts a more positive signal than eradication: it opens the hunt for drug traders and corrupt politicians rather than for poor farmers. This again enhances the legitimacy of the Afghan government. In the long term the demand for poppy will decrease more quickly through interdiction than it would through eradication, simply because, ideally, drug trafficking becomes too risky in relation to the revenues.

In conclusion, interdiction suits winning the hearts and minds of the local population much better than eradication. However, Task Force Uruzgan could only play second fiddle and assist the “owner” of the problem—the Afghan government—with intelligence, materiel, and practical support. Alignment of intelligence capacity, combined with greater attention in pre-deployment training to the role and structures of drug networks, can support this. In any event, interdiction will only be effective in the long run if it is combined with other drug enforcement pillars, such as the creation of an effective judicial apparatus and credible economic development, including the development of alternative crops. In this process, patience is key. **MR**

NOTES

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2. CIA, “Field listing: illicit drugs,” *The World Factbook*, <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2086.html>>.

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4. See, for example, Stanley A. McChrystal, “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment,” HQ ISAF (Kabul, August 30, 2009); Craig C. Colluci, “Committing to Afghanistan: The Case for Increasing U.S. Reconstruction and Stabilization Aid,” *Military Review* (May-June 2007): 90-97; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Afghan National Development Strategy,” Afghanistan National Development Strategy Secretariat (Kabul, 2008).

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9. For a similar choice, see for example Barnett Rubin and Jake Sherman, *Counter-narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan: the False Promise of Crop Eradication* (New York: Center for International Cooperation, February 2008), 24-25.

10. UNDOC, “Afghanistan opium survey 2009,” 2.

11. Afghanistan Investment Support Agency, Regional Rural Economic Regeneration Strategies, “Provincial Profile for Uruzgan Province,” <<http://www.aisa.org.af/downloads/provincialprofiles/uruzgan.pdf>>.

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13. Statement from an Afghan farmer in Helmand Province, cited in Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009).

14. For example, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, *Opium, Uncovering the Politics of the Poppy* (New York: Harvard University Press, 2009), 165.

15. The most important governmental stakeholders and programs are the Afghan Eradication Force, Governor Led Eradication, Poppy Elimination Programme, and Central Eradication Planning Cell.

16. Rubin and Sherman, 27.

17. Rahim Faiez, “Afghan Minister Says Drug Strategy is Perfect,” Associated Press, 29 June 2009.

18. Although the Dutch Minister of Defense at first pleaded for an aggressive eradication approach, the Minister of Development Cooperation heavily resisted against this. This latter vision still dominates during the contacts with Afghan authorities.

19. Christina Oguz, head of UNODC in Kabul.

20. UNODC, “Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: the Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium” (Vienna, October 2009), 104-105, <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/afghanistan/Afghan_Opium_Trade_2009_web.pdf>.

21. UNODC, “Addiction, Crime and Insurgency,” 60.

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23. For example, James Risen, “Reports Link Karzai’s Brother to Afghanistan Heroin Trade,” *The New York Times*, 4 October 2008.

24. Rubin and Sherman, 22-23.

25. UNODC, “Addiction, Crime and Insurgency,” 69.

26. Interview with a Dutch officer, July 2009.

27. Interview with a Dutch officer, June 2009.

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29. Interview with a Dutch officer, June 2009.

30. This is in line with Amitai Etzioni, who states that one should go for an easy win in his article “Reconstruction: A Damaging Fantasy?” *Military Review* (November-December 2008), 111-117.



The 407th Brigade Support Battalion in Operation Unified Response Expeditionary Logistics

Lieutenant Colonel Matthew P. Shatzkin, U.S. Army

WEDNESDAY, 13 JANUARY 2010, turned out to be more than the usual exciting day in the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne Division. The brigade's cavalry reconnaissance squadron, the 1-73 Cavalry, was alerted to respond to the earthquake in Haiti. As the commander of the 407th Brigade Support Battalion, I immediately had my staff launch into planning and preparing the response for the rest of the brigade. The 1-73rd was ready to fly by noon. Four days later I was on the ground in Port-au-Prince, and 12 days later the 407th Brigade Support Battalion's troops had closed in Haiti. The battalion would grow to 335 paratroopers; it supported the brigade's arrival in Port-au-Prince, sustained the BCT throughout the humanitarian assistance mission, and facilitated the brigade's return to Fort Bragg where it would reassume the Global Response Force mission.

The deployment was exactly what the battalion needed to validate its preparations. For the previous 18 months, we had trained for the Global Response Force mission, which involved conducting six Joint forced-entry exercises (each one including a parachute assault to seize an airfield), a mission rehearsal exercise, two battalion field exercises, and many training sessions at company and below. While this training certainly provided a framework for us to flow into an airfield under both semi-permissive and permissive conditions, the exercises were not large enough to replicate the complexity of real-world operations. Ironically, we were preparing for a January Joint exercise when we were notified and subsequently deployed to Haiti.

I gave the rear detachment commander the overall responsibility to out load the battalion. We needed to quickly centralize efforts to out load not only the 407th, but also the BCT. We selected five key nodes to accomplish this:

- Our internal unit loading and control center, where we would inspect battalion vehicles and equipment prior to movement by sea or air.
- The soldier readiness program site.
- The passenger departure airfield at Pope Air Force Base (commonly known as the "green ramp").

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PHOTO: Key personnel of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team prepare to receive the first relief vessel during the Haiti earthquake emergency, 6 February 2010. (Photo courtesy of author)

- The heavy-drop rig site, where we would weigh and check loads on vehicles for airworthiness.

- The Pope Air Force Base arrival/departure airfield control group site, where the Air Force would conduct Joint inspections on equipment to ensure its air worthiness, and where the equipment's operators would wait, sometime for days depending on the priority of his equipment, for a flight.

The 407th established an ad hoc rear detachment center at the battalion headquarters to track and centralize information. Additionally, the battalion maintained a planner inside the brigade's cell, which was quickly filling each flight manifest during the initial hours. Running short on manpower, the 407th struggled with whether to man these nodes with deploying personnel or fill them with rear detachment personnel. In the end, the battalion had to do both. Further, it had a few tasks, mostly unit-level, which did not fit into these nodes, but still had to be done. The battalion conducted rules of engagement briefings. Soldiers were issued permethrin to treat uniforms against mosquitoes (rampant in Haiti), a six-hour process that is good for six months, and given the antibiotic doxycycline for protection against malaria. The battalion requested mosquito

nets, but there were none available (we would eventually receive them in Haiti). The unit also tracked the packing of containers and the status of storing personally owned vehicles. The 407th had to upgrade all Blue Force Tracker systems with Haiti maps, so it surged to upgrade and install Blue Force Tracker in its distribution company's vehicles prior to departure, and continued installation while deployed. It eventually had Blue Force Tracker installed in 21 out of 31 systems during the deployment.

Strategic Deployment

Fifty-two percent of the BCT's fleet deployed by air, beginning on 13 January and terminating on 25 January. The remainder of the BCT's deployed equipment arrived in Port-au-Prince on three vessels on 7, 8, and 14 February. Through the previous Joint force exercises, the BCT had developed a prioritized vehicle listing of how to flow its priorities in any airfield. However, because of the situation on the ground in Haiti and conflicting priorities and disconnects with the Air Force, what the BCT received in Haiti via air did not mirror the prioritized list. Some battalions received more equipment than others did, and some equipment



(Photo courtesy of author)

There is little substitute for daily face-to-face coordination among logistic operators to successfully sustain the force. We began this critical meeting on Day 2 and continued throughout the operation.

arrived completely out of order (for example, ancillary medical equipment before first-line responder items; containerized kitchens ahead of unit trucks). The 407th went heavy on trucks and distribution assets, which it required immediately; conversely, it did not need the ancillary medical equipment as quickly.

To overcome the shortfalls in organizational equipment until surface vessels arrived, the 407th detached teams to units it knew would need them. The largest mobility package went to 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment; 407th detached three HMMWVs, eight utility trucks, and two ambulances, all with crews, to assist the battalion in its mission near the epicenter of the earthquake. It also detached three HMMVs, three utility trucks, and one ambulance to the 1-73rd, along with a forward area refueling team.

The 407th ran “logpac” missions to battalion operating bases steadily for approximately two weeks until battalions received their forward support company capabilities through the airflow from Fort Bragg.

The 407th received three different ships at the main seaport in Port-au-Prince, at Port Varreux, and at Port Les Moins. Determining arrival times for ships transporting deploying equipment and sustainment cargo was initially difficult, largely because of the immature theater and difficulties working through host nation ports. Teams rehearsed the first ship’s reception with elements from all battalions (mainly teams from forward support companies). The maintenance company led the operation, receiving the three ships, battle tracking the download, and releasing all equipment from the port to final destination. The maintenance company’s previous experience downloading vessels and training as the BCT arrival/departure airfield control group during past exercises, plus the terrific teamwork across the BCT, enabled successful vessel reception.

Text messaging was the most efficient way to communicate during the first days in Haiti.

Operating in a non-secure environment, the 407th staff used Blackberries with international cell phone capabilities to communicate with Fort Bragg via email and text. Text messaging was the most efficient way to communicate during the first days in Haiti. The staff primarily used the Blackberry to gain visibility on inbound personnel and cargo. Still, this method was limited: if you did not have a Blackberry, you did not have the information.

The 407th had no problem gaining control of arriving personnel. Cargo generally went well. The Air Force’s contingency response group moved cargo from arriving C17s and C130s to an intermediate cargo yard on the west end of the landing pad. Then either the response group or the 407th moved the cargo to the rapidly growing cargo yard. The 831st Rapid Port Opening Element also ran a cargo yard, directly to the north of the center of the landing pad. At times the contingency response group unloaded BCT cargo in this yard when there was an overflow or extended aircraft operations at the west end of the ramp. On occasion, poorly marked or mismarked cargo wound up in the contingency response group yard. The 407th stationed one of its arrival/departure airfield control group operators there to expedite throughput.

The Operation

While the 407th Brigade Support Battalion made a direct contribution to the 2nd Brigade Combat Team’s humanitarian assistance mission, the majority of the battalion’s effort went into sustaining the brigade. In doing so, the 407th issued 42,157 cases of purified bottled water, 131,452 gallons of bulk water, 39,598 cases of MREs (meals, ready-to-eat), 43,091 gallons of fuel, and 1,064 rolls of concertina wire. It moved 1,462 soldiers, performed 28 biannual services, and treated 733 patients.

The BCT operational area consisted of 20 square kilometers divided into five sectors. The 407th Brigade Support Battalion established the BCT logistics hub, Logistics Support Area (LSA) Gold, at the Toussaint Airfield. Our supported units included 2nd BCT; Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 18th Airborne Corps; and, for a short period during the initial response, other elements from 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command and the United States Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

Twenty-two percent (52 of 234) of the total logistics missions performed were for non-BCT units.

The climate was the first “threat” we encountered in Haiti. With families experiencing snow days back at Fort Bragg, we deployed into an area with a daily average temperature of 94 degrees and a UV index peaking at 14. Mosquitoes came out at night, and the occasional heavy rainfalls became more intense toward the summer months. To protect troops from the environment, the 407th distributed medium-sized tents on Day 8 and mosquito nets on Day 10, all arriving from Fort Bragg. An Air Force engineer had a ditch dug to protect us from runoff from the steep hill to our left and also developed a drainage pattern for LSA Gold. Still, even a light rain would quickly turn the logistics support area into a mud pit. Further, the malaria threat loomed large, so it was vital that we take our doxycycline pill every day at the same time.

For distribution, Port-au-Prince’s road network was somewhat constraining because of the earthquake damage, narrow roads, frequent dead ends, and steep terrain. The reconnaissance cavalry squadron established a base on a golf course atop a steep hill, so we could not get heavy trucks or load-handling equipment in to support the squadron. The base had limited internal trafficability—other than the helicopter-landing zone, there were no areas to stage or download large amounts of supplies or equipment. Getting into Forward Operating Base Endurance was also difficult due to narrow approach routes.

Overall, we learned that when supporting an austere architecture, assessing trafficability on all supported unit bases is imperative, particularly for equipment not normally used to support the BCT, such as rough-terrain container handlers, flatbeds, lowboys, or load-handling systems.

Host nation traffic and driving habits also affected distribution. We quickly found that a five-kilometer trip took 90 minutes during the day and 10 minutes at night, so the 407th executed all of its logistic convoys at night to avoid traffic. The battalion command sergeant major worked several consecutive nights to escort and distribute over 200 latrines to battalion and company operating bases across the BCT. While doing so, he was able to initially assess trafficability and provide many alternate routes. His observations enabled deliveries and improved circulation throughout the city.

Managing the terrain to build the BCT’s logistics base was a challenge. During exercises, the 407th arrival/departure airfield control group had trained on receiving and quickly integrating BCT equipment and personnel into units; however, we were not practiced in managing personnel holding areas while unit forward operating bases were being built. In addition, Air Force airfield managers, working to accommodate the Haitian airfield authority, immediately placed limitations on our footprint. We were required to remain 500 meters from a control tower to our west and 500 meters from the fixed-wing runway to our south. A small wall 200 meters to our south prevented locals from entering the airfield, and just to our east, the landing strip and helicopter-landing zone operated 24 hours a day, making it extremely difficult to communicate in person, let alone over the radio or telephone. It was no surprise that units did not want to stay within the small, limiting space the 407th was originally assigned. For the first several days, we played a terrain shell game as we attempted to receive sustainment stocks and establish the brigade



(Photo courtesy of author)

While the majority of workload involved sustaining the BCT, we did perform some distribution of humanitarian assistance items.



On 17 January 2010 we began with a bare piece of land. In less than 60 days we built a robust logistics support area to sustain and redeploy the BCT.

support area, while working around other units in the BCT, foreign armies, and media representatives. Not surprisingly, we went through numerous iterations and arrangements of our footprint before our enduring one evolved.

We also had several functions to integrate that were not thoroughly addressed during the past 18 months of training: a bottled water and MRE yard, a Class I (food, health, and comfort items) point that contained eight 20-foot MILVANS on an average day, a fuel container, a unit container yard, an area for a local vendor, a morale and welfare tent, a workout area, the brigade logistics support team, a bulk water storage area, a medical supply yard containing approximately 80 triwalls (containers), and several unit administrative and logistic operations centers. On 17 January, we occupied an empty piece of ground; 60 days later, we had a combined permanent and transient population exceeding 800 personnel.

As could be expected, the BCT initially flew only a limited amount of sustainment in by air, so our distribution company delivered supplies through traditional unit-type “logpacs” as early as its second night on the ground, executing 234 logpacs in under 60 days. To establish living accommodations and operating bases for all brigade soldiers, the 407th delivered tents shipped from contingency stock at Fort Bragg and from Guantanamo Bay, cots from

the same two locations, and 3,900 mosquito nets from Fort Bragg. In addition to pushing supplies forward from LSA Gold, the distribution company pulled supplies from the 7th Sustainment Brigade and moved a large number of sea and air shipping containers for various missions.

To synchronize distribution, BCT logistics operators met daily at LSA Gold to discuss requirements for the current and next 24 hours. Most of the relationships we had developed over the previous 18 months were still intact and paid great dividends in coordinating support of all types, commodities, and services.

Our toughest time was during our first seven days on the ground, getting sustainment to catch up with requirements and establishing a concept of support. Bulk fuel was initially the greatest challenge. We went black on fuel within the first 96 hours of operations. While distribution was part of the problem, we mainly lacked a higher source of supply that could meet the requirement. We experienced about 24 to 48 hours of “rough living,” living from tanker to tanker and not breaking the black. Finally, the Defense Energy Support Center contracted source kicked in, and after two days of successful “reverse resupply,” complemented with the Defense Energy Support Center spotting a 6,000-gallon stationary fuel container in our LSA, we never had a fuel problem again. On 6 February, the number of support battalion fuel trucks increased from three to seven with the reception of the *Crimson Tide*; on 24 February, the Joint task force cancelled the bulk fuel contract when the 7th Sustainment Brigade assumed the delivery function.

Although we had invested a lot in our water purification battle drill during our Global Response Force training, we continued to learn through the school of hard knocks in Haiti. The best selection for a water source was a 50-foot deep manmade well located on the west end of the airfield’s parking ramp. However, the well’s pump was inoperable, and the 407th had no generator to provide power. (The Air Force eventually provided a generator for this site.) Around D+5, our water problems were more strategic than tactical: we could not fly in bottled water because it took up too much space in the aircraft. We aggressively sought other options, buying time by getting bulk nonpotable water delivery from a local fire department supplier for several

days. We mounted our Forward Area Water Point Supply System on a load handling system and drew 3,000 gallons from the USS *Comfort*; however, this was an all-night course of action with an unequal return, and the 3,000 gallons gained still fell short of our estimated daily requirement of 4,100 gallons. Finally, on 30 January, 407th negotiated a water delivery contract with *Sourveinger Eau* for 12,000 gallons per day. The contract was expanded when the BCT received decontamination Base-X showers shortly thereafter. With arrival of most unit water buffaloes on 6 February, units were able to receive bulk water through supply point distribution from LSA Gold, and *Sourveinger Eau* resupplied forward operating base showers throughout the brigade area of operations. Had it not been for the contracted solution, we would have been hard pressed to sustain the growing water demand throughout the brigade area. Moreover, at the time, no other unit in Haiti possessed an adequate water distribution capability (the 7th Sustainment Brigade received several 3,000-gallon mobile fabric tanks in March). With the help of Army Materiel Command, we increased water storage capacity from 6,000 to 30,000 gallons with new semifabric stationary collapsible tanks.

To counter immature lines of communication, the 407th implemented “just in case” logistics—building stocks to cover disruptions and other friction in strategic or tactical distribution. To do so, we established the “gold standard” (above green) in each commodity area and shared our status in the nightly battle updates.

By D+7 (24 January), mobility assets across the BCT were having maintenance issues because of their constant use and harsh conditions caused by smog and heat. The 407th conducted its first formal maintenance meeting on 26 January and manually requested and tracked repair parts until D+12 (29 January), when the supply technician arrived with automated supply management equipment. The next day we submitted our first automated requisition. We used DHL to receive goods, and the shipping

time took an average of five days. We locally purchased Class III (P) (packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants) with field ordering officer funds until our unit basic load arrived. When the *Crimson Ace* arrived on 6 February, the status of packaged stocks jumped from black to gold for the remainder of the deployment. The maintenance company completed 33 welding jobs and 47 recovery and container transport missions, and it gauged 370 weapons for the BCT and conducted 12 assistance visits to battalion forward operating bases. Internally, we performed 28 organizational services, eight percent of our total fleet (28/336) and 16 percent of our deployed fleet (28/175), including our 24 generators on the ground, which we serviced every 12 days or 300 hours.

For rations, we delivered and consumed MREs until 14 February, when we received “Jimmy Deans” commercially packaged breakfast meals,” heater meals, boxed milk, orange and apple juice, coffee, and some ice. We also received contracted 40-foot long refrigeration vans on 21 February, but could not put them at all unit locations. Working with the vendor, we were able to position a 20-foot van at Forward Operating Base Endurance, but we were unsuccessful in reaching a solution for Forward Operating Base Gray, where space was limited. We had our first day of hot breakfast in the BCT on 22 February. We had to be creative with field feeding plans because not all of the unit-containerized kitchens made it to Haiti.

For medical support, the BCT ordered and shipped over 100 triwalls of medical supplies. Support battalion medical operations primarily consisted of casualty care from a Level II facility (laboratory, x-ray, pharmacy, medical hold, and medical supply assets) at the airfield approximately 300 meters from LSA Gold. This medical clinic quickly became a Joint clinic, as providers from all services combined to treat all types of patients, including service members, locals, and other civilians. The medical company also collaborated with

To counter immature lines of communication, the 407th implemented “just in case” logistics...



(Photo courtesy of author)

With the assistance of contingency contracting and additional equipment, we quickly expanded our bulk water storage capacity to 12,000 gallons.

the University of Miami Hospital, providing over 3,900 hours of care for local national patients. Simultaneously, our physical therapy, behavioral health providers, and preventive medicine teams conducted regular rotations and assessments of all base camps throughout the BCT's area of operations.

While the majority of the effort contributed to sustaining the 2nd Brigade, the 407th performed some missions to directly support the humanitarian assistance mission and restore stability to Haiti. We dispatched one of our medical operations officers to work with the BCT S-9 and the U.S. Agency for International Development to gain approval to transport humanitarian assistance supplies whenever possible. We moved 135,080 pounds of rice, 3,960 humanitarian daily rations, 59,712 bottles of water, 300 survival kits, 200 single tents, and 8,000 shortwave radios. We also dispatched liaison-officer teams to two transfer locations to facilitate bulk distribution of rice and other goods during Operation Flood, Joint Task Force Haiti's initiative to issue larger quantities of food to families throughout Port-au-Prince. To overcome shortcomings in

this system, we established a quick reaction force designed to deliver contingency stocks of rice or escort "lost" host nation trucks. In two weeks, this team completed eight missions, securing 74 trucks and facilitating the delivery of 1,064 tons of rice. Finally, we collaborated with the 2nd Nepal Battalion to establish distribution point 12 in Petionville, located in south Port-au-Prince. This team of 12 soldiers from the battalion helped GOAL (a non-governmental charity organization from Ireland) feed 12,500 families in two weeks.

Major Expeditionary Lessons Learned

1. *Design, train, and maintain a method to out load the BCT and brigade support battalion simultaneously and validate and continually exercise this system well ahead of time.* Include all nodes supporting the BCT: trooper transport from unit areas, individual issue of ammunition, personnel manifesting procedures, and dedicated "push/pull" teams for moving containers and palletized equipment. Include support for both pure passengers with only "to accompany troops" baggage as well

as equipment with drivers. Critical to the readiness standard operating procedures is identifying the relationship with the arrival/departure airfield control group supporting the specific installation and understand the installation's external operating procedures. Immediately upon our redeployment, we constructed and validated a deployment tactical operations center designed to swiftly out load the BCT while maintaining situational awareness.

At the same time, develop a pithy playbook standard operating procedure for the minimum requirements: a battalion rear tactical operations center, a unit loading and control center, and a marshalling area for passengers. While the rear detachment must lead this effort, inevitably the brigade support battalion will have to commit deploying personnel to these activities. Specific manning will be the brigade support battalion's greatest challenge, as it will have to—

- Get Alpha Echelon (first responder) and command and control capability downrange into the fight.
- Synchronize the BCT out load through the rear tactical operations center.
- Out load the battalion itself.

The troop to task across these functions must be complete before the deployment.

2. *Preserve a culture of trained and ready movement leaders.* This is essential for simultaneously out loading the BCT and brigade support battalion rapidly. While it is critical to track and review the status of movement officers, the BCT must continually provide training in the form of movement exercises and hands-on scenarios, both announced and unannounced, to ensure units are movement-ready at a moment's notice. The BCT must conduct systematic leader training in unit movement procedures to maintain proper leader emphasis in these areas. All logistics officers and senior NCOs should gain and maintain proficiency on movement procedures to provide efficient deployment support. Units gain proficiency through inspections of movement plans, teams, and equipment during operational readiness surveys. Keep units in a rapid deployment frame of mind by regular inspections of unit basic loads of blocking, bracing, tie-down, protective wrap, and other materials required to rapidly prepare equipment for air or sea movement

3. *Maintain vigilance on capabilities and limitations.* Before beginning to expand capacity, units

All logistics officers and senior NCOs should gain and maintain proficiency on movement procedures...

must understand their current logistics combat power shortfalls. Over 60 military occupational specialties reside in the brigade support battalion, so this requires regular, in-depth review and discussion of current capabilities among leaders at all levels. Logistics units on the Global Response Force must know their specific shortfalls in terms of required capability and line and national stock number. It is very likely that the support battalion will receive rapid resourcing from other agencies in the event of a no-notice mission. At any time, commanders must be able to provide a wish list of items that contributing organizations can quickly procure. We were fortunate to receive collapsible water storage tanks from Army Materiel Command and general purpose tents from 18th Airborne Corps contingency stocks; however, we were not best postured to provide detailed lists on other specialized items. (After redeploying, I kept some of these wish lists in a folder by my phone.) We also transformed our command and staff into a readiness review group to hone in our limitations.

4. *Units performing expeditionary logistics will arrive in immature theaters and be required to rapidly build, provide for, and operate in the theater logistics architecture, even if for a short while.* To adequately prepare for this, units must train outside their assigned mission set and across the full spectrum of operations. To visualize these support requirements (and their magnitude), logistics leaders must draw from their own experience while simultaneously researching other deployments, then transfer this visualization into prioritized, extensive, creative, and well-resourced training. Examples of mission requirements may include:

- Arrival/departure airfield control group functions for personnel, equipment, and sustainment cargo.
- Vessel reception and download.
- Rotary wing aircraft refuel.
- Cargo break/trailer transfer.

- Theater medical services and supply support.
- Transient personnel life support.
- Distribution using austere methods, to include sling load, containerized delivery, and low-cost, low-altitude aerial resupply.
 - Water production from a non-natural source.
 - Temporary management of theater-level stocks for medical and other supplies.
 - Management of log base terrain requirements to include bottled water and ration pallet yards, field ration break points, central receiving points, ammunition supply points, and others.
 - Fabrication.
 - Container reception and distribution.
 - Environmental testing and identification of other hazards.
 - Higher-echelon maintenance on nonstandard weapons.

5. *Brigade support battalions must maintain a trained and ready contracting team that can immediately secure contracts upon arrival.* While all companies must maintain field ordering officer and pay agent teams to enhance organizational sustainment, the brigade support battalion contracting team focuses on expanding capacity to increase the BCT's operational reach. This capability implies a battle drill containing security, translators, and field ordering officer and pay agent teams with draft prioritized statements of work at the ready. The contracting team should pursue commodities that are continually required during expeditionary operations. Support and services that directly expand capacity are buses, container handling cranes, 40-foot trailers, lowboys and heavy equipment transport, land/warehouse space, refrigeration vans, power generation and electricity equipment, forklifts, fuel (both as a source of supply and for storage), and water (both transport and delivery). Further, the contracting team should target and secure vendors that can provide floodlights, gravel, and supplemental labor to facilitate and (indirectly) expand support operations.

The employment of this contingency contracting capability must begin with the support battalion's battle staff's military decision making process. The battalion S2 must provide leads for services through the logistics intelligence preparation of the battlefield. In a nonpermissive environment, the support battalion S3 may potentially coordinate with battle space owners for a key leader engagement

to initiate services. The battalion must validate the entire process, from planning to the team's proper employment to realistic home-station training and combat training center exercises.

6. *Maintaining in-transit visibility will be a challenge during expeditionary operations.* Initially, our primary means of strategic in-transit visibility was Blackberry communications with home station; we later gained access to the Single Mobility System and used it heavily to command and control redeployment. However, our deploying combat power battle tracking was largely manual. We were unsuccessful in utilizing data gathered from electronic communications systems such as radio frequency identification. A lack of movement control teams on the ground exasperated the situation. This area begs further research and experimentation. Units should be intimate with how to use in-transit-visibility services or other methods to digitally track and manage in-transit containers and equipment in austere environments.

7. *Water production and distribution proficiency must be a training priority for early-entry sustainers.* This battle drill is simultaneously critical and complex. It has a strategic impact in sustaining soldiers and freeing valuable air-cargo space, and requires specialists in water purification, preventive medicine, and power generation. Because water production teams often employ away from larger units, commanders must ensure this capability is built as a team and has the appropriate leadership, security, and communications to sustain operations and to cultivate synergy through challenging training exercises on tough terrain, specifically manmade, undeveloped deep wells.

8. *Formally build and maintain fieldcraft proficiency through individual and collective training.* Introduce training situations in which units have to develop field-expedient showers with corresponding gray-water management solutions. Regularly inspect field-sanitation kits and expedient-shower units.

Conclusion

Operation Unified Response validated the 407th Brigade Support Battalion's strengths while ruthlessly exposing its weaknesses. The sheer magnitude of the operation tested the battalion's readiness under conditions that could not be reproduced in training and underscored the need for visionary, creative, and disciplined leaders in expeditionary logistics. **MR**



Engaged Leadership

Linking the Professional Ethic and Battlefield Behaviors

Major Christopher H. Warner, U.S. Army,
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PHOTO: Soldiers and airmen fire their weapons together on the “stress fire” range at Camp Atterbury Joint Maneuver Training Center in central Indiana at dawn, 24 August 2010. (U.S. Army, John Crosby)

ETHICAL BEHAVIOR OF battlefield soldiers is paramount in counterinsurgency and stability operations, where the support of the local populace is vital to mission success. Despite their rarity, ethical lapses even in the lowest tactical echelons can detrimentally affect the strategic mission. A single incident can set back the success of an entire unit.¹ Indeed, it can even set back an entire coalition, as was evident at Abu Ghraib and Haditha.² Recently, similar events took place in Afghanistan when five members of an Army Stryker brigade allegedly murdered three Afghan civilians.³ These events resurrect memories of Vietnam when soldier misconduct was considered more prevalent, as seen in major events such as the My Lai Massacre, but also in frequent drug use, fragging of unit leaders, and poor treatment of noncombatants.⁴ Events in Iraq revived a debate over the ethics of our soldiers, and whether these events represented isolated incidents or an ethical culture problem that might indicate a failure of Army Values and post-Vietnam initiatives to counter the problems of the “hollow Army.”⁵

On the surface, the recent moral failures appear to be isolated incidents. However, the repetitive combat deployments and asymmetric operational environments our Army faces now provide ample opportunities for future behavioral and ethical lapses to occur, as soldiers must make split-second decisions that affect the safety of their units and the local populace. Preventing ethical lapses requires a change in unit culture in which soldiers hold each other accountable to high standards of conduct and performance. This culture change can only occur through direct leader involvement via *engaged leadership* that fosters proper behavior and discourages inappropriate actions. This article offers an overview of factors that produce soldier misconduct, reviews the ethical climate in Iraq, presents a course of action to address battlefield ethics, and discusses how engaged leadership improves ethical performance on the battlefield.

Misconduct in the Operational Environment

During deployments, soldiers face a myriad of physical and mental stressors, both environmental and psychological. Environmental stressors include harsh climates, difficult terrain, constant noise, and the continuous threat of physical harm. Psychological stressors include sleep deprivation, fatigue, and illness or injury. Mental stressors include dealing with organizational dynamics and information flow gaps, performing duties outside one's normal area of concentration, and being separated from friends, family, and support groups. Taken together, these factors are termed combat and operational stressors. Soldiers respond to them with adaptive or maladaptive reactions along a continuum of physical and psychological adaptation.⁶ Adaptive responses lead to increased cohesion, mission effectiveness, and heroic acts, but maladaptive responses take the form of either misconduct behaviors or combat operational stress reactions.

Combat operational stress reactions are defined as "expected, predictable, emotional, intellectual, physical, and/or behavioral reactions of soldiers who have

been exposed to stressful events in combat or military operations other than war" and include physical, emotional, cognitive and behavioral responses.⁷

In contrast, misconduct includes a myriad of behaviors that range from shirking or malingering, alcohol use in theater, or significant violations of the Laws of Land Warfare.⁸ Of key interest in stability operations are the soldiers' interactions with noncombatants. Current military doctrine and research is unclear about the factors that lead soldiers toward misconduct during such interactions. Some experts think that post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) leads to misconduct behaviors.⁹ However, recent research indicates that the presence or absence of PTSD is not an influential factor in soldier attitudes toward noncombatants. Rather, the volume of combat exposures a soldier experiences seems to be the most influential factor.¹⁰

Furthermore, low levels of training and *poor unit discipline* are key indicators for misconduct.¹¹ Leaders should be aware of the previous experiences of their soldiers and create a climate that not only demands they act appropriately, but also ensures they hold other unit members accountable for their conduct as well.



(U.S. Air Force, SSGT Jorge A. Rodriguez)

U.S. Army BG John Basilica (center, left), commanding general, 256th Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, inspects the U.S. Army quick reaction forces at the Abu Ghraib Prison, Baghdad Province, Iraq, and other surrounding check points during Operation Iraqi Freedom, 28 June 2005.

Ethical Climate in Iraq

In 2006, the commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq requested an assessment of the ethical culture of his force in the annual Mental Health Assessment Team (MHAT) Soldier Well-Being Survey of deployed U.S. soldiers in Iraq. This represented the first systematic assessment of battlefield ethics in a combat environment since World War II and addressed soldier misconduct behavior, attitude towards battlefield ethical issues, and battlefield ethical training for soldiers preparing for combat operations.

The findings showed that less than 50 percent of soldiers were willing to report a member of their unit for ethical violations.¹² In addition, nearly 10 percent of soldiers reported damaging a noncombatant's personal property or hitting and kicking noncombatants when it was not necessary.¹³ Soldiers with higher levels of combat exposure reported increased rates of noncombatant mistreatment.¹⁴ These findings were revalidated in the next iteration of the MHAT survey in 2007.¹⁵ The findings were disturbing because they suggested increased vulnerability to further ethical breaches.¹⁶

Battlefield Ethics Training Program

The MHAT findings prompted then-Major General Rick Lynch, the Multi-National Division-Center (MND-C) commander, to develop and implement a battlefield ethics training program for all soldiers under his command. The MND-C staff, with assistance from the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General Center and School, the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), and several civilian experts in ethics, built a comprehensive ethics training program.¹⁷ They based the program on the Laws of War, Army Values, and the West Point Honor Code.¹⁸ They chose a chain-teaching instructional model in which senior leaders taught their immediate subordinates using a compact disc that included video vignettes from popular movies to highlight lesson objectives. The subordinate leaders, in turn, taught their subordinates and soldiers to filter the training down through all levels of military personnel to the lowest echelon.

Training was in small groups in teams, squads, and platoons to promote discussion. To ensure that

they standardized training throughout the organization, unit leaders were provided with a script that accompanied the training program and included a set of key questions and discussion points.¹⁹ The training began in December 2007, and all units reported training complete by mid-January 2008.²⁰

A recent scientific review of the effectiveness of this training program noted significant reductions in soldier mistreatment of noncombatants and simultaneous improvement in soldiers' ethical attitudes. While the video clips and material provided a novel technique to assist leaders with framing the context of the discussion, retaining soldiers' attention, and focusing it on key training concepts, the greatest impact of the program came from the chain-teaching format. It "provided a method for leaders to engage their subordinates (*engaged leadership*) so that soldiers were hearing personally from their own leaders how they were expected to respond to ethically challenging situations and allowed for direct discussion of mission-relevant situations."²¹

Engaged Leadership

In his 2007 book, *Engaged Leadership*, Clint Swindall noted that "engaged leadership" develops employees committed to the organization and its outcomes, including the methods and means used to achieve them. He defines three key tenets for engaged leadership:


- Directional leadership (building a consensus for the vision),
- Motivational leadership (inspiring people to pursue the vision).
- Organizational leadership (developing the team to realize the vision).²²

These tenets are not new. They are already ingredients in our current military system in the form of leaders who have the staff and positional power to build a consensus, inspire their soldiers, and direct them toward their commander's intent and vision. However, engaged leaders need to focus on the key competencies of knowing their soldiers, effectively communicating, and being directly involved with their subordinates. These competencies closely mirror three of the key tenets of mission command—*understand* your soldier, *describe* the mission clearly, and *direct* soldier actions on the battlefield.²³

These principles are not just about how the commander imposes his will on the enemy and synchronizes his unit's efforts, but also how he controls his unit and sets the conditions for achieving the desired end state.

Engaged leaders know their soldiers. Effective leaders build mutual trust by determining the needs and motives of subordinates and understanding how events and life factors affect them. Leaders need not only know their soldiers prior exposures and combat experiences and how that might influence their behavior, but also understand key events or stressors occurring in their lives that might distract their attention or affect their decisions. While combat exposure can be a significant event, recent studies have shown that the most frequent source of combat operational stress reactions are events happening back on the home front.²⁴

Leaders must get to know their soldiers before a deployment. They must learn about their soldiers' families, their friends, key events in their lives, their motivations for joining the military, and their plans, goals, and aspirations, not only for their military career but also for life. Most soldiers will openly share this knowledge, but it can be difficult for some to do so, especially those who are struggling to cope. They are not comfortable openly sharing details about their life outside of work. Studies have shown that there are significant stigmas about asking for help in the military culture with the largest barriers being soldier's concerns that their leaders or supervisors might have less confidence in them or treat them differently if they are having problems.²⁵ This perception more than doubled in those who did have ongoing problems.²⁶ Leaders must work to counter this perception.



Engaged leadership's impact on ethical culture.

Leaders must understand soldier learning styles and effective motivational methods to help them overcome barriers or stigmas associated with seeking help. There is no “one-size-fits all” technique to do this with; leaders must adapt their approach for each soldier and take the time not only to get to know the soldier but those around him, his family, friends, and the key individuals who influence him. These interactions can be both informal and formal, but need to endure throughout the leader-subordinate relationship and be viewed as part of leading.

Making these interactions routine helps overcome the lack of trust a soldier might have with the leader including reservations about the leader’s motivation. If questions about family, friends, and life events are infrequent, soldiers view them as probing and they will be less trusting. However, if the questions are part of the command climate from the moment that the soldier enters the unit, they become part of the culture and yield a higher level of understanding. When leaders possess this level of knowledge two echelons deep on all of their personnel, then they will have a higher level of situational awareness and understand how to effectively motivate, employ, and lead the unit.

Building trust starts with how the leader welcomes a soldier into a unit. Lieutenant General Lynch frequently noted how as a brigade and division commander he met with all newcomers to welcome them into the unit and outline his expectations for the unit. During these sessions, he addressed the importance of seeking assistance and emphasized that he viewed asking for help as a sign of strength, not a sign of weakness. Furthermore, he noted that when serving as a direct level or small unit leader, he frequently called the spouse and parents of each new soldier joining his unit to thank them for the trust and privilege that they placed in him and the Army.

Such interactions have several positive effects. First, they immediately send a message to the soldier that they are important to the unit, a cherished member of the team, and vital to the mission. They provide the commander with a level of awareness, insight, and understanding about the soldier that he is unlikely to get from just an initial interview. Second, the interactions immediately send a message to families that we genuinely care about their soldier. Third, the interactions build a bridge for future communication and instill a culture and climate in which junior or subordinate leaders see the value that the

commander places on getting to know soldiers. The interactions also encourage all subordinates to do this as well.

As previously mentioned, combat exposures and life events contribute to a soldier’s level of stress, and this directly leads to poor behavioral performance. If the leader has a level of insight and understanding about what is affecting the soldier, then he can anticipate potential adverse issues and situations and intervene early to ward them off. The Battlefield Ethics Training throughout MND-C educated soldiers and their leaders about potential negative influences and provided them with information, useful techniques, and methods they could use for intervention. Using the chain-teaching program opened a dialogue between direct-level leaders and their subordinates about issues of stress and combat performance. Furthermore, it emphasized that establishing understanding and awareness was vital to set the conditions for success for the soldier and prevent the negative outcomes that lead to ethical misconduct on the battlefield (Vignette 1).

Vignette 1

After five months in Iraq, a battalion commander noticed his personal security detachment was no longer functioning at the expected level. There was no specific deficiency or issue, but rather, that he and his team could sense there was a problem. He requested the assistance of a combat operational support team. The team conducted a debriefing and learned that there was growing frustration because the team was being “loaned” to the deputy brigade commander who was not following the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for IED defeat established by the battalion commander. Because of this, the team felt the deputy commander did not value their lives and was not concerned about their safety. Upon learning this, the battalion commander met with the team and addressed their concerns by stating that he would ride in the lead vehicle for all missions in which the battalion supported the deputy brigade commander and would ensure the unit followed the TTP.

Engaged Leaders Are Effective Communicators

Effective communication spans the gap between the leader and subordinates. The leader must ensure that soldiers know they are valued members of the organization and understand unit standards, values, behaviors, and expectations. The leader should seek buy-in from his subordinates.

To be an effective, engaged communicator, leaders must be able to do three things:

- Show empathy and connect with soldiers.
- Articulate the vision, direction, and expectations (mission, intent, and end state) to subordinates.
- Modify their delivery style to effectively motivate soldiers.

Showing empathy and connecting with soldiers is vital. Empathy is not sympathy. Rather, it is about reflecting back to the soldier that you understand his experiences and care about his personal needs and achievement. Empathic leaders seem to be better able to effectively build and maintain relationships. Leaders need to hone their empathy skills through listening, perspective-taking, and compassion.²⁷ This is especially important in a diverse organization such as the military because subordinates come from many different backgrounds and life experiences. As Stephen Covey noted in *Seven Habits for Highly Effective People*, empathic listening allows the leader to appreciate and understand the impact that different life experiences have on how individuals respond to and act in situations.²⁸ Empathy shows the sincerity and authenticity vital in understanding and creating a connection with soldiers.

As previously mentioned, getting to know soldiers is about building trust and developing an understanding of the soldier's needs and motives. Leaders who have a strong level of awareness and understanding of their soldiers can then carefully select their tone, word choice, and message in linking the soldier's personal motives to the unit's mission and vision. Creating a new connection to the unit's mission, vision, and values is a powerful influencing tool in all stages of the deployment cycle because it strengthens the core of the unit. As Gene Klann notes in his book, *Crisis Leadership*, "During a crisis, the leader can leverage a credible vision and value system and use both as a rallying point and as a way to provide stability to employees who are rocked by events."²⁹ A clearly communicated vision and set

of values creates a unit standard that will provide a learned response for how soldiers should act in times of crisis. These clear, established standards of performance become part of the unit culture and lead to adaptive rather than maladaptive responses to stress. Furthermore, they provide soldiers with internal direction to hold each other accountable to maintain the mission.

Leaders must establish the soldier's commitment to the unit's mission and values through many different methods. In his book, *The 21 Irrefutable Laws of Leadership*, John Maxwell noted that individuals first "buy-in" to the leader and then into the vision.³⁰ Unit leaders must leverage their awareness and understanding of the soldier to transition their behavior from compliance to the positional power of the supervisor to commitment to the organization and to its outcomes. Through the enhanced level of understanding, leaders are able to use rational influence techniques such as rational persuasion and apprising as well as soft tactics such as inspiration, relationship building, and personal appeals to achieve this goal. A leader can implement these methods in day-to-day operations, programmed performance counseling sessions, casual daily contact, and mentoring relationships. By converting from a culture of compliance to a culture of caring and commitment, leaders are able to establish cultural norms in which soldiers will be more apt to hold each other accountable and uphold the standards even when the leader is not present. This is vital in battlefield situations where soldiers may encounter swiftly changing, challenging situations where they must make rapid decisions. A clearly communicated vision, which establishes the level of expected standards and acceptable behaviors, creates a culture of commitment to the unit's vision, its values, and other members leading the soldiers to exhibit appropriate behavior.

Effective communication was a key component of MND-C Battlefield Ethics Training. Starting at the top with senior leaders, the first line supervisor met with their direct subordinates and subordinate leaders to discuss the issue of battlefield ethics. Rather than sending out a chaplain, lawyer, or senior leader to rotate between units delivering the message, the individual who knew the soldiers best and had a good understanding and awareness of each soldier's current levels of stress and life events was account-

able and delivered the training. This proved a much more effective approach and made the subordinates more receptive to the training. The leader tailored the dialogue to battlefield situations the unit had encountered, thereby enhancing the relevance of the discussion while referring back to the bedrock Army Values, timeless principles of the West Point Honor Code, and the Marne Standard book. Soldiers participated in the training with a group of their peers to create an environment where they felt more comfortable sharing their experiences and developing a collective situational understanding. As a result, the soldiers were able to grasp the importance of this issue allowing the leader to use his personal influence, rather than positional power, to enable the soldiers' commitment to a culture of battlefield ethics rather than mere compliance with a set of rules (Vignette 2).

Engaged Leaders Are Personally Involved. In the "Commander's Role" in *Mission Command*, FM

Vignette 2

A battalion was six weeks into its third deployment to Iraq. While more than half of the soldiers in the unit had previous experience in Iraq or Afghanistan, less than a quarter of them were with this battalion during prior deployments. During the train-up to deployment, the company commanders and first sergeants emphasized how the tactics, techniques, and procedures were significantly altered from prior deployments in accordance with the new counterinsurgency doctrine. All units rehearsed them during their exercises and leaders placed specific emphasis on how to interact with the locals to focus on establishing security. However, once in theater, one of the squads began to be confrontational and derogatory towards noncombatants. A sister squad leader pulled the senior NCO from the renegade squad aside and asked why they were acting in that manner and was told "that is how we did it in my old unit and we all got through safely." The sister squad leader replied, "That is not how we do it in this unit and you need to change or we are going to fail to accomplish what we are all here for."

3-0 notes that the commander directs all aspects of the operation by preparing, positioning, ordering, and adjusting personnel.³¹ In *engaged leadership*, the leader directs through his personal presence and involvement. Put simply, leadership is a contact sport. Good leaders are *engaged leaders*. They personally set and enforce standards, perform checks and inspections, share in hardships, and remove barriers to create the best possible conditions for the unit and soldiers to succeed.

While leaders publish their standards, orders, intent, and other expectations, they must first set and enforce them through their own actions and example. An *engaged leader* recognizes that he is always on a platform with soldiers watching him, so he leads the way for others through his example. An *engaged leader* must set the tone for the desired values and principles for the unit. A leader's actions are more influential than developing trust and communicating the values, goals, and vision. If a leader communicates the desired values in his vision, spoken word, and unspoken communication but then violates those same values through his own behavior or conduct, he creates a hypocritical ethical climate that will quickly erode morale and unit mission effectiveness. By modeling expected behaviors, the appropriate standards will trickle down through the ranks of subordinate leaders who will likewise mimic or emulate the leader's actions.

An example of this occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom when a division commander wanted to increase the emphasis his subordinate commanders put on addressing soldiers' mental health concerns. Rather than instructing his commanders to place emphasis on this area, the commander modeled this behavior, mentioned how he was focusing on this area for his staff, and had his staff behavioral health provider travel with him to several engagements with his brigade commanders. The subordinate commanders quickly noticed his emphasis and followed suit, acting in kind without any prompting or verbal instruction from the division commander.³²

Leaders must follow-up to ensure they set the proper tone through their direct involvement in performance checks, inspections, and counseling. A leader's personal participation and involvement in and emphasis on events, actions, activities, and items have significant impact. In 2007, a newspaper

story about poor living conditions for recovering Wounded Warriors at Walter Reed Army Medical Center received worldwide attention and resulted in the resignation of the secretary of the Army and dismissal of two general officers. During the congressional testimony surrounding this event the surgeon general of the Army testified that he did not inspect barracks.³³ While it was by no means the surgeon general's responsibility to inspect barracks, the remark highlighted that soldier living conditions were not a priority in that organization. Priority dilemmas constantly challenge leaders. The *engaged leader* must determine the key areas that support the organization's mission and values and emphasize them through performance checks and inspections. He must regularly examine the ethical culture and climate of the unit and anything that impedes this climate.

Engaged leaders remove all obstacles and barriers by creating the best possible conditions for success. As leaders communicate with their subordinates and motivate them toward the commander's vision and unit end state, they learn of impediments and roadblocks that hinder soldier effectiveness and unit performance. This feedback from subordinates is vital. It allows the leader to engage at various levels to make changes or determine effective workarounds in line with the values of the organization. This level of personal involvement aids direct leadership and allows the leader to establish and encourage ethical practices that help prevent unsound practices not in line or keeping with Army Values.

Conducting performance checks and inspections, as well as sensing sessions with the staff, also aid in recognizing key obstacles. In battlefield ethics, direct leader involvement is key. Ethical issues must be an important part of mission analysis and the evaluation of results. Leaders must identify potential situations units might encounter on the battlefield and build realistic scenarios into all training to challenge subordinate leaders and soldiers, prompt the right response, and reward the right behaviors. The professional performance of the soldier should be a daily concern in garrison, training, and deployment, not just in quarterly or annual training classes.

The MND-C Battlefield Ethics Training involves leaders directly with their soldiers. Chain teaching and scenarios infused with current unit experiences allow leaders, soldiers, and subordinates to

discuss how to cope with the same or similar ethical challenges on the battlefield as well as identify and address obstacles, including key equipment, translators, or items to overcome a barrier (Vignette 3).

Vignette 3

During a site visit to a remote patrol base in southern Iraq by the brigade commander and his staff, a member of the team became aware of a significant morale problem. A sergeant said that "he was so hot and tired, he didn't care" to enforce standards anymore. Thus, the patrol base had no ice, cooling systems, or reliable power. The following day, the brigade commander personally led a convoy carrying two new generators to the site. On follow up evaluation three weeks later, unit morale was significantly improved, standards were clearly being enforced, and commanders at all levels were now routinely assessing and addressing living conditions at patrol bases.

The Way Ahead

Leaders must demonstrate competence, courage, candor, and commitment, point the unit in the right direction, and maintain the laws of war, even in the toughest of times. To do this they must keep their troops informed—of the objectives of the operation, the mission, actions to take, and the commander's intent. They must conduct after action reviews to reduce uncertainty by candidly addressing the actions that occurred and defuse resentment and tension before soldiers come into contact with noncombatants. In doing so, leaders show that they understand challenges and the stress of combat but maintain a focus on the mission and end state to keep soldiers on the objectives and remind them of the true enemy.

Leaders must be aware of their soldier's levels of stress and fatigue. Fatigue can interfere with sound and effective decision making. The 2007 MHAT report noted that soldiers averaged only 5.6 hours of sleep per day, which is significantly less than what is needed to maintain optimal performance (7-8 hours per night).³⁴ Furthermore, the MHAT reported a decrease in work performance due to the accumulation of stress associated with higher cumulative

months of deployment.³⁵ Commanders must attempt to ensure that all soldiers get enough rest and monitor units for signs of elevated stress. If possible, they must establish predictable work and rest cycles. In 2007-08, Lieutenant General Lynch noted early in MND-C's deployment that some of his officers were nodding off during the day. In response, he established a division standard daily routine of 15 hours of work, 2 hours of physical training/personal time, and 7 hours of rest. He modeled this behavior himself and set the clear expectation that the staff would also. He soon noted significant improvements in officer performance and attitudes. This underscores the effectiveness of leading by example and becoming personally involved.

Lastly, the commander must make ethics a top priority throughout the deployment cycle. He cannot tolerate violations. Inappropriate soldier actions should be frequently discussed throughout

units. Ethics should not require a special class. It should become a habitual part of the unit's routine, incorporated throughout all actions of the unit and in all discussions. Leaders must directly participate in this process, signaling the priority of the issue and modeling the expected behavior. Otherwise, interventions are likely to be less effective.

The ethical performance of our soldiers on the battlefield is of great concern to all leaders. It not only affects our profession of arms, but individual lapses can have significant tactical, operational, and strategic level impact. Leaders must set the conditions that promote and uphold the ethical performance of soldiers at all levels. As evidenced by the MND-C Battlefield Ethics Training Program, appropriate ethical performance is not achieved through a specific training program, but instead through integrated ethical training and most importantly *engaged leadership*. **MR**

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Transformational Leadership

William DePuy's Vision for the Army

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey S. Wilson, Ed.D.

DURING THE MID-1980s, the entire American defense establishment was reconstructing its sense of professional identity after Vietnam. The all-volunteer force and a decade of budget shortfalls, equipment shortages, and maintenance problems ensued. Debilitating racial and substance abuse problems eviscerated all four services from within. New Abrams main battle tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and Apache attack helicopters rolled off assembly lines and steadily replaced the Vietnam-era M60-series tanks, M113-series armored personnel carriers, and Cobras. This was a result of an intellectual renaissance at the highest levels of Army leadership as well as an infusion of money into defense industry coffers by an administration elected on a strong national security platform. The renaissance generated a paradigm shift in the way the Army thought about how to fight and win a war against the Soviet Union in central Europe.

In 1974, in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, a U.S. Army general stood on a windswept hill in Israel and surveyed a vast expanse of wrecked Syrian tanks and armored personnel carriers littering the desert. The Israeli Defense Force had used American equipment—including American-made antitank guided missiles—to defeat a much larger Syrian armored and mechanized infantry force that had relied on Soviet-made hardware and Soviet-style tactics. The Israelis had demonstrated how effective army and air force coordination could disrupt follow-on forces with fighter-bombers and helicopters while tanks and missile-equipped mechanized infantry stopped the first wave of armor. The American general hoped he could use the lessons of the Yom Kippur War to devise a set of core doctrinal concepts to reframe the way the Army used its equipment and define requirements for its next generation hardware. Thus began the process that resulted in one of the most significant re-imaginings of Army doctrine in the 20th century: the 1976 and 1982 editions of FM 100-5, *Operations*.¹

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PHOTOS: Left: U.S. Marines with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, assigned to the amphibious dock landing ship USS *Carter Hall* (LSD 50), drive an M1A1 Abrams main battle tank on a beach during training, 26 October 2010, Djibouti. (U.S. Navy, PO3 Kristin L. Grover)
Right: William E. DePuy (U.S. Army)

By the time I pinned on my gold second lieutenant bars in May 1985, the new doctrine had a name—AirLand Battle—and four imperatives to guide thinking at the operational and tactical levels of planning: agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization. Although the Fulda Gap face-off between Soviet and NATO forces never took place, AirLand Battle doctrinal imperatives provided the blueprint for Army tactical successes in the 1991 Gulf War and the “shock and awe” campaign of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The ideological impact of the 1982 AirLand Battle imperatives on my generation of Army officers is so pronounced that it is easy to underestimate the revolutionary nature of the doctrine that preceded it—the 1976 Active Defense doctrine. Even though AirLand Battle quickly superseded Active Defense doctrine, we should not forget that the primary author of the 1976 doctrine, General William DePuy, was a transformational leader in the doctrinal development process.

DePuy identified a wicked problem, designed a conversation to address that problem, initiated a process that gave the Army an opportunity to exemplify the attributes of a learning organization, and affected the organization in lasting positive ways. DePuy articulated a clear, appealing vision; explained how the vision could be attained; remained confident and optimistic; expressed confidence in subordinates; used dramatic, symbolic actions to focus his organization on core values, and (always) led by example.² In doing so, he infused the Army with moral purpose during an institutional evolution that culminated in the Department of the Army’s publication of the new manual.³

This article uses a framework offered by conversational theorist Paul Pangaro to argue that General DePuy saw doctrine development as a wicked problem and then designed a conversation within the Army that continues today. It also leverages Peter Senge’s and C. West Churchman’s theories of the “learning organization” to show that the doctrinal



(U.S. Army, PFC Khorri D. Johnson)

SSG Thomas Leyva, 3rd Advise and Assist Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, looks out the top hatch of a Bradley after his crew has completed its run on the gunnery range. The Iron Brigade is in a training period that began early September and will last until early December 2011.

development process General DePuy started and led changed the Army. He revealed it as a learning organization by giving the institution an opportunity to exemplify its qualities. Finally, the article examines how General DePuy revealed the intrinsic moral content of doctrine. (The 1976 edition of FM 100-5 inspired Army leaders to conceptualize a morally purposed doctrine for the future.)

Wicked Problem, Continuing Conversation

Organizational theorists Michael Harmon and Richard Mayer define wicked problems as “problems with no solutions, only temporary and imperfect resolutions [such as] the location of a freeway or the confrontation with crime.”⁴ Although wicked problems are difficult to define, organizational theorist Nancy Eggert notes that “they are not hopeless, nor are they impossible to define.”⁵ However, they do require mental agility on the part of leaders, managers, and policy makers, for, as Harmon and Mayer note, “because of their uniqueness, wicked problems are not amenable to standardized routines for analysis and evaluation.”⁶ In order to “tame these wicked problems, to define and frame the issues,” leaders, managers, and policy makers must acknowledge that “various theoretical approaches frame the same situations in different ways, ask differing questions about them, and suggest different solutions or preferred modes of action for contending with them.”^{7, 8}

In contrast to wicked problems, tame problems are discrete, “malleable” problems that “could be attacked with common sense and ingenuity, [easily] defined and separated from other problems and from their environment [such as paving roads or connecting sewers].”⁹ Although a tame problem may be “difficult, time consuming, or complex,” it usually has a “primarily technical” solution—no matter how large in scale.¹⁰ A good example of a tame (although complex) problem was the problem of how to land a man on the moon and return him to earth. Although NASA proved itself quite adept at tackling the tame problem of accomplishing President Kennedy’s stated goal, it was (and, for that matter, still is) less adept at solving the wicked problem of identifying the moral purpose of the U.S. human spaceflight program.

DePuy started a conversation within the Army...integrating discussions of tactics, training, procurement, and other subjects.

When General DePuy became the first commander of the newly created U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) on 1 July 1973, he realized that developing tactics, techniques, and procedures to attack enemy capabilities was a tame problem. Not so designing doctrine to describe how the Army fights, trains and educates its soldiers, chooses weapon systems, and relates to its sister services and national defense policy.¹¹ Wisely, DePuy started a conversation within the Army that enabled leaders with competing interests and agendas to see the logic in integrating discussions of tactics, training, procurement, and other subjects.

Pangaro notes that attacking a tame problem is merely a matter of designing an iterative and evaluative conversation to agree on goals and means. Designing a conversation to attack a wicked problem is much more complex. Pangaro posits the necessity of a “conversation to design the designing” or “create a new language” to enable the organization to begin a conversation it had never had before.¹² DePuy’s design was remarkable for the way it used old terms in new ways. It enabled leaders to create a new language to describe new phenomena that the Army had never dealt with in an analytical way before.

One can argue that the entire philosophical base for DePuy’s then-new term “Active Defense” was the World War II-era concept of “overwatch,” which DePuy had learned from one of his mentors, General Hamilton Howze. General Howze “recognized that suppressive fire was the best way to neutralize enemy fires so that decisive maneuvers could take place.”¹³ Howze coined the term “overwatch” to describe tank-only maneuvers as well as larger combined arms formations in which tanks advanced “under the ‘overwatching’ direct fire of other tanks, which were [ideally in] stationary positions.”¹⁴

DePuy’s Active Defense doctrine emphasized the



(U.S. Army, SPC James B. Smith)

U.S. Army SSG Thomas McKean, 63rd Armor Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, holds a security position from behind an M2 .50 caliber machine gun while at the hatch of an M113 Armored Personnel Carrier at Forward Operating Base Scunion, Khalis Province, Iraq, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 11 September 2004.

requirement to “ensure the delivery of suppressive fire against an enemy so that the element engaged by that enemy could maneuver.”¹⁵ DePuy envisioned a European war in which the enemy outnumbered NATO forces by at least three to one. He saw tactical agility as essential for U.S. operations that emphasized defending as far forward as possible in a densely populated area and with no opportunity to trade space for time.¹⁶

The operational level concept of “forward defense” was congruent with and inspired by a West German doctrinal manual roughly equivalent to FM 100-5, in which the German Army emphasized “thorough preparation of terrain, flexibility to allow rapid shifting of the main point of effort, organization in width and depth, a willingness to take risk in some sectors in order to concentrate in others, and if possible, the deployment of mobile forces in an aggressive delaying action forward of the defensive area to buy time and determine the attacker’s main effort.”¹⁷

The German notion of panzergrenadier also

guided DePuy’s thinking about the relationship of infantry to armor. The term denoted infantry soldiers who rode into battle alongside tanks in armored vehicles from which they could also fight. DePuy borrowed from the Germans the implicit assumption that armor and infantry must be trained, educated, and employed together, along with artillery, air defense weapons, and even aircraft. (This last notion broadened the conversation to include the U.S. Air Force.) In fact, the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 was the first official Army document to include the term that the Army later selected to describe the doctrine that replaced Active Defense—“AirLand Battle,” at the time hyphenated as “Air-Land Battle.”¹⁸

The October 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and the combined forces of Egypt and Syria crystallized DePuy’s notion that the U.S. Army was at a critical point in terms of its ability to reframe its core assumptions about war in general and war against the Soviets in Europe in particular. While

aiming to fight and win the first battle of the next war was not a new idea in military history, it was not the way the United States waged war in the early 1970s. Despite the demonstrated cost of unpreparedness during the early stages of the Korean War, the U.S. Army still clung to a force generation model which assumed the United States would have time to engage in a World War II-style industrial and manpower mobilization—an event that increasing Soviet capabilities and the deplorable state of U.S. forces in Europe made increasingly remote.

After talking to U.S. Army analysts and seeing the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War with his own eyes, DePuy spoke with Israeli officers about their experience during the fighting, examined captured Soviet-made tanks and other armored vehicles, and concluded that, in a European War, “U.S. forces would have to concentrate against the enemy’s main force and defeat it quickly.”¹⁹

DePuy assumed that “involved governments would attempt to bring any such clash [in Europe] under control before it ignited into a world or nuclear war and that the rapid consumption rates of battle would disallow prolonged fighting,” DePuy realized that “the equipping and training bases of the Army would have to posture themselves along with the combat developers to assume, contrary to decades of previous thinking based on historical precedent that no longer applied, that the Army would have to win the first engagements of such a war so that the settlement would be favorable to U.S. interests.”²⁰

The new assumptions made it necessary to envision a new vehicle for the infantry that could provide “equivalent mobility [with tanks] and armored protection so that they could move with and fight alongside the tanks using automatic small arms fire to suppress enemy antitank-capable infantry such as that encountered by the Israelis.”²¹

DePuy also realized that Army leaders at all levels had to renounce linear thinking about even basic formations of tanks and infantry, “abandon

all thought of arranging their vehicles in geometric patterns . . . and, instead, have them flow across the ground in the configuration that would best exploit the available cover and concealment of terrain.”²² DePuy believed the Yom Kippur War demonstrated that, to “maintain rapid movement, armored units would have to be prepared to suppress the enemy, that is, to return heavy fire immediately to destroy him at best and at least to disrupt his fire. Ideally, [with] . . . tank and mechanized infantry . . . overwatching . . . from stationary covered and concealed positions . . .”²³

The preceding discussion shows General DePuy beginning a new conversation about a new reality in warfare, using the empirical evidence of the Yom Kippur War to validate theoretical concepts he had been developing throughout his career. He also used old terms such as “panzergrenadier” in new ways and invented new language such as “AirLand Battle” to describe a new reality of the operating environment.

In short, DePuy initiated a paradigm shift in U.S. Army thinking about the relationship between procurement, training, education, and force employment. He recognized the wicked nature of the doctrinal development problem. The conversation he started continues today as Army leaders struggle to define the Army’s role in ever-more nonlinear and multifaceted conflict environments.

The Army as a Learning Organization

Drawing upon studies that began as early as 1973 (the year DePuy assumed command of TRADOC), organizational theory researcher Graham Leicester described “the constant tension between the pressing need to learn and the obstacles to learning,” at both the individual and the organizational levels.²⁴

Learning organization theory became widely popular in 1990 with the advent of MIT Professor Peter Senge’s highly influential work entitled *The Fifth Discipline*. Senge posits five “disciplines”

. . . DePuy initiated a paradigm shift in U.S. Army thinking about the relationship between procurement, training, education, and force employment.

that distinguish the learning organization. I explain them in some detail here, as they are critical to understanding the framework. The essence of the first discipline, personal mastery, is “learning to expand our personal capacity to create the results we most desire.”²⁵

The second discipline, mental models, involves “reflecting upon, continually clarifying, and improving our internal pictures of the world, and seeing how they shape our actions and decisions.”²⁶

The third discipline is shared vision, which builds “a sense of commitment in a group, by developing shared images of the future [the group wishes to] create, and the principles and practices by which we hope to get there.”²⁷

Team learning, the fourth discipline, centers on “transforming conversational and collective thinking skills, so that groups of people can reliably develop intelligence and ability greater than the sum of individual members’ talents.”²⁸

Finally, Senge’s model presents systems thinking as the fifth discipline—which grounds the other four. Systems thinking, for Senge, is “a way of thinking about, and a language for describing and understanding, the forces and interrelationships that shape the behavior of systems [in order to] change systems more effectively, and to act more in tune with the larger processes of the natural and economic world.”²⁹ Senge emphasizes that the “essence” of systems thinking “lies in a shift of mind,” which entails “seeing interrelationships rather than cause-effect chains [and] processes of change rather than snapshots.”³⁰

Learning organizations come to fruition when the people in them are, in Senge’s words, “committed to the practice of these disciplines for themselves—expanding their own capacity to hold and seek a vision, to reflect and inquire, to build collective capabilities, and to understand systems.”³¹

Clearly, William DePuy was a practitioner of Senge’s five disciplines. Although he might not have described his own outlook or vision in exactly these terms, and although he did not

single-handedly transform the Army into a learning organization, DePuy’s work on FM 100-5 allows us to appreciate how the right leader can bring out an organization’s innate ability to function as a learning organization. DePuy demonstrated how a leader could mentor through practice so that people in the organization can become better systems thinkers.

In his vigorous efforts at outreach and collaboration, DePuy set in a motion a process that revealed the Army as a capable practitioner of the first discipline, personal mastery. In the often strained dialogue between the infantry and armor communities within the Army, in the DePuy-initiated conversations between the Army and the Air Force Tactical Air Command, and in the international dialogue between U.S. and German doctrine developers, Army leaders exemplified the process of “learning to expand our personal capacity to create the results we most desire.”³²

If the second discipline, mental models, involves “reflecting upon, continually clarifying, and improving our internal pictures of the world, and seeing how they shape our actions and decisions,” the DePuy-led process of using empirical data from events such



(U.S. Marine Corps, SGT Jeffrey D. Anderson)

A U.S. Marine Corps AH-1W Super Cobra helicopter assigned to Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, lands at Camp Bastion in Helmand, Afghanistan, 15 May 2010.

as the Yom Kippur War challenged assumptions about procurement, training, and doctrine—thereby revealing the Army as a learning organization in this way as well.³³


DePuy's idea that doctrine would be the hub of the wheel from which the spokes of procurement and training (among others) would extend was instrumental in leading the Army to the third discipline, the shared vision, understood as "shared images of the future and the principles and practices by which we hope to get there."³⁴

The FM 100-5 development process was also an example of team learning, the fourth discipline. Inter-service, international, and intra-service dialogues "transform[ed] conversational and collective thinking skills" through an evaluative and iterative process that evokes the essence of modern conversation theory such as that offered by Pangaro.³⁵

By approving FM 100-5, the Army embraced the fifth discipline by presenting a new "way of thinking about, and a [new] language for describing and understanding, the forces and interrelationships that shape the behavior of systems [in order to] change systems more effectively, and to act more in tune with the larger processes of the natural and economic world."³⁶ The manual "began a doctrinal reorientation rivaled in the U.S. Army's peacetime history only by the adoption of the pentomic division in 1956."³⁷ In its holistic view of war and the Army's role in it, the manual was truly a "shift of mind," which entailed "seeing interrelationships rather than cause-effect chains [and] seeing processes of change rather than snapshots."³⁸

General DePuy and Doctrine's Moral Content

Building "a sense of commitment in a group, by developing shared images of the future [the group wishes to] create, and the principles and practices by which we hope to get there" suggests a critical point about systems thinking and the learning organization.³⁹ Systems analyst C. West Churchman brings this point forward succinctly. He notes that the learning organization is morally driven. Like DePuy, Churchman was partial to systems analysis, co-authoring the "first international textbook in the field" in 1957.⁴⁰ His primary interest was to "apply philosophy [particularly ethics] through operations research, to industrial and governmental issues."⁴¹



FM-100-5, September 1968

Churchman's fundamental works on learning organizations and systems thinking are the *Design of Inquiring Systems* and *The Systems Approach and Its Enemies*.⁴² They argue that efficiency and effectiveness in organizations are inextricably bound up with the organizational ethic, and that "ethical alertness comes from thinking systemically."⁴³ He sets forth seven central concepts (that overlap and actually expand upon the basic ideas in Senge's five disciplines): "system teleology, sweep-in, unfolding, boundary setting, securing, wisdom, and hope."⁴⁴ Churchman defines wisdom as "thought combined with a concern for ethics."⁴⁵ He further defines *hope* as "the spiritual belief in an ethical future."⁴⁶ Churchman gives the learning organization and systems thinking a more refined values base. In recent years, educational leaders, managers, and policy makers have emphasized it as a commitment to "shared mission, vision, and values" or a professional learning community, under which an organization gathers its "collective inquiry, collaborative teams, action orientation and experimentation, continuous improvement, and results orientation."⁴⁷

Twenty years before the publication of the Army Values, the Warrior Ethos, and the Soldier's Creed, DePuy's doctrinal development process revealed the Army's moral commitment to institutional evolution. DePuy was concerned about efficiency and effectiveness, but he had the moral belief that the Army as an institution had an obligation to

the Nation to respond to new challenges after the Vietnam War, which required reframing the Army's intellectual foundation. DePuy sought "the best available thought" as he went about changing the way the Army thought about fundamental doctrine.⁴⁸ He saw doctrine as "a most important product of an army's attempt to foresee and prepare for the future [and] a living body of ideas and not a writ of permanent, inviolable laws."⁴⁹

Finally, DePuy saw how doctrine affects what theorists Lee Bolman and Terrence Deal call the four frames of the institution: the political, structural, human resources, and the symbolic.

As to the political (the conflict over power in the organization), DePuy directed TRADOC to synchronize ideas across branches and functional areas. In terms of the structural (the rules, roles, goals, and policies that govern the relationship with the environment), DePuy's FM 100-5 articulated a

way of understanding the relationships under the rubric of the Active Defense. In terms of the human resources (how the organization defines roles and missions), DePuy's FM 100-5 erased any doubt that the Army would be characterized by people from an organizational culture that valued initiative and autonomy in order to succeed in a decentralized conflict environment. Finally, as to symbolism (how culture develops and is shared), DePuy insisted that the Army publish FM 100-5 in a camouflage binder instead of a manila one, a clear example of form enhancing substance in an effort to focus the Army's attention on the first battle of the next war.⁵⁰

The evolving Army I came into in 1985 and the still evolving Army I will leave after 27 years of service in 2012 owe much to William DePuy, an intellectually brilliant, morally centered leader, mentor, and thinker who reminded us that doctrine is not an end state, but a journey. **MR**

NOTES

1. The general is Don Starry, one of DePuy's closest colleagues in the doctrine development process. The vignette is well told in James Kitfield's *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 151-55.

2. Gary Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 6th Edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, Prentice-Hall, 2006), 274.

3. Then-MAJ Paul Herbert's superb Leavenworth Paper on this subject is a foundational source and primary inspiration for this essay. 1 July 1976 was the date the Department of the Army approved the publication, though it was not distributed until later in the year. Paul H. Herbert, *Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 93 and 95.

4. Michael M. Harmon and Richard T. Mayer, *Organization Theory for Public Administration* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1986), 9. Quoted in Nancy J. Eggert, *Contemplative Leadership for Entrepreneurial Organizations* (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1998), 86.

5. Eggert, 86.

6. Harmon and Mayer, 11. Quoted in Eggert, 86.

7. Eggert, 86.

8. Harmon and Mayer, 12. Quoted in Eggert, 86.

9. Harmon and Mayer, 9. Quoted in Eggert, 86.

10. *Ibid.*

11. Herbert, 23.

12. Paul Pangaro, *Rethinking Design Thinking*, Presentation at Picnic 2010, Amsterdam, Holland, 1 September 2010, Slide 38, <www.pangaro.com>, 2 July 2011.

13. Herbert, 17.

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*, 18.

16. *Ibid.*, 64-65.

17. *Ibid.*, 65.

18. *Ibid.*, 68.

19. *Ibid.*, 31.

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*, 33.

22. *Ibid.*, 34.

23. *Ibid.*

24. Graham Leicester, "Meeting Don Michael: A Learning Journey in Five Scenes," Transcript of presentation at Global Business Network, San Francisco, 29 May 2009, <http://www.internationalfuturesforum.com/projects.php?go=dl&id=30&file_ref=pmmhicosrf> (4 July 2011).

25. Peter Senge, *The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook* (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 6.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*, 7.

30. *Ibid.*, 73.

31. *Ibid.*, 7.

32. *Ibid.*, 6.

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.*, 7.

37. Herbert, 95.

38. Senge, 73.

39. *Ibid.*, 6.

40. Robert L. Flood, *Rethinking The Fifth Discipline: Learning Within the Unknown* (London: Routledge, 1999), 62.

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.*, 63.

43. *Ibid.*, 92.

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid.*, 65.

46. *Ibid.*

47. Richard DuFour and Robert Eaker, *Professional Learning Communities at Work* (Bloomington, IN: National Educational Service, 1998), 25-29.

48. Herbert, 107.

49. *Ibid.*

50. Lee Bolman and Terrence Deal, *Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003), 16.



Aligning Means and Ends

Toward a New Way of War

Colonel Charles A. Pfaff, U.S. Army

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

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PHOTO: U.S. Army officers meet with a construction contractor at the site of Forward Operating Base Qara Bagh in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, 29 October 2009. (U.S. Air Force, MSGt Sarah R. Webb)

THE UNITED STATES has failed to align its strategy with its war aims in Iraq and Afghanistan. This has led to “strategic surprise,” manifested by unexpected and costly counterinsurgency campaigns. The source of the mismatch between U.S. strategy and political aims is a misunderstanding of the nature of the aims. Briefly stated, the misalignment arises when the United States employs a strategy aimed at imposing its will, when it would be better off employing a strategy aimed at gaining acceptance for its interests.

To correct this situation, rather than simply preventing our adversaries from realizing their aims, U.S. strategists must better align means with ends and employ all instruments of national power to coerce (or entice) our adversaries into accepting U.S. interests.

A close examination of the U.S. “way of war” reveals the source of the mismatch. The U.S. way of war emphasizes the imposition of our national will on the enemy, and it typically relies on strategies of annihilation and attrition intended to eliminate the enemy’s capability to resist. However, in many conflicts the United States only seeks the enemy’s compliance with U.S. will. Achieving compliance requires a different kind of engagement than simply eliminating the enemy’s capability to resist. In fact, pure strategies of attrition and annihilation often undermine such aims, requiring an approach that uses multiple agency efforts and individual agency capabilities to wield the full range of national power.

The U.S. “Way of War”

Clausewitz famously characterized war as the continuation of politics by other means.¹ However, as the historian Victor Davis Hanson notes, Westerners, in practice, see war as a way of doing something politics cannot.² Thus, war does not so much continue politics as replace it. When war replaces politics, military objectives become political objectives so that defeating the enemy militarily becomes synonymous with achieving one’s political aims. As a result, argues Hanson, the Western way of war favors “head-to-head” battles aimed at annihilating or at least attriting enemy forces until they no longer have the capability to resist.³

But the lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan is that military goals are not always synonymous with political ones. United States forces entered Iraq and Afghanistan expecting to fight—and win—using an attrition-based strategy that focused on capturing or killing Taliban fighters and Iraqi conventional forces. When that strategy failed to deliver the intended political goals, U.S. forces again employed a strategy of attrition aimed at capturing or killing insurgents. Unfortunately, the continued application of this strategy did not produce the desired results.

In response to this failure, the U.S. military revised its counterinsurgency doctrine to emphasize protecting the population rather than eliminating insurgents. The doctrinal revision, expressed in the Army and Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, argued that attrition alone would not defeat insurgencies. In addition to using lethal force against insurgent forces, the U.S. military would also be required to see to the physical and security needs of the populations where it operated. As a result, U.S. forces would have to emphasize protecting and caring for the population over combating insurgents.⁴

In a parallel effort, the U.S. government emphasized interagency cooperation and coordination. For example, the Joint staff and combatant commands created a number of interagency task forces comprised of representatives from various departments, including the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice, to coordinate nonmilitary means to achieve military objectives. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the major commands have also created provincial reconstruction teams that bring together a range of civilian and military expertise to realize political and economic development on the ground.

Despite the welcome change in emphasis and increased inclusiveness of the elements of national power, the United States still has not achieved its strategic goals. Efforts aimed at political and economic development simply represent recognition that destruction of the enemy in counterinsurgencies requires synchronized political and military efforts. What we do not recognize is that *the destruction of the enemy is not always the best way to realize U.S. goals.*

“Wars of Acceptance” and “Wars of Compliance”

The gap between military and political objectives accounts for a surprisingly large number of cases where weaker states defeat stronger ones. In fact, according to a survey of armed conflict from 1800 to 1998, significantly weaker adversaries defeated stronger ones approximately 30 percent of the time.⁵ In particular, the report examined “asymmetric conflicts,” where the force ratio between strong and weak actors was greater than five to one. In such conflicts, it found not only a surprising number of weaker-side victories, but also that the frequency of those victories has increased over time. In fact, from 1950 to 1998, weaker actors in asymmetric conflicts won the majority—55 out of 90—of the conflicts surveyed.⁶

The reason for this result, as political scientist Patricia Sullivan notes, is the failure to match strategies with aims. According to Sullivan, war aims fall into two broad categories: targets of acceptance and targets of compliance.⁷ Targets of acceptance are associated with political objectives that one can achieve by brute force, such as the seizure of territory.⁸ Targets of compliance, on the other hand, aim at compelling the enemy to change a policy that runs counter to one’s interests. A war of acceptance only requires that an enemy accept a certain state of affairs, but wars of compliance require the enemy to actively realize and maintain a certain state of affairs. In a sense, a war of compliance requires the enemy to abandon his interests and adopt one’s own.⁹

Brute force alone can rarely obtain and maintain such support. In fact, Sullivan argues, strategies that succeed against targets of acceptance, like annihilation and attrition, actually work against one’s aims when fighting targets of compliance.¹⁰

In a sense, a war of compliance requires the enemy to abandon his interests and adopt one’s own.

The reason for such a counterintuitive result is that militaries are adept at discerning how much force is required to defeat another military force, even given environmental complications such as terrain, weapons capabilities, and leadership.¹¹ However, it is much more difficult to discern how much coercive force is required to compel people to change their minds. As Sullivan notes, “the amount of coercive leverage an actor can derive from fixed amount of destructive capability is contingent on the target’s willingness to absorb the costs imposed.”¹² This fact places the target more in control of the outcome of the conflict, since he gets to decide how much tolerance for suffering he has. Additionally, he does not need to directly confront his adversary’s military force in order to determine that tolerance, allowing him to employ indirect strategies designed to increase the cost of the conflict, rather than decisively defeat adversary forces. As Sullivan notes, “It is difficult to predict costs or plan military strategies with any type of precision when success is dependent on reaching an inherently unknowable enemy breaking point.”¹³

Operations in Afghanistan illustrate this point. When killing one insurgent motivates many others who were otherwise not in the fight to take his place, killing that insurgent increases the enemy’s combat power. In Afghanistan, according to the International Security Assistance Force Commander’s Guidance, “The intricate familial, clan, and tribal connections of Afghan society turn ‘attrition math’ on its head. From a conventional standpoint, the killing of two insurgents in a group of ten leaves eight remaining...from the insurgent standpoint, those two killed were likely related to many others who want vengeance.”¹⁴ To the extent this “math” is accurate, strategies of attrition actually empower, rather than undermine, the enemy’s capability to resist.

Realigning U.S. Strategy: Clausewitz Meets Sun Tzu

Sun Tzu argued that the best general achieves his goals without resorting to force. In fact, Sun Tzu admonished military leaders not to put “a premium



(U.S. Air Force, TSgt. Joe Laws)

James Morris, U.S. Department of State representative to Provincial Reconstruction Team Kapisa, visits with children in Surobi District, Afghanistan, 21 August 2010.

on killing” and noted that “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”¹⁵ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, two colonels in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, argue the United States does not realize that, after its 1991 victory over Iraq, many would-be adversaries abandoned the idea that they can impose their will on the United States. However, the Chinese colonels claim prudent adversaries can find ways to compel the United States to accept their interests by shaping and constraining the choices U.S. policy makers have.¹⁶

Employing the language of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, they argue that war is not best characterized as “using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will,” but instead as “using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.”¹⁷ This characterization is very similar to Sullivan’s concept of “wars of compliance,” where the aim is not to destroy the enemy’s military capability but to compel him to change a policy.

This broader view of war suggests that there is not one kind of warfare, but many. In addition to conventional Qiao and Wang also list the following kinds of warfare:

- Atomic
- Diplomatic
- Financial
- Network
- Trade
- Biological and chemical
- Intelligence
- Resources
- Ecological
- Psychological
- Economic
- Space
- Tactical
- Regulatory
- Electronic
- Smuggling
- Sanctions
- Guerrilla
- Drug
- Media
- Terrorist
- Virtual
- Ideological

Additionally, one can combine these types of warfare in many ways to form other kinds of warfare. For example, they describe the U.S. “war on terror” as “national terrorist warfare + intelligence warfare + financial warfare + network warfare + regulatory warfare.” In fact, as Qiao and Wang note, “To a very great extent, war is no longer even war but rather coming to grips on the internet, and matching the mass media, assault and defense . . . along with other things which we had never viewed as war.”¹⁸

In the application of such combined warfare, the United States’ greatest strategic vulnerability, they argue, is its failure to recognize these other methods as war and thus not being prepared when adversaries employ these means against U.S. interests.¹⁹

Qiao and Wang’s thesis is reflected more comprehensively in their army’s concept of *shashou-jian*, or “Assassin’s Mace.” Assassin’s Mace is an umbrella term for doctrinal development and acquisition of weapons systems aimed at enabling the “inferior” to defeat the “superior.” This doctrine relies on surprise as well as deceptive and unorthodox methods “unknown to the adversary.” The means employed under this doctrine are intended to achieve the effects of deterring, decapitating, blinding, paralyzing, or disintegrating enemy forces.

The idea that war is more about shaping an adversary’s interests than imposing one’s will suggests that U.S. strategists should learn to articulate a range of acceptable end states and recommend a broad application of coercive and attractive elements of national power to make U.S. interests acceptable to an adversary. This idea also suggests that in addition to designing broad strategies aimed at shaping our adversaries’ interests, U.S. strategists need to be aware of adversaries’ efforts to shape our own.

It is beyond the scope of this article to fully articulate how one may best implement a strategy of compliance. However, at a minimum, the United States should overcome barriers to interagency coordination and cooperation, either by creating a central authority or by dispersing responsibility to an agency and giving it the authority to task others as required. Of course, each of these options will come with their own sets of difficulties that will have to be



(U.S. Air Force, MSgt. Jim Varhegyi)

U.S. Air Force 1LT Lee Turcotte, right, a civil engineer, and Teresa Morales, civil engineer with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, discuss the progress of a school construction project with contractors in Panjshir Province, Afghanistan, 4 August 2007.

managed. Centralizing authority and responsibility will require creating a “super-agency” that would need to be able to plan as well as execute national policy. To do so, it would require the authority to task agencies for personnel and other resources, which could undermine the ability of those agencies to fulfill other responsibilities.

An alternative would be to place a single agency, like the Department of State or Department of Defense, in a supported role and allow it to task other agencies for personnel. This approach might be suitable for addressing short-term concerns, but for longer-term conflicts the responsible agency would eventually accrue authorities that make it function like the super-agency, thus risking other subordinate agency goals that do not serve the national security concern at hand.

These difficulties are not insurmountable and there are structures in place that can help overcome them. Interagency task forces, for example, already serve as coordinating cells for multiple agencies’ efforts to achieve particular goals, but they cannot realize true unity of purpose because they only coordinate other agencies’ voluntary efforts. To make them truly effec-

tive, they need directive authority, as well. Where these entities operate in Joint operational areas, like Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense is already the supported agency. In this role, it could obtain the authority to task the other agencies and departments as required to meet U.S. objectives in the operational area.

Given the limited duration and decreasing scope of these operations, granting this authority will not likely have significant impact on the other departments’ operations outside the area. After December 2011, the U.S. presence in Iraq will likely be limited to an office of security cooperation that would fall under the U.S. ambassador’s control, thus transferring the supported role to the Department of State. While there will likely be significant numbers of U.S. forces in Afghanistan for a few more years, that presence is already decreasing and operations there will eventually transition to advisory and material support under the U.S. ambassador, as is currently happening in Iraq.

In areas outside a Joint operational area, embassies already provide space for various agencies to execute U.S. policy where adversaries are

confronting U.S. interests. However, ambassadors can only approve or disapprove of another agency's activities. They can do little to shape, direct, or even coordinate them. By giving the ambassadors such authority, the agencies can better direct their efforts and resources against specific goals. Placing this authority within the embassy minimizes the risk of undermining the supporting departments' broader domestic and international goals by limiting their commitment to just those assets they have in country.

U.S. government agencies should also consider how their capabilities can impact across the range of national power. For example, the Department of Defense should consider how it can use military force to create an economic, cultural, ecological, or other impact. Similarly, the Department of Justice should consider how its capabilities in building police and judicial expertise might affect the military situation.²⁰

Conclusion

Unless U.S. strategists shift the emphasis in warfighting from imposing U.S. will to making adversary interests compatible with those of the United States, current military efforts are not likely to yield victory. It would be wrong to conclude that wars of imposition are a thing of the past, but our prudent adversaries are not going to fight them. They will look for other ways to shape U.S. interests, instead.

This analysis suggests that the outcome of wars of compliance will be dramatically different from that of wars of imposition. There will be no formal surrenders and no victory parades. In fact, like economic recessions, we may only know a war is over long after it actually ended. Even then, such a conclusion may be controversial because shaping others' interests often means the adversary comes away having achieved some of its goals, as well. **MR**

NOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Anatol Rapaport, ed. (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1968), 119. Depending on one's translation, what Clausewitz said is that war is "the mere continuation of policy by other means." However, in his discussion, he clearly argues that war is not simply an instrument of politics, but itself a political act.

2. Victor Davis Hanson, *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power* (New York: Anchor Books, 2001), 22.

3. *Ibid.*, 22.

4. FM-3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006).

5. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security*, 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001), 96-97.

6. Arreguin-Toft, 97.

7. Patricia L. Sullivan, "War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 5 (June 2007): 502.

8. Sullivan, 503-504. For example, in the early days of World War II, the Germans seized control over much territory and resources in Europe. To do so, they only needed to destroy their enemy's ability to resist, thus forcing them to accept German control. Conversely, the Germans lost this control when these countries, with their allies, rebuilt that capability.

9. *Ibid.*, 504.

10. *Ibid.*, 505. According to her research, when the objective of the use of military

force is to affect a policy change, stronger states lose to weaker ones in over 75 percent of cases. See Sullivan, 511.

11. Sullivan, 506.

12. *Ibid.*, 507.

13. *Ibid.*

14. Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Memorandum, Subject: ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance, 2, <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf>.

15. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 77.

16. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999). English translation available at <<http://www.terrorism.com/documents/TRC-Analysis/unrestricted.pdf>>, 24.

17. *Ibid.*, 7.

18. *Ibid.*, 146.

19. Jason E. Bruzdinski, "Demystifying Shashoujian: China's 'Assassin's Mace Concept,'" in *Civil Military Change in China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas After the 16th Party Congress*, Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel eds. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004).

20. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, a lack of competent police advisors delayed the development of local police, considered a cornerstone of any successful counterinsurgency.

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THE GEORGE W. BUSH
DEFENSE PROGRAM

POLICY,
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& WAR



STEPHEN J. CIMBALA

THE GEORGE W. BUSH DEFENSE PROGRAM: Policy, Strategy & War, edited by Stephen J. Cimbala, Potomac Books, Dulles, VA, 2010, 317 pages, \$24.95.

This collection of essays by an impressive stable of contributors provides the reader with

an objective and contextual analysis of George W. Bush's defense program. The book analyzes military transformation, the exit strategy in Iraq, the status of civil-military relations, coalition war fighting in Afghanistan, and the status of nuclear policy. Unfortunately, the collection does not address many of the topics completely and does not address others that should have been included.

Stephen J. Cimbala and C. Dale Walton's essays on nuclear policy are comprehensive, well-written primers for anyone concerned with the development of nuclear policy, particularly in light of the recently ratified New START treaty. Peter Kent Forster's essay on coalition war fighting looks at the problems confronting NATO in Afghanistan and during the post-Cold War period. An entertaining read, Colin S. Gray's opening essay is a spirited and lighthearted look at the pitfalls inherent in defense planning.

The book has a number of major shortcomings. There is no comprehensive analysis of the decision to invade Iraq and simultaneously limit the resources available for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Several essays address the planning shortfalls in the run up to the invasion of Iraq as well as some of the invasion's unintended consequences. However, there is no stand-alone analysis of the decision. Given the decision's tremendous impact of on defense policy, then and now, it deserves an essay all to itself.

President Bush is addressed almost nowhere in the essays, unlike Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and many of the top military officers, including Secretaries Colin Powell, Robert Gates, and Condoleezza Rice (Rumsfeld is, in fact, excoriated in several of the essays). Yet, the president, the man whose policy all of this ultimately represents, is given barely a mention. To analyze Bush's defense program, it would seem critical that one should understand the president's worldview, thought processes, and objectives.

In addition, so much has taken place in Iraq, Afghanistan, Russia, Iran, and North Korea since the essays were written that many of them border on no longer being relevant. We need more time to analyze Bush's role in the policies ultimately executed. I look forward to the book being revised in five or ten years.

**MAJ Mark Battjes, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

UNMAKING WAR, REMAKING MEN, Kathleen Barry, Phoenix Rising Press, Santa Rosa, CA, 2011, 235 pages, \$17.95.

One key to a successful book is an interesting title. Though Kathleen Barry has succeeded with the title *Unmaking War, Remaking Men*, she has not managed to write a compelling book. The topics are wide-ranging: the expendability of men; how military training brainwashes soldiers; psychopathic national leaders; Israel's illegal war on Lebanon; the unmaking of war; and the remaking of man. Barry, a sociologist, seems to live in a world where people are products of social constructs. To put it simply, men are aggressive and women are nurturing because society has conditioned them to be that way, not because they might naturally be that way. Because society determines such tendencies, they can be unmade. In the end, she

wishes for a world "reshaped" by empathy.

While some of her claims would seem obvious to a person with military experience, other observations are surprising. She maintains that the military trains soldiers to kill without remorse and develops teams where great shame falls upon those who fail their fellow soldiers. Frankly, any responsible citizen who pays taxes to provide for the general defense would neither desire nor expect any other outcome. Oddly, Barry sees military brotherhood, seemingly a virtue, as dangerous and almost perverse, for it creates an elitism where "everyone who is not one of them is their enemy." Dehumanizing words such as *raghead* and *haj* make killing the enemy easier. Using such derogatory terms is a fairly obvious defense mechanism; consider similarly demeaning descriptions for Germans and Japanese in World War II. Barry breaks no new ground here; one need look no further than Thomas Hardy's 1902 poem "The Man He Killed" to realize that soldiers recognize—but at times must ignore—the enemy's humanity.

Barry seems to live in an alternate reality, where valor is a vice and cowardice a virtue. She explores a Tim O'Brien fictional story about a young man who lacks the courage to swim 20 yards from Minnesota into Canada, an act that would have allowed him to avoid the draft during the Vietnam era. Because of his cowardice, his failure to flee the country, he reports for duty. In Barry's world, true heroes run to Canada while cowards serve in the armed forces. Perhaps her most outrageous claim is "the military functions outside the law, human ethics, and just plain decency." If that is not outrageous enough, try this: the military sees as heroes those who "attack people who are weaker or unable to defend themselves."

Much of this book seems to advance a political agenda. She dedicates a full chapter to “psychopathic leaders” and names Osama bin-Laden, Ariel Sharon, and George Bush as such. Her treatment of President Bush operates at the simplistic “Bush lied. Kids died” level. In a public reading of this book, Barry sealed the deal by mentioning Hitler and Bush in the same breath; when Barry makes the Hitler comparison, she can no longer be taken seriously. Consider Barry’s analysis of President Obama: “Although he does not have the characteristics of a psychopath, he adopted the behaviors of his predecessor.” One would think that acting as a psychopath might be a step toward some classifiable dysfunction, even if only a minor one.

How can the nations of the world “unmake” war? Demilitarization is the answer, Barry says; get rid of all nuclear weapons and state armies and replace the armies with a global peacemaking force manned by people dedicated to serving and protecting people. Ensure all sociopaths, racists, and misogynists do not serve. Train the “force” on developing “an understanding of human rights . . . and a reverence for human beings.”

In fairness, Barry recognizes that her dream is utopian, but this raises a question. What value is a proposal that can exist only in fantasy? Some may find inspiration in William Ward’s “If you can dream it, you can achieve it” axiom, but a realist would likely observe that many dreams go unfulfilled, particularly delusional ones.

The proposal to “remake men” also lies in a gauzy realm. Barry recommends creating a more empathetic world, again assuming that we can condition people to be what we wish them to be. America’s first step would be to “face the atrocities our country commits.” Barry claims that patriotism ruptures our humanity because it divides us and makes empathy impossible, but most will find her definition lacking. She claims the days immediately following 9/11 were days of consolation

and empathy. We helped and comforted each other. Then patriotism reared its ugly head, and we went off to war when we should have “mobilized a defensive network against future attacks.”

Barry misses the point. Patriotism elicited empathy and brought Americans together, reminded us that out of many we become one, and showed the world that if you attack one of us, you attack all of us. Barry fails to understand that a purely defensive network would have us fending off endless attacks. Barry consistently demonstrates confirmation bias, the ability to look only for evidence that supports her position. Once she finds such evidence, her search ends. Moreover, she draws conclusions from insufficient data. For example, she cites Josh Stieber and Conner Curran, two ex-soldiers who display what she terms a new masculinity. They left the military and spread an anti-war message as they biked across the country on what they called the “Contagious Love Experiment.” It is good that Stieber and Curran feel better as they travel, show empathy, and commit random acts of kindness. However, a sample size of two is hardly convincing that the rest of the world is so malleable. For an empathetic person, Kathleen Barry certainly seems to hold great enmity for many Americans who enable her empathy.

**LTC James Varner, USA, Retired,
Platte City, Missouri**

**VICTORIOUS INSURGENCIES:
Four Rebellions that Shaped
Our World**, Anthony James Joes,
The University Press of Kentucky,
Lexington, 2010, 328 pages, \$40.00.

In *Victorious Insurgencies*, Anthony James Joes examines four conflicts in which guerrillas exploited population grievances, counterinsurgents made mistakes, and foreign actors presented opportunities to defeat counterinsurgents. The book’s primary contribution is that it provides the historical context missing in many cursory examinations. Joes provides a deeper

understanding of the factors that ultimately enabled insurgent success. His exposure of common counterinsurgent errors, such as failing to commit appropriate troop levels and failing to isolate insurgents from outside support, is a secondary but important contribution.

Like many texts on insurgencies, Joes begins his book with an examination of Mao Tse-Tung’s guerrilla (and eventually conventional) campaign against the Kuomintang and Japanese. Rather than exalting the infallibility of Mao’s strategic genius, Joes points to the effects of the Japanese invasion and subsequent occupation of China as the decisive factor for Mao’s ultimate success. Although Joes mentions Chiang’s opportunities had Japan not invaded China, his discussion does not devolve into a fruitless “what if” experiment. On the contrary, he presents evidence to debunk the invincibility of the Maoist approach.

In the second case study, Joes provides well supported facts for France’s ultimate withdrawal from Vietnam. He explores the personalities and decisions of the Vietminh and French leaders, reviews the manpower required for the counterinsurgent task at hand, and finds the French commitment sorely lacking.

When Joes turns his attention to Castro in Cuba, he finds similar counterinsurgent errors and concludes that foreign actions, Cuban military incompetence, and the seeming indifference of Batista were the primary factors for Castro’s success. Finally, Joes takes the reader to Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, which is of obvious contemporary interest. Much like the Japanese occupation of China, the Soviet tactics of economic deprivation created a net gain of support for the insurgencies. Again, individual counterinsurgent conduct was abhorrent.

Although each case study provides a deeper contextual understanding of the conflict, Joes is forced to use sweeping generalizations to explain complex subject matter due to text constraints. For example, the historian will revolt

at Joes' abbreviated commentary on the complex interactions of actors during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan while a reader with more breadth will appreciate Joes' summation of the facts. Ultimately, military professionals will gain an increased understanding of the historical context behind much of modern counterinsurgency theory and practice. Joes' book is a must read for counterinsurgency practitioners if they wish to arm themselves with more than a checklist of principles in their efforts to outthink their insurgent adversaries.

**MAJ Dustin R. Mitchell, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

INFORMATION OPERATIONS MATTERS: Best Practices, Leigh Armistead, Potomac Books, Dulles, VA, 2010, 153 pages, \$18.00.

Since the introduction of information operations (IO) into the Department of Defense lexicon in 1998, the Joint community has had an ongoing debate about how best to use this combat multiplier and establish U.S. dominance in it. In *Information Operations Matters: Best Practices*, Leigh Armistead enters the fray with an astute study of IO policy and theory and the federal bureaucracy's unwillingness and inability to make the transformational changes to fully exploit this new way of fighting and thinking.

Looking back over two decades, Armistead conducted over 100 background interviews and interpreted the results from two prominent research projects completed by the RAND Corporation, the Defense Science Board, and the Quadrennial Defense Review Board. The author's research provides an overview of IO's many facets, including paradigm-changing technological advances in computer technology—computer network attack, computer network defense, and critical infrastructure protection.

The author outlines shortfalls and gaps that have caused consternation and indecision at the Department of State and Department of Defense. He argues that the absence of a clear

IO definition has created a large gap in IO theory and concept and that a lack of integration among the services has led to a lack of unity in the IO community. He uses a pointed example to best illustrate this dilemma:

Currently, a variety of U.S. government organizations and commands teach over 70 IO courses. These courses have little or no interaction or integration with one another, and if a service member or Department of State or Defense employee completes IO training in one service, he or she cannot serve in a Joint organization without receiving additional specialized training. This example identifies a lack of cohesion that resonates across the IO community.

What emerges from *Information Operations Matters* is a better understanding of the power of IO and the nuances associated with the policy decisions. Although skeptical about the government's ability to close the gaps, Armistead provides innovative recommendations that address the need for development of a set of IO standards and a push to upgrade IO training and education curricula. Armistead believes these initiatives will ultimately lead to a long-term solution. Contemplating his recommendations, I wonder whether the author is too optimistic. Time will tell whether his recommendations will come to fruition, but in my opinion there must be more emphasis on integration and coordination within the IO community before any real change can occur.

Senior leaders across the Departments of State and Defense and students attending the various service-related IO courses should read *Information Operations Matters*. The book will provide decision makers at all levels the ability to articulate their services' needs, goals, and objectives. In the end, the book will be an invaluable foundational tool to allow the development of an integrated and comprehensive IO campaign strategy for the counterinsurgency fight.

**COL James L. Davis,
USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

SOMEWHERE INSIDE: One Sister's Captivity in North Korea and the Other's Fight to Bring Her Home, Laura Ling and Lisa Ling, William Morrow/HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 2010, 322 pages, \$26.99.

Inscrutable.

Rightly or wrongly, Westerners have long used the cliché-charged word stereotypically to describe the tantalizing, seemingly unknowable mysteries of Far Eastern cultures—and the dizzying array of labyrinthine philosophies, thought processes, and diplomatic dynamics that comprise them.

Arguably, no culture—East, West, North, or South—is more inscrutable, more impenetrable to the world's probing eyes and inquiring minds, than North Korea's. The tiny, impoverished Communist country sees itself still technically at war with both South Korea and the United States nearly 60 years after the unfinished fight for dominance over the Korean peninsula began.

In the fevered hearts and minds of the regimented millions who look to Dear Leader Kim Jong Il for inspiration and guidance, the Korean conflict still rages.

It's a given that North Korea doesn't play by the world's rules—or laws of the universe, for that matter—vacillating wildly between war-mongering rhetoric, conciliatory gestures, missile launches, nuclear threats, and general cage rattling, sometimes all in the course of a single week.

That's why readers may welcome the rare ability to catch a glimpse through an unguarded window into Kim's curtained country and its renegade, irrational regime afforded by *Somewhere Inside: One Sister's Captivity in North Korea and the Other's Fight to Bring Her Home*, co-authored by Laura Ling and Lisa Ling.

Written in alternating captioned first-person accounts, the journalist sisters provide versions of a story that are like two sides of a coin: Laura held captive in Pyongyang and *The View* and *National Geographic Explorer* veteran Lisa chronicling

stateside and worldwide efforts to pressure North Korea to release her younger sibling. Laura travails under months of house arrest and trial by a kangaroo court while the better-known Lisa marshals the forces within her mighty rolodex to hit just the right combination of political powerbrokers to help free her sister.

The tandem narrative device, distracting at first because of the temptation to focus on the more exotic “Laura” entries, ultimately helps to give depth and context to a complicated situation, in the process providing two memoirs for the price of one.

The wheels for this international drama were set in motion with Laura Ling’s *Current TV* channel assignment to document the plight of refugees fleeing North Korea’s repression and crumbling economy. But when Ling, producer Una Lee, and another crew member traveled to China for clandestine meetings with these escapees, then naively but knowingly followed a guide across an ice-covered river into North Korea, North Korean guards pursued them as they fled back to the Chinese side of the river bank. There, Ling and Lee were brutally captured, as Laura Ling recounts.

“The soldiers were intent on taking us across the river, and began pulling us toward the ice. We frantically tried to cling to bushes, the ground, anything that would keep us in Chinese territory, but we were no match for the brutal soldiers. The one guard standing above me was particularly ferocious. His grip was strong and his eyes piercing. To let me know he was serious, he kicked my jaw and shoulder with his heavy black boot and then delivered another crushing blow to my shoulder. I felt my neck snap from the first kick, and my whole body went numb from the second one.”

The violence of the capture—it also eventually included a soldier striking Ling’s forehead with a rifle butt—was not publically revealed until after Ling and Lee returned to the West; nor were the Draconian conditions of her captivity: incessant interrogations in dark rooms; no hot

water, little electricity, and at first, no reading materials or other creature comforts.

Perhaps through some form of Stockholm syndrome, Laura Ling eventually forged uneasy bonds with her captors and two young female guards assigned to watch her day and night. Because of the relentless interrogation, she and Lee ultimately confessed to charges of attempting to “bring down” the North Korean government. However, her journalistic powers of observation seem undiminished during her ordeal, giving her recollections the sharp sting of reality.

Lisa’s turns at chronicling the diplomatic efforts are detailed and compelling in their own way. It helped that Laura’s *Current TV* employer was former Vice President and Nobel Peace Prize winner Al Gore. Nevertheless, readers may find themselves perplexed, and maybe even a little angry, that Laura Ling and her crew blindly blundered into a situation spurred by questionable journalistic values that ultimately forced her country to kowtow to Dear Leader’s desire to make the U.S. come calling, hat in hand. Kim managed to reel-in former President Bill Clinton in the quid pro quo deal to save Ling and Lee from years of hard labor in a North Korean prison camp, allowing Dear Leader to bask in the kind of prestige he has so long craved.

In the end, many aspects of *Somewhere Inside* are likewise inscrutable—but fascinating, nonetheless.

**Carol A. Saynisch,
Steilacoom, Washington**

A TRANSFORMATION GAP: American Innovations and European Military Change, edited by Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga, and Theo Farrell, Stanford Strategic Studies, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, CA, 2010, 272 pages, \$24.95.

In *A Transformation Gap: American Innovations and European Military Change*, the authors, a group of European political and

military scholars, set out to determine the extent of the technological and conceptual gap between European NATO members and the United States. The book’s operating premise is that European NATO member states are increasingly lagging behind the United States in transforming their respective militaries, creating a capabilities gap that undermines the inherent ability of NATO to operate as an effective and cohesive force—a force equipped to undertake the full spectrum of operations in line with the alliance’s level of ambition.

Utilizing a structured case-study approach in probing for military transformation, a representative cross section of European NATO members (Britain, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, and Poland) are analyzed to determine the degree and pace of military transformation. Each country’s assessment is conducted using an analytical framework consisting of three distinct elements: network enablement, effects-based operations, and expeditionary warfare. The elements are further analyzed in terms of their technological, doctrinal, and organizational innovations. The elements and factors selected proved well-suited to substantively measure transformation.

A full chapter is devoted to each of the six assessed countries. Appropriate subject-matter experts accomplish each assessment. Individual chapters are laid out similarly, making for easy country comparisons, yet each chapter can be understood independently. The book concludes with detailed synthesis of country outcomes.

Challenged by myriad weighted factors (e.g., economic recession, growing national debt, shrinking defense budgets, inconsistent political will, and diverging defense priorities), the authors reveal an alliance that is not only struggling to transform state militaries in line with the United States, but also transforming at significantly different rates. Exacerbating matters further are the differing interpretations of what exactly transformation really

means, the dichotomy in transformational purpose among nations (e.g., tailoring force capabilities for peace operations over combat operations), and that national defense priorities are consistently taking precedence over NATO-driven priorities. The result is an alliance with ever-fragmented capabilities/capability development that is less relevant and increasingly dependent on the United States to meet its prescribed level of ambition.

The scholarly research and descriptive analysis in this book are beyond reproach. The authors utilize important NATO and government source documents and top-tier scholarly journal articles and make effective use of interviews with top-level country officials in conducting their assessments. This insightful book is best read by senior European or U.S. military leaders and government officials, international relations or political science scholars, and anyone else interested in a detailed understanding of the dynamics shaping the military capabilities gap between the United States and its European NATO counterparts.

**LTC David A. Anderson, Ph.D.,
USMC, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

INVISIBLE WAR: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions, Joy Gordon, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2010, 359 pages, \$39.95.

U.S. foreign policy failures, particularly in terms of Iraq and the 10-year UN Security Council regime, have been widely debated over recent years, but not as comprehensively and shockingly depicted as in Joy Gordon's *The United States and the Iraq Sanctions*. She describes in detail the moral and ethical dilemmas associated with U.S. foreign policy, international law, and governance. The author has no misgivings on attributing the high mortality rate in Iraq before the second Gulf War in 2003 to the U.S. bombing of critical infrastructure in 1991 and subsequent U.S. policy decisions throughout the 10-year

period of the UN economic sanctions. Gordon's study also reveals that the origin of the ongoing insurgency in Iraq was a result of the 10 years of economic sanctions. Her book is a compendium of knowledge on U.S. strategy, foreign policy, UN resolutions, and the shift of international influence associated with globalization.

A must read for all military and State Department professionals, Gordon's 10-year study exposes a lack of transparency, bureaucracy, and fissures in U.S. policy and incompetence within the UN Security Council committee. She documents how U.S. policymakers continually exploited dual-use prohibitions on humanitarian supplies and equipment to inhibit rehabilitation of critical infrastructure and thus contribute to the large-scale human catastrophe in Iraq: "Despite the frequent protests of the other committee members, the United States blocked salt, water pipes, children's bikes, materials for the production of diapers, equipment to process powdered milk, and fabric for children's clothing."

She also provides evidence associating the economic collapse with the lack of basic Iraqi government structure, policies, and corruption. In later chapters, Joy thoroughly details the Oil-for-Food Program scandal and asserts that the actions of the Security Council "constituted war crimes in violation of the Geneva Convention." Gordon provides sufficient evidence to support her primary supposition that the United States and UN are to blame for the human suffering experienced in Iraq from 1991 to 2003.

Gordon's research methodology is virtually flawless. Over several years, she compiled and analyzed significant amounts of sanction committee meeting notes, UN and Congressional documents, and interviewed numerous civilian officials directly connected with the economic sanctions. However, what the reader may find disconcerting is the author's disclosure that she had never traveled to Iraq. She relied on second- and sometimes third-hand

written and verbal accounts of the evolving environmental conditions in Iraq. Also not surprisingly, the author had no access to classified information. Outside of classified channels, we cannot be entirely sure of the extent of the Iraqi government's involvement in UN sanction violations or what Saddam's foreign policy or civil priorities were over the 10-year period between 1991 and 2001.

The United States and the Iraq Sanctions is important because it highlights important lessons learned. UN economic sanctions "were in gross violation of the principle of proportionality" as a result of flawed policy. The author also notes that globalization created a "risk posed to humanity by international governance." An equally critical lesson for professional strategists is that the prolonged economic sanctions were a means to insurgency. Gordon's findings warrant further study and possible citation in contemporary counterinsurgency manuals.

**MAJ Richard H. Hetherington,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE WRONG WAR: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan, Francis J. "Bing" West, Random House, New York, 2011, 336 pages, \$28.00.

Bing West's *The Wrong War* is a compelling study of close combat, a thoughtful examination of the application of counterinsurgency theory, and a recommended exit strategy from the longest conflict in American history. As with much of his writing, West brings events to life by stepping outside the safe confines of his study to document history as it unfolds. The result is a book that spans the levels of war and guides the reader on a thought-provoking journey through the war in Afghanistan.

More than half of *The Wrong War* takes place on the ground with soldiers, marines, and special operations forces engaged in direct combat with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This is West's forte, bringing the grit of the fight to the

reader. The crisp tales have the stark realism of a first-person lens. The author is at his absolute best when he introduces us to Marine Lance Corporal Dakota Meyer. In near stop-motion detail, West recounts the events of the Battle of Ganjgal, where the young Marine's heroism earned a Medal of Honor nomination, the first living veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to receive the honor.

West expresses his frustration with the conduct of the war through his critique of what he perceives to be a flawed counterinsurgency campaign. Readers familiar with the war will find flaw with the author's analysis and conclusions. West's insistence that we are not actively pursuing operations against the insurgents seems to run counter to the progress made over the past months, as the insurgency suffered a significant loss of capability under the relentless pressure of NATO forces.

Dedicated to an exploration of exit strategy, the book's final chapter (an anti-climactic seven pages in length) asserts that a "stable Afghanistan is helpful, although not critical, to our national security." The cost of the war is not producing the results necessary to justify further investment of blood and treasure, he says, adding that our greatest mistake was to "do the work of others for ten years." Our strategy was flawed and open-ended; this was the wrong war with the wrong strategy.

As a tactical narrative, *The Wrong War* ranks among the finest literary accounts of contemporary conflict. West's writing is superb, his credibility unmatched, and his determination to bring the story home remarkable. For that reason alone, *The Wrong War* is reminiscent of the writing of C.J. Chivers, Craig Mullaney, and Nate Fick. West is at his very best when sidled up to the warfighter, and few other writers have the fortitude at any age to do what he does at 70.

**LTC Steve Leonard, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

UNEMBEDDED: Two Decades of Maverick War Reporting, Scott Taylor, D&M Publishers Inc., Vancouver, BC, 374 pages, \$34.95.

After finishing Scott Taylor's introductory description of his terrifying captivity and inquisition by Turkomen insurgents in Iraq, the reader is likely to think the book might be an exciting read. Well, it slows down markedly through the next 50 pages in this, the author's seventh book, written along the lines of a memoir. Taylor's youth and upbringing and his early ventures into publication subsidized by the Canadian military are mildly interesting, but the truly newsworthy periods of his reporting life were centered around his dogged investigations into corruption, incompetence, and betrayal of the common soldier by the senior ranks of the Canadian officer corps, particularly in Somalia. When he really started digging, Taylor found the Canadian military establishment to be a "resourceful, recalcitrant, and vengeful foe."

Taylor's articles resulted in military investigations, which were more like whitewashes that pointed a finger of guilt at a "few bad apples" within the enlisted ranks. (The author set out to argue and then explain how news initiative is stifled by the protection and logistical support of reporters housed in military units (called "embedding"). When Taylor transformed *Espirit de Corps* magazine, essentially a Canadian military house organ, into a hotbed of investigative digging, he even accomplished some of the early revelations on the army's own nickel.

Taylor reaches his narrative zenith in this book when he traverses dangerous back alleys and trails to report on the warring factions in the Balkans. His ability to infiltrate areas with hazy borders—such as the Western Sahara—places him in a small circle of reporters including those who set up shop in prewar Baghdad.

The unembedded paths he covered included the Balkans and later Iraq. His excursion into Afghanistan

lacks the reporting depth of the others, but it is nonetheless an independent view gathered during an outside-the-wire, unsanctioned trip in 2006 into the volatile Kandahar region. His reporting at that time did not parrot the pie-in-the-sky press releases accepted then (and now) by the Western press. (Here we are five years later, and Kandahar remains volatile.)

Along the way we—

- Learn how Turkomen insurgents concluded—erroneously—that his regimental coin from service in Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry was an electronic device designed to guide Hellfire missiles up the tailpipe of an emir's Land Rover.

- Experience a stop at Casablanca's Holiday Inn (en route to the Western Sahara) where *As Time Goes By* was rendered not by Sam, but by a player piano.

- Hear the words of a UN police officer in Kosovo, who says: "The only locals who were organized and funded to run a campaign in postwar Kosovo were the warlords, thugs, and drug dealers. As a result, Kosovo went from a state full of criminals to a legitimate criminal state."

In the final analysis, Taylor neither proves nor disproves whether a straighter line to the truth emerges from reporters under military care and feeding. However, we should well remember the words of a war correspondent covering the Bulgarian insurrection in 1902. He telegraphed his employer:

"Arriving in Sorrowitz, I was delayed by a dinner with the Turkish general, which it would have been a great impoliteness to decline. Later, visiting a nearby hamlet with my escort of 25 Turkish cavalry, the only native I could find to talk with about Turkish atrocities was a somewhat incoherent 80-year-old Greek. What chance did I, a lone American with a frightened translator, have to find out the truth?"

**George Ridge, J.D.,
Tucson, Arizona**

IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF THE BAND OF BROTHERS, Larry Alexander, Penguin Books Ltd., London, 2010, 307 pages, \$24.95.

The author views World War II as a period when young men journeyed to distant, global battlefields to fight an evil force bent on world domination. Through his interest of World War II and the release of the mini-series, "*Band of Brothers*," Larry Alexander developed a friendship with Dick Winters and other members of Easy Company. Their story eventually became so iconic that the author felt compelled to walk in their footsteps.

As a result, the book's organization allows the reader to travel a path known only to a few during a dark period of history. It begins with the perils of training to become a World War II paratrooper at Toccoa, Georgia, where the battle cry "Currahee" developed. Arriving in England, the author tours the town and accommodations of the Easy Company soldiers. Then an aging soldier remembers his preparation for the D-Day invasion, and the action he saw during battles at Market Garden and Bastogne. The stories come to life through the memory of historical events that made a lasting impression on a country, a unit, and a soldier.

In the Footsteps of the Band of Brothers is highly recommended to those interested in World War II history as it relates to the airborne soldier. The book's chronological organization makes for a captivating trip back in time as the author and a former soldier travel from Aldbourne, England, to Normandy, Belgium, and finally Holland. As the author states, "As you visit the now silent battlefields and stop and listen real hard, you will find that an echo remains in the footsteps of those you follow."

Allen D. Reece,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

SEARCH AND DESTROY: The Story of an Armored Cavalry Squadron in Vietnam: 1-1 Cav, 1967-1968, Keith W. Nolan, Zenith

Press, Minneapolis, 2010, 448 pages, \$30.00.

Keith W. Nolan wrote his first book on Vietnam battles when he was still a high school student in suburban St. Louis, Missouri. *Search and Destroy* is his 12th book but, sadly, the last. Nolan passed away in 2009 from cancer at the young age of 44. In describing Nolan's key role in writing the history of the Vietnam War, perhaps St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* columnist Bill McClellan said it best in the 101st Airborne Division's Ripcord Association webpage:

"He developed a following among Vietnam veterans. There is nobody else in the country who has done what he has done. He has written gripping and honest historical accounts of battles and operations that would otherwise have been overlooked by everybody except the people who participated in them."

Search and Destroy is no exception to that pattern. It is a terrific book that tells the story of the 1-1st Cavalry Squadron, from deployment preparations in the United States to a year of combat with the Americal Division in the northern part of I Corps' area of operation. Like all of Nolan's books, this one tells its story from the first-hand accounts of the soldiers and junior officers who fought the war on the ground and from extensive research of official Army records.

Through interviews with dozens of 1-1st Cav veterans, Nolan tells it like it is, warts and all. There are accounts of breathtaking heroism, of leadership that ranges from superb and courageous to badly flawed, and disturbing accounts of atrocities and mindless violence against Vietnamese civilians. We follow combat at the platoon and company level and meet a wide cast of participants. There are the tough NCOs who led green troops, many of whom won well-deserved medals for courage and heroism. But we also meet a rear area executive

officer who manipulated the awards system to his undeserved benefit. There is a squadron commander who repeatedly flew into combat to support his troops, and a platoon leader whose inability to read a map and use a compass brought casualties to his soldiers. We meet a courageous sergeant whose record of atrocities against civilians was ignored, and we meet the young soldier described by another as "the conscience of the squadron." Nolan draws the reader into the squadron, shows the best and perhaps the worst, but concentrates on the struggle to survive in a hostile environment.

As with his other books, Nolan leaves us with an epilogue that tells what happened to those he interviewed "after the war." Some were career soldiers, reaching general's stars and the top stripes of an NCO. Others left the army after their obligated service and took regular jobs, got married, found a career—in other words, found a life after the terror and hardships of a year in Vietnam. Vietnam veterans will enjoy this honest account of a cavalry squadron's experience during a difficult and challenging year of unrelenting combat.

COL John B. Haseman, USA,
Retired, Grand Junction, CO

WAR WITHOUT FRONTS: The USA in Vietnam, Bernd Greiner, Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 2009, 544 pages, \$35.00.

Bernd Greiner's position in *War Without Fronts: The USA in Vietnam* is that the My Lai massacre was not an aberration but merely an extreme example of the targeting of civilians. Given the ambiguities of a war with unclear objectives at all levels, frustration was inevitable, and conditions were ripe for frustration to break loose in atrocities such as My Lai and comparable episodes. Because the crimes were systemic rather than individual, the blame for My Lai lay not solely with Lieutenant William Calley but also with those who created the necessary preconditions for war crimes. Indicted as part of a broken system are the military chain

of command, the civilians overseeing the war, and the American people. A cultural milieu made American involvement in Vietnam highly likely if not inevitable and success in that involvement highly unlikely.

My Lai is not central to the argument although it receives a detailed examination. Because he believes the killings were representative rather than aberrational, Greiner emphasizes their context: the Cold War, politicians afraid of failure, careerist officers and NCOs, and an overextended military scraping for officers and GIs. All this made Vietnam an aimless war fought by drugged or terrified GIs on search-and-destroy missions that took no territory but added to the body count sought by careerist officers on six-month tours and generals and politicians who used body counts to measure success.

What sets this work apart is the depth of the research. Greiner examined hundreds of boxes of primary documents. Unfortunately replication of the research is now impossible because many records of the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group that became available in 1994 and that Greiner explored have been closed once more. Greiner makes extensive use of the multi-volume Peers Commission report as well as Vietnamese sources and eyewitness accounts. Even so, he continually acknowledges that casual to non-existent record-keeping at all levels made his recapture of the various massacres more difficult than expected.

The decay of the army in Vietnam is well established. The commonness of brutality toward enemies and civilians alike is established by the Winter Soldier testimony of the 1970s. Still, many Americans refuse to acknowledge American forces engaged in atrocities and that superior officers either ignored or covered up those atrocities.

**John H. Barnhill, Ph.D.,
Houston, Texas**

EDOKKO: Growing Up a Foreigner in Wartime Japan, Isaac Shapiro, iUniverse Inc., New York, 2010, 227 pages, \$16.95.

Isaac "Ike" Shapiro has written a charming memoir of growing up in wartime Japan. The fourth son of Russian-born, stateless Jewish musicians, Shapiro was born in Tokyo in 1931, though he spent most of his young life in Yokohama. His grandparents lived for a time in Tokyo, and so the young Shapiro early took to calling himself an *Edokko*, literally, an Edo child, Edo being the pre-Meiji-era name for Tokyo. Technically speaking he was not; an *Edokko* is someone who is of the third generation to be born in Tokyo, but Shapiro found the Japanese were willing to tolerate the fancies of a young, blonde *gaijin* (foreigner). The author spends a short chapter on life in Harbin, Manchuria, where his mother, his three brothers, and he moved when he was only a few months old. The family moved back to Yokohama in 1936, and the bulk of the memoir focuses on Shapiro's school years at three English-language schools in Yokohama and Tokyo (all of which still operate). Along the way, in addition to the Russian spoken in his home, Shapiro picked up Japanese, English, French, some German, and a life-long love of learning and appreciation for other cultures. During the war years, Shapiro and his family evacuated to Tokyo and then farther inland. After the war, Shapiro returned to Yokohama in order to see the Americans landing, and the Americans immediately hired him as an interpreter. From there his life took another fateful turn. Taken under the wing of then-colonel, later lieutenant general, Toby Munn, U.S. Marine Corps, Shapiro finished high school in Hawaii, attended Columbia, naturalized as an American citizen, and embarked on a 50-year career as an international lawyer.

I have two small quibbles. I disagree, when the author declares, "The Japanese especially valued a foreigner's ability to speak their language." While the Japanese tend to be unfailingly polite when a foreigner makes an even minimal attempt to speak Japanese, I heard, more than once while I was there,

that many Japanese do not feel comfortable when a foreigner is "too fluent" in their language. I also think the author missed an opportunity when he discussed living across from the Sirota family, when the Shapiro family evacuated to Tokyo, by not mentioning that Beate Sirota, the daughter, played a key role in writing Japan's postwar constitution, introducing the equivalent of the Women's Equal Rights Amendment.

The book will probably appeal most to readers like me who have spent a great deal of time in Japan, but this is unfortunate. Shapiro's story, and that of his family, encapsulates our troubled previous century. His grandparents left Russia during the 1917 revolution, his parents spent time in the British mandate of Palestine. He, his brothers, and his mother arrived in Manchuria spare months before the Manchurian Incident, the start of Japan's 15-Year War, and they left one month before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which widened Japan's war into mainland China. His account of the (less nationalistic and more muted than one would expect) reactions of the Japanese people during World War II, of the rationing and hunger, and of the incendiary bombing of Tokyo, has a common-man perspective other historical accounts often lack. This is a well-written account of an interesting life.

**COL David Hunter-Chester,
USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

A NATION FORGED IN WAR: How World War II Taught Americans to Get Along, Thomas Bruscino, The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville, 2010, 348 pages, \$39.95.

In an extensively well-researched and written study, historian Thomas Bruscino shows conclusively that World War II was a defining moment in American history. In *A Nation Forged in War: How World War II Taught Americans to Get Along*, Americans, many for the first time, showed new appreciation for each other. With the large-scale mobi-

lization needed to fight the war, Americans from all over the United States gathered to train and live together in a new and tough environment. This newly found closeness put Americans of different religions, ethnicities, and regions together for the first time. The tough training, poor living conditions, and general discomfort of the newly enlisted soldiers bonded them together and dissolved many long-standing differences.

The author starts and ends the book with the 1928 and 1960 presidential elections. To some readers, it may seem odd, but it works brilliantly. Starting with the 1928 defeat of Democratic candidate and Catholic, Al Smith, Bruscino puts the election in context and writes convincingly that Americans were not ready for a Catholic president, and were not tolerant of Catholicism, Judaism, and people of other ethnic backgrounds. Ending in 1960, the author shows how far American tolerance had grown with John F. Kennedy's election. However, the transformation did not happen overnight, and even during and after the war intolerance lurked under the surface. Instead, it happened over time through military indoctrination and training, hours of boredom at camp and overseas, and ultimately fighting in the war itself. While World War II did teach Americans to get along, the author also states that it still did not teach them to get along with everyone.

While religious and regional tolerance grew out of the war effort, equality for African-Americans remained elusive. However, African-Americans did make gains. The war was, as Bruscino argues, the "jumping off point in the civil rights movement."

A Nation Forged in War is an exemplary study on World War II that will instantly appeal, not only to military history enthusiasts, but also to readers of religious, cultural, and ethnic history. Bruscino makes a convincing case that the change

in ethnic and religious relations in the United States came from the military experience in World War II.
**Jon Mikolashek, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

GUNS AGAINST THE REICH: Memoirs of an Artillery Officer on the Eastern Front, Petr Mikhin, Pen & Sword Military, Great Britain, 2010, 214 pages, \$39.99.

Guns Against the Reich is a fascinating, personal account of life on the German-Russian front during World War II. When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Petr Mikhin was a 20-year-old college student, but by the war's end in 1945, he would be a seasoned field artillery battalion commander preparing for operations against Japan. The events in between are an intense and often graphic account of war along the front lines.

The story begins with Mikhin and his college classmates eagerly anticipating the romanticism and glory of a quick and decisive victory against Germany. Mikhin and his friends quickly enlist in the military where the author's "political reliability" earns him a commission as an artillery officer. However, after three months of training, he leaves behind the warmth and comfort of school and begins to experience the brutal cold and hunger that came to characterize the German-Russian front. Mikhin vividly captures these images for the reader through such stories as the need to sleep five-to-a-bunk just to keep warm, or his soldiers breaking ranks to ravenously graze on the first shoots of spring grass.

As a young artillery officer, Mikhin began his service as a forward observer supporting the Soviet defense of Moscow. His initial experience with that campaign was the anxiety of having his first live fire exercise also being his first combat mission. However, his account of that event soon pales in comparison to his vivid and horrific descriptions of traversing back and

forth across "no man's land" from his battery to his observation post. Undoubtedly the strength of this book is the recounting of these and similar wartime experiences where through a combination of great skill and luck, Mikhin survives and continues progressing through the officer ranks.

If the memoir has a drawback, it is that Mikhin does not place his extraordinary personnel experiences within their overall historical context. For example, in the chapter titled "Kursk," there is no discussion of the great tank battle, only a thrilling account of when Mikhin, now a battery commander, leads a raid to capture a German soldier. Nevertheless, an understanding of the historical framework that surrounded Mikhin's actions would enhance the reader's appreciation of his exploits. The occasional map would also be useful in tracking Mikhin as he moves from Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, Ukraine, and into Czechoslovakia.

One of the book's surprises is Mikhin's treatment of the Communist Party. The book was originally written in 1984—several years before the fall of the Soviet Union. And while the author portrays himself as a loyal, brave, and patriotic Communist Party member, he is less generous toward the political officers assigned to his units. Several times, he relates how his career and even his life were subject to the "cowardly" and absurd behavior of Communist Party officials.

The book is a fast-paced, interesting read that recounts stories of courage under fire and dedication to duty. In addition, Mikhin reinforces many concepts crucial to all levels of warfare such as initiative, technical, and tactical competence and shows the importance of understanding and respecting your "evil, cunning, agile, technically educated, tough, and arrogant" enemy. I highly recommended this book.

**W. Kenna McCurry,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

PATTON: The Pursuit of Destiny, Agostino Von Hassell and Ed Breslin, Thomas Nelson, Nashville, TN, 2010, 195 pages, \$19.99.

Patton: The Pursuit of Destiny explores the achievements that propelled General George S. Patton into the history books as one of the most well known and popular American heroes of World War II. Agostino Von Hassell and Ed Breslin do not just rehash biographical dates, times, and events, they attempt to understand Patton's character and why he made certain decisions. Throughout Patton's life, he measured his success as a soldier against relatives for whom he held high esteem, such as his grandfather and great uncle during the Civil War. Disenchanted with the South's defeat, Patton's family decided to migrate west.

Patton's life reached a turning point when his mother was married to Benjamin Wilson, and the family moved to Los Angeles. Colonel John Singleton Mosby (CSA) also known as the "Grey Ghost" captivated Patton with stories of bravery and daring feats. The authors argue that a fear of disappointing or shaming the family history molded Patton's perception of life.

Patton's academic disappointments at the Virginia Military Institute and West Point and his raw determination and fear of disgracing his family's legacy drove him to success. Patton's peers viewed him as rigid because he held them to a standard. Patton's rigid and demanding character aided him in his success in training and increasing units' morale during World War II. As commander of the Third U.S. Army, Patton was a workhorse who demanded much from his soldiers. But he also demonstrated compassion as one of the few three-star general officers who personally awarded the Purple Heart to soldiers wounded in battle instead of delegating the task.

Hassel and Breslin's book draws from Patton's past to explain and justify why he made certain decisions. The book is a must read for military historians to gain an insight

into understanding Patton's decision making process.

MAJ Steven J. Swingle, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FORTRESS RABAUL: The Battle for the Southwest Pacific, January 1942-April 1943, Bruce Gamble, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, 2010, 416 pages, \$28.00.

The massive base at Rabaul formed the lynchpin in Japanese operations in the southern Pacific, playing a key role in the famous battles of Guadalcanal, New Guinea, and the Philippines. For months, it was a staging point for Japanese expansion, threatening Australia and the fragile American presence in the southwest Pacific. Later, it would become a critical target in the Allies' effort to defeat the Japanese Empire.

Despite its title, Bruce Gamble's book focuses more on stories of individuals and small units involved in the air campaign against Rabaul than the operational significance of the base. Those interested in the tactical challenges of mounting an air campaign over a vast expanse such as the southwest Pacific will find the study interesting.

Well-versed in the nuts-and-bolts of air operations, Gamble illuminates the difference between the realities of the air campaign and what it looked like on a planner's map. Reading Gamble's recaps of air missions, one can understand why massive raids of heavy bombers often produced skimpy results. Particularly intriguing is the tendency of both sides to vastly exaggerate kill reports, shedding light on why supposedly "successful" air missions rarely produced decisive results. By extension, Gamble's observations can help explain why ground assaults were usually necessary to defeat Japanese island garrisons.

COL David D. DiMeo, USA, West Point, New York

BOMBER COUNTY: The Poetry of a Lost Pilot's War, Daniel Swift, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, New York, 2010, 269 pages, \$26.00.

He studies twisted props of disbelief

Wondering what ruin to touch . . .

—John Ciardi, "The Pilot in the Jungle"

Daniel Swift teaches literature, drama, and history at Skidmore College, in New York. During the Second World War, his grandfather, Royal Air Force (RAF) squadron leader Eric J. Swift, served as a pilot in a Lancaster bomber squadron. With the opening line of *Bomber County*, "The beach where the body washed up," the reader is confronted with the heavy toll of war as the author reveals with haunting intimacy that his grandfather vanished off the coast of Holland after a night raid on Muenster on 11 June 1943.

In his research, Swift, along with his father, accessed the lost pilot grandfather's logbooks, attended his old squadron's reunions, examined RAF and British government documents, and German wartime records kept by the cities his father had participated in bombing. Yet Swift's story is more comprehensive than indicated by the title and encompasses a wider field than the sole history of one man. Framed against this background, the author has woven a narrative from poetry, memoir, and biography, as well as literary, cinematic, classical, and military history sources. He sees bomber and bombing poetry as "always of the near distance, its suffering always at a remove . . . The bombed city was quick with literary imagining, and most of all with poetry." As such, Swift includes many excerpts of the finest poems of aerial bombardment that emerged from the war.

Much of Swift's research took place at the Imperial War Museum in London. Here, he uncovered a wealth of poems, unpublished prior to their appearance in *Bomber County*. They are valuable not for being great verse, but for their creative response to the deaths of

RAF bomber poets. Particularly poignant are many poems and letters of airmen who didn't survive the war, and letters addressed to a chaplain from family members of the missing or killed.

Poets took aesthetic regard of the rubble and ruins in the streets of London. In this regard, the first poetry he discusses at length is the haunting, liturgical-like quality of Dylan Thomas's verse, and the emergence of the wartime poems of T.S. Eliot. Virginia Woolf found the terror of it all mesmerizing, as it incited her literary imagination in the days before her suicide.

Swift engages not only British, but American poets as well, especially Army Air Corps poets Randall Jarrell, John Ciardi, and James Dickey. Human frailty and isolation amid war's machinery were these poets' dominant themes.

Throughout, Swift details not only the operational flying experiences of his grandfather, but also his brief excursions home, his letters to his wife, his airplane drawings for his son (Swift's father), all of which heighten the reader's sense of loss as the story proceeds.

The close of Swift's journey is a painstaking reconstruction of his grandfather's last mission, derived from facts and well-reasoned deductions. Swift made some amazing discoveries. His sources include intercepted German radio traffic transcripts, the diary of a Muenster doctor present during the city's bombing, the Royal Netherlands Air Force Salvage and Recovery Unit, a summer day's last annotation in an RAF squadron operations log: "S/Ldr Swift failed to return." On 17 June 1943, having drifted 20 miles in a northbound tide for six days, he came ashore in the middle of a Dutch holiday.

Bomber County comes with my highest recommendation for those interested not solely in aerial bombardment refracted through poetry, but for anyone truly interested in the wartime lives of participants and victims, especially lives affected forever by the European Allied bomber offensive. Swift's research

is refined and exhaustive. He tells a deeply human and heart-rending story, eloquently wrought.

Jeffrey C. Alfier,
Torrance, California

THE BERLIN-BAGHDAD EXPRESS: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power, Sean McMeekin, Belknap Press of Harvard, Cambridge, MA, 2010, 462 pages, \$29.95.

We tend to think of global jihad as a modern phenomenon, something that dates back to events as recent as the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and 9/11. However, in his new book, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express*, historian Sean McMeekin argues the first attempt to spread Islamic jihad around the globe dates back to World War I. The Allies and Central Powers wanted to bring the Ottoman Empire into the war on their side, Germany had a special interest in bringing the "Sublime Porte" into the conflict. German interest was based a geostrategic analysis conducted well before the war began.

It went like this. Whatever the weakness of the Ottoman regime, it was still the seat of the Islamic Caliphate with some degree of spiritual authority over all the world's Muslims. With the right incentives, this authority might serve as a powerful tool in war against the Kaiser's three imperial enemies, France, Russia, and Great Britain. The French ruled millions of Muslims in North Africa, the Russians ruled millions of Muslims in Central Asia, and the British had a hundred million Muslims within their Indian empire. If these Muslims could be inspired to rise up in holy war against their imperial masters, the effect might be decisive.

Thus, the chief title of the book is deceptive. The real topic of the book is not the railway that symbolized the German-Ottoman connection, but rather the Germans' attempt to use that connection to strike at the Kaiser's enemies around the world. However, as with so many ambitious schemes that cross disparate

cultures, the plan briefed better than it executed. Its chief author, a strange character named Baron von Oppenheim, failed to allow for the divisions within the Islamic world (particularly between the Turks and Arabs) as well as the long reach of British naval power and British gold. So, for example, when the Germans sought to recruit Ibn Saud into a war against the Allies, they found that the Arab leader was already on the British payroll. After courting the Sheriff of Mecca, the Germans were thwarted by Lawrence and the Royal Navy's control of the sea routes to the holy city. When a German mission attempted to entice the Emir of Afghanistan into attacking India, they found they could not match British bribes.

McMeekin, who teaches at Bilkent University in Turkey, has used Ottoman, German, Russian, and British sources to create a fascinating account of a little known aspect of the "Great War." The book is full of colorful characters, daring exploits, and secret diplomacy. It reads well and provides invaluable perspective to today's headlines from the Middle East.

LTC Scott Stephenson, Ph.D.,
USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR, William Mulligan, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2010, 256 pages, \$24.99.

Few topics in historical debate are as contested as the causes of the First World War. William Mulligan, writing for Cambridge's *New Approaches to European History* series, admirably summarizes current scholarship on the topic. Mulligan refutes traditional explanations for the war. He argues that the war was not inevitable, but instead a unique breakdown of the usual restraints against war. Mulligan notes the incentives that European powers had against war. His approach is refreshing and enlightening, given the decades-long lull in fighting in Europe after the Franco-Prussian war.

Before 1914, there had been several wars between Serbia and its neighbors. Mulligan argues that concerted action by the Great Powers halted wars in the Balkans in 1912 and 1913, but that “self discipline in Vienna and St. Petersburg was [a] vital element in successful crisis management.” Similar discipline is visible in many of the colonial conflicts, such as the Moroccan Crisis. Mulligan correctly points out that self discipline likely happens only when the vital interests of the state are not at risk. Conflicting claims on tracts of Africa may lead to diplomatic crisis, but no European nation was willing to risk a general war for the Congo.

According to Mulligan, the July Crisis was a complete breakdown of early diplomatic and political norms. He places much of the blame

on Austria-Hungary. In 1914, Vienna placed Austria’s position in the Balkans above the general opinion of Europe and the general balance of power. Mulligan does not point out, as John Keegan does, that if Austria had acted unilaterally and quickly against Serbia after Franz-Ferdinand’s assassination rather than waiting for Germany’s “blank check,” Austria might have crushed Serbian independence without a European-wide escalation. The key flaw in 1914, Mulligan argues, was that the preservation of a military alliance had become an end in itself. Germany did not go to war to assist Austria-Hungary. Germany went to war simply to preserve its alliance. The same could be said of France. Mulligan rightly points out that much of the history of the prewar

period is a teleological search for causes for the First World War. This makes the turn of the century appear much more unstable than it probably was. Emphasizing peace and stability is somewhat counter-intuitive, considering the brutality and cost of the First World War. Mulligan’s suggested perspective on the 44-year peace between the Franco-Prussian war and the First World War, emphasizes that restraints to the use of power, great power diplomacy, and a period of increasing globalization. This helps put the period into its proper place and is consistent with the nostalgia for the stability of the prewar era common among post-war intellectuals.

**John E. Fahey,
Lafayette, Indiana**

MR Letters

William Thayer, *San Diego, CA*—I totally disagree with Jeffrey Sluka’s argument in “Death from Above: UAVs and Losing Hearts and Minds” (*Military Review*, May-June 2011) that UAVs targeting terrorists are a net loss in the War on Terror. Either we can let the terrorists sit with impunity in a sanctuary such as Waziristan or we can attack them. We could attack them on the ground

such as the Seal Team 6 attack on Osama bin-Laden. However, such attacks probably increase the negative response in Pakistan vs. UAVs. Furthermore, even though Seal Team 6 was very, very good, it is inevitable that there would be U.S. losses, and perhaps some troops would be captured, which would be a truly ugly hostage dilemma. If a UAV is “killed or even held hostage,” it is

a total non-event. Therefore, I totally support the current UAV operations.

Air Power and the subset of UAV operations give us a clear advantage over the terrorists. Since they cannot shoot them down (very often), they will try a propaganda campaign against them. Consequently, we will hear protests from Libya to Waziristan that planes or UAVs have attacked weddings or civilians.

MR We Recommend



THE GREAT BIG BOOK OF HORRIBLE THINGS: The Definitive Chronicle of History's 100 Worst Atrocities, Matthew White, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2011, 560 pages, \$35.00.

Evangelists of human progress meet their opposite in Matthew White's epic examination of history's one hundred most violent events, or, in White's piquant phrasing, "the numbers that people want to argue about." Reaching back to 480 BCE's second Persian War, White moves chronologically through history to this century's war in the Congo and devotes chapters to each event, where he surrounds hard facts (time and place) and succinct takeaways (who usually gets the blame?) with lively military, social, and political histories. With the eye of a seasoned statistician, White assigns each entry a ranking based on body count, and in doing so he gives voice to the suffering of ordinary people that, inexorably, has defined every historical epoch. By turns droll, insightful, matter-of-fact, and ultimately sympathetic to those who died, *The Great Big Book of Horrible Things* gives readers a chance to reach their own conclusions while offering a stark reminder of the darkness of the human heart.

From the Publisher.




HEARTS TOUCHED BY FIRE: The Best of Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, James M. McPherson, James I. Robertson, Jr., Stephen W. Sears, Craig L. Symonds, and Joan Waugh, Modern Library, New York, 2011, 1,264 pages, \$38.00.

In July 1883, just a few days after the twentieth anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg, a group of editors at *The Century Magazine* engaged in a lively argument: Which Civil War battle was the bloodiest battle of them all? One claimed it was Chickamauga, another Cold Harbor. The argument inspired a brainstorm: Why not let the magazine's 125,000 readers in on the conversation by offering "a series of papers on some of the great battles of the war to be written by officers in command on both sides."

Hearts Touched by Fire offers stunning accounts of the war's great battles written by the men who planned, fought, and witnessed them, from leaders such as General Ulysses S. Grant, General George McClellan, and Confederate captain Clement Sullivane to men of lesser rank. This collection also features new year-by-year introductions by esteemed historians who cast wise modern eyes on the cataclysm that changed America and would go down as the bloodiest conflict in our nation's history.

From the Publisher.



THE POLITICS OF PRISONER ABUSE: The United States and Enemy Prisoners after 9/11, David P. Forsythe, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2011, 334 pages, \$29.99.

When states are threatened by war and terrorism, can we really expect them to abide by human rights and humanitarian law? David P. Forsythe's bold analysis of U.S. policies toward terror suspects after 9/11 addresses this issue directly. Covering moral, political, and legal aspects, he examines the abuse of enemy detainees at the hands of the United States. Forsythe places the Bush administration at the center of the debate because it displayed disdain for international law, in contrast to the public's support for humanitarian affairs. Forsythe explores the similarities and differences between Presidents Obama and Bush on the question of prisoner treatment in an age of terrorism. The book traces the Pentagon's and CIA's records in mistreating prisoners, providing an account which will be of interest to all those who value human rights and humanitarian law.

From the Publisher.

U.S. Army Order of Battle, 1919-1941

LTC (Ret.) Steven E. Clay

2011

Combat Studies Institute Press
4 Volumes, 2902 pages



This order of battle is more than a simple listing of units. It is an encyclopedia of Army tactical organizations in existence during what has commonly become known as the "interwar" period. This four-volume set was written to fill a distinct void in the history of Army tactical units, especially those of the Organized Reserve (now U.S. Army Reserve). This comprehensive work details the history of every U.S. Army tactical organization from separate battalion to field army, as well as certain other major commands important to the administration and support of the Army. It includes the various units' changes of station, commanding officers, training camps, accomplishments, and key events such as major maneuvers and, for National Guard units, active duty periods for state emergencies. Also included are maps showing command boundaries and charts illustrating the tables of organization germane to the organizations of the time. In short, this order of battle is the definitive reference for the historian who wishes to understand the history and organization of U.S. Army units between the World Wars.

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DAYS OF THE WEEK ARE DEAD TO ME

Days of the week are dead to me.
Monday, Friday, Sunday, Saturday;
They are all the same.
Days of the week are dead to me
And so they will remain.

The day I saw an IED
Through a Predator's eye
Take out that convoy of Humvees,
That day of that week
With me will remain.
The day I heard the "All Clear" call
After rockets fell from the sky,
That day I will remember, laugh a little and cry.

The day of the week that the sergeant killed
Five of his brothers over by Commo Hill,
I can't recall.
But that day of that week
Was the worst of all.
Days of the week are dead to me
And so they will remain.

But when I return
And enjoy the life
That blood has paid
Many times over and more the price,
I shall rejoice in the days I spend
With family and friends
And not worry about
What day it is, or what day will come,
Because they're all the same to me now
And I will cherish every one.

CPT Thomas J. Carnes, III
Brigade Provost Marshal, 56th IBCT
Texas Army National Guard

1LT Carnes was the night Battle Captain for the Victory Base Defense Operations Center, 11 May 2009, the night a distraught soldier opened fire in the counseling center at Camp Liberty, Baghdad, killing five. Creating art, such as poetry, can build resiliency by strengthening emotional and spiritual fitness.





U.S. Army soldiers explore the ruins of Al Hatra in northern Iraq during their current deployment to Mosul, 20 September 2010. The soldiers are assigned to 3rd Infantry Division's Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Advise and Assist Brigade. (U.S. Army, SPC Gregory Gieske)

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★ Winners ★

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3rd Place - Lawrence J. Morris

4th Place - Brandon Robers

Special thanks to this year's judges:

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Professor Thomas W. Volek, Ph.D, Associate Dean, William Allen White School of Journalism & Mass Communication, University of Kansas

Lieutenant Colonel Gene J. Del Bianco, USAR, U.S. Army War College Faculty and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, U.S. Department of State

“Of Their Own Accord”



Sergeant First Class Leroy A. Petry

The President of the United States of America, authorized by act of Congress, March 3, 1863, has awarded, in the name of Congress, the Medal of Honor to Staff Sergeant Leroy A. Petry, United States Army. Sergeant Petry distinguished himself by acts of gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty, in action, with an armed enemy in the vicinity of Paktya Province, Afghanistan, on May 26, 2008.

.....

Staff Sergeant Petry's extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, the 75th Ranger Regiment, and the United States Army.