

Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions in International Assistance

Edited by
Harry R. Yarger, Ph.D.

PKSOI



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Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions in International Assistance

**Edited by
Harry R. Yarger, Ph.D**

Presented and Selected Other Papers from the Transitions: Issues,
Challenges and Solutions Conference,

November 16-18, 2010,
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

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FOREWORD

The end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization produced a more unstable world than most policy makers and military strategists anticipated. Without the structure attendant to the superpower struggle, states began to fracture along old ethnic lines resulting in increased incidence of genocide and terrorism, as well as a rise in the number of non-state actors willing to use conflict to achieve their political aims. Renewed economic hope and the dramatic increases in communications led to greater popular expectations as yet another source of instability. Even nature has made its contribution in this area with an extraordinary number of significant natural disasters contributing to a kaleidoscope of humanitarian crises and the resultant strain on governments. The ensuing response of concerned states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and a large number of civil sector humanitarian aid organizations provided an unprecedented level of assistance to populations and states in turmoil.

Despite this significant external assistance, the growing number of fragile, failing, and failed states showed no signs of abating in the first decade of the 21st century. In fact, the aid efforts often created new problems for the host nations and societies that were the intended beneficiaries of assistance. Donor and intervening states, intergovernmental organizations, and humanitarian relief organizations came to a slow realization that assistance and reconstruction must focus on a larger goal of building viable host nation government and civil institutions. Uncoordinated “best of intentions” and charity would simply no longer suffice. The greater assistance community began to focus on “whole of government” and “comprehensive” approaches that attempted to integrate concerned state and international community support into better coordinated and more properly focused efforts. Progress has been intermittent, but nonetheless moving more positively toward increased stability and human security. The international assistance community has slowly come to the realization that the only truly sustainable solutions involve transitioning assumed power, authorities, and services back to appropriately responsible host nation institutions.


In an effort to better understand “transitions” the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and its 13 co-sponsors convened the “Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions Conference” at Carlisle Barracks in November of 2010. Resulting from an open call for papers, this text is a series of essays from across the international spectrum of government, military, academia, and assistance non-governmental organizations that develop and share what the community knows about “transitions.”



CLIFF D. CROFFORD, Jr.
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, U.S. Army Peacekeeping
and Stability Operations Institute

PREFACE

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute is committed to support the Peace and Stability Operations community with high quality publications developed through a disciplined approach to research and analysis that addresses USG and international policy-relevant issues at both the national / strategic level and in support of the U.S. and comprehensive international efforts. Through our comprehensive publications program we look to provide visibility to the challenging Peace and Stability Operations issues facing the nation and the world and hopefully stimulate thought and analysis to come to recommendations and solutions to tough problems. We eagerly solicit your contributions to this effort.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Karen J. Finkenbinder". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

KAREN J. FINKENBINDER, Ph.D. (ABD)
Chief, Research and Publications Branch
U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute (PKSOI)

SUMMARY

States and humanitarian organizations intervene in fragile, failing, and failed states at critical points to serve their own interests and to assist the populations of the troubled states. At the point when these host states have become appropriately self-sufficient, or when the interveners deem it appropriate to leave, the host nation must reassume responsibility for its own destiny. In simple terms transition is the multi-disciplinary process by which intervening and sponsoring states and organizations through enabling and empowerment return the power, authorities, and services to functional host nation government and civil society institutions. However, transition is never simple. It is always a complex strategic undertaking that involves and affects all sectors of a modern state. Because of these multi-order effects, all transitions invariably pose issues involving sovereignty, legitimacy, dependency, and social reform. In the latter case, transition is particularly difficult because intervention in these states usually initiates a transformation of the indigenous society to better fit the shared global narrative of the 21st Century world order. As these changes occur, politicians, citizens, spoilers, and opportunists of every stripe seek advantages in the circumstances and to influence the outcomes.

In this text, papers prepared for the Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions Conference," conducted at Carlisle Barracks in November 2010, examine transitions from theoretical and practical perspectives. In sharing their research and experience, the authors collectively cultivate in the reader a necessary strategic perspective; one that is holistic and systemic in outlook. However, each essay focuses on some specific aspect of transitions and develops it in some detail. Readers will find each essay and its argument stands on its own merit, offering an independent assessment and making a valuable and enduring contribution to the body of knowledge on transitions and state-building.

In organizing the essays, the editor has sought to present the multiple viewpoints that represent the greater international community involved in interventions and transitions: government, non-governmental organizations, academicians, military, and host nation participants. At the same time, as the title suggests, issues, challenges, and solutions that cut across the spectrum of transition are examined. In the concluding chapter, the editor as author provides a summary analysis of the panel discussions following presentations and the results of the small group breakouts conducted each afternoon of the conference.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING TRANSITIONS

Harry R. (Rich) Yarger, Ph.D.


Transitions became an issue of increasing concern for the U.S. government as the fighting in Iraq wound down and it became clear that U.S. combat forces must shortly depart. However, the issue of how to transition authorities and responsibilities assumed during assistance efforts back to a host nation was already a concern among non-governmental organizations. To help all concerned communities better understand transitions and how to effectively pursue them, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) designed and hosted the *Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions* Conference in November 2010. With the support of 13 co-sponsors spanning government, academic, international and non-governmental sectors, the conference served as a vehicle to explore a broader and more common understanding of post-conflict and post-disaster transitions and their proper practice – creating a baseline for various communities to further expand understanding and practice of this important strategic concept. This text provides edited papers from the conference open call for papers selected by a PKSOI review committee for presentation or inclusion as instrumental for understanding of a baseline, but not presented. Collectively, these papers provide strategic insights for understanding the concept of transition and the potential issues, challenges, and solutions associated with it.

THE CONFERENCE

The conference convened November 16-18, 2010, at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. It brought together key international thinkers and practitioners from academia, civilian agencies and organizations, and military services to examine the issues, challenges, and solutions in the transition of assumed responsibilities and authorities back to host nation government agencies and civil society organizations. In addition, the conference advanced opportunities for new thinking, networking, and collaboration among the various communities involved in assistance and transition activities.

In order to establish a transitions baseline, the conference pursued the objectives and used the design methodology depicted in the diagram below:

Two products emerged from the conference: an interim summary and this text. The interim summary, *Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions – Interim Summary Conference Report* is available at <http://pksoi.army.mil/events/transition/> and is the basis for the concluding chapter in this text.



A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE OF TRANSITION¹

Transition is an important strategic concept for intervening states and humanitarian assistance organizations and for host nations and their civil society organizations to understand, but it is inherently complex and problematic. Transition has multiple meanings depending on where on the spectrum of assistance or conflict the various participants find themselves and the level at which they are participating—strategic, operational, or tactical. As the United States and its allies' experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate—and humanitarian organizations appreciate—transition is a lot more complicated than just leaving. The embracement of “whole of government” and “comprehensive” approaches to transitions emphasize it is a strategic undertaking of the first order. To understand transitions, you must understand the volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA) that elevates transition to the strategic level of thinking and the implications of VUCA for strategy, planning, and operations.

You can only reduce the VUCA of transition if you first embrace it—you must comprehend what transition is, how to think strategically about it, and how it fits into strategy, planning, and tactics. While such understanding of transition is complicated by the lack of an appropriate definition and theoretical construct, the basis of both exists in a growing literature in conflict studies and state-building and the collective practical experience acquired over the past 20 years by the United Nations, sponsor states, and nongovernmental organizations. Transition can broadly be described as:

A process or set of processes leading to a specific decision point in conditions and time that morally and legitimately justify the transfer of responsibility, authority, power (capabilities, resources and influence), and accountability for governmental responsibilities to aspiring host nation agencies and authorities from external and internal actors who have assumed host state functions of sovereignty through challenge, necessity, or practice. Transition's moral and legitimacy qualities require manifestation of the host nation populace's acceptance of the government in power, adherence to accepted international standards of good governance, and evidence of sufficient capacity to be successful. Transition occurs incrementally on multiple levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) over time, but success is ultimately defined by acceptable host nation sovereignty.

This description offers an encompassing definition for transition and the components of a theoretical framework. Success is defined as an acceptable host nation sovereignty: (1) a state government that is acceptable to its own population, implying internal legitimacy; (2) one that adheres to accepted international standards of good governance, implying external legitimacy; and (3) evidence of sufficient capacity, implying competence, organization, and infrastructure in governance, services, security, and economics. It suggests that moral, legal, cultural, and power contexts matter and accepts that multiple internal and external actors have usurped the state's sovereignty for numerous and varied reasons, and in differing ways. It acknowledges that transition is a shared responsibility and collaborative act among the usurpers and an aspiring host nation government. It is small wonder that transition exhibits the strategic characteristics of VUCA.


Transitions are collaborative and interactive processes that occur between and among state and non-state actors and the host nation at all levels—tactical, operational, and strategic. Successful transition at the strategic level does not occur until transition at lower levels is suffi-

¹ Adapted from Rich Yarger, “Thinking Strategically About Transition,” article in *PKSOI Bulletin*, Vol. 2, Issue 3, April 2010; available from <http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/journal/pubsreview.cfm?ID=8>, accessed February 15, 2011. This edition of the Bulletin, now titled *PKSOI Journal*, contains a number of short “transition” articles written by PKSOI members in support of the conference.

ciently nested in volume (capacity), kind (capabilities), and quality (competence) in a national paradigm. This choreographed relationship among capacity, capabilities, and competence across levels and time builds resilience and manages expectations. In order to facilitate this nesting, the host nation’s national paradigm – narrative, identity, governance, rule of law, security, economic and fiscal infrastructure, physical infrastructure, and services – must provide an acceptable pattern, establish favorable conditions for individual and community success, support realistic expectations, and be self-sustaining. A national paradigm must consider local, national, and international perspectives in regard to governance as well as the cultural, social, and geographic realities in which the state exists – context matters! It must be mindful of the past, aware of immediate expectations, and accommodate the long-term – seeking a calculated balance that leads to a peaceful and prosperous stability. Processes and actions at lower levels must nest into the national paradigm, adhering to the pattern and contributing to the favorable conditions and self-sustainment – but the national paradigm must facilitate this nesting in vision, stimulus, and capacity in and over time. Consequently, leadership and shaping context are key components of any transition effort.

Since transition occurs incrementally on multiple levels and these levels are interdependent, the leadership of the host nation and supporting state(s) and organizations must shape the context for successful transition to occur. The purpose or goal that justifies a transition must be properly articulated and supported by a believable paradigm, hard accomplishments, and consistency in actions and values inherent to the paradigm by both host and supporting actors. In particular, leadership in the host nation and the key supporting state(s) must provide congruent strategic guidance for nesting transition goals and objectives across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. There must be strategic clarity from both about where the host nation is headed, why the supporting state is present and what they are doing, what the necessary conditions for transition are, and what reasonable expectations should result from a successful transition. Context shaping must be accomplished in such a manner that it accounts for or supplants the varied interests of the multiple state and non-state actors.

Transition at any level or in any area always involves the transfer of responsibility, authority, power (capabilities, resources, and influence), and accountability. The better the transfer is integrated and negotiated at the various levels and among the various internal and external actors, the higher the probability of a successful transition. The more disparities produced among them – whether between an accepting agency and a transferring agency of the supporting and host states, among or within levels in either, between old and new elites, or with other state and nonstate actors – the greater the difficulty and the less likelihood of success. Disparities in volume, kind, and quality at any level or among levels affect transition hierarchically and horizontally, and often exponentially as unmet expectations and apparent inequities materialize. Chance and malevolence can also disrupt transition on any sector and any level. In strategy and planning, transition must be viewed from the perspectives of cumulative, sequential, and



simultaneous actions in order to create synergies and success, but also to take advantage of or mitigate unanticipated consequences.

Ultimately, the goal of any transition is a peaceful and prosperous stability within the host nation and in that state's relationships within the international order. Provisional or interim governments may represent progress in transition but they are not a satisfactory political end state for the host nation or long term stability and progress. Properly pursued, transition minimizes corruption and dependency. It significantly enhances the probabilities of the success of the host nation in achieving a new and positive competitive stability in the emerging world order. Leadership within the host nation and the supporting nation must create and pursue national visions for the prosperity and stability for both states that are evident for both populations. For the U.S. military and its allies, the professional concern cannot end until any military mission success has been converted into lasting political success. Strategy and planning by the host nation and supporting states and other organizations create a framework for properly integrated actions at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels leading to this political success. While spoilers may seek other goals, they are out of step with history. Good strategic thinking on the part of the host nation and its supporters confirms this.

THE TEXT

In the chapters that follow, a wide range of authors—scholars, policy advisors, government administrators, professional military, host nation participants, and members of the assistance community—share their knowledge, insights, and experience in regard to transitions through essays addressing the subject from different levels and perspectives. Their essays offer definitions, theoretical constructs, and perspectives in regard to the issues, challenges and solutions of transitions. From their essays the astute reader can gain an understanding of the VUCA of transition and develop a strategic perspective for how to develop appropriate strategies, plans, and operations that empower the host nation and society so that good governance and a supporting society prevail.

CONCLUSION

This text cannot provide a universal solution for every transition, or any one transition in particular. What it aspires to do is inform the reader's understanding of the issues, challenges, and solutions of transitions in general and stimulate the reader's thinking in regard to their own transition circumstances.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUALIZING “TRANSITIONS”

Jacqueline L. Chura-Beaver

U.S. Army Peace Keeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)

Transition, as currently used, lacks unified comprehension among its various actors to make it a shared strategic concept for empowering recovering fragile and failed states. Recent uses of transition as a critical piece of “shape-clear-hold-build-transition” have made the concept synonymous with “handoff” between military and civilian authorities or switching military responsibility between intervention forces and the host nation.¹ However, the complexity of stability operations requires a definition that is much more than handing authority from one entity to another. If transition is to be achieved at the strategic, “whole-of-society”² level it must be approached through community, regional, and national (intrastate) level goals across all societal spheres. Only a “comprehensive approach,”³ one which takes into account the pieces and the whole, makes transition an effective plan for enhancing peace in conflict prone societies. Most transitional approaches lack the collective foresight and dedicated leadership required to promote this comprehensive concept that unifies tactical, operational, and strategic initiatives across the spectrum of assistance and development to create sustainable transition – and ultimately stability.

DEFINING “TRANSITION”: A TENUOUS TASK

Historically, the United States has undertaken many stabilization missions around the world requiring government officials to deal with complex issues spanning political, military, economic, and social spheres of influence. The lessons learned are often reflected in the mechanisms, procedures, and doctrine used to guide the various government agencies in such operating environments. However, these experiences and lessons largely remain intangible in policy and strategy formulation as they have never explored the definition and analysis required to cull the larger and more universal insights necessary for theory to support policy and strategy. Such is the case in current stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where “transition” is heralded as the guiding strategy to stabilize both countries. Yet, transition remains an ephemeral concept without concrete definition and supporting theoretical precepts on which to found ends, ways, and means for either policy or strategy. Consequently, intervening and host-nation governments have no intellectual foundation for agreement or appropriate action, and policy and strategy for both are complicated by misunderstanding and missteps.

1 Transition, as described in *Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations*, exclusively deals with transitional military authority. Little emphasis is placed on other factors that lead to a whole-of-nation transformation promoting sustainable reform in post-conflict environments. See: Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008.

2 “Whole-of-society” refers to an approach that embraces all entities involved with defense, diplomacy, and development. “Whole-of-society” approaches cross several spheres of community development, including national, regional, and community level resources. For a more detailed explanation of “whole-of-society,” see Dr. Lisa Schirch’s interview on PKSOI’s website: http://www.youtube.com/user/USArmyPKSOI#p/u/8/uiRErKc_gvI.

3 “Comprehensive approach” refers to a methodology that wages the influence of all actors involved in post-conflict or chaotic situations. In terms of U.S. security policy, a “comprehensive approach” is broader than home agencies; it incorporates the talents of multinational partners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society groups.

FM 3-07 Transition

4-72. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. The shift in relative priority between the elements of full spectrum operations – such as from offense to stability – also involves a transition. Transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution. Potential transitions are identified during planning and accounted for throughout execution; assessment ensures that progress toward such transitions is measured and appropriate actions are taken to prepare for and execute them. The force is vulnerable during transitions, and commanders are taken to prepare for and execute them. The force is vulnerable during transitions, and commanders establish clear conditions for their execution. Transitions may create unexpected opportunities; they may also make forces vulnerable to enemy threats or unanticipated changes to the situation.

4-73. An unexpected change in conditions may require commanders to direct an abrupt transition between phases. In such cases, the overall composition of the force remains unchanged despite sudden changes in mission, task organization, and rules of engagement. Typically, task organization evolves to meet changing conditions; however, transition planning must also account for changes in the mission. Commanders attuned to sudden changes can better adapt their forces to dynamic conditions. They continuously assess the situation and task-organize and cycle their forces to retain the initiative. They strive to achieve changes in emphasis without incurring an operational pause.

4-74. Stability operations include transitions of authority and control among military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, and the host nation. Each transition involves inherent risk. That risk is amplified when multiple transitions must be managed simultaneously or when the force must quickly conduct a series of transitions. Planning anticipates these transitions, and careful preparation and diligent execution ensures they occur without incident. Transitions are identified as decisive points on lines of effort; they typically mark a significant shift in effort and signify the gradual return to civilian oversight and control of the host nation.

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008, p. 4-14.

U.S. military doctrine on transition is better developed than that of other agencies, but is still ambiguous and fails to coherently develop the concept in tactical, operational, and strategic terms. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, notes that “transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution ... and accounted for throughout execution.”⁴ In this instance, the doctrine calls for both comprehensive and individualized approaches to deal with the many issues that surround transition and the need to adapt to mission requirements per authoritative guidance. However, FM 3-07 does not state what transition *is* to better clarify *how* it can be achieved in order to guide strategists, planners, and commanders in creating sustainable stability. Tactical, operational, and strategic frameworks are not well developed or linked.

Most policymakers, strategists, and higher level planners lack this holistic appreciation of transition, resulting in calculations that fail to integrate ends, ways, and means to fit both short- and long-term goals. The disparities created often require individual leaders in the field to produce their own unique definitions of what transition is and how to achieve it in order to cope with their own piece of the complex environment and complete their perceived transitional mission. In shaping their mission sets and goals to conform to individual interpretations, subordinate leaders contribute to mismatched activities across the tactical, operational, and strategic spectrums. The result is a highly dysfunctional transition strategy that fails or only marginally supports national interests and objectives. The mismatch is compounded when other agencies and actors are involved. Clearly, a shared conceptual framework and definition of transition is necessary to undertake effective and efficient stability operations by multi-agency, multinational, and multi-sector personnel.

On several occasions, members of the greater stability operations community have attempted to create conceptual frameworks for transition, but most have

been flawed by reliance on unique personal experience, institutional bias, or parochial views of the challenge.⁵ In many respects the singular vantage point of an individual or organization shades the way transition is approached and packaged in crafting responses and guidance in ongoing operations. Such individual perspective and experience is crucial to understanding aspects of transition in complex environments, but individual preference, stove-piped institu-

4 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008, p. 4-14.

5 Based on interviews with practitioners. Many state that the policy community is often not aware of how difficult transition is to achieve. A lack of information about transition shades how policy is framed and tasked for practitioners.

tional procedures, and at best tenuous relationships between civil and military organizations have *prevented effective collaboration and analysis of transition*. As a result, no holistic definition or conceptual framework for transition – one that spans the military, government departments, civil society, and host nation perspectives – has emerged. Combining individual experiences and insights to develop a definition and suitable principles on which the greater community could agree would advance the concept’s clarity and implementation at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. It would lead to more effective and better integrated ends, ways, and means for actors at all levels and better achieve transitional success.

No comprehensive, strategic definition of transition is recognized in the stability operations community. Per the recognition and prompting of the U.S. Army, transition was tentatively defined by a group of researchers in 2009 who sought to clarify the wider implications of transition on the “whole-of-society” community.⁶ The researchers provided a broader definition to the challenge based on research and feedback from academics, the interagency, non-governmental institutions, and multinational partners:

Transition is a multi-faceted concept involving the application of tactical, operational, strategic, and international level resources (means) over time in a sovereign territory to influence institutional and environmental conditions for achieving and sustaining clear societal goals (ends), guided by local rights to self-determination and international norms. Transition is inherently complex, and may include multiple, smaller-scale transitions that occur simultaneously or sequentially. These small-scale activities focus on building specific institutional capacities and creating intermediate conditions that contribute to the realization of long-term goals.⁷

While this definition is helpful and embodies the holistic nature of transition, the concept remains impalpable without further explanation and appropriate analytical frameworks. Transition must be broken into digestible, tangible components to be useful as a concept to the multiple and diverse groups participating in the broad transition process – and more so for any hope of collaboration among these groups. Additional analytical lenses contribute to achieving transition at the host nation level by uncovering and exploiting the potential interactions, positive and negative consequences, and hierarchies inherent to this level and its broader goals and objectives. It also provides the partial and holistic concepts needed to plan for transition at lower levels of operation. Most importantly, conceptualizing transition more fully aids policymakers in determining appropriate policy and strategy to achieve broader stability goals.

Seeing the “Big Picture”

Think of transition as a puzzle that creates a picture out of multiple, smaller scale pictures: a photo-mosaic puzzle. Each puzzle piece contains fragments that build smaller pictures when placed together, but the puzzle is not completed until all the smaller pictures create the “big-big picture.” Transition is much the same way – several parts feed into several larger parts that affect the ultimate output. Completing the puzzle requires first understanding the parts and matching them together to create a larger outcome. The puzzle is put together one piece at a time, but organizing and sequencing the pieces is easier if you have a clear picture of what the completed puzzle is supposed to reveal.

BREAKING DOWN STRATEGIC TRANSITION

Part of the difficulty in understanding and successfully pursuing transition is that many policymakers, strategists, planners, and leaders at all levels either oversimplify or over-complicate the challenge of transitioning. Some focus on transition as simply the achievement of specific and often limited objectives in their specific operating environment, rather than see-

⁶ In 2009, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) began a research initiative with Syracuse University’s Institute for National Security and Counter Terrorism (INSCT) to explore transition components. The research has thus far produced a comprehensive literature review on the topic.

⁷ Nick Armstrong and Jacqueline Chura-Beaver, *Harnessing Post-Conflict Transitions: A Conceptual Primer*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010.

ing the need for their efforts to feed goals and objectives that advance transition as a strategic whole. For others, tactical transitional activities are represented in statistical goals or very specific benchmarks that are measurable and become ends in themselves, but may misrepresent or be unrelated to the real challenges at operational and strategic levels. All transition is complex because transitions involve human systems. At the strategic level the component parts must be understood in order to comprehend the whole, but the whole is often more or less than the sum of component parts. Transition is pursued on different levels by using these simplified, digestible parts, but it is the integration of the parts that creates a recognizable whole – the strategic transition. It must be noted that a strategic transition’s great complexity results from the interaction between levels and systems in a manner so that the component parts or subsystems cannot always be coherently separated. Nonetheless, some clarity of understanding is gained through deconstructing strategic transition and examining interactions to uncover potential relational effects.

Types of Transition

Any analysis of transition literature, whether academic or governmental, reveals that distinctions exist among realms of post-conflict and other transitions.⁸ Accordingly, six unique types of transitions are addressed in the literature.⁹ Each of these individual types of transitions is somewhat distinct in the particular attributes and activities that characterize them and are particularly useful in understanding the attributes, interactions, and potential changes in each specific realm. Fully understanding each piece provides for greater comprehension of transition parameters in relation to more holistic policy, strategic, and operational contexts.

It is essential to understand the differences among transition types and that they are manifested at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to fully conceptualize strategic transition – and to integrate them into a cohesive whole at all levels. Yet, because transitions are about complex human systems, transition initiatives at higher levels result in smaller scale transitions at lower levels that in turn affect the larger context of activities and goals in both intended and unintended ways. These small or lower level transitions interact through combined or overlapping activities that produce dual effects in operating environments, often prompting changes in related transitional realms.¹⁰ In a similar manner, a well intended but uncoordinated transition activity at the lowest level can move strategic transition forward or threaten its success. A closer look at each type of transition provides significant insights into the particular actors and activities involved, imparting the understanding necessary for producing intended effects in support of broader stability goals and to garner against unintended effects.

War-to-Peace: War-to-peace transitions describe a broad category of change as societies move from violent armed conflict to more normal, legitimate authority over and use of force. War-to-peace transitions are found in literature describing interstate warfare and conflict transformation activities within the state. Often, international actors (including the UN, World Bank, and NATO) are active participants in fostering this particular type of transition. War-to-peace transitions tend to focus on realist and liberal mechanisms, such as common threats in the former and cooperative international institutions in the latter, to stabilize the situation. War-to-peace transitions can span multiple levels of influence, including interna-

8 For a more thorough explanation of the literature review, see: Nick Armstrong and Jacqueline Chura-Beaver, *Harnessing Post-Conflict Transitions: A Conceptual Primer*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010.

9 Most texts do not explicitly use the term “transition” to describe the concept, but allude to it. These descriptions are similar enough to be included in this analysis.

10 Harry R. Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional*, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2008.

tional, regional, or intrastate (domestic) realms, and include activities such as reconstruction and development.

Power: Power transitions refer to changes in relative power between states operating in the international system.¹¹ Most power transitions relate to changes in security policy that affect the geopolitical relationships between competing states. They are usually a subset of war-to-peace transitions but deal specifically with the posture of states' relative and perceived influence. Power transitions are discussed in international relations literature, and deal almost exclusively with realist power mechanisms. The success or failure of other types of transitions can trigger a power transition.

Societal: Societal transition focuses on many of the same concepts of war-to-peace transitions, but at the intrastate level. Societal transitions deal specifically with the norms and rules of interaction that guide citizen behavior. This type of transition focuses more heavily on quality of life issues (human security) and civil society building. The basis for societal transition is that socially-built institutions foster social cooperation and reconciliation. These same civil groups also act as "filler institutions"¹² in areas where the government is unable to provide public goods and services. Societal transitions rely heavily on reconstruction and development and strengthen organizations and institutions that foster social cooperation and build social capital. However, more tumultuous acts that trigger transition, such as revolution, may create factions within society.

Political: Political transitions focus on the processes for changing functions and institutions of the state through introduction or reconstruction that improves the quality of the regime, often seeking to democratize it. In many cases, political transitions result as a change in authorized power through revolution, violent uprising, coup d'état, election, or intervention. Changes take place in political transitions as the security sector, justice mechanisms, political and economic elites, and media all conform to the new power structure. Political transitions are often equated with democratic transitions, which are a subset of this category.¹³

Security: Security transitions are about the proper assumption of responsibility for use of force within a sovereign state by legitimate and capable institutions (i.e., military or police). Literature on security transition often discusses the creation of safe and secure environments, and pinpoints this sector as the bedrock for other reconstruction and development to occur. Security transition activities tend to be broad in scope, but modern literature emphasizes creating and/or recreating functioning police and military institutions and professionalizing security forces. Security transitions are integral to other types of transitions, providing enabling conditions for governance, economic development, and societal reform.

Economic: Economic transitions are often neglected or underappreciated in the immediate pursuit of security and stability, but are arguably the most important in achieving sustained success in strategic transition. Research focuses on development of sustained economic growth patterns, economic infrastructure design, and market liberalization as foundations of success. Economic transition can vary in scope, ranging from community to national focus. In a post-conflict context, economic transition success is often limited by curtailed timelines and disjointed international efforts. Economic transitions are dictated by how well a country establishes an environment for wealth creation.

While dissimilar in scope and focus, these different types of transitions are inherent to strategic transition. Understanding them individually and how they interact provides thought-

11 K.N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1979.

12 "Filler institutions" refer to functions and activities undertaken by sources other than the government. In a positive transition context, filler institutions work in support of government institutions.

13 Democratic transitions deal more specifically with a change in formal political power and usually result in the establishment of political and institutional liberalization.

provoking insights in how large-scale, strategic transitions should be planned and occur – and how to adapt when the unexpected occurs. Unfortunately, when too many actors are involved in transitions, scaling goals to the specific boundaries of an individual transition type is overwhelmingly tempting because it falsely minimizes the complexity of transition and serves personal ambition, garners resources, and masks responsibility for failure. However, the relationships and interactions among these transition types, whether producing intended or unintended consequences, determines overall success and its respective costs. Cross-cutting linkages and principles can unlock how to understand, integrate, and sequence these transitions – and the activities that drive them – to produce effects that satisfy strategic and operational objectives.

Processing Transition

Grasping strategic transition requires more than analyzing and categorizing the types. Rather, it necessitates an intensive understanding of how the types work concomitantly to form a comprehensive whole. For practitioners in very complex environments (such as stability operations), the activities espoused by each of the individual types of transitions overlap and interact to produce effects at higher levels of analysis – strategic effects. That is, the day-to-day decisions and actions at the lowest levels interact and contribute positively or negatively to produce larger scale transitions that contribute to and detract from broader planning and strategy objectives. A framework to analyze these interrelationships, as well as how they may affect specific sectors of the operating environment, is necessary for a strategy and planning that creates positive whole-of-society effects.

An analysis of case studies suggests that larger transitions are driven by three key components: *the level of interaction, context, and function* of transitional activities. These components serve as useful lenses for developing strategic transition. Distinguishing the attributes of these frames of reference, as well as their relation to objectives, provides a framework to coherently understand *how* transitions occur and *what* kinds of outcomes are produced in conceptually complete transitions of each type. In turn, the inter-dynamics among specific transitions can be shaped to fit policy objectives and desired strategic outcomes.

The interaction among “pieces” can be thought of as the process that initiates national or strategic transition. The three lenses provided to arrange these pieces together are intended to aid practitioners and academics in thinking holistically about transition at all levels of activity, and specifically questions how these procedures should be integrated and sequenced to realize strategic goals.

Level of Interaction: Level of interaction refers to the scope of interest of actors involved in or affected by transitional activities. Within transition, interactions can occur at multiple levels, ranging among community, provincial, national, regional, and international forums. The extent of reach and consequence of each interaction is the direct result of the types of actors involved in both causing the need for and implementing transitional activities. For example, external involvement changes the nature of interaction involved in creating and implementing transitional activities, requiring potentially different approaches to foster transition and mollify participants. United Nations involvement in East Timor in the aftermath of violence in 1999 prompted calls from the international community to create an independent, democratic government in the territory. This specific mandate required the use of international peacekeeping forces in the formation of a transition plan and greatly escalated the stakes for both internal and external actors involved in the transition.¹⁴ Different actors seek to shade how internal and external policies and

14 UN involvement in East Timor created a burden for the international community by requiring long-term assistance to build democratic structures, increase human rights training, and broker a cease fire between East Timor and Indonesian forces.

strategies are approached, created, and disseminated, as well as what particular activities will be undertaken. As a result, those pursuing strategic or more specific transitions should be careful to shape solutions appropriate for the various levels of interaction and meet the needs of those involved to minimize resistance and garner support.

Context: Context considers the various sectors involved in the transitional environment and how they interact. As a part of the framework it requires analysis of the conditions, variables, and potential outcomes for each sector. Context is most often associated with topic areas – including governance, social justice, security, economics, and power relationships. As a result, many practitioners narrow their scope of consideration by focusing exclusively on one particular type of contextual transition, such as security, in shaping transitional initiatives.¹⁵

Strategies are often built around requirements to achieve a specific sector objective, rather than focusing on the larger, more integrative end-game transitional outcomes that lead to sustainable stability.

Context is affected by the level of interaction. Context becomes more complicated as the level of interaction increases or moves toward the inclusion of more actors. Often, different players focus on sectors that are relevant to their own personal, group, or national goals and priorities and create undue competition with other spheres of influence. If collaboration among these actors does not occur, strategies often oppose each other as multiple contexts compete for primary influence in the affected state. Multi-disciplinary approaches are necessary to address the different contexts in a single transitional environment to achieve strategic transition. In this regard, policy and strategy provide overarching guidance to the operational levels so they can better plan bundles of activities that appropriately drive mutually supporting outcomes for both smaller and larger transitions.

Misinterpreting the End Game

Many documents on stability operations missions focus exclusively on transitioning security in unstable areas. A recent Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) presentation labeled the development of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) as the “groundwork for transition” in Afghanistan. Such emphasis is shortsighted considering that no local community forces exist to respond to the panoply of issues affecting the country, especially since it requires social and economic development to enhance security, create community buy-in, and establish sustainable programs.

Source: “Shaping Transition: Creating an Effective ANSF and Laying the Groundwork for Transition,” briefing slides, Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2010.

Function: A function is the most basic transition level, focusing on specific tactical or local level activities and actions that drive changes in the transitional environment. Functions seek to positively affect the advancement of particular contexts by carefully calibrating specific activities and actions with higher operational goals. Functions usually are composed of several different tasks focused on achieving very specific objectives. For example, police training is a function consisting of mentoring, field work, and professionalization programs. The determination of functions is made at higher levels – policy, strategic, and operational planning – by the analysis of levels of interaction and context. They are expressed in the objectives and concepts or courses of action provided by these higher levels.

Functions can be generally categorized into four main areas. Each function provides specific benchmarks and/or goals that are achievable at the tactical level.

1. Process: Process describes a set of activities and tasks specifically calibrated and sequenced to shape the environment appropriately in support of stated goals and missions. Processes are usually bounded by doctrine, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and specific individual task assignments to ensure that necessary outputs are routinely and flawlessly produced in a timely and sequential manner.

¹⁵ Many practitioners believe that issues in most fragile states result from a failure to provide security. Especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, security is considered the preeminent variable affecting the sustainable stability of the state.


2. **Authority Transfer:** One of the most well-known transition types, authority transfer describes the process of handing responsibility of activities from one actor to another. In a post-conflict context, authority transfer usually occurs between the intervening force and the host-nation once established mechanisms and responsibilities are institutionalized. Authority transfer is often used as a benchmark for transition, signaling a significant change in relative stability or progress of a sector.

3. **Phasing:** Phasing refers to the “continuum of activities that span the political, economic, social, and military realms of state building over a period” to produce unique results that affect particular outcomes in stability environments.¹⁶ Phasing is usually multidisciplinary, focusing on exact sequencing of activities over a span of time to produce specific results. Phasing can be applied to other functions (in particular, authority transfer) to produce incremental benchmarks to measure stability in a frame of reference.

4. **End State:** End state is a benchmark in stability operations that recognizes when particular aspects of the transitional environment are stabilized. End states usually refer to the qualitative differences between indicators in pre- and post-conflict environments. Usually, end states are synonymous with the achievement of certain international or national goals, including human rights regulations and democratic election standards. End states usually signify enhanced stability in a region as they provide quantifiable progress benchmarks.

The framework and lenses provided in this section are not scientific mechanisms guaranteeing successful strategic transition. They are, however, a framework for policymakers, strategists, planners, and leaders at all levels who seek to grapple with the complexity of the concept or strategic transition and understand its many dynamics and interactions.

By providing a framework to analyze and discern how transition pieces fit together to build wider effects, these components are a start to more comprehensively approach transitions across tactical, operational, and strategic levels.



Adapted from diagram in: Nick Armstrong and Jacqueline Chura-Beaver, *Harnessing Post-Conflict Transitions: A Conceptual Primer*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010.

16 Nick Armstrong and Jacqueline Chura-Beaver, *Harnessing Post-Conflict Transitions: A Conceptual Primer*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010, p. 9.

PULLING THE PUZZLE TOGETHER

While the above framework simplifies the complexity of transition, several key issues in regard to successful strategic transition remain and merit equal consideration. How do intervening transition advocates positively engage others in the many processes complicating *all* types of transition? And, how do you *maintain* trends to advance transition for enhanced stability in the *long-term* for *strategic* success? Many contend that continual performance of the activities and procedures mentioned above, in a methodical and planned way, will promote this greater end-state. Perhaps so. However, in a world of finite resources and inconsistent political will, consideration of other means of fostering transition in the short-term and avoiding the resource drain that often consumes the political will of intervening authorities are in order. History suggests interveners cannot solely rely on their own drive and willpower to create and sustain a transition environment over the long-term, especially since resources are finite.

Numerous academic studies and individual analysis of the subjects of intervention and development contend that host-nation authorities and the populace must actively engage in the process to really make it “work” within the context of defined societal and political goals, processes, and structures that span all levels of transitional policy, strategy, and planning.¹⁷ Such analysis suggests stratagems and methods should be explored and used to empower the host-nation with the appropriate capacity and incentives or disincentives to support completion of transition. Such a course is logical since host-nation officials may have the greater insight on how to pull transition’s many pieces together. In many cases, their dedication and confidence can make the difference in success and failure, and their inclusion provides a greater assurance that progress will continue.

Recent experience with and analysis of transitions suggests that the transition process in these fragile states is more sociological than believed. Positive, or at least constructive, personal interactions between outside actors and host nation authorities are required to prepare the environment for “big picture” transition outcomes. Partnership is the operative word, and while partners may be more or less equal as progress occurs in transition, mutual respect and mutually appreciated priorities and objectives are essential attributes of the most successful transitions. At the core of transition is the capacity to impart, accept, and make use of advice, information, insight, and experience – or knowledge – to create locally acceptable solutions and mechanisms that meet external standards within socially appropriate boundaries. The most fundamental level of transition preparation requires a “knowledge transition”¹⁸ for societies to move successfully from the conditions that create instability and violence to conditions of stability, and consequently sustain changes in the long term *on their own*. The bigger challenge is how best to transfer this knowledge, creating the ability to transform existing contexts into workable governing, social, and economic systems, into latent skills, processes, and institutions that can be used by the host nation over the long-term.

Again, the more recent experience of the international community and the peoples and governments of the states that have required intervention are focusing the attention of all parties on the need to partner effectively and more clearly share knowledge, creating a two-way flow that both informs and is informative. As host-nations have grasped the challenges of transition and become more aware of the real political and resource limits intervening forces are confronted

17 Most prolific of these studies is Eleanor Ostrom’s *The Samaritan’s Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid* (2005). The study contends that programs that fail to elicit input and buy-in from host-nation entities tend to create situations requiring long-term involvement from outside actors to make systems temporarily sustainable. She concludes that host nation buy-in is crucial to developing programs that are beneficial and sustainable to the host-nation and outside actors.

18 Here, “knowledge transition” is used to convey the transfer of information, expertise, and experience from the intervening force to host-nation entities to aid reconstruction planning.

with, they have become more committed to the necessity of ownership. At the same time, intervening powers and agencies have learned the consequences for objectives and costs of not considering internal dynamics, human capital, and culture in formulating their strategies and plans. Such receptivity, if it can be continued and enhanced, offers new potential for assistance and progress in these states. In the 21st century world, both technological and knowledge geared, resources and information are conveyed through modern technological marvels – computers, databases, smart phones, internet relationships . . . the list is exhaustive. Technology can work to create external and internal relationships and partnering at multiple levels simultaneously in any of the contexts: it can serve as a conduit to enhance the transition of whole nations if manipulated in the correct way.

A recent philanthropic summit, hosted by former President Bill Clinton, noted that technology is a major contributor to advancing the growth of weak states. One participant indicated that technology “allows us [the IT community] to change people’s lives at tremendous speed” and has long-term implications on outcomes.¹⁹ Such technology will dramatically change how stability operations are undertaken, transition in particular. It would allow the host nation and its partners to shape the dynamics aligning transition towards more productive ends that are culturally acceptable and inclusive.

Instant Transition?

At the touch of a button host-nation authorities could access an array of information directly linked to transition – development projects, chats with international mentors, diagrams of neighborhoods and economic trends – the information is prolific. Why not use this technology to help the host-nation undertake transition on its own, shaping policies based on real-time data and feedback from their own constituents and international mentors?

Technology is not the end-all answer to solving transition issues, but is a key enabler worth exploration if stability operations continue to plague 21st century stability. Technology is prone to its own problem sets of misinformation, information overload, infrastructure shortages, and authentication and compatibility issues. Consequently, transition remains fundamentally a human enterprise; however, technology can facilitate effective partnership, knowledge sharing, and the better use of resources. Knowledge sharing and communications are the glue that hold the transition puzzle pieces together and create long-term stability. Learning how to communicate with and convey knowledge to the correct people, those who drive positive change over the long-term, is integral to integrating all types of transitions together.

CONCLUSION

Much like a complex puzzle demands intense scrutiny and study of the pieces, transition also requires a comprehensive analysis to place its many pieces together into the “big picture” of policy and strategy. Understanding how these pieces fit together is aided by the framework offered herein. It helps understand the different types of transitions and how they interact and are influenced to form substantial results and outcomes. The complex challenge of strategic transition is essentially a dual process: multiple approaches must be recognized or created and utilized or compensated for by other actions in an effort to calibrate all the activities to enhance the end game. Some can be foreseen through advanced analysis and are logically addressed in policy, strategy, and planning. Others are unforeseen and require adaptations in course as they emerge. Effective partnerships and knowledge sharing at all levels enhance both. Nonetheless, transition is inherently a human enterprise and perhaps the greater challenge is in finding or developing those individuals with the insights and tacit knowledge required to take on the complexity, and the creativity and foresight to draw the multiple pieces together.

¹⁹ David Storey, “Internet Said to Speed Development for Poor Nations,” New York Times, September 23, 2010. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/09/23/technology/tech-us-philanthropy-clinton.html>

CHAPTER 3

“JUS TRANSITUS”: TOWARDS AN ETHICAL BASELINE FOR TRANSITIONS

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INTRODUCTION

Ethics is an inherent aspect of transitions at all levels, and usually those who have intervened in a situation want to “do the right thing” and do it well. However, there are limited resources and pressing obligations at home, so there is constant pressure to finish the job and get out—in other words, to transition. Most discussions about transition rightly focus on the practical aspects of the problem, and it is natural for those who have to turn policy decisions into operational and tactical activities to focus on making transitions work. Nonetheless, the “do the right thing” component of any strategy deserves serious attention as well, because it informs and structures what all the practical efforts are working towards, and may ultimately determine success or failure. What ethical obligations are there in transition situations, and how do we decide when these obligations are met? What should be the ethical underpinnings of our involvement, and more specifically, what are the ethical issues inherent to transitions?

Largely, the ethics of transition fall within existing frameworks, especially the Just War tradition and emerging *jus post bellum* thought. However, there are aspects of transition that are not fully addressed, or that differ in scope from the ethics of war. Such questions are better addressed through an ethical framework for strategic decision-making on transitions. This essay argues for a “*jus transitus*”, a set of ethical criteria for “Just Transition” that complements Just War theory, and suggests what such a framework might look like.¹

ETHICS OVERVIEW

Ethics is the philosophical study of moral values—the principles of right and wrong that are accepted by an individual or a social group. An ethical code is a system of principles governing morality and acceptable conduct.² The goal of all ethical frameworks is to tell us what we must do, what we may do if we choose, and what we cannot do. At the strategic level, “ethical thinking as a competency evaluates the ‘rightness’ of a policy or strategy. It gets into the acceptability of policy and strategy, both at home and among other actors, and the effects of strategic behavior and its consequences.”³ A necessary basic assumption for discussing ethics in the context of transition is that ethics and ethical behavior matters in the first place and that there is value to having a moral framework for responsible national behavior in international affairs. In the 21st century, this value is self-evident based on the value both large and small states and international populations place on legitimacy.⁴ Legitimacy implies a public ethical code that is defensible, that determines state behavior, and that serves as a standard for judging the actions of nations.

1 *Translation Guide Dot Com*; available from www.translation-guide.com, accessed January 10, 2011. *Transitus* is translated as: “crossing, passing over, transit, changing, alteration.”

2 Wordnet Search; available from wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=ethics, accessed January 10, 2011.

3 Harry R. Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, Westport, CT, 2008.

4 *Ibid.*, 74-77.

In a transition environment there are many different and often conflicting ethical codes involved, including the personal ethics of individuals, the organizational ethics of each involved group, the national ethics of intervening nations and the host nation, and various sets of international ethics that apply to different levels and subsets. Beyond that, there are conflicting values within all ethical codes—liberty versus order, or the lives of others versus the lives of our own, for example. According to the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, “The essence of ethics lies in reconciling competing claims and often making hard choices between them. In other words, if there is no ethical dilemma then there is no ethical question. It is also about expanding the range of choices and imagining a better future.”⁵

Ethical dilemmas are best resolved through sound decision-making processes. A typical ethical decision-making process begins with a clear definition of the ethical problem, and then identifies relevant rules. These “relevant rules” include laws, religion, and ethical frameworks or codes, such as the ethical framework for transitions explored in this essay. It then develops courses of action, evaluates them by viewing the problem and the relevant rules from the perspective of one or more ethical theories, and eventually chooses a course of action.⁶ The guiding principle of this process, and of ethics in general, is that our first question is not “What should we do?” but rather “What is the right thing to do?”⁷

One pertinent and well-developed existing ethical code is Just War theory, which provides an ethical framework for the conduct of war.⁸ The first two categories of Just War ethics—*jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*—are well established and enshrined in international law through the various Geneva and Hague conventions, for example. They tell us when war is ethically allowable, and how we must conduct ourselves within an ethically justified war. According to *jus ad bellum* (the right to go to war) war is justified when a legitimate authority, for a just cause and with right intentions, as a last resort, conducts it with a reasonable probability of success and with proportionality between the expected benefits and the expected harms. *Jus in bello* (right conduct within war) requires combatants to use discrimination in directing acts of war only at enemy combatants, to attack only military targets from military necessity, and to attack with a proportionality of anticipated military advantage compared to harm to civilians.

An emerging third category of Just War theory is *Jus post bellum*—justice after war. This is a recent addition to the philosophy and not yet a settled body of thought. However, there is some consensus for including criteria such as security (order or stability), governmental legitimacy, and justice.⁹ Other proposed criteria include elements from *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, such as just cause, right intentions, discrimination, and proportionality. In addition, some have proposed democratic government and respect for civil rights.

5 “The Carnegie Council’s Approach to Ethics”, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs; available from www.cceia.org/education/001/ethics/0001.html, accessed September 28, 2010.

6 For example, the utilitarian approach favors the action that produces the greatest good or the least harm, while the Kantian approach considers principles over results and emphasizes treating people as ends rather than means.

7 Ethical decision-making is not solely a strategic process. There are complex ethical questions at all levels of action, and in today’s world the “strategic corporal” truly can make ethical decisions that have strategic impact. Ethical decisions at all levels are important, and must be guided by sound rules of engagement and a strong ethic at individual and organizational levels. However, ethical decisions at the strategic level set the tone, and they are the focus of this discussion.

8 Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, New York: Basic Books, 1977.

9 Doug McCready, “Ending the War Right: Jus post Bellum and the Just War Tradition,” *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2009, pp. 70-74; available from www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a909917417~db=all, accessed September 28, 2010. McCready provides a good overview of prominent sets of proposed jus post bellum criteria.

Transition is a complex strategic process and many other specific ethical guidelines and frameworks apply. The professional ethical codes of medicine, accounting, legal practice, engineering, etc., all contribute to an understanding of the overall ethical nature of transitions. In many instances, these are very specific sets of written technical guidelines meant to govern the conduct of specific activities. No single framework can address all the codes' concerns. The greater question is not about the technicalities of these codes, but rather the strategic transition question of how closely a donor or host nation must adhere to the accepted international standards in each of these specific ethical codes in or before transition, and how to find an acceptable balance among the dilemmas posed.

It is also important to understand that ethical decision-making is not bounded by the constraints of academic rigor. A proper ethical framework for transition should also consider common understandings of ethical behavior, the "common sense" that guides actions and reactions in transition. For example, Roy Williams discusses the impact of donor nation money promised, but delayed or not given, in the wake of natural disaster in Haiti.¹⁰ International aid requires recipient planning and the physical commitments of recipient staff and resources to prepare to receive and use these large donations. What happens to that investment on the recipient side, if the promised donations are not delivered? Of course, the impacts are large and negative in both lost time and energy, but also in the reputation of those involved—both domestically and internationally. The common moral value violated here can be stated in this way: "Do what you say you'll do – your word is your bond." This is just one example of an underlying ethic that also includes "Finish what you start," "Play fair," and "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." It is a colloquial, common-sense understanding of playground justice, or "all I really need to know I learned in kindergarten."¹¹ It is simple and informal, but it is also more or less universal, a basic ethical frame of reference for a majority of people in the world. For an ethical code to work, it must be defensible and recognizable at the lowest levels of interaction, and in a 21st century transitional context, the common person must understand the just nature of the intervention, and the just intentions for the departure of intervening powers.

THE NEED FOR "JUS TRANSITUS"

A simple strategic definition explains transition as the conclusion of an intervention in one state by another state or group of states and the processes through which that conclusion is reached. Interventions occur frequently. Each intervention eventually involves some form of transition, and the quality of the transition often determines the strategic success or failure of the intervention. However, transition is not a simple thing. As Nicholas J. Armstrong and Jacqueline Chura-Beaver make clear in their primer on the topic, transition is a complex concept with varying meanings in different contexts. It occurs on multiple levels, consists of different types, and it must deal with "interdependencies between types."¹² Comprehending this crucial term and its parameters is a challenge.¹³ This complex, pivotal, and unique nature of transition justifies a distinct set of ethical criteria for transition – a framework to help turn good intentions into effective and ethical decision-making, to institutionalize existing ethical transition practices, and to properly frame the ethical questions involved.

10 Roy Williams, "Haiti 2010: Coming Out of Disaster," panel presentation at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, November 17, 2011.

11 Robert Fulgham, *All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten*, New York: The Ballantine Publishing Group, 1986.

12 Nicholas J. Armstrong and Jacqueline Chura-Beaver, *Harnessing Post-Conflict Transitions: A Conceptual Primer*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010.

13 Armstrong and Chura-Beaver, p. 2. "Several attempts have been made to codify the term by assigning concrete attributes and qualities to transition mechanisms, but this has caused consternation in the actual application of the term to stability operations."

“Good” reasons motivate most modern interventions, or at least form the basis for rationalizing and marketing them to domestic and international audiences.¹⁴ Armstrong and Chura-Beaver summarize the motivation for the many post-Cold War United Nations or U.S.-led operations as “a fundamental, normative goal of transforming a state and society in ways that promote sustainable peace, good governance, and economic prosperity.”¹⁵ This is a noble goal, but noble goals do not necessarily create noble results, and the success record for interventions is mixed. The lack of input to the decision-making process from a transitions ethical framework may be partly to blame. A formal ethical framework can help “objectify” that subjective sense of “goodness” and improve both the process and the results. The application of a framework may differ in context and complexity with the nature of the involvement and the level of transition, but it poses the dilemmas in a uniform way that allows for better understanding and ethical decision-making.

It is important to note that the lack of a clearly defined “*jus transitus*” code does not mean that we are currently behaving unethically, and the ethical criteria this essay arrives at are not revolutionary. The “end states” and “cross-cutting principles” presented in *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* are a strong foundation that guides current planning and operations, as are other existing sets of guidelines and principles.¹⁶ However, formalizing a specific ethical code for transition can add weight to principles already in use, helping to ground them in existing philosophical traditions and making them more defensible in international forums, especially if the new code maintains integrity with existing codes. It helps define the legitimacy of the various actors and spoilers in any transition. Consequently, a code is an important aspect of the process for formalizing and institutionalizing the developing body of thought on “Transitions” and “Stability Operations,” taking it from its current somewhat ad hoc state into something more universal and permanent.

The ethics of transition are interrelated with-but also distinct from-the ethics of intervention, and they are more encompassing than the ethics of Just War. In a 2009 article on *jus post bellum*, the emerging body of post-conflict Just War theory, Doug McCready provides a list of questions that illuminate some of the difficulties of transition ethics:

What moral criteria must be met before a victor may exit a defeated nation? What does a victor owe an unjust defeated nation? Is the obligation moral or prudential? Does the postwar behavior of the conquered population affect the victor’s moral responsibility?¹⁷

These are challenging and relevant questions, but they are not sufficiently comprehensive. In building an ethical framework for transition after intervention in the modern world, the victor and vanquished focus of *jus post bellum* is too constraining. It is really a subset of a larger set of intervention situations that, while likely to involve conflict at some level, may or may not include war, victory and defeat, and conquered populations. In a basic sense, *jus transitus* must be a broader ethic that is applicable to all transitions. *Jus transitus* must fit not only “victor and vanquished” scenarios, but any situation where, for whatever reason, a nation or group of na-

14 Fernando R. Tesón, *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality*, Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 2005, p. 33. There are arguments that say the only ethical obligation of a nation is to maintain national security, that foreign involvement should be based solely on national security interests and the preservation of the homeland, and that nations have no ethical obligation to the people of other nations. This line of thinking usually concedes that other peoples of the world have rights, but that it is their responsibility to seize those rights for themselves (or that they must earn them through action), and there is no role in that for other nations beyond perhaps setting an example for others to emulate, as a “city on the hill.”

15 Armstrong and Chura-Beaver, p. 2.

16 United State Institute for Peace and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, Washington, DC, 2009.

17 McCready, p. 66-78.

tions has intervened in a sovereign state—by force, invitation, or circumstance—and now seeks to exit. A rephrasing of McCready’s main question makes it more inclusive: What moral criteria must be met by an intervening power before it may exit a nation it has involved itself in?

A KEY QUESTION: WHAT IS “GOOD ENOUGH” TO BE RIGHT?

Defining ethical criteria only informs the discussion—it does not answer the questions of ethical rightness in transitioning. And answering the basic ethical question of “What’s the right thing to do?” in an ideal world is different than answering it in the realities of an intervention. In an ideal world, ethical responsibilities after an intervention would be clear, they would be in accordance with international law, there would be both the will and the resources to meet those responsibilities, and there would be strong cooperation and support in that effort from both the international community and the host nation. Clearly, the answer to “what is the right thing to do” in an ideal world is unlikely to match “what we are able to do” in the real world. Ethical dilemmas are an inherent part of transitions.

Strategists determine the validity of a strategy by considering three factors: suitability, feasibility, and acceptability.¹⁸ This approach, using these factors as decision filters, can apply to ethical decision-making as well. Suitability gets at the “right thing to do” in regard to whether the effects of the decision serve useful interests and objectives of both the donor and the host—are the objectives and effects moral? The second filter, feasibility, considers the resource reality of what we can afford to do and whether we have the know-how and capacity to undertake it—can this be done? Acceptability, the third filter, addresses the political reality—the legitimacy question—of what is acceptable to the various audiences. It considers what is acceptable in terms of money, lives, and actions to the populations of the intervening nation, the host nation, and the international community. Roy Williams describes one aspect of the complexity of acceptability as “what you think is best versus what you can convince the local population to accept as best.”¹⁹ Feasibility and acceptability tests introduce harsh realities into the decision process and pose the dilemmas that make the ideally suitable answer impractical. Nonetheless, the requirement remains to find solution that can pass each of these filters—an ethically “good enough” solution.²⁰

The pottery barn rule—“you break it, you bought it”—is a popular analogy in current discourse for explaining obligations after an intervention. Of course, comparing the disruption of a state to the breaking of a bowl is an incomplete and inaccurate analogy, but it does provide insights into the question of when is “good enough” right? Buying implies permanent ownership, but “bought” in this analogy is really shorthand for “assume responsibility for fixing or replacing.” And that raises the moral question, “fixed” to what standard? Many possible answers exist within the analogy: pay the shop owner the value of the broken bowl, replace it with another copy of the same bowl, replace it with a plastic bowl that won’t break the next time it falls, or glue it back together so it will hold water, even if it does not look so nice. In the real-world corollaries the ethically “right” answer is no more apparent than it is with the pottery. Are we restoring to pre-war standards, to pre-sanction standards, or perhaps to future standards that include environmental sustainability? In Afghanistan The United States has moved toward a standard of “Afghan good” that hopes to meet basic requirements based upon local expectations, but “basic” requirements and expectations may not match, especially over the long term.²¹

18 Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional*, p. 156.

19 Roy Williams, panel presentation.

20 In practice, the specifics of “good enough” will vary for specific communities—for medicine, education, the legal system, security, etc.

21 Withdrawal time lines are another example of the impact of the acceptability test—they are salable to a conflicted public that wants to do “the right thing” but also wants to bring the troops home and stop spending huge amounts of money in foreign lands when “we have our own problems here at home”. They are a compromise between flight and full open-ended commitment, and they buy additional time from a voting

The U.S. pursuit of democratization and human rights is a particularly sensitive illustration of the complexity of the “good enough” question. Democracy is an assumed element of the desired end states of many western encouraged interventions. Along with it, there is an implicit goal of securing human rights for a host nation’s populace. However, increasingly skeptics who are frustrated with the results of democratization efforts in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, argue that it may not be “right” to impose the western idea of democracy on a culture that is not accustomed to it. From a pragmatic point of view this might have great appeal, but what are the ethics of it?

Democracy in and of itself is not synonymous with human rights. What if the democratic process leads to human rights abuses or violations? A democracy without positive constitutional assurances of human rights can make culture or religion-based choices that do not respect human rights. For example, is there an ethically acceptable way to allow a negotiated peace in Afghanistan that sacrifices human rights by returning women to a state of involuntary servitude? Foundational American values would say that basic human rights are inalienable and cannot be denied or bargained with. However, a different society might be willing to accept that sacrifice, because the good gained from the resulting stability outweighs the harm caused to women by not recognizing their rights. Moral relativists might deny the inalienable nature of the rights in the first place.²² They would say that human rights are relative rather than absolute and that we must accept each culture’s ideas about human rights rather than impose our own. If that is true, can we ethically ignore our own beliefs and the statement of universal human rights to which all members of the United Nations are bound by treaty?

The conflict between rights and safety and security has been a longstanding source of contention. In 1775, Benjamin Franklin voiced the American tendency to favor rights over security when he said “They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.”²³ However, democracies do sometimes suspend some rights during war, and the argument is usually about where on the continuum between liberty and safety to draw the line. Joe Pak points out that after the Korean War, the South Korean people were determined to succeed even at the expense of civil rights.²⁴ It is unlikely that this was a willing sacrifice by all the people, but the long term results indicate that it was at least a functional solution in which the ultimate good may have outweighed the initial harm.

Guiding Principles recognizes this recurring dilemma and addresses these points briefly as Rule of Law trade-offs.²⁵ On the cultural question of rights, it suggests that “certain core standards such as the prohibition against torture can be insisted upon,” but that continued pressure for incremental progress towards full compliance with international standards may be an acceptable alternative for immediate implementation of other norms. It does not offer a similar solution on a security vs. human rights trade-off, but does acknowledge the ethical dilemma by pointing out that security is a human right, and that “states around the world work to balance the need to protect the population with human rights guarantees.”²⁶

It is precisely because there are no simple black and white answers to many of the dilemmas posed by transition that an ethical framework is needed. Ideal solutions seldom exist and their implementation too often results in unanticipated and undesired secondary effects. A framework can provide a decision maker with a solution that is “good enough” to be right.

public that might otherwise require a more abrupt or less predictable transition.

22 Tesón, p. 40. Specifically, normative relativists, as described by Tesón.

23 Benjamin Franklin and William Temple Franklin, *Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Benjamin Franklin*, London: Henry Colburn, 1818, p.270.

24 Joe Pak, “Transition – Post Korean War, Republic of Korea,” panel presentation at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, November 17, 2011.

25 United State Institute for Peace, and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, pp. 7-94.

26 *Ibid.*, pp. 7-95.

WHAT “JUS TRANSITUS” MIGHT LOOK LIKE

A basic precept for the nature and scope of *jus transitus* is that when, for whatever reason, one nation chooses to intervene in another nation, it creates effects on, and thus incurs ethical obligations towards, a complex and interrelated set of groups. These include most directly the populace of the host nation where the intervention occurs and the populations of the intervening nation or nations that must support the effort with resources and sometimes lives. However, regional neighbors and the greater international community must also deal with the effects of any intervention. These effects may be direct, such as a flow of refugees, or they may be the indirect result of the security dilemma created by any threat to the status quo or change in equilibrium of the strategic environment.²⁷ The obligation to consider such effects is a peculiar 21st century requirement of state legitimacy even though great statesmen have always concerned themselves with them. Such effects are complex and contextual, and their impacts vary in extent and degree for each party, but they are real, they create moral obligation, and that obligation is what “*jus transitus*” should consider.²⁸

An examination of the definition of transition clarifies the specific problems of “*jus transitus*.” Dr. Rich Yarger defines transition as:

A process or set of processes leading to a specific decision point in conditions and time that morally and legitimately justifies the transfer of responsibility, authority, power (capabilities, resources, and influence), and accountability for governmental responsibilities to aspiring host nation agencies and authorities from external and internal actors who have assumed host state functions of sovereignty through challenge, necessity, or practice. Transition’s moral and legitimacy qualities are manifested by host nation societal acceptance of the government in power, adherence to accepted international standards of good governance, and evidence of sufficient capacity for success. Transition is inherently complex and occurs incrementally on multiple levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) over time, but success is ultimately defined – domestically and internationally – by acceptable host nation exercise of sovereignty.²⁹

A key aspect of this definition that makes it a good starting point for developing a “*jus transitus*” code is its universal nature. There is no mention of the cause of the situation requiring transition, beyond an assumption of sovereignty through “challenge, necessity, or practice.” It applies to the full spectrum of physical interventions, from traditional war scenarios with victors and vanquished, to humanitarian interventions after natural or manmade disaster, and all forms of physical intervention in between. It also makes it clear that transition is a “process or set of processes” rather than an outcome. Thus, a code for just transition must provide an ethical framework for both the processes and the consequences of transition through the entire span of those processes—before, during, and after intervention. The following list of six principles is a proposed code for ethical decision-making in transitions.

²⁷ Robert Jervis, as cited in Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, p. 152.

²⁸ Of course the impetus for involvement may bring its own distinct obligations—from a transitions perspective, additional obligations vary according to the nature of the intervention. So if that impetus is war, then Just War criteria apply, and the “*jus transitus*” question is also about how well *jus post bellum* criteria are met.

²⁹ Harry R. Yarger, “Thinking Strategically About Transition,” *PKSOI Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 3, April 2010.

Right Intentions

As in *jus ad bellum*, the prime motivation for any intervention must be a just cause—it must serve the interest of the people of the host nation, and the greater peace and stability of the region and the world in some manner. Intervention must not be solely for the benefit of the intervening powers, for blatant territorial seizure, for retribution, or solely for economic interests or material gain. Such exploitation is not morally justified in the U.S. inspired world order of the 21st century.

This is not to say that nations should not act in self-interest. Logically, any intervention serves an interest of the intervening state on some level, and nations intervene militarily for justifiable security reasons as well as to help in humanitarian operations. Noah Feldman is concerned with motivational factors and the ethics of self-interest in situations of intervention, and he makes an important corollary comment to both *jus post bellum* and “*jus transitus*” when he argues that actions done in the self-interest of the intervening power can still be ethical if they coincide with the interests of the people of the host nation.³⁰ Indeed this idea is reflected in the U.S. National Security Strategy which states “we must pursue a rules-based international system that can advance our own interests by serving mutual interests” as part of the objective “Promoting a Just and Sustainable International Order.”³¹

For “*jus transitus*”, consideration of right intentions in an intervening power’s decisions about transition and departure is as significant as it is for the question of intervention in the first place. The primary intent for departure and its processes must be the responsible return of sovereignty to the host nation, under conditions that enable the host nation to survive and to exercise that sovereignty. Transition motivated primarily by the needs of the intervening nation (such as a lack of internal public support or the need to save resources) rather than by the readiness of the host nation to complete the transition, would not meet the right intentions criterion. Nor would it be moral for the intervening power or powers to impose unfair conditions on departure such as unfavorable and uncompetitive economic stipulations.

Probability of Success

Probability of success, a *jus ad bellum* criterion, is equally applicable to *jus transitus*. Transition is a strategic consideration prior to intervention. Hence, *jus transitus* anticipates a successful entrance into and operations within the host nation, but focuses on assessing the requirements, resources, and political will associated with transition and departure. If the requirements are too great, the available resources too few, or the necessary political will unlikely, the probability of success in a transition should raise questions about the intervention and the transition’s objectives, methods, or timing. If the intervention has occurred, an examination of a transition’s probability of success would raise similar questions and provide insights into how to mitigate failure. Probability of success reassesses tangible and intangible factors throughout an intervention, particularly in periods of setback and ambiguous results.

30 Noah Feldman, *What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 26.

31 White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010; available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf, accessed January 19, 2011.

Stewardship

Noah Feldman presents intervention as sovereignty held in trust for the people.

Nation building can be salvaged ethically only if it is stripped down to the modest proposition that the nation builder exercises temporary political authority as a trustee on behalf of the people being governed, in much the same way that an elected government does.³²

Feldman's articulation is a powerful ethical concept that, if fully embraced, can guide many aspects of intervention and transition.

An intervening power assumes some or all sovereignty, but it must exercise that sovereignty in trust, with a spirit of stewardship that acknowledges the temporary and (hopefully) short-term nature of the relationship, but makes decisions with regard for long-term impacts on the people and the nation. Guided by this principle of stewardship, an intervening power's decision makers must:

- Fully integrate transition considerations into all aspects of planning and for all phases (to include the decision to intervene in the first place).
- Conduct all activities with regard for long-term sustainability and capacity-building.
- Seek the resilience that comes from local ownership of the process.
- Include not only government, but also civil society, in local ownership efforts.
- Be careful not to foster corruption or create dependencies that might change the nature of the relationship from one of temporary trusteeship into one of permanent support.

Transparency

A complete, coherent, and transparent narrative for intervention is critical to the success of a transition. The quality, consistency, and honesty of that narrative are an ethical imperative in transition decision making. Strategic communications must clearly state the ethical purpose, objectives, and desired end state of the intervention from the start, and the decisions and processes of transition must be a transparent part of this narrative. It is the narrative that defines success, manages the expectations of all involved audiences, and provides transparency to what is occurring. This narrative must be more than just "spin"—it must be an honest communication of motivation, status, and intent that reaches all parties and ties them together in a common understanding of a shared effort.

Legitimacy

Ethical transition rests on a foundation of host nation legitimacy. The definition of transition includes "host nation societal acceptance of the government in power" (internal legitimacy) and "adherence to accepted international standards of good governance" (external legitimacy) as manifestations of transition's moral and legitimacy qualities. Legitimacy is closely related to sovereignty, and thus to the stewardship criterion discussed above for intervening states. During the process of transition, legitimacy for the host nation government—both internally and

³² Feldman, p. 3. This view of temporary political authority on behalf of the governed correlates with one of the approaches to self-determination settlement discussed by Marc Weller – that of supervised independence and shared sovereignty as described for Kosovo. See Marc Weller, *Escaping the Self-Determination Trap*, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, p. 139.

externally-must be a constant goal. At that “specific decision point in conditions and time” that marks the culmination of transition, it is a requirement. Legitimacy is also associated with the difficult question of democracy and human rights discussed earlier. While democracy is not a strict requirement for legitimacy, true internal and external legitimacy will be hard to achieve without at least consideration of and movement towards representative government and full respect for human rights. Legitimacy in the 21st century is earned, but it also empowers—the ultimate success of a transition hinges on it. Decision makers must consider the consequences for host nation legitimacy in every transition decision.

Viability

“Evidence of sufficient capacity for success” is the third transition manifestation. This can be framed as the ability of the host nation to maintain legitimacy, and to effectively and acceptably exercise sovereignty through time and in the face of challenges. It includes two elements: a demonstrated autonomous capability (sovereignty), and the resources, political will, and institutionalized systems to sustain sovereignty over time (capacity and resiliency). Transition decision-making at every level must consider viability: does this decision and process lead to the right capabilities and build capacity and resiliency for the future? If not, the decision and processes should be reconsidered and better ones found. Viability criteria can be applied in each stability sector and in each province or political sub-unit of transition to determine if ethical obligations have been met.

Application of viability criteria does not guarantee success, but it does set high standards for decision making and conduct of operations that are aligned with what we know about transition principles. Such criteria are not open-ended obligations, but guide decision making by representatives of intervening powers to provide a higher assurance of success and better use of often limited resources of material, manpower, and time. To the degree viability is not supported, the harder it is to ethically justify withdrawal.

Other Considerations

Each transitional situation is different, and the context of the situation matters greatly. Context informs just transition thinking, but the principles apply across contexts. Thus, decisions must consider the principles in the specifics of a particular context, and in relation to the specific levels and stages of transitional processes.

Leadership is another critical aspect of transition decision making. Personalities, relationships, and power issues of decision makers, and the people who will apply their decisions, matter, and must be considered. In the long-term, though, ethical leadership and decision making matter more, and leaders must have the clarity and courage to apply ethical codes and do “the right thing”.

CONCLUSION

This exploration of a “*jus transitus*” raises more questions than it provides answers for; but that is the nature of such a model—to suggest the right questions and to provide a framework for considering answers. There is much more work to be done on this model, but the framework above provides a starting point for debate. The deep thinking and the hard questions that are involved in such a debate are long overdue. The global political churning that has motivated more and more interventions will not soon abate, and addressing these issues requires strong international leadership that is thoroughly grounded in a defensible, ethical foundation. Just transition is one much-needed element of that foundation.

We are currently making decisions and setting precedents related to transition upon a world stage where actions and motivations must be recognized as just by a wide international audience if the positive results of these actions are to long endure. Arbitrary rationalization does not lead to decisions that will long endure and is unlikely to create a better peace or a more hospitable world order. In the long run, it is ethical decision making that will provide a future that will serve our interests best.

CHAPTER 4

THE DANGER OF OPTIMISM: BUILDING STATES FROM INCOHERENT FRAGMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

Assisted, or in some instances forced, state-building and the attendant institution-building has been an important part of the foreign policy toolbox of predominantly Western states since the end of the Cold War. Post-war Bosnia is an extreme example of such foreign intervention. The amount and variety of pressures from the outside world since the Dayton Accords in 1995 were unprecedented and intervention on this scale seems unlikely to be repeated anywhere soon. The forced regime changes in Iraq and Afghanistan have left Western states reluctant to embark on further full-scale nation-building enterprises. But foreign assistance to fragile states is still likely to be in demand long into the future.

With special emphasis on institutions in the security sector of Bosnia, this paper draws some general lessons on state-building and its attendant “transition” to local ownership. There is no exact blueprint for state-building. Each “theater” therefore becomes an ongoing experiment in social engineering. There is always dynamic interplay between local and foreign elements. The local balance of power changes with the entrance of foreign military, economic and diplomatic activity. Correspondingly in transitions, the balance of power changes again with the foreign elements fading out and departing and as locals assume authority and responsibility. How the foreign elements enter, determines how they should and can transition and depart.

It must be stressed again that each instance of foreign intervention will be different, and the context will vary within each institution or function targeted for establishment and “reform.” On the other hand, there are certain pitfalls that can be avoided through proper pre-deployment planning and analysis of the challenges at hand, a careful calibration of the format of the mentoring regime, and the considered selection and training of those individuals who are to perform the mentoring and assistance in the field. Bosnia illustrates many of these,

BACKGROUND

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) broke up under its own inherent contradictions in the early 1990s. Demands for multi-party elections paved the way for populists and nationalists that tore apart the multi-ethnic Yugoslav mosaic. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia/BiH) had been a republic within SFRY. Severe disagreements surfaced among the three main ethnic groups: the Serbs, the Muslims (now called Bosniaks) and the Croats. The civil war in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995 saw intense fighting, with the neighboring states of Serbia and Croatia supporting their ethnic brethren in Bosnia. A U.S.-brokered alliance was formed in 1994 between Croats and Bosniaks, and in 1995 the Dayton Accords were signed by all parties (and the neighbors), after heavy military and diplomatic involvement from the United States and its European allies.

The Dayton Accords formalized the effects of ethnic cleansing. A weak state was emplaced on top of two sub-state structures called “entities.” Croats and Bosniaks dominated in the Federation of Bosnia, while Serbs made up the bulk of the population in Republika Srpska (RS). The

Federation of Bosnia was further subdivided into 10 cantons, each with its own government and assembly.

The Dayton Accords included measures for the temporary arbiter role of the international community. A body of interested parties, the Peace and Implementation Council (PIC), was tasked with appointing a High Representative (HR) to oversee the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. All military aspects were vested with the commander of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). The mandate of the civilian High Representative expanded drastically with the “Bonn powers” mandated by the PIC at a conference in Bonn in 1997. In subsequent years these Bonn powers have been used to impose and abolish laws, dismiss and appoint officials and instigate criminal investigations. Use of the Bonn powers peaked in the early 2000s, but as of late 2010 the measure is still available to the High Representative.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LIBERAL PEACE-BUILDING

The political-military intervention in Bosnia from 1995 may be described as “liberal peace-building.” Peace-building encompasses the various stages and aspects of an intervention, including peace enforcement, peacemaking, peacekeeping, state-building, reconciliation, democratization and capacity-building. The stages of peace-building can occur in conflict as well as in post-conflict environments.¹

A “modern state” may, at a minimum, be defined as an institution with an effective monopoly of the means of violence. Most Western-led military interventions since the Cold War have developed into variations of state-building. We have witnessed attempts at externally imposed or assisted state-building in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, DRC, Haiti, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, Cambodia, etc. A successful “transition” can be understood as the stage where state-building activities by external agents have succeeded, or are about to succeed.

Most attempts at externally assisted state-building have not been confined to the creation of a state, in the minimal sense of establishing monopoly of the means of violence. Over the past two decades, Western democracies have been engaged in creating a specific form of state, a *liberal* one. “Liberal” in this context means a state that a) upholds the rule of law, b) is democratic and c) is based on a market economy.²

State-building has not been without difficulties. True, there are some examples of successful intervention that have served limited objectives and created space for non-violent conflict resolution. But many countries on the receiving end of interventions have remained fragile constructs. In places where the state lacked a foundation in a common identity, a commonly understood history or the elements of an inclusive political system, state-building evolved into an enterprise of serial institution-building. It was assumed that the state would achieve strength from the establishment and/or strengthening of a single, common institution in the fields of security, taxation, education, health, etc. Bosnia became a prime example of this paradigm, as considerable pressure was exerted to centralize control of these functions.

Scholars of state-building and liberal peace-building can be broadly divided in two camps at the moment. Both seem to recognize that success over the past two decades has been limited, but they differ on what conclusions to draw. There are those who judge the whole project of externally, outside-in driven state-building to be fundamentally flawed and contradictory.³ For

1 Walton, C. Dale, “the Case for Strategic Traditionalism: War, National Interest and Liberal Peacekeeping.” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 16, No. 5, 2009, pp. 717-734.

2 Stein Sundstøl Erickson, “the Liberal Peace Is Neither: Peacebuilding, State Building and the Reproduction of Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 16, No 5, 2009, pp 652-666.

3 David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building* (London: Pluto Press, 2006). ; Nehal Bhuta, “Against State-Building,” *Constellations*, Vol. 15: No. 4, 2008, pp. 517-42. Dale C. Walton, C. Dale (2009)

them, state-building fails in its assumptions of the universalism of human rights, democracy and the liberal state. Conditions vary in essence, and that undermines state-building under its current goals. The other camp sees the model as legitimate, with success being a function of sufficient resources, stamina and adaptation to the local context.⁴ For them the goal of state-building is a sound one, and the means can and should be adjusted.

STATE-BUILDING IN BOSNIA

The Dayton Accords of 1995 left Bosnia with an extremely decentralized state. Responsibilities for taxation, defense, police, social security and education were vested at sub-state levels. In the ensuing years, the international protectorate set out to shape the administrative-political system into a more unified and centralized state. By means of arm-twisting and diverse incentives, the slow but steady formal transfer of authority from the entities to the state was carried out.

The international intervention in Bosnia post-Dayton took place in a highly charged, biased and contingent international and domestic atmosphere. Centralization was generally favored by Bosniaks, and fiercely resisted by Serbs. Part of the Croat constituency sought to carve out a third entity from the Federation. A complex set of conditions and context led to a hyper-energetic interventionist approach in which Western dominance of the international community was obvious. To justify the transfer of authority from the entities to the state, despite the explicit wording of the constitution,⁵ one of the international High Representatives evoked the concept of “the spirit of Dayton.”⁶ That was taken to mean that even if the wording of the Dayton Accords might entail a decentralized state, there was some vaguer “spirit” that existed even at the time of signing, and that corresponded to a more centralized version, despite continuous objections from Serbs and Croats alike.

Security sector reform (SSR) started soon after NATO troops entered Bosnia and the civilian intervention regime was put in place and affected the judiciary, military and police institutions. Initially this reform was, to a degree, non-political in nature. Police and military forces were heavily downscaled from the wartime footing in both entities. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs were implemented alongside security sector reform. Experts were sent to advise and assist on matters of procedure, ethics, organization and streamlining. The initial reforms were carried out mostly within the political framework set out in the Dayton Accords. Reforms were couched in terms of best practice and Euro-Atlantic norms. Defense reform was communicated as being a matter of adaptation to NATO standards.

PULLING ALL LEVERS: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

The terrorist events of 9/11 created an unprecedented political reality. Washington’s ability to influence policies abroad increased, and here Bosnia was no exception. Both Croats and Serbs suddenly found themselves with a far more formidable opponent to their objectives of decentralization and secession. And in 2002 came the ORAO affair. The ORAO aircraft factory

“The Case for Strategic Traditionalism: War, National Interest and Liberal Peacebuilding,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16: No. 5, 2009, pp. 717–734.

4 Roland Paris, *At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

5 According to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “All governmental functions and powers not expressly assigned in this Constitution to the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be those of the Entities.” *Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Article III. 3 a.; available from http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=372, accessed October 19, 2010.

6 Paddy Ashdown served as High Representative from 2002 to 2006, at the peak of centralization and intervention.

in Republika Srpska had been involved in illegal arms transfers to Iraq in breach of the UN embargo. ORAO was under authority of the RS Ministry of Defense (MoD).⁷

The High Representative at the time, Lord Paddy Ashdown, used the ORAO affair proactively. To him, it indicated that entities were unsuited for such wide responsibility. Other arguments were added. It was claimed from the OHR that defense policy was really part of foreign relations and therefore constitutionally a state prerogative. The pressure put on leading Serb politicians became formidable – indeed, some U.S. representatives hinted at abolishing the RS altogether. In May 2003, the RS government caved in and agreed to the establishment of the Defense Reform Commission (DRC).

The struggle over the armed forces in Bosnia was extremely complex. The international community employed a wide array of means to overcome Serb political resistance, including overwhelming force in both numbers and superior technical-legal expertise. “Best practices” and the Bosnian Constitution were selectively interpreted by qualified international and national lawyers to fit the political goal: state control. In September 2003, the DRC issued its report, laying out what was in effect a gradual but complete transfer of command and control of the armed forces from entity level to centralized state control. A similar process took effect in the intelligence sector.

After the complicated political-administrative Dayton set-up of 1995, police forces in Bosnia comprised 13 different services. Initial reforms focused on downscaling and vetting of personnel and the introduction of procedural and administrative changes within the existing political structure. The UN acted as lead agency on police reform until 2002, when the EU took over. Attempts to strengthen the state through institutional reorganization had started earlier in policing in 1999, with the creation of the State Border Service (SBS). In 2002 the international community advanced its centralization efforts through the formation of the State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA). Both these agencies were mentored, equipped and trained through various multi- and bilateral projects.

Despite the establishment of SBS and SIPA, state-level control over policing remained elusive. Encouraged by the success in cajoling and convincing the Serbs to enter into transfers of authority on defense and intelligence matters in 2003, High Representative Ashdown decided to attempt a similar political push on police reform.⁸

The HR employed a range of strong-arm tactics, but encountered considerably more opposition with police reform than in defense and intelligence reforms. The formal and legal arguments for centralization were far weaker, since policing could not be interpreted as an aspect of foreign relations and thus a state prerogative. The HR teamed up with the European Commission to get state-level control of police matters made part of the criteria for further EU integration. However, the Serbs could point out that various members of the EU had highly decentralized policing models themselves – and that hollowed out the arguments of the EC and the HR.

Officials and politicians in the RS were dismissed in large numbers in 2004 for “obstructions” concerning the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or the Dayton Accords. The political motivations behind the dismissals were hardly concealed. But RS politicians largely stood their ground. Despite the public criteria that were presented as demands from the EU, a very watered-down police reform was eventually agreed on at the end of 2005. The entities regained their substantive autonomy on policing and only a few, mostly token, administrative and technical agencies were added at the state level. Unlike the case of defense reform, the entity ministries of interior were retained within the new police system.

7 Heinz Vetschera and Matthieu Damian, “Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Role of the International Community,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 13: No. 1, 2006, pp. 28–42.

8 Thomas Muehlmann, “Police Restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Problems of Internationally-led Security Sector Reform,” *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, Vol. 2: No. 1, 2008, pp. 1–22.

The debacle on police reform nearly jeopardized the whole Dayton Accords. Serbs were isolated but unified in their opposition to the centralization push. The international community was seen as biased and deep suspicions seeped into the overall political atmosphere. The HR had perhaps over-extended his hand. Rather than giving Serbs time to digest the reforms on defense and intelligence, their willingness to cave in on those had led the international community to continue on the offensive to centralize further. This approach failed in its objective of securing for the state complete, formal control of the means of violence in Bosnia.

A SPECIAL CASE: INTELLIGENCE REFORM

Both defense and police reforms in Bosnia were matters of high publicity that preoccupied various international bodies, foreign diplomats and experts. Intelligence reform stayed, as intelligence often does, in the background. But in fact, the centralization achieved in intelligence reform, both formally and de facto, outpaced the other two SSRs in Bosnia.

“Intelligence reform” in Bosnia involves both internal security and external intelligence collection. The external and internal aspects are combined in one agency, the BiH Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA).⁹ Prior to the June 2004 establishment of OSA, the intelligence-security sector had undergone various changes since the break-up of Yugoslavia. OSA originates from the former UDBA – the Department of State Security. The UDBA operated autonomous branches/agencies in each of the six republics of the SFRY. From 1991/92, when tensions rose, the Bosnian branch of the UDBA broke from the federal level in Belgrade and then split into three ethnically-based intelligence outfits. A parallel process occurred with Yugoslavia’s military intelligence and counter-intelligence structures in Bosnia.

Intelligence matters were not specified in the Dayton Accords or in the constitutions of the two entities. Therefore the Bosniaks and Croats kept their own services wholly separate until 2002, when, due largely to international pressure, a combined civilian service was formed in the Federation.

The external dynamics that led to the formation of the Defense Reform Commission also prepared the ground for a similar Intelligence Reform Commission, set up by the High Representative in May 2003. It consisted of an international chair, a former Hungarian intelligence chief, Ambassador Kálmán Kocsis, and six professionals appointed by the directors of the two entities’ intelligence-security services. The Commission nominated a draft law on a state-level intelligence service in September 2003. From 1 June 2004 the entity intelligence services formally ceased to exist and OSA was established.

A wide range of processes had to be coordinated with the drafting and passing of the state-level law. A handful of international experts were put to work to manage the various aspects of the reform. Most of these worked for the Office of the High Representative (OHR), but a small number were also hosted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to BiH in the so-called Intelligence Reform Implementation Section (IRIS). Former head of the Slovenian Intelligence Service, Drago Férs, led IRIS, working together with experts from the entity services to prepare more than 20 rulebooks guiding the future work of OSA.

As is common throughout Bosnia, the question of leadership was contested for OSA, with all three ethnic groups claiming the highest positions for themselves. The Law on OSA specifies that the top three positions of Director General, Deputy Director and Inspector General cannot be held by individuals from the same people (ethnic group). Informally, account is also taken of who leads comparable institutions (police, defense, prosecutor, Ministry of Security) to find a proper ethnic balance. For OSA a variety of considerations played into the final decision. It soon emerged that the Director General should be a Bosniak, but there was disagreement on who

⁹ Obavestajna-Sigurnosna Agencija (OSA)

might be best qualified. Various international stakeholders from the intelligence community, the diplomatic circles and the ICTY were involved in opposing and lobbying for candidates to all three positions.

The choices made on the top leadership have turned out quite favorably. Unlike in the sphere of state-level policing, with its many changes and vacancies at the top levels, OSA has had the same team in place from 2004 to 2010. In fact, in April 2010 the trio was appointed for a new four-year term. The importance of the quality and political acceptance of the leadership of security institutions in fractured societies like Bosnia can hardly be overstated.

The personnel situation in OSA has not been without controversy. Ethnicity is not the only factor separating people. Deep divisions exist also within ethnic groups. "Politics" therefore has defined appointments to mid-level management positions as well. From its formal establishment in June 2004, OSA was given a transition period to complete the unification of the two services. All employees underwent a vetting procedure and new criteria for professional qualifications were established. The total number of staff in the new OSA was to be cut by more than 30%. Dismissed personnel were eligible for a few months of severance payment.

During the period of transition, which lasted for about nine months, some of the foreign intelligence services requested that ongoing operational cooperation should continue uninterrupted. This in fact proved favorable also to the long-term institution-building efforts aided by OHR and OSCE. Ongoing operations gave the Bosnian intelligence personnel a sense of purpose. Otherwise, their focus could have been exclusively of an "introspective" and organizational nature. Other Bosnian security institutions or political bodies were not requesting any intelligence. This situation, in which OSA operated in a sort of national vacuum, reflected the dysfunctional nature of the Bosnian state.

What made the cooperation with the foreign intelligence services a positive contributing factor for institution-building on state level as well was the relatively uncontroversial nature of the mainstay of this intelligence work. Counter-terrorism in the wake of 9/11 was supported by politicians from all ethnic groups. Far more sensitive were investigations and intelligence work on organized crime, as these had tentacles extending into high-level politics.

The state-level police agency, SIPA, underwent a reform and reorganization in parallel with the reform of the intelligence-security sector in 2003/04. SIPA gained additional investigative responsibilities – at least on paper.¹⁰ In practice, there was a profound lack of coordination between the international personnel working on the reform of SIPA and those working on OSA, and those involved in one reform hardly knew about the other reform processes at all. Information was stove-piped. This caused an excessive amount of overlap in the two agencies' responsibilities, with turf battles erupting regularly. Additionally, SIPA was established at state level, without much responsibility being withdrawn from the entity ministries of interior.

Also, the civilian intelligence-security sector was in dire need of coordination and de-conflicting with the ongoing military intelligence reform. In early autumn 2004, a reform package was drawn up that limited the scope of surveillance methods legally available to the MoD on counter-intelligence. Coordination with OSA was to be ensured by a memorandum of understanding. In reality this cooperation never materialized as originally intended.

The magnitude and impact of the intelligence-security sector reform as experienced by Bosnian personnel should not be underestimated. Some 30% of previously employed personnel were made redundant and the great bulk of those who were retained now had to commute for long distances to new workplaces. People found themselves working for former "enemies." In the early stages, a significant motivating factor for absorbing these changes was higher pay. Some also found the reorganization professionally inspiring.

¹⁰ SIPA changed its name from the State Information and Protection Agency to the State Investigation and Protection Agency.

It is difficult to measure success in institution-building when the challenge lies in divided loyalties along ethnic, religious or sectarian lines. Professional and technical progress can be excellent, but the institution in its essence still fragile. Having strong institutions did not prevent Yugoslavia from disintegrating in the late 1980s. Formal adherence to organizational hierarchy and authority does not necessarily imply de facto implementation. External observers, even embedded advisors, will often have a hard time figuring out the true realities and decision-making systems that operate, and local officials will often try to hide the informal realities. Many times, the external advisors may not really want to know what is going on, as that would paint a negative picture of their own performance.

On the whole, however, and given the fractured realities of Bosnian society, the intelligence-security reform has been a measured success. OSA made some significant steps towards integration during the first two years of its existence, and it has avoided disintegration since the initial spurt of progress. The organization is somewhat rigid, certain intelligence collection activities are not undertaken due to political sensitivity and there is a lack of robust political direction from the Council of Ministers. But success in Bosnia is measured mainly against the standard that outright infighting and obvious fracturing has not occurred.

OSA seems to have achieved more unity than comparable institutions in the security sector, especially more so than the police. The political acumen and relatively “multi-ethnic” and non-partisan attitude of the leadership troika has provided a solid basis for overall unity in the lower ranks. The purpose the organization, derived from counter-terrorism activities and cooperation with foreign intelligence services, has also positioned OSA outside the most intense politicking in Bosnia. OSA seems to have chosen to steer clear of the trickiest sensitive corruption and organized crime investigations that have in effect torn apart the police organizations on the state level.

OBSERVATIONS

The experience in Bosnia is not over, but it already offers significant insights. Observations drawn from that continuing experience can warn us of the dangers of optimism and inform us in our attempts to assist such troubled states.

Observation 1: Form and Function of External Assistance and Mentoring

During the heyday of Bosnian state-building in the early 2000s there was no doctrine or manual – or even any literature – that could guide the institution-builders towards their goal. For the most committed personnel there was learning by doing. Others left as ignorant as they came. Few of these theoretical tools are available even in 2010. Those attempting to institution-build in Iraq or Afghanistan are almost as clueless and without guidance and manuals as those who started out in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia, Haiti or East Timor in the 1990s. The task of institution-building has simply not been examined or “problematized” in a systematic fashion. Those theories that exist seem infused with ideology.

David Chandler has characterized the efforts on liberal peace-building as “empire in denial.”¹¹ Foreign elements take charge, determining the pace and content of various reforms, but without taking commensurate responsibility for the outcome. Responsibility is pushed squarely over to the local stakeholders. Actions often lack logical foundation or sound analysis. Initiatives are taken but soon abandoned for something entirely different. There are opaque processes among the supporting international institutions that effectively exclude domestic authorities from asserting their roles and proper functions – but the domestic authorities are the ones who get the blame for failure.

11 Chandler, *Empire in Denial*.

Furthermore, among liberal peace-builders there is still a profound lack of coherent understanding of what institutions are in essence and how they have come about historically. At least some rudimentary recognition of historical examples would help. Many of the modern institutions of Western states took decades, even centuries, to grow and establish themselves. To some extent the personnel involved were simply fulfilling individual tasks and functions (tax collection, law and order, cadastre surveys, etc.) and the “institution” arose as a consequence of the repetition of such tasks. We might perhaps say that the process of state and institution-building was somewhat “organic.”

That is very unlike the institution-building carried out under the liberal peace theorem of the 1990s and 2000s. Of course, also in the past, people learned from each other. Institutional innovations were carried over from country to country. Outsiders were also brought in to advise and lead reforms. But a key difference was that the initiative was taken from within the reforming countries themselves. It was, to use a tired expression, “local ownership.” And when countries were forcibly occupied and then reformed, the occupying power generally took full control of at least the top echelons of the local institutions. In a sense the imperial powers of the past took both power *and* responsibility. They did not have to pretend not to be in charge.

Those institutions, and states, that have survived the test of history have started out with a relatively singular political will. This political will resided with some individual (such as a monarch) or group (class, ethnic, clan) that imposed itself forcefully or considered itself native to the country. The process of monopolizing power preceded the invitation by outsiders to assist in reforms, or it was the outsiders who shamelessly wielded the monopoly. Liberal peace-building, by contrast, has implicitly sought to bypass the issue of domestic political will or how it realistically comes about.

The formation and development of the Bosnian Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA), in terms of the role played by the international institution-building regime, resembled more historical European state formation than what was found in defense and especially police reform. For one thing, there were simply far fewer international advisers involved in intelligence reform per number of employees in the institutions they were to reform – so their role had to be less comprehensive. For a significant time in 2004 and 2005 there were as many international advisers in the European Union Police Missions (EUPM) directly working to assist the state-level police organization, SIPA, as there were actual employees in SIPA itself (around 80). This created a strange and counter-productive dynamic.

Firstly, most of those working in EUPM were volunteers. They had taken the job for personal reasons and needed to justify their presence. If this meant doing tasks that local employees could do, like drafting manuals, organizing meetings, adjusting processes and organizations, etc., many would do so – in the process, leaving idle the people of the very institution that was supposed to be learning. The end-goal of a self-sufficient and established domestic institution would render external assistance obsolete. The incentive system therefore often militated against effective assistance, at least on the lower levels.

Too many advisers and mentors involved tend to develop a dynamic and workload of their own. More people entail a greater need for coordination. This means not only coordination on the international side: it also involves additional meetings to coordinate with the domestic counterparts. These would be meetings and processes that the domestic institution would not otherwise have to engage in. The circumstances that such “assisted” institutions come to experience are therefore artificial and a direct consequence of the way they are being assisted. The more external advisers there are, the more abnormal will be the institutional environment in which the domestic institutions are to “grow up in.”

Secondly, the more personnel that are required (or believed to be required) in the advisory and mentoring roles, the less likely is it that all will be uniformly competent. Furthermore, being a good police constable in one’s home country will not necessarily mean being able to under-

stand operating conditions elsewhere, having pedagogical abilities, or knowing much about how an organization should be formed and managed. It is a fact that many, if not most, international mentors end up advising local counterparts on far higher levels than they ever found themselves doing in their home organization before deployment.

The organizations carrying out the assistance are obviously not wholly focused on achieving their stated missions. And that concerns not only the personnel directly in contact with the domestically “assisted” institution. If there are for-profit organizations doing the mentoring work, they will have an incentive to stay engaged for the longer term in order to reap as much profit as possible. In other words, they will have an incentive *not* to succeed.

But even political and governmental bodies may suffer from disparate objectives. In Bosnia, the EU saw an opportunity to carve out a foreign policy niche on the international arena, so as to be able to tell itself and the outside world that it was indeed an important player. Individual member states would make a point of how serious they were by insisting on large national contingents to the EUPM, and the EU from its Brussels base would measure its footprint and importance by how many people it could declare that it had deployed to Bosnia. In these circumstances, politics often trumped actual requirements.

International organizations, NGOs, private contractors and individual states were almost competing with each other to provide assistance and funds for police, defense and justice reform in Bosnia. The EU, the EU Commission, OSCE, NATO, U.S. bilateral undertakings, the UN and others all wanted a piece of the action. Police and justice reforms were especially attractive, as those could be accounted for as official development assistance. As a result there was a tendency toward donor crowding.

In intelligence-security reform, the reverse situation emerged. Although nothing in the OECD rules prohibits development funds from being used on this sector such use was an anomaly in 2004, as it still is for most regular donors. Support for intelligence reform in transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe had been handled mainly by foreign intelligence agencies from the United States, the United Kingdom and a few others.

The OHR had the international political lead on all reforms in Bosnia, but much of the actual technical and professional follow-up was done by other agencies and organizations. The OSCE had initial lead on defense reform, replaced by NATO in 2005. The UN took lead on police reform until replaced in this role by the EU in 2003.

Trouble arose for OHR when a suitable implementing partner for intelligence reform was sought. Having one of the foreign intelligence agencies take the lead would have been too sensitive. But none of the multilateral organizations had any prior experience in assisting intelligence reform, and no precedent had been set for their involvement. What surfaced was a very ad hoc arrangement in 2003 in which the OHR made an agreement with the OSCE Mission in Bosnia to host a small unit, the Intelligence Reform Implementation Section (IRIS). This informal and unwritten arrangement included an understanding that the OHR would be more “hands on” when it came to intelligence reform than on police and defense reforms. The OHR would give direction to IRIS.

During 2005 it became clear that OSCE HQ in Vienna was loath to continue funding IRIS even if it employed only two local support staff and two international experts. The Norwegian government was brought in to provide funding. A new unit, the Intelligence Reform Unit (IRU), found its home from mid-2006 as a special project reporting directly to the OSCE Head of Mission. Norway would cover all costs, an arrangement that is set to continue until the end of 2011.

As a result the total international institution-building regime on intelligence reform in Bosnia has been very small and never more than a handful. As a direct consequence of the low number of people involved in the assistance, OSA itself, with its 700 employees, has been especially prominent in creating ideas and planning projects, administering and reporting on the use of funds and making sure that projects are followed up and evaluated.

The model followed in intelligence reform, which we might call a “light footprint” with an emphasis on local initiative and ownership, could achieve success only if there were a real political will and accompanying ability to persevere on the part of the OSA leadership. That its director had the political will and perseverance was immediately evident at the time of his appointment in mid-2004. Around the same time as Almir Dzuvo was appointed OSA Director, Ambassador Kalman Kocsis was appointed by the High Representative as the Supervisor for Intelligence Reform. The ambiguity that arose concerning the relationship between these two posts led to confusion and competition, but confirmed Dzuvo’s abilities.

The Supervisor for Intelligence Reform tried to assert himself and carve out a position of strength. Unusually for a Bosnian living in a de facto international protectorate, Director Almir Dzuvo fought back and would not agree to a system in which his authority within the agency, or when it came to OSA’s external relations, was in any way diminished. Although it almost cost him his job during the autumn of 2004, in retrospect this assertiveness on the part of Director Dzuvo was a sign of his strength—a definite benefit—and it also put an end to any doubts as to who was in charge of the OSA. Dzuvo proved to have the political will without which any attempt at institution-building might have become a futile exercise. The post of Supervisor for Intelligence Reform was abolished in 2005.

Observation 2: The Art of Mentoring

The structure and organization of international support obviously frames the work for the individual international experts assigned. The accompanying bureaucracy is often linked to the size of the support organization. The bigger the apparatus that is doing the mentoring and assistance relative to the size of the organization that is being mentored, the more detailed and low-level the assistance becomes. In the case of the EUPM and its local police counterpart SIPA, at times the ratio was 1:1. Every local employee could be assigned a personal mentor. But in intelligence reform the ratio was more like 1:350. The structural circumstances determine in large part how each mentor approaches his role.

The challenges in the institutions that are to be “built” come in two broad categories. Firstly, there can be deficiencies in the technical and professional knowledge among staff and in the country in general. Secondly, centrifugal forces can be at work, due to lack of loyalty and fragmented identities. Often countries targeted for “assistance” and intervention show a combination of the two but to differing degrees. In Bosnia, the main challenge was a lack of loyalty and perceptions of a common identity. By contrast, in Afghanistan the lack of technical and professional knowledge is most striking, whereas Iraq might represent a case in-between.

Regardless of the exact nature and combination of challenges, the universal requirement for any successful mentor is to establish trust and good interpersonal relations with the local counterparts. There are various barriers to this. International mentors and those they advise may differ in their goals and incentives. Language often is a barrier. Cultures can differ greatly, with some practices even being mutually abhorrent. Mentors may be seen to act in a patronizing way, as overly interfering, as out of their depth, etc. If for any reason there is little trust and confidence in the mentors, they are bound to be less effective.

Unless the challenge is purely a technical and skill set issue, like computer illiteracy, the mentor’s job becomes much like that of an organizational psychologist/therapist. In Bosnia, the citizens who found themselves working side by side in the same state-level institution had just been through a very bloody “divorce” from the same people that they were now “remarried” to. They shared a long, contested history. The most difficult question that every mentor had to consider was how best to deal with this. Should the mentor shy away from sensitive issues of history and ethnicity even when this was clearly why certain things did not function as they should

in the institution? Or should this be an inherent part of mentoring? Each country is different and each institution will present its own peculiarities. It difficult to give general advice on how to relate to the “intangibles” of perceived and contested history, divergent identities and parallel structures of loyalty. But in the places and countries where mentors are likely to find themselves there is every reason to believe that such issues will be encountered and are indeed profound. After all, that is one of the most common reasons why assistance is required in the first place.

Unless one has a very solid knowledge of the local history and culture, one should be cautious about prodding too much into sensitive topics of loyalty and identity. The danger of being seen as taking sides is significant – and should that happen, any chance of regaining a position of impartiality may be lost. On the other hand, showing a deliberate disregard for history and identity may alienate mentors from their local counterparts. And without asking questions and being alert to “hidden” schisms, how can one assess the strength of the institution one is supposed to mentor? Without this feel for the real dynamics of the institution, assessing whether an institution is ready for full transition becomes a guessing game. Soldiers who are able to fire and maneuver, police who are equipped and trained to man a checkpoint or an intelligence operative who can properly scout and secure a meeting place are important, but insufficient criteria for assessing the readiness for a transition to full local ownership.

Unfortunately, mentors are likely to find themselves in endless conundrums for which they are utterly unprepared. When mentoring missions are set up, what normally matters in selection of a mentor are criteria connected to the mentor’s job and position in their home country: for instance being a capable police, military or intelligence officer at the right level and function. It is often merely an added and coincidental bonus if anyone should happen to have deeper cultural and sociological qualifications. And yet, these latter qualifications are of greater importance in the quest to achieve strength in the institution one is attempting to build. One could say mentoring is an art more than it is a science; educating more than it is training.

There are other problems common to most mentoring regimes. One of these is the short time that mentors often spend in the same job. In Afghanistan rotations are done on a yearly or even more frequent basis. Stability is an issue. Longer tenure takes advantage of learning and experience, ensuring that mistakes do not repeat themselves for reasons of inexperience and time is not lost to a learning curve. In addition, less time is wasted in winding down one’s tour and overlapping with a replacement. In general, longer tours of duty are both more effective and efficient.

Many mentors experience that they are unwelcome among their local counterparts. They are seen as burdensome, demanding new routines, adding to the workload, being arrogant and patronizing or as informing on their local counterparts. All or part of this is often true. In most interventions the international mentors wield considerable influence over practices and appointments, promotions and dismissals, even for quite low-ranking positions. In the case of the latter, the ability to hand out some perks becomes quite useful, but it can also be problematic, particularly where ethnic and group identities are issues. In some societies this might be solved by a budget based on representation, or through influencing the distribution of donor funds. A common danger is of course that the mentor simply becomes a kind of Santa Claus who is tolerated for the gifts he or she provides; whereas the positive effect of the mentor’s professional knowledge is less significant. But where this occurs, the entire rationale of the mentoring regime should be questioned.

Observation 3: The Role of Political Legitimacy

All interventions that aim to build states and institutions are experiments in social engineering. Given the complexity of human societies, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to foresee with much precision the consequences of any given input. The sheer scale of some of the inter-

ventions means that the various components of state-building are broken down into manageable parts, with personnel dedicated specifically to each task and sub-task. Consequently, overall control and coordination becomes extremely difficult and political legitimacy is more at risk.

Post-Dayton, despite relatively free and fair elections, Bosnian politics remained divided along ethnic and religious lines. The wartime parties on all three ethnic sides won their respective electorates whenever there were elections (which was almost every year from 1996 on). The international community pressed ahead with changes to the election law to favor the chances of candidates with multi-ethnic appeal, but to little avail.

The international community became increasingly disappointed and disillusioned with the lack of a unified political space. The proposition arose that in order to fulfill its potential, electoral democracy needed a sound institutional basis and rule of law. In particular, the fact most public institutions were located on the entity level and not the state level was seen as hindering the development of a common “Bosnian” identity and polity. The state, it was felt, would rise into people’s consciousness partly through the establishment of institutions on the state level.

International representatives tried to argue for these transfers of authorities and establishment of state institutions as purely functional measures aimed at greater efficiency, but the real intention – to create a stronger Bosnian state – was fairly apparent to all. The assumption among many Westerners in the aftermath of the 1992–95 civil war in Bosnia was that the havoc had been caused by malign interference from Serbia and Croatia, as well as the by the vested interests of an entrenched war-profiteering elite. After all, Bosnians of all ethnicities had lived peacefully together for centuries, and could do so again – so went the refrain. This might have been more illusory than real, but it remained the underlying credo.

The constant machinations of the international diplomats created deep suspicions, particularly on the part of Serb politicians but also among Croat politicians. These two elite groups could hardly be expected to make the processes put in motion by the internationals (and favored by the Bosniaks) easy to accomplish, since the reforms targeted their very power bases. These politics put those Serbs and Croats who were, because of their professions, natural actors and employees in the newly established state institutions in a very difficult situation. They lacked a mandate from their own political leaders to make the institutions where they were formally employed workable and functional. In a sense, if the state institutions worked properly that would be taken as an argument for the legitimacy of the state itself. And, experience told the Serb and Croat elites it would encourage those who sought a stronger state (Bosniaks and internationals) to attempt further transfers of authority and competencies, further threatening their power bases.

Obviously, this created a personal dilemma for non-Bosniak leaders in state institutions. They were in a sense forced to be two-faced. Towards their colleagues in the state institutions they would pretend to work with at least some enthusiasm, but in the company of their co-ethnics they would pretend to drag their feet. Each individual had to find his own balance between cooperation and obstruction. These circumstances were found in every state institution, although the consequences differed according to the character of the work and the composition of the leadership. Where a Bosniak was formally in charge of an institution, that normally ensured a willingness from the very top to make it functional and effective. However, with a Serb at the helm, less initiative could be expected from the top.

The establishment of these state institutions despite strong resistance from almost half of Bosnia’s population put all state-level employees of non-Bosniak ethnicity in a tough spot. The international community implicitly banked on these individuals to place their bets on the state and “abandon” their ethnic brethren. That would mean working whole-heartedly for the benefit of a state some of them just recently had tried to secede from. Now, from a 2010 vantage point, it seems evident that this has failed. At best, in some institutions, OSA is one such example, Serb employees tried to ride both horses almost equally. They would go as far as they thought they

could in terms of aiding the state-level institution, but without burning all bridges with their friends and the political leadership in “their” entity, the Republika Srpska. The existence of this motivational difference between groups of employees further exacerbated the tendency for parallel ethnic structures within the institutions. The working atmosphere was obviously soured.

The variations in enthusiasm for the state directly affects how individual state institutions function in Bosnia. It also creates various dysfunctions between institutions that are meant to cooperate, like prosecutors, police and intelligence-security bodies. Again this often has to do with ethnicity. A Croat employee in OSA might prefer to, and indeed would, contact a Croat employee in SIPA even though his functional counterpart might be a Serb. The formal head of an agency or directorate or section might be kept in the dark because of suspicions of ethnic bias.

Such sub-national identities can be formidable obstacles to functional governance and political legitimacy of the state. And they are not easily overcome with the skills and tools normally available to foreign institution-builders. Training, modern equipment, doctrines and organizational tableaus do not address or overcome such cultural intangibles like identity. Measuring progress in institution-building by how many people have completed a certain training course means very little for the strength of an institution plagued by internal division. That is not to say that technical upgrading and training are pointless. Greater professional identity based on better qualifications and equipment may indeed reduce the importance of ethnic or other sub-state identities, but the effect is less than often assumed. Loyalty and identity are part and parcel of any institution.

Observation 4: Transitions Often Appear Infeasible

In Bosnia, the international protectorate is still a formal reality in 2010. The Bonn powers that gave the High Representative executive and legislative powers back in 1997 remain in effect. But the use of the Bonn powers has diminished greatly since 2005. A question mark now also hangs over the HR’s ability to enforce his decisions since the international peace-keepers, EUFOR, are greatly diminished in size. Without any credible means of violence, the clout of international diplomats is in serious doubt. Leverage increases with by the possibility of using violent force to enforce the international will.

The general reduction of internationally wielded political power in Bosnia has also affected personnel and organizations mentoring and assessing the status of individual security sector reforms. One reason why they could previously gain access to their local counterparts was their perceived ability to lobby the HR, either to dismiss or promote local actors. When the mentors no longer had this stick available, they could be ignored. Even if both EUPM and NATO still are assisting with police and defense reforms, respectively, their influence has been reduced. Many mentors are now simply treading water and it seems inertia is the one reason why their mentoring has not been scaled down even further.

One could argue that Bosnia is ripe for full transition and sovereignty. It is now too late for whatever has not yet been achieved – as the momentum has been lost. Still, there is reluctance to dispense with the Bonn powers and close down the protectorate symbolized by the Office of the High Representative. In the political field, the threats of secession by the country’s Serbs are more vocal than ever. During the election campaign in the autumn of 2010, the main Serb politician, Milorad Dodik, openly called for secession within four years. The state may now wield more formal powers and have more institutions, but the fundamental sociological reality has not moved towards unity.

The intervention in Bosnia shows that timing the phases of the intervention, including transition, is essential. For profound reforms there is a “golden hour,” a window that normally closes down quite soon. Immediately after the termination of violence, when actors are off-balance, or

due to some external “shock,” like 9/11, there is increased chance to push through reforms. But momentum matters. Once lost, it is almost impossible to regain. And once the momentum is gone, the withdrawal should, arguably, proceed apace. The continued existence of international organizations after momentum has been lost is often exploited to deflect the blame from local politicians and other local actors themselves. If the intervention is formally terminated, the local elite stand more exposed to their electorates. However, whether that actually makes for more responsible behavior cannot be guaranteed.

In general, a wide range of factors will determine the local needs for external assistance, on what level and by how many mentors. And various factors determine what is offered by the outside world. In some cases, the international mentors may seem reluctant to let go of their influence. In others, they seem eager to leave. There will normally be some benchmarks and metrics involved in the decision to scale down and ultimately pull out. However, these benchmarks are often politically driven rather than objectively measured by the host nation’s own abilities.

How you got into a supporting role and how that was carried out during the intervention will determine how and with what consequences you will and can depart. Where a heavy footprint was called for, it is likely that the intervention will be long and the extraction painful and difficult. All interventions create local dependency. And the more profound the intervention, the more ingrained will be the dependency created within the local society.

Interventions often entail military force, diplomatic pressure and economic influence. These inputs influence the local balance of power as well as the local incentive system. Interventions change behavior and the rules of the game. When the intervention is scaled down and ultimately terminated, the balance of power changes as well. And any change in relative power normally creates turbulence. Interventions therefore sow the seeds of future disturbance and turmoil within local systems of power.

Arguably, transitions should be carried out in steps, rather than abruptly. If it is also made clear just what is involved and how the pull-out is to be effectuated, local actors will have time to adapt to a new balance of power and a new system of incentives. Extending the transition period can provide an opportunity to test local readiness for complete sovereignty. On the other hand, such an approach might also encourage those who stand to lose most from external withdrawal to create “artificial” disturbances to discourage the transition from being completed. Transitions are bound to be difficult – both to analyze and to carry through.

Each process of transition needs to be evaluated on its own merits. The whole period must be managed politically, and it must be recognized that objective criteria will be confounded by international political realities and the political climate in the contributing nations. Unfortunately, some level of disappointment must be contended with in any process of transition. There will be groups, in the countries undergoing transition and elsewhere, who will always argue that it is either too soon or not soon enough.

THE FUTURE OF INTERVENTION AND ASSISTANCE

Without local political will, there can be no functioning state or society. External forces and organizations can provide some temporary space for this political will to materialize, like providing security through the stationing of peace-keepers, arbitrate in disputes, building technical capacity and provide funds for selected projects. But external assistance can go only so far. Experience over the past two decades would seem to have shown that many external interventions are less effective than originally assumed.

Recently, U.S. Secretary of Defense Roberts Gates concluded that the “...United States is unlikely to repeat a mission on the scale of those in Afghanistan and Iraq anytime soon – that is,

forced regime change followed by nation building under fire.”¹² However, he did not exclude missions where U.S. and allied forces would build “partner capacity” and help “other countries defend themselves.” The line between full-scale invasions and assistance missions can be difficult to draw. What starts out as a limited engagement may well escalate if the local partners are unable to make headway and root out or suppress their opposition.

Roberts Gates’ caution about forced regime change seems prudent. Costs are high in blood and treasure, and the impact quite unpredictable. Future engagements should be analyzed with more realism and less ideological optimism than in the immediate post-Cold War era. Societies are complex and difficult to understand; political dynamics are hard to engineer. Future engagements must include an assessment of the general state of disintegration and the causes, the enmity–amity relations locally and regionally, economic development and the resource situation. Historical and cultural attitudes towards those most likely to intervene and assist must also be factored in. Sometimes local powerbrokers can be de-legitimized by being associated with certain foreign powers. The manner and possibilities of intervention and assistance will also be a reflection of the development of the global order. Immediately after the Cold War the West, and in particular the United States, reigned quite supreme. No other powers could match their dominance militarily, economically, culturally or to some extent morally. With the rise of China and other powers this is bound to change. Rising powers will look with greater skepticism towards the involvement of the United States and its Western allies in areas they consider within their expanding sphere of interest. Building consensus for interventions in frail states may become more difficult, and it could also lead to local forces using the more multilateral and/or competitive international order to play the various factions of the international community off against each other. Also, the possibility of conflicts played out through local proxies, so prevalent during the Cold War, might re-surface in the new global game for influence that is now emerging. Needless to say, such developments would render assisted institution-building and state-building even more challenging.

12 Robert Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2010, p. 2.

CHAPTER 5

BLIND MEN AND POLITICAL ELEPHANTS: TRANSITIONS TO PHASE 4 AND BEYOND

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BEFORE WE BEGIN¹

This is not a typical academic paper in at least two respects. First, it is written with a particular audience in mind. Given the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations' (PKSOI) plans to disseminate the proceedings of this Transitions Conference (16-18 November 2010), I assume that most of its readers will have some connection to the military and little awareness of what the field of peace building is all about. That is hardly surprising. Therefore, I have tried to draw on concepts from peace building and political science that could best show the likely readership why we can profitably work together and perhaps why we have to work together better.

Second, it is written at an interesting juncture in my career. When I should be planning my retirement, I am organizing a new series of books on rethinking international security in our changing world. The series will include books that draw on both peace building and traditional international relations. One might think that there is a lot of overlap between the two. There is not. Therefore, I have written a series of papers in the past year that try to show ways in which work in these fields can illuminate each other and how they can help us all come to grips with the new security demands of the post-cold war and post-9/11 world. The work on this series and my impending retirement has made me reflective about what I have observed and learned over the years. This paper shares that story of learning.

BLIND MEN AND POLITICAL ELEPHANTS

In writing the paper, I kept being drawn to the parable of the three blind men trying to describe an elephant. Google tells us that almost 400,000 sites at least mention what happens when the three sightless men try to describe a very large elephant, each by feeling and interacting with some separate part.² This paper will draw on the experience of three such "blind men" – scholars/activists in peace building, political science, and DoD – all of whom I have worked with during the course of my 40 years in the field. Each of my "blind" sides adds something to our understanding of a very complicated "elephant." However, little has been done to combine the academic, political, and military sides of things. That is what I propose to do in this paper.

Doing so will take me beyond the formal topic of this conference and the collection of papers. Instead of concentrating just on what the transition to Phase 4 entails, I will cast my net wider to consider transitions more broadly and, with them, the emotional, political, and other questions they bring us. I would not claim that I have done so wholly, but my goal is to at least take us part of the way to the hopes of the old hymn, "Amazing Grace": "...was blind, but now I see."³

1 Earlier versions of this paper were given at Oberlin College, the British Politics Group of the American Political Science Association, and the Reinventing Governance conference at the University of Colorado.

2 Oddly it lists more hits for blind women and elephants, but most of them seem to be about treks real live blind women can take.

3 The hymn's words were written by an English cleric, John Newton, who became an ardent Christian when a storm nearly swamped his ship that was part of the slave trade. I am not advocating either religious conversion or surviving a calamity here on earth. Rather, Newton's conversion and the words he wrote some years later reflect what scholars of transitions have long understood: to make a major transition, you

For another metaphorical insight into our challenge, consider a statement Albert Einstein included in a telegram he sent to 200 prominent Americans urging them to end the nuclear arms race before it began, which we in the Beyond War movement used in the 1980s:

The unleashed power of the Atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.⁴

Our purpose at the time was to help others see three things that went beyond the obvious conclusion emblazoned on a bumper sticker I once owned that stated: "One nuclear bomb can destroy your whole day!" These points are equally valid for today's environment.

- The invention of nuclear weapons did not just change war, but in Einstein's terms, it changed everything. We did not heed Einstein's words then, but with the collapse of communism and the terrorist attacks on 9/11 we are all finally coming to grips with how much and how quickly things have changed.
- Despite the changes wrought in 1945, we continued to approach national security issues and political conflict in general using the same core values and assumptions we have used for generations. Following 9/11, we made the same mistake.
- Without a change in our "way of thinking," we are strategically adrift. The word "drift" is powerful for its weakness. When we sail and are adrift, we cannot control our boat. Similarly, in classical cowboy movies, a drifter was someone who wandered seemingly purposely from town to town six-gun in hand.

By the end of this paper, I hope to show that we need a new "mode of thinking" in all three of the "blind" communities I address.

In moving from blindness to seeing in this paper, I want to stress two critical aspects that must be included in any change in our way of thinking. The first concerns the key transition out of Phase 3 (combat) and into Phase 4 (reconstruction and stabilization) operations. Despite the most recent versions of Directive 3000.05 and the QDR, these are not tasks that are in the skill sets of most troops.⁵ Yet, for a number of wholly understandable reasons, we have asked our military to do just that. This is unlikely to change and we in the peace building profession must learn to accept this. Second, the two professional worlds I work in offer us insights into how to handle transition better, which the military profession must learn to accept. From a political scientist's perspective, we have agonized over the ways formerly authoritarian regimes become democratic. From the outside, it would seem that political scientists mostly yelled (intellectually) at each other. However, we have honed in on a number of concepts, including fixing failed states and "pacting," a process through which moderates on both sides of a conflictual political divide learn to work with each other. For conflict resolution practitioners, the transition away from combat operations opens the door to a much longer process of reconciliation in which former adversaries do not forget what initially divided them but learn to ease the tensions by

have to shed old ways of thinking and begin "seeing" and adopting new ones that are consistent with the new circumstances you find yourself in. For the history and lyrics, see http://www.anointedlinks.com/amazing_grace.html.

⁴ Walter Isaacson, *Einstein: His Life and Universe* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), p. 490.

⁵ Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.5, "Stability Operations," Washington, DC: DOD, September 16, 2009; available from www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf, accessed January 16, 2010. Department of Defense, *The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*, Washington, DC: DOD, February 2010; available from <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/>, accessed January 16, 2010.

understanding each other's version of "the truth" and acting accordingly. As the late General Andrew Masondo of South Africa put it while he was still head of the ANC's military wing, "... understand the differences, act on the commonalities."⁶

My approach here is to outline the argument and then illustrate the somewhat abstract argument with three brief cases because they demonstrate what my communities could bring to the intellectual table – and what we could learn from changes in DoD.⁷

- Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite my own past as a conscientious objector, it is important for someone who comes from outside the DoD and USG to look at why our failure to quickly adopt COIN and other policies hurt our policies in the region. Perhaps even more importantly, considering these two cases could help USG analysts understand what academic political scientists and NGO activists can bring to the table
- The world renowned transition from apartheid to a multi-racial democracy in South Africa focusing on the tremendous role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission offers unique insights to transition.
- The transition to a stable democracy in Brazil after decades of military and other authoritarian rule which owes a lot to how the last two presidents – Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luis Lula da Silva – worked together in opposition and at least tolerated each other in office.

NEW THINKING

For my many sins, I have to go to a lot of professional meetings in my discipline each year. Most never touch on civil-military relations in any form. Most could – and should! However they do stimulate insights important to transitions and lasting peace and how to think about them – leading to my ideas on new thinking.

Transitions

There is no shortage of writings on transitions. The one I find most useful for new thinking is based on the work of William Bridges⁸, which the Andrus Family Fund uses to determine what to fund and then how to structure the projects it supports.⁹ A transition can be sudden and happen all but overnight as with the hurricane or oil spill that devastated much of the Gulf Coast in recent years. More typically, however, transitions are extended and take decades to complete, if they are completed at all. That certainly is the case for the way both the military and the peace building communities have (or not, as the case may be) responded to the new security challenges of the post-cold war world.

One of the strengths of the Bridges model is that is not too detailed and avoids laying out too many steps a transition has to go through. In fact, in most of his writing, he only lays out three.¹⁰

6 For a fuller explanation of the implications of this statement see Charles (Chip) Hauss, "Focusing on Commonalities," June 2003; available from <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/commonalities/?nid=1303>, accessed January 16, 2010.

7 I have written about all of these concepts and cases (other than Afghanistan) in my two most recent books, *International Conflict Resolution*, 2nd ed. (New York: Continuum, 2010) and *Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Challenges*, 7th ed. (Belmont CA: Wadsworth/Cengage, 2010).

8 For the latest work on the theory see William Bridges with Susan Bridges, *Managing Transitions: Making the Most of Change* (Philadelphia, PA: Da Capo Press Books, 1991; 2009).

9 For a description of the Andrus Family Fund, see their website at <http://www.affund.org/>, accessed January 16, 2010.

10 Bridges, 4-5. See also "Transitions: Sustaining Social Change," available from <http://www.transitionandsocialchange.org/01understanding.shtml>, accessed January 16, 2010.

- *Endings*: A realization of the changes one confronts, which may often be caused from outside the participants' immediate network.
- *Neutral Zone*. After participants realize that they are in a transition and, therefore, realize that they have to shed their previous values and assumptions, they become open to adopting new core principles.
- *New Beginnings*. Once participants come up with new ideas (and after rejecting some that did not work), they come up with new ones. As the Andrus Family Fund puts it, new beginnings that work simply feel good.

I am by no means suggesting that the model developed by Bridges and used by Andrus is the only viable approach to major change. In fact, as someone who has spent his entire life in politics, I think Bridges puts too much emphasis on emotional responses. Nonetheless, the model has the benefit of being generally applicable and brief. It helps generate new thinking in the dozens of ways my worlds and DoD can collide. To keep this from turning into a book, I will concentrate on two from each of my fields.

From Political Science

Fixing Failed States

One of the most important recent books in political science is not by political scientists and is not as well known among political scientists as it should be. Ashraf Ghani is an economist who has taught at a number of universities, been a finalist for the top positions at the World Bank and United Nations, and spent the bulk of his time since the fall of the Taliban in his native Afghanistan calling for transparency and state effectiveness both as a government minister and as a private citizen. Clare Lockhart is a British lawyer (barrister) who helped write the agreement creating a civilian government in post-Taliban Afghanistan. She joined Ghani in Afghanistan in a variety of positions and, with him, created the Institute for State Effectiveness in 2005 and co-authored *Fixing Failed States* with him in 2008.¹¹

In fact, Ghani and Lockhart's thesis that a conflict-ridden country first and foremost needs an effective state is not altogether a new one. At least as long ago as the 1960s and the publication of Samuel Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies*, some political scientists have put development of state capacity ahead of other key goals including democratization.¹² Huntington's important work in this area has not always received a positive response in political science community because of his association with the war in Vietnam and his later work on the clash of civilizations. He took a very different tack from Ghani and Lockhart. In the simplest terms, Huntington argued that rapid change could lead to increased, demanding participation and thus destabilize many of the newly independent states in what we then called the third or underdeveloped world.

By contrast, Ghani and Lockhart concentrate on what makes states work well on the basis of their extensive experience in Afghanistan and other failed states.¹³ They lay out ten responsibilities of any successful state, among which are maintaining the rule of law and a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, administrative control over the country including the effective management of public assets, the creation of citizens' rights through implementation of effective social policy, the establishment of an infrastructure that meets human needs, the creation of a market,

11 Institute for State Effectiveness, website available at <http://www.effectivestates.org/>. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lochart, *Fixing Failed States*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

12 Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968; 1996).

13 The best overview on the term is the annual failed states index compiled by the Fund for Peace, www.fundforpeace.org, accessed January 16, 2010.

and more generally the provision of benefits that accrue from an effective and sovereign state.

In essence, they offer an overarching sovereignty strategy for creating an effective state that can be adjusted to meet the needs of individual countries. Such a strategy must be multi-faceted and operate at multiple levels. In a case like Iraq, the international community must coordinate its activities with local authorities to help achieve the goals listed in the previous paragraph. Domestic and international stakeholders must be aligned in support those goals. The rules of creation must be efficiently enforced and done so in ways that maximizes transparency and minimizes corruption. In the medium to long-term the state should try to increase the level of goodwill and trust based effectiveness. Then, such goals as democratization can be pursued; in other words, an effective state comes first.

If readers familiar with the COIN doctrine and the evolution of military thought since General David Petraeus rose to prominence in military thinking see parallels between “fixing failed states” and a strategy aimed at winning “hearts and minds, that should come as no surprise.¹⁴ Lockhart was part of a team of advisors who worked with General Petraeus for several months after he took control of CENTCOM. Most of the other members of that group (the list has never been published) included people who share the Ghani/Lockhart perspective; many have even worked with them. We will see below that adopting these views by no means guarantees success in the most failed of failing states. However, the work on the Institute for State Effectiveness and the cases we will consider suggest that we ignore these ideas at our peril.

Pacting

Political scientists have not been silent on the above themes, though I believe their best contributions come in what is a second order priority for Ghani and Lockhart – democratization. The literature on that subject is enormous and can’t be summarized in a paper of this length. Instead, I want focus on just one theme – pacting – that is found especially in the works of Larry Diamond and Valerie Bunce.¹⁵ The inelegant word “pacting” refers to a process in which relative moderates in a threatened regime and their counterparts in the opposition find a way to work together.

There is no blueprint for making pacts work, and the evidence from Eastern Europe suggests that they do not always emerge. Nonetheless, as we will see in the South African and Brazilian cases below, such, often informal, ties are required for successful and/or peaceful transitions from authoritarian rule and political turmoil to an effective or a democratic state.

As we will also see in Iraq and Afghanistan, the lack of pacting can doom a transition to failure. The attentive reader might reply that perhaps the most divided countries may not be “ready” for pacting. There is some evidence to suggest that they can form in even the most war torn of societies if the Ghani/Lockhart proposals are adhered to as well. In an as yet unpublished case study I did on Guinea-Bissau for the Before Project, we found targeted engagement by a small group of NGOs who created de facto pacts helped that country not return to war after

14 U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 *Counterinsurgency* (Washington,DC: 2008); available from http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/FM_3-24.pdf, accessed January 16, 2010. The manual was published commercially with introductions by General Petraeus, Sarah Sewell, and John Nagl who were among its leading architects. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). It is \$15 well worth spending.

15 Larry Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 2008), p. 52. See more of the work by Diamond in the *Journal of Democracy*. Valerie Bunce, “Democratization and Economic Reform,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, June 2001, pp.43-65.

forces loyal to the president killed the defense minister. Peace held even after those loyal to the latter assassinated the former, all in less than a twenty four hour period.¹⁶

From Peace Building

The peace building community is much newer and therefore lacks even the modicum of agreement on what matters that we find among political scientists. That said, it is very much a growth field both in academe and among NGOs. The practical work is not simply being done by organizations like mine that put peace building at their intellectual and political core. Rather, there are groups that focus on religion, gender, economics, the environment and more that include peace building as a core component of their work. Their logic is simple: can you develop an economy, save the environment, liberate women, etc. in countries ravaged by violent conflict?¹⁷

It is important to note here that the peace building community and the military have had a certain rapprochement that would not have been imaginable during my youth in the Vietnam era. We are grappling together to find ways of providing general human security for people around the world; in the process, we are discovering that we share a lot of goals – if not tactics – in common.¹⁸ Two stand out for the purposes of this paper.

Reconciliation

First is the long-term goal of reconciliation. Readers who have served in the military during the Iraq era will undoubtedly remember that this was a stated goal of the Bush administration in that country prior to “the surge.” However, the Bush team meant something very different in using this term than we conflict resolution specialists do. For the Bush administration, reconciliation simply meant getting people to stop fighting and ease tensions enough so that people could coexist and move safely and freely from one ethnically defined neighborhood to another. I learned to my chagrin that we were talking past each other when I did some consulting on the subject for senior intelligence analysts in 2007.

For peace builders, reconciliation is part of a process that can put a permanent end to a conflict. Elsewhere, I defined it as “a number of activities that help turn the temporary peace of an agreement which ends the fighting into a lasting end to the conflict itself.”¹⁹ The key word in that sentence is “lasting.” In this sense of the term, reconciliation brings conflicting parties as close as possible to a permanent end to a dispute. The most publicized technique is the truth and reconciliation commission which we will examine in the South Africa case. So far, there have been about 20 of them, including one to help the city of Greensboro, NC overcome the scars left twenty five years after a riot involving the Ku Klux Klan, leftist demonstrators, and the police in which five people were killed.

This is the area of this paper that comes closest to Bridges’ assertion that transitions are predominantly emotional in nature. The documentary, “Long Night’s Journey into Day” traces four cases the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) handled.²⁰ Each is filled with people crying. Tears are so common in such endeavors because people who lead them encourage par-

16 For more on Guinea-Bissau see www.beforeproject.org, accessed January 16, 2010.

17 To cite but one example, see www.economicsandpeace.org, accessed January 16, 2010.

18 See Colonel Cindy R. Jebb, Laurel J. Hummel, Luis Rios, and Madelfia A. Abb, “On the Margins: Insecurities in Niger and Chad,” in Helen Purkitt, ed., *African Environmental and Human Security in the 21st Century* (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2009), pp. 3-56. Note that most of the authors in this volume are current or retired military officers.

19 Chip Hauss, “Reconciliation,” September 2003; available at <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/reconciliation/?nid=1224>, accessed January 16, 2010.

20 Francis Reid, Producer and Director, “Long Night’s Journey into Day: South Africa’s search for Truth & Reconciliation,” Iris Films, 2000.

ticipants to confront their deepest losses and/or their deepest sense of guilt for what they did. That is easy to see intellectually in the four characteristics of a reconciliation process developed by the acknowledged expert in the field, John Paul Lederach.²¹

- *Peace*. In this sense Lederach and the rest of us agree with the Bush administration. Reconciliation is not possible if people are still fighting each other.
- *Truth*. One of the goals of most truth commissions is to find out as much as is possible about what happened. Because the truth brings raw memories to the surface, learning about what happened is never an easy process. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu has said many times, “reconciliation isn’t cozy.”²²
- *Justice*. Initially reconciliation advocates thought at least some people who carried out the atrocities had to be held accountable. In practical terms, it is rarely possible for a country to do so in traditional ways. First, there are too many people involved; as many as 200,000 people were detained for trial after the genocide in Rwanda. Second and more importantly, if you want to heal wounds, it is probably better to use some form of restorative justice that eschews punishment in favor of an outcome that helps people forgive – but not forget.
- *Mercy*. This is probably the key innovation that reconciliation brings to conflict and, in many ways, is the glue that holds the other three together. As noted earlier, in reconciliation, one has to learn to forgive without forgetting.

Patience

One of the most important lessons about conflict resolution and peace building is that it cannot happen overnight. The emotions are simply too raw. The good thing about this characteristic is that it can be allayed relatively quickly and easily. While “the troubles” were just easing in Northern Ireland in 1990, Lederach ran a workshop on reconciliation there. He was asked how long it would take to achieve reconciliation. He asked when the conflict began; the answer he got was the Battle of Boyne almost exactly three hundred years earlier.²³ He simply answered plan on three hundred years, demonstrating its like complexity and continuing nature. In practice, we know how to speed up reconciliation – some. But it cannot occur in the one to three year time span most foreign policy makers had in mind for Iraq under the Bush administration.

Success is never guaranteed. Search for Common Ground is the most important American-based NGO working on reconciliation. With programs in over 20 countries, it rarely takes on a project unless it can make at least a three-year commitment which is not easy in this funding environment.²⁴ Search is best known for its success with television and radio “soap operas” on conflict related issues in which the terms “conflict” and “resolution” are almost never used. The first and most famous of them, “Nashe Maalo,” was set, improbably, at an apartment house in which ethnic Macedonian, Albanian, and Roma teenagers live side by side and confront the problems people their age confront just about everywhere. Finally, even more improbably, the apartment house, Karman, comes to life and helps the young people settle their differences and understand their common humanity.²⁵ Even the most innovative efforts do not always work. As the Greensboro TRC showed all too clearly, as long as people blame each other a quarter century past an incident, it is hard to achieve a needed emotional response from the perpetrators – the recognize of a wrong and an apology. And, as we have learned in almost every TRC, all sides were responsible for some ill-treatment of their adversaries.

21 John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).

22 Commonly attributed to individual.

23 Ibid.

24 For more on this organization see www.sfcg.org, accessed January 16, 2010.

25 Nashe Maalo is near and dear to my heart because my son-in-law is from Macedonian and has seen many of its episodes.

CASE STUDIES

So far, this paper has covered a lot of ground, often on an abstract level and in ways that will not be familiar to at least some. Therefore, let me conclude with brief case studies that illustrate the points made above. I will deal with the two most problematic cases first. Although I could easily write on Iraq and Afghanistan separately, for the purposes of this paper they raise similar issues and I will therefore treat them together, knowing full well that they are very different places.

The other two cases are quite different. By no means did leaders in either Brazil or South Africa explicitly follow the options I teased from the academic literature and the on-the-ground experience of peace builders. Most of them had not been “invented” at the time of the Brazilian transition from military rule, and, of course, the South Africans went a long way toward developing those involving reconciliation and patience.

Iraq/Afghanistan

The two countries and their international occupiers fall short on all fronts, notwithstanding some important efforts, particularly by the military, though less often by politicians or NGOs. Although the peace building and political communities may not have noticed it sufficiently, there has been a sea change in military thinking in the last decade. I have had extended discussions with dozens of serving officers who have served as many as three tours in the region. All are discouraged except when it comes to efforts to win over “hearts and minds” through COIN based strategies, even when the results of specific programs have been less than spectacular.²⁶ They seem to sense where success lies. Here, I will first establish the dimensions of that failure and then focus on the reasons why this has been the case.

It would be foolhardy to argue that there are any simple, constructive solutions in either country. Consider two front page stories in the *Washington Post* and *New York Times*, respectively, on 4 October 2010. The *Post* wrote about NATO reliance on Abdul Razziq, an illiterate, corrupt strongman in the Spin Boldak region, near Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. By no one’s standards is Razziq an ideal leader; however he has kept the region he controls reasonably calm, freeing NATO forces to concentrate their efforts elsewhere. The *Times* report focused on the political difficulties facing Iraq seven months after elections were held. The country still did not have a government. In the days before Lee Myers’ story, it appeared that outgoing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki would retain his job, but only with the support of the anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Tensions were also high because the Shiite led coalition had denied 500 candidates the right to run in the March elections, most of whom were Sunnis. As a result, the split between the two communities deepened to the point that many Sunni leaders had all but abandoned political life.²⁷

Both stories reflect the fact that the United States and its allies appear to have made precious little progress in fixing these two failed states. That, of course, begs the question: could they have done any better? Of course, an answer that they could have would be counterfactual and we will

26 To see an example that did largely “work,” consider the Sunni Awakening centered in al-Anbar province in Iraq. Niel Smith and Sean MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point,” *Military Review*, LXXXVII, No.2, March-April 2008, pp.41-52. In general, serving and retired officers are writing reasonably critical articles frequently these days, especially in military journals. This piece raises the most serious issues that we in the peace building world have to confront. As a sign of how much progress we have made, it was first sent to me by a senior Colonel who had been a West Point classmate of now General MacFarland.

27 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “The Afghan Robin Hood,” *Washington Post*, 4 October 2010, p. 1. Steven Lee Myers, “Iraq’s Fissures Only Deepen,” *New York Times*, 4 October 2010, p. 1.

never know. What is clear is that without a growing degree of political stability – an effective state, progress on the other three criteria of patience, pacting, and reconciliation discussed above was all but impossible. Perhaps given the limited time perspectives imposed by electoral cycles at home or the growing impatience of their own constituents, they could not, for instance, adopt the patience or take steps toward pacting or reconciliation. Equally important, very few American or European peace building NGOs have been willing to overcome their qualms about the wars to help build constructive solutions. With their experience with pacting and reconciliation, they might have helped political leaders act more in a way that could lead to long term peace. Neither American or other politicians nor NGOs have pursued success in a manner suggesting they had learned the lessons surfaced earlier.

Brazil

On 3 October 2010, Brazilians went to the polls to elect a new president. The outgoing president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, universally known as Lula, was not allowed to run for a third term. Instead, his chosen successor, Dilma Rousseff, a former insurgent, won 47 percent of the vote, outpolling her closest rival by sixteen percent. She became Brazil's 36th President after a successful, but predictable runoff. Next to no one bats an eyelash at her political past. Indeed, her election provides yet more evidence confirming the fact that Brazil has become the world's fourth largest democracy. We should not, however, forget that for most of its history Brazil was ruled by military and other authoritarian regimes. Most were corrupt and at times resembled failed states. The most recent military coup took place in 1964 and stayed in power for twenty-one years. It was succeeded by a series of ineffectual and often corrupt civilian leaders, one of whom died before being sworn in.

Brazilian history becomes interesting for our purposes with the election of the moderate leftist Fernando Henrique Cardoso as president in 1994. Cardoso had been a prominent leader of the resistance to military rule and spent some time in exile. But, he was also the son of a prominent general and thus had close personal and political ties to the military. Cardoso is important here for two reasons. First, even before he came to power, he was primarily responsible for a series of reforms that stabilized the currency and seemed to go against his left-wing past. In short, he helped *fix a failed state*. Second, he validated *pacting*, especially in his relationship with his eventual successor Lula.

The two had been in the resistance together, but were not particularly close. After Cardoso made his shift rightward, Lula became one of his sharpest critics. However, as the end of his second term neared and it became clear that Lula was likely to win the impending election, the president began to act in a more conciliatory way toward his ally turned rival. Lula, meanwhile, abandoned some of his most left-wing goals and rhetoric, which had worried everyone from the Brazilian military to authorities in Washington. When Lula won, Cardoso handed over the presidential sash (the symbol of presidential power) with grace and in apparent friendship. Lula responded by stating publicly that Cardoso would always be welcome in the presidential mansion.

As President, Lula confounded his critics by consolidating most of the reforms begun by Cardoso. To be sure, Lula introduced reforms of his own, especially to address the country's poverty and racism. But, the reforms that had produced a mostly capitalist economy stayed in place. Brazil continued its amazing ascent in the global economy so that along with Russia, India, and China (the so-called BRIC countries) it has demanded and won a place in the G-20, which is replacing the G-8 as the most influential international economic forum. No wonder few people are worried about Dilma.²⁸

²⁸ Brazilian populist politicians are typically only referred to by their first names. This is usually different from their soccer players who usually use a nickname which bears little or no resemblance to one their

One last observation is important. Brazilian democracy did not take root overnight. Cardoso's economic reforms were implemented – perhaps of necessity – very quickly and with some negative consequences for people on fixed incomes. However, in a country that lived through almost a century and a half of military and, frankly, less than competent civilian rule, the fact that it took some time for democracy to take root should come as no surprise. *Patience* is important, and perhaps essential to lasting success.

South Africa

South Africa is often seen as the archetypical example of conflict resolution and peace building in the world today. The change has been so deep and so profound that young people today outside of the country are shocked when they learn about the brutality of the apartheid policy. The formal system of apartheid (literally separateness) only existed from the late 1940s until Nelson Mandela's inauguration in 1994. However, whites had discriminated against their fellow South Africans from the time that the first white settlers arrived almost four hundred years ago. That said, discrimination turned to repression under the policy of apartheid once black South Africans began to challenge the previous discriminatory practices.

At first, opposition to discrimination was non-violent, including following the formation of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1912. The ANC and other anti-apartheid groups reluctantly turned to confrontation and violence in the 1960s when the repression reached an all-time high and organizations like the ANC were outlawed. At the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, authorities fired on a crowd and killed at least 69 people. After Sharpeville (which was not organized by the ANC), Mandela and some of his young colleagues reluctantly decided they had to take up arms and created an armed wing of the ANC, admittedly without much tactical success. Mandela and others were soon arrested. Many feared he would be executed. Instead, he was sentenced to prison on Robben Island where he would remain for 27 years.

Mandela's imprisonment was brutal and he gained international recognition. His picture was never shown and his name was never mentioned in the South African media. Meanwhile, the regime's violence got worse, especially in its response to the protests in the all-black townships surrounding the major cities. By the mid-1980s when Mandela was nearly 70, he reached a conclusion that was intriguingly shared by a lot of his adversaries in the white security services. They had reached what conflict resolution experts call a hurting stalemate. They could continue fighting, but neither side was likely to win. Mandela put it best:

It was clear to me that a military victory was a distant if not impossible dream. It simply did not make sense for both sides to lose thousands if not millions of lives in a conflict that was unnecessary. It was time to talk.²⁹

However, Mandela took his time – *patience*. Between 1987 and his release in 1990, he held 47 talks with the authorities. He spoke Afrikaans with them, poured tea for their wives, and was granted better prison conditions, probably because the authorities thought they could split him off from the main ANC leadership.³⁰ During this time, political conditions changed and Mandela and most of his colleagues found *pacting* offered new opportunities. There was some blind luck involved. Mandela found it far easier to work with the new President, F. W. de Klerk, who assumed office only after his predecessor, P. W. Botha, suffered a debilitating stroke. The bottom

parents gave them at birth.

29 Cited in Patti Waldmeier, *Anatomy of a Miracle* (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 94.

30 Mandela was eventually allowed to live in a small cabin near the presidential compound. He rebuilt it for what would become his first retirement home and invited his chief jailer as a guest of honor at his inauguration.

line is that both the ANC leadership and supporters of the regime came to realize that change was needed. Mandela was released in 1990 and after four years of negotiations – interspersed with violence – he became president of a South Africa that would be governed largely by black South Africans under the principle of “one man, one vote.”

As president, Mandela confronted problems typical of the failed state dilemma which led to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. At first, pragmatism, not principle, led the new government to act. Mandela and his colleagues realized that they needed white business leaders to sustain the nation’s position as the wealthiest country in Africa by far and white civil servants to manage the country. Even though fellow ANC leaders wanted to bring many whites to trial, Mandela, Tutu, and others cut an implicit deal with white elites in which blacks would control the government while experienced whites ran the economy and sustained the government bureaucracy at least until a new generation of black leaders was ready.

Creating the TRC was an essential part of the deal. Co-chaired by Desmond Tutu and Alex Boraine, a white clergyman who had also been a leader of the anti-apartheid movement, its purpose was to hear testimony from prisoners who could be granted amnesty if they told everything they knew and could be released from prison as a result – *truth and mercy allow reconciliation*. Tutu is convinced that the commission learned all that it was possible to learn about what happened. About one seventh of the people who asked for amnesty were granted it.

Evidence of reconciliation was inescapable. One documentary film tracked the TRC through four stories.³¹ In the last, a black and a white police officer were sentenced to prison for setting up a group of protesters and killing them. They both applied for amnesty. The white officer showed no remorse and was quickly sent back to jail. The black officer met with the mothers of the people he had helped kill. After a tearful session with the mothers, one of them asked if his name meant “mercy” in his language. He said yes. She said, in essence, I can never forget what you did and what you took from me. But, as a good Christian, I cannot deny you mercy. He was freed – truth and mercy.

The scene from the film that works best with American students in grasping the concept of reconciliation involves Amy Biehl. Amy was a recent Stanford graduate who was on a Fulbright Fellowship to work on the transition to a multi-racial democracy in South Africa. After a meeting, she drove a few of her black friends back to their township outside of Cape Town. She was then pulled from her car and killed by a group of young blacks who had just returned from a failed demonstration. The four who were convicted of the crime applied to the TRC, but two fled before appearing before the Commission. Amy’s parents, who endorsed Amy’s work, decided to testify before the TRC. While visiting the Cape, they met with the families of the two young men whose cases were still pending (more tears). The parents testified in favor of amnesty, which was granted. The parents then paid for the two young men to finish their education and hired them at the newly formed Amy Biehl Foundation.³² Amy was not forgotten, but truth and mercy allowed reconciliation.

South Africa has not solved all of its problems. The ANC has more power than some people would like, although it has rarely abused it. The country has one of the highest crime rates in the world, much of which is black on white. It has had little success in reducing the economic gap between blacks and whites. But, there seems little chance that it could fall back into the chaos of the second half of the twentieth century.

31 “Long Night’s Journey Into Day”.

32 For more information on this program see website at www.amybiehl.org, accessed January 16, 2010. I had the pleasure of meeting with Peter and Linda Biehl shortly before he died. There was no question of their genuineness. My students who had lost friends and relatives in far less violent ways could not believe it.

BLIND MEN AND ELEPHANTS: TOMORROW IS ANOTHER COUNTRY?

One of the best early books on the transition in South Africa is entitled, *Tomorrow is Another Country*.³³ Given what we have seen so far, can we say that about the United States and its national security policy at any time in the foreseeable future? The short answer is probably not, but possibly yes. To return to the image I used to start the paper, there is blindness on all sides. More importantly, my reading of the evidence suggests that there are two key conclusions one can draw. The first is that all of us are at least partially right and largely wrong. Like the three blind men, we all understand some aspects of what the elephant is like while missing others. The second key conclusion is that if I am even half right here, we face our current dilemma because too few of us have recognized that we are in a massive transition that requires all of us to adopt a *new mode of thinking* that involves *fixing failed states, pacting, reconciliation, and patience*. Again, if I am even half right, these “pieces” of the “elephant” should help the four communities this paper is written for identify and address the right things for tomorrow. My assessment of each community’s status follows.

Military

Although I have not concentrated on shifts in the military, my reading of the less than complete evidence is that the military has come farther than the other communities.³⁴ My optimism about the military is not founded on a belief that all senior officers and decision makers inside the services see the depth of the crisis and the need for the kind of transition the likes of Bridges or Einstein would call for, but on the fact that people like me are invited to more and more military-organized events than we can possibly attend. It says a lot about the military as a learning organization and their desire to get tomorrow right.

NGOs

This is my personal *mea culpa* because this is my community. Most of us in the NGO world have kept our distance from efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan because we opposed the former from the outset and came to have doubts about the latter once the situation on the ground deteriorated. Most of us were therefore reluctant to get involved because we did not want to be associated with a government with which we disagreed.³⁵ Personally, I am one of the critics of both conflicts; but, I have been arguing long and hard for the peace building NGOs to be more involved in both countries. After all, most of us at least claim to believe that we have a responsibility to play whatever positive role we can in a seemingly intractable conflict. And, of course, NGOs were critical in solving many other conflicts. Perhaps it is enough to hope that we will play more of our traditional role in the next conflicts we face in which the U.S. government will (presumably) not be so clearly a party to the dispute.

Political Science

Like many in my generation, I started graduate school in the late 1960s with a hope that through teaching and scholarship we could make a positive contribution to solving problems

33 Allister Sparks, *Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s Road to Change* (London: Heineman, 1995).

34 The Highlands Group, run by Richard O’Neill (Capt-USN retired) is the leader on this front. I’m sure that not all serving and retired officers share its perspective. More information on this group is available at www.highlandsgroup.net, accessed January 16, 2010.

35 There are some exceptions. See the video that Lisa Schirch prepared in advance of this conference. www.youtube.com/watch?v=M-MXMFSKchk accessed January 16, 2010.

at home and abroad. Unfortunately, the field has moved in a very different direction. In our obsession with political *science*, the key people in the field have shifted their attention from real world problems to historical cases that lend themselves to quantitative analysis and provide insufficient insight into tomorrow.

Government

I suspect that American policy makers will be the last and the hardest to change. As noted earlier in regard to our Iraq policy, their time frame tends to be short, rarely longer than the next election. Yet, if we are truly going to fix failed states, let alone move toward reconciliation, we need a longer-term perspective. My guess is that only pressure from NGOs, serving officers, business, and other of domestic and global society's leaders and opinion shapers who lie outside the purview of this paper could begin to make that happen.

There is one final key conclusion. Events like the conference that I wrote this paper for and the text it led to are vital enterprises because they bring us into an active dialogue, in this case involving the military and NGOs. I have been working with current and former military leaders since just before 9/11. There have been at least 100 times when we have met the criteria the pollster and philosopher Daniel Yankelovich proposed for dialogue leading to effective public judgment:

The process proceeds by way of a dialogue that is so active and effective and highly charged that it leaves none of the participants untouched and unchanged. At the end of such a dialogue, no person is quite the same person he or she was before the dialogue began.³⁶

That's not enough, but it's a good start for a better tomorrow.

36 Daniel Yankelovich, "How the Public Learns the Public's Business," *Kettering Review*, Winter 1985; available from <http://www.danyankelovich.com/howthepublic.html>, accessed January 6, 2010.

CHAPTER 6

TRANSITIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF LOCAL OWNERSHIP IMPORTANCE AND IMPEDIMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

Fragile states – historically neglected, partitioned and absorbed by more powerful neighbors – have claimed a central place in the international security landscape. Not surprisingly, the number of assistance missions to states at risk has grown exponentially. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has engaged in 48 peace support missions compared to 18 between 1947 and 1990. In addition, Western governments responded to extremist attacks on the United States, Great Britain and Spain with major new assistance initiatives backed by substantial increases in funding to shore up fragile states and help (re)build states that had failed and/or were recovering from conflict. The number of assistance providers has grown apace. A dizzying array of international organizations (IOs), military and civilian government institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as private contractors are actively assisting fragile, failed or post-conflict states. Nonetheless, the increased efforts, resources and personnel have not produced the desired results.

The following graph shows that 31 of 39 intra-state conflicts in the past decade are recurring – much worse than the heretofore prevailing average of 40% of states that fall back into conflict within a decade.¹ The graph also suggests that the rediscovered comprehensive approach, coupled with that of classic counter-insurgency (COIN), is not working well despite valiant efforts to improve and refine it.



Trends in Global Conflict, 1946-2007 J. Joseph Hewitt, *Peace and Conflict 2010, Executive Summary*, www.cidcm.umd.edu

* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

1 Hoeffler, Anke. "State Failure and Conflict Recurrence" in *Peace and Conflict 2010, Executive Summary*. J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ted Robert Gurr. Center for International Development and conflict Management, University of Maryland 2010, p. 23.

What are the implications of these trends for *transitions*, recently featured as a linchpin in stabilization and reconstruction strategies? A review of the multiple transitions in post-conflict stabilization by Nicholas Armstrong and Jacqueline Chura-Beaver includes political, security, and societal transitions, as well as process and end state transitions. Common to all is a hand over of authority to host country actors and institutions. Implicit in all is the host country as the object of our assistance. The relationship between the donors and the host nation actors raises prickly issues of sovereignty, legitimacy, dependency and reform.² These issues are major sources of the dismal success rate in sustaining stability in these troubled states.

The focus on *transitions* provides an opportunity to examine some underlying weaknesses in our current efforts. First and most important, donors often forget that their role is one of *assistance* – it is not to design and create a new order in their own image. Effective assistance requires a leading role for local actors, critical elites and organizations in the host country; *in other words, local ownership*. Instead, donors preempt the lead and regularly apply technical approaches to the many problems that they identify in the country at risk. The term “tool box” has gained currency to capture the variety of donor assistance capabilities and is indicative of this technical predisposition. In the current process, then, *transition* is the turnover of redesigned institutions, repaired infrastructure, etc. to the host country to run and maintain, not unlike a turn-key production facility. The surprise of donors seems genuine when such transfers work poorly or not at all in these fragile or post-conflict states. What is largely unappreciated is that instead of technical problems or deficits, donors are encountering complex systems that are failing or have collapsed. The weaknesses are grounded primarily in governance and politics, which make local ownership all the more important to sustainable progress.

Although widely recognized and proven to be essential, the persistent failure of donors to make local ownership the centerpiece and driving factor in their efforts represents the major obstacle to effective assistance, whether for traditional development, system transition or stabilization and reconstruction missions. This paper examines the importance of local ownership to all aspects of stabilization and reconstruction missions in fragile states. It explores donor impediments as well as the challenges that fragile and post-conflict environments pose to those trying to apply the principle of local ownership. In addition, the unintended role of donor assistance in perpetuating state fragility in countries at risk is discussed. The case of Western assistance to Afghanistan is examined in search of lessons for local ownership and assistance to fragile states more generally. And finally, an alternative to current practice is offered; one that requires a different emphasis in the *transition* concept.

LOCAL OWNERSHIP: CONCEPT AND PRACTICE IN DONOR ASSISTANCE

The goal of external assistance to fragile states, both those in transition and those recovering from conflict, is to help establish a government that is able to perform reasonably well and is regarded as legitimate by most of the population in the country at risk. Ultimately, therefore, the success or failure of any stabilization and reconstruction or transition assistance will depend primarily upon the key indigenous actors, elites, and organizations and sufficient support from the population in the host country. Outside actors are necessary to help shift the local dynamics and power relations from a destructive to a constructive cycle; but without local ownership of the priorities, form and content of reforms, the impact of donor assistance has proven to be transitory.

The recipients of foreign assistance should not only determine the priorities for foreign assistance, including in what areas foreign actors may engage, but ideally they should also direct

² Armstrong and Chura-Beaver, *Harnessing Post-conflict Transitions: A Conceptual Primer* PKSOI Papers September 2010.

and manage how foreign assistance is provided. Local ownership goes hand-in-hand with local partnership. Local officials in a fragile state may not be able to exercise this level of control; however, weak governments can set priorities. Moreover local officials and communities can and will contribute their own resources – whether they be time, personnel, facilities and/or finances – if they consider the reforms and projects to be worthy. Indeed, active support by local authorities is essential if foreign assistance is to contribute to sustainable progress in the country at risk.

The professional development assistance community subscribes to local ownership in principle. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the UN, the EU and its constituent members and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) all reference the importance of local ownership in their policy and strategy documents.³ All are acutely aware that development assistance is littered with examples of projects that reflected donor priorities not shared by local actors, which fell into disrepair or were replaced by traditional practices once donor funding ended.

Some top-level US military leaders also promote the principle as they rediscover the insights of T.E. Lawrence and their applicability to contemporary challenges in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. Lawrence advised British officers in Iraq 'Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly.'⁴ General George W. Casey, Jr., Commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq, echoed this advice in testimony before the US Senate Armed Forces Committee in February 2007.⁵

Consensus on the importance of local ownership masks ongoing disagreement about how this is to be achieved. Should local actors really drive and manage foreign assistance? Or is it sufficient for foreign led reforms and projects to be gradually turned over to local actors and institutions? In the latter, local ownership is to emerge from selective participation in an agenda set by foreign donors.⁶ The transition discussion has become so important because donors generally follow the second path. That an increasing number of stabilization and reconstruction missions involve the use of force against non-state actors who exploit any security vacuum has reinforced this pattern. As a result, foreign actors drive the stabilization and reconstruction process: they develop the strategies, priorities and projects and manage implementation as well. The "Clear, Hold, Build, Transfer" strategy formalizes this practice. It should not be surprising, therefore, that assistance reflects donor institutional imperatives and vision for a more stable and just society rather than supporting the priorities and preferences of the locals. Two factors on the donor side reinforce this pattern: the profusion of actors and agendas and the training and expertise of donor personnel.

3 OECD DAC, «Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness »; UN Monterrey Consensus, Ch II (2002), <http://www.un-ngls.org/site/article>. 'The European Consensus' *EU Development Policy*, December 2005. <http://europa.eu>. *USAID Primer: What We Do and How We Do It*, 'Nine Principles of Development and Reconstruction Assistance,' p.10. January 2006. www.usaid.gov. See also 'Potomac Statement on Aid Effectiveness' (October 2007) signed by development agencies from Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States which reiterated the signatories' commitment to the 'fundamental principle of country ownership.'

4 T.E. Lawrence, 'Twenty-seven Articles,' *Arab Bulletin*, 20 August 1917, Article 15.

5 See http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june08/casey_02-01.html for a transcript of his testimony. General Casey now serves as 36th Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, a position he assumed on 10 April 2007.

6 Tobias Pietz, 'Local Ownership – Applicable Concept or Policy Ideal?' Discussion paper, Conference on Local Ownership in Peacebuilding Processes in Failed States: Approaches, Experiences and Prerequisites for Success, Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung, Report 12, 2007. pp. 5-15

The Profusion of Foreign Actors and Agendas

Host country conditions present very real challenges, but many of the impediments to local ownership are embedded in the mandate and institutional incentives of the donors themselves. Leaving foreign militaries aside for a moment, development assistance agencies and a multitude of NGOs typically descend upon a host country, each with its own agenda, resources and strategy. Their sheer numbers overwhelm the ability of most host country institutions (which are by definition weak) to orchestrate their activities and to bend them to host country priorities. NGOs are generally the least manageable of these organizations because their resources and authority exist independently of foreign or host country governments.⁷

Donor government agencies should, in theory, act according to a more internally coherent assistance strategy than NGOs – one that is traceable by the host government. However, stabilization and reconstruction missions are inherently inter-agency and increasingly multinational. This means not only that different ministries of one government must be harnessed to a common strategy but also that the personnel and resources of different governments must be as well. Because of the natural proclivity of individual ministries and departments within them to claim resources and assert their authority, the result is at best a division of labor that tries to respond to all the needs that appear obvious to foreign eyes. One need only multiply the “stove pipes” within one donor government by the number of participating governments to appreciate the magnitude of the challenge of producing a coherent comprehensive strategy. The need for participating governments to identify and claim success for their individual efforts further fragments assistance. As a result, assistance is seldom strategic or focused on indigenous priorities. Local actors seldom find a voice, let alone assert ownership in the process.

Foreign Donor Expertise and Structures

Expertise and institutional structures in government assistance agencies further impede the chances for effective local partnership and, therefore, local ownership. In the waning days of the Cold War, donor foreign and development ministries began to prize functional expertise over regional and/or country expertise. The trend accelerated following the implosion of the USSR when globalization was assumed to define the international environment in ways that muted the relevance of history, language, culture and tradition. As such, donors view the local landscape through the prism of their skills, practices and projects rather than the reverse. The functional emphasis, plus the rotation of Foreign Service Officers through posts in many countries, produces assistance programs that look very similar regardless of country or region.⁸

The devaluation of regional expertise limits donor ability to identify, understand and build upon the myriad of arrangements, both formal and informal, by which societies function. The human and institutional terrain is unfamiliar. In what appear to be ‘ungoverned’ spaces, social, economic and political behavior is usually managed, but in ways that are not always evident or recognized by foreign assistance providers. Where formal institutions are weak, informal arrangements often supplant their functions.⁹ Hence, this lack of local knowledge undercuts the ability to know with whom to partner in the host country. On the other hand, to have a local partner is not enough. There will always be local organizations, government officials or other

7 Of course, the host country government can deny an NGO permission to work in the country but enforcement may be difficult and the price paid in terms of host country standing in the international community will be high.

8 Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004. pp. 29-42.

9 Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber. *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications*. Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps University Press, 2008. pp. 15-50, 74-5, 103-7, 147-48.

actors willing to work with a foreign aid agency and to accept foreign assistance funding. However, if those officials or organizations have no real support within the society, their partnership will not serve the long-term goals of stability and reconstruction.

Recipients of Western assistance from the Balkans to the Caucasus complain that few assistance providers have knowledge of the host country history, traditions, culture or language. It is not easy for an outsider to penetrate informal arrangements that are present in all societies and often most important in fragile states; the dearth of regional and country experts in donor agencies and organizations magnifies the difficulty. Therefore, too often, assistance providers are deemed to be of little help and sometimes a hindrance to the goal of helping to establish the legitimacy and effectiveness of new or reformed government institutions once a minimal level of security is established.

Compounding these aforementioned impediments is the tendency for donor nation militaries to take the lead.¹⁰ Foreign armed presence is often a necessary part of stabilization and reconstruction but experience shows that it is insufficient. Military and civilian leaders regularly assert that there is no purely military solution to the pressing conflicts of the day.¹¹ However, because of the relative weakness of civilian ministries, militaries often assume responsibility for what are inherently civilian tasks of re-building institutions, re-starting the economy and providing basic social services. Given the institutional culture and training of the military¹² which combine to make an effective fighting force – subordination of the individual to the unit, rigid hierarchy, unity of command, and the practice of following orders – the military is ill-suited to partner with locals to rebuild the non-military institutions of society. Therefore, unless Western governments substantially rebalance resources and personnel to strengthen civilian agencies and reframe their assistance to turn on local ownership, the prospects for success will remain limited.

Finally, the complexity of the challenge and need to design and implement a whole of government or comprehensive approach leads donors to focus much more on themselves than on the host country – its priorities and dynamics. New donor analyses, institutions and strategies are dedicated to organizing themselves for stabilization and reconstruction missions: how to get the inter-agency to work together and how to work with a myriad of international partners. Local ownership is regularly overlooked in the process.

CONUNDRUMS TO LOCAL OWNERSHIP POSED BY THE LOCALS IN FRAGILE STATES

The obstacles among donors to operate according to the principle of local ownership are compounded by equally daunting impediments in the host country.

A major obstacle to local ownership may well be the dominant social, economic and political actors in the host country. Where contending elites operate according to a 'zero sum game' world view, they can often tear a country apart so that the social dynamics and formal or informal institutional arrangements continue to decline. A paucity of actors committed to stabiliza-

10 William Easterly, 'Foreign Aid Goes Military' *The New York Review of Books* Vol 55 No 19 December 4, 2008; Thomas A. Schweich, 'The Pentagon Is Muscling in Everywhere. It's Time to Stop the Mission Creep.' *The Washington Post*, December 21, 2008, p. B1. Afghanistan and Iraq should remain exceptions in stabilization and reconstruction missions because there Western invasions were actually responsible for the collapse of the existing states.

11 See General David Petraeus' speech at the Munich Security Conference, <http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede>. General Petraeus was commanding general of Multi-National Forces-Iraq and is currently Commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM).

12 Some European militaries no longer strictly adhere to these practices.

tion and reconstruction raises the question of partnership from the other side of the equation. Those who embrace the objectives may enjoy little support in their own society; in which case, donors support those who are not in a position to promote transition, bring peace or achieve stability. Alternately, some local groups merely package their aspirations in terms that are familiar and comfortable to Western donors, but may have a very different understanding of what those terms mean or may simply be artful in masking their real ambitions. The latter disconnect usually becomes obvious in fairly short order but damage will have already been done. The former problem is more trenchant because the recipients' vision is shared by donors but lacks significant support within the local population.

In other cases, state failure and/or widespread violence is so acute that local actors are simply too weak and fragmented to make a constructive contribution at the outset. In such cases, external actors step in to provide capabilities that the host nation does not possess, especially in the short-run. Local ownership needs to come later, once a foundation has been established.¹³ In this case, foreign donors not only become part of the landscape, they also shape it. Initial assistance establishes a path dependency that channels resources and sets priorities for stabilization and reconstruction. Equally important, how and where aid is delivered will affect power relations in societies divided by groups with competing agendas. Where a road is repaired, a well dug or a school built can strengthen one group at the expense of another. Both can have unpredictable and possibly deleterious effects on the prospects for sustainable progress in the host country. In such situations, local knowledge becomes more important than ever in order to begin stabilization arrangements that will be supported by the host society. Locals must be brought into the process as soon as possible and donors must begin the shift to a supporting role as rapidly as possible.

Finally, where the preferences and priorities of leading local actors are antithetical to donor interests and values, donors disregard the principle of local ownership. Although understandable, instead of highlighting differences, a more effective approach could be to focus assistance on two or three priorities that donor and host country share. Focusing assistance, in any case, would serve as a healthy counterpoint to the current practice of trying to address an almost unlimited number of donor identified needs in the host country.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Host Country Dependency¹⁴

In a stabilization and reconstruction setting, international and bilateral organizations focus on restoring basic services, such as potable water, electricity, basic health care and education in addition to food, medicine, and shelter where necessary as quickly as possible. Although noble in intent, such assistance may unwittingly undercut the local economy and institutions, creating long term dependencies. The negative effect of imported food aid on local agriculture is now well understood. The recent trend of 'buying locally,' is an important step forward. Major North American and European donors have focused attention on the particular challenges of service delivery in fragile states in recent years. However, no consensus has yet been achieved on which of the many demands for services should take priority in a stabilization and reconstruction environment or how they should be implemented to support local ownership.

¹³ Pietz, 'Local Ownership', p. 6.

¹⁴ For an excellent discussion of the general problems and ramifications of developing countries' dependency on donors, see Robert H. Bates, *Prosperity & Violence: The Political Economy of Development*. New York: WW Norton & Co. Inc. 2001, especially chapters 4-5. Of particular note is the role of external assistance in attenuating the mutual dependency of the rulers and the ruled — a hallmark of the development of the modern state in Europe.

An additional pitfall is the tendency for recovering ministries and organizations to focus more on donor interests rather than on domestic interests, which in turn contributes to unhealthy dependencies and undermines local ownership. Such dependencies attenuate the connection between those who govern and those who are governed, which is at the core of a well-functioning polity. Donors accentuate this pitfall by structuring recovery in ways that are unsuitable to the country in question and are harmful to long term recovery and stabilization.

Training of host governments and civil society participants is intended to build host nation capacity so that local institutions and actors can in time assume authority in a reasonably well-governed and functioning society. Training itself, however, may develop unintended dependencies, if it is geared toward Western-type institutions. The alien nature of these institutions can generate a long-term need for Western advisors and assistance, one that the development assistance 'industry' is happy to fill. Helping to strengthen civil society through grants can also direct local NGOs toward Western priorities and values, which may leave them permanently dependent upon outside funding.

Reduced Host Nation Capacity

The influx of Western aid agencies and NGOs can undermine local institutions by taking over basic functions. When confronted by great need, coupled with weak or failed institutions, a natural response for donors is to set up separate structures to provide basic services quickly and efficiently rather than working through local institutions. Separate structures are attractive because they not only enhance donor ability to file reports mandated by their governments in accordance with formal transparency and accountability requirements, they also improve the likelihood that relief will reach those in need.¹⁵ In the process, however, whatever capacity local institutions had is eroded further. In extreme cases, donors become the *de facto* state toward which all eyes turn for relief, direction and resources. This tendency only magnifies the obstacles to building or restoring local institutional capacity which remains the key to stabilization and reconstruction. All too often, then, short-term exigencies undermine long-term goals of both external donors and local leaders.

Another practice common to aid agencies and NGOs is that of hiring key personnel away from the host government and other indigenous organizations. Wages many times higher than those that the host government or local institutions can afford combined with better working conditions often attract the most qualified locals – precisely the people needed to (re)build effective ministries, economies, and educational and health systems. Hiring the most qualified locals further undercuts the likelihood that donors will accord local elites, institutions and organizations a real partnership, if not a leadership role, in their assistance strategies. All too often, qualified professionals, such as medical doctors, educators or well-trained civil servants are employed as drivers or translators for Western aid agencies or international NGOs, thereby depriving the entire project of valuable local talent and, therefore, meaningful local ownership.

A related dimension is the time demands that multiple suppliers of assistance place on host country institutions. Providers of aid expect to meet with high ranking government officials. The constant stream of meetings with the many functional specialists of one foreign donor must be multiplied by the number of official donor agencies as well as NGOs to appreciate just how much time local officials must devote to these sessions. In fact, some host country officials spend most of their time meeting with aid officials. If the process contributed to local ownership or a

¹⁵ Donor assistance is not immune to corruption or failures in delivering aid to those most in need. See Georg Cremer, *Corruption and Development Aid: Confronting the Challenges*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008; James Glanz, C.J. Chivers and William K. Rashbaum, 'Inquiry on Graft in Iraq Focuses on U.S. Officers' *The New York Times*, February 15, 2009.

more coherent and strategic foreign assistance, the time would be well spent, but that is seldom the case. For their part, local officials cannot turn away requests for meetings because of their dependency on foreign aid. Consequently, a resented and counterproductive cycle ensues.

Skewed Development

External assistance may skew development both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, the very presence of foreign donors affects the local economy. They drive up prices for everything from apartments to food and displace locals from more desirable neighborhoods. Small businesses sprout to cater to the international community. This can be positive in the short run as jobs are created and new money is pumped into the economy. However, when donors and NGOs begin to withdraw many of these businesses are not sustainable and jobs, dependent upon foreign funding, dry up. In the meantime local resources have been attracted to these opportunities rather than to others which may be more appropriate and sustainable, creating opportunity costs that fragile economies can ill afford. The lure of the most qualified locals to work for donors and NGOs, mentioned above, contributes in its own way to skewed development by depriving local institutions of their expertise.

External assistance skews development directly by its dominant role in channeling resources to specific projects which are seldom identified and designed under local direction. In addition, donors present a long list of particulars to new and inherently weak governments that they cannot fulfill.¹⁶ The record of foreign assistance is replete with projects – ranging from re-building the infrastructure, to legal reform, to strengthening civil society – that fail once donor support is ended. The lessons are bittersweet. On the one hand, this experience demonstrates that local ownership in some form will reassert itself over time; on the other, it underscores the opportunity costs, including lost time and wasted scarce resources, of projects that do not comport with local priorities and interests.

THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan has been trying to develop a functioning state ever since the US-led coalition ousted the Taliban. Progress commensurate with the lives lost (Afghan and allied), personnel, energy and billions of dollars allocated to stabilization and reconstruction, is sorely lacking. In the spring of 2009, a resurgent Taliban began expanding their reach and control in the country, undermining what little progress had been made earlier in the decade. Following a recent visit, Gilles Dorransoro observed that 80% of Afghanistan has no state structure; the Taliban are filling the void.¹⁷ A new study by the Open Society Foundation found that suspicion and resentment of the international military forces and civilian assistance providers have grown and spread to all parts of the country.¹⁸ Why is this?

All of the factors that undermine local ownership discussed above have pervaded donor assistance to Afghanistan. Kai Eide, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Afghanistan, wrote in diplomatic parlance what constitutes a serious indictment of the international community's efforts over the past nine years.¹⁹ Equally critical, albeit more narrowly focused, is a review of governance in Afghanistan by Colin Cookman and Caroline Wadhams.²⁰

16 Ottaway, Op cit, pp. 1007-1009.

17 Dorransoro, Gilles. "Afghanistan Will Only Get Worse," *International Herald Tribune*, 14 September 2010.

18 The Trust Deficit: The Impact of Local Perceptions on Policy in Afghanistan. *Open Society Foundations Policy Brief No. 2*, 7 October 2010.

19 Eide, Kai. "A Strategy for Transition to Afghan Leadership," 6 March 2010.

20 Cookman, Colin and Caroline Wadhams. "Governance in Afghanistan: Looking Ahead to What We Leave Behind" Center for American Progress. May 2010.

First and foremost, according to Eide and Afghan critics, most external aid has been administered independently of Afghan ministries. It has created parallel structures that have contributed to the weakness of nascent ministries. Less than 20% of foreign aid has gone through the Afghan government even though some ministries have improved financial management and oversight. Afghan officials have repeatedly asked donor governments to channel more of their aid through their ministries in order to help build government capacity and legitimacy. Instead, donors have stubbornly persisted in developing their own projects in accordance with their own priorities and expertise; not coordinating with other donors and the Afghan government or necessarily informing the Afghan government about their activities. Despite promises to the contrary, donors seldom harnessed their assistance to the *Afghan National Development Strategy*. Moreover, they carved up the country through a division of labor which some see as spheres of influence – reinforcing centrifugal tendencies present in Afghanistan.

Had international aid focused more on building Afghan government ministries early on, accompanied by appropriate oversight, it could have contributed to improving effectiveness of the new government. Effectiveness, in turn, would have reinforced the legitimacy that President Karzai enjoyed initially among many parts of the population. Despite the dearth of donor support, some ministries have performed quite well under unfavorable circumstances. The Finance, Health, Education and Mines ministries have earned high marks for professionalism. The Ministries of Health, Communications and Finance were recently approved to receive direct U.S. funding.²¹ Others expanding the list of effective ministries include Agriculture and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.

A second debilitating factor has been the primacy of the military. Most assistance has gone to the less secure areas of the country accompanying COIN campaigns; more stable parts of the country have been neglected. The military has more funds and more flexible funding which it uses to “buy” peace in the near term. For example, in response to deteriorating security, US Special Forces have begun training and equipping local militias—or Local Defense Initiative groups, modeled on the Sons of Iraq initiative. The effort elevates tribes in importance relative to other forms of social identity and organization and also counters widespread Afghan opposition to war-lord control buttressed by independent militias.²² PRT projects, widely regarded as a valuable innovation,²³ focus on short term, “Quick Impact Projects” that have proven to be “unsustainable, uncoordinated and unconnected to national development priorities”.²⁴ And because NATO contracting requirements often prevent contracts from being awarded to Afghan companies, PRT projects not only have not contributed to sustainable development, they also competed with and undermined local capacity.

Third, donors have wasted enormous amounts of money. They regularly employ expensive western or international contractors for reconstruction projects. Too many of these projects have proved inappropriate for the Afghan climate, terrain, and society. Western contractors incline toward ‘state of the art’ facilities for which they can charge more money but which are often inappropriate and unsustainable. Stories of contractor corruption are also rampant – overcharging donor governments for flawed services and products.²⁵ Moreover, Afghan businesses typically come in to the project at the end of a long chain of subcontracts at which point few funds are available for the actual (re)construction, few Afghans are put to work in rebuilding their own country and few actually see the benefit from the billions of dollars that donors claim to spend

21 Ibid. op cit p. 11.

22 Ibid. op cit p. 33.

23 PRTs look similar to the CORDS program in Vietnam. See Nuzum, Henry. “Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The false Hope of ‘Unity of Effort; in *American Counterinsurgency*,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. April 2010.

24 Eide, op cit. p.7.

25 See Cremer, Corruption and Development Aid. Op cit.

on reconstruction.²⁶ In sum, while Westerners are getting rich, Western assistance remains a mirage to most Afghans. The resultant frustration and disenchantment with the international community further undermines the overall mission.

Fourth, Western assistance providers came with preconceived ideas of how the country should be governed, how the economy should function and what modern values should be adopted. Although antithetical to the principle of local ownership, the pattern is common. Over time, external donors have scaled back their ambitions, but in the meantime valuable time and resources were wasted. This is to be deplored in any case of external assistance, but it has been particularly unhelpful in Afghanistan where the need for basic governance and tangible progress is so great.

Fifth, institutional impediments to effective assistance in Afghanistan among donors themselves were legion. At the time of the invasion, external militaries and aid agencies were notably bereft of knowledge about Afghanistan, its history, key actors, and current political, social and economic dynamics, not to mention any degree of fluency in Dari or Pashto. Many costly mistakes and misunderstandings ensued which all too quickly eroded the window of opportunity that opened when the Taliban was ousted and free elections produced a new president and legislature.

At the same time, a little bit of knowledge can be a dangerous thing. Once considered an informal arrangement that needed to be replaced by formal institutions, donors have discovered the value of shuras or jirgas (councils) in local governance and are actively creating new ones. As a result, local governance has been fragmented and legitimate shuras weakened. The Afghan government has contributed to the fragmentation as well. The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development's National Solidarity Program (NSP) has set up over 22,000 community development councils (CDCs) which also compete with traditional shuras.²⁷ Despite contributing to an increasingly difficult landscape at the local level, the NSP has nonetheless earned high marks from Afghans and Western analysts alike for its rare attempt to actually incorporate local priorities and concerns into development plans.²⁸

Sixth, to be fair, Afghanistan has presented its own impediments to local ownership similar to those discussed earlier. Warlords enjoy independent power bases and have well-equipped and trained militias. Trying to get them to support the new government in Kabul has been a difficult undertaking that has produced mixed results at best. A number of the warlords were awarded with ministries in the new Karzai government in an effort to unite the country. They joined the government as long as it served their purposes. However, the efforts of President Karzai to establish a strong central government were not welcomed by warlords whose power would be reduced as a result. The international coalition has worked with both entrenched warlords, with whom it had partnered to drive out the Taliban, and with the Karzai government. The extent to which these problems were created by donors or were primarily home grown will require further analysis.

Enthusiasm for the Karzai government among the population has waned as weak ministries have failed to perform. Popular dissatisfaction with external assistance has grown apace. The Taliban has benefited from the declining fortunes of both. Time and good will were squandered in the period immediately following the ouster of the Taliban. The absence of country expertise among donors and the primacy of their own institutional imperatives appear to have derailed

26 These complaints are by no means unique to Afghan officials and public. They were commonly expressed in meetings with recipients of Western assistance in other countries.

27 Miakhel, Shahmahmood and Noah Coburn, "Many Shuras Do Not a Government Make: International Community Engagement with Local Councils in Afghanistan," *USIP Peacebrief*, #50. 7 September 2010.

28 John A. Nagl, et al, *A Pathway to Success in Afghanistan: The National Solidarity Program, Policy Brief*, Center for a New American Security. March 2009. Cookman and Wadhams, op cit. p. 20.

the possibility of effective local ownership from the beginning.²⁹ The price paid by all has been very high.

Faced with a dramatically deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and declining support for their efforts at home, donors have made belated efforts to address some of the major flaws in their assistance. In April 2008, almost seven years after the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom, a NATO summit adopted a new comprehensive strategy which shifted emphasis to governance as well as security. In July 2008, \$20 billion was pledged at the Paris donors' conference in support of the Afghan National Development Strategy.³⁰ In January 2010, the international community committed to improve aid effectiveness through support of the Afghan Integrated Economic Development Plan approved by participants at the London Conference.³¹ At its April, 2010 meeting in Tallinn, NATO adopted an Afghan First Policy which pledged to increase procurement of local good and services. The intent is to shift spending *on* Afghanistan to spending *in* Afghanistan.³² Finally, at the Kabul Conference in July 2010, donors pledged to channel up to 50% of aid through Afghan ministries if satisfactory reforms were taken to improve transparency and accountability.

CONCLUSIONS

The new attention to transitions is unlikely to substantially improve the stabilization and reconstruction missions as currently designed and implemented. Instead, many of the most serious problems identified in critiques of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and applicable to other stabilization and reconstruction missions can only be alleviated by local ownership. Clearly inadequate knowledge of the country reinforces superficial analysis of the situation which, in turn, undermines the ability to prioritize and sequence assistance in support of realistic host country goals. Increasingly elaborate assistance approaches have failed to produce the desired results. It is time to try a new approach in which local ownership takes center stage. This requires donors to develop a cadre of professionals who bring sophisticated knowledge of various regions and countries and who can be paired with functional experts and strategic thinkers for stabilization and reconstruction missions. This also requires the assistance community to be guided first and foremost by acceptable host country priorities³³ and to build upon local practices whenever possible.

As noted earlier, U.S. General Casey said that it is better for the Iraqis to do things less well than for us to do them perfectly. The point is equally valid for stabilization, transition and reconstruction missions generally. The foreign aid community can more effectively practice its own principle of local ownership, all of the difficulties notwithstanding. To do so, donors must focus on the following:

- Knowledge: develop in depth knowledge and understanding of host country actors and dynamics.
- Essential Functions: focus assistance on essential functions, not all of the problems in a particular polity.

29 Ulrich Ladurner, 'Der Sündenbock aus Kabul' *Die Zeit*, Nr.8, 12 Februar 2009, p. 4.

30 The Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) was approved by President Hamid Karzai on 21 April 2008. For full ANDS text, see <http://www.ands.gov.af>.

31 Afghanistan: The London Conference, 28 January 2010. Communique. See also, International Conference on Afghanistan, Kabul. 20 July 2010. Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Prioritization and Implementation Plan

32 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Background. NATO Afghan First Policy.

33 These mean host country priorities that do not violate international conventions or laws as well as priorities that were not sources of fragility or conflict.

- Realistic Demands and Expectations: set realistic demands and expectations for fragile states.
- Preeminence of Civilian Leadership:
Civilian agencies should lead assistance to help build government effectiveness in the political, economic, and social spheres.
Donors must develop a robust cadre of civilians with the necessary knowledge and training to partner effectively with locals to help build host nation institutional capacity.

If all international donors understand and make progress in the direction of effective local ownership, the potential to help establish a foundation for sustainable security and development will improve significantly. Many of the challenges revolving around *transitions* will become muted because locals provide a knowledgeable and prominent voice from the outset. In addition, the tensions between short term and long term goals characteristic of stabilization and reconstruction can be ameliorated. Is success guaranteed? No. Nonetheless, it is worth a try.

CHAPTER 7

TRANSITIONING TO A STRONG SUSTAINABLE HOST COUNTRY ECONOMY

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There is a strong consensus among the larger international assistance community working with failed and failing states that successful states require a balanced measure of effective internal and external security, good governance, and a functioning economy. This essay accepts this consensus and focuses on the problem of how to best go about transitioning to a strong sustainable host country economy. Experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere emphasize the importance and role of economic development in this triad. Yet, in spite of so-called brilliant economic strategies and the expenditure of billions of dollars, success continues to elude the community of states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) making up the assistance community. In the past decade practitioners and researchers alike learned new lessons and provided new insights. Is success possible, and if so, what is needed to achieve success? The answer is yes, but policymakers do not need a brilliant new economic master plan. What is required is a willingness to work cooperatively with all stakeholders to attain a grassroots “CommUNITY of Understanding” which informs strategies and strengthens the interdependent systems that support the transition to a strong, diverse, entrepreneurial, and sustainable economy – which is predominantly owned, managed, staffed, and financed by the people of the host country.

Given the extensive knowledge and experience gained over the past decade, three strategic imperatives are needed to facilitate the transition from a weak to a strong sustainable economy in a fragile, failing, or post-conflict country:

- An understanding of the necessary conditions of security, governance, and economy that must be achieved and the interdependent nature of the systems and actors that can support that achievement.
- An accurate, comprehensive, and evolving CommUNITY of Understanding of the grassroots social-economic-cultural-political context of the host country by the relevant stakeholders, especially the local microeconomic challenges facing the aspiring small businessperson.
- A determination by all stakeholders to focus on the design and implementation of every economy building tool or program in a manner which strengthens the role and capacity of host country economic participants.

When these three imperatives are ascribed to and guide adequately resourced strategy and planning the desired end state of a strong, diversified, and sustainable economy that host country people own, manage, staff, and finance is achievable.

CURRENT FRAMEWORKS

Recent experience and research yield a wealth of information and knowledge on economic development and transition, providing new frameworks for understanding. The existing frameworks for economic development-related analysis are useful and provide relevant insights, but fail to achieve the comprehensive grassroots CommUNITY of Understanding needed. This understanding of the local context by all the interdependent stakeholders is critical because the

aspiring entrepreneur considers these factors when deciding whether or not to start or expand a new business. Evolving economic development theory and experience suggest that the strongest and most sustainable economies are built on the capacity and willingness of aspiring entrepreneurs to start and expand small businesses. Bearing this in mind, a brief tour and critique of the major existing analytic frameworks provides a basis for a more comprehensive model that addresses this element of understanding:

- **Department of State's Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF)** focuses on identifying the key groups, societal patterns, and institutional performances that prompt core grievances and drivers of conflict.¹ From the economic development perspective, this analysis can be helpful, especially if it identifies economic grievances and drivers of conflict such as high unemployment, lack of education/training opportunities, or perceptions of unfair distribution of economic gains. However, the ICAF is not designed to consider the key questions facing the aspiring small businessperson.
- **U.S. Institute of Peace's *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)*** offers useful metrics for assessing progress during an intervention, including several relevant questions for the person considering opening a new business. The most relevant questions include the caliber of the work force, availability of electrical power and access to basic services, whether or not laws and societal attitudes help enable market activity, and access to credit and external markets.² Nevertheless, these questions need to be augmented and focused on specific localities.
- **US Agency for International Development's (USAID) District Stability Framework (DSF)** is a village oriented effort that seeks resident input to identify the most important problems and action priorities as well as perceptions about who is most capable of solving these problems.³ From the economic development perspective, this information can be helpful if it identifies economics-related problems, priorities, and perceived most effective action agents; however, the DSF does not focus attention on the microeconomic questions needed.
- **United Nations Integrated Strategic Framework** addresses economic revitalization needs and plans,⁴ but not at the level of local specificity needed. **United Nations Post Conflict Needs Assessment** addresses macroeconomic needs and strategies,⁵ but provides inadequate microeconomic analysis of the local private sector.
- **United Nations and International Labour Organization: *Local Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict Guidelines*** presents a **Local Economic Profile** which is more comprehensive and locally focused than all other sources,⁶ but it does not address all the necessary microeconomic questions.

1 Department of State, Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/what/144930.htm>, accessed January 22, 2011.

2 U.S. Institute of Peace and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington DC, *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)*; available from <http://www.usip.org/publications/measuring-progress-in-conflict-environments-mpice-0>, accessed January 22, 2011, pp. 51-65.

3 U.S. Agency for International Development, *District Stability Framework*; available from www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/ma/dsf.html, accessed January 22, 2011.

4 UN Integrated Strategic Framework for Haiti 2010-2011; available from www.ht.undp.org/_assets/fichier/publication/pubdoc62.pdf?PHPSESSID, accessed January 22, 2011.

5 United Nations Development Programme, *Post-Conflict Needs Assessments*; available from <http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=144>, accessed January 22, 2011.

6 International Labour Organization and United Nations Development Programme, *Local Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict Guidelines*, United Nations, 2010; available from http://www.ilo.org/employment/Whatwedo/Instructionmaterials/lang--en/docName--WCMS_141270/index.htm, accessed January 22, 2011, pp. 73-115.

- **The World Bank’s Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations** provides rankings, country profiles, and reports assessing the relative ease of doing business in 183 countries. Local observers assess government regulations and processes for starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and closing a business. The World Bank itself notes the limitations of their methodology, including focusing solely on major cities and limited liability companies (not sole proprietorships), as well as not assessing the quality of infrastructure, the security of property from theft and looting, the transparency of government procurement, and the underlying strength of institutions.⁷
- *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, includes **PMESII-PT** (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time) considerations,⁸ which address many key macro factors, but the resulting analysis does not normally include the local microeconomic insights needed.
- *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations*, includes **ASCOPE** (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events), which provides useful local information,⁹ but not the microeconomic insights needed. The **Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment Format** included in this manual is comprehensive and includes significant economic data, but most of it is aggregate macroeconomic information.
- *U.S. Army Field Manual 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, considers demographic and economic issues, including living conditions, cultural distinctions, allocation of wealth, political grievances, and social status;¹⁰ however, it remains woefully inadequate for educating and training Army intelligence analysts to perform the comprehensive bottom-up microeconomic analysis needed to inform commanders. As is often the case, current practice in the field outruns doctrine and training in this area.
- *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-34.170, Engineer Reconnaissance*, provides a useful analytic framework for infrastructure assessment: Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academics, Trash, Medical, Safety, and Other Considerations (SWEAT-MSO).¹¹ However, this is just a small piece of the puzzle.
- Gary Paul Green and Anna Haines’ *Asset Building and Community Development Analysis* introduces a useful community asset-based analysis of the following types of capital: human, social, physical, financial, environmental, political, and cultural.¹² This framework needs further refinement to apply it to the post-conflict environment.
- United States Institute of Peace and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operation’s handbook, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, provides a particularly useful **Sustainable Economy** framework that identifies the distinctions between macro- and micro-economics and integrates economics into the broader framework of

7 The World Bank: Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations, 2011; available from <http://www.doingbusiness.org/~media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Profiles/Country/DB11/AFG.pdf>, accessed January 22, 2011.

8 *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, February 2008, Glossary C; available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3_0a.pdf, accessed January 22, 2011.

9 *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations*, September 2006; available from www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-40.pdf, accessed January 22, 2011, p. 1-4.

10 *U.S. Army Field Manual 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, July 1994, Chapter 6; available from www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-130.pdf, accessed January 22, 2011.

11 *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-34.170, Engineer Reconnaissance*, Appendix C, Figure C-1; available from <https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/24655-1/FM/3-34.170/appc.htm>, accessed January 22, 2011.

12 Gary Paul Green and Anna Haines. *Asset Building and Community Development*, 2nd Edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2008, pp. xi – xv.

state building.¹³ It represents a good, but too brief summary of various economic aspects.

- **The Rand Corporation’s *Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations*** provides useful insights regarding “What Do People Do for a Living?” and “How Do Local People Survive?” and “How Do People Live?”¹⁴ but it does not provide the granularity needed regarding local microeconomic factors.
- **United States Joint Forces Command’s *Handbook for Military Support to Economic Stabilization*** provides many useful and detailed questions and an effective organizing construct for a host country’s economic profile: performance, environment, and policies.¹⁵ However, the handbook focuses primarily on macroeconomic factors, not localized microeconomic considerations. This handbook also references the now discontinued **Department of State Economic Engagement Matrix**, which also provided many useful economic metrics and diplomatic tools, but exclusively at the macro level.

Although these analytic frameworks are very helpful, they do not sufficiently develop the comprehensive strategic perspective and the detailed localized microeconomic insights – or the interaction and interdependency among these within a transitioning environment – needed to enable a strong sustainable host country economy. Nonetheless they help provide the basis for developing economic understanding and unity of understanding that are the keys to success.

NECESSARY CONDITIONS AND INTERDEPENDENCE

The *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* provides a very useful framework for understanding that a sustainable economy is only a piece of a larger strategic environment within the host country and that it is interdependent with the other components of the environment. In this Venn diagram, the authors also identify critical cross-cutting principles that facilitate development and transition and necessary conditions that must be attained in each component.



If we look at this through the economic development and transition lens, a similar but more economic centric

view of this interdependency is evident. Before drilling down deeper into the specifics of each economic necessary condition, it will be useful to consider the role of the multiple interdependent capacity building systems that can support the transition to economic development. The


¹³ United States Institute of Peace and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operation Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*; available from http://www.usip.org/files/resources/guiding_principles_full.pdf, accessed January 22, 2011, pp. 9-131.

¹⁴ Rand Corporation, *Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations*; available from www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR633.pdf, accessed January 22, 2011.

¹⁵ United States Joint Forces Command, *Handbook for Military Support to Economic Stabilization*, Appendix A (Assessments); available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc/econ_hbk.pdf, accessed January 22, 2011, p. A-3.

diagram shown below highlights the interdependent nature of those systems.

The long-term sustainability of these highly interdependent capacity building systems by host country actors is seen as a necessary condition because host country people must be capable of running the economy after external actors depart. As highlighted by its central position in the diagram above, the Human Capacity Building system is crucial for achieving a successful transition and has a direct impact on all the other supporting systems. Another example of the complex interdependency of these systems is in the creation of an infrastructure-focused public private partnership (PPP), which requires detailed legal negotiation and contracts, enabling economic governance set by public sector actors, expertise from infrastructure planners, and public and private investment from the money, banking and finance system.



The environment is made more complex by the fact that all of these interdependent components can act independently or interact consistently but differently over time. For policy makers and planners this poses challenges of simultaneous, sequential, and dependent operations without full control of independent or interdependent variables. USAID captures this in a useful model looking at level of effort and time across the spectrum of development activities.

Recognizing that context and timing matter, USAID offers these as general guidelines for prioritizing the level of effort across multiple tasks simultaneously over a timeframe that varies but normally lasts at least 10 years. USAID asserts that all these key economic development tasks should be pursued immediately and simultaneously, not sequentially. However, USAID recognizes that some key tasks require significant planning and train-up before more substantial effort and resources from multiple organizations—both internal and external—can be effectively dedicated to their accomplishment. The most obvious examples are “Reconstruct Infrastructure and Provide Public Services” and “Build Institutional Capacity.”

The challenge of pursuing these key tasks simultaneously, without full control of all the variables, is also demonstrated by the task “Provide Humanitarian Assistance and Expand Physical Security.” USAID sees this as the highest priority task after the cessation of hostilities, but recognizes that multiple external organizations will likely assist with humanitarian assistance and that external military and/or police forces will likely lead the physical security



effort, not USAID. Eventually, the goal is to eliminate the need for international humanitarian assistance and for the host country to assume responsibility for physical security.

USAID also sees “Provide Jobs” as a key task that is pursued simultaneously with the others but is transitioned to the host country much earlier. The logic is that externally provided “cash for work” type programs should be replaced as soon as feasible by home-grown jobs created by the private sector of the host country.

This chart also suggests that policy makers and planners should craft a simultaneous “bottom-up” and “top-down” strategic approach. For example, providing humanitarian assistance, physical security, jobs, and essential public services are primarily “bottom-up” micro tasks, but undertaking policy and legal reform and building institutional capacity are mostly “top-down” macro tasks. The challenge is to pursue these micro and macro tasks simultaneously in a way that best enables and reinforces success on both ends of the spectrum. For example, a host country can be coached to help create a business enabling environment that supports small and medium enterprise business success by adopting monetary policy that expands access to credit at reasonable interest rates without sparking high inflation rates.

The challenges of the temporal and levels of effort context presented by USAID are also recognized by the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization when it addresses phasing in *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks*.¹⁶ It identifies three phases of intervention: Initial Response (short-term), Transformation (mid-term), and Fostering Stability (long-term). The points in time for transitioning from one phase to the next are not precisely defined, but are dependent on host country conditions. This framework aims to build host country capacities across multiple sectors over time so that the host country becomes self-sustaining and genuinely in control of its own destiny. The U.S. Army incorporated this framework into *FM 3-07, Stability Operations*, and added details on how the military can support specific economic development tasks during the Initial Response and Transformation phases.¹⁷

The stated goal of the “Initial Response” phase in the area of Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure is to respond to immediate needs.¹⁸ This phase includes economic capacity building actions such as: assess the labor force for critical skills requirements and shortfalls, provide immediate employment, identify obstacles to private sector development, secure and protect post-harvest storage facilities, and many others.¹⁹

The stated goal of the “Transformation” phase is to establish the foundation for development.²⁰ This phase includes economic capacity building actions such as: implement public works projects, support establishment of a business registry, invest in critical public sector projects neglected by the private sector, facilitate access to markets, facilitate access to credit, and many others.²¹

The stated goal of the “Fostering Stability” phase is to institutionalize the long-term development program.²² This phase includes economic capacity building actions such as: ensure

16 Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Essential Tasks*, 2005; available from <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCsQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Ffinec.usip.org%2Fresource%2Fpost-conflict-reconstruction-essential-tasks&ei=1ZIUTvbvA8jm0QHPqO2qCw&usq=AFQjCNGcg8CUWyuxeuM0-Qi6xI3XRkxa0A>, accessed January 22, 2011.

17 The U.S. Army is currently drafting *ATTP 3-07.5, Stability Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, which adds greater detail to the military support tasks involved in all three phases of intervention.

18 Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Essential Tasks*, 2005, p. IV-1.

19 *U.S. Army Field Manual, FM 3-07, Stability Operations*, Washington DC: HQDA, 2008, pp. 3-15 to 3-19.

20 Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Essential Tasks*, 2005, p. IV-1.

21 *FM 3-07*, pp. 3-15 to 3-19.

22 *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Essential Tasks*, 2005, p. IV-1

that sufficient institutional capacity and trained staff exist to manage monetary policy within the macro-economic policy framework; institutionalize improvements in treasury operations, payments and budget execution; consider public-private investment partnerships, and many others.²³

Economic development is a system within a system of systems – a strategic challenge. Nonetheless, its interdependence and independence can be managed through an understanding of the environmental context and the necessary conditions that must be achieved.

One of the most important necessary conditions is to build **Sustainable Interdependent Capacity Building Systems**. This condition undergirds the achievement of all other conditions because host country people and systems must have the capacity to accomplish all economy building tasks after the external actors depart. Examples of this were provided earlier in conjunction with the diagram of Interdependent Capacity Building Systems. Four other necessary conditions for achieving a strong sustainable host country economy are taken directly from the United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute's *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*:

- **Employment Generation:** Create job opportunities to yield quick impact and demonstrate progress employing military-age youths. Establish a foundation for sustainable livelihoods, including rehabilitation of the agricultural sector.
- **Macroeconomic Stabilization:** Pursue monetary and fiscal policies that maintain price and currency exchange rate stability and create transparent and accountable systems for public finance management. Ensure the existence of an effective legislative and regulatory framework to govern property rights, commerce, fiscal operations, and foreign direct investment.
- **Market Economy Sustainability:** Enable the market-based economy to thrive. Build or rehabilitate infrastructure; and strengthen the private sector and the supporting human capital and financial sectors.
- **Control Over the Illicit Economy and Economic-Based Threats to Peace:** Prevent illicit wealth from determining who governs; prevent predatory actors from looting state resources; reintegrate ex-combatants and provide them jobs and/or benefits; and manage natural resource wealth accountably.²⁴

Elements of one other necessary condition are addressed under the Social Well-Being end state described in the *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* as Social Reconstruction, which includes Community-Based Development;²⁵ however, this description needs further refinement. Creating a strong sustainable economy requires an effective civil society and supportive community networks and this aspect is better described as **Functioning Civil Society and Supportive Community Networks**. Community networks include active participation from representatives of all levels of government, business, education and training, service, non-profit and faith groups. These community networks seek full understanding of their community assets, including social and other types of capital,²⁶ not simply rely on a needs assessment as asserted in the *Guiding Principles*.²⁷

23 Ibid.

24 United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, p. 9-133.

25 Ibid, p. 10-191.

26 As described earlier in Gary Paul Green and Anna Haines' *Asset Building and Community Development*, these other community sources of capital include human, social, physical, financial, environmental, political, and cultural capital.

27 United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, para. 10.8.13, p. 10-191.

Two cross cutting considerations of paramount importance are persistent Security and Stability. Adequate physical security in the homes, businesses, fields, factories, and marketplaces of the host country must precede efforts to start to re-build the economy. If people have little confidence in the hope of lasting peace, they will refuse to start and invest in a business that faces unacceptable risks. Likewise, if people perceive a lack of stability in market prices, supply and demand of their products and inputs, interest rates and availability of capital, then they will also refuse to start and invest in a business in the face of such unacceptable volatility.

Each of these necessary conditions is derived from inherently complex sub-components and is interdependent with one another.

A NECESSARY COMMUNITY OF UNDERSTANDING

Missing from the multiple other frameworks discussed above is another necessary condition for success: a “CommUNITY of Understanding.” A CommUNITY of Understanding is a shared perspective by internal and external actors and participants of existing and potential conditions that enable possible ways forward. This shared understanding of the socio-economic-cultural-political environments at the local, national, regional, and international levels is essential to inform and facilitate a “CommUNITY of Effort” that develops a viable economy which can be transitioned to host country economic actors capable of sustaining it.

Ideally, this CommUNITY of Understanding produces a comprehensive assessment, an ongoing process, and durable relationships (e.g. community networks consisting primarily of internal actors) that stimulate informed and sustained action. Such action can produce a strong and sustainable host country economy and other related benefits, including the creation of strong social capital links between the key stakeholders in the community networks.

The CommUNITY of Understanding **assessment** is a comprehensive and constantly evolving analysis of the relevant socio-economic-cultural-political environments. This assessment employs multiple analytic lenses:

- **Geographic:** comprehensive socio-economic-cultural-political factors in individual villages, valleys, provinces, regions, etc.
- **Functional (necessary conditions):** employment and income generation, macroeconomic stabilization, market economy sustainability, etc.
- **Interdependent capacity building and information systems:** human capacity development, rule of law, economic governance, information creation and sharing, etc.

For example, the assessment produces a comprehensive picture of the socio-economic-cultural-political assets, liabilities, and interdependencies within a specific village – within the broader context of each necessary condition of economic development and the supporting interdependent capacity building and information systems at multiple levels. Extending this example, participating economic actors in the CommUNITY of Understanding will see how that village impacts and is impacted on by village, provincial, national, regional and even international efforts to create strong market economies at all these levels by leveraging the relevant capacity building system(s) identified in the Interdependent Capacity Building Systems diagram. Host country entrepreneurs can use this comprehensive and dynamic understanding to build their businesses; policy-makers and planners can use it to craft policies that strengthen the business enabling environment; and non-participants will find themselves falling behind in an increasingly competitive market environment.

The CommUNITY of Understanding **process** begins with the creation and/or strengthening of relationships (e.g. community networks) of relevant internal and external stakeholders. These stakeholders include host country participants from all levels of government, business, education and training, service, non-profit and faith groups as well as external actors including representatives from international governmental and financial institutions, foreign governments (Diplomatic, Defense, Treasury, Agriculture, etc.), foreign donors and non-profits, and others. The creation of sub-communities should also be achieved, including one for each of the supporting interdependent systems (e.g. Human Capacity Development, Rule of Law, Money and Banking, etc.)

The next step in the process is for all these stakeholders to help collect, analyze, share, and routinely update the relevant socio-economic-cultural-political information across the necessary conditions and supporting capacity building systems. Since private sector small businesses are frequently the key to sustainable economic development in these environments, this assessment process should start with a bottom-up approach which adopts the perspective of the aspiring small business person who is considering whether or not to start a business. The answers to their likely questions will provide invaluable insights:

- Can my new business be profitable in the long-term given the projected costs and availability of inputs (land, labor, capital, energy, parts, seeds, etc.) and the likely market demand and price for my products?
- Will prices remain relatively stable for these inputs and outputs?
- Can I securely transport my product to and gain access to the appropriate local, regional, and/or international markets?
- Are there enough adequately trained and healthy laborers locally available to do the work required at a reasonable wage rate?
- Can I gain access to capital (private or public) in a timely manner and at a reasonable interest rate? Is there safe and secure access to other banking services?
- Are there any economic, cultural, or political barriers to market entry or other potential spoilers that are insurmountable?
- What are the relevant government taxes, regulations, and/or requirements and can my new business comply and remain profitable?
- Does the rule of law system provide fair dispute resolution and contract enforcement, adequate protection from corruption, and property and intellectual property rights?
- Will basic services be available, including energy, water and sewage, trash collection, police and fire protection? Is there likely to be long-term stability of the host country currency and international exchange rate?
- Does my national government have the capacity and will to work with international institutions such as the World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund to support my industry's interests, including the ability to prevent foreign competitors from dumping their products in my local market at below market prices?

Next, individual actors and participants use the insights gained from answering these questions and other related ones to fully understand their situation and craft their unique plan for success. This understanding is used to objectively identify and evaluate the specific conditions needed for success before creating strategies, plans, programs, and resources at all levels. Achieving perfect information in any socio-economic-cultural-political environment involving humans is impossible; however, participants can gain sufficient understanding to effectively manage their risks and create strategies and plans that are more likely to succeed. Examples include:

- Aspiring entrepreneurs can create more effective business plans (however rudimentary they might be)
- Educators and vocational trainers can better tailor their programs to prepare students to meet actual local market demands
- Capital lenders (including micro-financiers) can more effectively evaluate which businesses are best positioned to leverage current and future market trends
- Infrastructure planners can more effectively maximize available funds to construct or repair those systems most needed to provide rapid access to the most critical markets and resources
- Legal reformers can identify and resolve problems with contract enforcement and property rights in specific localities
- Government policymakers and planners can identify those policy fixes and programs most needed to strengthen the business enabling environment. These governmental actors should recognize the significance of the cross cutting considerations explained earlier, especially the focus on building host country capacities, comprehensive engagement, expectations management, and reinforcing success.

Having performed this CommUNITY of Understanding assessment process with the help of external facilitators initially, indigenous participants are fully prepared to maintain the process themselves in the future. Their ability to do this is significantly strengthened by the guided creation and evolution of durable indigenous community networks across different geographies, necessary conditions, and interdependent capacity building systems. Additionally, the process of participating in the assessment should itself strengthen relationships and engender trust amongst participants.

A NECESSARY DEFERRAL TO HOST NATION PARTICIPANTS

The durable indigenous community networks described above are essential for transitioning to a strong sustainable economy that host country people own and operate. This transition, coupled with sustainable indigenous capacity building and ownership of the economy, is essential if the host country is to achieve internal and external legitimacy and to avoid long-term dependency and potential return to conflict.²⁸ Therefore, the most appropriate roles for external actors are “partner, consultant, catalyst, facilitator, teacher, trainer, and coach,” not person in charge.

Performing the roles of partner and consultant may require a difficult mindset shift for those people and organizations accustomed to leadership roles or being more comfortable being directive in nature. Nevertheless, this shift is imperative if the external actors are to partner with host country leaders to help shape and implement strategies and policies that genuinely build host country capacity.

The most challenging and important initial roles for the supporting external actors are those of catalyst, consultant, and facilitator. The first catalytic requirement is to motivate potential internal and external members to join and actively participate in the relevant geographical, functional, and capacity building communities. Although the economic incentives for participating in these communities may seem obvious to external actors who have lived in viable market economies, efforts will probably need to be made to assist the host country pursue an effective information campaign to persuade relevant stakeholders to participate.

²⁸ Recent analysis indicates that 40 percent of all post-conflict countries return to violent conflict within a decade. Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, *Post-Conflict Risks*, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, 2007.

After the initial formation of the CommUNITY of Understanding and other functional sub-communities, external actors will likely need to help facilitate organizational actions by internal actors in the host country, including the identification of information collection and analysis goals, processes, deliverables, sharing mechanisms, and others. Throughout this process and follow-on capacity building efforts, external actors must approach these tasks as “partner, trainer, teacher, mentor, and coach.” The initial investment costs are higher as external actors teach and train host country actors rather than simply constructing strategies, policies, and plans for them. However, this approach is imperative if the host country is to have the capacity to avoid dependency after most external actors depart the scene.


When assisting with the capacity building efforts of the various communities and supporting systems, external actors should facilitate host country actors’ efforts to identify the key capacities needed, critical actors, goals, interests of the key participants, historical record of strategies attempted, and metrics for measuring progress. Such information resides within the indigenous systems and the external actors’ goals are to draw the right information out, build commitment among internal actors, and help develop indigenous capacity in the process.

One essential cross cutting consideration is the importance of “good governance” across multiple necessary conditions and capacity building systems, including governance of public and private organizations and programs. For example, external actors can teach, mentor, and coach host country actors involved with the crafting of fiscal, monetary, trade, and regulatory policies that can set the enabling conditions for success in the areas of employment generation, market economy sustainability, human capacity building, and the money, banking, and finance system. Although good governance in this context normally focuses on public organizations, external actors can also provide advice regarding corporate governance to private commercial entities in the host country.

Another important cross cutting consideration that external actors need to assist host country participants with is the effective management of expectations. For example, host country citizens should never be led to believe that they can expect to be living in an advanced industrialized society in a year or two. Achievable goals should be set and communicated to the public in the host and donor countries.

SUMMARY

Providing economic development assistance and transitioning such economic assistance to host country principals who can achieve a strong diversified sustainable economy is context dependent and complex. It changes over time and according to conditions. The **Model for Transitioning to a Strong Sustainable Host Country Economy** shown below summarizes the key points of this essay and provides a strategic framework for conceptualizing the appropriate roles for external actors, the necessary conditions to be achieved during the three phases of intervention, the desired end state, and the relevant cross cutting principles. The keys are achieving a shared CommUNITY of Understanding and external actors playing the right roles.



Such a model cannot be simply overlaid over any environment. Each host country environment is unique with national, regional, and local contexts. However, the model can assist the policy maker, strategist, and planner in asking the right questions to achieve understanding of the environment, the actors, and the potentials of economic development.

CHAPTER 8

BANKING IN BOSNIA 1996-2003: TRANSFORMING AND TRANSITIONING A POST-CONFLICT BANKING SYSTEM

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INTRODUCTION

Reforming a post-conflict or fragile state's banking sector is often overlooked in the literature on economic transitions, but the Bosnia experience suggests it should not be. At its core, economic development is about job creation and training people for better, more productive jobs through capacity development. Capacity development is never easy and is based on the foundation of human and financial capital specific to each country or market place. Hence, capital is a pivotal component in economic development and economic success hinges on the efficacy of its distribution. Some experts argue for applying a model of economic "shock therapy" in post-conflict situations to force host nations to make the sacrifices necessary to generate the capital required for economic development. The experience in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia) suggests an alternative model of a more gradual economic transformation and transition of the post-conflict economy to a successful liberalized, locally controlled one. As a case study, Bosnia serves as a prime example of how private sector led growth can be accelerated by capital contributions from development agencies like the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) teamed up with technically skilled implementing contractors from the U.S. private sector. In Bosnia, general supervision and funding by USAID unleashed U.S. private sector know-how and resulted in innovative banking program designs leading to large scale, system-wide economic reforms. The banking programs helped stabilize the fragile economy, and in synchronization with the critically important military stabilization of the security situation, brought about a more lasting peace to the region.

BACKGROUND

The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from 1992 to 1995, resulted from the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. It destroyed Bosnia's economy. With the end of hostilities and signing of the Dayton Accords in late 1995, there was an immediate need to generate employment for demobilizing soldiers and refugees. The badly damaged commercial banking system had extremely limited funds and lacked trained manpower to make loans desperately needed by small and medium enterprises to resume operations and hire workers.

Dire circumstances prevailed. Foreign reserves were depleted, industrial production was 4% of pre-war levels, the unemployment rate stood at 90%, and capital assets suffered from extensive damage. The Bosnia banking system was not in fact a real banking system in the Western sense of the term as transactions were actually carried out by the country's Soviet-style Payments Bureaus, which were subsequently dismantled. Loans were short term—for periods of six months to one year maximum—and interest rates were exorbitant, even for short term trade finance.

Immediately upon the signing of the Dayton Accords, USAID banking sector specialists and experts contracted from the private sector designed a unique emergency lending program called the Business Development Program (BDP). A grant agreement between the U.S. and Bosnia established the BDP as an emergency lending program in 1996. It had two components. The primary banking component, the Business Finance (BF) project, provided job-creating commercial credit rapidly, yet with full accountability. A separate smaller component, called Business Consulting, provided technical and management consulting services to eligible borrowers of Business Finance loans. The BDP helped to promote economic growth by assisting enterprises to expand production, creating job opportunities for the general population—including 1.2 million refugees and 200,000 demobilized soldiers. In turn, this employment generated income for families and communities.

During its seven years of existence, the BDP made nearly 600 loans worth \$162 million to Bosnian enterprises eager to expand business activity, but lacking working capital and access to medium-term financing. The loan sizes ranged from \$100,000 to \$1,000,000, with an average loan size of \$750,000. The vast majority of these firms were privately owned. Of BDP's 473 clients, 97 were repeat borrowers. The growth they achieved with their previous loans enabled them to borrow more and expand even further. In fact, a study by PricewaterhouseCoopers found that 93% of BDP borrowers experienced growth as a result of their loan.¹ The program specifically targeted local small and medium-sized private enterprises in order to promote the successful transition to a market-based economy. Typical loans included forestry (logging, sawmills, etc.), manufacturing (furniture, metal, etc.), agro-business (milk products, fruit processing, bread, etc.), and construction (building materials, cement, etc.). The program ended in 2003 with several locally based banks purchasing the loan portfolio.

One of the greatest accomplishments of the BDP was the number of jobs it created and sustained. BDP borrower companies on average subsequently employed 10 more full time employees than they did before they received the loan. This was in contrast with non-borrower companies, where employee levels had fallen by an average of 16 positions. The commercial loans supported new employment for 9,782 Bosnians from all ethnic backgrounds. They also helped sustain another 27,636 jobs. BDP lines of credit created 202 new positions and sustained 3,030 jobs, while support for microcredit organizations (MCOs) enabled the creation of an additional 5,121 new jobs.²

The BDP made a profound impact on the BH economy through the start-up of new companies, provision of jobs, and strengthening of the banking sector. However, the program's reach extended even farther as loan repayments were channeled into other projects. Chief among the initiatives financed by BDP recycled funds were the creation of Deposit Insurance, which restored confidence in the banking system and increased deposits by 30% in its first year. Millions of dollars' worth of loan reflows also provided support for agricultural production, bank supervision, privatizing businesses, public sector accounting reform, Central Bank operations, and the repair of power and water systems for minority returnees. It is likely that no other single program has had such a profound and positive impact on Bosnia's economic recovery as the BDP.

The creation of the BDP filled an important gap in the Bosnian banking system. It provided local companies with much-needed capital at reasonable interest rates and repayment periods of three to five years. The BDP was instrumental in helping restart production and fueling economic growth at rates higher than in past reconstruction efforts such as the rates Germany experienced during its post-World War II years. In fact, USAID loan recipients accounted for an impressive 50% of all of Bosnia's post-war exports up to when the BDP completed its transition to local private banking control and concluded operations in 2003.

1 "The Bosnia Business Development Program," USAID brochure published September 2003.

2 Ibid.

CASE STUDY

The uniqueness of the USAID Bosnia Business Finance (BF) project lay in its direct provision of commercial loans under USAID-control by U.S. private sector banking experts for the purpose of capitalizing on their expertise to strengthen local private sector banks that served as Agent Banks. As Agents, the local banks did not have to assume the credit risk of loans which would have been dangerous to their very fragile balance sheets at the conclusion of hostilities. This case study focuses primarily on the period covering Phases II and III, beginning in 1998 and ending with the completed transition in 2003. These phases built upon the initial Phase I emergency lending operations.

The Business Finance component was the key commercial banking activity in the overall \$300 million BDP. By design, it transitioned to Bosnian principals and standard commercial banking by using the same principles that made BF successful: training, mentoring, and technical assistance. The \$300 million figure includes over \$162 million that was loaned out and subsequently repaid. Rather unexpectedly, repayments achieved the high rate of 92%, and in turn were redeployed for other financial sector assistance activities in Bosnia and other parts of Eastern Europe.

For the record and for context, but not detailed in this paper, the BF and the BDP of which it was a major part, were accompanied by several other USAID major fiscal and economic reconstruction programs to rehabilitate and modernize Bosnia's entire financial and private sector business system based on international market principles. Under the overall leadership of USAID/Bosnia Mission Director Craig Buck and Economic Reconstruction Office Director Mike Sarhan, these related programs included: Banking Supervision Reform; Bank Strengthening and Training; Business Consulting; and dismantlement of the complex socialist Payment Bureau system. Each of these programs helped facilitate Bosnia's successful transition to local operation, control and/or ownership of its own financial institutions.

Despite some problems on the political and governing side, to this day Bosnia enjoys a sound, productive and highly regarded private sector banking system run by Bosnian nationals. By providing employment as rapidly as possible, initially on an emergency basis, the BF project served to "jump start" economic growth pragmatically by helping grow companies that formed the engine of the emerging Bosnian private sector and related commercial banking system. This in turn facilitated continued growth through increased trade and investment.

Overview of the Business Finance (BF) Project and Transition

The BDP's Business Finance (BF) lending component provided commercial credit in three ways: quick disbursing loans to private businesses; lines of credit to commercial banks; and lines of credit to micro-credit organizations (MCOs). During its early years, the BDP (through its separate Business Consulting component) also provided valuable free technical consulting assistance to borrowers to assist in the creation of realistic business plans. Additional, follow-up assistance focused on improving marketing, financial management, and production skills. In a similar manner, the entire BDP (consisting of its separate Business Finance and Business Consulting components) played a significant role in strengthening the whole Bosnian banking system.

In the beginning, the BF contractor program implementers partnered with local banks to process and disburse loans. Concurrently, USAID provided intensive training and technical assistance to the Agent Banks' personnel in areas such as credit analysis, loan collection, and problem loan management. All the assistance paid off when five banks qualified to receive initial BF lines of credit worth approximately \$13 million. Under the agreement the banks assumed


all credit risk. Each demonstrated a base of understanding of credit analysis and management, which were lacking when the activity began. The lines of credit were repaid in full at program end.

By the end of 2003, the Bosnian banking system had matured to such a degree that USAID was able to bring the BDP (which by then consisted only of its Business Finance lending component) to a close by auctioning off the loan portfolios to private, locally based commercial banks. In this manner, the banks purchased performing loan portfolios, established new borrower relationships, and ultimately hired trained Bosnian BF loan officers as a backbone for their own lending and problem loan departments. Just like its assets, the BF's local human capital was effectively transferred to the private sector, significantly strengthening the Bosnian banking system.

Since its inception, the operation of Business Finance can clearly be described as having moved through three planned phases of operation:

- Phase 1-Emergency Lending: 1996-1998 (Contractor-DAI)³
- Phase 2-Program Institutionalization: 1999-2001 (Contractor-BearingPoint)⁴
- Phase 3-Transition Planning, Implementing and Exit Strategy: 2002-2003 (Contractor-BearingPoint)

Business Finance Project Phases . . .



Phase 1: At the launch of the program, Business Finance activities were heavily focused on the establishment of the program and the initiation of an emergency lending capability. In very challenging circumstances, this initial phase of the program was a success and significant levels of credit were moved into the marketplace. Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) implemented the emergency lending phase of the Business Finance project.

In order to ensure sound credit quality and financial control during the two years of this initial phase, loans were extended directly by experienced expatriate contractor lenders after joint approval by USAID and Central Bank top management. They worked with local Bosnian understudies in branch offices in five major business centers around the country. In this early phase, select Agent Banks merely sourced and serviced the loans on behalf of the program, earning transaction fees for collecting loan and interest payments. This direct lending approach was adopted because the banks lacked the institutional capacity to safely underwrite loans under the program.

Phase 2: Approximately two years into the program, it became apparent that BF required installation of greater controls and processes and an overall shift in operations to manage the program more like a bank and less as an emergency lender. This second phase, lasting three years, can best be described as the institutionalization of the BF activity. In late 1998 under US-

³ For more about DAI, see DAI website; available from <http://www.dai.com/>, accessed April 18, 2011.

⁴ For more about BearingPoint, see BearingPoint website; available from <http://www.bearingpoint.com/>, accessed April 18, 2011.

AID/Bosnia supervision, BearingPoint, Inc. (now part of Deloitte Consulting, LLC) became the implementing partner responsible for managing BF.

While lending efforts continued, significant contractor effort was also expended in development of local staff in all banking activities: portfolio management, lien perfection, file maintenance, loan monitoring, problem loan management, and workouts and collections. The latter proved crucial as grace periods ended and many of the emergency credits started to encounter repayment difficulties. Over a period of 18 months an all-out effort was made toward upgrading the quality of the portfolio. This portfolio improvement effort was ultimately quite successful and directly supported a major refocus, which was the adoption and installation of policies, procedures, and controls to tighten the credit standards of the program and ensure maximum loan repayment over the balance of the program.

Another major area of focus for the second phase of the project was the concentrated delivery of training and technical assistance to the local BF staff and Agent Bank personnel in support of the program. A significant on-the-job training effort was undertaken from the very first days of the project and was complemented by the delivery of classroom and workshop-based training programs for local staff and Agent Bank personnel. As a result of this training effort, during Phase 2 the local BF staff assumed more key management positions on the project and, more importantly, they developed the skills to significantly contribute to the ongoing operation of the project while preparing to assume its future management in the Transition Phase. In addition, Agent Bank staff demonstrated a more analytical approach to understanding credit risk and prepared briefer and more succinct recommendations to their bank's credit committees.

Over time and as a result of an intensive technical assistance program to bolster the credit underwriting processes and procedures in the local banks, select banks were identified to participate in an on-lending program. On-lending allowed these banks to underwrite loans to small and medium enterprises (SME) on their own, having borrowed funds under bank lines of credit issued through the BF program. Technical assistance continued to be provided to these banks to ensure ongoing credit quality. Credit lines were also provided to select micro credit organizations across Bosnia, on a wholesale basis, directing scarce credit to these organizations so that in turn they could make micro credit available on a retail basis.

Toward the end of this second phase of the program, the requirements of a transition plan were considered and preliminary proposals supporting possible exit strategies were explored with the USAID Mission. Such efforts supported the development of the transition options required for Phase Three of the project.

Phase 3: The last two years of the BF project concentrated on developing and implementing the transition plan and exit strategy. This final phase consisted of three major components: (1) on-going lending to small and medium enterprises directly and indirectly via lines of credit to partner financial institutions; (2) designing and implementing the policies and processes to sell BF's small and medium enterprise and consumer home mortgage loan portfolios and to hand off of the on-lending lines of credit; and (3) providing training and technical assistance to local BF staff and the staff of the Credit Line Financial Institutions (qualified Commercial Banks and Micro-Credit Organizations) to prepare them to assume key activities under the program and after the project ended.

The training built directly upon the previous training conducted during Phases 1 and 2, but focused more directly on the implementation of the Transition Plan that was executed in close consultation with USAID. Extensive local staff and Agent Bank training developed complete local counterpart teams that included lending and credit administration staff, internal audit specialists, human resource and marketing personnel, and environmental specialists. By conclusion of Phase 3 in 2003, local employees had been trained and mentored to occupy 14 key management positions under the BF program. Only a small handful of expatriates remained at project's

end to help sell the remaining loan portfolio to the local banks, thereby fully localizing the entire BF project. As noted earlier, local staff members were hired by the banks to manage the loan portfolios and clients purchased by the banks. Transformation of Bosnian banking and transition of BF were successfully completed.

Business Finance Lessons Learned in the Bosnian Case⁵

As discussed earlier, the program moved through three phases of operation. Each phase presented different challenges, and every succeeding phase was built on lessons learned from the prior one. In a very real sense, the BF project members were very good at learning from both their successes and failures, reflecting the value of a business mentality in this type of environment. That entrepreneurship mindset proved contagious and is reflected in many of the other lessons learned.

Lending to privately owned companies is paramount. It is better from an economic development and loan repayment point of view to lend money to private and for profit businesses. State-owned company managers hold different priorities and attitudes than private business people. In the efforts to privatize these entities, these managers often felt that they should expend the resources of the company on maintaining employees or sought to extract funds from the company for their own benefit. Also, there is the ever-lasting problem of politics and politicians connected with the management of state-owned companies. This is one of the greater BF successes. Business Finance recognized this problem early, and focused on the private business after Phase 1. Private sector businesses respond to and exploit the potential of the marketplace.

Train and use the local staff. Since the Bosnian credit staff best knew the psychology of their countrymen, during second and third phases of the program the initial evaluating and screening of the borrowers was completed by them. Evaluation of whether clients were able and willing to repay loans became easier. U.S. contractor bankers taught, coached, and managed the local staff to professional standards – a critical requirement. However, the local staff better inquired about potential borrowers in unofficial ways—by asking around, communicating with other colleagues, companies, banks, etc. Such local intelligence better supported business growth, reduced the potential loan risk, and improved loan collections. For example, in one case, a company’s manager supposedly was a doctor who quit his job to start a private business, but it turned out that he in fact was only an ambulance driver without any qualifications for the business or a loan. Fortunately, the branch-team found it out and the loan was denied. However, in other cases initial write-ups were compiled by non-local credit staff who failed to properly interpret or question the information presented.

In Bosnia, with proper training the BF local staff proved the best, most knowledgeable commercial lenders in the country with excellent leadership and client relationship management skills. They understood how to evaluate businesses in light of the market and local industry in order to determine the businesses’ viability. Equally important, they could more readily monitor and track the success of the businesses and successfully manage the relationship with the borrower. They worked together and complemented each other’s skills. They possessed experience and confidence and were not afraid of “thinking outside the box” to achieve results. Training and mentoring released their innate potential.

Get the staff out of the office. There are many business opportunities and funding needs and they can be found if the staff gets out of the office and looks for them. Business development efforts by team members in Bosnia were crucial in creating good prospects.

Change public awareness of what is acceptable business practice. One of the great successes

⁵ This section also includes an original “Lessons Learned” document compiled and produced for USAID by BF’s Bosnian professional staff in 2003.

of the program was that BF changed public awareness of what business and banking are about in post-conflict states. BF made clear to the Bosnian public that successful business requires high standards and fraud and corruption cannot be tolerated. BF created better-prepared deals through application of better standards, pioneering effective practices. It set the lending criteria for other banks, which now have criteria similar to or higher than BF's. Everybody—policymakers, banks, businesses, and the public—learned from the practices of BF.

BF activities affected attitudes about other concerns as well. For example, clients were made aware that if they are environmentally conscious and if the businesses were conducted in such a manner, they would fulfill one of the major conditions in the loan approval process. Companies and banks started performing their own environmental assessments to facilitate the loan process and to ensure environmental regulations compliance.

Form a special assets department within banks. Special assets departments specialize in dealing with bad loans. They get good at it and free other departments for normal activities. The concept of such a separate department primarily focused on the collection of delinquent loans had not existed within the Bosnian banks' structure. BF introduced the idea, and banks started to implement such organizations based on the experience of dealing with the Business Finance staff, that were persistent and good in ensuring clients' repayments.

Form a marketing unit. One of the great innovations of BF's management was the establishment of a marketing unit in 2001. In the first year of the unit's existence, the number of companies attending the Loan Application Seminars increased by 205% as a result of intensified newspaper and radio advertising. The larger pool of applicants contributed to an increase of 91% in loan applications received and a 70% increase in approved applications compared to the year 2000. Such units find more innovative ways of attracting new entrepreneurs.

Smooth the opening of new branches. Getting new offices started right generates business immediately and saves a lot of time and energy in retraining. Based on lessons learned earlier in the project, BF recognized the need for a more organized manner of setting up new offices. Key to this was finding good staff and getting them trained by the lending teams on how to directly assist interested companies in applying for BF loans. Such focus contributed an increased number of applications and shortened application submission times. As a result of this lesson, the percentage of applications approved in 2001 was 70% compared to 47% in 2000. The substantial increase resulted in a wider variety of qualified borrowers.

Funds must be managed and controlled. The proper management and control of funds has repercussions for programs and local economic development far beyond the dollar value of the funds. During 1996 and 1997, as a result of the urgency to maximize the quantity of emergency loans portfolio quality suffered, initial credit analysis was inadequate, loan monitoring and credit reviews were minimal, and there was inefficient action when loan funds were diverted for ineligible and/or fraudulent purposes. In addition, there was poor control over disbursements. The so-called "big push", or the emergency lending with a goal of KM⁶ 10 million per month in such a small market as Bosnia, resulted in a great number of delinquent loans. Without policy emphasis and trained BF credit staff to check the disbursement process Agent Banks were solely responsible for the control of disbursements. Such independence resulted in numerous unsubstantiated, inappropriate, and in some cases fraudulent disbursements.

For instance, some borrowers were current with payments to Agent Banks, but Agent Banks kept the money internally to repay their own more visible loans. After many similar cases, BF established an internal control process with policies and procedures to control the disbursement process and a legal department to register the collateral. Should a Business Finance program be started elsewhere, the priorities must include: immediately establishing sound disbursement procedures, guidelines, and credit policies; more adequate and frequent monitoring and report-

⁶ Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible mark, equivalent to the Deutsche mark.

ing; and setting of team or individual goals to measure business performance. Proper management and control gets the funds to the right places quickly and ensures they do the most good. It also contributes to a less corrupted business environment.

Identify eligible loan applicants. In the loan application process in Bosnia, the greatest initial problem was that most prospective clients failed to prepare a business plan. Consequently, projections were overstated or too optimistic. No business basis existed for evaluating loans. Excuses included: the sources of gathering financial data were limited due to war destruction, disappearance of documentation and databases, or while statistics on various business activities were available, they were outdated. In reality, initial borrowers were more likely to be less educated and craftsmen as opposed to businessmen. Few had any history or background in business and lacked the skills to manage start-up companies. Not understanding market forces and how to adjust to them, a business plan was a bridge too far. Complicating this further, their communications and relationships with other enterprises and BF's credit people were inadequate and few showed any understanding of technology, finance, and marketing. Simply stated, most were solely production oriented. Others were of perhaps of questionable character. BF focused on credit histories and contacts as a means to identify a better class of applicants. Applicants who are better businessmen actively seek to improve their operations and their environment. Their success spurs other development and encourages greater participation of qualified entrepreneurs.

The right initial staffing is crucial. Staffing and training are synergistically linked. However, in Bosnia staffing could have been improved if the initial lending teams had consisted of Bosnian bankers with complementary experience in different economic sectors to supplement the expatriate professionals. In the beginning BF hired Bosnian locals who knew English but little about the economy and banking. Inexperienced and not trained effectively, they could not adequately assess financial statements, business operations, spot problems and determinate proper actions to address them, or collect payments. The skills of managing a business conversation, performing site visits, and making financial projections eluded most. Even those with experience found their Bosnian methods outmoded and inadequate. For example, it was noted among local staff that Americans have a different, business-like manner of dealing with clients, which was not the case with their Bosnian counterparts. The expatriate bankers brought in under contract were instrumental in creating a modern and efficient local staff. Earlier implementation would have hastened progress and used funding to better ends. Complementary sector expertise among bankers should have been an obvious need from the start. For example, a city banker should not be expected to do effective agricultural loans, not knowing anything about it. Representative and complementary sector expertise is simply good business.

Obstacles in the legal system need to be resolved. The legal system in Bosnia simply did not work effectively enough to accommodate a progressive investor-ready business environment. Both the criminal and civil courts gave too much consideration to the difficulties of the debtor and too little to the rights of the creditor. The legal regulations, inherited from the previous system where the debtor's interests were completely protected, enable a debtor to file an appeal in each stage of the referral. Most cases were resolved by the BF Special Assets Unit working with problem companies to resolve their issues. However, the program eventually was forced to initiate the first foreclosure action ever seen in Bosnian courts. BF's successful prosecution of the case was a landmark for Bosnia that helped increase investor confidence that their investments could be protected. As 98 firm foreclosures followed, it became apparent that the country's collateral laws were sorely lacking. In collaboration with the Office of the High Representative, the BF was able to draw on its experiences to help draft a new law. The new law, coupled with court precedents set by the BF, helped to instill a credit culture that is making Bosnia more attractive to foreign investors. BF has yet to bring a criminal referral to a successful conclusion and civil mat-

ters take unreasonable amounts of time. Even though the economic environment has changed, the laws and regulations have not kept pace.

Separation of some business related processes from the court system could fundamentally improve this situation. Among these are the lien/mortgage recording process and property appraisal based on different methods-market value, construction value or return on investment value. Business Finance, through its participation in the legal system, caused positive changes in courts' operation. However, without an initiative on the governmental level reinforcing these changes they will be temporary.

The political system needs to be reformed to better support business. In Bosnia, as in many post-conflict or fragile states, corruption existed at all levels of the political system. It was an ever-present problem and affected the efficacy of business and economic development. Not only was corruption an extra drain on profitability and an obstruction to innovation, it introduced a corrupting influence into the overall business environment. For example, many believed to be a very successful businessman it was imperative to be a part of the corrupt system. Many borrowers exhibited the attitude that stealing and cheating were all right. In general, business people perceived that government institutions were not there to help them, but existed only to perpetuate the efforts of crooked politicians to steal.

These perceptions were well founded. Politicians were often self-serving and unwilling to make changes necessary for efficacy in business and economic growth. Changes that best served the nation's economic well-being too often threatened the political elites' power and access to wealth. Government's bureaucracy enriched the corrupt. For instance, government officials inspected successful uncorrupted companies at least 10 times more than companies that were more "politically attuned." Clearly corruption needs to be eliminated for more successful business development, but this alone is not enough. Other supportive measures that stimulate growth and productivity required government support—and in a responsible manner—in the various economic sectors. In Bosnia some improvements have occurred, but only slowly. National success rests on economic well-being and government must take responsible steps to facilitate economic development.

Programs must fit the beneficiaries and their environment regardless of the donors' intent or desires. Without an appreciation of the indigenous environment emergency lending is merely an oxymoron for giving the money away. Just giving the money away carries its own baggage of corruption, dependency, and economic developmental aberrations. Understanding the local context and sector expertise are both crucial to program development. For example, you cannot expect loan repayment until sound, fundamental environment-adapted credit risk management practices are developed and implemented. The quality of business development is disciplined in large part by credit risk analysis. Credit risk management practices can only be developed with appropriate banking experience and local knowledge.

Moderate risk loans can be made in a high risk environment if correctly approached. A high risk environment does not preclude successful loan making. It does require better evaluations founded in local knowledge. In Bosnia, trained, local staff involvement throughout the client relationship and back office support functions resulted in a well-documented risk management process appropriate to the local environment and conditions. Local staff contributions included: understanding of the local context (cultural, political, legal, economic, etc.); where borrowers were located; evaluation of the business' viability; collateral verification, recording and insuring; monitoring of the business' financial results and managements' professionalism; and, assessment of the market's ability to support the business.

Bosnia is a very small market. News traveled fast through the business community, although it was not always accurate. This worked both for and against BF's efforts. A good word goes a long way and BF's lending terms and conditions were the best in the country. The good clients

talked about BF among themselves and created new, less risky prospects. Reputation still matters in a risky environment. In a similar manner, although there was the perception that cheating and stealing were okay, the borrowers did seem to be influenced by the threat of publicizing their misdeeds. Frequent contact with guarantors, especially relatives, sometimes also produced payment. Understanding local context mattered!

The lack of centralized registries or credit reporting agencies made credit risk assessment more difficult. Unlike in the United States creditors hoarded client credit information rather than sharing it. In addition, centralized registries of real estate and movable property ownership were non-existent. The data contained in other more local registries often did not reflect true ownership and rarely reflected existing liens or mortgages. In all of these cases, knowledge of the local context – practices, procedures, and culture – allowed risk to be better assessed and mitigated.

Clearly defining and communicating expectations leads to desired behavior and project success. Over time BF learned this lesson well and documented its insights in policy and reinforced them through education and training as well as evaluation. Project staff knew and understood their jobs, their goals, their responsibilities and their performance requirements. Policy and procedure manuals were written detailing all functions and activities. These served as daily references for the staff. Written job descriptions for each position detailed individual objectives, goals, functions, and responsibilities. Project, team, and individual goals were discussed and well known. Supervisors reviewed job performance with incumbents frequently. Staff provided feedback to BF management to improve the process.

Management of expectations also applied to clients. Applicants and borrowers were educated via several means. Loan applicants attended Loan Application Seminars that reviewed what credit is, how it can be used, how to apply for it, and BF's minimum terms of acceptance. BF staff members coached applicants in preparing loan applications, business plans, and financial statements, as well as, collateral requirements. Borrowers' obligations (to pay, to provide collateral, to comply with loan terms, conditions, and covenants, to minimize environmental impact, etc.) were thoroughly discussed in detail at the closing of the loan. And finally, the BF staff conducted regular visits to the borrowers' places of business to monitor and discuss the borrowers' compliance with loan terms and conditions, and progress in regard to the business plans.

Due to the absence of management and control of the Agent Banks, loan funds were diverted for ineligible or fraudulent uses in the early stages of the project. As a result, BF provided Agent Banks with an "Agent Bank Operating Manual" and training. The manual contained policies and procedures covering BF's credit practices, collateral verification, disbursements, monitoring, repayment, etc. Regular monitoring of Agent Bank performance reinforced policy and training. When expectations were made clear and checked on, the rate of success improved hugely.

Audits by BF's Audit Unit reinforced training, ensured compliance with policies and procedures, identified when policy/procedural changes were appropriate, and provided BF management with an independent view of project performance.

Cooperating with other projects and programs minimized duplication of effort and supplied input for action by others. BF communicated, worked, and cooperated with numerous organizations within and without the Bosnian Mission family including: the U.S. Embassy; the NATO Office of the High Representative (OHR)'s economic and judicial review sections; the World Bank's activities; NATO's Security Force (SFOR) and Civil Affairs (CIMIC); the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); and agencies of the Bosnian government – Federation Banking Agency (FBA), Republica Serbska Banking Agency (RSBA), Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance, and Court Presidents and Judges. Cooperation with programs and efforts complementary to the banking sector helped produce more comprehensive development within the business and financial sectors as well as facilitate specific BF interests.

For example, the USAID Bank Development and Training Project supported the development of Bosnia's banks through a comprehensive development and training program in the areas of strategy, credit underwriting, IT, accounting and operations. In the final phase of the project, a moveable property registry was also developed and implemented. The registry allowed potential borrowers to pledge collateral to lenders through a country-wide web-based system, increasing access to finance and allowing lenders to confirm on-line whether a particular asset was already pledged to another lender.

In a similar manner, the USAID Banking Supervision and Regulation Project focused on strengthening the financial sector regulatory environment by supporting the introduction of a new banking law, instituting improved licensing procedures, strengthening the on-site and off-site bank regulatory capabilities of the Federal Banking Authority, and providing bank resolution assistance.

Another project, the Payment System Reform Project led by USAID with major contributions from the World Bank and IMF enabled the Bosnian government to dismantle the Soviet-style Payments Bureaus that essentially allowed the pre-war government to control all significant financial payments and economic activity throughout the country. This was absolutely essential to enable the growth of the new market-oriented economy which took root in the post-war years. All of these projects enhanced and enabled the success of BF.

APPLICABILITY TO OTHER POST CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS

BF was a successful commercial lending, banking system transition, private sector business development and employment generating program that is applicable to other post-conflict or failing state environments. Through cooperative efforts among development and defense professionals, targeted or comprehensive reform programs can be implemented to effectively jump start economic activity and create jobs in these environments. What has been done in regard to a credit program in Bosnia (and elsewhere) can be introduced virtually anywhere development activities are underway. However, in all cases such programs must focus on what ultimately ensures a transformed economy.

- The greatest contribution of the Business Development Program was making available business financing when commercial providers (banks, investors, etc.) were unwilling or unable to lend. The availability of medium term credit that would otherwise not be available in a fragile, unstable or post-conflict environment enabled economic development. With longer term credit, capital investment (equipment, tools, vehicles, facilities, etc.) can be financed, creating greater economic activity, new jobs, and long-term business viability. Loans under these programs should be offered at rates as close to market as possible to limit potential price distortions over the long term.
- Clearly differentiate these types of programs from emergency grant programs and subsidized finance and micro-finance programs. It is vital to create and instill a credit culture from the outset. Borrowers must understand that they have to repay the loans and make business decisions accordingly. It is a functioning credit culture that ensures the availability of future capital for continued development.
- Set prudent business standards and discipline the process. Be clear about expectations with all – business, government, and population – in regard to proper practices and standards. Inform, educate, and mentor to assist where needed and monitor and evaluate to ensure adherence internally and externally. Institute very proactive loan monitoring and collection activities in these programs from the outset and never stop the monitoring and collecting efforts. Staff members must be trained for these functions and be relentless.

Such activities are the “blocking and tackling” part of the program that constitutes the heavy lifting and ensures the program contributes to a viable economic development mindset.

- Train and use local team members in all aspects of the program as early as possible. Local staff members better understand local context and can help set both conditions and expectations for success. Such localization also helps establish an “exit strategy” from the outset of the program.
- Financial capacity building is a key and often overlooked part of these programs. Most of these environments require initial teams containing expatriate financial sector expertise because there is seldom qualified indigenous expertise available. However, training, coaching, and mentoring of local staff, bankers, micro credit lenders, and borrowers should be undertaken from the outset to build a local modern financial capacity in order to enhance and sustain economic growth and development.
- Finance programs can be customized to meet the realities of each country and tailored to specific circumstances. They can be designed as direct credit programs utilizing donor finance or as guarantee programs to mobilize existing liquidity in the market. They can be retail programs that lend directly to borrowers or they can be wholesale programs that on-lend to existing retail lending networks (NGO’s, micro credit organizations, etc.). Regardless, the implementation should be based on sound principles of credit with clear expectations, evaluation standards, and discipline.
- The implications for and benefits of these types of programs stretch well beyond making credit available. Credit and capital lie at the heart of modern economic development and are interconnected with all aspects of a modern society: governance, rule of law, security, and individual progress. These latter are often the greater beneficiaries of competent credit programs and in the longer term perhaps more important than the immediate jobs and economic impact created.
- Choose winners. Focus on those prospective borrowers that are clearly credit-worthy and therefore most likely to succeed. Such focus is counterintuitive to the philosophy of most development projects which often seek to “help equally”; however, it is self-evident in banking. Winners will create new businesses, jobs, and economic activity – an expanding economy that will create more winners. Losers only consume capital and never increase it.

CONCLUSION

At its core, economic development leads to job creation and/or training people for better, more productive jobs which are widely viewed as a stabilizing factor in most societies. While recognizing that each country has a different economic culture (resources, regulations, business practices, and critical problems), the authors believe the experience in post-war Bosnia demonstrates how the development sector can be synchronized with security and governance sector efforts to accelerate stabilization operations. A USAID designed program focused on private sector business and banking, BDP successfully teamed USAID funds and expertise with technically skilled implementing contractor partners from the U.S. private sector in a highly effective approach. While requiring significant time and resources to work, the benefits of assisting Bosnia to modernize its financial and private business sectors appear to be worth the effort. In Bosnia’s case it helped stabilize the situation enough to steadily reduce the number of U.S. and NATO troops necessary to keep the peace while other political and security issues were addressed, however haltingly. The Business Finance project served to “jump start” economic growth by helping grow companies that formed the foundation and engine for the emerging

business private sector and related commercial banking system. The structure and technical details of such programs are likely to vary significantly in different countries and situations, but the lessons learned in Bosnia are applicable to other troubled states and suggests a better model for assistance – one that uses capital in a way that builds host nation capacity and sustains economic growth after the assistance partners depart.

CHAPTER 9

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN THE HEALTH SECTOR: HOST NATION PERSPECTIVE

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INTRODUCTION

One of the key challenges in countries emerging from conflict is their relative lack of capacity to establish or rebuild legitimate, stable, and functional government institutions. Post-conflict reconstruction efforts are instrumental in helping these countries accomplish a successful transition from war to peace, and form self-sustaining state institutions capable of providing essential services to their citizens.² The issue of post-conflict reconstruction is widely discussed within the international aid community; however, the views of external stakeholders primarily frame this discussion. These discussions too often neglect to include the perspective of countries at the receiving end of aid. This essay examines post-conflict health sector reconstruction in Iraq to discern lessons learned, and to highlight areas where early and consistent consultation with host country nationals may have produced better outcomes. It analyzes the historical, geopolitical, social, and economic contexts as primary driving forces in determining the success or failure of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Finally, it highlights the main challenges and obstacles that hindered early coordination and collaboration among the different stakeholders and demonstrates their influence on the outcomes of the transition phase during which Iraqi government institutions sought to take full ownership of the reconstruction and development agenda.

BACKGROUND

Post-Conflict reconstruction is commonly perceived as a process of restoring pre-conflict physical infrastructure. However, as a concept, it also deals with the broader need to rebuild the socio-economic structure and the institutional capacity in war torn countries.³ Post-conflict reconstruction requires a lengthy commitment from all stakeholders involved, both internally

1 This work was supported by the efforts of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. It contains facts, observations, and conclusions based on some of the authors' experience during the transition process.

2 Steven Holtzman, Ann Elwan, and Colin Scott, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank*, 1998; available from http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000009265_3980624143531, accessed March 10, 2011.

3 Hugh Waters, Brinnon Garrett, and Gilbert Burnham, "Rehabilitating Health Systems in Post-Conflict Situations," 2007; available from <http://www.wider.unu.edu/stc/repec/pdfs/rp2007/rp2007-06.pdf>, accessed April 12, 2010.

and externally, and an extensive, and often risky, financial investment in the future of fragile states.⁴

Often developed over years of engagement in different parts of the world, the experiences of different international aid and development organizations in planning and implementing post-conflict reconstruction projects, offer valuable lessons that can be used to evaluate ongoing and future efforts.⁵ Careful examinations of these experiences reveal the unique nature of every engagement effort and the relevance of context in each case. Iraq's experience with conflict and reconstruction is no exception.

Post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq came in the aftermath of a U.S.-led military intervention that was not supported by the United Nations Security Council.⁶ Initially, the U.S.-led coalition intended to have a brief postwar involvement in Iraq and planned to use pre-conflict Iraqi government institutions to quickly stabilize the country, provide basic services, and jump start the reconstruction process. Once stabilized, the plan was to transfer power in Iraq to a democratically elected government that would later embark on a broader reform and development agenda.⁷

Previous analysis of U.S.-led nation-building efforts in Iraq suggests that the coalition's postwar plans were based on unrealistic, best-case assumptions and were ill prepared to deal with unforeseen events.⁸ The immediate and unanticipated collapse of Iraq's government institutions after the military intervention forced the coalition to revise its strategy and seek wider support from the international community for its postwar reconstruction efforts. Unfortunately, the coalition undertook a series of missteps that further complicated various aspects of the situation and derailed the ongoing efforts to stabilize the country.

Decisions to remove the top four ranks of the Baath Party members from the civil service and to dissolve the security apparatus and the Iraqi army^{9,10} proved to have short and long-term detrimental effects on post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction processes in Iraq. As a direct result of these decisions, the U.S. led-coalition authorities faced a security and governance vacuum. They had no other choices but to assume direct governance responsibilities in order to address immediate security threats and provide basic services.¹¹ The unanticipated power vacuum and uncertainty also placed the coalition under political pressure to show a skeptic Iraqi public – and international audiences – immediate and tangible results. In response, the coalition focused on provision of essential services and initiated rehabilitation projects without prior consultation with reliable and credible Iraqi counterparts at the local and national level. This

4 Donald E. Klingner and L.R Jones, "Learning from the Philippine Occupation: Nation-Building and Institutional Development in Iraq and Other High Security Risk Nations," *Public Administration and Development*, Vol.25, 2005, pp.145-156.

5 Olga Bornemisza and Ebert Sondorp, "Health Policy Formulation in Complex Political Emergencies and Post-Conflict Countries," 2002; available from <http://www.who.int/disasters/repo/8678.pdf>; accessed April 12, 2010.

6 James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, et al., *The UN's Role In Nation-Building from the Congo to Iraq*, 2005; available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG304.pdf; accessed April 12, 2010. Andrew Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn," *International Affairs*, Vol. 81, No.5, 2005, pp. 1013-1038.

7 Carlos L. Yordan, "Failing to Meet Expectations in Iraq: A Review of the Original U.S. Post-War Strategy," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2004, pp.52-68.

8 Dobbins (2005).

9 The Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1: De-Ba`Athification of Iraqi Society, 2003; available from http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_1_De-Ba_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_.pdf

10 The Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2: Dissolution Of Entities, 2003; available from http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Entities_with_Annex_A.pdf

11 Rathmell.

response created an atmosphere that favored the adoption and reliance on quick and short-term solutions over a long-term strategy that focuses on capacity building and a smooth transition to capable and self-sustaining government institutions.

The coalition's decision to disband the Iraqi military and security forces directly impacted Iraq's capacity to provide healthcare. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense had a well-established healthcare system, which contributed significantly to Iraq's healthcare capacity. Disbanding the Iraqi Army immediately deprived the country of almost twenty percent of its national healthcare capacity. Further, without protection, military health facilities, warehouses where drugs and medical supplies were stored, and offices with confidential patient files were looted and destroyed as employees abandoned their work places.

The U.S.-led coalition placed most of Iraq's government institutions under the supervision and direct control of U.S. administrators. These administrators were subject matter experts in their respective fields, however, they spoke no Arabic and many had limited experience in international development. They had to rely heavily on Iraqi advisors and interpreters, usually exiles who had been residing abroad for decades, to understand the nuances of Iraq's culture and political landscape.¹²

Most of the Iraqi exiles who came back to Iraq and served as advisors to the coalition administrators spent at least 25 years outside Iraq and knew very little about the health situation in Iraq, or how Iraq's healthcare system was organized and functioned prior to the war. They did not know, and were unwilling to learn, how the sanctions impacted the health sector in Iraq and what the healthcare administrators and providers had to do to adapt their practices to the austerity experienced under the economic sanctions. Most of these exiles came with an unrealistic vision for the healthcare system in Iraq based on their lives and experiences abroad.

The solutions and models they proposed focused primarily on establishing advanced, expensive, and difficult to maintain healthcare centers, training local providers in western hospitals, and privatizing the public healthcare sector, rather than expanding the role of the private sector in providing healthcare services to respond to the unmet needs. Possessing only a superficial understanding of Iraqi government policies and practices regarding the health sector, they did not understand the actual capacity of the private sector in Iraq. Nor did they grasp the challenges many private providers were facing in the health sector in terms of security, corruption, and the lack of supportive legal and financial infrastructure. Well-intended, but ill-informed, coalition administrators sought to replicate foreign administrative norms, introducing unfamiliar technical and institutional models instead of identifying models and solutions more suitable for the Iraqi context.¹³ The relative exclusion of local participation (when solicited, local participation was restricted to novice enthusiasts seeking to introduce quick and unrealistic changes) created a deep sense of resentment among Iraqi civil service professionals, who predictably resisted many of the new models and refused to cooperate in many instances.

THE SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT

A key challenge the coalition faced as they started to implement their post-conflict reconstruction plan in Iraq was their lack of a good understanding of the broader social, cultural, and geopolitical context in Iraq. Historically, Iraq's complex internal and external environments tend to have a substantial influence on the political process and the form of political institutions.

12 Yordan. Sultan Barakat, "Post-Saddam Iraq: Deconstructing a Regime, Reconstructing a Nation, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.26, No. 4/5, 2005,pp.571-591. David Charles-Philippe, "How Not to do Post-invasion: Lessons Learned from US Decision-making in Iraq (2002-2008)," *Defense & Security Analysis*, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2010, pp. 31-63.

13 Barakat.

The internal make up of Iraq's society is very diverse in terms of religion, sect, and ethnicity. Early signs of a rising tension among different ethnic and sectarian groups were evident immediately following the U.S led military intervention in Iraq. With the passage of time, this tension spread and became more violent. It placed the entire democratic process and institutional stability in the country in jeopardy. Although a consistent reality in Iraq's modern history, the strong national identity associated with political institutions mitigated sectarian tensions in the past.¹⁴ Up until 2003, Iraq's successive rulers, the bulk of whom belonged to the Sunni Arab minority, laid claim to a nationalistic agenda, promoting national policies to diffuse the resentment of other groups and somewhat artificially binding different societal groups' interests together. Public discourse of societal diversity and political identity was subdued in favor of grand nationalistic ideals.

In hindsight, the sudden introduction of democracy, as an abstract concept to a society that lacked the political maturity and understanding of civil society processes and institutions but with the expectations of direct and immediate transformation, was unrealistic and outright naïve. However, at the time the participants failed to comprehend the potential problems. Immediately after assuming office in 2005, the transitional Iraqi government started a systematic process of political cleansing by purging the existing government workforce and filling key governmental and bureaucratic positions in accordance with ethnic and sectarian affiliation and political loyalty. Within the Ministry of Health, these policies were pursued with different mechanisms. Among these were: the removal of former members of the Ba'ath party (other than those in the top four ranks whose removal was mandated by law); targeting select civil service staff with criminal charges through the commission of public integrity dominated by politically appointed factions; and using direct violence against potential adversaries. The progress of reconstruction and reform efforts faltered as most government institutions were deprived of their knowledge and experience base.

As a result of the unrestrained release of these suppressed tensions, ethno-sectarian factors dominated the political process and were the main determinants of institutional structures and policy preferences in Iraq following the U.S.-led military intervention in 2003. In December 2005, over 90% of Iraq's National Assembly seats were occupied by parties and coalitions defined primarily by ethnic and sectarian identities.¹⁵ Members of the National Assembly distanced themselves from the pressing needs and problems of the country and focused instead on responding to the immediate demands of their parties.

The ethno-sectarian divide prevails in Iraq today and continues to jeopardize the democratic process more than seven years after the initial military intervention. In March 2010, Iraq held its second general election, however, more than seven months after the election as of the time of this writing there is still no government in sight. As the struggle for political power among the different groups goes on, the living conditions of Iraqis continue to deteriorate with successive governments. Appointed or elected, each fails to meet the most basic needs of its citizens. Initiatives, such as the parliamentary effort to pass laws that would allow the state to regulate political parties and to conduct a national census prior to the most recent elections, faltered. Political parties in order to protect and advance narrow political interests blocked both of these steps intended to address the ethno-sectarian influence on the political process and allow the formation of representative state institutions.

Iraq's external environment is equally complicated. For years, Iraq has been a battleground for a proxy war between Iran and the Gulf States. Unfortunately, this continues to be the case after the 2003 U.S.-led military intervention. Iran, the Gulf States, and other neighboring countries

14 Adeed Dawisha, *Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation*, Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009.

15 Ibid.

in the region observed what was happening in Iraq with mixed emotions. Tension and conflict defined Iraq's relationships with its regional neighbors over the past thirty years. Many of these countries did not shy away from publicly showing their lack of opposition to the disposition of a regimen they always considered a threat. On the other hand, all shared concerns that the military intervention in Iraq would lead to democratic governance. Any possibility of a stable democratic government promoting political and economic reforms potentially threatens the future of their governing systems. To its own detriment, the U.S.-led coalition allowed neighboring countries to meddle with the political situation in Iraq by providing financial and political support to competing local factions. By allowing such an open and direct interference in Iraq's internal affairs, the coalition authorities made a significant strategic mistake with potentially devastating consequences for Iraq's security and stability, and in turn Iraq's political and economic future.

THE HEALTH SECTOR IN IRAQ: PRE-CONFLICT REALITIES

Established in 1918, Iraq's healthcare system was modeled much like the British healthcare system. It enjoyed a reputation as one of the best healthcare systems in the region. Patients from neighboring countries seeking high-quality healthcare traveled to Iraq.¹⁶ During the 1970s and early 1980s, the country experienced significant improvements in several critical health indicators including decreased infant and under-five mortality rates.¹⁷

Iraq's traditional healthcare approach is hospital oriented and requires large-scale supply of expensive medicines, equipment, and human resources.¹⁸ Prior to the 1980s, the system ran fairly effectively, largely because the size of Iraq's population and the strength of its economy allowed for such a capital-intensive model. At the same time, the system had a number of weaknesses, including the relative absence of a public health focus and the lack of a formal mechanism to collect data on health indicators, healthcare services, and population health needs. It also lacked a formal human resources development strategy. Professional development focused on enhancing the clinical performance of healthcare providers. During the 1970s and early 1980s, Iraq sent a large number of clinicians and university professors abroad for advanced education and training in their respective fields. Largely driven by personal preferences, these scholarships tended to focus on clinical and basic sciences. Other key professional areas, including public health, healthcare management and administration, and health economics and finance, went unaddressed.

There are two parallel healthcare delivery systems in Iraq: public and private. The public healthcare system was based on a network of primary health clinics providing basic healthcare services everywhere in the country, supported by hospitals and specialized care centers providing secondary and tertiary care at the provincial and district levels. The public sector was responsible for supplying the public and private health systems with pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and medical equipment. The healthcare workforce in Iraq split its time between the public and the private sector, working for the government in the morning and in private clinics, hospitals, and pharmacies in the evening. The private health sector in Iraq was reasonably developed and able to supplement some of the services provided by the public health sector during the economic sanctions. It provided a broad range of services within the private health sector through its own large number of clinics, small hospitals, and pharmacies distributed na-

16 Ala'din Alwan, *Health in Iraq: The Current Situation, Our Vision for the Future and Areas of Work*, 2nd Ed., 2004; available from http://www.who.int/hac/crises/irq/sitreps/2004/Iraq_Health_in_Iraq_Dec2004.pdf, accessed May 14, 2010.

17 World Health Organization: Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office (EMRO), "Health Systems Profile: Iraq," 2005; available from <http://www.emro.who.int/iraq/pdf/HealthSystemsProfile.pdf>, accessed May 14, 2010.

18 Ibid.

tionwide.¹⁹ The private health sector, however, suffered chronically from under investment and strict regulations imposed by the government.

The deterioration of the Iraqi healthcare system started in 1980 and continued for three decades because of three wars and more than a decade of comprehensive and tightly enforced economic sanctions.²⁰ The negative impact on healthcare due to the 8-year war between Iraq and Iran became evident during the late eighties as spending on health declined significantly. The situation worsened during the nineties due to the considerable devastation to Iraq's infrastructure caused by the 1991 Gulf War and the following economic sanctions. During this period, the funding for healthcare declined by 90 percent and population health indicators fell sharply. Iraq's inability to rehabilitate damaged buildings and replace equipment compounded the problem of the destruction of the physical infrastructure during the war. In addition, Iraq could not maintain a stable and qualified workforce as a result of the economic sanctions. To compensate for the massive deterioration, the former Iraqi government introduced a number of new healthcare financing policies resulting in inefficient and inequitable access to healthcare services. For example, in 1997 the Ministry of Health introduced self-finance mechanisms (a form of subsidized fee for service) to generate income. The purpose was to help the government cover the operational expenses of healthcare facilities and pay for physicians, nurses, and other ancillary staff. These mechanisms created a multiple-tier system that offered "higher-quality" healthcare services exclusively for those who could pay, and induced demands for unneeded services. They also created inequalities in pay among physicians with different specialties. For example, physicians working in surgical units could expect to be paid hundreds or even thousands of dollars a month, while others working in units generating less income, such as psychiatry or dermatology, earned significantly less. Inequities between physicians and nurses and ancillary staff were greater. For some, the monthly payment did not exceed two or three dollars a month.²¹

Notwithstanding the significant role of the private sector in supplementing public health sector capacity and absorbing unmet needs, the government did not support a more active involvement of the private sector by relaxing its restrictive regulations. In the midst of Iraq's struggle with shortages in the supply of pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and medical equipments, the private sector could not independently import supplies to meet the market demands, and had to work within the confines of Ministry of Health's highly complex and cumbersome *bureaucratic* procedures.

In 1996, Iraq agreed to implement the United Nations Oil for Food Program. The execution of the program started in 1997 and provided for funds necessary to meet the humanitarian needs of the country, including healthcare goods. However, the program was largely employed for political purposes and was not sufficient to mitigate the enormous strain placed on the healthcare system because of the economic sanctions. Iraq's health indicators revealed the negative impact of the sanctions, as the country continued to suffer from chronic shortages of life saving pharmaceuticals and medical supplies. Iraq endured a dramatic rise in unmet health needs as its population suffered from a double burden of increased incidences of communicable and non-communicable diseases.

Prior to the invasion in March 2003, the national strategic stock of external fixation devices, used to treat open long bone fractures, in Iraq's top military orthopedic facility was only six for the entire country. This lack of basic equipment posed an enormous challenge for medical personnel faced with prioritizing care for an ever increasing number of patients. Thus the long

19 Ibid.

20 Phyllis Bennis, Martha Honey, and Stephen Zunes, "The Failure of U.S. Policy toward Iraq and Proposed Alternatives," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, 2001; available from http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_failure_of_us_policy_toward_iraq_and_proposed_alternatives; accessed May 14, 2010.

21 Riadh T. Abed, "An Update on Mental Health Services in Iraq," *Psychiatric Bulletin*, Vol. 27, 2003, pp. 461-462.

term erosion of public health infrastructure caused by the thirteen yearlong embargo against Iraq diminished every level of medical care to include the availability of the most basic medical devices.

More than three decades of wars, economic sanctions, under-investment, poor management, and corruption transformed Iraq's healthcare system from one of the best in the region to a system gasping to survive. Post-conflict reconstruction efforts confronted a system with a dual reality: (1) relatively developed in terms of human resources from the residual of highly educated and trained healthcare professionals with advanced clinical skills and (2) operating within a system that lacked the basic physical infrastructure and managerial skills necessary to support effective healthcare delivery. The widespread destruction, looting, violence, and general lack of security that followed the U.S.-led military intervention in March 2003 further weakened the healthcare system and created a difficult environment for healthcare providers and personnel to function effectively in daily much less work on rehabilitation and reform.

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ'S HEALTHCARE SYSTEM

Following the U.S.-led military intervention in 2003, the coalition's initial involvement focused on responding to urgent health needs. In June 2003, the United States appointed an official senior advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Health to manage the overall rehabilitation and reconstruction process. Following a two-month assessment of the status, the capabilities and capacity, and the needs of the Iraqi healthcare system, the coalition convened interested parties at the Ministry of Health Headquarters in order to develop a strategic plan to guide the future development of the healthcare system in Iraq. The coalition's efforts to rehabilitate and reform the healthcare system in Iraq, however, faced a number of challenges due to the highly politicized and turbulent environment in which they were implemented. The following sections highlight some of these challenges and discuss their impact on post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

Civil-Military Coordination

Post-conflict environments involve large numbers of civilian and military organizations responding to often diverse and sometimes common needs and requirements. They perform different tasks and share others ranging among peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, security, and planning and implementing development and reform projects. Although often diverse in terms of their affiliations, roles, and mandates, the different actors, whether civilian and military, need to coordinate and work together in order to be most effective and successful.²² The typical power vacuum, security issues, and humanitarian needs following any conflict call upon both civilian and military authorities to act immediately, collectively, and decisively to mitigate further damage to infrastructure and alleviate human suffering.²³ Having a formal mechanism that helps integrate the delivery of humanitarian and development aid from different sources and takes into account all relevant actors and contextual factors is essential. When early stabilization and rehabilitation activities are scattered, uncoordinated, and implemented without the participation of key stakeholders, the transition to subsequent phases

22 Roland Paris, "Understanding the 'Coordination Problem' in Postwar Statebuilding," in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, New York: Routledge, 2009, pp. 53-78. Marina Travayiakis, "Civil-Military Coordination in Post-conflict Settings: United States Policy and Practice," 2010; available from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/4/1/5/7/0/pages415708/p415701-1.php; accessed March 23, 2011.

23 Travayiakis. Scott Feil, "Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction," in *Roland Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 4, Autumn 2002, pp.97-109.

where the host country takes full ownership of the development and reconstruction agenda can suffer considerably.

In Iraq, complicated relationships and a relative lack of coordination among coalition civilian agencies and military authorities characterized post-conflict reconstruction.²⁴ Because the intervention in Iraq was a U.S.-led military effort, the U.S. Department of Defense was placed in charge of interagency coordination and planning. Unfortunately, this decision greatly limited the participation of other U.S. government agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) primarily because the Department of Defense did not have a formal process in place to coordinate activities with other actors.²⁵

The Coalition Provisional Authority simply failed to bridge the gap. A visible tension existed between the civilian authority (the Coalition Provisional Authority) at the Ministry of Health and the coalition military personnel who were involved in health sector rehabilitation in different parts of the country. Each had the impression that the other was operating independently and both riled about each other's intentions. Both complained that the other side had established separate lines of communication with host country nationals without prior consultation and coordination.

A near continuous deterioration of the security situation in Iraq further limited the involvement of civilian agencies in post-conflict reconstruction activities. The military assumed the responsibility to carry out medical reconstruction projects without sufficient institutional knowledge and capacity. They improvised to meet their immediate reconstruction goals, and often used their resources in an ad hoc and uncoordinated fashion.²⁶

It was very common for military units to visit health clinics in their area of responsibility without prior coordination with either the Coalition Provisional Authority Office at the Ministry of Health or the Ministry. Military personnel interviewed doctors and staff at these clinics, inquiring as to the clinics' needs and wants. Later, sometimes more based on "better ideas" or funding programs than needs, units provided assistance in the form of ill-conceived renovations and unsustainable services and supplies. Such interventions, obviously intended to win the hearts and minds of the local population, occasionally backfired as expectations were not met or were unrealistically created. In addition, insurgents and terrorists got suspicious and targeted the people who worked in these clinics as collaborators with the "occupying" force. The Ministry of Health could not, or would not, support or protect these clinics or their staff since the assistance they received was without their prior knowledge and consent, and contrary to their planning and priorities.

Poor interagency coordination, both within the U.S. government and within the broader international community, created a sense of confusion among the Iraqis involved in post-conflict reconstruction projects. Unilateral initiatives emerged at different levels with massive amounts of resources dedicated to humanitarian assistance and infrastructure renovation projects without prior planning and coordination. These activities created an environment conducive to inefficiency, waste, and corruption, and diffused any opportunity for a meaningful and credible Iraqi input and participation in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. In the end, they did long-term harm.

24 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Who Killed Iraq?" *Foreign Policy*, August 11, 2006; available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/08/11/who_killed_iraq, accessed May 14, 2010.

25 Travayiakis. Francis Fukuyama, "Nation-Building 101," *The Atlantic Monthly*, January/February 2004, pp. 159-162.

26 Authors' personal observations and conclusions.

Coordination with the Host Nation

The lack of a genuine host nation partnership with full Iraqi participation in the planning and implementing of post-conflict reconstruction posed another challenge. There was a common perception among Iraqis that the participation of Iraqi government officials following the military intervention in 2003 served ceremonial purposes rather than represent an effort to establish a true partnership. If the U.S. coalition effort represented a sincere effort, the coalition did much to work against itself and help to create a misperception. As noted earlier, senior positions in the transitional government were filled either by U.S. administrators or by Iraqi exiles. The U.S. government recruited Iraqi exiles and offered them six month contracts for working in government ministries or assisting U.S. administrators in doing so.²⁷ Unfortunately, the massive and near-complete reliance on Iraqi exiles in regard to Iraq's political, social, cultural, religious, and economic realities proved to be ill-advised.²⁸ Further, since post-conflict involvement in Iraq was intended to be brief initially, there were no formal mechanisms in place to evaluate potential partners to work with at the local and national levels. For the sake of expediency, simple criteria, such as fluency in English, became the criteria by which to judge whether a particular Iraqi was knowledgeable, credible, reliable, and trust worthy as an advisor.

A number of factors contributed to the difficulties the coalition faced in building working relationships with local Iraqi counterparts. The rapid turnover of coalition military personnel, who were in charge of post-conflict reconstruction, was a major challenge. It encouraged a pattern where the implementation and sustainment of projects were dependent on short-term personal relationships. The pattern was problematic for coalition personnel and Iraqis alike. Often, local counterparts, who were not adequately vetted for knowledge, skills, and reliability, were not qualified or were motivated by the wrong reasons. It was very common for new teams replacing redeploying personnel to select an entirely new group of Iraqis to work with because the old group was deemed unreliable, corrupt, or too sympathetic to the old regimen. De-ba'athification policy made things worse by eliminating most of the pre-war Iraqi government bureaucrats from participation. It made it difficult, if not impossible, to solicit credible input from the actual technical experts, the people who spent years within the system and were most aware of its governance structure and the details of its operation. The turnover also encouraged the unscrupulous to take advantage of what all saw as unique, but temporary, opportunities to profit.²⁹

Counterproductive secondary effects also occurred. When major combat operations ended, coalition military units and civilian agencies visited healthcare facilities throughout the country frequently conducting needs assessment. Multiple visits to the same health facility often took place without delivering tangible benefits, wasting time and creating unrealized expectations. Losing enthusiasm, the Iraqi staff in these facilities stopped cooperating after a while. Further, information collected by visiting groups was not passed to new teams as the groups redeployed. The rapid personnel turnover should have been kept in mind when the needs assessment was being considered and incorporated into the assessment design and follow-up. In addition, the local staff in the clinics should have taken the lead in conducting the needs assessment, keeping and maintaining the data and accepting the responsibility of communicating it and subsequent progress and changes to all relevant entities—new teams, new assessors, and the Ministry of Health. At a minimum, copies of any coalition needs assessment and data should have been left with the local staff at each healthcare facility and shared with the Ministry of Health to build an official national data repository of data that could be accessed and used by all parties involved.

27 Yordan.

28 Barakat.

29 Authors' personal observations and conclusions.

At the policy level, U.S. administrators and their close advisors and staff made the consequential policy decisions in closed meetings without Iraqi officials. Iraqi government officials only participated in the reconstruction process later on when invited to implement what have been decided in these closed meetings. Replacing the old organizational structure of the Ministry of Health with a new one is an illustrative example. The decision was made with minimum input from local and national government officials. Iraqi participation was largely restricted to a group of Iraqi exiles with a very limited knowledge of the existing organizational structure and procedures. The resultant new structure is still in effect today. Considered by many to be problematic and inefficient, it represents what can occur when a valid partnership does not exist. Closed doors and limited input created a multi-layered system with mixed roles and responsibilities and numerous opportunities for duplication, waste, corruption, and administrative confusion.³⁰

The complex political structure encouraged in Iraq after the war by the U.S.-led coalition permeates the day-to-day operations of government ministries today. Upon turnover of sovereignty to the newly formed Iraqi government, senior positions within the Ministry of Health were apportioned based on political—ethnic and sectarian—affiliation. Incumbents were endowed with a considerable amount of independent political power and privileges.³¹ The Minister of Health, for example, often cannot make meaningful changes in personnel or policy to overcome serious problems within the Ministry because of the independent political power of his direct subordinates. This political influence also intimidates civil servants at all levels and suppresses attempts to provide genuine input and feedback to address the real problems the Ministry of Health needs to deal with. Political polarization, intimidation, a general sense of operational paralysis, and a lack of transparency characterized most of government ministries in the post-conflict environment.³² To expect excellence of partnership in Iraqi officials, bureaucracies, and participants in the reconstruction process under these circumstances would be naive. However, if transitions are to be improved, interventions must avoid contributing to conditions that diminish success.

The Missing Role of Multilateral Institutions

The adoption of a unilateral approach by the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq worked to the disadvantage of the coalition's goals in terms of implementing its post-conflict reconstruction agenda. Within few months, the coalition realized that a multilateral approach in Iraq was necessary. Not only would multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), bring a wealth of expertise and field capabilities in post-conflict peacekeeping, stabilization, and reconstruction that was much needed to fill in the capacity gaps the coalition was facing, but also because of the legitimacy and credibility multilateral partners can provide.³³

In August 2003, an attempt to bring all stakeholders together at the table, including representatives from the coalition, the UN, NGOs, the World Bank, and the Iraqi Ministry of Health, to discuss reconstruction plans for the health sector in Iraq ended abruptly and tragically without achieving its goals. A terrorist attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad caused the UN to close its offices in Iraq and truncate its role in post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq for years to come.

30 Ibid.

31 Toby Dodge, "Iraqi Transitions: From Regime Change to State Collapse," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4/5, 2005, pp.705-721.

32 Authors' personal observations and conclusions.

33 Dobbins, et al. Fukuyama. Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, "Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building," May 2003; available from <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Policybrief24.pdf>; accessed May 14, 2010.

This decision deprived the coalition of much needed expertise and advice. The impulsive departure soured relationships and curtailed prospects for collaboration and information sharing.³⁴

Operating in a country they knew little about, the coalition initiated health sector reform and reconstruction not only in a historical vacuum, but also in a virtual expertise void. Creating a new healthcare system, they ignored the one that already existed and missed the advantage of most of what UN agencies had learned in the previous 50 years about healthcare and its institutions and systems. For example, they implemented a reconstruction agenda without a proper needs assessment to identify priority areas where reconstruction funds and resources most needed to be targeted. They made too little effort to understand what existed and worked in the country prior to the conflict in terms of governance capacities and how the conflict affected them.³⁵ Instead of cultivating appropriate indigenous partners, Iraqi exiles and foreign experts with limited experience in international development recommended solutions and made decisions without taking into account the historical background, the political and economic realities, and the overall context in which the healthcare system would exist. The UN and other multilateral developmental organizations possessed the critical knowledge and expertise to foresee the problems of context, culture, and practice in fragile states.

The unilateral approach of the coalition, which ignored proper consultation with Ministry of Health officials and multilateral institutions that have long-standing relationships with Iraqi ministries, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), created unfavorable results. It produced an atmosphere of distrust and contributed to a lack of commitment by the Ministry of Health. Iraqi officials and practitioners perceived many of the reconstruction projects as foreign, unnecessary, and condescending of existing institutional knowledge, policies, capabilities, and practices.

TRANSITION STRATEGY: HANDING OVER SOVEREIGNTY TO THE IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT

In November 2003, the coalition made the decision to transfer sovereignty in Iraq to an interim government as of June 2004.³⁶ Consideration of post-conflict reconstruction activities appeared to play little role in the decision. In keeping with its over-reliance on exiles, the coalition handed sovereignty to an Interim Iraqi Government largely dominated by formally exiled political appointees. Therefore, the interim government possessed only very limited institutional knowledge and administrative capacity at the top.³⁷ Hence, the transition strategy was handicapped from the start.

The hyper-politicized atmosphere created after the war in many government ministries made the cooperation between the newly appointed administrators and the vast majority of employees difficult. Remnants of the old civil service, employees viewed the new administrators with suspicion because of their close links to the U.S. government. As a result of this, and identity and competence issues, the new "Iraqi" elites generally lacked legitimacy. On the other hand, the administrators tended to not trust members of the old civil service, often viewing them as compromised because of their past affiliation with the old régime. Technically, and practically, speaking no unified and reliable host country government existed to which to transition

34 Authors' personal observations and conclusions.

35 United Nations Development Programme, *Capacity Development in Post-Conflict Countries*, Global Event Working Paper, New York: United Nations, 2010.

36 Larry Diamond, "Building Democracy After Conflict: Lessons from Iraq," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.16, No.1, January 2005, pp. 9-23. Wolfram Lacher, "Iraq: Exception to, or Epitome of Contemporary Post-conflict Reconstruction?" *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 14, 2007, pp.237-250.

37 Dodge.

authority. Similar to Iraqi participation in the initial phases of stability operations under the coalition authorities, genuine Iraqi participation in the transition to the newly formed interim government was largely ceremonial.

The transition strategy appeared to focus primarily on transferring the resources and leadership for existing reconstruction projects to the Iraqi principals as quickly as possible. In the case of the Ministry of Health, no time existed to develop a comprehensive plan in order to guide the transfer of ongoing projects and resources. Consequently, they were not integrated successfully into a comprehensive national strategic plan for the health sector. Placed in the driver's seat with new organizational structure, functions, and leaders, and all aspects of the reconstruction projects, the Ministry of Health simply lacked the institutional capacity to take charge. Health policy, regulatory guidance, and monitoring suffered accordingly. One big oversight was in identifying as soon as possible or developing a group of experienced and credible national staff to guide the post-conflict reconstruction and development. Better coalition assistance in policy development, change management, health systems management, and finance may have sharpened the Ministry's capacity to shape and lead the health sector development agenda. Such shortcomings were, however, a natural consequence of the coalition not properly assessing conditions and neglecting to involve national players in the initial phases of the reconstruction process, which discouraged national ownership and limited potential better control over health policy design and implementation by the Iraqi government.³⁸

The Coalition Provisional Authority showed awareness of what needed to be done to assist the Ministry in being successful. In preparation for the UN Donor's Conference in October 2003, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and its contractor, Abt Associates, sponsored public consultation workshops. The purpose was to facilitate policy discussion on the prioritization of healthcare issues. Seven working groups and a steering committee met for four months (from October 2003 to January 2004). Convened by the Ministry of Health, they included Ministry of Health leaders, representatives from all sectors of the healthcare system, and NGOs. Support came from the CPA and staff of Abt Associates. The workshops addressed the areas of a national health information system, women's health, nursing and nursing education, pharmaceutical and medical supplies procurement and distribution, facilities master planning, and the introduction of a National Health Account (NHA).³⁹ Their efforts produced a "vision document" to guide the future development of Iraq's healthcare system—a comprehensive strategic vision for health sector reform. The vision document, however, did not include an implementation plan to help the Ministry of Health design and implement projects in line with the objectives and goals outlined in the document. It was a critical oversight since the Ministry of Health lacked the institutional capacity to handle such a task. To compensate for the oversight, the coalition offered short-term training for ministry staff in key leadership positions, focusing primarily on strategic planning and implementation. Such compensation proved inadequate and the loss of momentum allowed other dynamics to supersede the goodness of the vision's accomplishment.

At the same time, the effects of earlier coalition actions lingered. For example, the type of reconstruction projects and methods to determine them initiated and implemented by the coalition and others immediately after the invasion constituted another transition challenge. Initial assistance and rehabilitation efforts focused on conducting immunization campaigns, distribut-

38 Paolo de Renzio, Lindsay Whitfield, and Isaline Bergamaschi, "Reforming Foreign Aid Practices: What country ownership is and what donors can do to support it," 2008; available from <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/Reforming%20Aid%20Practices,%20final.pdf>, accessed March 23, 2011.

39 Gerald A. Evans, Final Summary Report Iraq Health Systems Strengthening Project, USAID, 2004; available from http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACA956.pdf, accessed May 14, 2010.

ing essential medicines and medical supplies, and construction of hospitals and health clinics.⁴⁰ As noted elsewhere the majority of the construction projects were not demand driven. Iraqi officials were not given the opportunity, time, or wherewithal to determine what Iraq needed in terms of medical service and reconstruction. Efforts to assess existing capacity and to determine and project actual needs suffered correspondingly. As the picture cleared concerning real needs or Iraqi officials became more aware of the implications for resources, disconnects in long-term needs and the well-intentioned, but haphazard construction, surfaced. As transition unfolded, no one on the Iraqi side would agree to take ownership of many of these projects. In some cases the leadership and commitment to carry projects through to completion was missing. In others, the projects made no sense in terms of needs or resource availability and priorities.

In one example involving the Ministry of Defense, transition cooperation failed completely. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense asked for the transfer of level three medical facilities to Iraqi forces as part of the transition. The Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) decided to provide three field operative theaters located in Falauja, Mousul, and Salah Al-Deen. For whatever reason MNSTC-I wanted these three specific hospitals transferred. However, the locations did not meet the needs of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. A series of meetings among the Ministries of Health, Defense, MNSTC-I, and the Embassy followed, seeking to find a means to staff and make use of these field hospitals. Ultimately, however, no one agreed to staff the hospitals. As a result, they remain neglected and unused. It dramatically illustrates that decisions that do not involve and take into account the needs and priorities of the host nation pose issues of ownership.

The transfer of 16 military health clinics, built to meet the health needs of the new Iraqi Army, provides an example of a successful transition. While Iraqi medical personnel and workers staffed these clinics, Americans performed the management functions. The Americans made key management decisions pertaining to finance, procurement, medical supply, etc. During the transition period, multiple teams formed to consider how to transfer these centers to the Iraqi side. However, the teams initially did not include representatives from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Problems and misunderstandings ensued. When the Ministry of Defense recommended and placed representatives on each team, the representatives anticipated and resolved issues. Having a representative from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense on these transition teams allowed them to interact with the American management staff directly, understand how the clinics were managed and what gaps existed, and participate in determining the best ways to fill these gaps and keep the clinics open. It shows that all the stakeholders need to be involved in a transition activity because they possess critical knowledge and ultimately need to take ownership.

Iraq's troubled transition in the health sector should have come as no surprise. A common obstacle for successful transition in post-conflict situations is the absence of a resolute government with the appropriate institutional capacity to take full ownership and provide effective leadership. Ongoing programs, reconstruction projects, and proposed future development suffer accordingly. Assistance providers need to avoid compounding that common obstacle by their initial decisions and actions and the manner in which they deal with the host nation agencies; far better to focus on strengthening indigenous governance skills. Such an approach leads to an earlier ability to coordinate and integrate transferred projects and resources into a comprehensive national reconstruction and development strategy. In doing this, those seeking to assist accept that ultimately the host nation's agencies must take ownership and that for that to occur you have to accept them as full partners whose knowledge, understanding, and contributions merit respect and in many cases precedence.

40 Open Society Institute and the United Nations Foundation, *Iraq in Transition: Post-Conflict Challenges and Opportunities*, 2004; available from http://www.soros.org/initiatives/washington/articles_publications/publications/iraq_20041112/iraq_Transition.pdf, accessed May 14, 2010.

CONCLUSION

Examining post-conflict reconstruction experiences in the health sector in Iraq brings to light a number of challenges and insights about transitions. First among these is that context matters. Regardless of how sophisticated, well-resourced, and well-intended programs and reconstruction projects are, if they fail to fit the context of the environment that exists or will exist, they likely will fail. Deep historical and cultural understanding of post-conflict environments and a true appreciation of existing capabilities, resources, and stakeholders involved is essential for establishing a realistic assistance, reconstruction, and development agenda. In Iraq, the coalition authorities failed to grasp the nature of the internal dynamics of Iraqi society, the complex relationships among different countries surrounding Iraq in the region and their cost-benefit analysis of the possible outcomes of any intervention in Iraq, and the importance of appreciating pre-invasion Iraqi government structure and bureaucracy. In many ways, the coalition was its own biggest obstacle to earlier and more enduring success.

Second, information sharing among coalition civilian and military entities and joint planning and execution of programs and reconstruction projects are critical. Taking the lead in coordinating reconstruction efforts among different civilian and military entities was a novel task for the U.S. Department of Defense for which it was not adequately prepared. Establishing a formal framework and a mechanism for future civil-military coordination in post-conflict situations is a strategic imperative.

Information sharing and joint planning with host nation officials are equally critical. Government officials in the Iraqi Ministry of Health were not routinely or systematically consulted regarding best practices, cultural preferences, existing capacity, and priority of needs in the coalition's decisions. Not only were matters of context and substance missed in making early decisions, but resources were wasted, opportunities were missed, resistance was inured, and ownership discouraged. As a result the coalition was less effective than they wanted to be and, in turn, more eager to get out. Iraqis contributed to misunderstandings with political and personal agendas and were also disappointed. Beyond matters of professional frustration and pride, a growing spiral of faux pas increasingly dampened understanding and cooperation, further limiting the potential benefits from the financial and technical assistance provided by the coalition.

Third, the short duration of direct involvement of the U.S.-led coalition in post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq placed significant pressure on the coalition authorities to show immediate results by adopting short-term solutions. It also discouraged efforts to develop and commit to a long-term strategy that focused on capacity building and a smooth transition to capable and self-sustaining government institutions. Coalition efforts to help the Ministry of Health develop a national health strategy were truncated by the abrupt transfer of sovereignty to an interim government with limited institutional capacity to take charge of health policy setting and implementation. Post-conflict transition is about duration of assistance as well as amounts. Properly integrated a little may do more than a lot over the long term.

The commitment of host country governments to post-conflict reconstruction and development is a key element of success. Strong host government commitment and support is contingent upon giving host country officials the time and space to fully engage and actively participate in the planning and execution of reconstruction and development projects.

Finally, relying on the Iraqi Diaspora to represent the interests of the government and people of Iraq was clearly problematic and of questionable value for multiple reasons. Not only are expatriates likely to be out of touch with the realities of everyday life in their original home country, their possession of dual nationalities constitutes a clear conflict of interest as it is not completely clear as to who they truly represent. The sensitivities created among the local nation-

als by heavily relying on exiles to run the country after the war is understandably justified; for as far as the local nationals were concerned, these exiles were also foreigners given their lack of understanding of how the country and life in Iraq had changed following three major wars and devastating economic sanctions. Fluency in English and easy familiarity with western culture, norms, and values make exiles an attractive and easy partner to work with, but raises questions of legitimacy and propriety. In post-conflict states, whose interests are being represented is always a question. Notwithstanding the best of intentions, putting them at the forefront of the coalition efforts in Iraq was perceived locally as disrespectful and insensitive to the long-term suffering, existing talent and experience, patience and enduring service, and national aspirations of Iraqis who never left despite wars, sanctions, and a long, brutal dictatorship.

CHAPTER 10

THE IMPORTANCE OF WOMEN IN ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND STABILITY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIODS OF CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

Captain Jennifer Glossinger
United States Army Reserves

It is impossible to realize our goals while discriminating against half the human race. As study after study has taught us, there is no tool for development more than the empowerment of women.¹

Kofi Annan, then UN Secretary-General, 2006

Economic development in countries with conflict is critical to peacekeeping and stability operations and a pivotal element of transition from conflict situations. Unfortunately, many times the essential role of women in security and economic development during stability operations is simply overlooked. This essay examines the author's observations, experiences, and reflections in Iraq during 2008 and 2009 as part of a Women's Initiatives (WI) Program. It suggests that focusing on women's capabilities and roles in a post-conflict transition may hasten a return to normalcy and reduce the violence in any potential COIN setting. Overcoming institutional and cultural bias, both within the Iraqi and U.S. cultures, proved essential to encouraging the critical role women play in the context of reconstruction, stability, and transition. However, if this women's role is to be used to strategic and operational advantage, the U.S. military needs to rethink the value of and approach to Women's Initiatives Programs.

BACKGROUND

Women outnumber men in many societies, and this is especially true in societies emerging from conflict. Such was the case in the southern provinces of Iraq during 2008-2009. During that timeframe, women composed over 55% of the population in Iraq. While a factor not totally lost on the commands involved, it also was not fully appreciated for the strategic and operational opportunities that it presented. If we consider this disparity from a different perspective, perchance that of economics or business, one realizes that the demographic has implications for both labor and markets. If the business person ignores over half of their profit opportunities, in either labor or customers, they miss half of the potential to affect the outcome of their business success. In similar manners, host governments and their sponsors, that ignore over half of the human capital of the recovering state, also miss opportunities to create national and individual success and to enhance their legitimacy. Unfortunately, due to many reasons, the United States and others repeatedly end up overlooking the female half of the population when we try to restore stability and do economic development in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa. We simply fail to consider educating and empowering women sufficiently.

Post conflict countries ripple with profound secondary effects that lead to great social instability. Men too often focus on divisive issues such as political power and revenge. Women tend to focus more on restoring normalcy and redressing grievances, putting the pieces of a viable so-

1 Nicholas D. Kristol and Sheryl WuDunn, *Half the Sky: Turning Oppression Into Opportunity for Women Worldwide*, New York: Vintage Books, 2009, p.185.

ciety back together.² However, this is not necessarily a foregone conclusion. In many unstable or underdeveloped countries, these women typically are uneducated and under trained. Many are left to raise the children of deceased fathers. Stricken with poverty, desperate, and often hopeless, they may turn to alternative means to provide for their families. This can lead to an increase in vulnerability and exploitation for criminal or terrorist purposes as in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Women hit the military radar screen in Iraq in 2008 when the number of female suicide bombers skyrocketed from eight in 2007 to 38 in 2008. Female suicide bombers represented a logical escalation in terrorist attacks. Attacks became more effective because of women's particular place in Iraqi society and culture and U.S. sensitivity to it. Their easy access to public and military sites provided for greater death and destruction. Unsearched and largely ignored, they mingled with greater masses of people. Underneath their *burkas*, women could wear suicide vests that went undetected. Analysis of the trend revealed that women, particularly widows, suffering in desperation, were more susceptible to recruitment as suicide bombers. Obviously only a few women choose to become suicide bombers, but the evidence suggests the desperate circumstances the women found themselves in led to acts they would not have considered otherwise.³

Multi-National Division-Central (MND-C) encompassed the eight provinces south of Baghdad, exclusive of Basra. MND-C transitioned into Multi-National Division-South (MND-S) when U.S. Forces took over for the British in the spring of 2009, adding the final province Basra and making a total of nine provinces in the area of operations. MND-S became the largest Multi-National Division in Iraq. MND-C/MND-S experienced two of the 38 female suicide bomber attacks, but these two attacks focused the command on the role and importance of women in the division's area.

In MND-S provinces, widows accounted for a surprisingly high number of the population as result of the proclivity of Saddam Hussein's régime to recruit and misuse Shia men in his numerous wars. Eighty percent of the employment in the area came from agriculture and women composed 70% of the agricultural workforce. Given economic development and women's role therein plays an essential part in curtailing violence and establishing long-term stability, it should be no surprise that MND-S took an interest in this relationship.

A NEXUS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY, AND HUMAN CAPITAL

Economic development is critical to peacekeeping and stability operations. This is a fact U.S. leadership appears to have grasp.

Probably most important, the current U.S. military and civilian leadership in Iraq seem to have placed a greater emphasis on economic development as a means of both increasing confidence in the Government of Iraq (GoI) and reducing tolerance for the insurgency. This is consistent with the recent revision of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual which states that restoring essential services and accelerating economic development are essential components of successful counterinsurgency. The current MNF-I [article written in December 2007]

2 Laura C. Loftus, "Influencing the Forgotten Half of the Population in Counterinsurgency Operations, in Harry R. Yarger, ed., *Short of General War: Perspectives on the Use of Military Power in the 21st Century*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010, p. 192.

3 Norman Fried, "Female Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Effect on the Survivors," July 11, 2008; available from <http://www.britannica.com/blogs/author/nfried/page/2/>, accessed March 29, 2011. Alissa J. Rubin, "Despair Drives Suicide Attacks," *The New York Times*, July 5, 2008; available from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/05/world/middleeast/05diyala.html?_r=2, accessed March 29, 2011. Rubin suggests that the subordinate role of Sunni women in rural, conservative families makes them particularly vulnerable to pressure, a pressure that may ultimately reach its denouement in suicide.

Commander, General Petraeus USA, was one of the co-authors of this manual, along with Lieutenant General James F. Amos USMC.⁴

Yet economic development and security alone are insufficient. Former Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan succinctly captured the nexus of development, security, and human rights when he stated, “Accordingly, we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all of these causes are advanced, none will succeed.”⁵

On a very large scale, the relationship of economic development and security is very simple. Individuals can do two things with their wealth: spend it or save it (invest). When there is a feeling of security, people are more likely to save and thus invest their wealth in further development in the local economy. Saving money is actually an expression of hope in the future. When there is a perception of instability, myopic behavior occurs which distorts peoples choices regarding their wealth. It takes flight or is secured in ways that pose the least risk. Consequently, with an increase in violence, there is a decrease in savings and investments locally, capital stock is damaged or neglected because of the conflict and lack of funding, and employment declines. In turn, production and wealth generation fall and a vicious cycle ensues in which conditions continue to worsen.

Economic development models, such as the Harrod-Domar Model, explain an economic development and growth rate in terms of the level of saving and productivity of capital, and the ratio between capital stock (total physical capital within a state—anything that enhances the power to perform economically) and its depreciation. Harrod-Domar assumes that the relative price of capital and labor is fixed. It further assumes that economic growth and development are the same but experience suggests that how you develop is as or more important than simply acquiring capital to grow. Nonetheless, capital and capital stock are still critical. Successful transition from fragility to stability requires the considered injection of capital into the post-conflict environment in a manner that contributes to the long-term stability of the host nation.

Terrorists and insurgents use terrorism in various ways to create or sustain an unstable economic environment—or decrease capital stock—for political purposes. By continually disrupting the existing or emerging economic cycle, insurgents increase divisions among labor, entrepreneurs, and government, decrease economic productivity, and diminish the people’s trust in existing governance. David Galula in his book, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, writes on the criticality of this trust:

The population represents this new ground. If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tactic or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.⁶

An effective counterinsurgency or counterterrorism strategy requires an environment of stability in the economy, governance, and security sectors that provides legitimacy for government.

The two major conflicts in which the United States is embroiled in Iraq and Afghanistan represent diverse post-conflict environments from an economic development and reconstruction

4 Frank R. Gunter, “Economic Development during Conflict: The Petraeus-Crocker Congressional Testimonies,” *Strategic Insights*, Vol. VI, No. 6 (December 2007); available from www.lehigh.edu/~incbeug/.../GunterEcoDevelDuringConflictDec07.pdf, accessed March 29, 2010.

5 Kofi Annan, in “Human Rights and Human Security,” United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization Chair website; available from <http://web.uconn.edu/unescochair/pastchrconference05.htm>, accessed march 29, 2011.

6 David Gulula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2006, p. 6.

perspective. The Iraqi economy was far more modern, inclusive, and capital intensive than that of Afghanistan, which was overwhelmingly agricultural and underdeveloped. Yet, as a result of a protracted war with Iran, two wars with the United States and its coalition partners, and years of UN economic sanctions, Iraqi capital stock suffered greatly from damage and neglect – and the lack of incentives and fiscal capital to further develop it. This greatly hurt Iraq’s ability to put people back to work, especially women. Further, when the United States disbanded the Iraqi Army in 2003, many Iraqi Soldiers began to compete with Iraqi women for the scarce jobs in the Iraqi public and private sector. Human capital was not appropriately used in development and unfortunately served the goals of insurgents.

Afghanistan suffered from under development complicated by rapidly rising expectations and inadequate and poorly planned and executed international assistance. In both cases adversaries were able to take advantage of the conditions resulting from inadequate economic development. Tackling this problem is complicated and requires an understanding of the attributes of underdevelopment and the roles of inequity and human capital. In an interesting study, *Inequality does cause underdevelopment: insights from a new instrument*, William Easterly clarifies the role of inequality in underdevelopment. He begins by distinguishing between structural inequality and market inequality; two concepts related to economic development that confuse both populations and governments. He writes:

Structural inequality reflects such historical events as conquest, colonization, slavery, and land distribution by the state or colonial power; it creates elites by means of these non-market mechanisms. Market forces also lead to inequality, but just because success in free markets is always very uneven across different individuals, cities, regions, firms, and industries.⁷

Using current literature Easterly concludes that in failing states bad institutions and low value placed on human capital investment lead to chronic underdevelopment. He suggests this is the logical consequence of three key principles identified in current research. The first principle is “redistributive policies”: it explains how high inequality results in lower economic growth because the “poor majority” consistently votes for policies redistributing wealth instead of policies promoting economic growth. The second principle is “quality of institutions,” which postulates an “institutional mechanism in which rich elites will suppress democracy and equal rights before the law so as to preserve their privileged position.” The last principle says that those who are elite and educated will prevent those who are uneducated from becoming educated in order to prevent any reformation resulting from new elites moving ahead. Such current structural inequities tend to support the status quo at the risk of leading to politically unstable institutions. As consequence, human capital is stymied, economic development hampered, and stability and security placed at risk.⁸

Easterly’s work does not address gender specifically but his conclusions on the role of structural inequities pose interesting questions about the role of women in development and security. Other research furthers the understanding of the implications of potential feminine roles and how women may contribute to the progress of post conflict and failing states.

7 William Easterly, *Inequality does cause underdevelopment: insights from a new instrument*. New York University, October 2006, p.2.

8 *Ibid.*, 6.

THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATING GIRLS TO DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

Why are Women's Initiative (WI) programs important in economic development and stabilization? Why is it important for the U.S. military and interagency to focus on and work together to support WI in post conflict and transition situations? What is the role of education? The answers are not surprising. A mounting body of evidence indicates the greater integration of women into the economic, political, and social life of fragile states increases development, stability, and security. Education appears to be a major enabler in this process.

Greater WI may even have the potential to get out in front of global terrorism. "Countries that repress women also tend to be backward economically, adding to the frustrations that nurture terrorism."⁹ The United Nations and the World Bank recognized the implications of the failure to appropriately develop feminine capital in the early 1990's before the advent of the current global terrorism. As the chief economist at the World Bank, Larry Summers concluded that greater education of young girls was a high return national investment. In his judgment, the issue confronting many fragile states was not "whether" to make the investment, but whether they could live with the consequences of not investing in feminine education.¹⁰ Arab and other Islamic states largely failed to heed this warning where illiteracy among women accounts for 2/3's of the region's illiterates.¹¹

The facts of the failure to develop this feminine potential are indisputable. However, the question of can it actually be done is open. Extensive research by Nicholas D. Kristol and Sheryl WuDunn suggests that despite current cultural stereotyping and very real resistance, progress is possible. "Farsighted Muslim leaders worry that gender inequality blocks them from tapping their nations' greatest unexploited economic resource – half of the population that is female."¹² Their research suggests that not only is it possible but it would be welcomed. Others working in the practical realm have reached similar conclusions.

The work of Greg Mortenson with the Central Asia Institute sheds additional light on the feminine predicament. Mortenson's work involved him in educating girls in the most remote and war torn areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. He gained acclaim among military professionals and others for two influential books that seem to capture the cultural and social essence of the region, *Three Cups of Tea* and *From Stones to Schools*.¹³ Though not a professional educator, through his volunteer service, he very quickly realized the importance of girls and education. Mortenson came to believe if you educate a boy you educate a person, when you educate a girl, you educate a village. He writes in *From Stones to Schools*, "I have always been dismayed by the West's failure-or unwillingness-to recognize that establishing secular schools that offer children a balanced and non-extremist form of education is probably the cheapest and most effective way of combating this kind of indoctrination [Islamic militarism]."¹⁴

Empirical data supports Mortenson's intuition. According to *What Works in Girls' Education, Evidence and Policies from the Developing World*, by Barbara Herz and Gene B. Sperling, the education of girls may lead to greater income gains. One year's additional primary education leads to eventual gains of 10-20% for girls, as opposed to 5-15% for boys. For secondary education, the

9 Kristof and WuDunn, p.159.

10 Ibid., p. xx. See also *World Bank, Engendering Development: Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and Voice*, A World Bank report, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001.

11 UN Development Programme, *Arab Human Development Report 2002*, New York, United Nations Publications, 2002, p. 52.

12 Kristof and WuDunn, p. 159.

13 Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin, *Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to Promote Peace...One School at a Time*, New York: Penguin Books, 2004, 2007. Greg Mortenson, *Stones into Schools: Promoting Peace with Books, Not Bombs, in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, Boston: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2010.

14 Mortenson, *Stones into Schools*, p. 180.

female gain is 15-25%, still ahead of males. This positive effect also applies to economic growth. In a World Bank study of 100 countries, a one percent increase in the number of women with secondary education yielded a 0.3 percent increase in annual per capita income growth. The data suggests that obtaining a more equitable balance in male and female education could yield a 25% increase in an existing GDP. Increasing education for both males and females in conjunction with other development efforts could have exponential benefits. In addition, education of women has second and third order effects in health, lifespan, social order, and promotion of democracy and other positive social change.¹⁵

In light of the mounting evidence of the roles and potential of women in creating stable and economically viable societies, it makes sense to develop and pursue WI programs in post-conflict environments. The field experience in Iraq informs what these programs might look like and the problems they may encounter.

LESSONS FROM WOMEN'S INITIATIVES (WI) PROGRAMS IN THE FIELD

Post conflict operations require military units to make changes in both their operations and mindsets. Threats still exist, however, as Karen Guttieri reminds us in post conflict operations the centre of gravity becomes civilian rather than military.¹⁶ The United States military faced this situation in Iraq after the initial fighting ended. WI Program were part of the plan to get at this center of gravity. Two WI experiences illustrate how these efforts looked like on the ground and provide the basis for examining the problems and issues encountered.

A WI Story in MND-C/S, Iraq October 2008-July 2009

WI Programs are a new idea for most of the military: even where to place them can be an issue. They may fall under Governance, Rule of Law, or other stability operations areas; and, sometimes WI is forgotten or given to someone as an additional duty. Women's Initiatives fell under Economic Development in MND-C/S during October 2008 to July 2009. There was no written guidance explaining its purpose or focus. In December 2008 a Women's Initiatives Program was finally written into the Campaign Plan.

In the area of operations, women composed 70% of the agricultural workforce, but others lived in urban settings. Agricultural Extension Centers already existed in every province. Centers consisted of buildings where farmers could come together and learn about updated technology, create Co-ops, and take classes ranging from irrigation to inoculating farm animals and planning green houses. MND-C/S WI guidance focused on bringing classes for women into the centers and small business development opportunities. The MND-C/S focus nested within the Department of State's campaign plan and helped facilitate efforts between the military and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), who were the tip of the spear in these endeavors. Initially provided in the form of a Fragmentary Order (FRAGO), this guidance was later written into the campaign plan of the 10th Mountain Division.

Regular visits were made to the PRTs to establish relationships and to help inform and guide actions in regards to WI programs. An additional goal of these visits was to learn which WI programs worked and extend successful programs to other provinces. Visits to agricultural extension centers were at the top of the list. Fortunately, 10th Mountain Division supported WI programs and air assets were readily available. The two-woman WI team consisted of a Divi-

15 Barbara Herz and Gene B. Sperling, *What Works in Girls' Education: Evidence and Policies from the Developing World*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004, 3-6.

16 Karen Guttieri, "Civil-military relations in peacebuilding," *Sicherheitspolitik und Friedensforschung*, Vol.2, 2004, p. 80.

sion WI coordinator and a Bilingual Bicultural Advisor. At times the WI team traveled with the Division Agricultural Officer in his efforts to promote better agricultural. Teaming up with the division agricultural team proved to be a useful tool as it open opportunities and contributed to unity of effort. However, agriculture projects were not always compatible.

Numerous projects were considered and some approved during this time. One of the projects WI and Agriculture worked together on with the PRT in the province of Najaf involved support to the local dairy industry. In this program the WI team worked with women in the dairy sector. Iraqi women cared for and milked the water buffalo. A very sweet and popular yogurt is made from the milk and it always fetched a good price. Unfortunately, because of a lack of cold storage, milk or yogurt failing to sell on the day taken to market, often spoiled. Economically, income was a factor of the quantity and shelf life of yogurt.

The project goal was simple: increase milk and yogurt production and increase the shelf life of yogurt. The plan consisted of increasing milk production between 30% and 40% by inoculating the water buffalo and purchasing small, solar-powered refrigeration systems and new yogurt making equipment for the women with WI project funds. The Italian PRT in Dhi Qar had already proven the value of the solar paneled refrigeration and yogurt making equipment in a similar project. In turn, once our initial group of women perfected their system, they could teach other women in the province the skills needed to use the equipment in the agricultural extension centers.

In spite of being well thought out, availability of resources and a market, and founded in previous success, the project could not be sustained. It was too long-term and intensive to be overseen within the capabilities and rotation pattern of the military civil affairs who initiated it and failed because of a lack of continuity and coordination with the agencies involved.

During visits with these same Iraqi dairy farmers in and around Najaf, another obvious need surfaced. Widows, who compose a majority of the adult population of this group, were unable to receive stipends provided by the Iraqi government because of the complicated paperwork needed. The government required completion of a seven-page form, often demanding additional documentation to be faxed to them. These widows lived in poverty with huts made from the dung of the water buffalo and without the conveniences provided by electricity. Illiterate and without help or facilities, it was impossible for them to complete and send the completed forms to the appropriate agencies. Consequently, they were unable to obtain the stipends owed them by the government and trapped in wretched poverty with no hope of breaking the cycle.

Working hand in hand with the PRT Rule of Law person, the Division WI Coordinator devised a program where over a period of six months the project helped 1,200 women. Funds were allotted for a pilot program. The plan projected that a lawyer could assist five clients per day, some 25 clients per week. Using two lawyers through the 24-week trial period between 15 March and the end of August, it assisted the projected number. Well- thought out and focusing on a women's issue, it met a need, but not all the needs.

What else could have been done? Could it have been sustained for a longer period of time or institutionalized? For example, what if the project had focused on the local university's law students and funded a program to require law students help register a certain number of widows as a practicum for graduation. Would reading and writing programs for the widows and others in this area had a bigger and longer term effect on this issue? In hindsight and with consistent, purposeful planning, more sustainable projects are possible.

In another example in the province of Muthanna, the PRT's Governance Specialist took particular interest and was active in WI. Made aware of over 30 female veterinarians who had completed their five-year degree without any opportunities to apply their skills, she worked to get these women employed in the agricultural extension centers – teaching and training farmers and vaccinating farm animals. In addition to putting their skills to work, the women were able

to attend video conference training with Texas A&M University. With her urging, the Muthanna PRT also developed other projects at the AL Kihar Agricultural Extension Centers, including carpet weaving and poultry enterprises. Unfortunately, on the departure of this key individual, interest in WI waned.

The division sponsored or assisted with numerous projects in its tour with varying degrees of success and many lessons learned.

Systematic Implementation at the Basra PRT

In Basra, a unique opportunity concerning WI arose and provided insights to WI planning. The MND-S WI coordinator replacement arrived in country three months early. At the Basra PRT leader's request, the serving division WI coordinator spent her last three months at the PRT developing how systematically to pursue WI's initiatives at a PRT level. As the new Basra PRT WI coordinator, she worked in the economic cell and with the Deputy Team leader, a LTC who was a CA officer but had spent much of his military career in Special Forces.

Five strategic target areas became the focus of the initiatives, but the team methodology was the key. The methodology relied on legitimacy achieved through local collaboration. It leveraged PRT team visits with the local sheikhs. Normally, the visiting team consisted of representatives from USG civilian agencies and civil affairs soldiers who represented the areas of essential services, rule of law, governance, agriculture, and WI. During these visits, the WI coordinator received time to address issues concerning widows and women with the sheikhs. This presentation sought to identify 10-15 women, preferably widows, who would best represent the rest of the women in the area. Subsequent meetings with the women followed.

The first meeting with the Iraqi women sought to establish relationships, identify female leaders, assess the skills the women possessed, and discuss possible projects/programs. With the insights the gained at this first meeting, the WI coordinator reviewed available USAID programs, identified potential NGO capabilities, and established relationships to construct programs tailored for the women of that specific area. After devising a supportable draft program, a return visit with the Iraqi women sought their insights and feedback on potential projects. Following this, revisions were made and the details of the project worked through. The written plans became the basis of approval for either CERP (Commanders Emergency Relief Programs) or DoS funding support. This entire process took a lot of time and many obstacles presented themselves, but it yielded a purposeful, if somewhat rough, coherent plan—something more than was there before. At the end of three months, the WI coordinator had met with four of the five sheikhs, had conducted sessions with women from three of the areas, and had three or four programs in the works.

Of course, with the impending departure of the WI coordinator, oversight, sustainment, and lessons learned became concerns. The problem confronting the WI effort was who would carry on the work at the PRT level and take back the knowledge gained to MND-S? The proposed new WI coordinator for MND-S was a captain, not trained in Civil Affairs, and activated directly from the Inactive Ready Reserve (IRR). No matter her other talents, she had no training or experience for the challenges confronting her. Fortunately, the leadership recognized this predicament and assigned a more WI experienced officer, who had been groomed for the WI position at MND-S, to Basra in hope that the organized approach to WI could eventually be spread to other PRT's in MND-S. Working with the new WI officer at Division, this officer aggressively took the reins and followed through on initiatives successfully.

Experience's Lessons

The experience in Iraq provides a number of insights into WI. While in no way comprehensive, they provide much to ponder as we consider stability operations and transition in the future.

U.S. military forces prefer to think of themselves as war fighters; and yes, generally speaking, they are foremost and should be war fighters. However, our military forces are increasingly called upon to perform roles other than combat or in addition to combat. If the U.S. Army wants to be successful in this new era of multiple roles, it must nurture the necessary expertise. In the U.S. Army, expertise for many of the necessary post conflict operations activities resides in the Civil Affairs (CA) Branch. Yet, this expertise is neither nurtured nor developed nor available in sufficient numbers. For example, in 2009 when 10th Mountain Infantry Division (Light) completed their tour and the division assumed control, the most experienced Civil Affairs officer was moved out of division headquarters to a trailer on the other side of the Forward Operating Base (FOB). This was symptomatic of the larger problems of a failure to understand the relative importance of civil affairs activities and a lack of continuity from command to command. Either threatens the ability to conduct ongoing or long-term civil affairs projects.

CA branch issues are much larger than this. In spite of general recognition of an increasing need for these specializations, the military has been ambivalent about how to best structure and assigned this capability.¹⁷ The Army understands the need based on earlier experiences in the Balkans and ongoing efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, CA forces moved from conventional force structure to part of Special Operations Forces and back to conventional structure. Today, 95% of CA is in the reserve force. These forces are too few to meet mission requirements and seldom train with the active Army. Consequently, CA appropriate positions often are not filled and active forces do not understand the CA mission or know how to best utilize CA personnel.

The existing U.S. military culture also works against effective CA and WI. Often times during 2008-2009 at Division Headquarters, WI appeared of secondary importance to the "combat" staffs. In the WI coordinator's absence, the staff dropped it from the Commander's update briefing. However, the 10th Mountain Commander understood its importance and demanded the WI update. Too few senior military leaders understand the relative importance and it should be addressed in senior leader education.

Another cultural misstep for the U.S. military was its misinterpretation of the consequences of Iraqi culture. Make no mistake – Iraqi culture had significant implications for WI projects. In southern Iraq, which is mostly Shia, interpretations of Islam are very conservative. In these provinces, it is rare to see a woman out of the traditional dress of the Hijab. Women stay confined to their homes, only going out in public with a group of women or with a husband or male family member. These cultural differences presented obvious challenges. Women could not feely work outside the home. Such habits greatly constricted a woman's mobility and employment opportunities and posed real dangers.

There has been a great push for greater attention to be paid to women's issues from the International NGO's, the CPA, and some Iraqi elites. However, they are working against fierce resistance, wherein the threat of violence and general lawlessness seriously hampers any possible progress. Women working with NGO's, as well as individual female members of the general population, have been the targets of both random and targeted violence.¹⁸

17 For support for the importance of this see Greg Grant, "Gen. McChrystal and Adm. Olson Actually on the Same Page," *Defense Tech*, May 27, 2010; available from: <http://defensetech.org/2010/05/27/gen-mcchrystal-and-adm-olson-actually-on-the-same-page/>, accessed April 4, 2011.

18 Lucy Brown and David Romano, "Women in post-Saddam Iraq: One step forward or two steps back?" *NWSA (National Women's Studies Association) Journal*, Vol.18, No 3 (2006): 51-70.

On the other hand, much of the U.S. concern of WI actions inciting problems amongst Iraqis was misplaced. Most Sheikhs and local leaders in MND-S were open to “appropriate” WI. For example, more often than not, the plight of the many widows in their areas confounded them and they felt at a loss to help them.

In addition to the over concern about violence, upper echelons often failed to grasp the appropriateness of projects. Units and PRTs were inundated with projects that had no sustainability or relevance to overall goals or local conditions. On the other hand, solid projects or programs encountered significant issues getting approval and resourcing. People with little or no education or exposure to civil military operations tended to focus on innovative projects with greater media appeal. More often than not, these innovative projects were inappropriate for post-conflict and lesser-developed countries. Sometimes it appeared staffs feared being scoffed at for briefing the more primitive projects to their higher echelon. As a result, what could work was often rejected in favor of what briefed well. Nonetheless, programs designed to improve things that showed appropriate consideration for local culture and conditions gained much deeper and broader local support.

The lack of sufficient guidance, appropriately integrated campaign plans, and an integrating strategy created problems in project planning and resources early on. As a result programs did little to aid the overall efforts and were burdens on and the butt of jokes among the PRTs. Such “matching lipstick to scarves” efforts were a case of “doing” as opposed to “contributing.” In addition, the brigades, battalions, and PRT’s did not have the right personnel resources or operating procedures. For example, because of local culture, non-family males could not approach or talk to women. An integrating strategy or comprehensive campaign plan would have recognized PRT’s and military teams are primarily composed of men and communicating with woman an issue. Even when understood, finding a female soldier and a female translator proved challenging. Simply getting off the Forward Operating Base (FOB) could sometimes prove to be difficult due to battle space ownership and the layers of staff bureaucracy.

Once relationships with the local Sheikh and local women were established and needs for the women identified, new challenges emerged. The next step in fielding an initiative was to find a local, reputable Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) to implement and sustain the project. Qualified organizations and corruption were problems. Continuous U.S. oversight of the project or program was critical, but often enough it could not be sustained for sufficient time because of rotations and reassignments of WI personnel.

Problems with interagency coordination also arose. PRT’s took the lead in reconstruction and infrastructure during this period. Unnecessary tense relations and turf battles among PRT’s and military units occurred as a result of unclear boundaries, ambiguous tasking and expectations, and inappropriate competition. In part, the cultural gaps among DoS, USAID, USDA, etc., and the military contributed, but were not solely the cause. Other agency members and the military personnel suffered from these incongruence’s alike. Interagency groups and the military were often discordant. Each side asserted that one side was telling the other inappropriately what to do. Often these “power struggles” appeared to take precedence over the larger, shared mission. Regardless, subordinates in the crossfire would often be confused as to who gave orders and what to do when. Clearly, more interagency exercises and training are needed to prepare for such duties.

Transition of military units was particularly disruptive. Even when problems of interagency coordination were overcome, the transitions of major commands or even a new PRT commander might disrupt progress. The continuity and accomplishments of the previous command typically get lost when the new division transitions into theater, setting new goals and parameters and recreating a new learning curve. Regardless of the best of intentions, long-term harm resulted as

hard-learned sustainable projects were dropped in favor of “better” ideas or a lack of an appreciation of the real needs and possibilities. WI suffered, some would say disproportionately as a result of a deeper lack of understanding and commitment, along with other transition programs.

CONCLUSION

Stability operations and transition in post-conflict are always difficult, but critically important. In the first decade of post-conflict peace, states face double the risk of another conflict because of what has happened to them during their previous conflict.¹⁹ Therefore, it makes good policy sense for the United States and its allies to help these states to recover and achieve a sustainable peace. Women are the backbone of the single most critical unit in a society – the family. Their roles in a successful recovery and a sustainable peace are well documented. They are instrumental in both the economic and security sectors. It makes strategic sense to address women’s economic, educational, and social issues if for no other reason than the security dividend.

Women’s Initiatives as a program will not happen without emphasis from military and civilian leaders at the highest levels. Military commanders must understand the importance of civil military operations and the particular importance and nuances of WI in all phases of operations. Well-trained and prepared individuals must be assigned to the WI teams and supported in developing and implementing practical, meaningful, and sustainable programs. Above all, WI must be part of an integrated CA approach within the military and, in turn a part of a greater interagency and comprehensive approach at local and national levels. Obstacles to effective CA and WI must be overcome. Cultural ineptness, inadequate personnel policies, inappropriate personal ambition, and “change for change’s sake” all hamper success and need addressed. Iraq and Afghanistan are not challenges to get past, but harbingers of problems to come. The lessons of Iraq and WI need to be institutionalized and built upon so that the Army is better prepared in the future.

19 Paul Collier, “Economic Causes Of Civil War And Their Implications For Policy “, in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds., Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall , United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, pp. 143-162.

CHAPTER 11

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP FOR TRANSITION

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Another thing – and something that I believe has not been emphasized sufficiently and publicly at home – is that the Government of Germany should, at the very earliest practicable moment, pass to a civilian organization...the War Department consistently holds that the control and supervision of Germany, on a long-term basis, is a civilian function, operating through German civil organizations... The change to Civilian control will not, in itself, lessen the need for occupational troops, nor will it imply any limited term of occupation.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower in a letter to General George C. Marshall
dated 13 October 1945

There is a tendency among many today to see Iraq and Afghanistan as historically unique cases of transition, but while the particular context for any transition differs – and the differences are important – the issues confronting strategic leaders and the skills and competencies required to address them remain similar. Eisenhower’s letter to Marshall succinctly states the strategic dilemmas of all post-conflict transitions: What is the role of civilian agencies and the military in interim governance? How soon can U.S. or friendly forces depart? And, when and how should the host state government assume sovereignty? Any military intervention by one state into another poses similar dilemmas and creates multiple dialectics among the states involved, the various agencies and institutions of the states, and the demands of the corresponding populations. These tensions revolve around security, power relationships among states and agencies, and the allocation of resources. World War II confirmed the U.S. role on the international state and forced us to deal with the problems of others to ensure our own security and advance our values.

The problems that General Dwight D. Eisenhower, General George C. Marshall, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt faced in and following World War II, like the problems facing our national leaders today, are problems that require strategic leadership, which the Army War College defines as:

...the process used by a leader to affect the achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing the organizational culture, allocating resources, directing through policy and directive, and building consensus within a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous global environment which is marked by opportunities and threats.¹

This essay examines the U.S. modern experience in war and transition in search of specific competencies and skills required of strategic leaders in transition environments. It then provides a template to help these leaders focus on those aspects of leadership essential to successful transition.

1 Roderick R. Magee II, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks: 1998, p. 3.

THE MODERN U.S. EXPERIENCE

Contrary to what some may think transitions are not new to U.S. strategic leaders. Following the experience of World War I, the United States government devoted thought and resources to the problem of transition and beginning with World War II acquired a great deal of experience. It is only with the end of the Cold War – and the so-called strategic pause – that transitions reemerged as an unfathomable challenge for our leadership. Notwithstanding the complexity of the 21st century, looking to our past provides an insightful story about transitions.

Setting a Course

The key question in any intervention – and consequently, transition – is what the desired end state of the intervention is. As obvious as this might appear to be, it is a very complex issue as this assessment illustrates.

In fact, policymakers were unable to define the desired end state beyond the immediate objective of defeating and occupying Nazi Germany. Not unusually [sic] for a politician, President Franklin Roosevelt preferred to keep his options open, and not surprisingly, he vacillated between competing visions of a retributive and realist peace. More importantly, he had to consider the demands of maintaining a wartime coalition: so long as the decision hung in the balance it was folly to raise troublesome issues arising from competing visions of the postwar order.²

Notwithstanding President Roosevelt's penchant for enigmatic methods of politics and policymaking, he had an end state in mind and provided a coherent **vision** and **narrative** to subordinates and the American public.³ It was a vision that ultimately resonated around the world with the formation of the United Nations and the acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. "...Roosevelt defined American involvement in World War II as an all-out endeavor in pursuit of high principle ...demanding sacrifices of everyone. ...animated on the Allied side by trust in decency and responsive government..."⁴ His vision can be found in the 1941 State of the Union Address, more often referred to as the "Four Freedoms Speech."⁵ And, his narrative was reinforced through his later speeches and fireside chats that enlisted the American people's support for the war against fascism.⁶

It might be easy to dismiss World War II as an aberration in illustrating leadership and its necessary skills and competencies, but as Eric Larrabee points out in *Commander In Chief* today's same obstacles, the same indifference and skepticism, and lack of perfect harmony in efforts, existed then. Much of this he notes is because war has its own momentum as it does today.⁷

2 Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth O. McCreedy, United States Army, "Waging Peace: Operations Eclipse I and II—Some Implications For Future Operations," 16 March 2004, Army War College, Strategic Research Project, p. 2.

3 Eric Larrabee. *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1987, p.2

4 Larrabee, p. 4.

5 Franklin D. Roosevelt, "The Four Freedoms," January 6, 1941, *Congressional Record*, 1941, Vol. 87, Pt I; available from <http://www.wwnorton.com/college/history/ralph/workbook/ralprs36b.htm>, accessed May 6, 2011.

6 "The Fireside Chats," <http://www.history.com/topics/fireside-chats>, accessed February 20, 2011. Visit this site to see videos of how Roosevelt communicated his vision and narrative in different periods of his presidency.

7 Larrabee, pp. 4-5.

Quite unlike what some scholars define as the legacy of World War II—an: “unrealistic American concept of victory.... Victory in hot wars or cold ones means that we can withdraw, that our responsibilities have ended, and that our interests are secure.”⁸ World War II’s real legacy is the value of vision, narrative, and **strategic communications**. Roosevelt died before the United States defeated Germany and Japan and did not have to sell the idea of long-term occupation to American taxpayers. However, his successors found the visions and narratives that have kept the United States politically and militarily involved in international affairs ever since.

Vision, the ability to see what is possible and what should be, is an essential strategic competency. It is not about predicting the future but about shaping it. The Army War College *Strategic Leadership Primer* describes strategic vision as:

... a means of focusing effort and progressing toward a desired future—what ought to be. While the vision is an image of a future state, it is also a process the organization uses to guide future development. An effective vision also requires an implementing strategy or plan to ensure its attainment—how to get there.⁹

Strategic vision as a competency for Roosevelt did not exist in isolation. He had a strong belief and understanding of U.S. national purpose and the evolving strategic environment. He had accurately **mapped the environment** and understood it in terms of national interests and opportunities, not simply threats. He was willing to learn from past and new experiences and open to differing opinions from his advisors and others.¹⁰ Knowing what the environment was and where he and others wanted to go, he could shape the future.

A part of shaping the future for strategic leaders is to get the support, or at least acquiescence, of major subordinates, allies, and the public. A large part of this is the creation—or better stated, finding and articulating—a common narrative that communicates to both organizational and national cultures the direction in which “we” need to move and the “why” of the direction and actions. Narratives are about who and what we are in relation to a particular strategic context. Narratives set visions into strategic context and are uniting as opposed to dividing. They are both a part of and guide to strategic communications. Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms Speech” is an example of how he continues the American narrative and expands it to an international one appropriate for the times.

...a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression--everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way--everywhere in the world. The third is freedom from want--which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants--everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear--which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor--anywhere in the world.¹¹

During the Cold War President John F. Kennedy provided a similar national narrative that communicated to a new generation and secured domestic support for his vision and foreign policy in his Inaugural Address in 1961:

8 Magee, p. 7.

9 Ibid., p. 19.

10 Ibid., pp. 8, 38.

11 Roosevelt, “Four Freedoms.”

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.... And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country....¹²

Kennedy's narrative led most Americans to support a new more expensive "flexible response strategy" to replace President Eisenhower's budget reducing "new look strategy." It resonated with the values and interests of Americans and built the initial support for South Vietnam and the creation of other programs and agencies such as the Peace Corps and USAID. It is a continuation of the American story in the context of the times and in terms of Kennedy's vision of how America should respond to the challenges of the Cold War. It also found traction among other peoples of the world, providing them hope that the United States would not falter and ultimately that the brighter future of liberal capitalism would prevail. Kennedy's early death precludes any assessment of how well he personally may have politically fared over time, but President Ronald Reagan's actions in bringing the Cold War to an end are consistent with Kennedy's words. It is no accident that history labels Roosevelt, Kennedy, and Reagan as strategic communicators.

Finding Partners

President Roosevelt and his team devoted significant time and resources to cultivating allies and keeping them in the fight or aligned with the United States. The Axis threat was too large to undertake alone. Lend-lease built partnership capacity even as Britain and the Soviet Union's increased capabilities strengthen their negotiating positions at Yalta. By the end of the war over 49 nations were aligned with United States in some form of agreement focused on the objectives of defeating the Axis powers and transitioning to a new global order. In the transition to the post World War II order, Roosevelt set into motion and President Harry Truman pursued **coalition building** and negotiation in the structure and adoption of the United Nations to resolve security and other problems.

When the fragile partnership with the Soviet Union started to unravel and the new threat became evident, the United States again sought to build a new coalition with Western European and Asian partners based on military, economic, and ideological foundations. The transition of the occupied Axis powers, as well as other devastated nations, to functioning sovereign states was an integral part of this new security paradigm. It would be incorrect to say the United States rebuilt Europe, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK). However, these nations benefited from foreign credit, foreign aid, and military and other technical training. This building partnership capacity (BPC) effort was significant and carried out across the economic, political, and security sectors. For example, the U.S. Army trained the ROK Constabulary, then the ROK Army, and during the height of the fighting in the Korean War, doubled the size of the ROK Army from 10 to 20 divisions. These nations rebuilt themselves by virtue of their own hard work. Their political leaders, military leaders, and citizens had "skin in the game" because their interests were threatened by communist advances and they shared objectives with the United States. As Eisenhower noted though, transition to a better peace does not mean total withdrawal of U.S. military presence. Today U.S. forces remain in Europe, Japan and the ROK, many decades after government functions and authorities transitioned from the U.S. military to the partner nation governments.

12 John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961; available from <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkinaugural.htm>; accessed May 9, 2011. At this site you can hear the delivery as well as read the words.

In a similar manner, President George H. W. Bush is often given high praise for bringing much of the Arab world into the coalition against Iraq during Operation DESERT STORM. His understanding of Middle Eastern politics and culture, acceptance of their viewpoints, and consensus building in regard to objectives led to successful military operations, but did not fundamentally change the government of Iraq. The reclaimed Kuwait rapidly transitioned from a devastated occupied state to a liberated one. The United States and its coalition partners assisted in this transition, but largely left it to the Kuwaitis who could both afford and manage the scope and scale. In contrast, his son, President George W. Bush, failed to attract Arab states into his “Coalition of the Willing” and failed in his attempts to convince significant numbers of European allies to support U.S. efforts in Iraq or to maintain the support of many European allies that initially contributed resources in Afghanistan.¹³ The failure to appreciate varying points of view and differing objectives, and misunderstandings concerning resourcing continue to plague the ongoing transitions in both countries.

Meaningful coalitions and the right partners increased the perceived legitimacy of our cause amongst the international community and shared the costs of stability within the international order. If it assisted others, it also gave us access to additional capabilities and advanced our interests. Ultimately it enabled us to outlast our enemies and build a world order favorable to us.

Focusing Efforts

Historians like to emphasize that in the ebb and flow of politics and military operations during World War II and the dawn of the Cold War the United States considered numerous policy and strategy options. However, Roosevelt, Truman, and the professionals within the government sustained a **unity and priority of purpose** that directed the war and the ensuing peace. Over sixteen months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, War Department FM 27-5, Basic Field Manual, Military Government (30 July 1940) expressed this as:

The first consideration at all times is the prosecution of the war to a successful termination. ... The object of the United States in waging any war is to obtain a favorable and enduring peace. A military occupation marked by harshness, injustice, or oppression leaves lasting resentment against the occupying power in the hearts of the people of the occupied territory and sows the seeds of future war by them against the occupying power when circumstances shall make that possible; whereas just, considerate, and mild treatment of the governed by the occupying army will convert enemies into friends.¹⁴

This doctrinal statement reflects what the United States learned from World War I. Each of the individual alliance documents that build the coalition and the aggressive pursuit of a collective security through a United Nations organization also reflect this unity of purpose focusing on a “favorable and enduring peace.”

Despite this grasp of purpose, unity in the civilian branches and bureaucracy required extraordinary leadership, particularly regarding political figures. The brief popularity of the punitive Morgenthau Plan to dismantle Germany’s industries and create a new pastoral Germany indicates how far focus may vary if unity and priority of purpose are not sustained.¹⁵ In actual operations in foreign countries during the war and immediately following its end, unity of

13 Peter L. Bergen, *The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and Al-Qaeda*, Free Press/Simon & Schuster, New York, 2011, pp. 181,182,189,190.

14 War Department, *FM 27-5, Basic Field Manual, Military Government*, United States Government Printing Office, Washington: July 30, 1940, pp. 3-4.

15 Henry Morgenthau, Jr., U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, made this extraordinary proposal and it found traction for a time with many in the administration and the Congress.

purpose benefited somewhat by the personnel shortages plaguing other government agencies, particularly the State Department. Other agencies had not been prepared nor did they have the means to recruit, train, and deploy personnel to fulfill the requirements logically related to their departmental responsibilities. The U.S. military under a wartime footing stepped into this gap. While perhaps levels of effectiveness and efficiency can be argued, the military structure and mindset did create a high level of unity of effort in transitioning all of the occupied powers into more functional states and converted “enemies into friends.”

In Korea, the U.S. military also played an instrumental role in the transition of the state, but more often in support of other agencies when outside the security sector. This was to be true also in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s with the formation of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program. CORDS involved the military and three major agencies: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the now defunct Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Led by Ambassador Robert Komer and others, CORDS unified the pacification program in Vietnam from 1967 to 1972. Unity and priority were achieved by placing the 8,000 personnel, 15% of whom were civilian and 85% military, under command of Komer and creating integrated command authorities – direct command control of an interagency or Whole of Government effort.¹⁶

In stark contrast, President Bush’s National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” included the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Treasury, Health and Human Services and Homeland Security and the CIA and USAID, encompassing domestic and internationally focused agencies.¹⁷ These domestic agencies have powerful clients and patrons – voters and congressmen. Achieving unity of purpose from eleven U.S. agencies in Afghanistan and Iraq would logically be more difficult and require far more senior leader effort than achieving unity of effort in Vietnam with only four.

NSPD 44 directed the civilian agencies of the United States government (USG) as well as the Department of Defense to:

...work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies and the rule of law.¹⁸

NSPD 44 further directed the Department of State “to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance....”¹⁹ Other executive departments and agencies “whose programs and personnel may be able to assist in addressing the relevant challenges” were directed to “Coordinate with S/CRS during budget formulation for relevant reconstruction and stabilization activities prior to submission to OMB and the Congress” and “Make available personnel on a non-reimbursable basis, as appropriate and feasible, to work as part of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization....”²⁰ NSPD 44 came four years after the intervention in Afghanistan. While its intent is clear, it did not achieve unity and priority of purpose in theater or at home. Transition in both

16 Patrick V. Howell, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, “Unraveling CORDS, The Bureaucratic Processes That Created the Cords Program in Vietnam,” presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Bureaucratic Control-Operations (Table 39-4), 2009 Annual Conference, pp. 6-7.

17 *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44*, The White House, Washington, DC: December 7, 2005, p. 1.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

19 *Ibid.*

20 *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

Afghanistan and Iraq has been plagued by leader missteps, conflicting priorities, petty bickering, cross purposes, and a lack of transparency, credibility, and trust. It would not be an unfair observation to say the Presidency has been unable to unite or disciple its bureaucracy and coalition. Nor has the Presidency achieved unity within the political arena as Congressman Dennis Kucinich (Democrat) remarks following President Obama's speech at West Point in December 2009 concerning the surge in Afghanistan indicate:

I'm not taking on the president of the United States. That's not my role. My role is to say as a member of Congress that we don't have to escalate, that we should bring our troops home, that we should focus on creating jobs and health care and retirement security and investment security, and saving people's homes. That's nation building at home.²¹

Finding and Using Resources

President Roosevelt and his senior advisors did not shy from making difficult resource decisions. Even when the nation was on a full wartime footing, resources were still problematic. In anticipation of the nature of World War II, Roosevelt devoted scarce funding and resources to the development of a modern army air corps and lend lease, even at the expense of a more modernized ground force and depression priorities. As more resources became available the problems of acquisition, alignment, allocation, and sustainment evolved, but did not disappear. The strategy of Germany first established the strategic priority, however, other theaters had to respond to threats and provided strategic opportunities that could not be ignored. Transition was no less complex.

Planning for the peace of Europe began well before 1945, in fact, well before December 1941. Within the War Department and the United States Army, resources and talent were devoted to developing doctrine for occupation and military governance prior to and during the war. Although the likelihood of U.S. military forces occupying Germany appeared small in the inter-war period and compelling priorities existed during the war, the resourcing of these activities were in some ways more significant than the subsequent mission-oriented plans and preparations. These efforts provided the Army appropriate civil affairs-military government doctrine and training before the requirement to administer occupied territories was placed upon it. It was a true innovation in the conduct of military affairs.²² In Clausewitzian terms it emphasizes that resourcing is about preparation for war as well as conduct of war—about preparation for transitions as well as conduct of transitions.

In thinking ahead about transition, U.S. Army leaders allocated resources to develop doctrine for military government, created the Military Police Corps, and, later in 1942, the Military Government Division, both under the aegis of the Staff Judge Advocate.²³ Officers and soldiers from these branches conducted stability operations, including support to governance and civil security. Civil Affairs and Military Police were used extensively throughout the actual conflict and in transitioning governmental activities to new host nation authorities and societies in occupied Germany and Japan. In the European Theater of Operations, strategic leaders aligned resources for the occupation and rebuilding of Europe in a plan known as Operation ECLIPSE.

21 Congressman Dennis Kucinich on The O'Reilly Factor, December 1, 2009; available from <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,578873,00.html>, accessed March 15, 2011.

22 Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in The Occupation Of Germany 1944-1946*, Army Historical Series, Center Of Military History United States Army, Washington, D. C., 1990, p v.

23 Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, Center Of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D. C., 1992, pp. 8, 15, and <http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/civaff/ch01.htm>

Formal planning began over a year prior to the Allied landings at Normandy.²⁴ ECLIPSE was well resourced, drawing on 61 U.S. Army divisions to provide security, oversee the disarmament and demobilization of the defeated German Army, and help care for displaced civilians and assist them in returning home, help restore essential services, and “prevent humanitarian disaster resulting from famine, epidemic or exposure.”²⁵ In this regard they aligned the resources with the sequential and simultaneous activities of the transition.

Although President Roosevelt and his subordinate strategic leaders successfully changed a U.S. military culture that had been largely preoccupied with Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry, they were less successful in changing the culture of U.S. civilian agencies. As Eisenhower’s letter to Marshall indicates, Eisenhower would have loved to have had a core of qualified civilians to handle the difficult tasks of occupation and transition in Germany. Roosevelt toyed with putting the Department of State in charge of these affairs, noting that “The governing of occupied territories may be of many kinds but in most instances it is a civilian task and requires absolutely first-class men and not second-string men.”²⁶ However, as noted the obstacles were too great. After Operation TORCH, as an economy of force measure, the United States allowed Admiral Darlan, a top-ranked Vichy French politician whom had previously collaborated with the Nazis, to serve as High Commissioner of France for North and West Africa and garnered indigenous capabilities for governance. Still, the Army and numerous U.S. civilian agencies were required to ensure that the civilian populations of these occupied territories did not suffer too greatly. In the end, the requirements of security and the lack of civil capacity caused the U.S. Army to devote more resources to civil-military operations (CMO) than they preferred.

Learning from North Africa, the Army expanded its capabilities to conduct humanitarian assistance, other stability operations tasks, and to provide governance. With no corresponding growth in U.S. government civilian capacity to support transition, the Army, courtesy of a draft system with few if any deferments, was able to “attract” quality people with extensive civilian education and expertise to staff its military government efforts in occupied Germany. Though many argued that occupation of Germany should be administered by civilians, the civilians did not exist to support this contention. Regardless of whether the occupation government wore fatigues or pinstripes, all recognized transition to a German civilian government meant a better peace and fewer U.S. resource requirements. However, transition in their minds did not mean that the U.S. military abruptly decamped Europe.

Post-conflict occupation and stability operations leading to a lasting peace are not cheap, but their costs must be weighed against the risks or gains for national interests. In Europe, the comparison was weighed against the expansion of communism and a potential third world war. In South Korea the risks were less obvious. The attempt to transition governance responsibilities to the newly elected government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948 resulted in an expensive and prolonged war. The rapid draw down from an initial American occupation force of 72,000 troops to a military advisory group of only 500 Soldiers, coupled with poor strategic communications of U.S. interests, made the Republic of Korea (ROK) an irresistible target of opportunity for communist North Korea.²⁷ Between 1950 and 1953, the war between North Korea and the ROK resulted in more than 33,000 U.S. service members killed in action, over 92,000 wounded and 8,000 unaccounted for. ROK casualties exceeded 220,000 killed and over 700,000 wounded. Civilian Korean deaths on both sides are estimated as high as two million. When the Armistice was signed in 1953, the U.S. had over 365,000 Servicemen stationed in Korea, significantly more

24 McCreehy, p. 1.

25 Ibid., p. 5.

26 Coles and Weinberg, p. 22.

27 “Chapter 8, OCCUPATION OF KOREA, 1946-1948, p.1; available from <http://31stinfantry.org/Documents/Chapter%208.pdf>; accessed March 15, 2011.

than the original occupation force.²⁸ Today, slightly less than ten percent of our active duty military still serve in the Republic of Korea and Japan. Though some may feel this is excessive, our presence in these countries secures peace in northeast Asia and the Pacific, and these resources serve vital national interests.

In Vietnam a different tragedy unfolded. The United States negotiated a conclusion to the war that left a viable and improving South Vietnamese state through a security transition program called Vietnamization. South Vietnam assumed the missions and provided the forces for security. Unfortunately, further direct military assistance of any type was precluded by the Case-Church Amendment in 1973. Any hope for the success of this transition hinged on the continuance of robust foreign aid from the United States over a longer term for the development of the state. For example, CORDS, discussed previously, cost \$780 million a year at the height of the Vietnam War.²⁹ As a resurgent Democratic U.S. Congress cut resources the opportunities for a North Vietnam victory increased. These opportunities were moral as well as physical. While South Vietnam had assumed a major portion of its resource needs, it was not yet self-sustaining and the precipitous reduction of U.S. aid between 1973 and 1975 contributed to its fall in 1975 by demoralizing the South Vietnamese as both U.S. political support and resources faltered.

Afghanistan and Iraq offered an opportunity for the United States to profit from its previous experience—but instead, it largely had to relearn those experiences. Ultimately, over a decade the major war fighting lesson has been that in conflict you can under resource military forces and create conditions for insurgency as occurred in both countries. Transition lessons in regard to resources have been more complicated. In Afghanistan too little support left a fragile indigenous government unnecessarily vulnerable. A corrective surge of funds and resources may have contributed to problems of dependency, inflation, and corruption. In Iraq, the United States was more generous with resources but as a result of a policy of De-Ba'athification did not make good use of the indigenous human capital and complicated reconciliation. Here, accountability of the use of resources was largely lost and similar problems of dependency, inflation, and corruption emerged. If it is true that sufficient coalition resources are essential to creating and transitioning to a modern state; it is also true that the poor management of these resources contributes to issues that complicate a successful transition.

Resource issues cannot simply focus on the host nation capacity and coalition dollars. U.S. human capacity also matters. Most U.S. agencies were created to provide public goods and services or otherwise address the needs of American citizens at home. For the most part, they recruited employees who were trained to deal with domestic issues in their fields of expertise and presumably wanted to work in the United States and not in lesser developed countries and war zones. This may explain the relatively small size of the “civilian surge” in Afghanistan as opposed to a larger civilian involvement in Vietnam. “In May 2009, there were 67 civilian personnel in the field, in early January 2010 there were 252, in April 2010 there were 350....”³⁰

Others see the lack of civilian expertise for these operations as simply a matter of department requirements not being funded. They insinuate that if the Department of State only had as many Foreign Service Officers as the Army had musicians, the United States would be more successful in stability operations and transitions. This may be true, but we may never know. While the civilian agencies of the United States grew both during the Bush and Obama administrations, they have not produced a flood of recruits for the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization or numbers of volunteers for duty in Afghanistan on a scale approaching civilian participation in CORDS. This shortfall is a resource need that strategic leaders must identify and find a means of acquisition. Vision, narrative, and communication may be keys to its resolution.

28 United States Force Korea (USFK), *The New Korea USFK Strategic Digest 2009*, pp. 3-4.

29 Howell, p. 24.

30 Curt Tarnoff, *Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 12, 2010, p. 3.

Clearly, the management of resources is a strategic leader competency at the national level at home as well as within the occupied and transitioning states. It is also clear that successful transition requires leadership that is competent across a spectrum of competencies and that these competencies must work in concert to overcome the challenges of transition.

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP FOR TRANSITIONS: A TEMPLATE

Strategic leadership is challenged by its own unique tasks and possesses its own set of conceptual, technical, and interpersonal competencies.³¹ While these shared competencies are appropriate in all leader situations at this level, the emphasis may change based on the environment. In transitions, such a pattern can be discerned from modern experience. The following template highlights a transition focus.

Mapping the Strategic Environment

Mapping the strategic environment is a key conceptual strategic leader competency in transition. It entails the leader seeking to fully understand his position relative to transition-national interests, will, objectives, resources, factors affecting success, and risks—and the same for all other actors involved. It implies strategic leaders should entertain multiple and opposing viewpoints when constructing a mental map of the transition. It is not necessarily different in all aspects from what is already known, but the focus is on plotting a preferred course and suitable alternatives that successfully transitions aspects of power, sovereignty, and legitimacy from the intervening state(s) or agencies to the host nation government and society. It purposely eschews a single point of view in order to avoid a skewed map of the strategic environment.

Mapping the strategic environment employs strategic thinking competencies such as critical thinking, systems thinking, creative thinking, ethical thinking, and thinking in time.³² It is informed by study of intelligence and information, observation, personal experience, and consultation with advisors and actors. It shapes the strategic vision and informs how it will be pursued.

Strategic Visioning

Strategic visioning at its core is the conceptual competency for envisioning a preferred—and achievable—strategic outcome and articulating it in a word picture so that others can see that future and are inspired to support it. However, effective visions are more than word pictures:

Practically, visions should be clear and concise, communicate a sense of purpose—the *raison d'être*, and be shared with others. When enterprise members perceive it as worth the effort, the vision creates energy, commitment, and belonging. When shared by all participants, the vision can bring people to significant achievements.³³

Any transition path will be full of decision points at various levels; the vision serves the purpose of shaping these decisions along favorable lines and establishes a measure of personal accountability applicable to all. Hence it contributes to unity of purpose. The leader is responsible for the vision but its creation may be a collaborative process.³⁴

31 Colonel (Ret) Stephen J. Gerras, Ph.D., ed., *Strategic Leader Primer, 3 ed.*, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, U.S. Army War College, 2010. In this monograph, the editor updates the War College's continuing elaboration of the uniqueness of leadership at this level.

32 Harry R. Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, Westport, Connecticut, Praeger Security International, 2008, pp. 11-14.

33 Gerras, p. 21.

34 *Ibid.*, pp. 20-23.

Narrative

A narrative is a story and a strategic narrative is a story constructed so that a nation's population or an enterprise's constituents can identify with and understand where they are coming from, where they are at, and where they are going to end up. Narratives are usually rooted in common and shared values, purposes, and histories. While strategies are written by professionals for professionals, narratives appeal to the intellect and emotions of larger audiences more generally. They simplify the what, why, and how questions that all participants and supporters need answered and link the changes required of the current enterprise to the valued continuities of the past and a better future.³⁵ In doing this, properly constructed narratives transcend political divisions and other divisive factors, creating shared understanding and purpose. Leaders must constantly and consistently communicate to their subordinates and partners, indigenous and domestic populations, and other global actors and populations why transition is necessary, how it is to unfold, and what its results must be.³⁶ If major political parties, media outlets, and populations do not embrace the narrative, they will undermine efforts domestically and abroad and give encouragement to adversaries.

Strategic Communications

Strategic Communications refers to the competencies and means by which the strategic leader communicates strategic intentions and keeps internal and external audiences informed of the vision, narrative, actions, and strategic context. It can refer to communications as narrow or broad as with a leader's key team, particular individuals, key groups, within organizations and agencies, among multinational leaders, or with domestic and international populations.³⁷ Whether specifically focused or more general in character, successful strategic communications appear to share these principles:³⁸

Leadership-Driven Leaders must lead communication process	
Credible Perception of truthfulness and respect	Understanding Deep comprehension of others
Dialogue Multi-faceted exchange of ideas	Pervasive Every action sends a message
Unity of Effort Integrated and coordinated	Results-Based Tied to desired endstate
Responsive Right audience, message, time, and place	Continuous Analysis, Planning, Execution, Assessment

Whether specifically focused or more general in character, successful strategic communications appear to share these principles:³⁸

35 Wayne Porter, Captain USN, and Col Mark Mykleby, USMC, "A National Strategic Narrative by Mr. Y," with Preface by Anne-Marie Slaughter, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; available from <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/A%20National%20Strategic%20Narrative.pdf>, accessed May 23, 2010.

36 Harry R. Yarger, "Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions, Interim Summary Conference Report," United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute; available from <http://pksoi.army.mil/events/transition/index.cfm>, p 6.

37 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication," June 2007; available from <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/National%20Strategic%20Communications%20Plan%20w%20kph%20changes.pdf>, accessed May 9, 2011.

38 Department of Defense, "Principles of Strategic Communications," August 2008; available from [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Principles%20of%20SC%20\(22%20Aug%2008\)%20Signed%20versn.pdf](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Principles%20of%20SC%20(22%20Aug%2008)%20Signed%20versn.pdf), accessed May 9, 2011.

Coalition Building

Coalitions are groups of states, organizations, and people that unite to work on an enterprise that is too large or too difficult or complex for any one of the members to take on by themselves. Coalitions can also maximize specialization; eliminating the need for expensive redundancy or “niche capabilities.” In addition, coalitions often enhance legitimacy and provide the means to bridge cultural gaps. Inherent to coalition building is its sustainment. The construct of coalition building applies to both an intervention and the subsequent transition.

Various senior leader conceptual, technical, and interpersonal competencies are required in creating and sustaining coalitions. Among conceptual competencies problem management, with emphasis on competing issues, no single right answers and the ability to recognize and ignore irrelevant issues, and critical self-examination stand out. In technical competencies, systems understanding of political, economic, cultural, logistical, force management, and joint/combined interrelationships and the ability to recognize and understands interdependencies are critical. No less critical are the key interpersonal competencies of consensus building, negotiations, cross-cultural savvy, and communications.³⁹

Using these skills, effective coalition building at any level adheres to a common framework. The first step is the actual decision of whether to make use of a coalition or not. The answer to this question lies in the advantages listed above and consideration of the other aspects of the framework below, but for all the value of a coalition it does place limitations on the decisions and actions of any one actor and poses additional risks. Both the political situation and the costs and benefits must be thoroughly considered. A following step is to recruit or include the right coalition partners. Shared interests, resources and capabilities, and legitimacy are all valid considerations, but commitment to expressed objectives and outcomes are critical. Hence a key step is to develop a shared set of objectives and activities, in essence a coalition strategy that leads to the desired end state. Transition would be a central element of this. In addition, resources must be carefully considered and clearly understood as to what is available and who is providing and monitoring the resources.⁴⁰

Given the nature of interventions and transitions, the life span and basis of a coalition are not easily predictable. Successful coalitions structure in flexibility and adaptability to accommodate the ups and downs of these political processes. Such coalitions also look to other ways of maintaining their viability. Essential to doing this are the processes, procedures, and norms established for the coalition. There should be established rules or procedures for how membership will be determined and how decisions will be made. All points of view must be considered and respected. Transparency within the coalition should be valued and pursued. To achieve this, both formal and informal means of communication must be structured into the coalition organization and practices. Successes should be shared and celebrated. And, last, but not least, procedures to evaluate progress and make changes should be integral to coalition processes and activities.⁴¹

Unity and Priority of Purpose

Transitions are inherently complex undertakings of multiple sequential and simultaneous operations that interact to create success or cause failure. They require unity and priority of

39 Gerras, pp. 28-34, 58-61.

40 Coalition Building; available from <http://www.gchd.us/ReportsAndData/ClioModelPlanningProcess/PDF/CoalitionBuildingfromGenCoHlthDpt%20ClioBook.pdf>, accessed 10 May 2011. Gerras, pp. 49, 60, 63-64.

41 Ibid.

purpose. Most significantly, transitions involve at least two states and their various agencies, but also often integrate intergovernmental organizations (IO's) and elements of civil society and the private sector: non-governmental organizations (NGO's), private volunteer organizations (PVO's), business and industry, educational institutions, media, and others. For a single government's agencies, the term whole of government is used to describe an integrated effort. For multiple governments and other actors working together, the term comprehensive approach is used. The need for this specific terminology is a harbinger of the great difficulty of achieving unity and priority of purpose.

In military organizations commanders exercise command authority or can achieve unity of effort through enforcement of detailed plans. Even with this great advantage, friction still exists. Unfortunately in whole of government and comprehensive endeavors, command authority holds little sway and autonomy is highly prized. The senior leader task is to focus the widely diverse efforts of the agencies and actors involved on the common purposes of preparing and assisting the host government and society to assume the responsibilities, authorities, and attributes of a modern state. Thus, the focus is more on harmonizing efforts and precluding actors from working at cross purposes or duplicating efforts.

Strategic leaders practice unity and priority of purpose through compelling visions and strategic communications, the selection of their subordinate leaders, understanding and appreciation of others, negotiation, alignment and de-conflicting of objectives, and how they leverage the capabilities and power inherent to their positions. Done properly and with a degree of transparency, such efforts keep the focus on what is most important—the essentials that allow all else to unfold. Furthermore they build credibility and trust as well as provide value to the various participants. In the case of the latter reference to capabilities and power, how senior government leaders organize their priorities and allocate resources often dictates what other actors can do within a host nation environment. The persuasive use of such power is more likely to build the relationships to further enhance unity.⁴² For example, an open information and coordination center is more apt to create shared information and coordination that demands for schedules and locations.

Management of Resources

All strategies and activities are dependent on resources and transition is no different in this regard. Management of resources is a key transitions competency for strategic leaders. It requires the leader to identify, acquire, align, allocate, continue the flow, maintain accountability, and evolve the resources. While much of this paradigm is shared with other undertakings, transitions possess a degree of uniqueness.

In most situations, the provision of resources is an integral part of the strategy decision. However in transitions, success in large part hinges on the acquisition of some part of the resources from the existing indigenous environment; and, the eventual evolution of the resources to the point where they can be sustained by the host nation. In effect, transitions must in part self-resource and evolve overtime to a self-sustaining environment managed by the host nation. It requires building partnership capacity while downsizing your own capabilities and footprint. Such dynamics further complicates the alignment of resources with the sequential, simultaneous, and interdependent activities of a transition. The alignment, and subsequently success, is dependent on non-traditional resourcing; not just your government, but another government, an element of civil society, an IGO, or the private sector.

42 Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond, "Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan," Strategic Forum, no. 248, October 2009; available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/SF248_Lamb.pdf, accessed May 13, 2011.

Allocation also differs. In most undertakings, allocation is about prioritizing and apportioning too little resources. Over resourcing is seldom a problem and is a matter of efficiency, not effectiveness. In transitions, over resourcing can be directly counterproductive and create inflation, dependency, and corruption as well as hinder the evolution of a local source. Resource management in transitions is always about balance, sufficiency, and self-sufficiency.

CONCLUSION

To transition successfully to a better peace, a strategic leader and his or her team of senior civilian and military advisors must possess the requisite conceptual and technical competencies that will allow them to correctly map the strategic environment, envision a better future, and plan and implement an acceptable course to it that is feasible, acceptable, and suitable to multiple audiences. Such leaders can learn from history but their actions must be founded in the realities of the current strategic environment. Nonetheless, our modern experience with provides a useful template to help prepare potential strategic leaders for the challenges of transition and guide actual leaders through the VUCA of this process. However, these leaders remain personally responsible for the self-discipline, persistence, and vigilance needed for the “permanent management of the nation’s interest through the planning and application of political, economic, and military strategies”⁴³ for transition. In doing this they answer the questions of: What is the role of civilian agencies and the military in interim governance? How soon can U.S. or friendly forces depart? And, when and how should the host state government assume sovereignty?

43 Magee, pp. 7, 38-43.

CHAPTER 12

THE ROLE OF FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN FACILITATING TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN

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INTRODUCTION

Pervasive corruption — “the abuse of entrusted office for illegitimate private gain” — is now recognized as a major threat to the legitimacy of the modern state.¹ Corruption is a pervasive problem in Afghanistan. According to a 2010 Integrity Watch Afghanistan survey, 72% of respondents said that the Afghan public sector was corrupt.² Meanwhile, 6% of Afghans held that view for the private sector, 5% for the aid community, 2% for political parties and foreign military, and 1% for the media. Similarly, a recent United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report found that 52% of the adult population had paid bribes to different types of government officials in order to receive technically free government services.³ According to Integrity Watch, “The main causes of corruption are considered to include weak accountability systems (63%), low civil servant salaries (57%), and the large sums of money in circulation (49%).”⁴ While no one argues pervasive corruption is not an issue in Afghanistan; however, what remains a matter of debate is what should be done about it?

In September 2010, the *Washington Post* reported ongoing discussions, at the most senior levels within the Obama Administration, on the necessity of fighting corruption through exclusively punitive means.⁵ “Punitive means” alone is questionable as a strategy. Nonetheless, in conflict and post-conflict settings — or in counterinsurgency, when corruption impedes the reliable, fair, and effective delivery of services (or to paraphrase Bernard Fall, when it means the government is being out-governed⁶), populations invariably turn to other mechanisms to provide security and the rule of law. Consequently, senior International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) leaders recognize corruption as a “fatal threat” to stabilization in Afghanistan and fear the Taliban may become an acceptable alternative. International intervention requires a certain level of efficiency, accountability, and transparency as a prerequisite for transitioning to normalized international relations and moving to traditional foreign aid assistance mechanisms. Widespread corruption can be a crippling impediment to successful transition. This paper uses the framework developed in the Stimson Center Report *Mapping and Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States* to examine the nature of corruption in Afghanistan. It then uses the categories of anticorruption efforts

1 Alix J. Boucher, William J. Durch, Margaret Midyette, Sarah Rose, and Jason Terry, *Mapping and Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States*, The Stimson Center, Washington, DC, March 2007; available from <http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/mapping-and-fighting-corruption-in-war-torn-states>, accessed April 20, 2011, p.1.

2 Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA). *Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption: A National Survey 2010*. Kabul. August 2010, p. 29.

3 UNODC, *Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by the Victims*, January 2010, pp. 10, 25.

4 IWA, p. 13.

5 See for example, Greg Jaffe, “U.S. to Temper Stance on Afghan Corruption,” *Washington Post*, 4 September 2010 and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “A Subtler Tack to Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan,” *Washington Post*, 13 September 2010. In this context, punitive means refers to efforts to investigate and prosecute corruption, particularly on the part of high-level government officials.

6 Bernard Fall, “Insurgency Indicators,” *Military Review*, April 1966.

delineated in the Stimson report to examine efforts to date and their scope.⁷ It seeks to facilitate transition to Afghan authority by identifying the nature and role of corruption in Afghanistan and strategies that offer may successfully fight it.

MAPPING CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN

This section uses the Stimson Center framework to map corruption patterns in Afghanistan. The five nodes of corruption are: 1) Post-Conflict Distribution of Political and Military Power; 2) Cross-Border Trafficking in People and Commodities; 3) Formal Economy and Informal Economy; 4) Weak National Public Administration Capacity; and 5) Wasted, Misspent, or Mismatched Reconstruction Aid. Each node is examined in turn.⁸

Post Conflict Distribution of Political and Military Power

The 2001 Bonn Agreement has been widely criticized for failing to achieve its national reconciliation and peacebuilding objectives.⁹ Indeed, the structures set in place as part of the agreement led to confusion and the initial adoption of the old Soviet regime's administrative and legal structures of governance. At the same time, some *mujahedin* structures were also put in place. This system meant that the new administration was opaque and that what should have been simple administrative tasks (like obtaining a driver's license) were cumbersome, involved too many steps and therefore ended up increasing opportunities for corruption.¹⁰

The elections that were held in Afghanistan, first in 2004 and more recently in 2009 (it is too soon after the September 2010 elections to assess their impact, though fraud was reportedly widespread), are largely considered to have cemented the power of (sometimes criminal) patronage networks and assured the place of a large number of corrupt individuals within the governmental structure.

Moreover, given the sweeping powers afforded to the Afghan presidency, including the appointment not only of Cabinet officials but also of provincial and district governors, the oversight power of the fledgling legislature is viewed as minimal. The President has used his authority to appoint officials favorable to his agenda. He has also refused to dismiss officials who are widely considered to be not only corrupt but also to have contributed to insurgency and instability through their role in the drug trade and criminal networks.

Regional and local stakeholders, in particular province and district governors, continue to play important roles and guarantee their positions by ensuring they (or their allies) are appointed to key positions, with control over appointments to key institutions and income generation. More generally, positions, ranging from the low ranking police chief to the higher ranking governorship (for example at the district level), are widely reported to be available for purchase.

7 Boucher, et al., *Mapping and Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States*. This report focused on the nature of corruption in post-conflict settings, finding that corruption is different in these settings and that combating it requires a comprehensive program, spanning across a host-state's institutions. The report recognized that such a program could amount to a wide-ranging state building strategy but argued that preventing the recurrence of conflict, if that was a main objective of international assistance, required such broad efforts. This paper relies on the previous literature review in the report, as well as more recent studies on corruption in these settings. It also relies on not-for-attribution interviews the author conducted with anticorruption officials in Washington and Kabul in October and November

8 A useful visual mapping chart, "Mapping and Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States," is available from: http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Figure_1_Mapping_corruption_and_conflict.pdf, accessed April 24, 2011.

9 The Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, or the Bonn Agreement, is a series of agreements among Afghan factions from December 2001 that serve as basis of the new state.

10 UNDP, *Fighting Corruption in Post Conflict and Recovery Situations: Learning from the Past*, June 2010, p. 91.

When this happens, the official must seek bribes to be able to recoup the cost of the appointment and make sure that a more solvent competitor is not appointed in his place. In short, what appears to be petty corruption—the setting up of road-blocks or soliciting of bribes by a police officer or police chief for example, or the embezzlement of a portion of customs revenues for a border official—may in fact be a manifestation of a requirement to pay back a boss or patron.¹¹

Cross Border Trafficking in People and Commodities

The most notorious (or perhaps infamous) part of the Afghan economy is poppy production and the trafficking in opium. The World Bank and UNODC estimate that it represents one third of Afghan economic output.¹² Such trafficking is not merely limited to illegal commodities however. As in many post-conflict states, lack of customs capacity limits Afghanistan's ability to collect the bedrock of any government's revenue: customs fees. The inability to collect customs duties in turn precludes the government from having sufficient funds to deliver basic services, ranging from improved infrastructure to health services and education.

When border officials are present, their lack of adequate pay and training also make them particularly vulnerable to corruption: commodity traders (again for both legal and illegal goods) bribe officials to ensure the safe transit of their goods. In addition, many traders refuse to use formal trade routes and border crossings, taking advantage of limited border monitoring capacity to more easily trade between border-straddling communities.

In Afghanistan, this trafficking is compounded by the international community's presence and its requirement to truck in all manner of goods to support its military operations in the country. In September 2010, the Pakistani authorities, protesting military activity inside their country, closed the border to NATO supply trucks and failed to respond to attacks on the waiting convoys.¹³ A recent Congressional report on the support required to truck in goods for NATO troops highlighted numerous challenges, including the need for local truck drivers to pay exorbitant amounts of money for their security, the links the security providers have to both government officials and insurgents, and the fact that failure to pay for safe passage would have disastrous effects on NATO's resupply abilities.¹⁴ Finally, the recent rediscovery of allegedly expansive mineral resources may impact this cross-border trading.¹⁵

Statistics on Afghanistan: the Basics

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. GDP per capita is \$800 at purchasing power parity (which makes the country 219th in the world). Life expectancy is 44 years, adult literacy is estimated at 28% (with 43% for men but only 12.6% for women).

Government expenditures have increased from \$900 million in 2006, \$1.2 billion in 2007, \$2.7 billion in 2008, and about \$3 billion in 2009. According to the World Bank, official grants to Afghanistan were \$3.2 billion in 2007 and just over \$4 billion in 2008.

Sources: The World Bank, "Afghanistan at a Glance," 2009; Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy," 21 July 2010

11 Manija Gardizi, Karen Hussman and Yama Torabi, *Corrupting the State or State-Crafted Corruption? Exploring the Nexus between Corruption and Subnational Governance*, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), June 2010, available from: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c21cd102.html>, accessed April 28, 2011, pp. 17-18.

12 Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Peacekeepers Among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies, and Intervention." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 16, February 2009, p. 92.

13 Alex Rodriguez, "Pakistan Reopens Border Crossing to NATO Trucks," *Los Angeles Times*, 11 October 2010.

14 Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, US House of Representatives, Warlord, Inc: Extortion and Corruption along the US Supply Chain in Afghanistan, Report of the Majority Staff, June 2010. See also, Alex Rodriguez, "Pakistan Reopens Border Crossing to NATO Trucks," *Los Angeles Times*, 11 October 2010.

15 James Risen, "US Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, 13 June 2010.

Formal Economy and Informal Economy

In many post-conflict countries, the line between the formal and informal economy (the industries for which the government does not collect taxes or customs duties) has been blurred. In other words, many licit goods are traded illegally or on the so-called black market because doing so is easier and limits exposure to administrative hassles. In the case of Afghanistan, this type of trading and economic activity is supplemented by the trade in illegal goods, such as opium or cannabis.

Another important part of such economies is the predatory practices of armed groups. For example, Felbab Brown has well documented the Taliban practice of forcing farmers to cultivate opium.¹⁶ In a similar vein, both the Taliban and the Afghan National Security Forces (whether police or armed forces) routinely set up road blocks to extort money from people who need to use the roads. These kinds of taxes, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, notably in the Democratic Republic of Congo, are known to sustain armed groups, their activities, and their weapons purchases.

Another important aspect of post-war economies is the difficulty that businesses face in operating legally precisely because of weakened government capacity. In Afghanistan, for example, obtaining a driver's license requires the successful completion of 20 separate steps. At each step in any licensing process, a fee is required, but since public information is inaccessible, businesses do not know how much of each fee is legitimate and how much is being extorted from them by underpaid corrupt officials. Businesses therefore resort to paying bribes so they can operate "legally."¹⁷ In addition, small businesses in Afghanistan often lack the ability to find out about opportunities to bid on projects, do not know how to ensure they have the proper licenses, and cannot determine if they paid the necessary taxes to operate legally.¹⁸

Years of war also affect public attitudes on the necessity of using businesses that work within the law. According to the Integrity Watch Afghanistan survey, 21% of respondents said they would "buy the products of a company that had been involved in corruption if the products were offered at prices slightly below market prices."¹⁹

Finally, the arrival of large amounts of foreign aid, as well as of the well-paid aid workers who administer it, can have a huge impact on a country's economy, both formal and informal. The table below, based on World Bank Data, provides a clear picture of the Afghan economy and the relative size of foreign aid.²⁰


16 Vanda Felbab-Brown, pp. 110-114.

17 IWA, p. 19.

18 Author interviews of civil society representatives, Kabul, October-November 2010.

19 IWA, p. 52.

20 The table can be found in Stefanie Nijssen, "The Afghan Economy: A Brief History," NATO, CIMIC Fusion Center, October 2010.



Weak National Public Administration Capacity

Limited (or in some cases non-existent) public administration capacity is a wide-ranging problem in post-conflict countries. It occurs at different levels ranging from security forces, to judicial institutions, to ministries, to district councils and at the village level. In Afghanistan, the problem is compounded by low levels of literacy and education, and the ensuing difficulty in finding qualified civil servants.

Reconstruction aid has a mixed impact on this capacity. Indeed, many donors refuse to channel their support through ministries, precisely because they fear the funds they award will be siphoned off. As a result, the bulk of foreign assistance provided to Afghanistan is “off budget” though donors, as part of the Kabul conference, committed to progressively increasing their direct budgetary support to 50%.²¹

At the provincial and local levels, the refusal to work through budgetary support may have even more impact on the ability of the government to work effectively because they lack essential items: “according to a September 22, 2009, quarterly UN report on Afghanistan, about 180 district governors (there are 364 districts) have no offices, and 288 district governors have no official vehicle.”²²

Moreover, according to Integrity Watch, civil servants had to pay their superiors bribes to keep their jobs, as did independent professionals (in the latter case for business licenses, etc.) in 29% of cases.²³ In addition, salaries, when they are paid at all, are not considered sufficient to support an individual, let alone a family. As a result, according to UNODC, “25% of Afghans had to pay a bribe to police officers over the past year, 17% had to bribe a judge, and 13% a prosecutor.”²⁴ The pervasive cost of bribery is also illustrated by the presence of “commission-kars,” whom, Integrity Watch explained, 44% of people who had to pay bribes resorted to using when they found that a service required a bribe payment. These “professional” commission takers are routinely used in such transactions but only men provide this service, limiting access for women to public services which require going through such an intermediary.²⁵

21 See Kabul Conference Communiqué, 19 July 2010.

22 Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy*, Congressional Research Service, 21 July 2010, p. 19.

23 IWA, p. 12.

24 UNODC, p. 5.

25 IWA, pp. 10, 45.

Finally, weak public administrative capacity trickles down to the citizenry in a different way: a UNODC survey found that citizens do not have enough information on administrative procedures and that the information they did have was not clear.²⁶ This made them even more vulnerable to bribery because citizens lacked the knowledge to determine whether certain fees were in fact legal.

Wasted, Misspent, or Mismatched Reconstruction Aid

In post-conflict states, large inflows of international assistance have a huge impact on heavily damaged local economies. Significantly, according to the World Bank, international assistance to Afghanistan in 2000 was just under \$135 million. It grew to \$250 million in 2001. This number reached \$2.8 billion in 2005 and over \$3 billion after 2006.²⁷ In 2008, U.S. assistance alone was \$5.7 billion.²⁸ As of 2008, GNI per capita remained under \$400.²⁹ Such an inflow of aid and money represents a tremendous opportunity for the country, but it also presents enormous risks that donor imperatives to spend that money will come before making sure it is spent wisely, effectively, and in a transparent and accountable fashion.³⁰

When money is provided directly to Afghan authorities, a clear risk is the ministries do not have the capacity to manage it properly. Unfortunately, assistance has not been accompanied by widespread or systematic efforts to build Afghan capacity to manage budgets in the relevant ministries.³¹ Instead, donors deployed international civilians to help manage it. Consequently, the arrival of so much cash has had a contradictory effect on public opinion. According to UNODC, "over half of the Afghans (54%) believe that international organizations and NGOs, the transmission belts of foreign assistance," are corrupt and are in the country just to get rich."³²

One of the main challenges of so much cash flowing in is the risk that bad management and waste will be conflated with corruption. Because private contractors are widely perceived as more corrupt, General David Petraeus issued important new contracting guidance in September 2010 requiring contractors to monitor their funds more closely and to use Afghan companies as much as possible.³³

Section Observations

Corruption in Afghanistan takes different forms and ranges from corruption by Afghan officials to corruption resulting from bad donor fund management and oversight. Afghan views on the seriousness of the corruption problem (based on surveys such as that of Integrity Watch) suggest that Afghans view corruption as particularly problematic in many of their every day

26 UNODC, p. 23. UNODC added: "One third of citizens in urban areas (34%) stated that they have the information necessary to adequately understand the administrative procedures. Another 26% stated they did not have any information or only some information, while the remaining 40% indicated that the information was not clear enough to understand the procedures." UNODC, p. 31. These numbers are unaffected by literacy levels.

27 Afghanistan Conflict Monitor, ODA, available from <http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/docs03.html>. Importantly, World Bank Assistance, largely through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, represents only a small portion of all international assistance.

28 Curt Tarnoff, *Afghanistan: US Foreign Assistance*, Congressional Research Service, August 12, 2010, Table 1, p. 12.

29 World Bank, *Afghanistan, Poverty at a Glance*, available from <http://www.worldbank.org.af/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0,,menuPK:306010~pagePK:141132~piPK:141109~theSitePK:305985,00.html>, accessed 2010.

30 Author interviews of US government officials, October 2010.

31 Author interviews, Kabul and Washington, DC, October-November 2010.

32 UNODC, p. 5.

33 COMISAF, CDR/USFOR-A, COIN Contracting Guidance, 8 September 2010.

interactions with government. The large amounts of aid money flowing into Afghanistan have also led to a perception among Afghans that the international community itself is corrupt (not to mention sanctimonious for lecturing Afghans about corruption). This section highlighted the different dynamics of Afghan corruption and found that the Stimson Center framework is useful for analyzing some of these dynamics. One weakness of the framework, however, is that it does not allow for much analysis of what constitutes permissible corruption, based on Afghanistan's particular cultural context. The following section looks at current efforts to fight corruption in Afghanistan.

"FIGHTING CORRUPTION" AND TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN

This section outlines ongoing efforts to stem corruption in Afghanistan. Much like other post-conflict settings, fears that addressing corruption might jeopardize a struggling peace process and undermine counterinsurgency efforts, limited anticorruption efforts in Afghanistan. Arguably, they were not a major focus of international attention until 2009. Previous efforts largely related to ensuring that donor funds were properly used. As recently as September 2010, senior White House officials also were debating the value of focusing on anticorruption efforts. As noted earlier, both donor and the Afghan leadership's commitment to seriously fighting corruption is often questioned, in the case of Afghan officials because they repeatedly block anticorruption efforts.

Unlike other post-conflict countries, efforts to combat corruption in Afghanistan are guided by several strategic level documents, including the Anticorruption Strategy that is embedded in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and benchmarks included in the London and Kabul conferences.³⁴ Notwithstanding the existence of these documents and stated commitments on the part of the Afghan authorities and the international community to coordinate efforts, anticorruption efforts in Afghanistan remain unsystematic and ad hoc. Following the Stimson Center Report template, this section addresses (to the extent possible) efforts in eight areas.³⁵

Criminal Justice

Corruption in the criminal justice sector is pervasive. It is also widely recognized for its adverse impact on the legitimacy of Afghan authorities. According to Integrity Watch, "13% of households had experience corruption in the judiciary, while 10% had paid a bribe. 66% had access to the courts, while 25% of these said they felt deprived of justice because of corruption within the courts."³⁶ In addition, "[a]ttorneys' offices accounted for 44% of the corruption cases...The courts constituted another 34%, while administrative tribunals generated 15% of the corruption interactions." Integrity Watch also found that Afghans view the Ministries of Interior and Justice, as well as the Directorate of National Security, as the most corrupt government institutions.³⁷ Concerning police, Integrity Watch found that "10% of households had paid a bribe, and 14% had faced corruption in relation to police services." Moreover, 76% of households had

34 UNDP, p. 96. The Anticorruption strategy resembles the Azimi Report, drafted by Chief Justice Abdul Salam Azimi upon request from President Karzai in 2006. For benchmarks on corruption, see the London and Kabul conference communiqués.

35 In this section, the author endeavored to find out about as many initiatives as possible but given the number of actors involved and the scope of activities, not all efforts have likely been covered as part of this survey. The relevant Stimson Center framework chart can be found at: http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Figure_2_Anticorruption_Best_Practices.pdf.

36 IWA, p. 74.

37 Ibid., p. 30.

access to police but 26% said they “were deprived of security that should be provided by the police.”³⁸

The criminal justice problem is about more than bribes, however. In one UNODC survey, one respondent reported that “Police heads are taking a percentage from each payroll of their subordinates.”³⁹ One study found that judges in the provinces earn \$35-50 per month.⁴⁰ Moreover, Afghan judges often lack access to basic information including copies of the country’s constitution and laws. Many officials within the judicial system lack sufficient training and, according to a 2007 Human Development Report, judges and others often complain that armed groups interfere with their work.⁴¹

Donors have taken numerous steps to start to address this challenge, but they have not been sufficient.⁴² First is the ongoing reform of the Afghan National Police (ANP). While initial efforts faltered (due to lack of resources and trainers), ISAF and several key donors have in recent years focused their efforts on training and equipping the forces themselves. In addition, they have also worked to build management capacity within the Ministry of Interior.⁴³ Reform efforts at the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Attorney General continue to pose challenges however. Despite one recent U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) effort to train “over 900 judges, lawyers, prosecutors and buil[d] at least 40 judicial facilities,” additional work is needed to train “court administrators for the MOJ, the office of the AG, and the Supreme Court.”⁴⁴

Yet more reforms are needed if accountability is to be established. In some cases, constitutional frameworks must be amended through legislation so that the powers of the executive are diminished. The role of the Attorney General (AG) remains insufficiently independent and subject to political interference. As seen in recent news reports, cases referred to the AG have been stopped by President Karzai.⁴⁵ This kind of interference increases the perception that only “little people” get punished for corruption and that important players, particularly those with political connections, can get away with doing as they please.

Legislative and Political Institutions

In this context, legislative and political refers first to a country’s legislature and second to its executive institutions, particularly offices determined either as a result of elections or by the direct appointment of elected officials (the Office of the President, Cabinet Ministers, and regional and local level officials). According to surveys conducted by Integrity Watch and UNODC, members of Parliament were very seldom directly identified as being corrupt (indeed, respondents mentioned the legislature in only 2% of cases).⁴⁶

38 Ibid., p. 71.

39 UNODC, p. 21.

40 UNDP, p. 103.

41 Karen Gussman and Martin Tisne, “Integrity in State Building: Anticorruption with a Statebuilding Lens,” OECD DAC, Network on Governance – Anticorruption Task Team, Paris, August 2009, pp. 93-94.

42 International Crisis Group (ICG), *Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary*, Asia Report N. 195, 17 November 2010.

43 For more on this subject, see International Crisis Group, *Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary*, Asia Report No. 195, 17 November 2010, available from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/195-reforming-afghanistans-broken-judiciary.aspx>, accessed April 28, 2010.

44 Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy*, pp. 53-54. Rod Nordland and Alissa Rubin, “New Afghan Corruption Inquiries Frozen,” *New York Times*, 14 September 2010.

45 Rod Nordland and Alissa Rubin, “New Afghan Corruption Inquiries Frozen.”

46 UNODC, p. 24. Recent releases of cables given to Wikileaks and published by news outlets such as the *New York Times* suggest that some MPs had offered to confirm cabinet officials if they were given money to vote for the President’s appointee. See also Scott Schane, Mark Mazetti, and Dexter Filkins, “Cables Depict Afghan Graft, Starting at Top,” *New York Times*, 2 December 2010.

In interviews, civil society organizations noted that the legislature rarely holds public meetings or hearings and that in many cases, parliamentarians fail to show up for work altogether. In fact, Parliament rarely holds public hearings and does not yet view its role as one of monitoring and oversight of the other branches of government.⁴⁷ While a Parliamentary Complaints Commission has been established, its level of activity remains uncertain. The Anticorruption Convention, which Afghanistan has ratified, also requires legislation on asset disclosure for these types of officials. Again, how much relevant legislation will be fully implemented is uncertain. It appears that if officials complete assets disclosure forms, they do not yet do so annually and the accuracy is not verified.⁴⁸ The capacity of the legislature to provide oversight of the executive and of the courts needs to be improved through training of legislators and parliamentary staff, increased openness of legislative sessions and committee meetings, etc.⁴⁹

Concerning those officials appointed by the Executive, it is clear that there are particularly serious challenges to fighting corruption. First among these is the role of the President in appointing governors and their deputies not just to the province level but also down to the District level. In some cases, officials have reportedly argued that province and district governors have been appointed and sent to work from Kabul because there are too few qualified and uncorrupt individuals at regional level from which to draw an appropriate leader. Given the low levels of literacy, not to mention lack of higher education among the Afghan population overall, this argument could be seen as compelling in some cases. In other cases, however, the President has reportedly appointed officials not for their integrity but for their ability to maintain order in the relevant province or district. Such ability allegedly often stems from their control of criminal networks and exploitation of natural resources.⁵⁰ Such direct appointment raises important questions of legitimacy. Nonetheless, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) reports to President Karzai and takes screening authority away from the Interior Ministry. "It has, to date, helped replace more than half of Afghanistan's 34 governors and aspires to replace at least 30% of the 364 district governors, either for alleged corruption or for ineffectiveness."⁵¹

At the ministerial level, some ministers are seen as reluctant to pursue anticorruption efforts because doing so would expose people close to the President, thereby embarrassing him and limiting his ability to work with key stakeholders. In Afghanistan, designing and implementing anticorruption programs within the Executive requires careful consideration of rebalancing political prerogatives with stability needs.⁵²

According to the World Bank and to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the Control and Audit Office (CAO) could be more efficient with the passage of legislation to improve capacity for external audit. Legislation to increase the CAO's independence is justified because at present the executive can minimize findings and "reduce candor in reporting."⁵³ In addition, the Anticorruption Law (ACL) needs to be amended because it currently "does not distinguish between corrupt procurement practices and mistakes or

47 Author interviews of media representatives, civil society representatives, and Afghan and donor country officials, Kabul, October-November 2010.

48 Author interviews of Afghan officials, Kabul, October-November 2010. One official explained that he had only filled out the form once in the last three years and that he had never been contacted to provide forms for the years he failed to submit them.

49 The role of the media and civil society in supporting this oversight role will be discussed later in the paper.

50 Author interviews, Washington DC and Kabul, October-November 2010.

51 Katzman, p. 20.

52 Author interviews, Washington DC and Kabul, October-November 2010.

53 World Bank, "Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan: Summaries of Vulnerabilities Corruption Assessments (VCA)," Washington DC, May 2009, p. 24. For an indicting assessment of the effectiveness of the CAO, see SIGAR, "Afghanistan's Control and Audit Office requires operational and budgetary independence, enhanced authority, and focused international assistance to effectively prevent and detect corruption," SIGAR Audit 10-8, Anticorruption/Control and Audit Office, 9 April 2010.

negligence.”⁵⁴ This is a problem because it could lead to unnecessary and unfair prosecutions or reluctance to prosecute over concerns of fairness. Moreover, the CAO’s role has yet to be clearly delineated: the Ministry of Finance is asserting a role in line ministry auditing which could interfere with the CAO’s work. In short, the role of various institutions (the Ministry of Finance and the CAO in particular) concerning internal and external auditing needs to be clarified. Finally, Afghan officials have explained that there are too few auditors in Afghanistan and that those who are employed as auditors do not have sufficient training to conduct more complex investigations.⁵⁵

From the perspective of the Stimson Center’s framework in this area, the following issues also require further investigation: the existence of whistleblower protection; the passage of legislation limiting immunity for government officials (in all branches of government); and whether the new penal code that is currently being developed will have adequate provisions for bribery, embezzlement, money laundering, abuse of power, illicit enrichment, and obstruction of justice.⁵⁶

Elections

The organization and holding of elections has, at each step, posed challenges for Afghanistan. Essential steps (according to the Stimson Center framework) included the creation of an independent elections commission (established in 2005) and the passing of elections rules on campaign finance and candidate eligibility, which have generally been publicized and enforced.⁵⁷ The elections, of course, need to be monitored for compliance with electoral rules. Indeed, despite wide-ranging U.S. and NATO support, the most recent presidential elections in Afghanistan were marred by widespread reports of irregularities and ballot stuffing. A concern in Afghanistan has also been the ability to provide security, both for polling stations and for voters trying to get to these stations. In insecure areas, the Independent Electoral Commission of Afghanistan (IEC) decided not to open polling stations, reducing the risk of violence but making it more difficult for people to participate. In general, the participation of women was also a challenge. As in many other countries trying to organize elections during conflict or post-conflict environments, voter registration proved a challenge, one compounded by the absence of personal records.

In the most recent elections (both presidential and parliamentary), the IEC has been widely criticized for failing to prevent fraud, intimidation, and abuse. In November 2010, however, the IEC invalidated the election of several parliamentarians, as well as election results in an entire (and largely Pashtun) province, limiting the President’s majority in Parliament. Several IEC officials were arrested for alleged fraud. In short, it is clear that the IEC (as do members of other institutions) remains susceptible to political interference and intimidation from senior Afghan officials.⁵⁸

Civil Service and Public Administration

In 2009, the World Bank conducted a series of “Vulnerabilities to Corruption Assessments” (VCA) for Afghanistan. In large part, the assessments focused on the capacity of important min-

54 World Bank, VCA, p. 27.

55 Author interviews of Afghan officials, Kabul, October-November 2010.

56 UNODC, p. 6. IWA, p. 16.

57 UNODC, p.6. In its recent survey, UNODC noted the need for more transparency in elections funding. For more see the IEC’s website at: <http://www.iec.org.af/eng/index.php>.

58 Rod Nordland and Sangar Rahimi, “Arrests Put Pressure on Afghan Voting Officials,” *The New York Times*, 25 November 2010. Alissa Rubin, “Contrary to Hopes, Afghan Elections Disappoints,” *The New York Times*, 1 December 2010.

istries to prevent, mitigate, and fight corruption.⁵⁹ The Bank found weaknesses in five areas: organizational weaknesses, capacity weaknesses, procurement, overly bureaucratic processes, and vulnerabilities at the subnational level.⁶⁰ As such, the Bank made several recommendations, including several it called “cross-cutting”: “i) organizational restructuring and where necessary improving the legal framework; ii) developing capacity; iii) strengthening procurement; iv) addressing vulnerabilities at the subnational level; v) ICT development; and vi) enhancing internal audit.”⁶¹

As the Stimson Center Report suggests, the World Bank notes that in regard to civil service:

The first step in capacity development is to identify staffing and skill shortages in areas vulnerable to corruption and to develop plans and budgets to alleviate such shortage. Measures to promote high levels of professionalism and integrity include merit-based recruitment policies, adequate remuneration, conflict of interest rules, enforced codes of conduct, and effective staff oversight. Also, it would be important to adapt and deliver current ethics induction training as a wider corruption awareness and staff conduct training programs, as a means of introducing planned organizational integrity policies and initiatives.⁶²

In addition, the VCA found numerous weaknesses in the Afghan civil service’s merit-based appointment system. These included insufficient “discussion of job selection criteria,” unclear (or incomplete) job descriptions, “deliberately distorted selection criteria and requirements, emphasizing for instance administrative experience and knowledge of detailed administrative procedures over judgment in order to favor incumbents and exclude outsiders,” widespread problems with listing requirements for technical qualifications, failure to advertise in time and widely enough, failure to check references, and many cases of bypassing formal recruitment processes.⁶³ The VCA noted that such bypassing or interference with hiring

may reflect a strategic move to develop or strengthen a corruption network in a given institution by making sure that all the positions of authority – from the decision maker to those who will implement and control the decisions (including the internal auditors) – are filled by close “associates” in what becomes a “corruption pact.” The overall purpose of such pacts may be to fund and strengthen a specific ethnic or political group or simply to enrich a group of corrupt individuals.⁶⁴

The VCA also found that there are continuing problems with the “weakness” of payroll in the Afghan public sector. As the document points out, one weakness is that workers are paid even if they do not come to work, or if they do not work on the job.⁶⁵ Employee lists are available and they help to mitigate against worker fraud but not completely. As the VCA explains:

The MOF maintains two separate databases, one for Military Employees and one for Non-Military Employees. Since the MOF headcount database is a stand-alone application that is not connected to the government cash-based AFMIS accounting system, a close watch needs

59 World Bank, VCA.

60 Ibid., p. 6.

61 Ibid., p. 8.

62 Ibid., p. 9.

63 Ibid., p. 60. Author interviews suggest this is a continuing problem and one that will not be entirely addressed by ongoing reforms within the Civil Service Commission. Author interviews of donor country officials and Afghan officials, October-November 2010.

64 World Bank, VCA, p. 62.

65 During one interview with Afghan official, the official continued to watch a soap opera for the duration of the meeting. Author interview of Afghan official, October-November 2010.

to be kept on the reconciliation between the headcount database and AFMIS, and the Monitoring Agent does this.⁶⁶

Another problem for the civil service is the failure to sufficiently advertise requests for bids, vacancies and consultancies. In cases where such work is advertised, it is often without sufficient notice.⁶⁷ This is a problem because it leads to unfair competition and could facilitate corruption if officials notify some people in advance of others. In 2005, the new Civil Service law included provisions that:

i) the principle of open competition and merit for all civil service appointments; ii) the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission and independent appointment and appeal boards; and iii) the Administrative Reform Secretariat as the focal point for public administration reform.⁶⁸

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has also worked with the Civil Service Commission “to integrate ethics and anticorruption training in the leadership training being provided to high-level Afghan civil servants.”⁶⁹

Public Finance

Reforming public finance and increasing transparency is another challenge for transition in Afghanistan. In many post-conflict states, a particularly serious challenge is insufficient government revenue (from taxes and customs duties in particular) and the subsequent reliance on international assistance for both budgetary and extra-budgetary support. This reliance creates additional challenges in managing funds and ensuring accountability in their spending.

In June 2005, the Public Finance and Expenditure Management Law mandated a:

i) sound budget preparation framework with comprehensive and transparent documentation; ii) requirements for accounting and regular reporting in line with international standards; and iii) an independent review of the annual financial statements for presentation to the National Assembly.⁷⁰

Simultaneously, the new Law on Procurement mandated: “i) transparent and competitive procurement procedures with contestable mechanisms based on objective and verifiable selection and award criteria; and ii) the responsibilities of government officials involved in procurement.”⁷¹

UNDP, as part of its Action for Cooperation and Trust (ACT) program, has therefore provided support for the development of a corruption monitoring system for public financial management. The agency has also worked to establish a fraud investigation unit within the Ministry of Finance’s Internal Audit Department.⁷² One challenge the World Bank VCA found is that “there is no formal reporting arrangements for internal audit within each ministry.”⁷³ They point out that “this could potentially lead to dilution of audit findings.”⁷⁴ Much like other civil servants,

66 World Bank, VCA, p. 19.

67 Ibid., pp. 27-28.

68 UNDP, pp. 98-100.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid., pp. 98-99.

71 Ibid.

72 UNDP, p. 100.

73 World Bank, VCA, p. 22.

74 Ibid.

auditors still require the implementation of Codes of Ethics and Conduct, as well as clear employment contracts that spell out requirements for adhering to such standards.⁷⁵

The World Bank also identified public finance controls as an area in need of improvement. Interviews suggested that line ministries do not have in place effective financial tracking mechanisms down to the village level (in particular, district and provincial governors have financial tracking responsibilities for which they rarely have trained staff). As a result ministries in Kabul do not have sufficient mechanisms to know how money is disbursed.⁷⁶ The World Bank found that line ministries have insufficient record keeping and that the process for approving payment for transactions is not always sufficiently segregated. Officials charged with payments are also not sufficiently trained on procedures to follow when faced with an unusual transaction. In addition, the Bank found that:

the current process, supported by weak internal controls, might allow payments and transfers to be made without complete documentation, not properly authorized by the unit or the Director General of the Treasury Department, or not properly filed and archived.⁷⁷

More generally, the ministries do not have “an approved manual” which could “lead to inconsistent execution of payments.”⁷⁸ Overall, there are too few qualified civil servants, both from the Ministry of Finance and from the most significant line ministries, to ensure proper funds management and service delivery at the provincial, district, and village levels.

On the donor side, which as previously noted many Afghans consider corrupt, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction seeks to audit how international assistance is used by various Afghan institutions. In 2010, it also assessed the capacity of Afghan audit institutions to perform these kinds of functions in the long term, finding both technical and political barriers to effective oversight of public finance.⁷⁹

Civil Society and the Media

According to UNODC, Afghan media does not play an important monitoring/awareness raising role in regard to corruption. “Country wide, 43% of city dwellers say that the media rarely addresses corruption issues. In the South, two thirds indicated that corruption is seldom, or never, in the news.”⁸⁰ On the other hand, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit argues that “the Afghan media, specifically television and radio stations, continuously portray flagrant cases as well as allegations of corruption and thus nurture public debate and demand for action.”⁸¹

In interviews, media representatives for a key TV and radio channel explained that they continuously discuss corruption and encourage listeners and viewers to report it. Recently, they have also encouraged citizens to film officials who try to bribe them (using their cell phone cam-

75 Ibid., p. 23.

76 Author interviews of donor and Afghan officials, October-November 2010.

77 World Bank, VCA, p. 16.

78 Ibid., p. 17.

79 See for example, SIGAR, “U.S. Reconstruction Efforts in Afghanistan Would Benefit from a Finalized Comprehensive U.S. Anticorruption Strategy,” SIGAR Audit 10-15, *Anticorruption Strategy and Planning*, 5 August 2010.

80 UNODC, p. 5.

81 AREU, Manija Gardizi, Karen Hussman and Yama Torabi. “Corrupting the State or State Crafted Corruption: Exploring the Nexus between Corruption and Subnational Governance,” Discussion Paper, June 2010, 3.

eras) and then send the video to the TV channel for airing.⁸² Nonetheless, they recognized that the roles of the media in providing information about the government in general and public administrative procedures in particular as well as encouraging the citizenry to monitor the government remain limited. These roles are extremely important and need to be further developed. The media representatives also argued that they have trouble finding enough well-trained reporters around the country. In their view, education and training are problems. The various journalism faculties' curricula are dramatically out of date. Even trained journalists do not yet systematically check their sources or ask for comment from government officials on stories they are working on, and generally require on the job training to perform well. In short, the emerging generation of Afghan journalists could benefit from additional training (perhaps through brief shadowing of journalists outside Afghanistan) and improved education in Afghan universities.⁸³

Civil society organizations (CSOs) play varying roles in Afghanistan but they require additional support to provide the population with the essential information they need about their government and its activities.⁸⁴ Existing CSOs—both local and international—do play important roles (discussed below) in facilitating business development, promoting human rights, providing training, and building civil capacity for monitoring at the province and district levels. Nonetheless, a greater need exists to create local civil society organizations that can play a role in monitoring governance across the spectrum of government activities ranging from education and mining to the individual actions of executive officials, members of parliament, and the judiciary.⁸⁵

Private Sector Economy

According to the World Bank, the barriers to trade in Afghanistan are increasingly limited. The remaining insecurity is a significant problem, but the old barriers to effective international trade have been largely dismantled.

There has been a major rationalization of the tariff structure, introducing use of the market exchange rate in calculating import duties and reducing the number of different tariff rates to six (2.5, 4, 5, 8, 10, and 16%) with a relatively low level of dispersion. The simple average tariff rate correspondingly declined to 5.3%, making for one of the lowest and least differentiated tariff structures in the region (nevertheless this is considerably higher than the actual collection rate under the previous regime using artificial exchange rates)...Furthermore, licensing requirements have been drastically simplified; the import license application process, which previously involved 42 steps, 58 signatures, and several weeks of processing, now requires only three steps, six signatures, and two days to process. Overall, Afghanistan's trade regime is currently rated the same as the EU and USA in the IMF's Trade Restrictiveness Index.⁸⁶

On the other hand, there are reportedly few ways in which the private sector is monitored for abuse and corruption. For example, pollution and construction standards are simply not monitored. The latter is a serious problem in earthquake prone Afghanistan.⁸⁷ Legislation, as well as monitoring mechanisms, therefore needs to be developed. An important initiative is the September 2010 Counter-Insurgency Contracting Guidance issued by ISAF which requires

82 Author interview of Afghan TV and radio station, Kabul, October 2010.

83 Author interviews of Afghan TV and radio station, civil society representatives, Kabul, October-November 2010.

84 Author interview of international civil society organization, Kabul, October-November 2010.

85 Author interviews of civil society organizations, Kabul, October-November 2010.

86 The World Bank, "Afghanistan: Trade Policy and Integration," 2006.

87 Author interviews, Kabul, October 2010.

military contractors to improve oversight and transparency over their contracts and increase the use of Afghan businesses, especially smaller ones.

In terms of development of the private sector economy, some key civil society organizations play important roles in developing the ability of small businesses to work with the government and international donors. For example, because these small businesses often do not have access to the internet, or cannot travel to ministries or province offices, the Peace Dividend Trust provides services such as sending text messages, networking of small businesses, training for responding to bid requests, support for properly registering businesses and paying the relevant taxes.⁸⁸ Small business owners reportedly still face requests for bribes however when they interact with the relevant institutions. Nonetheless, developing this type of capacity in small businesses is crucial for increasing employment and growing the Afghan economy.

The Application of Contested Practices in Afghanistan

What appear as obvious strategies or practices for countering corruption are not always appropriate in conflict or post-conflict situations and pose their own challenges. Political amnesty, buying off spoilers, criminalizing corrupt behavior, imposing sanctions on corrupt actors, decentralization, and the role of anticorruption agencies can all be problematic. Each needs to be understood in the Afghan context.⁸⁹

Amnesty and Buying Off Spoilers. Amnesty and buying off potential spoilers is contentious among experts. Indeed, some believe that only military defeat can ensure that certain actors will not return to violence if negotiations do not achieve their specific demands.⁹⁰ Amnesty programs, particularly of senior officials known to be corrupt or to have played a significant role in violence, can be hugely detrimental to a government's fledgling legitimacy. In other cases, when there has been a shift in government, amnesty has been effectively used to allow the retirement of corrupt officials – essentially buying them off. In Afghanistan, amnesty without removal from office would likely be perceived as permission for government officials and others to resume previous corrupt behavior without fear of any consequences. After insisting that corrupt people be held fully accountable, any amnesty program or “buy off” would be hugely damaging to the government's legitimacy.⁹¹

Criminalizing Corrupt Behavior and Targeted Sanctions. The effects of criminalizing corrupt behavior also raise questions, particularly in post-conflict countries such as Afghanistan where lack of capacity in the criminal justice system complicates proper prosecution. Indeed, criminalizing behavior too early can lead to unsubstantiated accusations and may help criminal elements cement their positions by falsely accusing their legitimate opponents of corruption.

In Afghanistan, United Nations efforts (as well as EU and bilateral efforts) targeted those believed to be Taliban and Al Qaida leaders with financial sanctions (an assets freeze) and travel bans.⁹² The sanctions lists have been modified overtime with some people being removed as

88 Ibid.

89 These contested practices are discussed in Boucher, et al., *Mapping and Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States*, pp. 41-44. This section uses the practices discussed in the Stimson report and examines their use in Afghanistan.

90 Carlotta Gall, “Karzai Names Peace Panel for Taliban Negotiations,” *The New York Times*, 29 September 2010. Dexter Filkins, “Taliban Elite, Aided by NATO, Join Talks for Afghan Peace,” *The New York Times*, 19 October 2010.

91 Author interviews, Kabul, October 2010.

92 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1267, S/RES/1267, 15 October 1999. Since 2001, various expert groups have monitored the implementation of the sanctions. To read the reports, visit <http://un.org/sc/committee/1267/index.shtml>

well as added. In addition, individuals subject to the measures have challenged them in court and criticized their unfairness.⁹³ Nonetheless, in other countries such as Liberia, targeted financial sanctions have proven useful in marginalizing corrupt actors and, when accompanied by clear anticorruption benchmarks for lifting them, useful in encouraging the government to adopt what the international community considered necessary reforms.⁹⁴ They may continue to prove an effective tool in Afghanistan.

Decentralization. The role of decentralization in governance is an important debate because in a country like Afghanistan, where central public administration capacity is so limited, decentralization may be extremely helpful in ensuring timely delivery of services to the population. Nonetheless, significant challenges in decentralization are posed for Afghanistan. For example, governors down to the district level are appointed by the President. This can be problematic when the officials lack knowledge about their assigned provinces, or do not have capacity to access funds from the central government. This in turn limits their ability to deliver even basic services. In cases where officials are corrupt, the issue is particularly problematic. In such circumstances, assistance providers may be played by corrupt officials who obtain assistance and then provide false information on the effectiveness of projects. In less secure areas, where monitoring is particularly difficult, decentralization may be all the more damaging.⁹⁵ In Afghanistan, decentralization must be accompanied by efforts to extend the writ of the central government through relevant ministries and in particular their ability to ensure money makes it down to the village level. Only through such integration can services be delivered effectively and legitimacy of governance achieved. Capacity is also an issue. Simply decentralizing power into the hands of provincial and district governors, without equipping them adequately for increased administrative responsibilities, could prove hugely problematic. And as described above, the lack of capacity in line ministries for the appropriate expenditure of public funds down to the village level is a major issue.

Anticorruption Agencies. In post-conflict settings, as well as in development efforts more generally, anticorruption agencies are often contentious. While they can play an important part in oversight, in many cases anticorruption institutions have had to be disbanded because they were inefficient or had themselves become corrupt. In Afghanistan, the General Independent Administration for Anti-Corruption (GIAAC), which President Karzai established in December 2003, was recently replaced by the High Office of Oversight (Government of Afghanistan's High Office for Oversight and Anti-Corruption). Several donors have provided wide-ranging support to the Office in the hopes that it would provide oversight of the criminal justice sector as well as of the line ministries. The High Office has also been tasked with helping all ministries develop clear anticorruption strategies.⁹⁶ The effectiveness of the High Office remains to be seen since its senior officials are appointed by President Karzai and report to him, rather than to a Parliamentary Committee or another independent entity. In addition, the Office is merely an investigative unit; it must refer findings to the Attorney General for prosecution. Such follow-up is reportedly difficult.⁹⁷ Many question if it is serving its purpose adequately.

93 For wider discussion of this issue, see Thomas Biersteker and Sue Eckert, *Addressing Challenges of Targeted Sanctions: An Update to the Watson Report*, Watson Institute and The Graduate Institute Geneva, October 2009. For an extensive discussion, see Alix J. Boucher and Victoria K. Holt, *Targeting Spoilers: The Role of United Nations Panels of Experts*, The Stimson Center, January 2009.

94 For an extensive discussion, see Alix J. Boucher and Victoria K. Holt, *Targeting Spoilers: The Role of United Nations Panels of Experts*, The Stimson Center, January 2009.

95 Author interviews, Kabul, October 2010.

96 Author interviews of donor and Afghan officials, Kabul, October-November 2010.

97 Author interviews of donor country officials, Kabul, October-November 2010.

Section Observations

This section examined ongoing issues and efforts in fighting corruption in Afghanistan. Such efforts are new and still limited. In interviews, officials explained that efforts focused specifically on corruption had only begun in the spring of 2009. Obviously, much needs to be done and the efforts must fit the Afghan context. Donors in particular continue to work on finding effective ways of increasing anticorruption support. Doing so will require careful coordination, substantial information-sharing, and a focus beyond Kabul.

CONCLUSION

In Afghanistan, the international community, most notably the U.S. and its allies, the UN, and international financial organizations, has been working since 2001 to build a stable Afghan state. These efforts have been uneven however and challenged by insurgency, a flourishing drug trade, and uncertain commitment by both donors and Afghan authorities to success. This case study of corruption and efforts to fight it in Afghanistan suggests that donors have only recently begun to critically examine the issue of corruption. Certainly capacity building efforts more generally, if properly implemented and conceived, curtailed corruption; but, if so, not as part of a comprehensive and intentional program. Comprehensive efforts began in earnest in 2009-2010 and focused in large part on building capacity at the leading anticorruption agency, the High Office of Oversight. However, even these efforts have faltered as cases investigated by the High Office and submitted to the Attorney General have generally not been followed through.

Donors have been so dissatisfied with the current situation that they have pushed for the establishment of yet another anticorruption body, the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee. They hope it will address areas where the High Office has not acted, such as investigating ministries, etc. Moreover, specific efforts to investigate senior officials, such as the advisor to President Karzai, Mr. Mohammed Zia Salehi, provoked swift reaction from the President and his appointees and the prosecutions were abandoned in the name of national security. In short, it is abundantly clear that trying to “go after big fish” first is not only impossible, but given the political backlash perhaps counter-productive to the donors’ interests.

Given the limitations of the peculiar Afghan context and recent pronouncements from ISAF and senior donor officials on the need to fight corruption, anticorruption efforts will remain contentious. However, it is clear that donors and the international community will have to focus on areas which do not pose a threat to the Executive and the President’s ability to keep the peace. As such, there are several areas of corruption that the international community could work proactively in to help facilitate transition in Afghanistan. In a 2010 study on corruption in post-conflict and fragile states, UNDP suggested mainstreaming anticorruption into assistance programs and finding micro measures to address it. In short, the authors argued that small measures will have more impact than wide-spanning measures.⁹⁸ These areas could serve much like an oil spot to increase capacity, awareness, and eventually, when political will increases, serve as a base for higher-level efforts.

First, line ministries require additional capacity, not just in terms of monitoring, but also in terms of management (particularly of public finances, civil service appointments, and procedures for service delivery). Second, because oversight capacity is so limited donors should work to build such capacity first in the legislature and second in civil society and the media. This would more than likely take the form of education and training and providing support in building public awareness of the ways in which citizens can hold their government accountable. Finally, donors can help the private sector find ways to work more effectively with the govern-

⁹⁸ UNDP, pp. 60-63.

ment, either by developing the capacity of businesses or by building capacity in the relevant government ministries to deal with the private sector. Because Afghanistan suffers from problems ranging from pollution to earthquakes, support to the private sector could also include mechanisms for ensuring that businesses operate according to established international standards as a means of illustrating the value of non-corruptive behavior.

Donors will face challenges in implementing these programs, but none are insurmountable. For example, previous lack of coordination permitted Afghan institutions and leaders to play donors against each other or to obtain assistance from one when another had already refused for good or principled cause. Donors should work together to assess gaps in needs and through collaboration, identify preferred areas of action, and work together to develop a plan and relevant benchmarks for providing much needed assistance while promoting anticorruption. Nonetheless, because of current limitations in political will by high-level Afghan authorities and some donors, who view anticorruption as a threat to maintaining good relations with the government, the international community will also need to work together to balance their objectives with the political realities. Such a coordinated approach can build for the future while reducing some corruption in the near term.

Finally, the international community must recognize that corruption will never be completely eradicated in Afghanistan. Indeed, it has not been eliminated in the United States and elsewhere. Institutions however do exist in modern states at the local, state, and federal level to identify corruption and prosecute those that engage in it so that neither the legitimacy nor the ability of the state to serve its citizens is questioned. Ultimately, the Afghan people will judge their government and institutions. For donors in Afghanistan, the international community will have to determine what level of corruption and what level of capacity to respond to it is required for an acceptable transition to occur. Such benchmarks may be tailored to individual Afghan institutions and the specific leadership of said institution. Such a pragmatic approach to fighting corruption is required to facilitate transition in Afghanistan because the solution must fit the context in which it is to be implemented.

CHAPTER 13

HAITI 2010: COMING OUT OF DISASTER

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INTRODUCTION


Haiti has been described as a chronically fragile state. In a sense, this description does not do justice to the realities of the daily lives of its inhabitants. Despite decades of massive foreign investment and attempts at the creative application of resources, the country – as of the end of 2009 – still ranked economically as the poorest in the Western hemisphere. An extended series of fluctuating levels of bilateral and multilateral aid programs, and a largely unregulated role by presumably well-meaning foreigners (defining problems and then addressing them as they thought best), has not stabilized the country. The efforts of Haitian society to affect significant change in terms of responsible self-governance and establish long-term, broad-based economic growth have been consistently frustrated. Haiti offers a stark example that *more* international assistance does not necessarily translate to a *better social future*. The international community's new commitment to invest the equivalent of over nine billion dollars in Haiti over the next three years offers an unprecedented opportunity to learn from past assistance errors and secure a more reasonable foundation for future national development, and therein to strengthen the relationship between international aid and demonstrable state need.

HAITI BEFORE THE QUAKE

The Republic of Haiti was born in conflict. In 1804 the mainly slave population drove out the colonists and declared freedom. The first flag optimistically bore the motto “L’Union fait la force” (Union makes strength). Union and strength were then thought of in political and social terms based on an implicit assumption that these were the pillars of an independent society. Two hundred years later – despite billions of dollars in foreign aid and enduring more than seventy changes in leadership – that “union” has made remarkably little progress towards the underlying societal objective of protecting and supporting social well-being. Half of Haiti’s nine million person population remains illiterate. The mean age of the population is 20 years old (approximately 40 percent are under the age of 14). Eighty percent of the population relies on agriculture to survive, yet over fifty percent live in urban settings – most in the sprawling capital Port-au-Prince metropolitan basin.¹ (see diagram below)

1 These statistics were summarized from the “CIA World Fact Book,” 2010; available from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html>, accessed January 20, 2011. For a quick but thorough summary of Haiti’s history, see “Haiti Archives:” available from <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/43a/>, accessed January 20, 2010.

Haiti's problems have been long term and little seems to help.² The international community has routinely supplied aid to Haiti. Faith-based and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and an assortment of development agencies (primarily from the United States) have journeyed to Haiti for decades with a range of objectives running across virtually all the elements of civil society. In addition to large scale development programs, by 1994 several



hundred non-profit groups were registered with the Haitian government. Though scattered throughout the country the bottom-up assistance approach also showed little durable effect as the majority of Haitians continued to be abjectly poor. Former President Bill Clinton, regarding the appropriateness of foreign aid and its long-term effects, observed that in Haitian assistance external decisions regarding priority needs were determined and addressed with insufficient consideration of the ability of the beneficiaries to benefit.³ Foreign aid has simply been delivered, again and again and again.

A unique opportunity to inject durable change took place in 1994 with the international community forcibly intervening in Haitian domestic affairs and returning Jean Bertrand Aristide to political leadership. Aristide, a charismatic personality, had risen from his role as a church minister in the slums of the capital area to capture the presidency, only to be ousted by a military coup. His reinstatement was heralded as a fresh opportunity to break free from the dire social and economic confines of the past. Massive foreign aid arrived through governmental and private institutions with the ambitious objectives of demobilizing the discredited standing military, reforming the security services, upgrading the agricultural services, and otherwise jump-starting local economies. By the early 2000s, exports were on the rise, remittances had significantly increased, equaling one quarter of the GNP, and negotiations with the World Bank to forgive the nation's debt had been successful.

Despite these positive signs of growth, two underlying realities persisted. First, the majority of Haitians remained semi-literate, unskilled, landless in a primarily agricultural society, semi-employed at a subsistence levels, and generally distrustful of any authority. These conditions were very long-standing and could not be easily overcome. It is fair to say that Haitians up to this time had never experienced any authority consistently delivering on promises. Therefore, for most Haitians, the notion of a brighter future was seen as wishful thinking.

2 For those interested in examining more detail than the chart used here or to recreate the chart see International Monetary Fund, "Data and Statistics," available from <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/index.aspx>, accessed January 26, 2011.

3 President Bill Clinton recalling (2010) the US government cajoling Haiti to reduce their rice tariff: "... we made this devil's bargain on rice... it wasn't the right thing to do. We should have continued to work to help them be self-sufficient in agriculture." Various citations in differing contexts but to understand its ramifications see ABC 24, October 6, 2010; available from <http://www.abc24.com/news/local/story/Food-Fight-Arkansas-Rice-vs-Haiti/rTnsZctZM0yrX-9RmrgvhA.csp>, accessed January 20, 2010.

The second issue was that the political management of Haiti – after two hundred years – remained in the hands of a small elite group. To prosper, a Haitian typically has to come to the capital and become a part of this privileged class. In this environment, personal security is paramount; people have to defend what they have from others. Consequently, the principle security risk for any Haitian is other Haitians. Haiti has no active armed insurgency; but with so few resources, and so few appreciated opportunities for gain, competition for basic resources is the norm. Nonetheless, the relatively small elite group sees little reason to change a social system that has served them reasonably well for centuries.

Predictably, as circumstances have worsened, the elites have been increasingly under duress. Their political maneuvering to stay in power has run into resentment from a primarily young and dissatisfied population. They have been in the position of having to maintain control of limited resources, while also managing to convince the international community of the need for ongoing foreign assistance. The rampant deforestation and destruction of the environment have also impacted severely on the growth possibilities of the country. A growing and increasingly young population has seen nowhere to go but to turn to crime, rely on aid or leave Haiti.

In 2007, a revised Haitian national strategy, under newly elected leadership, included inviting UN peacekeepers to take a more aggressive security role, targeting the reduction of gang violence in order to facilitate economic recovery. Some successes followed, primarily in parts of the capital. In addition, USAID worked closely with community groups in Cite Soleil, the worst crime area of metropolitan Port au Prince in 2008, to create a climate for local investment and employment, and at the same time to enhance the capabilities of the police, judicial systems, community forums, public infrastructure and communications.⁴ This opened the door to some increase in public participation.

Despite such episodic gains, the underlying challenges described above remained and determined the course of daily life for most Haitians and complicated any progress. For example, building codes for the continuously growing capital area did not exist, were out of date, or simply were not enforced as urban sprawl preceded non-stop. An extensive metropolitan open canal system for water drainage remained poorly maintained and inadequate with tons of plastic, paper, glass and other debris routinely fed into it by a population ill-served by trash collection services. As a consequence, extensive flooding was routine, particularly during rainy seasons or after large storms. Overwhelmed and poorly managed Port au Prince trash collection services collected less than half of the daily-generated city waste and individuals were left to dispose of the remainder with predictable results.⁵ Recycling was ill-promoted and sporadic at best.⁶

Other factors affected progress and the population. The United Nations economic embargo in 1994 severely disrupted employment and studies among the country's youth. As a result, gang membership and associated violence soared. Troubled by this lack of progress, during 2009 the U.S. Government decided to substantively revise the strategy for development assistance to Haiti. A detailed plan evolved to direct resources to specific sectors and systems to create a more secure foundation to spur local growth. The first stage of the plan, the reshaping of existing aid systems, was well-advanced by the end of 2009. Further adjustments (a second stage) were anticipated to take place during 2010, but fate intervened.

In summary, the close of 2009 found Haiti wrestling with a still-fragile political structure, a feeble economy, barely functioning social services, a distrustful and restless electorate, and a long prevailing assumption on the part of the elites and populace that the international community would continue the flow of foreign aid.

4 USAID, "Success Story Lessons/Learned," 12/02/08, available from http://www.usaid.gov/ht/docs/successstories/iip/hsi_success_story.pdf, accessed January 23, 2011.

5 Responsibility of DINEPA / Ministry of Public Works as executed by the Department of Solid Waste Management.

6 Several fledging foreign donor projects were initiated, inadequately maintained and proceeded to fail in due course.

THE EARTHQUAKE AND THE AFTERMATH

The January 12, 2010 Haitian earthquake had a magnitude of 7.0 with an epicenter only 16 miles from the country's capital. Dozens of massive aftershocks followed the initial shocks. Most buildings in the metropolitan area were either heavily damaged or destroyed outright. Approximately 300,000 persons were killed nationwide and 1.5 million people eventually moved to displaced person locations. The essential public services – water, power, light, markets, airports, and hospitals – were compromised or non-functioning. Almost all of the inmates of the Metropolitan prison, including hundreds of the most notorious prisoners, escaped. The international development agencies were equally affected with a combination of missing staff, both local and international, lost facilities, and little ability to communicate locally or internationally.

Over 90 percent of Port au Prince's government ministry buildings were destroyed in the earthquake. A considerable percentage of senior government personnel were unaccounted for immediately following the disaster.⁷ President Preval quickly requested international assistance, but the magnitude of the quake's damage hindered external support. In the days immediately following a large part of the emergency relief effort fell to individual or local capabilities.

However, as alluded to previously, the earthquake damaged the already weak social service delivery mechanisms in several distinct but related ways. Many employees were killed or unfit for service. There were many confirmed deaths, but an even larger number simply disappeared. Virtually all primary government buildings were either destroyed or rendered inoperable and unsafe. These losses precluded access to records and equipment. Communication breakdowns prevented remaining government personnel from rallying to a central operational location and resuming activity in an orderly manner. Those who managed to reestablish contact were handicapped by the need to adjust to the vast numbers of missing personnel. The major destruction to roads, markets and other public spaces prevented people from assembling at what otherwise would have been the normal gathering points and greatly handicapped any ability to provide emergency assistance. In short, massive numbers of survivors became displaced, seeking shelter, food and medical assistance wherever they could find it.

Immediately following the quake, chaos seemed to reign. Those able to flee the epicenter, located near the capital, did so, going to provincial hubs and moving in with friends and relatives. Others, either unable to flee or believing their best future lay in remaining in the capital, gathered at makeshift IDP (internal displacement persons) encampments wherever open space allowed. In addition, those persons with intact or semi-intact housing joined those in these camps, either out of fears that their dwelling might still collapse or because they believed they would receive priority social services from a camp location. Informal self-appointed local power brokers raided accessible stockpiles, taking by force supplies not already distributed. The chaos resulting from the movement of so many put many thousands of already vulnerable persons – the elderly and others – at even greater risk, as they were virtually hidden from view. The initial assessments of arriving international relief workers, concluding that almost everything required for an effective response would need to be imported, were clearly justified.

Government and relief organizations responses were initially inadequate and haphazard. Haitian ministries met in private homes or under trees or tents, meeting with whoever had the ability to get there. Communication was severely compromised as landlines were down and mobile phone network operation was irregular. Acting under the imperative of saving lives, the international community operated with considerable independence, doing whatever it felt was necessary. As a predictable consequence, the majority of early aid efforts suffered from a

⁷ Some ministries were able to reconvene only several weeks later, and then often in makeshift offices (occasionally in tents).

conspicuous lack of focus and coordination. Nonetheless, the immediate international humanitarian aid response was massive and necessary.⁸ Hundreds of organizations and institutions flooded into Haiti and thousands of relief activities were initiated. Tens of thousands of Haitians benefited from access to the emergency resources spread throughout portions of the affected area. However, much could have been done better.

A host of small NGOs, particularly those providing health services, arrived via the few incoming flights or drove overland from the Dominican Republic. Many had no previous in-country contacts or accommodations, frequently resulting in largely random efforts once on the ground. Some inexperienced groups grew quickly frustrated to the point of an untimely and precipitous withdrawal, further presenting to the general public outside of Haiti the image of a haphazard response.

Acting under a sense of extreme urgency, many relief agencies delivered whatever quality and quantity of material assistance they had available or could easily obtain. Little thought was given to ensuring that pre-quake Haitian standards or customs were respected or that already established local counterparts and systems were supported and important local capabilities and the chance to rapidly rebuild local capacity were ignored. As a result, a range of varied health-care regimes were promoted, such as new medicaments and treatments, differing care and follow-up, etc., that caused issues for local acceptance and continuation of treatment. Other ill-considered second order effects occurred. Many Haitian clinics did not reopen because their potential clientele was relying on the free services provided by a nearby NGO. Given the availability of free resources and services supplied by the wide variety of responders, many other businesses delayed reopening as well.

Other fallacies in the link in relief mentality and longer term development thinking were also evident. For example, a long-term environmental concern quickly emerged as imported relief food and water containers, most frequently made of styrene or plastic, littered the landscape. When asked, some relief workers suggested the clean-up of discarded emergency service materials would form part of the later stabilization and development phases of foreign assistance. They tended to see their role solely in terms of immediate outcomes, with the amount of assistance provided as the only measuring stick. As is well known, the question of how immediate action during a response will affect subsequent transition and reconstruction efforts is one with which the humanitarian community has long wrestled.

Rapidly swelling to 22,000 military personnel, the U.S. military established or supported an unusually wide range of activities, primarily, in the initial stages, aimed at quelling outbreaks of violence and supporting actions directed towards a quick return to normalcy. Military management of the international airport, while arousing some protests in regard to priorities, was among the highlights of the response effort. The U.S. military effort, directed by the U.S. Special Operations Command, worked closely with the already present UN forces (MINUSTAH), but set up their own internal support mechanisms. While effective in operational terms, there was little immediate connection to the already ongoing civilian effort and collaborative opportunities were potentially lost.

The reality today, more than a year after the earthquake, is that a large percentage of the population remains displaced living under conditions worsened by the impact of seasonal rains. Donors have been slow in providing expected funding and a spreading cholera outbreak, widely seen as attributable to UN peacekeepers, has served to undermine the credibility of the international community. In addition, local criminality continues to rise, enhancing a sense among the populace that little has changed or will change. At a moment when many expected to be reflecting on a year of applying resources better and seeing a fresh foundation for state development, Haiti still only limps along and its population remains vulnerable with the impact of the immense foreign aid still to be felt.

8 InterAction NGO members alone raised 978 million dollars (Sam Worthington, InterAction).

Entire sections of the capital city remain largely no-go zones for internationals. The lack of publicly visible social improvement, despite the rhetoric of the government and international donors, increases the ability of gangs to offer attractive alternatives to participating in reconstruction in a socially responsible manner. Post-disaster construction sites after a year have resulted in new accommodations for under 100,000 individuals¹, only one tenth of the still displaced population. Haiti remains in a uniquely fragile state. The uncertainties attendant on the reconstruction effort have made essential, in the case of many Haitians, a need to perfect their ability to manipulate assistance requests, to seize on any evidence of response and to demand more—a traditional stance for a society long used to the adjusting to the failure of government to assist in meeting their needs. In short, the massive 2010 promise of international aid—to date little delivered and poorly administered—has run into the well-entrenched Haitian pattern of behavior. The most-fragile state in the hemisphere is not getting better.

HAITI IN TRANSITIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Haiti offers a unique opportunity to examine the issues and opportunities in regard to transitions thinking for both crisis humanitarian relief operations and longer term reconstruction and development efforts. Its long history with the international community and aid provides much to ponder in regard to issues, pitfalls and opportunities in assistance and potential insights for better methods that lead to transition of responsibility back to the Haitian state, and other states more generally.

Host Authorities: Background for Reconstruction

Pre-earthquake, the Government of the Republic of Haiti maintained ministries tasked with governance and the provision of public services. Prominent among these was the Ministry of Public Works. Public Works was organized into various specialized departments, including departments for canal cleaning and maintenance, the provision of public water, solid waste removal, and others. Security was provided primarily through the Haitian National Police (HNP). A Ministry of Education oversaw an extensive network of private and semi-private elementary and high schools. The Ministry of Health was responsible for an extensive set of private health clinics. It is difficult to evaluate the present roles of these departments as they tend to be thinly staffed and, therefore, their potential role in an overall reconstruction plan remains unclear as much of the responsibility for health care remains with the international entities.

The metropolitan area of Port Au Prince was designed and developed for a population of perhaps 500,000. However, pre-earthquake estimates suggested a population that ranged up to several million. The majority were renters with a large percentage living in congested, poorly maintained housing. Conditions are obviously much worse and many have fled Port Au Prince but long term there is no reason to believe the congestion will not reoccur unless changes are made in the conditions that created the overcrowding and poverty.

Despite obvious corruption, and to some degree because of it, most of the government ministries have long operated with limited and aging resources. The public, however, while it has low expectations of ministries in general, continued to approach the ministries for assistance, given the lack of alternatives. A historical pattern of limited assistance arriving irregularly is, for many, a fixture in their view of government involvement. The government's response during the crisis has only worsened the government's image. As such, this image and its affect on the legitimacy of the government will be a challenge to overcome during the reconstruction phase.

In the past, foreign assistance has been repeatedly directed at ministries in an attempt to strengthen their capabilities and improve self-management. However, this assistance has been

episodic, with the predictable consequence of making a sustainable capacity building effort almost impossible and helped set up conditions and cycles of dependency and corruption.

The realities of Haiti's past are ingrained continuities that must be overcome if a transition from the international community to effective Haitian governance is ever to occur. It raises the obvious question of from where does leadership at the national, middle and community levels come. It also raises the question of how should the international community assist for an effective reconstruction program.

The Role of the U.S. Military

There is no question as to the quality of the work performed by the U.S. military. Its remarkable logistics capability plus its access to an extensive variety of resources and equipment, coupled with a disciplined command structure, enabled it to quickly step in and reestablish some essential services. As a result, the airport quickly became functional, general street security improved, and GPS mapping and plotting greatly contributed to a more effective response. In addition, the extensive communication capabilities it provided enabled it to establish and maintain liaison with the principle actors. An excellent example of the latter is the engagement with the UN cluster system.

As remarked earlier, however, the U.S. military's initiative and ability to perform in such an efficient manner often failed to mesh with the initiatives, operational styles and resource capabilities of other assistance organizations. As an example, the military decided, based on its own independent assessment, that the populations residing in particular IDP camps were most vulnerable. Based on that initial conclusion, they used their extensive skills and capabilities to lobby assistance groups for extensive assistance for these particular camps. Subsequent evidence suggests that other communities and camps were also in similar or greater need and even after the needs of the original camps were addressed a change in emphasis was not made. Not only does this demonstrate a need for closer collaboration among the military and NGOs, it also suggests that military authorities must pay careful attention to the inherent influence of their capabilities and unintended consequences of their decisions and actions.

The U.S. military's period of engagement was limited. Their attempts to engage successfully with host nation counterparts involved in similar efforts ran into the same challenges outlined above, where differing assessment information, manner and timing of decision making and methods became factors. By the time the U.S. Marines withdrew, they could rightfully claim credit for the handing over of substantial essential resources and furthering a safer environment for host nationals and international humanitarian workers. However, any lasting effect of their efforts immediately began to erode due to the vastly different methodologies and choice of objectives of other foreign donors and host country authorities. The U.S. military's priorities and those of the UN Mission in the immediate aftermath of the disaster were fairly similar. However, this too changed as differences in mandates, authorities, resources and outreach capabilities became more evident. The U.S. military's experience in Haiti illustrates how the military's participation in any stability operation needs to consider the multiple implications of military involvement and how to tailor and leverage them in regard to both short range needs and longer term transition considerations.

The United Nations

The United Nations was represented by individual agencies with a range of assumptions, expectations, skills and capabilities. Following the cluster system approach, the UN set about

initiating and supporting a forum for inter-institutional exchange and cooperation.⁹ However, the scale of the event and sheer number of responding institutions exceeded the management capabilities of the cluster leads. As a result, instead of a consolidated set of cluster groups meeting in the capital looking at and sharing data on a nationwide basis, individual and regionalized cluster meetings were initiated. In addition, the processes normally associated with successful cluster management were not rapidly developed. A common database did not emerge for several months, causing each cluster to function virtually as a semi-independent operation. This difficulty persists. None of this is hardly surprising given the nature of Haiti's terrain and conditions and the problems associated with inadequate communication. The earthquake approach arguably foreshadows what may be expected during reconstruction.

Thus, the cluster systems approach, though theoretically a practical basis for the organization of information exchange and program management was only marginally effective. The sheer scale of the disaster led to insufficiently experienced officers in too few numbers being assigned without adequate authority or resources. The textbook model calls for the setting up of regular meetings and effective lines of communication. These essentials are clearly reliant on sufficient trained staff and other resources. In the absence of both, the "cluster system model" became somewhat duplicative, semi-independent and site-specific throughout Haiti. Training, experience and adequacy of numbers of personnel and equipment are essential to facilitate inter-institutional exchange and cooperation. It is fair to say, however, that overall the provision of information by the UN was welcomed and essential given the conditions and the lack of reliable information gathering options.

From Response to Transition

In reviewing much of the emergency relief effort, this essay so far has raised questions in regard to effectiveness and efficiency and challenged the assumptions and operational methodologies of key players in the relief effort. Hopefully, the critical look at crisis assistance provided insights to all actors without disparaging their great contributions. Nonetheless, questions of overall coordination aside, two larger aspects stand out: (1) an inadequate effort was made in parallel to the emergency relief effort to reestablish Haitian essential service mechanisms, and (2) insufficient attention was paid in managing the relief effort to avoid establishing new patterns of dependency. As a result, Haiti's prospects for a brighter future are no better than before the quake, and those were insufficient. Once again, Haiti begs the question of how you move from response to transition. Without new thinking among the humanitarian assistance and development community, Haiti remains perpetually on the verge of a humanitarian crisis. And Haiti is not alone in this social dilemma.

Obviously effective governance is instrumental to the relief and recovery of any state affected by such a crisis, but Haiti represents those states where governance itself is part of the issue and the problems are greater than NGO assistance alone can alleviate. This raises the fundamental question of who or which organization, within the humanitarian and development communities, has the authority and capabilities to deal with disasters of this magnitude in a manner that addresses both the immediate needs and the long-term consequences of response. Any solution must include leadership and capacity. Obvious answers that come to mind are the United Nations, other regional organizations, coalitions, a lead nation, or some combination thereof. Regardless of the choice, problems anywhere near the magnitude of Haiti will require

⁹ A recent evaluation of the cluster approach with description used in 2008 highlighted the importance of establishing clear roles and links between and division of labor among humanitarian stakeholders (Binder and Grunewald 2010) – ALNAP Report, "Haiti Earthquake Response: Context Analysis," July 2010; available from <http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/haiti-context-analysis-final.pdf>, accessed January 23, 2011.

support from the whole of the community and will confront any effort with difficult political and social realities.

The Political and Social Realities of Reconstruction

The political and social realities confronting aid efforts are the subject of much literature and here this essay seeks only to highlight Haitian examples in order to better illustrate the nature of these realities.

As alluded to above, governance is the crucial reality in response and reconstruction. However, good governance is much more than structure and is rooted in acceptable levels of sovereignty, legitimacy, effectiveness and efficiency, all of which have direct and indirect consequences. Populations expect and are entitled to physical and human security. Yet, Haitians' distrust of their own government limits progress in improving governance. Governance has external consequences also. Among the obstacles to moving toward a viable recovery and transition to a reconstruction phase is the weak Haitian justice system. This has become what may be a major impediment to the transfer of U.S. funding, as concerns exist about the ability of the government to present a legal system strong enough to deter the misappropriation of reconstruction funds. Any long term solution in Haiti must address governance in better ways.

Haitians must take greater and more effective local ownership in both the government and private sectors. Stronger engagement is needed by the host country government and community mechanisms in defining, then addressing, "needs." Host government entities have long been subsidized, trained, equipped and otherwise supported in this regard by the international community. However, Government of Haiti counterparts have become very comfortable with only contributing as much or as little as they always have and no more, as they know that the international donor community will continue to assist. As a result, there is little incentive for communities and individuals to think beyond what has become the acceptable norm. New efforts and new ideas need to be embraced by the host government and the people. The international community may need to take a step back once the situation is stabilized and prescribe some harsh medicine for the patients. For example, foreign donations may need to be matched, not exceeded, by host country "donations," whether in cash or in-kind.

As things currently stand, there are still an insufficient number of skilled and knowledgeable host country management groups to meet the needs and act as counterparts to donor initiatives. Centralized systems, while arguably a defensible approach in the abstract, are unlikely to be successful in the Haiti context. An effort should be made to establish a decentralized system of contacts between the international community and Haitian institutions at all levels in order to deliver assistance. Such assistance, however, must be organized and pursued in ways that impact on the local level and through increased participation of local communities ensures that local ownership extends to all citizens.

Too often, previous agreements on development projects between the government and donors have been unrealistically made and soon broken. The host country commitment has often proved to be more than the Haitian government knowingly can or will actually deliver. This results in a quandary in which the foreign donor must either: (1) increase their own support in order to meet the objectives, (2) permit the host authority to invest less and accept the objective may be compromised, or (3) penalize the host authority for missing the commitment by proportionally reducing the foreign donor investment and accepting that the objectives may be compromised. Even dismissing corruption and gamesmanship, such false commitments are a disservice to the Haitian people and compromise donor support. Responsibility for investment and outcome must be borne by host authorities. Such an approach raises questions of evaluation and reporting standards that concern donors, but the Haitian politicians and bureaucrats must be held accountable by the people.

Outside intervention by any actor has potential consequences for the host nation government's exercise of sovereignty and may affect its legitimacy at home or abroad. All "foreign" aid of any kind is currently registered and nominally approved by host-country authorities prior to transfer or engagement. Adequate international safeguards, though seemingly intrusive, must remain in place. It is important that host authorities develop the managerial capacity required to monitor and manage foreign aid and keep accurate records readily available for public and international donor inspection. Issues and irregularities must be duly noted and effectively dealt with in a timely manner.¹⁰

Funding has dynamics beyond waste and corruption. Long-term development professionals looked at the Indian Ocean tsunami for lessons in dealing with a massive natural disaster and an appropriate response effort. During that response, a large portion of the international aid received was channeled through the specially created Bureau for Recovery and Reconstruction (BRR). The BRR was a host government-led multi-donor vehicle to approve and promote the strategic placement of incoming aid and assistance, in an effort to "build back better." A somewhat similar mechanism, specially tailored to Haiti, was created and titled the Interim Humanitarian Recovery Commission (IHRC). The IHRC is the mechanism to administer the \$9 billion of pledged international donor reconstruction funding. Both the dynamics of availability of funds and the character of earlier expenditures play a significant role in determining the nature of the reconstruction period and the options open to the IHRC.

Funds and pledge dynamics can be problematic. The expression "follow the money" is applicable here. For example, the United States has pledged \$1.15 billion for rebuilding Haiti, but as of early October, some nine months after the disaster, no rebuilding funds have been received. This stands in contrast to the very rapid expenditure of \$1.1 billion on direct relief. It is interesting to note, however, that a considerable portion of this expenditure has been tied to the Port au Prince metropolitan area. As a consequence, towns and villages have been left behind, thus encouraging a continuing migration to Port au Prince.

And, perhaps, the biggest funding incongruity confronting the international community assistance efforts is the simple fact that it is unreasonable to expect Haiti to effectively absorb billions in international donation assistance in the time frame of three years. Nothing in Haiti's or the international community's experiences suggest otherwise. New thinking needs to occur in regard to "how" this can be approached. The objectives are understood and the resources are slowly aligning, but Haiti's own assistance related issues of dependency and mismanagement – and, yes corruption – must be addressed in whatever concept is used to dispense this assistance.

The international private sector, while not a "formal" relief and reconstruction player, may have an important impact on the long-term nature of the reconstruction process. Clearly, external private sector investment in the Haitian economy is desirable, and achievable if the environment evolves appropriately. However, the private sector should be looked to for more than investment and to assist with nearer term issues. As an illustration, the inadequacy of building codes was a significant factor in the number of deaths. Three leading digital imaging companies are working on the development and implementation of a standardized building code system for Haiti's reconstruction. Eastman Kodak Company, Context America, and BMI are developing the capability to facilitate the review of building plans online. Such needs and contributions should be an inherent part of new thinking in relief and reconstruction.

Relief efforts and reconstruction need to be thought of in a holistic manner in Haiti by both the government and donors because everything is interconnected. For example, it is worth noting that currently the necessity to clear rubble does not stand alone as a clearly defined objective to be accomplished by the expenditure of "X" dollars and human resources. In Haiti land owner-

¹⁰ Funding irregularities and corruption are obvious issues in this regard, but the government should be equally concerned with whether relief and developmental activities are having unintended consequences.

ship is a big factor, and as long as the rubble is not blocking general access, it is technically not a state responsibility. Further, an estimated 70 percent of landowners do not have title, leading to multiple claims of ownership, leaving urban planners with the prospect of building around undisturbed rubble for years to come.

What reconstruction should focus on merits thought and debate, particularly in regard to the Economy. No matter whatever economic sector ultimately dominates, reconstruction in Haiti in the foreseeable future is as much about developing a viable agricultural foundation as it is about rebuilding infrastructure. A solid agricultural base stems the migrate flow to the city and makes Haiti more self-sustaining. The long-term planning of the U.S. government and the government of Haiti has been about strengthening decentralized agricultural systems and encouraging nationals to invest in local economic opportunities. It seems clear that a strong agrarian base needs to continue to be a priority.

And finally, climate conditions will prove to be an important element during the transition period. Haiti normally experiences periods of heavy rains. Given the large encampments of displaced persons, urgent attention needs to be paid to the provision of adequate shelter. The storms in late September destroyed several thousand tents sheltering the displaced. Those living in temporary wood or metal shelters were less affected, but these were relatively few in number. Dealing with the impact of these events is clearly a function of available resources. Delays can, arguably, have a negative impact on other transition efforts as well as reinforce long-standing convictions on the part of the populace that the government is incapable of looking out for their interests, and further fueling the donor dependency cycle.

CONCLUSIONS

This past year in Haiti has tested the humanitarian and development community to a degree never previously experienced. The magnitude of the urban disaster caught relief and development personnel unprepared. Nonetheless, the rapid use of long-practiced procedures and the distribution of stock-piled materials and deployment of skilled personnel, the issue of coordination notwithstanding, were impressive, as was the rapid establishment of a multi-billion dollar assistance fund. And yet by most accounts Haiti remains in an emergency relief phase. The national and local political scene remains fragile. As noted, there is a strong consensus within the United Nations and among international donors that Haiti must “build back better.” In the view of some, upcoming elections are seen as an opportunity to install a government capable of achieving this vision. There are, however, many levels of decision making involved in reaching such a goal as well as competing interests in accepting what “building back better” means and in whose interest. Given the history of social and economic divisions in Haiti, developing a strategy for achieving a better Haiti will be a formidable task.

International and national electoral experts are negotiating a questionably legal revision concerning presidential candidates for a run-off, largely to quell an array of violent street riots. The absence of elected personnel to participate in governing bodies and processes continues to be partially to blame for the lack of robust stabilization and development activities. However, the problems are deeper and broader than this and competence, corruption, dependency behaviors, commitment, and ownership all play roles in the current dismal environment. Haitians, in light of a long history of instability, need to see progress in reconstruction ending with the emergence of credible institutions. They also need to have a sense that it is in their interest to be part of the process needed to achieve this end. The international community bears a significant burden in supporting the framework required to bring this about.

The overall security situation remains precarious. Gangs are recovering rapidly while the public security sector reorganizes too slowly. A stronger international security presence may be required for a time until the outcomes of the November elections are clearer, the pace of reconstruction picks up and Haitian security forces improved.

Hundreds of thousands of nationals remain displaced, many in temporary shelters that were purposefully designed and installed to act only as short term transitional dwellings. The bulk of the population remains largely unemployed, and make-shift systems, initially established to provide temporary basic social services, are steadily becoming more permanent in the absence of the restoration of more complete public services. At the same time, the transient nature of the population makes more difficult the establishment of common systems, standards and behaviors. Clearly, the problems of shelter and employment need to be addressed and could be a stimulus for the economy if land laws and other obstacles can get the attention they require.

All of the above demands the immediate establishment of an international coordinating body, with perhaps a limited, but sufficient term of authority. Such a body, empowered through respect for its members and the necessary political and fiscal authority to act, could negotiate and hold Haitians accountable for responsible reconstruction. In acting, the body should not overlook Haitian history and the lessons of the past. Among the major lessons must be that program operations during the response and transition phases can have a significant effect on long term reconstruction. In other words, as the relief continues and transitions into reconstruction, relief and transition operations must seek to facilitate follow-on reconstruction or development. Neither can the international body fail to recognize how previous practices of the international community impact on a country in recovery. In this regard, consideration must be given to how to change social imperatives and practices that past efforts have shaped. Any successful international strategy must deal with the circumstances of today, the continuities from the past and the changes necessary to build a stable state. It is a difficult task no doubt, but the Haitian people through proper leadership must be led to share the goal of a successful society and state. They deserve no less.

CHAPTER 14

TRANSITION: POST KOREAN WAR, REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Joseph Pak
United States Force Korea

The Republic of Korea today is itself a memorial to American and Korean sacrifices which is written not in stone but on living hearts in our flesh and blood.... Korea is great not because the USA is great; the USA is better, or great, because Korea is great. That is the kind of relationships we have between ourselves and the ROK, my fellow veterans of Korea. We must preserve, defend, and ever build higher our relationship.

Louis T. Dechert, Korean War Veterans Association, 2008¹

INTRODUCTION

A modern, democratic country, the Republic of Korea (ROK or also referred to as South Korea) is an economic powerhouse with between the 12th and 13th largest gross domestic product (GDP) in the world. Scholars and pundits offer many explanations that identify one factor or another as being critical to the ROK's democratization and economic successes. Regardless of their emphasis, all agree that since the founding of the ROK in 1948 her journey has been arduous and complicated by internecine and often violent struggles. The ROK's transition from a highly autocratic government in a devastated and impoverished post-conflict environment into a mature, liberal democracy where its citizens enjoy a panoply of civil rights and benefits from a robust economy is a testament to what is possible when a donor nation persists in assisting another even though the motivation is largely self-interest. It is also a testimony of the persistence required by the host nation and an illustration of the often convoluted route to national success. Further, South Korea illustrates the role of the United States military and security played in the creation of a modern state. This paper examines the issues and challenges for the Republic of Korea during the years from 1953 to 1988 as a modern nation emerged and seeks to provide insights in regard to how this occurred and the role of the U.S. military in the process.

OVERVIEW

To United States foreign policy-makers at the end of World War II the Korean peninsula was considered of little strategic importance. Nonetheless it was an issue that had to be politically dealt with among the allies and the manner in which it was addressed created the conditions for what followed. In his book, *Nation Building in South Korea*, Gregg Brazinsky describes the precarious commitment the United States assumed:

Unable to compromise with the Soviet Union on the creation of a unified Korean government, the United States supported the division of the peninsula into separate states in 1948. By doing so, it (United States) invested a substantial amount of its own credibility in the survival and success of anti-Communist South Korea.²

1 Louis T. Dechert, "Korean War Veterans Association Website," June 12, 2008; available from http://www.kwva.org/update/archives_dechert/i_update_080612_dechert_last_gb.htm, accessed February 16, 2011.

2 Gregg Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy* (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), p.2.

Notwithstanding its initial strategic indifference, the United States provided various limited mechanisms to aid the emerging Republic of Korea (ROK) from 1945 to 1950 as the parameters of the Cold War became clearer. And despite the existence of policymakers in D.C. who repeatedly wanted to extricate from the Korean peninsula, a U.S. presence remained. Soon after the establishment of the Republic, President Harry Truman made a rare declaration of U.S. foreign policy aims in Korea and foreshadowed the future relationship in his message to Congress of June 7, 1949, on economic assistance to South Korea:

Korea has become a testing ground in which the validity and practical value of the ideas and principles of democracy which the Republic is putting into practice are being matched against the practices of communism which have been imposed upon the people of North Korea....the Korean Republic, by demonstrating the success and tenacity of democracy in resisting communism, will stand as a beacon to the people of Northern Asia in resisting the control of the communist forces which have overrun them.³

On June 25, 1950 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) invaded South Korea. North Korea was supported by the Soviet Union with military aid and by the forces of the new People's Republic of China (PRC). The South was supported by military forces and aid from the United States and its United Nations (UN) partners. Severe combat action swept up and down the peninsula, but neither side could defeat the other and unite Korea into one nation. An armistice was signed on July 27, 1953 and a precarious "peace" dominated by North Korean threats and provocations still endures today.⁴ For the next 40 years security dominated the concerns of South Korea's governments and allies. Korea's development cannot be understood without grasping this.

Since the founding of the republic in 1948, the South Korean people have found themselves in the midst of a worldwide struggle between liberal capitalism and communism. At the same time, the whole of the Korean people have also been involved in a continuing struggle for the unification of the peninsula and the nation. For the first 40 years South Korean governments were characterized by political factionalism and autocratic feudalism. Truman's "putting into practice" of democratic principles would fail numerous times before the 1990s.⁵

The most central concerns for both the North and South during the first decade after the Korean War were to rebuild their respective nations and unify Korea under their own terms – be it under communism or democracy. Economically and politically, the ROK was at a disadvantage *vis-à-vis* North Korea for a number of reasons.⁶ Real wealth in the South was depleted by a third by the time the armistice was signed in 1953. Never economically developed, the war had left the South with over three million refugees from the North. Most South Koreans lived a very harsh life below the level of subsistence. Health care and other services were not much better for those above the poverty line. Economic recovery was slow. The average growth of the Gross National Product (GNP) was merely 1% per year. The economy was kept from collapse only through massive economic assistance by the United States.⁷ In fact, the U.S. government provided 95%

3 U.S. Congress, Senate, "The United States and the Korean Problem: Documents 7943-7953," *83rd Cong., 1st sess.* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 29-32.

4 For a good history of the war see Robert Leckie, *Conflict: The History of the Korean War* (New York: Putnam, 1962).

5 Han Tai-soo, "A Review of Political Party Activities in Korea (1945-1954)," *Korean Affairs*, Vol. I, No. 4, 1962, pp. 413-27.

6 Thayer Watkins, "The Economy of South Korea," available from <http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/korea1.htm>, accessed January 17, 2011.

7 Irma Adelman, "Social Development In Korea, 1953-1993," available from <http://are.berkeley.edu/~adelman/KOREA.html>, accessed February 17, 2011. Myung Soo Cha, "The Economic History of

of all foreign aid that the ROK received in the post-Korean War decade with the other 5% coming from the UN Korea Reconstruction Agency. Notably, this agency received 2/3 of its funding from the United States.⁸

As we are re-learning in Iraq and Afghanistan, “democracy on steroids” did not prove conducive to nation building in the ROK. Democratic politics were initially more problematic than helpful. Factionalism dominated politics in the South and the military essentially kept control, while the North Korean government was able to consolidate power swiftly after a series of purges and quickly recovered from the war with economic assistance from the Soviet Union. The latter influenced in large part by the fact the North had been more industrially developed before the war and retained most of its human capital. To all appearances the ROK lagged behind communist North Korea in all aspects of rapid recovery, especially economically, until the late mid-1970s.⁹

The post war situation in Korea was grave for South Korea and the United States and other countries involved. South Korean survival and global peace hung in the balance. Some might argue the U.S. government maintained peremptory influence over the ROK government throughout the critical turning points in the South’s history, but the situation was far more complicated. U.S. government policy sought to allow democracy to mature at its own pace and maintain international stability by simply supporting the government in power. Others argue that the U.S. interest in Korea was simply to block expansion of communism.¹⁰ And this is true, but does not solely account for how policy was pursued. Arguments of peremptory U.S. influence and purely U.S. security interests also ignore the role of South Korea’s own policymakers. ROK leaders, including Rhee Syng-man, Park Chung-Hee, and Chun Doo-Hwan were very aware of U.S. interests and keenly strove to ensure their own national priorities first.¹¹

Rhee’s administration used U.S. foreign aid during the 1950s to build an infrastructure that included a nationwide network of primary and secondary schools, modern roads, and a modern communications network. While Rhee’s term ended in a bitter student uprising that led to a military coup d’état in 1961, Rhee’s administration with U.S. support transitioned from a failed state to one with a potential foundation for a future successful republic.¹²

Shortly following the student revolt, Army Major General Park Chung-hee and a military junta assumed power from the government. Park maneuvered himself into the presidency in 1963, beginning the Third Republic. Notwithstanding Park’s harsh and unyielding authoritarian presidency, his economic planning set up the ROK’s overall economic success. Park’s policies transforming his country from a backward agricultural state into a modern industrial nation faced stiff resistance from his own people and drew strong criticism from his staunchest ally, the United States, as his actions often seemed to conflict with democratic rule. In addition, Park demanded equal recognition of his regime’s interests and he sought greater sovereignty from

Korea,” February 1, 2010; available from <http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/cha.korea>, accessed February 17, 2011.

8 Edward S. Mason, et al., *The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 189.

9 Ibid, Brazinsky, pg.113-125.

10 George F. Kennan, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, laid out the seminal Cold War geostrategy in his Long Telegram and *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*. He coined the term “containment.” George F. Kennan, “The Long Telegram,” February 22, 1946; available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm>, accessed February 17, 2011.

11 Lee Wha Rang, “Who Was Rhee Syngman?” 22 February 2000; available from <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/55a/186.html>, accessed February 17, 2011. Brazinsky, p. 8.

12 “The Syngman Rhee Era, 1946-60,” *South Korea: A Country Study*, eds., Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1990), available from <http://countrystudies.us/south-korea/>, accessed February 17, 2011.

foreign powers, to include the United States. Park was assassinated by a once considered close confidant and the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), Kim Jae-Kyu, on October 26, 1979.¹³

Shortly after Park's death, another military man, Major General Chun Doo-Hwan, the commander of the Defense Security Command (DSC), took control and assumed the presidency. He served from 1980-1988. Chun is unfavorably remembered by his countrymen for the brutal suppression of the Gwangju uprising, his blatant corruption and nepotism, and as the first president to receive a death sentence. In the case of the latter, the sentence resulted from his role in the Gwangju massacre, but he was pardoned.¹⁴

Chun Doo-Hwan's high school and military friend, Roh Tae-Woo, who played a major supporting role during the 1979 coup, replaced Chun as president in what are considered the first truly open elections in 1988 as a result of disagreements among other competing politicians. Roh is remembered largely for his role as the presiding president of the Seoul Olympics in 1988 and his foreign policy of *nordpolitik*. Perhaps most importantly, Roh merits credit for keeping his campaign promise of democratic reform, offered in an attempt to retain military control within the Korean government. It was not until after Roh Tae-Woo, who handed the military led government over to Kim Yong-Sam, that true democratic government was established in South Korea. Roh, charged for his role in the Gwangju massacre as well as bribery and corruption, was also sentenced to death and subsequently pardoned.¹⁵

Sixty years after the outbreak of Korean War, the Republic of Korea revels in the title of "Miracle on the Han River" and is a flourishing free-market democracy, in spite of provocations and attacks by the communist regime in North Korea that have continued from the signing of the Armistice in 1953 to the recent sinking of ROK Navy Corvette Cheonan on March 26, 2010. There are many explanations for the growth of the ROK economy and the emerging democracy, but clearly among the variables of success the hardworking people of the ROK and their leaders deserve much credit for their success, even while many of the leaders' motivations were mixed. U.S. policy and the U.S. military also played instrumental roles as the Korean economic and democratic drama unfolded.¹⁶

13 Ibid., "The Democratic Interlude" and "PARK CHUNG HEE, 1961-79." In 1961 General Park Chung Hee overthrew the popularly elected Prime Minister Chang Myon, ending the Second Republic.

14 Seo, Joong Suk, *Republic of Korea Recent History* (Seoul Korea: UnJin JieSik House, 2009), pp. 304-334. Jo, Gap-je and Lee, Dong-uk, [Biography of Park Chung-hee] *Spit on My Grave!*, in *The Chosun Ilbo* (in Korean), December 7, 2007; available from http://news.chosun.com/svc/content_view/content_view.html?contid=1997120770206, accessed February 17, 2011. For a brief description of the Gwangju Uprising, later recognized as the Gwangju Democratization Movement, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gwangju_massacre, accessed February 17, 2011. After his sentence was finalized, Chun began his life in prison. On 22 December 1997, Chun's sentence was commuted by President Kim Young-sam.

15 Seo, Joong Suk, p. 332. *Nordpolitik*, or northern politics, referred to the 1983 policy that guided ROK efforts to reach out to the traditional allies of North Korea. The ultimate goal was to normalized relations with the People's Republic of China and Soviet Union, both to improve the South's economy and to leave the North so isolated that it would have no choice but to open itself up and reduce military tensions.

16 Terry Young, "Re-Assessing the Health of the Asian Tigers," *Graziadio Business Review*, Vol.3, No.1 (2000); available from <http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/001/tigers.html>, accessed February 17, 2011. Dick K. Nanto, *North Korea: Chronology of Provocations, 1950 - 2003*, Congressional Research Service; available from <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl30004.pdf>, accessed February 17, 2011. *New York Times*, "The Cheonan (Ship)," May 20, 2010; available from http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/cheonan_ship/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=Cheonan&st=cse, accessed February 17, 2011.


A LONG AND ARDUOUS TRANSITION

Allied indecision and a two-state policy may have created a distinct South Korea, but the ROK was established as a fact by war. It was a war in which the United States invested both treasure and blood.

The miracle that is the Republic of Korea is the result of the hard work and sacrifice of the Korean people, but it was made possible but for the sacrifices of the American 'sons and daughters' who answered the call to defend a country they never knew and a people they never met.¹⁷

The massive role of the U.S. military in Korea was motivated by the sudden attack from North Korea in late June 1950. This surprise attack served to validate the strategy of containment argued for in NSC-68; that is, the need to aggressively contain all communist ambitions.

Prior to the attack, only 510 servicemen were based in South Korea. The war provoked an immediate U.S. response and a sustained U.S. military presence on the peninsula that continues today. U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) records show that 326,863 troops were deployed in South Korea in 1953, a number that stabilized between 50,000 and 60,000 in the 1960s and 1970s. A slow drawdown ensued afterwards with troop strengths averaging 40,000 in the 1980s and 35,000 in the 1990s. The U.S. Forces Korea graph depicts the U.S. Forces in Korea overtime



Source: ROK Embassy website. (See - http://www.koreaembassyusa.org/images/sub_img/military_01.jpg)

from 1945 to 2008.¹⁸ The presence of these troops had economic, security, and political consequences for both nations.

The war had devastated an already poor South. Compared with the more industrial North, South Korea was mostly a subsistence level agrarian society before the war and remained so in the war's aftermath. Domestically, the young republic was inundated with problems that would challenge the abilities of the most talented politician. Estimates of the number of civilians killed during the war ranged from 1,500,000-3,000,000; most estimate closer to 2,000,000. More civilians died in the ROK than in communist North Korea during the war. Already a fragile state before

17 Col. Bryan Groves, "Stability Operations in the Republic of Korea," PKSOI Blog, June 24, 2010; accessed from <http://pksoi.army.mil/blog/article.cfm?blog=PKSOI&article=117>, accessed February 17, 2011. Part of this quote is from the Korean War Memorial in Washington, D.C.; available from <http://www.defense.gov/specials/koreanwar/stamp.html>, accessed February 17, 2011.

18 "The Remaining Course Of Action--A Rapid Build-Up Of Political, Economic, And Military Strength In The Free World," in NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950; available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68-9.htm>, accessed February 17, 2011. Tim Kane, Ph.D., Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003, Heritage Foundation, October 27, 2004, available from <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/10/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003>, accessed February 17, 2011.

the war, the massive loss of people and the number of displaced persons in a largely agrarian environment put the ROK at a disadvantage in stabilizing its society relative to its enemy to the North. Factions vied for power in the new republic and the ROK's first President, Rhee Syung-Man, was overwhelmed with the complexity of building a nation from scratch while trying to maintain his political power among the factions.¹⁹

Unemployment and the accompanying poverty were ultimately the primary sources of disapproval of Rhee's governance. His government was confronted with tens of thousands of unemployed as well as over 100,000 war orphans and widows. The need to find employment for discharged veterans exacerbated the problem. While exact statistics and figures are not available, in 1961 it was estimated that there were about 279,000 unemployed. Among these were 72,000 university graduates and 51,000 discharged soldiers and recently laid-off workers. The country's economy was not meeting the needs of its people and the unemployed provided a powder keg of anger and resentment that waited only for a spark to set it off.²⁰

However challenged, inept, corrupted, or unlucky Rhee was in economic policy he understood the threat the North posed and the opportunity the United States represented. Realizing that the conclusion of an armistice agreement was inevitable, Rhee sent a letter to President Eisenhower in regard to future security. The letter proposed the ROK and United States sign a Mutual Defense Treaty equivalent to the bi-lateral treaties between the United States and the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, once an armistice agreement was signed. It also asked for economic aid to rebuild Korea. In October 1953, the Republic of Korea and the United States signed the Mutual Defense Treaty. The Mutual Defense Treaty provided the basis for U.S. forces stationed in Korea to deter another Korean war. Initially, the U.S. troop strength was approximately 300,000. However by 1955, the U.S. Army had reduced its forces to a single corps consisting two divisions.²¹ The threat from the North never abated:

Between 1946 and 1959 alone, there occurred some 1,200 unequivocal instances of guerrilla war, organized terrorism, mutiny, coup d'états, and so forth. Therefore, barring some unforeseen improvement in men's political judgment, the future of revolution seems assured.²²

While Rhee's security arrangements, troublesome as the North Koreans were, ensured the survival of the state, Rhee's strongman style of governance was never able to create a viable economy or the desired human security. He was forced to resign in April of 1960 as a result of student protests and among charges of corruption. His authoritarian rule left a political vacuum in which an inept parliamentary form of government could not maintain law and order in the face of continued student violence.

The Tipping Point

In the early morning of May 16, 1961, Major General Park Chung-Hee led a military coup that began a new chapter in Korean modern history. By March 1962 he was acting president and in 1963 became president by a narrow margin in the prevailing indirect election process. Coups are often about power and elites remaining in power, however, "in general, those who

19 Ibid, Brazinsky, pg.35

20 Asianinfo Website, "Democratic Revolution;" available from http://asianinfo.org/asianinfo/korea/history/korean_war.htm, accessed February 17, 2011.

21 Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, 1953; available from [http://www.usfk.mil/usfk/\(S\(awrhugnp0in5lledkbfuxn45\)A\(GGOUiYrywEkAAAAANzdmNDE0MWEtYmU2Yy00NTYxLTk0ZjctNDA4MwY3ZjczODgwI2NS4JUw-7Ikusu0s07J4kybs1\)\)/ShowContent.aspx?ID=76](http://www.usfk.mil/usfk/(S(awrhugnp0in5lledkbfuxn45)A(GGOUiYrywEkAAAAANzdmNDE0MWEtYmU2Yy00NTYxLTk0ZjctNDA4MwY3ZjczODgwI2NS4JUw-7Ikusu0s07J4kybs1))/ShowContent.aspx?ID=76), or http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp.

22 Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 172.

had engineered the coup were relatively young men with peasant backgrounds and who in many cases had known poverty their whole lives.”²³ Park was new to politics and politics and the Presidency became a journey of discovery and learning for him. Park Chung Hee’s initial challenge was to gain approbation from the United States and a degree of legitimacy to sustain needed aid. Any disruption in U.S. aid potentially communicated that the United States did not support Park and his administration would fall prey to the insidious political infighting of Korean politics. Not knowing the (U.S.) red line, Park cleverly contrived his domestic agenda, as did his successor, Chun Doo-Hwan, in regard to foreign policy with the United States.²⁴

Park effectively reorganized the South Korean economic model around export oriented industrialization, focusing on industries where South Korea had a competitive advantage in the international market place. His policies set new records in economic growth. His administration stimulated economic growth by promoting indigenous industry through imparting special privileges to industries that were able to acquire foreign currencies in exchange for their product. The influx of foreign currency helped build capital, stimulated job growth, and improved the quality of life of Koreans. The export-based industrialization and somewhat collusive economic policies initially incurred skepticism among U.S. economic advisors as such models were unsuccessful in many underdeveloped countries. However, Park’s assessment of the energy and drive of the Korean people proved right and he moved the economy beyond reliance on U.S. aid.²⁵

A 1997 Congressional Budget Office report succinctly captures the essence of Park’s approach:

The most important period in South Korea’s development began after the fall of the regime of Syngman Rhee in 1960. General Park Chung Hee, who took over in a military coup in 1961, instituted a process of economic reform. He devalued the currency, reformed interest rates, imposed tighter fiscal policies, lowered trade barriers, and, especially, put in place a number of incentives to encourage exports. In many ways, South Korea’s exports were the central driver of its successful development. The government has maintained a relatively open, market-based economy ever since. In addition, the government has been stable and a competent administrator, with only relatively modest amounts of corruption.

Foreign aid after 1960 contributed to South Korea’s successful development. It provided an extra pool of capital that the economy used for saving and investment. The Agency for International Development (AID) provided extensive technical support to the officials and agencies responsible for South Korea’s export drive. U.S. military aid helped Korea with its defense needs and thus possibly freed up some resources that could be used for development rather than for the military. Foreign assistance also helped improve South Korea’s health, education, and agriculture sectors.²⁶

What the report encapsulates are the critical ingredients of successful economic development in weak states. Park takes local ownership of the problem and originates a Korean solution. In Park’s model, Korea lessens the dependency cycle on the United States even as it makes better use of U.S. aid to become self-sustaining. Park focuses the aid on building capacity, knowing

23 Hahn Bae-ho and Kim Kyu-taik, “Korean Political Leaders (1952- 1962): Their Social Origins and Skills,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 3, No. 7 (July 1963), pp. 309-II.

24 Mark L. Clifford, *Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South Korea*, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 1994.

25 Park Chung Hee, *Our Nation’s Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction*, Hollym Corporation Publishers, Seoul, Korea, 1970.

26 Congressional Budget Office, *THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AID IN DEVELOPMENT: South Korea and The Philippines*, September 1997; available from <http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=4306&type=0>, accessed on February 17, 2011.

in the long run South Korea is stronger if it is economically interdependent with as opposed to dependent on the United States. He leverages the presence of the U.S. military not only for its security value, but as a strategic means to free up funds for purposes other than security.

By far, the most significant contribution of the U.S. military in the ROK was to provide the security framework which enabled the ROK leadership to focus on ameliorating their economic development.²⁷ As indicated above, the continued defense of the republic was a salient problem after the war. The U.S. military provided a much needed security structure. It not only provided the modern military power to directly deter major North Korean aggression, but it also provided substantial training and mentoring to the ROK military. The U.S. military engendered the ROK to transform its military into a well-organized, highly educated, and advanced institution. Beyond encouraging and assisting in the development of combat units, the U.S. military focused on the development of the Korean officer corps. These educated and trained officers later served their country well in various capacities after their military service. Though there were a number of ROK officers that held reservations in accepting U.S. tutelage, and at times displayed truculent nationalism, the military's aspirations to modernize and defend the nation's freedom overcame such vexations.

President Park, as were many ROK leaders, was one of the recipients of the U.S. military sponsored training programs. Park attended the U.S. Army's artillery school at Fort Sill, Oklahoma in 1954.²⁸ While such experiences were not necessarily a comprehensive paradigm for molding the young republic, the exchange training opportunities in America exposed numerous ROK officers, subsequent future leaders, to a vibrant democracy supported by a efficacious economy. These officers did not become Americanized; however, they may well have developed their own national vision for a successful South Korea and a proper role for a democratic military.

U.S. forces in Korea also provided additional direct and indirect assistance in the development of Korea. The U.S. government's facilities offered employment opportunities that ranged from engineers and accountants to grounds maintenance and cook's helpers. Through partnership and individual and organized unit initiatives U.S. troops participated in numerous beneficial activities that helped alleviate poverty and provide economic opportunity. Among the many humanitarian activities were the building and adoption of schools, outreach and financial support of orphanages, adoption of unwanted children, and support to higher learning institutions.²⁹ Directly and indirectly, U.S. servicemen's expenditures stimulated the local economy around the U.S. military bases. Not all of this was good, as the presence of so many foreign soldiers corrupted the local cultural practices, inflated prices, and created opportunities for vice and crime.

Nor was the flow of military benefits entirely one-sided. During the construction of the first South Korean highway (*Gyeongbu Expressway*), 416 kilometers of modern roadway connecting Seoul and Busan, in the late 1960's, President Park asked the U.S. military to provide construc-

27 Robert A. Scalapino, "The Challenges Ahead," Tong Whan Park, (ed.), *The U.S. and the Two Koreas: A New Triangle*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998, p. 56.

28 Ibid, Brazinsky, pg.113-125.

29 The evidence in this regard abounds. The U.S. Army 40th Infantry Division is remembered for its role in establishing one of the high schools in Gapyong Korea; available from <http://www.gapyong.hs.kr/G>. The early role is documented by William F. Asbury, "Military Help to Korean Orphans: A Survey Made for the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Forces, Far East, and for the Chief of Chaplains of the United States Army," 1954; available from www.koreanchildren.org/docs/CCF-002.htm, accessed February 17, 2011. According to the report 50 orphanages were built and another 65 were underway. Asbury also documents all the engineering and other projects (some 1828) underway as well as the unit volunteer efforts. The pattern of assistance never ceased. The U. S. Army, took care of 65 percent of the material needs of orphanages. Eighth Army statistics showed that "Troop Aid (Voluntary), from 1 July 1950 through 31 October 1953 was estimated to be \$1,156,194.63."

tion equipment. In return, the ROK government promised to exempt the U.S. military from paying the highway toll fee, indefinitely. The *Gyeongbu* Expressway is a monument to the ROK economic development and is celebrated as one of the hallmarks of President Park's legacy. Its construction also represents a partnership in which a quid pro quo gave benefits to both participants.

Equally important, U.S. military commanders at all levels encouraged their ROK counterparts to participate in civic action projects, including lending assistance and providing equipment for Park's New Community Movement (*Saemaoul Undong*). The New Community Movement did much to improve the infrastructure in rural South Korea. It brought modernized facilities such as water systems, bridges and roads to rural communities. The program also marked the widespread appearance of orange tiled houses throughout the countryside, replacing the traditional straw-thatched or *choga-jip* houses.³⁰ While *Saemaoul Undong* was clearly Park's most famous rebuilding project, an Army colonel, C.A. Anderson, who started the 4-H Club movement in Korea in 1947, influenced Park's thinking. Anderson, serving under the U.S. occupation forces, started a 4-H Club to promote youth activities. By 1967, there were 29,821 4-H clubs with 762,182 members.³¹ U.S. military member participation like that of Anderson modeled the way for Koreans to mobilize and take charge of their future. Encouraging their counterparts to participate in civic action, U.S. military leaders helped Korean officers to build a mutual respect with the Korean people.

Park Chung-hee approached security policy in a similar nationalistic and realistic manner as he did economic policy, judging what Korea had to offer in regard to U.S. interests and leveraging that to gain advantage. He sent approximately 320,000 ROK troops to fight in the Vietnam War. This calculus paid a large dividend for Park in terms of political support from the United States and additional U.S. aid in return for his country's participation in the war.³² When President Nixon in the early 1970s reduced the U.S. forces in Korea by withdrawing one of the two divisions in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, Park sensed a transition opportunity. The U.S. policy encouraged the ROK to take a larger role in its own defense and Park seized the opportunity for a more equal partnership and greater Korean nationalism. A Combined Forces Command (CFC) was formed in 1978, and this combined ROK-U.S. organization assumed primary responsibility for prosecuting any future Korean War. By 1979, after President Carter abandoned a plan to withdraw all U.S. ground forces from the ROK, the U.S. Army's involvement leveled off at 43,000 troops.³³

Understanding Success

If, as this paper argues, Park's Administration marks a tipping point in South Korea's transition to a sovereign and legitimate democratic state it is fair to ask why this is the case and what are the lessons that can be drawn from the ROK-U.S. experience.

Park ruled in South Korea with an iron-fist for eighteen years (1961-1979), sixteen of which were spent as president. The hallmarks of his presidency were mixed and provide insights into how modern nations are formed. He was a military usurper turned autocratic leader, but more than this he was a nationalist who wanted his people to rise above their poverty. If autocratic in style, he focused the government and nation on setting conditions for economic success that


30 <http://saemaoul.net/background.asp>

31 In 1952, the Korean government designated 4-H as a national project. Since then, 4-H became the primitive model of the nation-wide Sae-ma-ul movement in Korea. In general, 4-H activities have grown enormously enough to lead the modernization and democracy of rural communities in Korea. See- <http://english.4-h.or.kr/>

32 Ibid, Brazinsky, pg.133, 136-41, 150.

33 See, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2140>.

ultimately led to a democratic ROK. Park's authoritarian legacy draws both condemnation and praise even today. However, his presidency marks the major shift in the ROK's transition from an impoverished, war-torn agricultural economy to a modern industrial democracy. Today, Park is regarded as the greatest president the ROK has ever had as indicated in the poll findings below.



Source : Kukinews poll August 2008 (60th Anniversary of ROK) www.kukinews.com

Park's career raises the oft embarrassing question of what kind of leader is required to transform a failing state into a successful one in the modern world. And, of course, that depends on the context of conditions, culture, and actors:

Nation-building suggests an architectural or mechanical model. As a house can be built from timber, bricks, and mortar, in different patterns, quickly or slowly, through different sequences of assembly, in partial independence from its setting, and according to the choice, will, and power of its builders, so a nation can be built according to different plans, from various materials, rapidly or gradually, by different sequences of steps, and in partial independence from its environment.³⁴

As the earlier overview illustrates Park and those who preceded and followed him were not ideal leaders. What is important about Park is that despite his participation in the military coup, negative aspects of his authoritarian rule, and corruption, he maintained a singular focus on the object that could change the conditions of failure that plagued South Korea. He did what needed to be done to build the economic engine that could fund those foundations that gave his nation legitimacy as a state and its claim to full sovereignty. For Park, security and political power were essential, but not sufficient.

While insidious factionalism and corruption in Korean politics were to linger after Park, as the economy grew and human security improved the demands for democracy and good governance accelerated. The economic stagnation and dependency inherent to the pre-Park régime precluded political progress and kept the elites of the factional parties in positions of relative power within the state. Park changed these dynamics and used U.S. aid in a new way to leverage Korea's strengths and break the cycles of poverty and dependency. Park's changes empowered

34 Karl W. Deutsch, "Nation-building and National Development: Some Issues for Political Research" in *Nation-Building in Comparative Context*, eds., Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), p.3.


and encouraged others to enter into the building of the state economically and politically. As time passed, political parties continue to be important but they are less about elite factions and more about democratic governance.

This paper suggests to some degree Park’s experience in a modernizing military shaped his vision, but further research is required to validate such a claim. Nonetheless, the South Korean experience confirms the importance of the role of leadership and strong, effective governance during transition. It suggests that the path to an effective democracy and successful state may require an interim courtship with less than ideal regimes. How those authoritarian regimes are to use and relinquish power is a different problem from a failing state.

Park’s régime also represents a transition in security. Clearly, Park is a Korean nationalist but again he approached security issues differently than his predecessor. While South Korea remains dependent on the U.S. military for its ultimate security, Park gave substance to the words “security partner” by his support of the United States in Vietnam and embracement of a combined defense structure for South Korea. He also recognized that U.S. force presence offered opportunities beyond security to budget economic development more aggressively. The latter observation further confirms his competency as a national level leader.

From Park’s new definition of security partner, the United States gained a formidable regional partner with military, economic, and political clout. The Northeast Asia region is generally at peace, but rife with potential conflicts that could destabilize the region—not the least of which is North Korea. Most Northeast Asia leaders support continued U.S. presence and response capabilities to maintain equilibrium in the region. America’s theater military presence and the ROK example have been major factors in creating the conditions for the expansion of democracy and peaceful development within the region. Habits of cooperation, increased dialogue and exercises, improved interoperability in Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, Peacekeeping and other pertinent skills are an integral part of today’s security partnership. These activities, combined with continued U.S. military presence, continue to help strengthen peace and positively shape the regional security. The partnership serves U.S. interests as well as Korean ones and the history of its evolution offers insights into what partnerships actually imply.

The role of civic related activities of the U.S. military and individual service members in the survival and development of South Korea was described above. It can be argued that no other nation’s military possessed the selfless commitment and audacity to play the supporting role the young republic required to emerge from the total desolation in 1953. Clearly, U.S. interests were at play, but the U.S. military engaged the society at all levels and in ways far beyond security interests.³⁵ They helped to build schools, adopted orphans, hired locals to stimulate the micro-economy, trained and mentored young ROK soldiers and officers, and established institutions to support higher learning. American Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines reached out to help Koreans harvest grain and recover from natural disasters; build roads, bridges, and dams; and provide health care and disinfect towns and people.



35 Scalapino, p. 56.

Both Koreans and Americans waited patiently in a high degree of personal hardship for a young ROK government to mature. The U.S. military and its people led by example and not in words alone. And despite missteps along the way, the U.S. military has a special relationship with the Korean state and people. It is relationship that has strategic benefits for both U.S. and ROK interests: deterrence of North Korean aggression, regional stability, preservation of robust a ROK-US and ROK-Japan Alliance, economic prosperity, non-proliferation, and the promotion of democracy and human rights.³⁶ Civic actions over time yield both tangible and intangible results.

Former Commander of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Command (UNC/CFC/USFK), General B.B. Bell, summarized the U.S. military's contribution to South Korean transition in 2007 as:

Despite the decimation of the Korean economy and society during the Korean War and the insurgencies and guerrilla warfare that continued long after the signing of the armistice in 1953, U.S. military presence in and commitment to the Republic of Korea afforded the newly formed independent state the opportunity to rebuild. Today, we see the fruition of over 50 years of alliance partnering in a dynamic Republic of Korea that is vibrant democracy grounded in its own cultural tradition; a formidable economic power with the worlds' eleventh largest economy; a professional military power with the worlds' sixth largest armed forces; and a longstanding and reliance U.S. ally, constantly supporting U.S. and United Nations (UN) military operations around the world.³⁷

CONCLUSION

Korea's modern history is replete with invasion, resistance, and political turmoil. In the 20th century Korea was occupied by the Japanese for over thirty-five years and divided into two states in 1945. In the initial years, it appeared that North Korea had all the advantages of industrialization, human capital, and external support. Today the situation is reversed. North Korea walks a thin line between slow starvation and utter chaos. The Republic of Korea remains prosperous even in the midst of a crippled world economy. It has withstood the challenges confronting a failing state and morphed into a successful modern democratic nation. The ROK's success is a testament of how a transition from a devastated, impoverished post-conflict environment with a highly autocratic government to a mature, liberal democracy can occur. All of the lessons are not pretty and may not apply elsewhere as context changes, but nonetheless the insights derived from the ROK inform what might be required of other states and their sponsors.

The successful transition of the ROK from an impoverished and failing state had multiple components. First, transition was in the sovereign and shared national interests of the United States as a sponsor and the ROK as a host nation. Second, the ROK people and their leaders wanted to make this transition. In particular, the emergence of a national leader in President Park, who had a vision for a successful South Korea, and the actions he undertook to create the conditions and momentum for success and transition were critical. Success did not flow from democracy, but rather democracy flowed from vision, ownership, success, and partnership in a spiraling interaction initiated by competent, nationalistic leadership. Third, the role of the U.S. military in providing a security shield and the manner in which it played out its roles in defense, presence, civil actions, and development of the ROK military proved pivotal. And fourth, the transition was given time to succeed. Security, economic development, and a rise in human

36 Derived from an analysis of current National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, Defense Planning Guidance and the Department of State Strategic Plan.

37 B.B. Bell and Sonya Finley, "South Korea Leads the Warfight," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 47, 4th Quarter 2007, p. 80.

security over time built a strategic partner for the United States. There was no rush to failure or clamor for an exit strategy. Transition was and remains a nonlinear process. Transition cannot be episodic nor react to artificial timelines of a supporting nation. However, supporting nations by recognizing the components above can better make decisions in regard to intervention and better manage the extent of their contributions and the nature of their departure.

CHAPTER 15

LEADING THROUGH, BY, AND WITH: THE CHALLENGE OF MANAGING TRANSITIONS WHEN THE UNITED STATES IS NOT THE LEAD PARTNER

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this essay is to stimulate further scholarship and discussion regarding alternative approaches to leadership of counterinsurgency (COIN) and post-conflict transitions efforts.¹ The current focus of the U. S. government's interagency community is understandably on the execution of effective COIN and planning and managing transitions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite emphasizing its supporting role in both conflicts, prevailing conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the United States to assume an unambiguous leadership role. The continuing commitment, despite escalating costs in both human and financial resources, reflects that this is a national priority. The policies, plans and actions of the U.S. government will decisively determine the outcome of these transitions. In both cases, the U.S. interagency community provides the preponderance of military and civilian assets on the ground. Operational realities on the ground and the political constraints of working with a diverse array of international partners have mitigated earlier appearances of unbridled unilateralism and a "go it alone" mentality. Yet, although working in concert with key partners such as NATO in Afghanistan, the United States as the lead actor arguably "owns" the situation. The current approaches to transition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan is very much "made in the USA". Consequently, significant thinking and writing is being focused on managing transitions in these theaters. However, more attention and thought is needed on developing a framework to deal with supporting transitions in situations where the United States is not the lead actor and where "ownership" is shared with other partners, or even firmly in another's grasp.

By considering the experience of the United States in managing other counterinsurgency and post-conflict transition efforts this essay suggests the need to further explore the utility of assuming a non-protagonist leadership model, that of strategic sponsor and collaborator.² This model of leadership can be characterized as "leading through, by, and with." Leading through, by, and with requires an emphasis on three factors identified as patience, partnership, and parsimony.³ Allowing other nations to lead, while offering support and a judicious application of these factors, may yield better long-term results than those achieved by unilateral leadership. The challenge faced by United States leadership and interagency is that while this may be a more

1 The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the United States Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), the United States Army Reserve, or the United States Army.

2 In strict terms the appropriate term for this role would be "deuteragonist", from the Greek δευτεραγωνιστής [deuteragonistes], the second actor in Ancient Greek theater tradition.

3 In this context, "parsimony" is used in its primitive sense of frugality. In the following discussion it is stand-in term to cover a concept that combines the principles of Joint Operations of "Economy of Force" and "Restraint". Along these same lines, the advocated use of patience aligns with the Joint Operations principle of "persistence". See Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 2008), Chapter. II.

useful model for future involvement in irregular warfare and transition efforts, it requires an approach that lies outside the mainstream of their experience and theoretical constructs.

STRATEGIC DRIVERS FOR ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF LEADERSHIP

There are theoretical and practical reasons for considering alternative models. One intellectual justification for exploring a different approach is the need to avoid “learning the wrong lesson” about counterinsurgency and post conflict transitions from these conflicts. While the United States has emphasized that it sees itself as a supporting player in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is still a danger of an emerging orthodoxy that would see American experiences in those countries as providing the canonic example of success in meeting irregular warfare challenges. Such a model implicitly requires placing the United States in the role of protagonist. This would be especially true if, as it appears from recent history, the focus of U.S.-sponsored counterinsurgency and transition efforts have shifted from enabling “a stable, sovereign, and reasonably cooperative government” to “creating a democratic government in fallen foes.”⁴

There are practical drivers for exploring alternative models largely founded in the reality of a transformed strategic environment defined by globalization and characterized by multi-polarity where assumptions of United States dominance will be tested.⁵ First, the challenges of balancing the significant costs of international leadership against an increasing and long-term demand signal for global presence will serve as a damper on the United States’ tendency to assume the role of strategic protagonist. The extensive demands of the future international security environment will challenge any single nation’s ability to pursue an unilateral global leadership role and sustain the significant economic, human and political costs required.⁶ This is especially true for the United States given the significant expenditures already required by campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of its present commitments, the nation risks suffering from the “imperial overstretch” Paul Kennedy warned of long before these interventions.⁷

Second, the emergence of multi-polarity, and the attendant likelihood that other nations will seek leadership roles in transitions both within and beyond their borders, will serve as an incentive for increasing the U.S. government’s willingness to work as a collaborator and sponsor. As Fareed Zakaria points out, in order to bring nations into the coalitions that future challenges will likely require, the United States must demonstrate “that it is willing to allow other countries to become stakeholders in the new order” and increasingly allow them to “own” and lead those coalitions.⁸ In short, while the term is currently out of favor, it is still true that “[V]ictory is easier with friends” and potentially cheaper.⁹

ORGANIZATION AND APPROACH

This work uses a mixed methodology. It combines a literature review and case study methodologies to examine broad historical narratives, focusing on certain representative indicators of key character (protagonist or actor) involvement in counterinsurgency or post-conflict stabi-

4 Irving W. Levinson, “Occupation and Stability Dilemmas of the Mexican War: Origins and Solutions”, in *Armed Diplomacy: Two Centuries of American Campaigning*, proceedings of 5-7 August 2003 Symposium held at Fort Leavenworth, KS, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 10.

5 See for instance *National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, November 2008).

6 See Patrick M. Cronin, Ed., *America’s Security Role in a Changing World*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009), 364.

7 Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 515.

8 Fareed Zakaria, *The Post American World*, (W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 43.

9 Cronin, 374.

lization efforts.¹⁰ In the three cases developed, U.S. government strategic aims sought to enable the host nation's successful response to imminent security threats and a transition to successful autonomy in governance. The representative indicators used are:

- Character of Conflict and U.S. Involvement
- Levels of U.S. Military Presence Since 1950¹¹
- Character and Evolution of The Political And Military Relationship
- Current State of Transition Planning and/or Execution.

LIMITATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF WORK

Two caveats must precede the detailed analysis and discussion of the cases and the resultant observations. First, this is by no means a comprehensive analytical effort; it is intended as a preliminary assessment pointing to the need for further study. Insights derived are characterized as observations rather than conclusions. Despite its tentative character, it identifies some factors worth considering for future broader application in assessing how to approach counterinsurgency and post-conflict transitions. This essay does not present a strategic sponsorship or collaborative model as the only or correct approach to counterinsurgency and post-conflict transition. There is no intent to suggest that there would be no place for unilateral leadership in future irregular conflict situations. As David Kilcullen notes "there are no standard templates or universal solutions in counterinsurgency"; the same can be said of transitions.¹² This work simply points to an urgent need to recognize that there may be viable alternatives to always being "on point" for security, stability and democracy across the globe. Given the significant national cost of U.S. leadership in Iraq and Afghanistan and the potential for a long standing requirement for a national commitment in terms of human, capital, and political resources there and in many other places across the globe, this urgency is clear and present.

Secondly, these observations are preliminary and subject to further analysis of the particular historical and geographic context of the nations discussed. Some questions for future study might include an analysis of the extent to which the bipolar world order of the Cold War impacted the shape and tempo of counterinsurgency and transition efforts, how this contrasts with the emergence of a multi-polar world, and the impact of domestic political pressures on the strategic approaches used by the United States in these countries.

10 To a lesser extent personal observations based on the author's overseas deployment experiences and during academic research visits to Colombia, Iraq, and Korea inform the effort.

11 Force (troop) level numbers used in this essay are from data in United States Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate of Information, Operations, and Reports (DIOR), DOD Personnel & Procurement Statistics Personnel & Procurement Reports and Data Files, online <http://si-adapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm>, (accessed 30 September 2010). Several caveats on this data include minor issues such as missing information for the period of 1951-52 and the shift in Fiscal Year reporting periods, to more significant contextual shifts such as the variations in nomenclature for geographical area boundaries and the resulting from changes in the way U.S. forward deployed presence was reported. Other significant changes include those in country coverage by Unified Command Areas of Responsibility (AORs). At times, the Office of the Secretary of Defense adjusted Service reported data to ensure it matched data reported by Combatant Commanders. Note that the use of this data is intended to convey general trends and does not constitute a claim to exhaustive statistical analysis, which could be the focus of future investigations.

12 David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 26.

CASE STUDIES

The countries in this case study, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), and Colombia are widely divergent in geographical location and characteristics, historical antecedents, demographic characteristics, political development models and contemporary history. However, they all share two traits: ongoing low-intensity conflicts and/or ongoing transitions to security autonomy in partnership with the United States. The Philippines and Colombia have an extended history of insurgency and are still engaged in robust counterinsurgency efforts with long-standing U.S. assistance. South Korea does not face an internal threat to its security and stability but continues to confront its northern neighbor, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) in a protracted national conflict of varying intensity.

One critical difference between these cases is the role ungoverned space plays in the conflict and transition dynamic. While outside the scope of this effort, it is important to note the presence of such areas within the territories of the Philippines and Colombia. In both cases, ungoverned spaces have been significant contributing factors to internal instability. Another difference is that neither nation has experienced a major conventional conflict in the past century. In Korea, however, the post-conflict legacy of partition after World War II, its unresolved territorial division across the DMZ, and the ongoing confrontation with its northern neighbor are direct results of the 1950-1953 war. A final difference is that outside support for instability in both the Philippines and Colombia is a minor factor while North Korean and a major external strategic sponsor (China) play a major role in the ongoing confrontation across the DMZ.¹³

The United States has enabled the evolution of each of these nations into their contemporary political configuration, a role similar to that which it is attempting to play in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is very much the case for the Philippines and Korea where, since 1989 and 1952, it has served as a sometimes reluctant midwife for sovereignty. In Colombia, U.S. presence has been historically less ubiquitous, but it nonetheless has had significant impact on strengthening national sovereignty.

In all three cases, strategic considerations have required long-term intervention while at the same time political, statutory or practical considerations have constrained the scope and size of U.S. military presence. In the Philippines, for instance, the national constitution places distinct limits upon foreign military activity.¹⁴ Likewise, a combination of domestic concerns, global commitments and political sensitivities in Asia and South America moderated any move towards a large presence in Colombia or South Korea. A final factor affecting military involvement in these nations is that they were not the "preferred battlefield" of the moment.¹⁵ While these

13 This characterization is supported by a RAND Corporation report which identifies Colombia and the Philippines as falling under the "Minor State Supporter" category. See Daniel Byman, et al., *Trends In Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 12 and 14.

14 A 2005 U.S. government report states: "U.S. military operations in the Philippines are limited by the Philippine constitution (foreign military forces are not permitted to participate in combat operations on Filipino territory) to training in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tactics, advising Filipino units, and participating in civil-military operations." See Andrew Feikert, *U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 26, 2005):15. However, these limits are often misunderstood and actually only restrict basing of foreign forces, a direct result of the longstanding U.S. presence in Clark and Subic. See Stuart Farris, "Joint Special Operations Task Force- Philippines", SAMS Monograph, (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2009), 17.

15 This phrase is used by Bolger, for example, in characterizing the priority of efforts in Korea given the attention required by the Vietnam conflict. See Daniel P. Bolger "Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1961-1969", Leavenworth Papers Number 19, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1991), xiii.

experiences with conflict are uniquely different, the character of involvement in all three cases is marked by a key distinction from Iraq and Afghanistan—due to varying historical and political reasons they were (or continue to be) secondary theaters of operation where “ownership” is firmly in the hands of the host nation.

The Republic of the Philippines

Character of Conflict and U.S. Involvement

Insurgency and irregular warfare are almost constants in the recent history of the Philippines. Prior to U.S. involvement in the archipelago, long simmering rebellion and unrest against Spain morphed into the 1890s *Kaputiner* revolt and then matured into a widespread independence movement under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo.¹⁶ After the Spanish-American War, played out in the Philippines with the arrival of U.S. forces and decisive and brief engagements, the United States inherited the untidy remnants of that “splendid little war.”¹⁷ It took three years of tough fighting and adaptive efforts by the veterans of the Mexican incursion and the Indian Wars to end the conflict characterized by Philippine War scholar Brian M. Linn as “the most successful counterinsurgency campaign in U.S. history.”¹⁸ Eventually, the experiment with accidental imperialism gave way to Commonwealth status in 1935, which was short-lived due to Japanese occupation during the Second World War. The former counterinsurgent briefly became the strategic sponsor of insurgency when the United States provided limited support to some of the estimated 75 guerrilla groups that operated against Japanese wartime occupation.¹⁹ After the war’s end and Philippine independence in 1946, the United States supported the fledgling government against the continued threat posed by one of these groups. The *Hukbalahap* communist guerrillas (Huks) presented a viable threat to the government from 1946 to 1954. Ramón del Fierro Magsaysay’s classic campaign, supported by U.S. forces and such storied operatives as Edward Lansdale, successfully integrated nonlethal and lethal approaches. The campaign effectively mitigated the threat but ultimately did not completely neutralize its base.²⁰

The present finds the Philippine government simultaneously dealing with three major insurgent trends. There are communist guerrilla groups, successors of the old Huk and the New People’s Army (NPA), founded in 1969, which are now fragmented but still active. Muslim insurgent groups coalesced shortly after the NPA formed and continue a separatist struggle that has roots in the Spanish colonial times. These include the now splintered and less militant Moro National Liberation Front (MNFLP) and its 1981 offshoot, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Finally, two Islamist terrorist organizations, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) have been active since the late 1980s and are the focus of U.S. involvement through the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines.²¹ The disruptive potential of the presence of these organizations affects not only Philippine sovereignty and security but havelarger strategic implications which make continued U.S. presence likely.²²

16 See Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War: 1899-1902*, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 16-19.

17 Hugh Thomas, *Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom*, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1998), 404.

18 Linn, 328. For a brief summary of the U.S. approach to this irregular conflict, see Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, (New York: Basic Books, 20020), 99-128.

19 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Instructors (unidentified), *Insurgent War Selected Case Studies* [RB 31-100, Volume 2], (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1 July 1969), 1-3.

20 Op. cit., 1-32.

21 Farris, 26-28.

22 See Charles Comer, “The Parting of the Sulawesi Sea: U.S. Strategy and Transforming the Terrorist Transit Triangle”, *Military Review*, (May-June 2010), 82

U.S. Military Presence

Since 1950, the size of U.S. military presence has fluctuated from a reported low of 22 in 1950 to a high of 28,444 in 1968. The average level hovered around 10,000 troops with a standard deviation of approximately 9,000. Troop levels were steady over the course of the 1950s. During the height of the Huk insurgency they reached their second highest level, topping over 26,000. After the Huk threat was mitigated, presence increased significantly in support of operations in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s (averaging 21,000) then radically diminished with the closing of U.S. bases (Subic Bay and Clark) in 1991. From a significant presence of approximately 16,800 during the period of 1960 to 1990, the U.S. military practically vanished from the Philippines, with only 53 personnel permanently assigned to the entire archipelago in 1993. Troop levels did not increase again until the early 2000's.

Excluding exercise and contingency personnel, U.S. presence averaged around 28,000 service members over the last 60 years²³ These levels reflected the supporting role of troops in the Philippines to efforts in Vietnam and the requirement for troops in other theaters of operation. While initially less than 200 soldiers strong, the JSOTF-P effort is reported to have authorized levels of up to 600 troops.²⁴ Relative to the historic levels of troop presence in the Philippines, the modest size of the JSOTF-P commitment is a classic example of economy of force.²⁵

Character and Evolution of the Political and Military Relationship

Experiences in the Philippines present mixed results in terms of the impact of U.S. assistance. During the 1950s, the impact of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG)-Philippines was dramatic and yielded almost immediate results.²⁶ After the success of the Huk counterinsurgency campaign, Ferdinand Marcos rose to power. The long-term impact of his dictatorship on the economic development of the Philippines was negative as aid was "lost, wasted, or diverted".²⁷ This negative impact extended to governance and military capability. Despite significant increases in defense spending, military institutional development and professionalization were relatively stagnant during the Marcos years. A contributing factor was an extended period of absence following the departure of U.S. forces after the 1990s closure of the Subic Naval and Clark Air Bases.²⁸

23 See DOD Personnel & Procurement Statistics Personnel & Procurement Reports and Data Files above; see also Tim Kane, *Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003*, (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, October 27, 2004): 4; see also Shirley A. Kan and Larry A. Knisch, *Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 26, 2007), 1.

24 For all case study nations, actual levels of Special Operations and related supporting deployments are not discussed. Press reports consistently use this figure of 600. See for instance, "American forces in the Philippines: Front Line Vets," *The Economist*, 394, 8667 (January 30th - February 5th 2010), 51-52.

25 On this point and the utility of an indirect approach see David S. Maxwell. "Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines: What Would Sun Tzu Say?" *Military Review* (May-June 2004), 20-23. Maxwell discusses the initial challenges faced by the JSOTF and also provides insights into its early activity and size. Also see, Gregory Wilson, "Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach," *Military Review* (November-December 2006); and David P. Fridovich and Fred T. Krawchuk, "The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 44 (1st Quarter 2007), 24-27.

26 Antonio G. Parlade Jr., "An Analysis of the Communist Insurgency in the Philippines," Master of Military Arts and Sciences Thesis, (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 2006), 35.

U.S. Congressional Budget Office, *The Role of Foreign Aid In Development: South Korea And The Philippines*, CBO Memorandum, (Washington, DC: September 1997), ix.

27 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, *The Role of Foreign Aid In Development: South Korea And The Philippines*, CBO Memorandum, (Washington, DC: September 1997), ix.

28 Parlade, 101.

As recently as 2003, credible reports mentioned significant limitations in operational capacity due to basic equipment and training deficiencies among Philippine Armed Forces (AFP).²⁹ In the context of current counterinsurgency operations, the AFP benefited from the training and support provided by the U.S. military, but there are still significant obstacles to improved operational effectiveness and integration of civil military efforts. Some of the obstacles relate to institutional culture, others to lack of clarity in executing strategic-operational concepts.³⁰ However, there are signs of progress. Since 2006, civil military operations have increasingly focused on integrating indigenous civilian interagency and military efforts.³¹ Also, Philippine Armed Force units--especially Special Operations Teams (SOTs)--show increasing signs of proficiency in counterinsurgency and civil military operations as a result of ongoing JSOT-P activities and training.³²

Current State of Transition Planning and/or Execution

The Philippines continues to evolve in terms of its capacity to provide effective governance and security, but there is still room for improvement. JSOTF-P has been active since 2002, but the nature of the conflict and underlying grievances, especially in the case of the Islamist and ethnically-motivated insurgencies, indicate a need for a longer term commitment. The limited ability of the AFP to execute a sustained and effective campaign, and its limited governance capability in the contested areas and corresponding lack of influence over the human terrain, are signs that U.S. presence may be needed for some time. There have been media claims that lack of progress by the AFP may be intentional to prolong U.S. assistance and presence in the conflict.³³ Further, even the more aggressive suggestions for radical strategies to diminish the level of insurgent activity by addressing grievances, such as extending the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), would take significant time to implement.³⁴

The Republic of Korea

Character of Conflict and U.S. Involvement

Confrontation has been a constant in Korean contemporary history. After the Second World War and a short-lived trusteeship resulting from Russian entry into the peninsula, a major conventional conflict erupted in Korea between the North and the South with major combat operations from 1950-1953. It may be argued that this major combat phase was really the First Korean War. It also included significant guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations by the belligerents.³⁵

29 Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, CRS Report RL31265, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 23, 2006), 20.

30 Parlade, 85-92.

31 Delilah Russel, "Examining the Armed Forces of the Philippines' Civil Military Operations: A Small Power Securing Military Relevancy in Nontraditional Military Roles," *Small Wars Journal*, Volume 6, No. 1, 4 February 4, 2010, 17-18.

32 Author discussion with former JSOTF-P participant (non-attribution), June 2010.

33 *The Economist*, 52.

34 Thomas G. Wilson, "Extending the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front a Catalyst for Peace", SAMS Monograph, (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2009). Wilson's proposal, although a creative example of "out-of-the-box thinking" and potentially feasible, does not address the time requirements and political implications of implementation of what would appear to be a lengthy and complex process.

35 See, for example Richard L. Kiper, "Ps, Gs, and UW - Korea Style", in *Armed Diplomacy: Two Centuries of American Campaigning*, proceedings of 5-7 August 2003 Symposium held at Fort Leavenworth, KS, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 177-187. Also see Riley Sunderland and Marshall Andrews, "Guerrilla Operations in South Korea, 1945-1953" in "Isolating the Guerrilla," *Classic and Basic*

This direct conflict has been followed by a simmering irregular conflict, which some have labeled as a Second Korean Conflict³⁶ In spite of the existential threat that North Korea initially and continues to represent, regional and global commitments required an economy of force approach.³⁷ The ongoing tension between North and South which initially had a Cold War backdrop has now developed into a cycle of disruptive, politically-charged episodes of proliferation, failed deterrence, economic and political sanctions, competing propaganda and at times, open hostile action.³⁸

The unresolved conflict and leadership of a still standing coalition from the First Korean War has placed the United States in a unique position and resulted in a mature alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea. Although a Cold War relic, U.S. presence in Korea serves contemporary needs: “[T]he ROK-U.S. alliance is the core of military deterrent capabilities on the southern Korean peninsula.”³⁹ Forward U.S. troop presence provides sustained deterrence, which not only protects national interests and effectively balances North Korean actions, but also contains China’s nascent power.⁴⁰

U.S. Military Presence

Since 1950, permanent U.S. military presence in the Korean peninsula has fluctuated from a reported low of 510 personnel immediately preceding the war in 1950, to the wartime high of 326,863 in 1953. In the past 60 years, the average level has been around 51,000 troops. After a rapid post-war decrease, troop levels fluctuated over the course of the 1950s and reached their second highest post-Armistice level (over 57,000) during the height of the “Second Conflict”. After moderate increases during the mid-conflict phase of Vietnam (60,000 to 70,000), U.S. presence significantly declined as a result of the strategic primacy of the European theater and the NATO effort, hitting historic low levels in 1981 (28,254). Numbers steadily increased for the next decade, reaching about 45,000 then fluctuated moderately. Since then, anticipation of a transfer of Operational Control (OPCON) from the United States to the Republic of Korea along with global force structure changes resulted in steadily reduced presence on the Korean peninsula. With the exception of the 1950-1953 conflict, and especially at the height of the Vietnam War, these levels reflect a policy decision that Korea was not a primary theater of operations. Instead, the focus of presence has been on demonstrating commitment to the ROK – U.S. alliance.

Character and Evolution of the Political and Military Relationship

The political relationship between South Korea and the United States has not always gone smoothly. U.S. influence has waxed and waned with internal political developments. After decades of authoritarian leadership by Syngman Rhee, a short experiment with democracy was

Case Studies, Volume II, (Washington, D.C.: Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, 1 February 1966), 249-264.

³⁶ Bolger makes a cogent case for seeing the period from 1966-1969 as a Second Korean Conflict (supra, no. 12).

³⁷ Op. cit., 9.

³⁸ For instance, the latest example of potential North Korean hostile activity and the potential issues raised are discussed in Ralph Cossa, “Cheonan Incident: Choosing and Appropriate Response”, PacNet #21, Center for Strategic and International Studies website, online <http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-21-cheonan-incident-choosing-appropriate-response>, (accessed 30 October 2010).

³⁹ Jacqueline D. Chang, *Politics of North Korean Refugees And Regional Security Implications*, (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2009), 16.

⁴⁰ The discussion of that dynamic is well outside the scope of this paper. For one interesting take on the situation, see Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, *America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy*, (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 127-133.

truncated by a military coup. During this time, the United States played a vigorous role in the political, military, and economic development of the Republic of Korea.⁴¹

The following decades were full of political turmoil. An extended period of military interference in civilian political processes followed. This period was fraught with internal unrest, repression, and a presidential assassination by the head of the intelligence agency. In parallel, South Korea's economy took a dramatic upturn, fueled by an indomitable national will to succeed and a pervasive culture of sacrifice and hard work, together with the assistance of the United States and other nations. Prior to 1974, the United States contributed over \$4 billion in aid, supplemented by inflows of foreign investment capital.⁴² Economic development in part fueled political developments and, together with social internal pressures toward liberalization, eventually resulted in the emergence of true democracy.⁴³

The United States has steadily transitioned from its post-war role as senior partner to a supporting role to an increasingly autonomous South Korean government and military. In the early years, during the conventional conflict and immediately thereafter, there was a significant but numerically limited advisory effort.⁴⁴ In addition, while a relatively large force footprint was in place, U.S. leadership increasingly and consistently sought involvement, ownership, and engagement by the ROK's political and military authorities.⁴⁵ Finally, due to the limitations that being a secondary theater placed upon U.S. forces, Korean augmentees were gradually (not always smoothly) but persistently integrated into conventional formations through the KATUSA program.⁴⁶

Close working relationships, continued emphasis on host nation responsibility and ownership, and utmost professionalism of the ROK military are now the norm. Over the last few decades, advisory efforts, collaboration, and a steadily increasing degree of operational integration have contributed to the growth of ROK armed forces in size and proficiency.

Current State of Transition Planning and/or Execution

In terms of a transition toward political autonomy and military capability, South Korea is fully developed. The ROK has among the highest levels of political, economic and security sta-

41 The implication is that this support was critical to the successful economic and, eventually, political development of the nation. As a 2003 U.S. government report states: "U.S. economic assistance to South Korea, from 1945 to 2002, totaled over 6 billion; most economic aid ended in the mid-1970s as South Korea's reached higher levels of economic development." See Larry A. Knisch, *Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations – Issues for Congress*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 13, 2003), 1. Not all assessments of the U.S. role are positive. See, for example Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*, (New York: Owl Books, 2000), 95-118, and 216 *passim*.

42 See "Foreign Economic Relations", in Andrea M. Savada and William Shaw, editors. *South Korea: A Country Study*. (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1990), online <http://countrystudies.us/south-korea/>, (accessed 25 September 2010).

43 *Op. cit.*

44 For a fuller discussion of advisory efforts in Korea see Robert D. Ramsey, III, *Advising Indigenous Forces, Global War on Terrorism, Occasional Paper 18*, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006). See also Alfred H. Hausrath, *The KMAG Advisor: Roles and Problems of the Military Advisor in Developing an Indigenous Army for Combat Operations in Korea* (Chevy Chase, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Office, February 1957); Robert K. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War* (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 1962); and John Tabb, "The Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG): A Model for Success". Ramsey and Hausrath provide a negative assessment of advisory efforts, while Sawyer and Tabb offer a more positive view.

45 Bolger, 19, *passim*.

46 For an early assessment of the KATUSA efforts see, Alfred H. Hausrath and Richard C. Sheldon, *Integration of ROK Soldiers into US Army Units (KATUSA)*, Johns Hopkins University, (Bethesda: Operations Research Office, 31 March 1958).

bility in its region.⁴⁷ The former security protégé is now a full-fledged security partner. During operations in Iraq, ROK troops contributed to the execution of major Civil Military Operations in the MND-North area of operations, and Korean planners and liaison officers were fully integrated into major headquarters staff elements in Baghdad.⁴⁸ Although U.S. forces on the ground continue to provide a deterrent capability the focus has shifted towards a transition to South Korean control and “passing the baton” to the ROK leadership. The initial intent was for the operational control (OPCON) transition to take place in 2012.⁴⁹ While sensitivity about sovereignty was an important factor in the original timeline, recent developments and pragmatic consideration of military readiness have caused a further delay of the OPCON transfer date until 2015.⁵⁰ Nonetheless, Korea represents the most mature example of successful post-conflict transition in recent U.S. experience. As Gregg Brazinsky pointed out, “[O]f the numerous places where nation building was attempted, South Korea was one of the few to emerge as a wealthy democracy at the end of the twentieth century.”⁵¹

Colombia

Character of Conflict and U.S. Involvement

It is difficult to pinpoint an unequivocal source for contemporary conflict in Colombia. One-time political candidate and historian Rafael Pardo Rueda ascribes a plausible economic origin to the conflict. However, a significant volume of scholarship points to a complex confluence of geography, cultural norms, historical antecedents, and political grievances.⁵² In some ways, the insurgency may be seen as an extension of the period of politically motivated strife known as *La Violencia* which began in 1948.⁵³ The oldest and major guerrilla group, the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] emerged during the early 1960s after the reorganization and consolidation of precursor communist movements in southern Colombia. Around 1964, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) [National Liberation Army], a *foco*-style revolutionary group, began operations in more central locations. Other lesser movements emerged around that time but the final major actor, which came to prominence in the 1980s, was the paramilitary counterinsurgent entity known collectively as the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC) [United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia].

Around this same time, given the increasing relevance of narco-terrorist elements, the conflict became less a classic COIN fight and more what retired Army Colonel and theorist Jo-

47 IHS Jane’s, Military and Security Assessments Intelligence Centre, *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - China And Northeast Asia*, (November 17, 2010), online http://jmsa.janes.com.ezproxy.usawcpubs.org/JDIC/JMSA/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/cnasu/cnaa014.htm@current&pageSelected=&keyword=&backPath=http://jmsa.janes.com.ezproxy.usawcpubs.org/JDIC/JMSA&Prod_Name=CNAS&activeNav=/JDIC/JMSA#toclink-j1931227101622000, (accessed 30 November 2010).

48 Author’s personal experience during deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom during 2004 and 2006-07.

49 Chang, 18.

50 See Tara O, “U.S.- ROK Strategic Alliance 2015”, Center for U.S. Korea Policy, *Asia Foundation News*, Vol, 2, No. 9, (September 2010), online <http://www.asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/CUSKPNewsletter29SepWEB.pdf>, (accessed 30 October 2010).

51 Gregg Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 1.

52 See Rafael Pardo Rueda, *La Historia de las Guerras* (Barcelona: Ediciones B Colombia, S.A., 2004), 402.

53 For an excellent in-depth discussion of the complexity of the origins, development and regional implications of the hybrid narcoterrorist threat in Colombia see Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, “Colombian Labyrinth The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability”, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), online

seph Celeski has described as a “grey stew” of terrorists, drug traffickers, and other criminals.⁵⁴ Although there was a positive political climate between the two nations, and a long existing military relationship rooted in the Colombian participation in the Korean conflict, up until that time the United States paid scant attention to the conflict. The severely constrained U.S. counter-narcotics activity during the period of 1981 to 2000 had only a minimal impact on the Colombian counterinsurgency efforts.

The FARC’s military challenge to the Colombia government reached its peak between 1996 and 1998.⁵⁵ Following decades of steady growth by the FARC, and failed attempts at accommodation by the Pastrana Administration between 1998 and 2002, the U.S. and Colombian governments developed Plan Colombia. This was a joint effort to address the parallel “grey stew” challenges of insurgency and narcotics faced by Colombia. As a result of this program and its successor efforts Colombia received over seven billion dollars (USD) in diverse capacity enabling aid packages from 2000 through 2009.⁵⁶ However, it was not until the first administration of President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2006) that the Government of Colombia, energized by a clear popular mandate and with focused U.S. government interagency assistance, began a process of focused integrated military and social action against the insurgent threat. Beginning in 2002 and throughout the second Uribe administration, the United States provided funding, materiel support, training and advisory efforts which yielded significant results. The conflict is ongoing, but indications of eventual success are numerous.

U.S. Military Presence

U.S. military presence in Colombia from 1950 up to the late 1980s had been relatively small even when compared with the levels sustained elsewhere in the region. Since 1950, permanent U.S. military presence fluctuated from a reported low of 29 in 1998 to a high of 244 in 2000. The average level hovered around 55 troops with a standard deviation of approximately 35. Even for what has been historically an “economy of force” theater, U.S. presence in Colombia had been minimal in comparison to other sites of strategic significance.⁵⁷ Until the start of Plan Colombia, levels were below 100 personnel for most of those 60 years.

Operations in support of Plan Colombia marked an immediate, aggressive and sustained increase in personnel levels. While initial levels rapidly increased from the 244 troops (2000), strict limits were placed on the numbers of U.S. military personnel in country by the U.S. Congress. During the last decade, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), as the Global Combatant Command primarily responsible for efforts in Colombia, closely managed personnel levels to ensure compliance and the adequate mix of capabilities.⁵⁸ In 2004, Congress raised initial limits

54 Joseph D. Celeski, “Operationalizing COIN”, JSOU Report 05-2, (Hulburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, September 2005), 2.

55 Jon-Paul Maddaloni, “An Analysis of the FRAC in Colombia: Breaking the Frame of FM 3-24”, *SAMS Monograph*, (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2009), 16-20.

56 June S. Beittel, *Colombia: Issues for Congress*, CRS Report RL32250, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 13, 2009), 20.

57 The Panama Canal, until its devolution to the Republic of Panama in 1999, was a strategic asset in both economic and military terms during the Cold War. U.S. presence during the period from 1950 to 2000 averaged close to 7,800 troops. Bases in Puerto Rico, which supported logistic, training and operational requirements, opened prior to World War II and until their respective closures in 1973 and 2004, supported an average troop level of over 5,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines.

58 Author’s personal experience as a Troop Program (TPU) member of a Florida-based U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs (FID/UW) battalion and as a civilian contractor employed at the U.S. Southern Command, during part of the period.

(commonly referred to as the “cap”) of 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors up to 800 military personnel and 600 civilians. By way of contrast, these increased limits to U.S. presence allowed in Colombian territory still represent a significant smaller amount of troops than those found between 1950 and 2003 in Puerto Rico, a U.S. territory which held critical strategic significance during the early part of the past century.⁵⁹

Character and Evolution of the Political and Military Relationship

The military and political relationship between Colombia and the U.S. has historically been positive. Journalist Robert Kaplan once wrote that Colombia was “after Iraq and Afghanistan, our third-biggest nation-building project, and ...by far our most successful.”⁶⁰ Despite U.S. support of Panama’s secession from Colombia in 1903, both the United States and Colombia worked together well in the past. Bilateral military bonds and mutual respect were strengthened as a result of shared sacrifices in Korea and military exchange assignments as junior officers of men of the caliber of Ralph Puckett, Frederick F. Woerner, Jr. and John R. Galvin.⁶¹ In the 1950s, for example, Colonel Puckett, a decorated veteran Korea Ranger, helped to establish the Colombian *Escuela de Lanceros*, similar to the U.S. Army Ranger School. This school still functions as an elite institution within the Colombian Army.

Troops supporting Plan Colombia and follow-on efforts further enabled institutional capacity building in conventional and special operations. The Military Group-Colombia (MILGP) has been a critical enabler in implementing a number of focused initiatives. For example, US-SOUTHCOM has sponsored programs such as the Planning Assistance Training Teams (PATTs) and Civil Military Relations Seminar (CMRS). Both initiatives have provided critical assistance through very small teams focused at the unit level.⁶²

Admittedly, there have been periods of friction and stress on the relationship, especially concerning Human Rights issues. Despite those instances, unit and individual training have continued, to include attendance by Colombian soldiers to tactical training schools and military education institutions in the United States. At times personality conflicts have impeded progress when “[A]rrogance ran both ways.”⁶³ Sometimes traditional institutional approaches have raised concerns about the relevance or applicability of assistance and training offered by the U.S. troops.⁶⁴ Over time, these issues have been consistently resolved and as a result further strengthened the U.S.-Colombia partnership.

The partnership has also matured as the U.S. government interagency community, focused through the Embassy Country Team, has provided support for internal policy development and strategic planning. The U.S. interagency efforts have enabled an increasingly autonomous Colombian approach to joint operations planning and execution. Colombia has crafted its own ap-

59 Beittel, 22. The authorization was contained in the FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4200; P.L. 108-375). As noted (supra No. 46) “cap” management and its impact upon planning and execution efforts were a subject of intense attention for USSOUTHCOM and other DoD stakeholders.

60 Robert Kaplan, “A Colombian Vision for Iraq”, *The Current*, in *The Atlantic*, online <http://thecurrent.theatlantic.com/archives/2008/04/alvaro-uribe.php#more>, (accessed 3 September 2010).

61 Both Galvin and Woerner eventually rose through the Army ranks to become Commanders of the United States Southern Command. For a personal level example of the impact this type of experience had on a future senior leader see for instance, John R. Galvin, “Challenge and Response on the Southern Flank: Three Decades Later,” *Military Review*, Volume LXVI, No. 8, 9.

62 Ramsey, Robert D., *From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque: the Colombian Security Force Experience, 1998-2008, Occasional Paper 34*, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009): 97, passim. CMRS information based upon author’s experience as member of CMRS team, (supra No. 46).

63 Op. cit., 116.

64 Ramsey uses a relevant example from a PATT participant’s perspective; Idem, 107.

proach to “jointness” involving both government agencies and the military. This was not accomplished effortlessly, as demonstrated by the forced retirement of senior military leaders resisting efforts at inter-service integration in 2004.⁶⁵ Yet despite initial setbacks and institutional friction, a Colombian model of integrated operations gradually emerged that rivals U.S. achievements in civil-military coordination. The Colombian model of civil-military coordination included the creation in 2004 of an integrative node for interagency activities focusing on the restoration of the ‘social fabric’ and government presence at the local level in select critical regions and municipalities in Colombia. This node, the *Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral* [Coordination Center for Integrated Action] included representatives from 13 ministries and appropriate military liaison officers.⁶⁶ The initially modest but gradually significant success of this approach exceeds similar U.S. efforts at promoting indigenous interagency integration in other theaters of operation. As a senior U.S. military official remarked to a Colombian Ministry of Defense colleague in 2005, “we are learning from Colombia now”.⁶⁷ Long-term engagement and persistent collaboration have yielded dramatic results, such as the rescue of multiple hostages, including three American contractors and former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt in 2008. This kind of result supports an evaluation of Colombian counterinsurgency efforts as “meeting with increasing success since 2000....”⁶⁸

Current State of Transition Planning and/or Execution

The apparent success of increasingly autonomous Colombian effort in restoring governance and pursuing counterinsurgency efforts does not mean the U.S. forces there can simply “pack up and go home”. Contemporary Colombian counterinsurgency strategy is only now nearing the “conventional wisdom” resolution threshold of ten years of progress (which recent RAND research has validated as a useful metric) while by other measures the fight is closing on the forty plus year mark.⁶⁹

Security is still lacking in certain areas, the hybrid threat is still viable, and ungoverned spaces still exist within Colombia. Nevertheless, the government of Colombia is aggressively restoring governance to areas that had until recently not seen a security presence in decades. The focus of partnership efforts is decisively swung away from dependence on U.S. enablers and towards increased autonomy. In terms of whole of government integration and institutional effectiveness, military and governance institutional capacity in Colombia has matured to a self-sustaining level. It is possible to say with a measure of confidence that U.S. assistance is welcome but no longer as critically needed as it was a decade ago. In short, contemporary Colombia has become a net “exporter” of security. Colombian Air Force elements, for instance, participated in immediate response and assistance efforts after the January 2010 Haiti earthquake with minimum U.S. support.⁷⁰

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

The preceding case studies touched on the historical context, force levels, character, and outcomes of U.S. involvement in Korea, the Philippines, and Colombia. The discussions high-

65 Ibid, 115. As the development of the Joint Forces community and the history of interservice integration since World War II demonstrates, this has not been a simple matter for the United States either.

66 Republic of Colombia, “CCAI: Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral,” PowerPoint presentation, and author’s discussion with CCAI members during visits in 2005 and 2006.

67 Author’s notes during meeting between senior U.S. and Colombian MOD counterparts in the Centro Administrativo Nacional, Bogotá (non-attribution), 3 June, 2005.

68 Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010), 59.

69 Op. cit., 27.

70 Author’s personal communication with a member of the MILGP-Colombia, (nondisclosure).

lighted certain characteristics of counterinsurgency and post conflict transitions in areas where the strategic context did not allow the United States to be the categorical leader and where the need to work by, through and with the host nation was necessary. The concepts of patience, partnership and parsimony serve as a way to broadly characterize the approaches used and the relative effectiveness of these partnerships.

Patience

Long before the term “era of persistent conflict” existed, the experiences of the United States in the three nations discussed above present examples of a persistent confrontation and cyclic conflict between antagonists. The complexity and persistence of conflict is an integral part of the national experience in the Philippines, Korea, and Colombia. A survey of the sustained length and relatively constant levels of U.S. involvement in these cases supports the view that persistent conflicts require patience and commitment. This leads to a realization that, notwithstanding recent RAND Corporation findings concerning insurgency endings,⁷¹ some conflicts may require a long-term perspective towards engagement. Transitions and success in the context of some insurgencies and persistent confrontation scenarios similar to those found in the case studies may take low levels of force presence over time with moderate increases, rather than significant commitments in search of a decisive short-term resolution.

Partnership

U.S. experience in all three cases appears to support the view that a long-term commitment to growing an equal partnership, based on a combination of advisors, continued military-to-military engagement, significant levels of aid over time and shared or local leadership may be effective. This suggests an alternative to a decisive ‘ramp-up’ approach to developing host nation armed force capability and massive amounts of aid. Another observation supported by the experiences in all three cases underscores the need for a whole-of-government approach. A military or security-centric approach does not always yield positive or sustained results. As evidenced in the case of the Philippines and Korea, the implications of the negative impact of allowing the emergence of a dictatorship on the tempo and quality of transition efforts should be strongly considered.

Parsimony

Finally, in all three cases the relative size of U.S. troop commitments was small when compared to other active theaters of operation. Economy of force seems to support an approach anchored in patience and partnership. This suggests that parsimony, or frugality in the employment of forces, may be a positive trait of counterinsurgency or post-conflict transition efforts in some contexts. The role of Special Operations Forces, especially in Colombia and the Philippines, has been critical. Their effective use supports not only the sparse use of troops in terms of the minimum possible combat power, but also the requirement for a focused balancing of the right capabilities to prevent collateral damage, not in the physical sense, but in terms of the political and other potential adverse effects of a significant U.S. military presence in a host nation.

PARTING THOUGHTS: WHICH COIN AND TRANSITION LESSONS SHOULD BE LEARNED?

In light of these initial observations, closer study and further consideration should be devoted to understanding the benefits of an alternative approach. Experiences in Iraq and Afghani-

71 Connable and Libicki.

stan point to a latent contradiction in U.S. stated intentions and aspirations to play a supporting role in counterinsurgency efforts and post-conflict transitions and what is actually occurring. There is a gap between the stated national desire to allow partners to take the lead and U.S. actions actually setting conditions to enable this. Two major factors create this gap: the desire of policymakers and conventional militaries to produce quick victories and the obvious logic of irregular warfare theory. Consequently, there is a paradoxical and apparent tension inherent in what has actually been done by the United States and its partner nations in response to internal and international political pressures and what theorists and practitioners write and reflect about this “Way of Irregular War”. The costs in blood and treasure and the lack of apparent success – the passage of time – accentuate the tension.

The current doctrinal basis emphasizes the need for a gradual, people-centric, whole-of-government approach that supports establishing legitimate local and national institutions to address population needs and thereby ‘out-govern’ the adversary. This approach is reflected in recent Service and Joint doctrine, such as Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, and Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. For example, joint doctrine states that in countering internal security threats, the “United States would assist friendly nations, but would require them to provide the manpower and be ultimately responsible for their own national defense.”⁷² Army/Marine Corps doctrine emphasizes that “[W]hile it may be easier for U.S. military units to conduct operations themselves, it is better to work to strengthen local forces and institutions and then assist them. HN [Host Nation] governments have the final responsibility to solve their own problems.”⁷³

However, contemporary wisdom and experience in Iraq and Afghanistan contrarily suggest that effective counterinsurgency sometimes requires a decisive, security-centric, American-led effort requiring a significant commitment of military forces and heavy external interagency support. Unfortunately, this may often have the unintended consequences of retarding the development of a host-nation’s fledgling security and governance capabilities. There is a real risk that this contemporary experience may be misunderstood as the “best” model of an effective counterinsurgency approach instead of seeing its uniqueness. Confusion can happen, for instance, as when well-known experts such as James Dobbins of the RAND Corporation write “a counterinsurgency strategy, which helped reverse the deteriorating military situation in Iraq in 2007, could do the same in Afghanistan.” Ambassador Dobbins is using the Iraqi template to contrast a COIN approach against the “counterterrorism” approach that some have advocated. He is clearly not saying that the Iraqi Surge is “the” paradigm of COIN strategy. However, his call to apply that specific model in Afghanistan may be misinterpreted readers who miss the synecdochic intent or do not parse his reference carefully.⁷⁴

Whether due to a cultural or institutional preference for a certain “way of war” or a policy and political apparatus that often seems to suffer from the strategic equivalent of attention deficit disorder, the United States often appears impatient and seems to default to an industrialized mass-driven approach to irregular warfare, even as its theorists and doctrine writers recognize the dangers of this approach. Army doctrine, for example, discusses several ‘paradoxes of counterinsurgency’ and clearly identifies “[S]uccessful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency operational practices” advocating the need for patience, an economy of force approach, and putting host nation forces in a leading role.⁷⁵ Unfortunately, a review of the successive efforts by rotating units in theaters shows that U.S. forces are sometimes driven to employ less than optimal approaches. One instance of this may be seen in the mixed results of early efforts by the U.S. Army

72 Joint Publication 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 July 2010), ix.

73 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) No. 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 15 December 2006), 1-26.

74 James Dobbins, “Your COIN Is No Good Here: How “Counterinsurgency” Became a Dirty Word”, Snapshot, *Foreign Affairs*, online <http://www.foreignaffairs.com>, (accessed 30 October 2010), 1.

75 Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 1-29.

to support the requirement for combat and ministerial level advisors in Iraq.⁷⁶ Another is best captured in a former tactical leader's comment that in the conduct of its Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns "the military placed too little value on the localized, non-transferrable knowledge a unit gains".⁷⁷ In practice, the immense pressure to achieve "irreversible momentum" to effect "game changing" strategic resets, or to "turn the corner" often inexorably leads to strategic and operational approaches that may, paradoxically, achieve the opposite of what they intend.⁷⁸

The U.S. experiences in the Philippines, Korea, and Colombia suggest that—in some contexts—rather than seeking a decisive approach, "owning" the fight and committing a significant amount of forces, an alternative model based upon patience, partnership, and parsimony may be more effective. Along these lines, future efforts may be positively shaped if the United States considers working towards a strategic partnership in lieu of taking on a uncompromising leadership role, and using a "Bauhaus" approach to counterinsurgency and post-conflict transition. The Bauhaus School of design, which emerged during the early 20th Century, sought to achieve an ideal of "simplicity and elegance" summarized by Mies Van der Rohe's aphorism that "less is more."⁷⁹ In the same way, future U.S. intervention efforts should seek to apply patience, partnership and parsimony in order to achieve the simplest and most elegant solutions to the complex and dynamic problems of COIN and post-conflict transition. As these case studies suggest, such an elegant solution would require an alternative model of leadership based upon a long term commitment, a significant but relatively minimal level of presence, and a politico-military relationship focused on developing a coequal partnership.

76 Author's personal observations during deployments in 2004, 2006-07, and during a research visit in 2010.

77 J. Andrew Person, "Getting Past the First Cup of Tea," Volume 6, No. 1, 4 February 4, 2010, 10.

78 In this context, see for instance, Frederick Kagan, "Turning the Corner in Iraq", *The Guardian*, Tuesday 24 April, 2007, online <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/apr/24/comment.iraq>, (accessed 15 September 2010); or Jim Garamone, "Forces Must Develop 'Irreversible Momentum' in Iraq, General Says", *American Forces Press Service*, 3 October 2007, online <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47675>, (accessed 15 September 2010); and Michael J. Carden, "More Troops Provide 'Game-Changer' in Afghanistan", *American Forces Press Service*, online <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60950>, (accessed 1 October 2010).

79 See Jeremy Melvin, *Isms: Understanding Architectural Style*, (New York: Universe Publishing, 206), 438 and 434.

CHAPTER 16

TRANSITION AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

Lisa Schirch

Transition from a situation of repressive, elite-centric government toward a participatory democracy with strong civilian leadership does not usually require international intervention. History shows that over the last century, the most sustainable and successful transitions from dictatorships to democracy have been led by civil society itself. In countries like South Africa, Chile, El Salvador, Poland, and Czechoslovakia communist leaders or elite dictators were thrown out of power not by military force but by millions of ordinary citizens who took to the streets to take back their countries and build a democracy from the ground up.¹ In many of these countries, elements of the national military played a critical role in withdrawing support from the regime, and moving to support the people.

In Iraq, Afghanistan, Colombia, the Philippines, and elsewhere, the international community stepped in to bring about a transition in governance. The term “transition” also refers to moving from a military-led international intervention toward locally led and owned civilian leadership aimed at changing or rebuilding the state.

Long before U.S. troops began arriving in Iraq and Afghanistan, small local organizations worked to battle government corruption, promote human rights, foster development and reconcile divided groups. Yet as helicopters landed and tanks rolled into the country, such local civil society groups were virtually invisible. These civil society groups suffered under Saddam Hussein and the Taliban. Some of their leaders spent time in jail. Their families received death threats. They lived a life on the edge at the same time that many of their compatriots were fleeing the country to take up jobs abroad. Their work continued on over the last decade of international intervention, making small progress here and there to prevent communities from joining the insurgencies, to create community structures able to make decisions democratically, and to identify and work at prioritizing their development needs and finding the resources to address these. These civil society leaders are the yeast for growing democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Without their efforts to foster citizen engagement and local ownership of development and governance, international efforts and assistance are futile.

While numerous books² examine the civilian challenges of statebuilding, the literature on civil society’s roles during military-led transitions is scarce. While counterinsurgency and stabilization strategies identify “building civil society” on checklists of transition tasks, the concept of civil society is not widely understood and strategies for engaging and supporting civil society during transition are lacking. The knowledge and curriculum to teach military personnel about civil society is largely missing from counterinsurgency manuals, military doctrine, and in military academies. In recent literature on statebuilding, experts agree that transition toward stability rests on the quality of relationship between a state and civil society.³ The way international

1 Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).

2 See Franklin D Kramer, Thomas Dempsey, Joseph Gregoire, and Susan Merrill, eds., *Civil Power in Irregular Conflict* (Washington DC: CNA, 2010). See also *Commanding Heights: Strategic Lessons from Complex Operations* (Washington DC: National Defense University Center for Complex Operations, 2009).

3 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Fragility and Conflict*, January 2011; available from http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3746,en_2649_33721_46623180_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed February 24, 2011.

forces relate to local and international civil society to foster effective transition is the focus of the six principles described in this chapter.⁴

1. TRANSITION REQUIRES BOTH STATEBUILDING AND SUPPORTING CIVIL SOCIETY

Stability requires a balance between strengthening a citizen-oriented state and creating an environment conducive to an active civil society that can exercise democratic powers to hold the government to account for its responsibilities. A state is stable when it is citizen oriented, as described more fully in Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart's *Fixing Failed States*.⁵ Governance is legitimate and stable only when citizens view their government as legitimate and acting in the communal best interest rather than in the interest of a minority of wealthy elite. What constitutes "good governance" or a "stable peace" is in the eye of the beholder. On questions of governance and stability, civil society asks, "good for whom" and "stability for whom and for what purpose?"

The international community uses a complicated algorithm to decide whether to instigate change and when it favors stability. One large factor in this calculation is how change or stability impact perceived national interests. Math can change quickly as public support for a leader supporting U.S. national interests vanishes and mass civil uprising creates even more economic uncertainty and political risk.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, local civil society leaders complained that the international community's efforts to support new governments in these countries more often excluded and undermined local civil society.⁶ Elections became the primary way to determine legitimacy; and as cries of corruption and fraud increased, the new governments' legitimacy wavered. Especially in the first eight years of these international missions, governance initiatives overlooked mechanisms for civil society inclusion and participatory decision-making. A more strategic understanding of transition and stabilization requires a more sophisticated understanding of civil society.

The intense challenges of coordinating government civilians with military actors and the increasing military use of civilian contractors confuses and overshadows the distinct nature of civil society-military relationships sharing space in conflict-affected regions. There are many different types of civil-military relationships. Civilian government, civilian contractors, and civil society organizations are very different kinds of "civilians." Civilian government representatives hold a presumed unity of mission with the military; though focused on broader development and diplomatic efforts. Civilian contractors implement government missions for profit. Civil society usually refers to nongovernmental groups of citizens who join together for some independent mission that is not for profit.⁷

While vast effort has been invested in the creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) aimed to foster unity of effort between the Defense Department, State Department, and USAID

4 It draws on a series of dialogues between civil society organizations and military personnel in the United States and Afghanistan resulting in "Civil Society-Military Roadmap on Human Security," Washington, DC: 3D Security Initiative, 2011; available from <http://www.3dsecurity.org/>, accessed February 24, 2011.

5 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (London: Oxford University Press, 2008).

6 Research has documented that the Global War on Terror often has undermined civil society's ability to hold governments accountable, as some fragile governments label any dissent from civil society as aiding extremism or terrorism. David Cortright, George A. Lopez, Alistair Millar, and Linda M. Gerber-Stellingwerf, *Friend or Foe: Civil Society and the Struggle against Violent Extremism*, Report to Cordaid from the Fourth Freedom Forum and Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, October 27, 2008; available from http://www.fourthfreedom.org/Applications/cms.php?page_id=273, accessed February 24, 2011

7 Some definitions of civil society do include the for-profit sector.

among other agencies, only a small fraction of this effort centers on how these PRTs will relate to local or international civil society organizations. As such, civil society-military relations are suffering in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Colombia, and elsewhere. Many civil society organizations conducting humanitarian aid and development vehemently oppose military involvement in these activities and are withdrawing from all contact with military actors. Civil society organizations claim military-led development endangers their safety, undermines sustainable development, is not cost-effective, and frequently leads to unintended negative effects counterproductive to human security.⁸

Ultimately, a successful transition requires a civil society that can both hold its government to account and work with government to build security from the ground up through shared development and reconciliation efforts. The presence of an active civil society is an indicator of a functioning and democratic state. Civil society both works in partnership with the state to complement and supplement its capacity and to hold the state to account for its responsibilities and the transparency of its governance.⁹ As such, civil society has a unique role to play in fostering a stable peace.

2. TRANSITION REQUIRES A SOPHISTICATED UNDERSTANDING OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society organizations (CSOs) are groups of citizens not in government that organize themselves on behalf of some public interest. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are diverse and include international and local non-profit, non-governmental groups such as religious, educational, media, community-based organizations (CBOs), business and trade associations, traditional and indigenous structures, sports associations, musicians, artists and more. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are a category of CSO. There are several types of NGOs: humanitarian, development, human rights, research, environmental and peacebuilding. There are both local NGOs (LNGOs) and international NGOs (INGOs). Many NGOs hold several mandates. NGOs must meet specific legal requirements for organizational oversight and accountability. There is no single representation for civil society's vast diversity. CSOs represent a wide variety of views, and do not agree on all issues.

CSO capacities include fostering economic development, health, agriculture, human rights, participatory governance, security sector reform, as well as disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and fostering moderation and coexistence. Local civil society's strengths lie in their cultural, linguistic, political and social knowledge of and long-term commitment to the local context. International NGO's strengths lie in their technical knowledge, capacity building expertise, broader resources, comparative experience across contexts and access to advocate to international policy makers. INGOs often hire the country's best and brightest at salaries higher than local government or CSOs can afford, and in some cases create parallel government structures that can undermine local capacity.

CSO challenges are similar to those facing military and government staff. There are capable and incapable, corrupt and trustworthy CSOs. CSO networks try to bring some accountability and oversight to CSOs while representing CSOs interests to other groups. In some places, local communities look favorably upon CSOs. In other areas, they are despised and seen as carrying out a foreign agenda. Some NGOs seem to exist as moneymaking schemes oriented more toward getting funds for staff salaries rather than serving the community. While many CSOs

8 "The US Military's Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance," InterAction Policy Brief, January 2011; available from <http://www.interaction.org/document/us-militarys-expanding-role-foreign-assistance>, accessed February 24, 2011.

9 See Don Eberly, *The Rise of Global Civil Society: Building Communities and Nations from the Bottom Up* (New York: Encounter Books, 2008).

aim to foster human security, not all CSOs play constructive roles. Independent radio stations in Rwanda, for example, fostered inter-ethnic hatred.

NGO network umbrella organizations help to coordinate NGO programs, build capacity, address questions of corruption and improve NGO practices. NGO accountability mechanisms include, for example, oversight on administering funds from donors responsibly and relating respectfully and transparently with the recipients of NGO programs.¹⁰

CSO humanitarian principles guide the work of most CSOs. The principles are guiding values that also help ensure CSO access to and security with local populations who view them as humanitarians, not military agents. Using an “acceptance” security model based on consent by local communities, CSOs say they become “soft targets” for insurgents when they are called the “soft power” of the government or military or when they are referred to as “force multipliers” or pawns in military-led efforts.¹¹

Much of the tension between military-led interventions and local and international civil society organizations comes from the perceived “shrinking” of humanitarian space.¹² “Humanitarian space,” as defined by International Humanitarian Law (IHL), refers to the ability to pursue humanitarian missions in a context with other armed actors without fear of attack and while maintaining independence, impartiality, and freedom of movement. The term does not refer to physical space but the clarity of roles between civilian and military actors.

There is no one list of CSO principles. However a general code of conduct includes the key values in the following chart.

CSO CODE OF CONDUCT

Humanitarian Imperative: to save lives, alleviate suffering, and uphold dignity.

Independence: to make decisions, program plans, and strategies free from political goals.

Impartiality: to provide resources regardless of the identity of those suffering.

Partial to Human Rights: to work in support of the human rights of all people.

Neutrality: to not take sides in armed struggles.

Do no harm: to avoid harming others intentionally or unintentionally.

Accountability: to consult and be accountable to local people and long-term sustainability.

Respect for rights: to ensure that local populations are able to exercise their human rights.

10 See Lisa Jordan, “Mechanisms for NGO Accountability,” Research Paper, Series 3 (Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute, 2005).

11 Stephen Cornish, “No Room for Humanitarianism in 3D Policies: Have Forcible Humanitarian Interventions and Integrated Approaches Lost Their Way?” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2007; available from <http://jmss.synergiesprairies.ca/jmss/index.php/jmss/issue/view/9>, accessed February 24, 2011.

12 “The US Military’s Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance,” (Washington DC: InterAction, January 2011).

3. TRANSITION REQUIRES A “WHOLE OF SOCIETY” COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

A comprehensive approach, according to U.S. military stability operations doctrine,¹³ integrates cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities such as CSOs to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. A whole of society approach recognizes the key roles civil society plays in building security from the ground up.

A whole of society approach includes international organizations and civil society as key actors operating at the top, middle and community levels of a society in building security. CSOs seek to maintain their independence and impartiality, as building human security sometimes conflicts with a national security approach. The U.S. counterinsurgency guide¹⁴ and new doctrine for stability and peace operations¹⁵ illustrate how a comprehensive approach using diplomacy, development and defense might include actors at the top and bottom of the pyramid.



A comprehensive approach sees the links between poverty, development and security. It seeks to disrupt the patterns of civil war that threaten security and undermine efforts to reduce poverty and weaken local support for violence by spreading the economic benefits of peace. Development can pre-empt the ability of extremist groups to mobilize support from the population in need of basic services and discourage violence by addressing perceived grievances and offering better economic alternatives than the incentives provided by armed groups. Development can empower local change agents who can make demands on their government for transparency and accountability and foster middle class and civil society actors who can put a brake on political violence. Development and diplomacy are first resort security strategies, preventing, hopefully, the last resort of defense.

A comprehensive approach requires building social capital between civil society organizations at the community and mid-level with top level military and government planners.¹⁶ Social capital is a term that refers to the quantity and quality of relationships between people and groups.¹⁷ It is based on the idea that social networks have value. Social capital should exist horizontally and vertically within the pyramid illustrated above. Horizontal social capital is the quality and quantity of relationships between groups at the same level, such as the interagency process at the top level of the pyramid. Vertical social capital exists between groups at different levels, such as consultation mechanisms between local civil society and top-level policymakers. Preparing for transitions between military and civilian actors requires increasing the social capital or communication between these groups.

13 See U.S. Army, *Stability Operations US Army Field Manual 3-07* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Army, October 2008).

14 Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*. (Washington DC: United State Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, 2009).

15 Beth Cole, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, 2009).

16 Lisa Schirch, “Civil Society and the US Government in Conflict-Affected Regions: Building Better Relationships for Peacebuilding” (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2010).

17 Robert D. Putnam, *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society* (London: Oxford University Press, 2002).

4. PLANT THE SEEDS OF TRANSITION FROM THE BEGINNING

From a civil society perspective, the concept of an international military-led transition is just as much about an “entry strategy” as it is about an “exit strategy.” Civil society should help define the terms in which foreign nations will enter their country, how they will define their mission, carry out that mission, and determine the conditions under which they will leave. Knowing when and how to transition from military to civilian leadership and effort is in part a question of negotiating and defining the mission with civil society leaders from the very start.

Both local and international CSOs question the legitimacy of security missions, national or international, when military forces act without the consent of local populations, and when no legally enforceable mechanism exists to hold forces accountable to legitimate local political decision-making bodies. CSOs cite a long legacy of military forces acting against the interest of local citizens to achieve access to resources or geo-political gains. The quality of relationships between civil society and the military rests on the degree of legitimacy local people confer on the military mission.

In many parts of the world, military governments are the norm. During the colonial era, local militaries were repressive and accountable to colonial authorities. In these countries, much of civil society continues to perceive all military forces as a repressive tool in support of elite, government interests in resource extraction and projection of geo-political power. This historic impunity and legacy of civil society-military relations means that in some settings, the security forces are viewed as part of the problem, not part of the solution. The colonial legacy of civil-military relations means many CSOs around the world view all militaries with suspicion.

The legacy of colonialism also means that local people continue to perceive Western forces as using development projects in a bid to take over land and displace local people. In Kenya for example, the British provided sugar to local people and then took over the land. So when the U.S. military comes today, local people ask “What is your interest?” and want to know explicit goals of foreign military forces. With the growing presence of AFRICOM in East Africa, local civil society ask if the U.S. military is doing peacebuilding and development work in Kenya just to ‘pacify’ the population and/or contain Al-Shabaab in Somalia. They ask, “Is the US military motivated solely by national interests, or does it really want to promote peacebuilding on the ground?” Recent research from East Africa echoes civil society concerns about US military mission there on the ground: “Do they think we’re stupid?”¹⁸ Civil society organizations note that U.S. articulation of its mission in various countries keeps changing, and different parts of the U.S. government define the mission differently. There is less local support and legitimacy when the military mission is unclear or shifts over time. Greater consultation with CSOs before and during military interventions could help achieve greater legitimacy, consent and collaboration on human security goals.


5. KEY TENSIONS ON MISSION AND STRATEGY INHIBIT TRANSITION

Planning international military-led transitions also requires an in-depth understanding of the many differences and tensions between CSOs and military approaches. These include the following:

18 Mark Bradbury, “Do they think we’re stupid? Local perceptions of US ‘hearts and minds’ activities in Kenya,” Tufts University: Feinstein International Center, July 2010, available from <https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=19270958>, accessed February 24, 2011.

Defining the Mission: Human Security and National Security

Both Iraq and Afghanistan suffered from mission confusion. While internationals debated achievable goals and minimum end states for withdrawal, locals in both countries developed elaborate hypotheses about America's pursuit of oil, minerals, and geo-political control of their regions. Taxi drivers in both countries looked suspiciously in their rear view mirrors at Western passengers to ask why the foreigners were in their country. Public diplomacy messaging within the United States during U.S. interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq gave the U.S. public both broad, humanitarian motivations for interventions in these countries as well as more narrowly defined national security interests to obstruct terrorism, secure oil assets, or prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. According to public opinion polls, strategic communication efforts wavered in both Iraq and Afghanistan as populations debated whether international forces were helping or hurting their human rights and freedoms. Local people who experienced night raids, home searches, or drone bombs had a significantly higher rate of questioning the legitimacy of international forces.¹⁹



Civil society groups often perceive that militaries around the world narrowly define terms like “security” and “national interests” as stable governments pliable to U.S. interests in energy, geo-political power and security. Civil society’s vision of human security emphasizes the safety of individuals and communities around the world. Human security includes civilian protection, fostering stable, citizen-oriented governments with participatory democracy, human rights, and human development. Human security relies on a process of peacebuilding. Human security does not, by definition, contradict national security. Human security and more narrowly defined national security interests often overlap. In Nigeria or Iraq, for example, a stable, citizen-oriented government could both enable human security and more narrowly defined national security interests.

Military personnel contribute to a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding and human security when they are sensitive to inter-group dynamics, use conflict management skills to interact with local populations, provide logistical support to reconciliation efforts such as transporting tribal elders to a dialogue, and when the military responds directly to interrupt a mass atrocity.

CSOs contribute to a comprehensive approach to countering extremism, insurgencies and terrorism by conducting conflict assessments to identify core grievances, providing aid and development to vulnerable groups, helping reconcile divided groups, and fostering participatory governance and security sector reform. The next section illustrates these different approaches.

However, in practice, these two ends of the comprehensive spectrum are often in conflict along a civil-military axis. When national security interests contradict or undermine human security goals, civil society is in conflict with military actors. Developing a shared mission or comprehensive approach can either orient military resources in support of a human security agenda or it can orient development and diplomacy resources in support of short-term political or security objectives. It may benefit future missions to more explicitly communicate the overlapping interests of local populations in a human security framework and those of the international community in their own national interests. Other tensions also exist between military and civil society approaches to peace and security.

¹⁹ Sarah Ladbury, *Testing Hypotheses of Drivers of Radicalisation in Afghanistan: Why do men join the Taliban and Hizb-i Islami? How much do local communities support them?* Report in collaboration with Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU)(Afghanistan: Department of International Development, August 2009).

Enemy Centric vs. Population Centric The U.S. government gives military services the authority to use both kinetic (violent) and non-kinetic (nonviolent) measures to detect, deter and destroy an enemy. U.S. military actions are subject to international laws such as the Geneva Convention that include provisions to do the least amount of harm and reduce civilian casualties. Counterinsurgency emphasizes population-centric security, focusing on the safety of local citizens. Many CSOs focus exclusively on human security and make explicit commitments to 'do no harm'. CSO approaches to countering extremism and insurgency are different; they do not focus on "enemy identification." Instead, they work on addressing long-term root causes of violence and developing sustainable solutions to extremism, insurgency and terrorism. CSOs focus exclusively on population centric human security. Civilian casualties and human rights violations increase CSO-military tensions.

Control vs. Empowerment: Current U.S. counterinsurgency guidance identifies empowering local populations to interact effectively with their own government as key.²⁰ Residual military references to more widespread "population control and pacification" as well as the metaphor of "human terrain" raise suspicions, misunderstandings or confusion of military objectives. Military forces use a spectrum of coercive and persuasive methods to bring about change. The "money as a weapon's system" concept is an example of a drawing on coercive metaphor of a weapon's system to describe a persuasive tactic of development assistance.²¹ The American Anthropological Association released written statements²² denouncing the terminology of "human terrain" as sending a message that human beings can be treated as geographical "objects" to be manipulated and controlled rather than "subjects" who can be further empowered to shape their environment according to their own priorities.²³ CSOs use persuasive approaches to foster changes in beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. CSOs share concerns about terrorism but many would like to see more persuasive diplomatic and developmental strategies to create political processes to address extremists' grievances and crimes. Current War on Terror legislation prevents some CSO unofficial diplomatic efforts to facilitate reconciliation or peace processes by interpreting it as material support to terrorist groups.²⁴ While CSOs and military articulate the goal of "local ownership," both struggle to operationalize it.

Short-term vs. Long-term Time Horizon Military forces focus on shorter-term, quick-impact efforts to reduce immediate threats. CSOs generally take a long-term, relationship-based approach to human security. CSOs charge short-term U.S. national interests are undermining the longer-term goals of human security. The challenge is to design short-term programming that contributes toward long-term goals and to design long-term programming that supports short-term objectives.²⁵

In addition to these philosophical and operational differences, civil society and military personnel tend to hold mutually negative stereotypes and limited knowledge of each other. Military personnel tend to characterize NGO staff as liberal, naive "tree huggers" who lack love

20 U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Guide.

21 Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System: Tactics, Techniques, Procedures, Handbook No. 09-27* (U.S. Army Financial Management School, April 2009).

22 Anthropologists' Statement on the Human Terrain System Program, American Anthropological Association, January 26, 2010; available from <http://zeroanthropology.net/2010/01/31/action-alert-sign-the-anthropologists-statement-on-the-human-terrain-system/>, accessed February 24, 2011.

23 David Price, "Human Terrain Systems Dissenter Resigns, Tells Inside Story of Training's Heart of Darkness," *CounterPunch*, February 15, 2010; available from <http://www.counterpunch.org/price02152010.html>, accessed February 24, 2011.

24 Joshua Gross, "U.S. Terrorist List System Constrains Peacebuilding Efforts," *World Politics Review*, 19 Jul 2010.

25 Agnieszka Paczynska, "Development and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan" (Seattle, Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009).


of country and suffer from idealistic notions of what can be achieved to ease human suffering. NGO personnel, on the other hand, stereotype military personnel as blindly nationalistic and uncaring of human suffering.

At the same time, both sides share significant characteristics. Military personnel and civil society leaders share a public service ethic, follow a strict set of principles, make personal sacrifices, live on low salaries, and risk their lives for the sake of others. Both sides lack humility in regard to their internal problems. Some of the same problems of lack of capacity and corruption plague both civil society organizations and military.

The lack of education and understanding of each other means that every civil society-military dialogue starts at the ground level. The discussion only achieves a basic understanding of how the two sides disagree, but does not move to a stage where both sides develop creative ways of addressing the tensions. Planning for transition requires de-conflicting CSO and military approaches through greater attention to potential friction and the use of informed problem-solving approaches to the issues, tensions, and possibilities in this relationship.

6. TRANSITION REQUIRES CIVIL SOCIETY-MILITARY “COMMUNICATION” NOT “COLLABORATION”

Military-led interventions by necessity interact with and impact civil society. Given the extent of tensions between civil society and military-led transitions, establishing better communication channels is more realistic and likely to be more effective than stressing collaboration. In Iraq and Afghanistan as well as elsewhere, military-led interventions have sought civil society collaboration. In the COIN strategy, for example, government and military would like CSOs to be more fully engaged in the final “build” phase. Many CSOs resist being “implementing partners” or “coordinating and integrating” with a military-led mission and strategy. Civilians do not yet have the capacity to coordinate massive relief efforts and many CSOs acknowledge there may be a temporary role for the military in extreme cases. Many CSOs so strongly object to military-led humanitarian and development efforts that they are withdrawing from all contact with the military.



For now, better communication between civil society and military-led international interventions is necessary to begin to move toward a shared understanding of transition context. There can be no unity of effort or comprehensive approach where the stakeholders do not share unity of understanding or unity of mission. The diagram below illustrates that CSOs may be more interested in policy dialogue to discuss ways to minimize harm and maximize human security than in collaborating programmatically with a mission they do not see as legitimate.

Some CSOs, especially local ones, do wish for greater policy dialogue and “communication” at earlier stages when governments are conducting conflict assessments and developing strategic plans so as to emphasize human security goals. In the broader field of peacebuilding, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines on security sector reform (SSR) and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration/reconciliation (DDR) call

for civilian oversight and participation working with military actors when shared goals exist.²⁶ Peacebuilding CSOs may also assert their independence and critique of intervening forces based on the tensions identified earlier in this paper. However, at the same time they recognize a pragmatic need for civil society to engage in SSR and DDR and therefore the need for direct communication and even collaboration with armed forces in these activities.

Given civil society's diversity, the ways government and military personnel interact and communicate with civil society can and should be diverse.

First, the international community can develop better mechanisms for listening to and consulting with local civil society leaders including, for example, religious leaders, universities, labor unions, women's organizations, and traditional or tribal leadership. CSOs, civilian government, and military personnel do not have adequate forums for information exchange, monitoring of civil-military guidelines or general discussion at any stage or level of conflict assessment, planning, or implementation. A problem-solving approach to civil society-military relations requires communication and consultation mechanisms to provide a space for sharing conflict assessments, discussing the impact of potential policy options on civil society, or addressing field-level conflicts and issues.

In the United States, for example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties consults with a group of approximately 20 Arab, Muslim, Sikh, South Asian, and Somali community leaders. DHS draws on this group for crisis rapid response phone consultations, broader community consultations to identify concerns and brainstorm solutions, and to develop DHS cultural competency.

Identifying legitimate civil society leadership to make up such a consultation group is a challenge, but not impossible. In every region of the world, legitimate civil society groups are already working on democracy, human rights, peace and security. Global and regional civil society networks can help identify legitimate and longstanding civil society leaders. Civil society consultation can take place outside the country if necessary, and include members of the diaspora. Polling, focus groups, and interviews with key civil society leaders can inform and advise how the international community can best support transition toward democracy and stability.

Second, a spectrum of civil-military relationships, defined by UN OCHA, exists at the operational level for civil society organizations involved in humanitarian, development or peacebuilding efforts. The type of CSO-military relationship depends on whether missions align or there is sufficient humanitarian space for CSOs to maintain their principles.²⁷ The first category, "curtail presence" refers to situations such as the height of the Iraq war when civil society-military relations disappear when it becomes impossible for CSOs to operate in the same space as armed actors because of a lack of security and humanitarian space. The second category represents the situation in Afghanistan today, where there is minimal contact or communication between representative CSOs and military actors.

26 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Security System Reform and Governance* (OCED Publishing, 2005).

27 Edwina Thompson, "Principled Pragmatism: NGO Engagement with Armed Actors" (Monrovia, California: World Vision International, 2008).

Curtail Presence	Where it becomes impossible for CSOs to operate safely, international CSOs may pull out and local CSOs may go into hiding.
Co-existence/ Communication	Where CSOs, government and military operate in the same space but their missions do not align, only basic communication on logistical details takes place.
Coordination	Where CSOs, government and military missions partially align, there may be some basic coordination to promote CSO core values in human security.
Cooperation	Where CSOs, government and military missions partially or fully align, there may be collaboration on joint projects, particularly in disaster relief or DDR.

CSO-military communication happens informally and formally. Where there is no coordinating body, groups coordinate informally when working in the same area, or groups coordinate via “Heineken diplomacy” as individual people build relationships in informal settings. Coordination by command refers to some type of government Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) or international coordinating agency (UN OCHA) that has legitimacy through formal authority, through the rewards for being coordinated (e.g. funding) or the punishments for not following commands (e.g. denial of access to certain areas or refugee camps). Given CSO humanitarian principles of independence, coordination by command has not worked in places like Afghanistan, Haiti or Rwanda. More often, there is minimal coordination by consensus when a recognized coordination body builds consensus among diverse actors to work in ways that complement rather than conflict.

In sum, transition requires a focus both on fostering a citizen-oriented state and participation and leadership from civil society. Ideally, the international community can support transition toward democracy and stability via civil society’s own efforts. History suggests these civil society-led transitions are quicker, result in far fewer deaths, and require civil society to organize itself democratically, thus paving the way for more stable governance in the long term. But if the international community does decide to carry out a military intervention, international military and government leaders require the design of communication mechanisms so they can listen to and consult with local and international civil society. The more this type of consultation takes place, the more likely there will be shared understanding of the drivers of conflict and instability and the more likely that CSOs and the military will complement rather than undermine each other’s efforts and enable transition.

CHAPTER 17

NAVIGATING A SHIFTING PATH: PLANNING AND CONDUCTING SECURITY TRANSITION TO A HOST NATION

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Not in his goals but in his transitions is man great.
Ralph Waldo Emerson¹

INTRODUCTION

The context for security transition considered in this chapter is that of deliberate intervention in a fragile or failing state for the purpose of stabilizing it in support of national interest.² The reason for this is twofold: current indicators predict that the incidence of fragile and failing states is likely to increase in the future and it is arguably the most complex scenario.³ Conducting security transition from an external power to a host nation is a key national strategic decision and must be considered and shaped from the beginning of the overall strategy formulation process

1 Ralph Waldo Emerson, American Poet, Lecturer and Essayist, 1803-1882.

2 UK military doctrine identifies two main types of intervention, focused and deliberate. The author argues that there are at least three. (1) Preventive—this is normally by invitation to try and prevent the conditions in the host nation from deteriorating to a level where effective security is lost. This is usually in a permissive environment based on a clear legal framework through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). It is also likely to be with a nation that is already a strategic partner or with whom we have prior historical ties and effective dialogue. Activities will usually be restricted to diplomatic, economic and limited military assistance such as training teams (i.e. the British Military Advisory and Training Teams in Mozambique (BMATT) in the 1980s). This is the UK preferred basis for intervention and is encapsulated in the current National Security Strategy: “...we are going to place much more emphasis on spotting emerging risks and dealing with them before they become crises.” (2) Focused Intervention—a focused intervention is usually aimed to achieve a short to mid-term objective such as an imminent threat (Terrorist training Camp or WMD), emerging humanitarian crisis, to extract UK and other nation non-combatants from a deteriorating security situation (Non-Combatant Evacuation (NEO)), or an invitation to assist by a host nation to help with a specific problem. The reason for intervention is normally conducted in a semi-permissive environment, but can also be non-permissive. It is a short-term deployment for a specific purpose. (3) Deliberate Intervention—deliberate intervention, and the context for this chapter, is where the United States or UK will deploy in support of allies and partners to protect either our own national interests, maintain international security, or uphold international law by intervening directly with all of the national elements of power (Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME)) to contribute to either the defeat of a state adversary that poses a significant threat, or support the stabilisation of a fragile or failing state. Deliberate Intervention is a long-term commitment which requires political will and diplomatic and economic effort, particularly resources, long after military operations have ceased.

3 JDP 3-40- *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, (MOD Joint Doctrine Publication, Nov 2009), defines a Fragile and a Failing State on p.1-2 as follows. A Fragile State—a fragile state still has a viable host nation government, but it has reduced capability and capacity to secure, protect and govern the population. Without intervention, it is likely to become a failed state. A Failed State—a failed state is where remnants of a host nation government, or some form of potential host nation government, may still exist. However, in such states, the government does not have monopoly on the use of force, cannot provide security or simple basic services, and is not sufficiently legitimate or effective to protect its borders, citizens or even itself. It may exert a very weak level of governance and rule of law in all or part of the state but, overall, the mechanisms and tools of governance have largely collapsed.

for intervention.⁴ Accepting that there are often political imperatives requiring governments to act quickly in their national interest, to do so without identifying conditions and objectives for when and how we should aim to transfer power between those intervening and the host nation is folly. Recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown this to be true.

Security transition is only one part of a national transition from a fragile or failing state to a stable one, but an essential part of the transfer of real power to the host nation. It is a complex and fluid problem but one that is often talked up to be almost insoluble. Consequently, at its very mention, there is a tendency to take a sharp intake of breath and put it in the all too difficult bracket labeled “to be considered later.” While security transition is complex and elements of it sometimes intractable, it needs to be understood and tackled head on with confidence. Transition is ultimately about change and change is the natural order of life. As Emerson says, it is how we deal with transition that is the true mark of excellence. It is a constant and we must treat it as such. While we cannot possibly forecast every eventuality, we can certainly identify the types of change and conditions we need to see and how we transition between them. For security transition is not just about physical activities and timelines, it is also about having the understanding, mindset, ethos and philosophy that enable us to deal with the problems that arise and identify solutions.

The focus of this chapter is therefore to consider some of the key issues and factors when transitioning security from an intervention force to a host nation. It uses and adapts work the author and others in the United Kingdom doctrine community are currently developing. Three major areas linked by the central theme of understanding are discussed: the strategic context; ideas on the theory, nature and conduct of security transition; and the development of enduring security partnerships as an effective vehicle for security transition.

THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT - TRANSFORMING FRAGILE AND FAILING STATES

“To intervene or not to intervene, that is the question.”⁵

The decision to intervene in the affairs of another state is not an easy one and sits firmly in the realms of grand strategy: the politically directed and controlled use of national power to achieve national objectives. There are many reasons that might compel us to intervene. The baseline is normally whether or not intervention is in our national interest.⁶ The case for intervening in fragile or failing states has to be considered carefully and is the probably the greatest strategic challenge in the 21st Century. Whatever the reason for intervening, the fact is that intervention, based on historical analysis, has a tendency to be an enduring commitment that is costly in blood and treasure. Several things may compel us to intervene: it may be because of a crisis in another nation that affects us in some way; we may have a legal obligation to support a long-standing strategic partner or ally; there may be a moral imperative such as preventing genocide; or there may be historic ties between us and the host nation. Whatever the reason, it is imperative to identify the likely full extent of the problem and the potential commitment involved before engagement. This is easier said than done, mainly because western nations generally do not have an information and intelligence system that is optimized to allow us to “understand.” Constant and effective understanding is the key to successful intervention, stabilization and transition, but what do mean by understanding?

4 *Oxford English Dictionary*, 11th Edition, 2004, p.744: Intervention - Interference by a state in another's affairs.

5 With apologies to William Shakespeare!

6 This term is so open to interpretation that almost anything can be justified as being in our national interest. Strategic planners must understand the parameters of what is in our national interest very clearly.

The Importance of Understanding

The UK military considers understanding to be one of the three key components of statecraft: understanding, power and influence.⁷ Understanding provides the context for the decision-making process in the form of situational understanding. This in turn informs the decisions that result in the application of the national instruments of power to achieve national objectives. The purpose of understanding in security transitions is therefore to enable us to develop and maintain detailed situational understanding in order to provide our national operating context during transition.⁸ This context must be understood by all levels of command and underpins how others perceive us and how we develop our own narrative to strengthen or to change this perception.

In all contexts, understanding refers to the acquisition and development of knowledge to such a level that it can be used to enable *insight* (knowing why something has happened or is happening) and *foresight* (being able to identify and anticipate what may happen).⁹ The object of understanding can be situations, people or technology among many others. Developing understanding relies first on gaining the situational awareness to identify the problem. This applies equally to individuals, our collective requirement to know (*within a group*), or our common situational awareness (*between groups*). Analysis of this situational awareness then provides greater comprehension (*insight*) of the problem, and our judgements based on this comprehension provide understanding of the problem (*foresight*) that allows us to identify what action we need to take. It also forms the basis of our narrative—how we want to be seen by others, how others see us, and how we see ourselves. This is summarised below.¹⁰

Understanding

Situational Awareness + Analysis = **Comprehension** (Insight)
Comprehension + Judgement = **Understanding** (Foresight)

The distinction between situational awareness and understanding is therefore the level of analysis and depth of comprehension that allows judgement to be applied effectively. The UK military defines understanding as: *the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making.*¹¹

Developing understanding is not, however, easy. There are a number of obstacles to overcome. All understanding is contextual and will change when the dynamics of the situation change. It is perishable and, if not constantly sought after, it will quickly lose currency. It is also highly competitive in that all of the actors within the operational area and the wider single information space are competing for similar information sources. Most importantly, it will always be imperfect. Try as we might, we will never gain perfect understanding because of our own biases and perceptions, and because we are competing against actors who have spent their lives in that environment. We therefore need to learn to make assumptions and be comfortable taking risks based on the gaps in our knowledge. This is particularly pertinent when dealing with transition because transition is, by its very nature, fluid.

7 JDP 04: *Understanding*, DCDC Dec 2010.

8 This includes a detailed view of our national interests, our strategic partners and our international obligations (e.g. the UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organization).

9 JDP 04: *Understanding*, DCDC Dec 2010.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

Understanding and Transition

Understanding sets the context for effective security transition planning. We therefore cannot consider transition without understanding the environment that we are going into and knowing where transition fits into the overall strategy. What is also clear is that the process of transition cannot be de-linked from the original decision to intervene. The reasons for intervening, the way that we conduct ourselves in another country and how we interact with the other actors all form part of the background narrative that will shape security transition.

The intervention environment is a highly complex one. It is a singular, highly competitive information and intelligence space in which knowledge is power and to which we can only have partial access. It is both local and global at the same time. It consists of numerous actors, each with identities shaped by multiple ties, loyalties and personalities. As a result, many different narratives and social and psychological pressures and norms exist and interact. Accelerated irregular activities in the form of crime, corruption, insurgency, piracy, and gangs, as well as competing elites, are part of this interaction. The battle is therefore over influence in its many incarnations and understanding is the key to achieving it. This mosaic must then be set against the actual problem – how we transition from intervention through a stabilization process to stability.

JDP 04: *Understanding* identifies six simple generic questions that we need to constantly ask ourselves before and during any campaign:

- What do we want to understand and how soon?
- What do we know?
- What are the potential gaps in our knowledge?
- How do we fill those gaps? (i.e., Who has the knowledge?)
- How do we achieve continuity?
- How do we improve the level of detail?¹²

The fundamental requirement is to fully understand the nature of the problems that we are facing. As Clausewitz so clearly states: “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature.”¹³ We are very likely to be in arrears as we initially compete for information. While stabilisation is a process which is supported by a number of civilian and military activities, in terms of security, we must understand the type of conflict that we are fighting. This determines the campaign theme or themes that are critical to developing a proper vision, narrative, and deployable capability – and to how we are perceived. The campaign themes may change over time. Using Iraq as an example, the primary campaign theme was initially regime change through major combat. It then switched prematurely to transition, before becoming counter-insurgency focused and finally transitioning to stability operations. The goal must be to create a dynamic and flexible information and intelligence network that is agile enough to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances and allow us to know what we are facing. It must enable us to exploit our understanding to advantage, leading to clear core campaign themes.

¹² Ibid., pp. 3-1 to 3-2.

¹³ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 88.

Parallel Journeys – Understanding National Transition

Intervention is best considered as a transformational journey for the host nation. Concurrent with the central journey of the host nation are the parallel but linked journeys of the other state and non-state actors, and each of these have their own narrative which we need to understand. In the case of the host nation, we are effectively forcing (if intervention is non-consensual) or assisting (if consensual) a fragile or failing state to transform itself into a stable and secure state over a flexible timetable that may or may not have been agreed on with the host nation. For the host nation the transformation is a national transition from an old failed system to one that delivers a better future for all. And this is a fundamental point; the host nation has to be responsible for the completion of their journey. Ultimately, only they can restore and regenerate themselves to self-reliant, full sovereignty. The national narrative therefore changes through this transition process from one of state failure, to working with external assistance in some form of partnership, to becoming self-reliant. Figure 1 illustrates this.



Figure 1. National Transition – A Journey of Transformation

Transition, however, lacks a common definition. Most nations define it in their own terms, but there is no shared internationally agreed definition and such a definition is essential if the international community is to understand and assist in the host nation's transition journey. In its simplest form transition is the process or a period of changing from one state or condition to another which aligns and is synonymous with the definition of change—to move from one system or situation to another.¹⁴ The change envisaged for a fragile or failing state is to terminate and resolve conflict by identifying the root causes, provide security for the population, transform its national institutions to govern effectively within the law, and rebuild the economy to provide jobs, opportunities and prosperity. In terms of security, the host nation must take full responsibility and accountability for the use of force from the intervention force as soon as it has the capability and institutional mechanisms to do so. Therefore, in the context of fragile and failing states, national transition can be defined as:

The transformation, aided by external intervention, of a fragile or failing state from conflict to a stable, self-reliant sovereign state. This process is enabled through the progressive transfer of power and the development of professional and competent institutions to restore full sovereignty, authority and accountability to the host nation and their monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

Within this overall national transition there will be a large number of other subordinate transitions which have to take place along the way. In doctrinal terms we tend to group these transitions into the three elements that are the bedrock of a stable state: security; governance and the rule of law; and economic infrastructure and development.¹⁵ When these are in harmony, they lead to balanced political settlement and societal relationships. While this is good framework,

¹⁴ *Oxford English Dictionary*, 11th Edition, 2004.

¹⁵ *JDP 3-40- Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, (MOD Joint Doctrine Publication, Nov 2009), p.1-5.

it oversimplifies the enormity of the challenge. General Sir Mike Jackson's braided rope much better illustrates the complexity of the problem as shown in Figure 2, but even this does not cover the full scope.¹⁶

Within each of the major elements of Jackson's rope are many different layers and components which need to be considered. For example, in the rule of law, there is civil law, criminal law, common law, international law, and even military law. Many of the actors in these various environments are interlinked, but also fulfill distinctly different functions. Security transition requires clear priorities on what are the most important strands of the rope to reconstruct to form the catalyst for other changes. In addition, a nation or




Figure 2. Constituents of a Nation or Society

society is shaped by more than its history and culture; geostrategic considerations of the physical environment in its many manifestations – maritime, land, air, space, climate and resources, cyberspace, and human capacity all matter. All of these combined shapes a nation's institutions and how they develop technologically and organizationally. It is essential to understand in detail during national transition how each of these constituents are linked to and interact with each other. For example, security transition cannot occur without the host nation political and financial institutions to control and support it, or without a robust economy to pay for the appropriate security capability. The reality is that within all of these areas are many other sub-transitions that need to take place to achieve the overall transformation sought.

The host nation government is not the only player. The parallel journeys of any intervening force or other actors must also be considered in detail. Once our nation begins to consider intervention we significantly change the dynamics of the extant situation. The decision to intervene changes the dynamics completely because we then become an active participant and this is, in effect, the first major transition. A good analogy is throwing pebbles in a pond. Throwing pebbles in a still pond creates turbulence. When entering a conflict situation, the intervention force is a large pebble, whether unilateral, an international governmental organization (IGO), or an ad hoc coalition. Intervention by coalitions is the more complex and more likely intervention, and some would argue more turbulent. Ad hoc coalitions are preferred because they share costs, lend legitimacy, and avoid much of the traditional political stalemate associated with the United Nations and other IGOs. The reality is, however, that the pond is already very turbulent because other actors – external and internal – are already playing in the pond. If the intervention force is sufficient and of one voice, the dynamics of the turbulence change favorably as the force enters the fray with some actors aligning with the intervention goals, others aligning in opposition, and some remaining neutral. If the coalition pebble is not heavy enough, either alone or with those host nation actors who align with its goals, it will fail to have an effect and will sink without trace. If the coalition is divided in its own strategic aims and conduct it will have the same effect as throwing a handful of pebbles into the pond, creating a lot of ripples without much effect. It will significantly increase the turbulence and the complexity of the actor alignment and delay

¹⁶ Designed by General Sir Mike Jackson GCB, DSO, ADC, DL. when he was Commander Multi-Division South West in IFOR in 1995. Now included in UK doctrine in JWP 3-50 The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations (Second Edition), 2004.

or threaten success. It will also undoubtedly prolong the turbulence. Being an active participant therefore presents some real challenges.

The first of these is deciding the shape and size of the intervention and hence commitment. In the case of preventive intervention, this may be a very small team under civilian control which could include military capability to assist with security sector reform (SSR). In the case of deliberate intervention, it very much depends on the nature of the conflict. If we have to fight to achieve conflict termination, military mass will be very important. Whether or not this mass is provided by some form of external force, or can come from the host nation, very much depends on whether or not the host nation military forces are part of the overall problem—which may well be the case—and the effectiveness of the indigenous military capability. The state of host nation military also has important ramifications for the longer term security transition in terms of how much effort we need to place on training and equipping the indigenous forces and for what roles and missions. As a minimum we will need to ensure that they are at least capable of maintaining their own internal security. Inherent to this is preparing and equipping to operate in their environment as opposed to creating a mirror image of the intervening coalition forces. The coalition will then have to decide how it is going to guarantee the defense of the host nation from external threat until such time as they develop their own capability. All of this suggests a very long term commitment.

The second challenge is achieving unity of purpose and effort. Difficult enough to achieve among departments and agencies in unilateral efforts, a coalition is even more problematic. However, without a politically driven and sustained agreed purpose a coalition will find extreme difficulty in executing its mission effectively. Logically, coalition members define what is in their national interests differently and will have different views on how to deal with any problem. Nonetheless, coalition membership is at least founded on some shared or mutually supporting interests. Knowing how to negotiate from a political and military perspective with allies, and understanding how to achieve influence among them are critical skills in achieving alignment of purpose. Political will and agreement are perishable and must be constantly worked at.

A third challenge is to understand what is the best vehicle for achieving transition? When we intervene, we do so for a purpose. Intervention is normally for some form of self-interest and there must be some benefit from it. Developing a long-term strategic partnership with the host nation through partnering both the government institutions and the security forces is an effective method of achieving lasting benefit. This subject is considered in more detail later in this chapter, but self-interest and benefit must be understood.

The fourth challenge is that, by intervening, we become a target for adversarial actors, particularly when we are aligned with any form of the host nation government. Whenever the host nation government acts against the interests of their people or can be portrayed as such, we are considered to be a part of that decision and that regime. This means that we must choose our partners very carefully, and ensure that there are clear caveats to our assistance. These caveats should include standards of governance and rule of law and economic conditions that must be adopted in order to provide a sense of security and meet the basic needs of the population. If we do not get this right, the conduct of the security transition between the intervention force and the host nation will be at best problematic and, at worst, fail and allow any opposition to prevail. In effect, the opposition is on a third parallel journey which must also be understood to be effective. The opposition journey is one of many, all of which must be taken into account. Others are identified in Figure. 3.



Figure 3. A Multitude of Actors Journeys and Perspectives

Having developed a degree of understanding, considered the strategic implications, and made the decision to intervene, we find that modern interventions are likely to rest on four broad assumptions: (1) intervention is in our national interest, (2) we have a legitimate reason for doing so, (3) we would hope to be in some form of coalition with our allies and partners, and (4) we will aim to transition the responsibility for security, governance and rule of law, and economic infrastructure and development, to the host nation as soon as is practically possible. These assumptions therefore provide our mandate and the moral authority to prosecute the mission. This is critical to how we will be perceived by the actors within the environment that we will be entering. Hence, significantly divergent permutations on any of these assumptions will shape how our actions are perceived at home and abroad and have a marked effect on how we interact with the key actors, conduct the mission, or achieve long-term success.

THE NATURE, THEORY AND CONDUCT OF SECURITY TRANSITION

Defining Security Transition

In the context of intervention and stabilisation, security transition concerns the transfer of power and responsibility from one security mechanism to another. The UK currently defines security transition as:

...the progressive transfer of security functions and responsibilities between actors in order to reach a durable level of stability for the host nation that is not dependent on a significant operational international military contribution.¹⁷

The salient points from this definition are: security transition is not just one transition, but a series of transitions (*progressive transfer*); it is by agreement and design a dialogue between the intervening force and the host nation (*best met through some form of partnership*); and the intent is to develop a durable capability that does not develop into dependency by the host nation on its sponsor. On the face of it this sounds fairly logical but, as with all complex activities, the devil is in the detail and it is not easy to understand, coordinate and action security transition without understanding the true nature of the beast.

¹⁷ Combined UK Stabilisation Unit and Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) *Joint Doctrine Note 6/10, Security Transitions*, dated Nov 2010, p.1-1. Further highlighted in UK Stabilisation Unit, *Responding to Stabilisation Challenges in Hostile and Insecure Environments: Lessons Identified*, London, Nov 10.

The Nature of Security Transitions

Security transitions are at best complex and, more often, wicked problems. That is to say they often defy a direct, scientific, process driven or logical approach to solving them.¹⁸ The political nature of all transitions, the number and variety of external and internal actors involved (from neutral to supportive to hostile), the changing character of conflict, and a host of other complicating and interacting factors (cyberspace, globalisation, climate change) make effective security transition exceptionally difficult. It is an Indiana Jones style maze where each step taken can either lead to success or disaster and it is difficult to predict which before starting. Wicked problems are, however, what we need to educate and train ourselves to deal with. In this respect, the study of security transitions is a useful way of understanding complexity and how to operate within it.

The nature of security transitions is broadly summarised by seven characteristics. The first is that security transition is only one line of activity, although a decisive one, in the overall national transition. It is often the most important part of that process because without security political accommodation and the development of strong non-violent societal relationships are impossible. Nonetheless, it depends on success in the other lines.

The second is that all security transitions are *sui generis* (unique) in character.¹⁹ Each time we plan and conduct security transition different international and local factors will shape the final outcome. While there may be some superficial similarities with other historical examples, beneath the surface the dynamics inevitably differ. This does not mean that historical analysis of security transitions in other conflicts is invalid. On the contrary, as the old adage says, history doesn't repeat itself but it does rhyme;²⁰ case studies do allow us to identify and construct enduring principles from history, but we have to apply judgement to them based on the unique context of each new situation.

A third characteristic is that security transitions take place in a highly competitive and dynamic environment. Competition is not just among the actors in the host nation, but also within the coalition that forms the intervention force. There will always be a divergence of views among actors and the only way to try and align them is by effective strategic communication and the narratives that flow from it. Security transition requires detailed situational understanding, constant negotiation between the key actors, and the ability to react fluidly to shocks and surprises.

The fourth characteristic is that security transition is ultimately about how we transfer power, and particularly the monopoly on the use of force, back into the hands of the host nation government. This is a significant moral responsibility and very firmly a political lead. Transfer should only occur after political accommodation has been achieved and a representative government is in place. Not just representative in our eyes, but in the eyes of the people of the host nation. In addition, there must be sufficient security capacity so that the people can go about their daily business without undue fear and any remaining internal security issues can be dealt with by the host nation security forces in accordance with international standards.

The fifth characteristic is that how we plan and conduct intervention operations shape the strategic and local environment and this, in turn, affects the options that we have to conduct transition. The key strategic decisions before intervention are: whether to deploy military capa-

18 The term "wicked problem" was introduced by Professor Horst W.J. Rittel in one of his lectures in 1967. This was followed by a joint treatise by Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber in 1973 entitled *Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning*.

19 Combined UK Stabilisation Unit and Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) *Joint Doctrine Note 6/10, Security Transitions*, dated Nov 2010, p.v.

20 Exact provenance unknown but generally attributed to Mark Twain, American author and humorist, November 30, 1835 - April 21, 1910.

bility, within what context, how to use it, to what effect, and how to extract it. Our campaign design springs from these decisions and determines what we need to understand to prosecute the intervention, and how we command, deploy, plan, fight, exploit, cooperate, sustain, recover and support our own forces and those of the host nation. It is also important that we understand that transition is inherently about multiple activities at different levels sometimes running sequentially and sometimes concurrently. They must be coordinated and security transition must therefore be planned from the beginning of a campaign.

The sixth characteristic is that conducting a security transition is not a uniform set of activities on a single, predictable trajectory. The progressive transfer of functions between key actors identifies that there is no single transition, but rather a series of transitions over time. To complicate matters further, what can physically be achieved within a specified time period is usually unpredictable. The conduct of security transitions must be flexible enough to adjust to emerging events. Although the core principle of security transitions is a political focus, unrealistic political timeframes unaligned with needed progress in host nation security capacity can only ever be aspirational. The conduct of security transition can helpfully be divided into “big T” and “little t” transitions. Big T transitions are those that must be achieved to attain the final campaign goal and objectives. They are politically set, critical to overall success, and relate to achieving decisive conditions in a campaign. They are also normally linked to a political agreement. For example, in the current drawdown in Iraq, the Big T transitions have been and are:

- The implementation of the Security Agreement and the Strategic Framework Agreement on 1 Jan 09.
- The Withdrawal of U.S. troops from Cities, Towns and Villages by Jul 09.
- The cessation of combat missions from 31 Aug 10.
- The reduction of U.S. Force-Iraq to 50,000 from 154,000 by 31 Aug 10.
- The withdrawal of all U.S. Forces from Iraq by 31st December 2011.

Little t transitions are those which occur naturally on the path to achieving a big T transition. In other words, for every big T transition, there may be many smaller t transitions. Linked to the Iraq example of big T transitions above, some of the small t transitions between the withdrawal of U.S. troops from cities, towns and villages and the cessation of combat missions were: ensuring that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) had reached the standard to operate on their own with limited support; the handover of U.S. bases to the ISF; ensuring that the Iraqi Ministry of Defence was paying its own troops; how the US military would retain situational awareness; and how overwatch would be conducted.

The seventh characteristic is that the lead for delivering the key aspects of security transitions at the local level is context dependent. While the overall lead must remain political, at the local level it very much depends on the security situation. In the early stages of intervention it is likely to be the military commander who has the lead as the result of the need for security and the other agencies work within his framework. As the security situation improves, the other agencies come to the fore and take the lead. The military changes from being the supported organization to supporting the other agencies as they pursue the broader mission.

Current UK Security Transition Theory and Doctrine

Although the process is disliked, a joint-interagency approach to planning is critical; it is the glue that brings players together cementing the relationships. It also provides a shared vision and means of achieving it.

Rear Admiral Dave Buss U.S. Navy, Commander CJ5, HQ MNF-I 08/09

Transition is inherently a joint, integrated and interagency process for the reasons that Admiral Buss has highlighted above. An excellent recent example of joint interagency cooperation is the UK's current Joint Doctrine Note on *Security Transitions* which is a joint publication between the UK Government's Stabilisation Unit and the Ministry of Defence. This is a unique arrangement and the first time that doctrine has been published between two different government agencies. The purpose of the Joint Doctrine Note is to provide guidance on how to think about security transitions and a framework for their planning and conduct.

The approach is centered on three main tenets: a multinational and interagency process; negotiation as the critical enabler; and constant monitoring and evaluation. In addition, four principles have been identified. The first is having political focus. The key point is that intervention in a fragile or failing state and the provision of overall security is not a singularly military activity. Intervention relies on a truly comprehensive interagency approach that applies all of the elements of national power to achieve success. It is a politically led action in which the military has a key part. The military must therefore understand its role within the overall strategy and focus on the security aspects of any intervention. It may be able and willing to assist in other areas, but must temper this against fulfilling its main role. However, while from a military perspective security transition may be the main effort, political primacy in both the host nation and the coalition is the key to effective security transition because it relies on success in other areas. All security transition planners, military and civilian, must work within the overall strategic context under clear political authority and not in isolation; stovepipe planning, as we saw in 2003 in Iraq, can lead to disastrous results.

Legitimacy is a second principle. Joint Doctrine Note 6/10 stresses that legitimacy is critical to delivering effective security transition, but it also raises the issue of legitimacy from whose perspective: "**what** legitimacy and in the eyes of **whom**; ultimately, it is ... domestic legitimacy that provides long-term stability."²¹ It further identifies three sources of legitimacy: through performance (doing the job and doing it well); through process (the legal mandate or political agreement to provide that function); and social legitimacy (being the right person or organization to be the right source of authority through popular sovereignty and moral authority).²²

A third principle is building comprehensive capacity. Building comprehensive capacity is a long-term and complex process. It is not just about the growth and training of security forces, but rather the development of the wider national infrastructure to develop, sustain and deploy them in the interests of the nation under civilian control. This requires the creation of a holistic and comprehensive approach among host nation government agencies in order to value and integrate security concerns and forces within overall government policy.

Sustainability is the fourth principle. By the end of the security transition, the host nation must be able to sustain its own internal security and forces, enabling the intervention forces to withdraw. Post transition, intervention forces will likely need to underwrite the external defense of the host nation until such time as it has been able to build its own capacity to do so.

A Joint-interagency Security Transition Planning Framework

JDN 6/10: *Security Transitions* proposes five key questions as the foundation of security transition planning for a joint-interagency team.²³ These questions are designed to help the planners think about the critical aspects of security transition.

21 Combined UK Stabilisation Unit and Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) *Joint Doctrine Note 6/10, Security Transitions*, dated Nov 2010, p. 1-9.

22 Ibid.

23 Combined UK Stabilisation Unit and Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) *Joint Doctrine Note 6/10, Security Transitions*, dated Nov 2010, pp. 2-2 to 2-13.

- **Why is the transition taking place?** This question is aimed at developing common situational understanding in order that we can define the negotiating space.
- **What functions are critical enablers of the security?** This question aims to identify four things: the technical security functions required (internal security of the people and the state, external defense of the nation, provision of rule of law); the geographic area and scale over which the security transition will take place; the organizational levels at which security transitions take place (policy and resource level, management level and delivery level); the main oversight and accountability mechanisms (executive control, parliamentary oversight, independent bodies, media and civil society groups)required.
- **Who are the potential partners and stakeholders in the transition?** What are their interests in the transition? Are they perceived as legitimate? Can they develop the required accountability mechanisms? Do they have or can they develop the required capacity and motivation to perform the function? Can they perform and sustain the function.
- **When should the security transition take place?** This question aims to set the timeframe and conditions to be achieved through the use of milestones (Big T and small t transitions), and determine the sequence and duration of activities within the overall plan.
- **How will transition options be developed, negotiated and implemented?** This question focuses on how we articulate our outcomes and the options to deliver them, how we negotiate and influence key events, how we manage the effective drawdown of military assistance and how we monitor and evaluate progress.

These questions and their interrelationships are illustrated in Figure 5.




Figure 5. UK Security Transition Planning Framework.

Detailed military internal planning is based on answers to these broad strategic and operational questions developed by the joint-interagency team. The military do, however, have significant input to and influence over the overall joint interagency planning process. In fact, although it is civilian-led, the military logically is the major player in supporting its development purely

because of their ability to plan and distribute it. Nonetheless it is not a typical military plan and there are some “golden rules” that best be adhered to in joint interagency strategy formulation and planning:

- All campaign planning is in support of an overall Political goal.
- The military decision-making process (MDMP) doesn't work in the joint-interagency environment without significant revision. It is far better to design a common theatre-wide taxonomy jointly with civilian partners that is easy to understand and not entrenched military jargon. For example, ends, ways and means translates well across all agencies. End-state and centre of gravity may not.
- Keep the strategic framework simple. For example: good strategy is based on at least eight main elements: understanding, vision, clear objectives, resources and credibility (political will, capability and resources), strategic communications and energy and timing.²⁴ This is illustrated below:

Understanding - understanding the strategic context of the operating environment and the nature of the problem; all strategy is contextual.

Vision - A clear and unambiguous vision statement explaining the desired outcome. The strategic vision is to achieve a steady-state of a long-term strategic partnership between the intervention forces and the host nation, but what do we mean by this? In his speech at Camp Lejeune on 27 Feb 2009, President Barack Obama outlined his strategic vision for Iraq and this provides a good model:

Forging a true and lasting Partnership with an Iraq that is sovereign, stable and self-reliant. With a Government that is just, representative and accountable, that provides neither support nor safe haven to terrorists, and in developing independent, competent, responsive and accountable government institutions that secure the Iraqi people and their national infrastructure, deliver essential services, and govern in a just, and non-sectarian manner while confidently contributing to regional peace and stability.

This statement clearly enunciates where the U.S. and the Government of Iraq (GoI) would like to be, sets some pre-conditions (representative government, secure population and no safe havens for terrorists), and highlights the aspiration of developing regional peace and stability together.

Objectives - Clear strategic objectives that support the vision. JDP 3-40²⁵ outlines three key strategic objectives when intervening in a fragile state:

--Building Human and National Security - creating the environment for success.

--Fostering Host Government Capacity and Legitimacy - Governance and participation.

--Stimulating Economic and Infrastructure Development - social and economic well-being.

24 Based on the original concept and acronym UVOCET: UNDERSTANDING, VISION, OBJECTIVES, CREDIBILITY, ENERGY, TIMING by Col I A Rigden OBE, RCDS Strategic Leadership Workshop, Seaford House, Nov 2008.

25 JDP 3-40, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, (MOD Joint Doctrine Publication, Nov 2009), pp. 2-20 to 2-21.

The U.S. Iraq Strategic Objectives 2009/2010 as an Example²⁶

The U.S. Joint Campaign Plan 2009 focuses on five key cross-cutting pillars as its key strategic objectives: (1) Develop representative and accountable Government; (2) Develop a robust and diverse economy; (3) Develop strong regional diplomatic relations; (4) Develop respect for the Rule of Law; and (5) Create a peaceful security environment.

Resources and Credibility –The latter is achieved through demonstrated political will, diplomatic, military and economic capability, long-term commitment, and the allocation of sufficient resources to get the job done. Once committed, there is the requirement to maintain unwavering political will for the duration of the mission, however long it takes. This must permeate all aspects of the intervening nation’s defence and security strategy, and not just those who are deployed. General Sir David Richard’s insistence that the MOD make Afghanistan its priority focus is a good example of this.²⁷ A second requirement is to employ sufficient capability and resources to enable the failed or failing state to develop legitimately. This means that the diplomatic, military and economic assistance and capabilities provided must be capable of achieving the lion’s share of the mission initially, and of being able to influence other international agencies and NGOs to fill the gaps.

Energy and Strategic Communication- Placing sufficient energy to see the strategy through to fruition whatever the obstacles is critical in intervention and assistance. Energy is about leadership, determination, strength, vitality, willpower and dynamism without which meaningful success cannot be achieved. There should be a single point of political focus and the determination to succeed in the face of internal and external opposition and media pressure. Most importantly, it requires excellent strategic communication to ensure that the public understands why their armed forces have deployed into a dangerous and volatile environment. The key, however, is effective leadership.

Timing – Identifying the timeframe within which to make key decisions and having the strategic patience to pursue long-term strategies is paramount. It effectively sets the objectives, operating parameters and life of the narratives throughout the campaign. There is seldom a perfect time to engage and intervene, but it is important to strive to create the best conditions and timeframe by considering the real and potential threats and opportunities. Thereafter, timings must be realistically matched to host nation and one’s own conditions and resources, but must also remain flexible to meet the unanticipated challenges. Deploying national power to assist a fragile or failing state is a long-term commitment and requires a long-term political approach be taken. Strategic patience is essential as it underpins the development of the conditions to achieve success, provides the continuity of thought and resources to support the overall goal, and takes advantage of opportune timing.

- Campaign Objectives are jointly owned by the political leader and the military commander, but the political leader has the final say.
- There must be an effective monitoring and evaluation system to support decision-making. During security transitions the focus of monitoring and evaluation will be very much on our partners, the politics of the host nation, the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the people, the capacity, capability and professionalism of the security and justice sectors, and whether or not the transition is sustainable in the long term.²⁸
- There must be an effective coordination and synchronization mechanism that can identify key strategic issues and provide political and military leaders with the information that they require to make key decisions on time.

26 Extracted from 2009 Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq Unclassified EXSUM Version 2, published in Jul 09.

27 CGS, General Sir David Richards GCB,CBE, DSO, ADC Gen, 2009.

28 Combined UK Stabilisation Unit and Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) *Joint Doctrine Note 6/10, Security Transitions*, dated Nov 2010, pp. 2-12 to 2-13.

PARTNERING AND PARTNERSHIPS—KEY TO SUCCESSFUL SECURITY TRANSITION²⁹

Security transitions require credible partnerships to succeed. Indeed, the focus of a stabilization strategy or operation is to create effective partnerships between the intervention forces and the host nation. Success is founded on common interests and trust built over time. Shared interests and goals and trust are critical at all levels among all parties. However, the national interests involved ultimately determine the levels of commitment and assistance and shape the final partnership. Surprisingly, given the importance of partnership, what a strategic partner is and how partnerships are developed is poorly understood.

This lack of understanding is inherently problematic. In the case of security transitions, the long-term aim of developing indigenous governmental institutions and security forces is to build up sufficient capacity for them to replace external assistance in these areas. Creating an effective partnership that achieves this capacity is a pillar of any eventual exit strategy. The trouble with aligning such development to the term exit strategy is that it does not instill much self-confidence or self-assurance within the indigenous institutions and forces. We are effectively saying, “you are our ticket out of here.” While this may be true in a literal sense, it suggests the purpose is to exit at the potential expense of real capacity. A strategic partnership implies something much more enduring beyond the period of physically embedding U.S., British or allied political, military and economic team assistance. A relationship needs to continue in the longer term if it is to really have value and inspire indigenous confidence and assurance, and this is the essence of what a strategic partnership is about: an enduring, mutually beneficial relationship of choice.

Such strategic partnerships need more study. For example, there is no common definition of a partnership in a security context. A proposed simple definition is: *a formal legal arrangement where the partners are otherwise independent bodies who agree to cooperate to achieve common security goals that are mutually beneficial.*³⁰ From this definition, it logically follows that the key characteristics of a strategic partnership include:

- Inherent differences between or among two or more partners that must be factored into all decisions and activities; all partners have an option vote, if only to be less than supportive.
- A requirement to develop structures and rules to enable joint decision-making and cooperation.
- A requirement to develop the overall approach (strategy) jointly.
- A need to share information.
- A need to share risks and rewards jointly.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Adapted from the definition of the South Yorkshire Fire & Rescue Service, South Yorkshire Fire & Rescue Service website, www.syfire.gov.uk, updated 3 Oct 08.

The Decision to be a Strategic Partner

A decision to be a strategic partner is always a political decision and conditional. It is determined by political considerations and depends upon the conditions inherited, jointly created, or negotiated as part of the intervention. Such a decision logically carefully considers the moral issues involved and requires a full cost-benefit analysis. Countries entering a partnership must identify further key conditions that need to be achieved before the partnership is fully realized. These might include statements, agreements, policies, practices, and structures concerning:

- Defense obligations.
- Political standards to be achieved within a certain timeframe.
- The Rule of Law, Justice and Human Rights.
- Economic burden sharing.
- Mutual Respect.
- Trust and Cooperation.

Once committed to, however, such conditions need to be followed through.

Developing a Strategic Partnership

New strategic partnerships tend to develop over time in three broad stages of a partnering process.³¹ The first stage is the initial engagement. The initial engagement may be result from historical ties, enduring national interests, or a sudden imperative to connect as the result of a crisis. It could be a mix of all three. The important factor is that engagement is necessary because not to do so will affect our perceived national interest – threat, opportunity, or real or perceived obligations, such as treaties, humanitarian concerns, or support of allies' interests. At the beginning of the engagement, it is important to understand the context and to ascertain what the relationship and roles among the host nation and any assisting or intervening nations will be. In the case of conflict, this poses questions like, who will be leading on what aspects of trying to stabilize the situation? What is the legal basis for intervention? Paraphrased from *The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, a useful list of other considerations prior to deciding whether to engage follows below with one addition:

- What is the character of the affected government? What are the moral and ethical consequences and implications of supporting an oppressive or abusive regime?
- What is the bias of the government? Does it side with a particular faction that may be against our goals?
- Rule of Law
- Level of Corruption
- Civil Military Relations
- Economic Viability
- The presence of severe negative influences such as terrorists or transnational criminal groups
- Border security and ungoverned spaces
- What is the relationship with its neighbors?³²

31 This implies no existing strategic partnership and that the countries either have had no substantive prior engagement, have previous historical links which have ossified, or have had poor relations in the past which requires diplomatic engagement to rectify. It also assumes that engagement is in the national interests of both or all parties.

32 *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, (U.S. Government Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, January 2009), pp. 37-40.

As commitment levels, resources, and experience increase, and some success is enjoyed, confidence and trust are established which can lead to the second stage of partnering where a sound relationship evolves. It is at this stage that the intent to pursue a strategic partnership with the host nation can be used as an incentive to develop even greater cooperation between the participating countries. Such intent must, however, be perceived as a credible proposal. As previously noted a strategic partnership is a long-term commitment and may require significant resource outlays. As the partnering relationship develops over time, it can transition into the third stage of a true strategic partnership formalized through an alliance or treaty imposing mutually agreed obligations upon all parties, and based on a sound and further refined legal framework.

In conflict situations, or when intervening in a fragile or failing state, it is the success of the initial engagement and the development of a sound relationship through partnering—the process of developing a partnership—that determines whether or not the need and potential for a strategic partnership exists. In other words, all partnerships are aspirational until certain conditions are achieved. These conditions are developed by the partnering process through such activities as developing common goals and objectives, achieving political accommodation between the intervention countries and the host nation, developing the legal framework for external assistance, and transitioning to a host nation lead for security.




Figure 6. The Stages of Development of a Partnership.

If the first two stages are proving to be problematic or the mission is failing, and there is no obvious way of resolving the differences between the parties concerned, other options are better pursued: review the strategy, withdraw, or seek assistance from an interlocutor such as the UN or regional bodies like the AU to try and identify another path to assistance.

Planning the Transition of Security Forces within a Partnership³³

In planning the transition of security forces, we must be very clear on what we see as our desired end-state. Unlike the overall strategic partnership that our political strategic vision may espouse, there must be an end to the capacity-building mission. The military partnering end-state is therefore best articulated as: *Self-reliant, competent and professional security forces who are*

³³ Extracted and developed from DCDC Discussion paper on 'Partnering Indigenous Forces' written by the author, 31 Mar 10.

representative of the people and the nation, and capable of providing for their internal and external security. The bulk of the intervention forces should be withdrawn after the host nation is capable of providing for its own internal security. Small elements remain to assist in the development of the external defence capability, but security from external threats is guaranteed by standby forces at readiness provided by the original intervention forces until such time as full indigenous capacity is achieved. Therefore, the host nation security forces are built-up as the external coalition forces withdraw. Continuing the journey metaphor, their journey is one of transforming (often in combat) from one of being led within a coalition, to being supported by the coalition, to taking command and control of their elements within a coalition force, to then taking command and control of all operations and self-employing their own forces. Figure 7 illustrates this journey and provides a clear framework for military security transition planning.




Figure 7. Host Nation Security Forces Journey of Transformation

Types of Assistance³⁴

Irrespective of whether or not a strategic partnership is eventually achieved, there are four key assistance tools for capacity building in the security sphere. These tools can be applied across assistance spectrum for all the elements of national power: Mentoring, Advising, Supporting and Training (MAST). In terms of building security capability and capacity, these four tools are the same for either developed states who are seeking to improve their armed forces or failed and failing states who desire to build credible security forces to deal with their insecurity. All of these are forms of assistance from one sovereign state or coalition of states to another sovereign state and involve issues of sovereignty and legitimacy. Providing “considered” assistance is the cornerstone of changing the conditions in a failing or failed state, and for subsequently developing an enduring strategic partnership.

Support and training form the bedrock of assistance. Support comes in many forms and may include niche support such as intelligence, pay, logistics, and combat support. Training assistance may be provided in or out of theatre, but training is a constant in assistance programs. As with niche support areas, the training commitment often continues long after the last combat troops have been withdrawn. Support and training are therefore extremely important in the development of a long term strategic partnership as well as for the immediate imperative of working together to resolve the conflict.

34 Ibid.

Mentoring and advising are both about providing direct support to frontline forces based on professional competence and developing relationships with indigenous forces. They differ in that mentors should be empowered to lead until such time as the indigenous forces are capable of doing so themselves. Until then the mentors must essentially make the key decisions. Once a host nation capacity is sufficiently developed, mentors switch to an advisory role where the host nation forces make the key decisions. Advisors possess the power to make recommendations of their own to host nation leaders based on their experience, or through their chain of command, but not to act on or enforce them. They can, for example, recommend courses of action, or inform about a fact or situation, but the final decision must be with the indigenous force commander and that commander's chain of command.³⁵ Once a course of action is about to be enacted the advisor fulfils the functions of observer, provider of capability support and official representative of his own chain of command.

Indigenous Forces and Partnering

Partnering with indigenous forces is the best way to develop them. There are two types of indigenous partnering: embedded and integrated. Both types involve the use of MAST, but differ in their command and control relationships. Embedded partnering denotes mentors and advisors working within the indigenous unit they are partnering with and providing direct assistance. Integrated partnering describes where coalition and host nation forces work together within a combined command structure, i.e. an Afghan Kandak working within a UK or U.S. Brigade. The lead for command and control may change as the host nation regains its full sovereignty as power is transferred. The types of assistance and partnering are summarized in Figure 8.




Figure 8. Types of Partnering and Assistance

Risks and Threats to Security Transition

As has been stated, security transitions are inherently risky. JDN 6/10, *Security Transitions*, identifies a number of risks and threats to achieving effective security transition which provide a very useful start point for risk analysis.³⁶ These are summarized as:

- Absence of credible partners—this stresses the importance of understanding the actors within the operating environment. If there is a lack of credible partners, compromise may be the order of the day. We may have to deal with individuals and groups that we

³⁵ Ibid., footnote 9, p.19.

³⁶ Combined UK Stabilisation Unit and Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) *Joint Doctrine Note 6/10, Security Transitions*, dated Nov 2010, pp. 1-14 to 1-18.

would not normally choose. Understanding in this scenario becomes doubly important as we will have to find ways of influencing them to achieve the best effect for the population.

- Premature transitions—conducting security transition before the host nation is ready and professional enough to take on the responsibility for security can set back the overall national transition significantly. It may, in turn, lead to a longer commitment by the intervening coalition.
- State collapse or vacuum—linked to premature transition, withdrawal of the intervention coalition may precipitate a state collapse or, in the event of a weak political accommodation, a political vacuum. We must decide what our response to this will be as part of our strategy formulation and planning process. Do we re-intervene, or leave them to fend for themselves?
- Human Rights abuses—human rights abuses undermine the legitimacy of transition. If these abuses are conducted by the host nation security forces, the transitioning coalition forces may be regarded as being part of the same regime by association. The coalition may need to change course and partners to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the people.
- Conflict of interests—the multiple actors of a coalition may not all share the same overarching common national interests over time. Some may feel that the conduct of the security transition does not support their national view. Negotiating through these tensions is a key and constant element of security transition.

These points make clear that any risk analysis must be based on sound understanding and that this understanding must be sustained throughout the intervention.

SUMMARY

Security transitions are difficult and each one is different, however they are not, and must never be viewed as, insurmountable. Instead, they are better seen as a series of parallel but interlocking journeys by the various actors along a path of change and transformation—from conflict to stabilization to long-term stability. The core journey is that of national transformation of the host nation. Our journey starts with our decision to intervene in the affairs of this sovereign state as we move from being an observer to an active participant. This is our first transition, one of engagement. Our second stage is the assistance that we provide from across our elements of national power to stabilize the environment within which the host nation exists. This is best achieved through partnering with the intent to develop a long-term strategic partnership. As we build and develop host nation capacity, we potentially move through several more stages of change or transition, from leading to supporting the host nation. Our participation is, however, conditional, and this means that at a time to be specified our direct in-country support will be withdrawn. This is the critical security transition when responsibility for security passes from the intervention force to a sustainable host nation security capability which we have helped to create. The transition journey does not end there. We may well provide support to the external defence of the host nation for period after we have withdrawn, and we may develop a long-term strategic partnership that entails an enduring commitment. The complete journey and some of the multiple participants are summarized in Figure 9.




Figure 9. The Totality of National Transition

In order to be successful and meet our commitment, security transitions must be effectively enabled. This essay argues the key enablers for successful security transitions are: understanding the operating environment as best as we possibly can; maintaining political primacy; maintaining a joint, multinational, inter-governmental and interagency approach to strategy, planning and problem-solving; negotiating; continuously monitoring and evaluating progress; taking risks based on sound assumptions from our situational understanding; and developing an effective long-term strategic partnership with the host nation.

Finally, to ensure our success, we must educate and familiarise the appropriate personnel from all government and military agencies to be comfortable with the idea and challenge of planning and conducting security transitions. *Experience is something that you get only after you need it, but its lack can be partially mitigated if you have at least thought about the problem beforehand.* The security transition maxims articulated herein and summarized below may help shorten the inevitable learning curve of experience.

- Security transition is only one part of an overall national transition/transformation by the host nation from conflict to stability after external intervention.
- All transitions are *sui generis* (unique).
- Effective situational understanding is a pre-requisite for effective security transition.
- We must plan for security transition before we intervene.
- How we plan and conduct intervention operations shapes the environment and affects our options for how we conduct transition.
- Security transitions take place in a highly competitive and dynamic environment.
- Security transition is not a uniform set of activities on a single trajectory.
- The lead for delivering the key aspects of security transitions at the local level is context dependent.
- Partnering and partnerships offer the best chance of achieving long-lasting success.

CHAPTER 18

TRANSITION TO STABILITY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ: JCOA CASE STUDY ONE

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INTRODUCTION

This case study looks at how U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF-I) transitioned from counterinsurgency (COIN) to stability operations during the period 1 January 2009 (signing of the Security Agreement) through 31 August 2010 (end of combat operations).² While there were many factors that complicated the transition, success was predicated upon the USF-I and civilian-military organizations becoming adaptive learning teams with leaders driving change – all while drawing down in size by approximately 100,000 troops.

The stability operations mission undertaken by USF-I consisted of three primary tasks: advising and assisting the Iraqi security forces (ISF), building Iraqi civil capacity, and conducting partnered counterterrorism (CT) operations. U.S. forces focused on setting the conditions for the ISF to achieve minimum essential capabilities prior to the end of 2011, while supporting U.S. Embassy efforts to build Iraqi civil capacity at local through national levels. Partnered CT operations enabled the transition by maintaining pressure on insurgent and terrorist networks. A detailed look at USF-I's efforts in accomplishing each of these three tasks follows.

PRIMARY TASKS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

Task 1: Advising and Assisting the Iraqi Security Forces

Resources for manning, training, and equipping the ISF were prioritized based on operational assessments. The analysis and planning process employed by the Deputy Commanding

1 Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) Mission: as directed, JCOA collects, aggregates, analyzes, and disseminates joint lessons learned and best practices across the full spectrum of military operations in order to enhance joint capabilities. Requests for information can be sent to jcoa.ed@jcom.mil (NIPRNET) or jcoa.ed@hq.jcom.smil.mil (SIPRNET), or jcoa.ed@usa.bices.org (NATO).

2 In October 2009, General Raymond T. Odierno, U.S. Army, Commanding General, Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I, later to become USF-I), requested that US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) conduct a study on the transition from counterinsurgency operations (COIN) to stability operations (TSO) in Iraq. He requested the study focus on the following: (1) How the US forces and the civilian-military team in Iraq adjusted to the shift in the operational environment? (2) How significant challenges impacting the transition were overcome or mitigated? In response to this request, the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) developed a phased data collection plan that included multiple study team deployments and a comprehensive continental U.S. (CONUS) collection effort. Over 150 interviews were conducted with the key leaders in Iraq from USF-I, US Embassy Baghdad, US Divisions (USDs), Special Operations Forces (SOF) and selected Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), Advisory and Assistance Brigades (AABs) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). In addition, over 70 CONUS interviews were conducted with key leaders from US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), National and Joint Readiness Training Centers, Combined Arms Center (CAC), national and theater SOF, Department of State (DOS) Near East Asia Iraq Desk, and various redeployed units. In all, over 200 interviews of key leaders were conducted, and their insights provide the foundation for this study.

General for Advising and Training (DCG A&T) projected where ISF capability would be by the end of 2011 and identified where shortfalls were likely to occur. This allowed USF-I to prioritize and allocate available resources to enable ISF to achieve minimum essential capabilities. In support of this, U.S. divisions were able to redirect and target their resources to help the ISF in specific needed areas.

We've got two years to get the Iraqis to the point of minimum essential capabilities for internal security and lay the foundational capabilities for defense against external threats ... what do we need to do, what can we do, and where do we put our resources to get us there? So we went through a pretty rigorous analysis to identify what those capabilities are and then what the Iraqis needed to have as far as training, equipping, skills.³

ISF development included both internal security capabilities and a foundation for defense against external threats. U.S. forces' strong partnerships with the ISF, accurate assessments of capabilities, and realistic capability projections all helped create and sustain a coherent effort in ISF development.

The U.S. approach to partnering with the ISF evolved and was redefined over time, based on the capabilities of the ISF, the changing operational environment, and the implementation of the security agreement. In the first years of COIN, U.S. forces were in the lead, teaching combat skills and instilling confidence. As the ISF's capability and the operational environment improved, the ISF began to take the lead, with U.S. forces providing support and enablers. As the operational focus moved toward and into stability operations, the partnership continued to evolve as U.S. forces took an increasing advisory and assistance role.

As we looked at the Security Agreement and picked it apart, it became clear to us that in order to continue to operate 'full spectrum,' we were going to have to redefine partnering. So we committed ourselves to the notion that our ultimate success would be defined by the quality of our partnering with ISF. It's inconvenient, it's hard, it's manpower intensive, everything takes longer, there are cultural issues and professional issues, but the thing I am proudest of most is how every leader...committed to it, and I think it made all the difference.⁴

Over time, the example of U.S. forces, through the combination of mentoring and partnered operations, began to change ISF operational paradigms. Partnered operations were doing much more than just building capabilities; they were also beginning to create some major shifts within the Iraqi military culture. Lieutenant General (LTG) Michael D. Barbero stated that the areas of most notable change included the noncommissioned officer corps, demand-driven logistics, democratic policing, and evidence-based warrant processes.⁵

Task 2: Building Civil Capacity

In 2009, USF-I's *Guidelines for Achieving Sustainable Stability* directed U.S. forces to synchronize their efforts with interagency partners to strengthen Iraqi political, economic, diplomatic, and rule of law institutions while avoiding temporary "quick fixes" that could undermine long-term institutional viability.⁶ Working with U.S. Embassy Baghdad, USF-I embedded personnel

3 Lieutenant General Michael D. Barbero, Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training (DCG A&T), USF-I, interview by JCOA, 12 February 2010.

4 Lieutenant General Charles H. Jacoby, Commander, I Corps (DCG-O, USF-I), interview by JCOA, 12 February 2010.

5 Lieutenant General Michael D. Barbero, 12 February 2010.

6 General Raymond T. Odierno, U.S. Army, Commanding General, MNF-I, "Guidelines for Achieving Sustainable Stability," 3 May 2009.

at the U.S. Embassy to reinforce planning capacity where it was critically needed. The subordinate commands and civilian organizations such as Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I) and U.S. divisions worked with the U.S. Embassy’s Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA), while the divisions and brigades worked with the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). This helped to ensure unity of effort in developing coherent and achievable goals and synchronizing short- and long-term civil capacity development.

U.S. forces worked to expand the reach and reinforce the capacity of the PRTs. The division-brigade-PRT civil-military team helped the Iraqi provincial governments, local governments, and ISF connect with the population to better understand local issues and concerns. Efforts included facilitating and building relationships amongst the Iraqis themselves (government officials, ISF, and the people). In addition, the U.S. forces’ security and logistics assets provided transportation for PRT members to participate in numerous regional, provincial, and local government meetings and conferences.⁷ These efforts to build “connective tissue” served as catalysts for further demands for good governance:

[We are] creating a demand in the population for good governance. That demand from the population, if we get this right, will be a continuing influence that years of future Iraqi governments, both local and national, are going to have to contend with. So what they are doing is creating an expectation in the people of Iraq for what a government does. And long after we are gone, if we can get this right, governments of Iraq are going to have to satisfy that demand.⁸

By working to develop Iraqi processes, the PRTs helped increase the capacity of provincial governance, enabling enhanced public services and economic opportunities for the population. There were numerous examples where division and brigade specific expertise (engineering, legal, medical, etc.) were used to reinforce PRTs and enhance civil capacity building. One technique that worked well involved demonstration projects such as green houses, center-pivot and drip irrigation, and grain silos to allow the Iraqis to see for themselves the advantages of certain concepts and technologies.

In addition, U.S. forces aligned their efforts with interagency, international, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) efforts. With the U.S. Embassy in the lead, USF-I supported and reinforced civil capacity assessment and planning efforts. The Joint Campaign Plan (US Mission–Iraq [USM-I] and USF-I) and the Unified Common Plans (PRT and brigade or division) facilitated a “whole of government” approach and unity of effort among the interagency organizations involved. In addition, USF-I provided critical logistics, security, and movement of United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) personnel, enabling humanitarian, reconstruction, development, human rights, and political assistance missions.

Task 3: Conducting Partnered Counterterrorism Operations

Partnered CT operations supported and enabled the successful transition to stability operations in Iraq. These operations maintained pressure on the violent extremist networks (VENs), providing the time and space necessary for continued political maturation, civil capacity development, and the growth and maturation of ISF capabilities.

7 Ms. Karen Malzhan, North Baghdad ePRT Lead, interview by JCOA, 3 February 2010 and Mr. Gabriel Escobar, PRT Lead, Kirkuk PRT, interview by JCOA, 4 February 2010.

8 Deputy Director Political–Military Affairs Iraq Desk, Department of State, interview by JCOA, 9 July 2010.

The development of an Iraqi CT enterprise was integral to the success of the partnered operations. The CT enterprise included those institutional functions and capacities that “kept terrorists off the streets,” and thus involved the legal, judicial, and correctional systems, as well as police and investigative systems related to CT operations.

During the transition period, the Government of Iraq (GOI) continued to gain confidence and exert its sovereign authority, necessitating continuous U.S. innovation and adaptation to sustain pressure on the terror networks. Successful partnered CT operations were achieved through extensive collaboration and information sharing at all levels.⁹

In 2004, ISOF [Iraqi Special Operations Forces] was assisting US Special Forces [USSF] prosecute the war against insurgents and violent extremists in Iraq; by 2009, roles had reversed, USSF were now assisting ISOF ... As the US mission in Iraq evolved over the years, so too have the capabilities of ISOF. ISOF is poised to become a self-sustaining, national counterterrorist command that can independently and successfully plan, prepare, and execute counterterrorist operations in a synchronized and coordinated effort.¹⁰

UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

In order to successfully accomplish the three stability operations tasks described above, USF-I had to continue to fully understand and shape the operational environment. This required USF-I to:

- **Maintain Situational Awareness (SA):** Innovative approaches were used to maintain situational awareness despite reduced resources and decreasing access resulting from the drawdown in U.S. forces.
- **Retain Influence with the Iraqis:** Partnerships and personal relationships were crucial to retaining necessary influence and enabling continued progress in building ISF and civil capacity.
- **Execute Non-lethal Targeting:** Non-lethal targeting was used to solve complex problems encountered in the operational environment and affect drivers of instability.¹¹
- **Conduct Mission Preparation:** Mission preparation focused on training and changing the mindset of U.S. personnel who were returning to Iraq as part of an advisory and assistance brigade (AAB) conducting stability operations (as opposed to previous missions conducting major combat or COIN operations). Through a combination of home station training, joint and Service training, and in-theater training, units were mentally and physically prepared to conduct stability operations.
- **Master Transitions:** Mastering transitions proved critically important to the civil-military teams in Iraq as they continuously planned, executed, assessed, and adjusted to the changing, complex operational environment.

A discussion of each of the aspects of understanding and shaping the operational environment follows.

9 The intent for partnered CT operations was that there would no independent operations without GOI approval.

10 “Iraqi Special Operations Force, An Overview,” paper, April 2010, UNCLASSIFIED.

11 Drivers of instability included: communal/factional struggle for power and resources, insufficient GOI capacity, violent extremist groups, and external interference.

Maintain Situational Awareness

U.S. forces developed innovative approaches to better understand the constantly changing political, military, economic, cultural, and social environment. It was through this holistic understanding that U.S. forces were better able to identify, assess, and develop solutions that mitigated the drivers of instability within their areas of operation. Partnerships and relationships with a wide range of organizations and entities were used. Additionally, media monitoring, polling, and information fusion were important capabilities that U.S. forces used to keep informed of immediate news events, gauge atmospherics, and bring together multisource information for analysis.

Partnership with ISF coordination centers, headquarters, operational commands, and command and control (C2) nodes enhanced situational awareness. Furthermore, a more accurate understanding of the Iraqi perspective was gained through routine interaction with Iraqi counterparts. Using U.S. resources to support Iraqi priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and other shared priorities increased information sharing and situational awareness, as well as continuing to build trust.

Division staffs combined information from many sources to develop operational environment assessments and to support the targeting process. For example, in U.S. Division–Center (USD-C), the Environmental Effects Cell integrated PMESII (political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure) information from various sources, including ISF, PRT, and command staff. The Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) was used by U.S. forces throughout Iraq to allow ready access to data and tools for analysis and presentation. CIDNE continued to evolve to support the mission, increasingly incorporating access to information like key leader engagement (KLE) reports.

Retain Influence with the Iraqis

The challenge for military and civilian leadership was in retaining the level of influence necessary to help shape and sustain progress, while tactfully “backing off” and allowing the Iraqis to increase their capacity by doing more themselves. During the transition from COIN to stability operations, the level of influence retained was derived directly from the strength of partnerships and relationships. Built on cultural knowledge and respect, these personal relationships allowed development of the trust, transparency, and confidence that were crucial to influencing and enabling continued ISF and civil capacity progress. USF-I, the U.S. Embassy, and their subordinate organizations worked as a team, enhancing each other’s relationships with their respective Iraqi military and civilian counterparts.

Now we have to retain influence not with the number of tanks and airplanes, but with the contributions to civil capacity and governance and finishing the job of buttressing the legitimacy of the GOI, and deterring nefarious, aggressive neighbors.¹²

The Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) was fundamental to achieving success. The SFA established seven areas of cooperation including political, defense and security, cultural, economic and energy, health and environment, information technology and communications, and judicial. With these agreed upon areas of cooperation, USF-I and the U.S. Embassy were able to retain access with key Iraqi ministries. Over time, this access resulted in the GOI recognizing the genuine desire by the U.S. to support continued Iraqi development.

At the local level, the AABs’ emphasis on partnership enabled strong relationships and influ-

¹² Jacoby, 12 February 2010.

ence. The AAB structure, coupled with mission focus and augmented with the stability transition teams (STTs), allowed unity of effort in partnering with ISF units. This greatly facilitated multiple touch-points and growing trust with the ISF. Providing regular secure transport for the PRT, the AAB had frequent engagements with the local and provincial leaders, helping build trust and relationships. Brigade leadership indicated that the relationship with their ISF counterpart was the primary “pacing item” for enabling ISF progress.

Every principal on the staff, every commander, every sergeant major, every company commander, they all had a partnered unit, a partnered person. There was a 10th Iraqi Army G3 and there was a Maysan Operations Center G3, so those two staff colonels were my partners. You have to spend a lot of time getting to know them personally and trying to help them professionally, which can be difficult.¹³

Finally, as U.S. forces drew down, the importance of “information activities” (e.g., key Leader engagement and information operations [IO]) became even more crucial to extending influence and shaping perceptions across various audiences. Information activities helped shift perceptions in desired directions and counter malign influences. As part of the partnering process, U.S. forces assisted their ISF counterparts in recognizing the importance of information on the battlefield and in developing their own practices and capabilities. In commenting on the importance of information as part of the transition plan, General (GEN) Raymond T. Odierno stated:

I would argue that as we reduce the size of our force in Iraq, the importance of IO grows. Again, because we want to influence and we want to have a strategic communications plan that talks about why we are drawing down. We need an influence operations campaign that says al-Qaida is still bad, and you need to reject Iranian influence...IO will continue to play a big role. All of our statistics tell us that we have been very successful in changing mindset...it is almost counter-intuitive, but as we reduce our forces we'll need more ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and we'll need more IO. It is a cheaper way for us to mitigate our risks as we draw down our forces and turn over responsibility to the GOI.¹⁴

Further reinforcing the importance of strategic communications and the critical role played by senior leaders, Brigadier General (BG) John G. Rossi, J33, USF-I, commented:

You are in an influence game here, that is what our role is ... The most potent weapon system we have is the number of stars on a guy's shoulders that go into a meeting to convince a leader 'cause the Iraqi's operate on instructions from higher, so you have got to hit them at all levels on the totem pole. A lot of times, the lower level guys [Iraqi ISF] will agree with you, but they will not act until they are told to... The way you move anything forward here is with KLE.¹⁵

13 S3, 4/1 AD, interview by JCOA, 12 May 2010.

14 General Raymond T. Odierno, U.S. Army, Commanding General, USF-I, interview by JCOA, 23 June 2009.

15 Brigadier General John G. Rossi, J33, USF-I, interview by JCOA, 18 August 2010.

Execute Non-lethal Targeting

U.S. forces adapted their targeting processes, often employing non-lethal means to solve complex problems and affect drivers of instability. Non-lethal targeting involved determining the drivers of instability or, as GEN Odierno described, “Understanding the why.”

And then, lethal versus non-lethal ... One of the things that I’ve been trying to stress (and it’s combat, but it’s more reflected in stability operations) is first you have to understand why there is a problem. You have to answer that question, ‘Why?’ Once you know why, you know what tools are available for you to fix it. Most of the tools now are non-lethal tools.¹⁶

To understand “why” required a profound knowledge of the operational environment, often developed from strong relationships among U.S. forces, the interagency, and their Iraqi counterparts. These relationships were used to influence and leverage key Iraqi decision makers in solving problems through non-lethal approaches. It was critical that Iraqi decision makers were brought into the process of addressing and solving these problem sets, thereby creating “buy-in.”

There is no problem [here] that you will tackle that is strictly a military problem. They are all interagency problems ... Everything is convoluted and tied together. It’s a matter of creating that combined, joint, interagency cabal of people. It does involve Iraqis ... My job ... was to bring people together to solve a very complex problem.¹⁷

Key to effectively addressing the drivers of instability was getting the right people around the table to discuss and understand the problems and tools available to help solve them. In that regard, information activities such as KLE and IO proved to be useful tools for non-lethal targeting and affecting the drivers of instability.

Conduct Mission Preparation

This is an army that changes every year and passes brigade areas of operations to new brigades, divisions to new divisions, and Corps to new Corps. This is unbelievable what is going on here and people wouldn’t understand it unless they saw and lived it. How a unit, for over a year, will prepare itself for this mission and develop its capacities and its intellectual understanding of the battlefield, and will seamlessly transition from one organization to the next. It’s an Olympic handoff, and no other army in the world could do it. Every now and then, we ought to remind ourselves of that.¹⁸

Home station training gave commanders the opportunity and flexibility to tailor their pre-deployment training based on unit needs and specific areas of operation. Commanders leveraged non-traditional training partners to assist in training stability operations tasks. Local universities, city resources, border patrol agents, and the Foreign Service Institute were used to educate staffs in understanding the breadth and complexity of civil-military operations. At the same time, units began “battle tracking” from home station months in advance of the deployment. Pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS) provided opportunities to incorporate the most current operating conditions into the home station training plan and strengthened communications between incoming and outgoing units.

16 General Raymond T. Odierno, U.S. Army, Commanding General, USF-I, interview by JCOA, 21 August 2010.

17 Commander, 4/1 AD, interview by JCOA, 11 May 2010.

18 Jacoby, 12 February 2010.

Exploiting electronic connectivity, commanders were able to collaborate and “battle track” with their in-theater counterparts in preparation for relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA). As an example, MG Wolfe, as the incoming Commanding General for USD-C, had Command Post of the Future (CPOF) on his desk, viewing the same common operating picture as his counterpart in Iraq. The ability to access the in-theater unit’s portal and listen to briefings and meetings contributed significantly to units’ pre-deployment preparation.

The combat training centers (CTC) placed an emphasis on remaining current and integrating lessons learned into rotational training. This was achieved through extensive dialogue with deployed units, routine video-teleconferences (VTCs) with senior commanders, deploying teams to Iraq to observe the environment first hand, and placing a premium on bringing in observer trainers (O/Ts) with recent combat experience. These efforts enabled the CTCs to shape training and scenarios to more closely reflect the current operating environment. Integration of role players, to include Iraqi Army commanders, local Iraqi leaders, and Western and Arabic media, further enhanced the realism and complexity of the training environment.¹⁹

I’m trying to look back to the MRX [Mission Rehearsal Exercise] and what we’ve learned in the first 30 days in theater to see if there’s anything substantially different. I ask that question all the time to the battalion and brigade commanders. ‘What did you have to do differently or adjust dramatically once you got here that you didn’t practice or train on when you were on your MRX?’ And surprisingly, I haven’t found anybody who has told me they didn’t train on the tasks that they needed to train on to be ready, capable, and competent to do what they’re doing right now.²⁰

Finally, the in-theater training by the COIN and Stability Operations Center (COINSOC) provided units with regionally-focused training, to include dialects and cultural nuances, as well as functional training such as rule of law. Commander driven, the COINSOC experience also served as a civil-military team-building event between the AABs and their respective PRTs and STTs, providing a forum for standard operating procedure (SOP) development and the sharing of best practices and lessons learned. This forum also provided the opportunity to receive guidance directly from senior leaders of both USF-I and the U.S. Embassy, promoting a better understanding of the commander’s intent and increased potential for unity of effort.

Master Transitions


From the beginning of the implementation of the Security Agreement on 1 January 2009 through the end of combat operations on 31 August 2010, there were multiple critical transitions taking place simultaneously and sequentially. These transitions were related to the evolving mission, the ever-changing operational environment, bilateral agreements between the United States and Iraq, normal rotational unit RIP/TOA events, redeployment of a significant portion of the force, consolidation of headquarters staffs, and the election and seating of new GOI officials. While many of the transitions were time-based, USF-I worked diligently to create the conditions required to make the transitions seamless.

The conditions and drivers of instability differed from region to region necessitating varying transition timelines. Deciding when to initiate transition was as much an art as a science, as the timing in one region was not necessarily optimal in another. Further complicating this was the need to project second- and third-order effects arising from implementation—as these effects would shape subsequent timeline decisions. This challenge required detailed yet flexible planning by the civil-military team.

¹⁹ Plans Chief, National Training Center, interview by JCOA, 2 February 2010.

²⁰ Brigadier General Ralph O. Baker, interview by JCOA, 2 February 2010.

USF-I strategic guidance and operational orders established transition priorities. Planning documents and orders highlighted transition tasks with leaders prioritizing efforts and focusing resources to attain the desired outcomes.



Military staffs, working jointly with the U.S. Embassy, ensured detailed plans were fluid enough to be adjusted in the midst of the evolving strategic environment. Each line of operation in the Joint Campaign Plan was analyzed, and the civil-military team determined whether each task, program, project, or relationship would be terminated, completed, transitioned to the GOI, or transformed into a U.S. Embassy responsibility. These efforts identified over 1,500 functions/activities for transfer to other entities.

CONCLUSION

The transition from COIN to stability operations in Iraq was a success story. Whether the result is an enduring success still remains to be seen. While there were many factors that complicated the transition, success was predicated upon the USF-I and civilian-military organizations becoming adaptive learning teams with leaders leading change.

Shortly before departing Iraq, GEN Odierno reflected on the transition journey:

One of the things that's been most gratifying to me has been the performance of our forces, how our forces have adapted and learned, how our leaders have adapted and learned and adjusted to very difficult situations. And I'm pretty proud of that, of the young men and women who've been able to do that.²¹

As the transition period came to a close, USF-I's success could best be summarized by a 22 August 2010 interview with LTG Cone, who quoted the head of the Iraqi Federal Police as saying:

²¹ General Raymond T. Odierno, U.S. Army, Commanding General, USF-I, DOD news brief from the Pentagon, 21 July 2010.

My God, we have no idea how you went from over 100,000 to 50,000 [forces] – we never saw it, we never felt it....²²

However, for all we learned in JCOA Case Study 1, the study suggested more questions even as it provided answers to our initial set. Included here are a number of these questions that merit consideration.

1. Maintaining situational awareness was the most significant challenge that confronted USF-I during the drawdown of forces and the transition to stability operations. As forces withdrew from the cities and brigades were drawn down, the number of U.S. “touch-points” with the population was greatly reduced, impacting SA. What approaches can be implemented to overcome this challenge?
2. Units, preparing to rotate into Iraq for their third or fourth tour, found it challenging to adapt their mindset to the vastly changed conditions. Additionally, the skill sets and understanding required for stability operations were not emphasized in traditional military training. What efforts could be taken to mentally prepare forces to successfully operate in the stability operations environment?
3. Retaining influence was necessary for mission accomplishment but was increasingly difficult with the host nation’s growing independence and the US’s simultaneous draw-down of all elements of national power. Overlapping spheres of influence also added complexity, requiring caution to avoid influence fratricide. What efforts could be taken to retain necessary influence?
4. “Transition” refers to both the transfer of authority from an intervening nation to the host nation, as well as the handover from indigenous military forces to local civilian authority. What are the challenges and considerations in determining the transition process, its sequence, and pace?
5. The strategic communications environment is extremely complex and multi-layered. Because of this, the narrative had to be managed very carefully. What are the considerations and techniques in managing the narrative?
6. Forces had to understand and take action to mitigate complex drivers of instability that related not just to security, but also to political, economic, and legal elements. How are these drivers of instability identified and what possible actions can be taken to mitigate their impact?
7. Building a counterterrorism enterprise, which is rooted in the host nation’s rule of law, was a challenging aspect of the transition to stability. How do you strike a balance between the pursuit of intelligence-based CT operations with supporting the host nation’s development of an enduring, fair, and legal-based CT enterprise?
8. Forces had to continually adapt in consideration of Security Agreement constraints, increasing host nation capability, the level of insurgent activity, and decreasing U.S. resources. What are the considerations in continuing to advise ISF, partner with the PRT to build Iraqi civil capacity, and target drivers of instability, while simultaneously drawing down forces?

²² Lieutenant General Robert Cone, Commanding General III Corps, interview by JCOA, 26 October, 2010.

CHAPTER 19

CONCLUSION: STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS¹

Harry R. (Rich) Yarger, Ph.D.

In the 21st Century, all states are vulnerable to instability and may need assistance from other states and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to recover from natural disasters, conflict, or chronic societal problems. Such assistance ends as the host nation government and civil society “transitions” back from a period of crisis to self-sufficiency, while outside interventionists transition out of their assumed roles and responsibilities to ones of more international normalcy. Assistance and interventions in failed or post-conflict states pose particularly difficult transition challenges. All transitions invariably pose issues involving sovereignty, legitimacy, dependency, and social reform; however, in the latter cases transition may also initiate a transformation of the indigenous society to better fit the shared global narrative of the 21st Century world order. Managing transitions—at all levels—requires close cooperation between the host nation, other governments and militaries, intergovernmental organizations, and indigenous and foreign civil society. Consequently, transitions are strategic in nature and require a strategic perspective. The experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere overwhelmingly support this conclusion.

TRANSITIONS AS STRATEGY

While transitions may be an inherent part of a larger strategy, transitions at the state level adhere to the premises of strategic theory and require their own strategic thought and strategy. Although not developed fully in detail here, some brief insights in regard to how the theory of strategy applies illustrates the fundamental strategic nature of transitions.² To not see transition as a strategic enterprise is to court endless operational and tactical planning and much doing at the tactical level with the latter serving no real purpose in terms of the desired end state and often being counterproductive to achieving the policy goals.

First, transitions are fundamentally political processes. The sum product of all actions and the fruit of the transition processes at all levels contribute to successful states that can govern themselves effectively and provide for their own populations through cooperation and legitimate competition—a positively competing nation-state. This is not to suggest a perfect state, but rather a state that can engage with a high degree of normalcy in the world order and provide human security for their citizens as expected of modern 21st century states. Such an end state fits the aspirations of all responsible modern states, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In this regard, all pursue actions within a strategic framework of state building, which shapes the nature of the host nation. Significantly, in these transition processes the host nations simultaneously undertake nation-building, state-building, and modernization—an incredibly difficult challenge. Transitions are ultimately not about an exit strategy for the outside actors, but about creating a favorable normalcy in relations among peoples and states to ensure a viable state and favorable stable world order. Hence all activities are subordinate to the political aims.

1 Adapted from author’s analysis and authorship of Issues, Challenges and Solutions—Interim Summary Conference Report; available from <http://pksoi.army.mil/events/transition/>, accessed March 15, 2011.

2 For an understanding of strategic theory, see Harry R. Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, Westport, Praeger Security International, 2008.

Second, transitions are all encompassing. All of the systems of the host government and indigenous civil society are interconnected. Furthermore, the host government and indigenous civil society are inexplicitly interconnected with the rest of the global community. What occurs within the host nation, or what occurs elsewhere in the global community, affects the support for and success of transition. Transitions are subject to the volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA) of the strategic environment – and to the deliberate choices of supporters, spoilers, and opportunistic actors. Transitions are inherently human enterprises. If COIN is about “hearts and minds,” it can be said transitions are inherently about “minds and hearts.” When the population perceives state success, they will participate actively in governance and civil society.³ Transitions require holistic outlooks and comprehensive consideration, but success hinges on active popular participation in the new systems.

Third, transitions must focus on root causes without ignoring the indigenous population’s reasonable expectations in regard to all aspects of human security. The bedrocks of successful transitioning are security and good governance, but in and of themselves in the 21st century they are insufficient. Expectations rise with any success and can positively or negatively influence future progress. It is not enough to eat the transition elephant by taking one bite at a time; it is more complex than that. You still must eat the elephant one bite at a time but you must figure out what bite to take where and in what sequence. Transitions require comprehensive strategies supported by detailed planning and integrated and effective operations.

Fourth, transitions have a symbiotic relationship with time. They cannot proceed faster or slower than either the circumstances or “national will” allow. If leaders get ahead of or behind the realities on the ground or what indigenous or other domestic populations can accept, success is at risk. On the other hand, transitions can develop a momentum of their own that defies planning milestones and requires an adaptive mindset to seize opportunities or avoid pitfalls. Judging and influencing the aspects of timing are crucial.

Fifth, like all strategy transitions require an appropriate balance among the objectives, concepts, and resources. Un-resourced big ideas and ill-conceived concepts can be more than failures; their second and third order effects can be extremely counterproductive. More resources do not equate to greater effectiveness and can lead to issues of corruption, dependency, and inflation. In addition, since transitions are about minds and hearts, what the transition strategy is attempting to do and why must be communicated clearly and frequently. Any gaps between what is communicated and what is occurring must also be explained. Proper goals, clear understanding, and transparency lead to intellectual support from which the hearts will follow.

CONFERENCE INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS

As part of the conference design panel discussions and breakout groups were used to further garner insights in regard to issues, challenges, and solutions. The following are the author’s analysis of the notes taken during these sessions and were previously printed in *Issues, Challenges and Solutions – Interim Summary Conference Report*.

Intervention and Transition. In the 21st Century world order, interventions are by definition political and transitory. No modern state is pursuing territorial annexation and all international forums condemn its contemplation. Many non-state actors, for their own reasons, have come to similar conclusions about the necessary transitory nature of their assistance. Consequently, any

3 Colonel I.A. Rigden, “The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: Myths, Realities, and Strategic Challenges,” in Short of general War: *Perspectives on the Use of Military Power in the 21st Century*, Harry R. Yarger, ed., Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010, pp.221-222.

intervention, big or small, short or long-term, governmental or civil, begs the question of the desirable terms on which to end. Regardless of outside actor roles, such consideration always leads to a desired end state in which the host nation government and civil society can successfully manage its own affairs. The challenge of transition is how to best arrive as close to this end state as possible. Hence, **transition is a linchpin in the success of overall intervention policy and strategy, and state-building, an inherent strategic framework.** Thus, transitions are inherently strategic in nature. Like most stability operations challenges, **transitions focus on the human domain – interactions among people and how these interactions shape the environment.** Intervention policy must be contemplated comprehensively to develop clear and acceptable strategic and operational objectives for transition.

Inherent Security Dilemma. Intervention in a state, in any manner, creates security dilemmas for internal populations, elites, and other regional and global actors. The intervener leads where necessary, seeks partners to act when appropriate, and clearly and consistently affirms objectives to all. Progress in transition heightens anxiety for all. What looks like right to one actor creates threats and opportunities for others. Change frightens individuals and threatens existing power relationships. External and internal actors are logically more active as interests are more clearly affected. Hence, **risks elevate during transitions.** Transition activity may create greater instability unless such concerns are alleviated or channeled towards positive ends. Reactions are individual, local, national, regional, and global. A successful transition is dependent on the resolution of these internal and external security dilemmas. **Consequently, negotiation is inherent to transitions.**

Sovereignty and Legitimacy. **Sovereignty and legitimacy form a strategic nexus in transitions.** The act of intervention implies some degree of shared sovereignty between the host nation and other actors. Consequently, there are obvious challenges to the host nation's sovereignty and legitimacy, but there are intrinsic risks for outside actors also. Constituent issues related to each actor drive transition. If the host nation government exercises sovereignty effectively, it garners legitimacy at home and abroad and is supported. If the host nation cannot effectively and appropriately exercise sovereignty, it loses legitimacy at home and abroad, leading to internal political challenges or instability and declining international support. In the latter case, supporting governments, IGOs, and NGOs will find their own constituents and others questioning their involvement—regardless of valid interests or motivations. Since interventions are by nature a challenge to host nation sovereignty and *legitimacy success in transitioning logically leads to push back from host governments.*

Success. Definitions and measurements of success are critical. The goal of any transition is to inculcate a peaceful and prosperous host nation stability and form constructive relationships within the international order. Success in transition is measured not by some “gold standard” for transformation, but by the host state's continued progress. **State-building is not an all or nothing proposition: incremental progress over time counts. It is ultimately not an act of creation, but one of development.** For those who intervene, successful transition is about facilitating host nation development while meeting individual organizational goals or national interests. Progress is composed of a series of small steps with occasional broader leaps, rather than one big jump into the 21st Century. Nonetheless, progress in any form can lead to exponential gain while small transgressions may result in disaster. **Transition undertakings are more often indirect as opposed to direct and are about shaping positive outcomes as opposed to directing specific accomplishments.** In this regard, objectives serve to shape and motivate—goals as opposed to being absolute end states. Partnership, patience, and parsimony are more powerful than non-indigenous accomplishments and unrestricted spending.

Context Matters. Context matters at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical – national, provincial, and local. **Each intervention and transition is unique** even though common concepts and doctrine may aid in understanding any particular circumstance. **A valid strategic appraisal and its proper use are paramount to success.** Both strategic and local operational environments must be understood and accounted for in planning. Root causes must be determined and addressed in operations whenever possible. **Transitions, by definition, occur in dynamic environments. Continuous re-assessment of context and situation at all levels is imperative** to calibrate plans correctly. Policy and strategy provide unifying goals and direction for operations and tactics, but subordinate levels must also inform the policy making and strategy formulation. Objectives at all levels must be broad enough to provide flexibility and adaptability for subordinate levels and changed when necessary to respond to contextual dynamics.

Complex Process. Intervening in the affairs of host nations makes transition inherently complex. It is not an event, but a shared process that results in the host nation achieving an acceptable degree of normalcy in its domestic and international affairs – it reestablishes state power and authority and implies adoption of modern ideas of sovereignty and legitimacy. Fragile and failed state problems tend to be more systemic in nature, rather than technical. Outside actors are usually not well organized or equipped to deal with these types of problems. They require a systemic approach and consideration of near and long-term objectives, as well as potential second and third order effects. **Transition must occur on multiple levels, in multiple sectors and venues, and in various interconnected temporal and cultural dimensions. It is neither linear in planning nor predicably in time.** It must accommodate both continuities and changes for progress to occur. Effective planning nested in good policy and strategy is the key. Synchronization and sequencing across the spectrum of activities is critical. Templates and models can be useful, but also dangerous, in complex operations. They are only marginal or partial solutions to these types of difficulties and can be misleading. **Complex operations require strategies and planning that are civil-military in nature for the specific environment.** Consequently, transition is a strategic level question even though it has operational and tactical components. We have to make a differentiation between big “T” and little “t” transitions, losing sight of neither what is important nor what is necessary: both the distinctness and the interrelationship of the two must be acknowledged in planning and implementation.

Leadership and Personalities. **Transition success is exponentially affected by leadership and personalities.** Extraordinary leadership is a fundamental aspect of successful transitions. Leadership within the host nation, supporting nations, and supporting organizations must create and pursue visions for host nation prosperity and stability that are evident for constituents and multiple populations. At the highest levels, leaders create national and organizational narratives to provide common identities and purpose. Such narratives write a new chapter for the host nation populace, explaining why external involvement and support is necessary to advance the state as a whole. Supporting states and organizations must find narratives that explain their support to their own constituents and others. The vision and direction of leadership tie together the myriad activities that transition power, authority, responsibility, and accountability from intervening actors to the host nation, or anticipate and plan for gaps and emerging requirements. Leaders in all agencies and activities at all levels are integral to success and are interdependent. Collectively, **leadership spans the divide among host nation authorities and supporting nations, communicates to multiple audiences and populations, creates unity of purpose and effort from the policy to tactical levels, and sets conditions for success.** When personalities affect leadership responsibilities, progress is retarded, costs escalate, and the risk of failure increases. **Credible leaders drive the success of transition.**

Partnership. Partnership is driven by the degree actors can agree on the why, what, who, when, where, and how of transition; the more actors agree, the more likely transition will be successful. In these environments, partnerships evolve based on conditions and needs. A clear conveyance and understanding of the interests of all involved is imperative to successful transition. While compromise by one or another partner is inherent to some degree in an effective partnership, **the failure to adequately address the legitimate interests of any partner affects the success of the transition.** In particular, there has to be a quid pro quo between interveners and the host nation to engage in a cooperative venture to ensure stability. In a similar manner, **differing priorities and timelines are matters of negotiation.** Strategy and planning by the host nation and supporting states or organizations—in a collaborative partnership—create a framework for properly integrated actions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels that establish conditions enabling and enacting transition.

Whole of Government and Comprehensive Approaches. In most cases, **transitions are bigger than what anyone can undertake alone.** For larger efforts whole of government and comprehensive efforts are required. Whole of government needs to be understood in the context that any outside state's decision to be involved must be undertaken with consideration of, and full support of, all the branches and agencies of the government. For some agencies, participation in whole of government efforts of this nature represents new requirements and necessitates appropriate authorities and resources. At the same time, **an interagency effort cannot be perceived by the host nation and its population as a series of individual external agency actions; its power lies in both its unity of effort and statement of national support.** Equally important, **the host nation must also achieve a whole of government and social gestalt.** Strategic transition is not advanced by a divided house. It is also clear that our involvement in fragile and failed states requires a **more comprehensive approach—one that includes perhaps multinational forces, differing roles for multiple states or IGOs, and integrated support by NGOs and other parts of civil society.** There are advantages of more and closer collaboration. Transition must work in concert within the security, political, economic, and socio-psychological realms, taking into consideration all the actors and populations involved. Ultimately diplomacy, development, and defense all play roles in the transitional process.

Civil Society. While it is important to build good governance capacity, **many other relevant civil institutions are necessary to make societies sustainable.** Civil society is defining new domestic and international roles for itself in the 21st Century as a result of greater interconnectedness, rising social expectations, greater collective wealth, and a more universal view of human rights and security. In a very real sense, “civil society” in its broadest manifestations of private voluntary organizations (PVOs), NGOs, and private sector (business, etc.) are actors on the national and global stages. They add to the complexity of the environment for governments and militaries because they pursue their own objectives and agendas. Nonetheless, they share the same strategic, operational, and tactical space and represent a vast reservoir of talent and resources. **Engagement of civil society should be started early in the game** to capitalize on vertical social capital. Civil society organizations have contributed to the democratization of most modern states and help create a citizen-oriented state. Active citizens affect the way the government behaves and interacts with society. Gauging civil activities can help focus the role of government and measure its effectiveness. Civil society also functions to combine identities and narratives for a national response to common problems. A “whole of society” approach is desirable when rebuilding; the state does not need to provide all services to the people. Instead, it can adopt frameworks by which civil society public-private partnering can better provide

some of these services. **The security community also needs to understand the different types of civilians present in societies and how they can affect the military's success in security and transitions.**

Local Ownership. There is a social fabric inherent to all stability operations, and this lies mostly in local networks that build structure and resiliency in societies. **Local ownership is a guiding principle of assistance and transition.** Recent NGO, IGO, and US experiences establish that the host nation must undertake and own transition to be self-sustaining. Outsiders tend to categorize problems in ways that become counterproductive to rebuilding the indigenous society. The practice of local ownership focuses transition activities away from outsiders, pre-determined external preferences, and outside competition and shifts them toward the people and society undergoing transition. Local ownership potentially brings a more sophisticated and nuanced local knowledge and cultural competence. The host society, agencies, and government must take ownership for the key components of successful states: security, rule of law, good governance, and economic development. Good local practices build resistance to dependency and corruption while building capacity and sustainability in the host society's structures and activities. On the other hand, transition can neither lag too far behind indigenous expectations nor too far exceed indigenous acceptance. Ultimately, at the highest levels, the intervener must correctly judge and negotiate how and when to step back and countenance greater local ownership. Such stepping back means that objectives may be at risk and progress may be less efficient or even redefined. **Understanding how to hand back or accept what has been undertaken for a host nation and when to do it is as much art as science for all involved.**

Goals and Objectives. **Goals and objectives must be founded in reality, in both what is needed and what is possible within the host nation.** Goals and objectives should establish realistic expectations that can move the state and its people forward and can be met with the resources available. **Analysis should be less threat driven and more needs and opportunities based. A thorough understanding of how incentivizing and de-incentivizing work relative to objectives and their supporting systems must be developed and applied.** If the host nation, supporting states, and organizations have valid interests, they must be accommodated in the objectives for transition. Expediency is never a substitute for moral legitimacy in determining and pursuing goals and objectives. Universal human rights are valid objectives for international support to demand and for indigenous populations to expect: they are essential to a successful 21st Century state and world order. Based on a proper assessment, objectives must also be timed to collective progress and the willingness of indigenous persons to take ownership. In operational and tactical planning there are no magical end-states to be achieved, only acceptable steady states or progress in support of a sovereign, successful state.

Sustainability, Capacity-Building, and Resilience. At its core, **successful transition is about the relationships among sustainability, capacity building, and resilience.** Transitions in large part must be driven by the host nation's human capacity to adapt to a changing social environment and the ability to sustain and build on the development that has occurred. Therefore, sustainability and resilience take precedence in capacity building. Projects or capabilities that are not sustainable cannot lead to developed capacity and resilience: they are largely resources wasted and can be counterproductive as local expectations are disappointed. Such precedence, as opposed to a purely capabilities or projects mindset, logically leads to improved analysis, clearer priorities, more realistic expectations, and achievable goals. For example, indiscriminate replacement of existing institutions and systems can create unanticipated issues and costs. Better analysis might suggest creating complimentary structures and programs that are acceptable

and sustainable. A focus on developing “adaptive capacity” within host institutions might encourage capacity building and resilience by helping host institutions better prepare to deal with potential crises and changes. At the same time, all such endeavors offer an opportunity to leapfrog old industry and technology, advance education and training, and adopt new ideas that can strengthen society, economic development, and governance, if appropriately integrated. Integration is critical. There is a convergence of frameworks in successful transition activities: there must be a satisfaction of local issues while also advancing national interests. A fragile or failing state has sufficient capacity – security, governance, economic, and social at local and national levels – built when it competes effectively and acts responsibly at home and abroad. This level of capacity creates sufficient resiliency to rapidly recover to a state of normalcy in the face of crisis.

Relationship Building. Transitions represent changes in relationships. Cultural understanding and relationship building are important. Power boundaries and incentives change with the withdrawal of interveners, and the consequences of withdrawal merit thought ahead of time. In transitions, at whatever level, relationships among the host nation representatives and supporting nations and organizations are crucial, but the international community should also encourage locals to create enduring, positive relationships amongst themselves. Proper relationships build trust and encourage constructive risk taking. Relationships bridge the gap among conflicting values, interests, and cultures and the gaps between perceived needs and available resources. **Creating sound and enduring relationships may be an equal imperative to planning and resources.**

Structuring. Transition must be structured for success. **Structuring takes many venues.** The US government has been described as too big, too bureaucratic, top-heavy, top-down, risk averse, impersonal, and disconnected. While guidance and bureaucracy are essential in large enterprises to establish direction and boundaries and manage collective progress and resources, it cannot be allowed to hamper the necessary agility and anticipatory action required at the various levels of interaction; both reorganization and streamlining processes can address these. Modern technology has the ability to provide real-time information sharing and translation capabilities that can help in complex environments, but these have not been adopted into our structures. At the same time, there is a need to develop managerial and leadership capabilities, rather than focusing exclusively on technical skills. Unwillingness to restructure leaves existing preferences and capabilities that supplant the actual needs of the operating environment. Likewise, a more multilateral approach to stability operations that quells negativity is generally preferable, even if more problematic. Ultimately, success is more likely when more friends are involved in the process, but this requires different structuring that facilitates the creation of sustainable, mutually beneficial results.

Strategic Communications. Building a network of willing actors and supportive populations is essential to making transition a success. The world is now “social, mobile, and global.” People have unprecedented access to communications, and information sharing at every level is important in transitions. Populations need a common narrative to avoid the challenge of competing and counter narratives. Competing and counter narratives undermine stability and stymie transitional progress. Transition must be explained in acceptable terms to multiple audiences. Leaders promoting transition need to build individual, collective, and common understandings at the same time. *At the strategic level, leaders must constantly and consistently communicate to their subordinates and partners, indigenous and domestic populations, and other global actors and populations why transition is necessary and how it is to unfold.* Sincerity, honesty and unity of voice count. Hubris detracts from intent and slows momentum.

Resources. Resources include much more than dollars and material goods. Every resource assessment should include indigenous human capital, institutions, material, and capabilities—real and potential. Local capacity can help expedite transition for the benefit of all. Policymakers need to look at economy of force and restraint to make transition feasible over the long term. The size and nature of the footprint—or troop presence—for transition can be counterproductive to long-term goals. **Parsimony is an emerging guiding principle because it recognizes multiple resource challenges, discourages redundancy, and reinforces indigenous ownership.**

Corruption and Dependency. Properly pursued, transition minimizes corruption and dependency and creates structures for a successful 21st Century state. **Corruption and dependency are the handmaidens of intervention and transition.** Intervention corrupts any existing structure and creates new dependencies. Transition activities tend to further exacerbate these. Too often, corruption is viewed as just a law enforcement problem, but **both corruption and dependency are systemic problems in recovering and developing societies.** There are specific frameworks for looking at both these issues. The correction or avoidance of corruption and dependency hinges on partner policy choices about indigenous institutional structures and the molding of incentives and dis-incentives in line with transition objectives and activities.

Obstacles. Transitions are difficult endeavors, and obstacles are numerous throughout the process. Differing interests, objectives, and priorities are inherent to the process and pose unique challenges. Others are self-imposed. **Organizational cultures and firewalls, over classification and lack of information sharing, under resourcing, over resourcing, overly complex and counterproductive funding authorities, lack of and inadequate legal authorities, poor organizational structures and management practices, inadequate education and training, and resource competition are common examples of the latter.** Less common are the problems associated with typical intervention and transition mindsets. Often, outsiders’ “best intentions” for the host nation create the greatest impediments to progress by focusing on unrealistic goals or corrupting the economy by an influx of inflationary resources. In a similar manner, too large a presence, regardless of the tactical good done, may be strategically counterproductive. The paradox of best intentions is that the whole is often less than the sum of its parts.

Role of Expectations. Expectation management among internal and external populations and actors is key in successful transitions. Understanding expectations is only one aspect of this process. An equally important aspect is not creating expectations through promises and actions that may later be unachievable or unsustainable. **Expectation management requires forthright strategic communications and negotiations in regard to what is important to host nation success, the challenges involved, and the indigenous support required.** Ultimately, if the latter is provided and timely delivery is achieved, expectations are met and the supported state and its people are vested in their own future.

Role of Education and Learning. The literature and discussion on transitions and the issues of governance are maturing. Transition is clearly interdisciplinary and comprehensive in nature. Recent experiences show that transitions and related issues can be thought about in theoretical and conceptual terms. While there are no cookie cutter solutions, these intellectual foundations will serve to educate, train, and build flexible doctrine that provide for increased success in transitions. At the same time, these foundations will provide common vocabulary and concepts agencies and organizations from across the spectrum of communities can use to share insights and methods on how to engage this process.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, transitions are a strategic challenge for members of the 21st century world order, and one not likely to go away in the near-term. Fragile, failing, and failed states appear to be increasing as opposed to decreasing in numbers. In all likelihood, whether they wish it or not, the stable states, IGOs, and member organizations of the international humanitarian community will find themselves intervening in these states and territories and trying to improve local conditions. As conditions improve, they will have to decide how to transition the authorities and responsibilities they have assumed back to local authorities. Unless they wish to return on a recurring basis, they will approach transition from a strategic perspective and find a comprehensive solution that builds a better state and society. In doing this, they will find the issues, challenges, and solutions presented in this text a useful portal to such a perspective.

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Chapter 2

Ms. **JACQUELINE CHURA-BEAVER** supports the U.S. Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Transition (STR) division. Prior to joining PKSOI in 2009, she served as an intern and later a Foreign Affairs Officer (FAO) at the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in support of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). Jacqueline has undertaken significant research projects on topics including leadership in provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, governance issues in fragile states, and successes and failures of the Vietnam-era Civil Organization and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program. She is currently exploring issues and consequences of transition in stability operations. She holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Spanish from the University of Dayton (2006); and a Master's in Public and International Affairs, with a concentration in Security and Intelligence Studies, from the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (2010).

Chapter 3

JEFFREY A. CALVERT, a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, is the Civil-Military Operations Officer in the Security, Reconstruction and Transition Division of the Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He has served in a wide variety of command and staff positions in the United States, Germany, and Iraq, first as a Cavalry officer and since 2001 as a Civil Affairs officer. He is a veteran of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM, JOINT FORGE, and DESERT STORM. Lieutenant Colonel Calvert is a graduate of the Pennsylvania State University and of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Chapter 4

Mr. HELGE LURÅS is an adviser at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) where he specializes in political-military interventions, state-building, energy policy and geopolitical strategy. From 2004 to 2008 he was a political adviser to the High Representative in Bosnia where he focused on intelligence and defense reform. Lurås has previously worked for the Norwegian Intelligence Service, the Norwegian Armed Forces, the UN and NATO.

Chapter 5

CHARLES “CHIP” HAUSS wears several professional hats. He is on the Board of Directors and staff of the Alliance for Peacebuilding where he serves as government liaison, including with the military. He has also been a professor of political science at Colby College, the University of Reading, and George Mason. He is the author of 14 books including three on peace building. His market leading *Comparative Politics* will be published in Fall 2011.

Chapter 6

DR. ANN L. PHILLIPS is Director, Program for Security, Stability, Transition & Reconstruction, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany.

Prior to her arrival at the Marshall Center in September 2007, Dr. Phillips was professor of international relations and comparative politics from 1986 until 2000, first at Smith College in Northampton, MA and then at American University in Washington, D.C. From September 2000 until September 2007, Dr. Phillips worked for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) where she helped rewrite USAID’s overall foreign assistance strategy and develop agency policies and strategies on fragile states, stabilization and reconstruction, and promotion of good governance. Recent publications include “Mozambique: A Chance for Peace” case study of a successful stabilization and reconstruction mission. “Afghan Priorities for Stabilization and Reconstruction” Collection of papers presented at conference on Afghanistan, Tashkent, Published by Regional Policy Forum, Uzbekistan. July 2010 and “Local Ownership: The Achilles Heel of Foreign Assistance to Fragile States,” From Fragile State to Functioning State: Pathways to Democratic Transformation in Comparative Perspective. Sabine Collmer, ed. Berlin: Lit Verlag. Autumn 2009, pp. 75-96.

Chapter 7

RICHARD (Rick) COPLEN is the Professor of Economic Development at the Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute. Prior to his assignment with PKSOI, he served for 20 years as an officer in the United States Army and 5 years with Booz Allen Hamilton. His uniformed service included assignments with military intelligence, infantry, and signal units in Germany, Korea, Bosnia, and Panama. His peacekeeping and stability experience includes service in Bosnia and the Demilitarized Zone in Korea. His teaching experience includes International Political Economy (Course Director), International Relations, Economics, and Personal Finance in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy at West Point and Global Macroeconomics, Business Ethics, and Persuasion at Elizabethtown College. Rick Coplen was educated at the United States Military Academy and Princeton University.

Chapter 8

BRYAN H. KURTZ, a former senior USAID Private Sector project manager, is currently an independent civilian-military and inter-agency development advisor, mentor and trainer. With extensive additional public and private sector experience in strategic planning and commercial banking he has established track record building innovative programs, new institutions and public-private alliances. His career has focused primarily on international employment generation (job creation), capacity development (training), and/or high level inter-agency coordination in conflict and post-conflict countries (Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia), countries undergoing major

transitions in Africa (Botswana, Nigeria), the Middle East (Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait), and Eastern Europe (Bosnia, Russia).

PATRICK M. BRYSKI, a seasoned international banker and project manager, is currently a Principal in Deloitte Consulting LLP's Emerging Markets Segment where he leads the Financial Sector Development business unit. Mr. Bryski has 30 years of international banking and consulting experience managing line units and projects in Central/South Asia, the Middle East, Central and Eastern Europe, the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, Former Yugoslavia, Turkey and China. As head of Deloitte's donor focused financial sector development group his clients include USAID and other major international institutions. He focuses primarily on Central Bank and commercial bank strengthening/restructuring, credit on-lending programs and enterprise development, financial sector reform and capacity building, and IT applications across the financial sector.

Chapter 9

SHAKIR JAWAD is a Senior Consultant on International Health and Medical Stability Operations at the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM), and Assistant Professor of Military and Emergency Medicine at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Science (USUHS). Prior to joining CDHAM, he served as a senior International health analyst at the International Health Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for health affairs. In 2003, Dr. Jawad assumed a number of senior leadership positions at the Iraqi Ministry of Health including Director General (Assistant Secretary) for military medical affairs and Director General (Assistant Secretary) for Operations and Technical Affairs. Before 2003, Dr. Jawad held the rank of Brigadier General and was the director and chair of the orthopedic surgery department at Hammad Shihab Teaching Military Hospital (the Iraqi Walter Reed Army Medical center equivalent).

ALI ALAMERI is a Military Health Scholar at the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM), and Assistant Professor of Military and Emergency Medicine at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Science (USUHS). Prior to joining CDHAM, he served as a consultant for the International Health Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs working on health system reconstitution and evaluating the role of health in national reconciliation. Before arriving to the United States, Dr. Alameri held the rank of Brigadier General and served as the Deputy Surgeon General of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Dr. Alameri is a physician (General Surgeon) and prior to April 2003, he held the rank of Colonel and had 17 years of service in the old Iraqi Army.

MAYSAA MAHMOOD is a Pharmacoeconomist at the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM), and an Assistant Professor of Military and Emergency Medicine at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Science (USUHS). In 2003, she joined the Ministry of Health-Coalition Provisional Authority's Senior Advisor Team in Iraq and had the opportunity to work with multinational health professionals involved in the early stages of the post-conflict reconstruction effort. Previously, she served as a Pharmacist at Iraq's Ministry of Health in various capacities, including Manager of Clinical Pharmacy Training Section, Assistant Manager of the World Health Organization (WHO) Essential Drugs Program in Iraq, and Clinical Pharmacy Specialist. She is currently engaged in research focusing on pharmaceutical supply chain management and cross-cultural communication in humanitarian settings.

GREGG NAKANO is the Development Outreach Coordinator for the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM). Previously, he served with the International Health Division, which authored DoDI 6000.16 “Military Health Support for Stability Operations” as well as USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance where he provided civil-military coordination support in Guatemala, Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, and Philippines. Gregg initiated the creation of USAID’s Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) and expanded the security portion of USAID’s Iraq pre-deployment training. A former Marine officer, Gregg participated in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Special Purpose Joint Task Force Los Angeles. He has studied Mandarin and Farsi at Fudan University and University of Tehran’s ICPS respectively.

Chapter 10

CPT JENNIFER GLOSSINGER is an Army Reserve Civil Affairs officer. Assigned to the 350th Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) in Pensacola, Florida as the Secretary General Staff, she served as Women’s Initiatives (WI) Coordinator for Multi- National Division –South in Basra, Iraq. In this position, she created a Campaign Plan and worked closely with inter agencies at Provincial Reconstruction Teams to coordinate military WI’s among nine provinces. CPT Glossinger holds a Masters Degree in Counseling from Colorado Christian University. A former Medical Service Corps branch officer, she held a Licensed Professional Counselor license from the state of Colorado.

Chapter 11

BRYAN A. GROVES, a U.S. Army colonel, currently serves as the Chief, Civil-Military Integration, at the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), at the Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He previously served as the Chief of Information Operations, Combined Forces Command Korea, as Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs, Eighth United States Army, Korea, and prior to that, Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs, 19th Expeditionary Support Command, also in Korea. He also served in the 304th Civil Affairs Brigade in support of the 1st Marine Division and the 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq and commanded the 443rd Civil Affairs Battalion in Kosovo. Colonel Groves has published articles in *Special Operations Technology*, *Army Magazine* and *American Legion Magazine*. He is a graduate of the Army War College Class of 2006.

Chapter 12

ALIX BOUCHER is a Research Fellow at the Center for Complex Operations at the National Defense University. Her work focuses on lessons learned from counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, in particular on fighting corruption, building the rule of law, and civil-military relations. Prior to joining the Center for Complex Operations, Ms. Boucher worked at the Stimson Center’s Future of Peace Operations program where her research focused on improving the effectiveness of UN peace operations, security sector reform, targeted sanctions, and building the rule of law in post-conflict states. She has conducted research in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, and Liberia. Ms. Boucher holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from Mount Holyoke College and a Master of Arts in International Relations and International Economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Chapter 13

WILLIAM HYDE

Not provided.

HOWARD ROY WILLIAMS is President and CEO of the Center for Humanitarian Cooperation. He is an Adjunct Professor at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs and is a Visiting Professor at the Peace Keeping and Stability Institute of the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Mr. Williams was previously Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Response, of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Appointed to this post in January 1998, he served until January 2001. Before going to OFDA, Mr. Williams served with the International Rescue Committee (IRC) for 12 years. From May 1996 to January 1998, He was IRC's Vice President for Overseas Policy and Planning. From 1993 to 1996, he was Vice President for Overseas Programs, and from 1985 to 1993, he was Director of Operations. During this time, he led efforts that resulted in the conceptualization, creation and staffing of IRC's Emergency Preparedness Unit. He helped to establish and staff IRC offices in a variety of places, including Northern Iraq, Jordan, the Balkans, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, and Southern Sudan. He is a graduate of Columbia College in New York.

Chapter 14

JOSEPH (JOE) PAK joined OSD in August 2007 as the Chief, Field Support Team-Korea with duty at United Nations/Combined Forces/United States Force Korea Command (UNC/CFC/USFK) Seoul Korea. In this capacity, he is responsible for responding to direct tasking from the director and from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as other DoD customers, such as Combatant Commanders, Military Services, and Defense Agencies, to produce studies and analyses. Joe's previous assignment in UNC/CFC/USFK includes; POL-MIL and Theater Policy Planner for ACofS U/C/J5 Strategy Division from 2003 to 2005. Joe served 22 years in the U.S. Army - 14 years in Special Forces. He completed his MA in International Relations from Dankook University in Seoul. He attended Senior Executive Fellow at the Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government (KSG) in 2009 and currently studying post-graduate studies in Pastoral Theology with St. Joseph College, ME.

Chapter 15

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSÉ M. MADERA is an Army Reserve Civil Affairs officer. He is assigned as Assistant Chief of Staff G5 (Plans) for the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Previously, he served as an Army Fellow at the RAND Corporation's Arroyo Center in Washington, DC. He is a former Aviation branch officer. His Civil Affairs experience includes service in Colombia while assigned to a Foreign Internal Defense/Unconventional Warfare unit; planning support to humanitarian assistance efforts during the 2005 Pakistan earthquake; defense support to civil authorities during Hurricane Katrina; and civil military operations planning in Iraq. LTC Madera holds Masters degrees from Purdue University, Carnegie Mellon University, the United States Army Command and General Staff College, and the United States Army War College.

Chapter 16

DR. LISA SCHIRCH is the founding director of the 3D Security Initiative and a professor of peacebuilding at Eastern Mennonite University's graduate Center for Justice & Peacebuilding. The 3D Security Initiative is a policy voice for civil society to foster peacebuilding through more extensive diplomatic initiatives, smarter development strategies, and human security-oriented defense strategies. Dr. Schirch connects policymakers with global civil society networks, facilitates civil-military dialogue, and provides a peacebuilding lens on current policy issues. A former Fulbright Fellow in East and West Africa, she has worked in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Taiwan, Ghana, Kenya, Brazil, and 15 other countries. She is the author of 5 books on peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Dr. Schirch holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Waterloo, Canada, and a M.S. and Ph.D. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University. She is a frequent public speaker and has TV and radio experience discussing international relations.

Chapter 17

COLONEL I. A. RIGDEN, a British Army Colonel, is currently the Assistant Head of Thematic Doctrine at the UK MOD's Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre at Shrivenham. He previously served as the Chief of Campaign Plans HQ MNF-I in General Odierno's CJ5 staff. An infantry officer, his parent Regiment is the Royal Gurkha Rifles. He has spent 7 years as a rifle company commander and 2 and a half years commanding a Gurkha Battalion in Brunei and Afghanistan. He is a veteran of operations on the Hong Kong-Sino border, Northern Ireland, Bosnia (twice), Afghanistan and Iraq. He has served on the staff in the MOD, HQ Land Forces, and 1st (UK) Armd Div. A graduate of the USAWC Class of 2008 and the Royal College of Defence Studies, Colonel Rigden hold Master's degrees from King's College London and the U.S. Army War College. He is also an Honorary Colonel in the Commonwealth of Kentucky Militia.

Chapter 18

BRADFORD J. (BRAD) DAVIS, a US Army lieutenant colonel, assumed command in June 2011 of the 30th Signal Battalion on Wheeler Army Airfield in Hawaii. During his three-year assignment to JCOA, he worked as a C4 ISR analyst. In addition to the Transition to Stability Operations in Iraq study, he contributed to Iraq Information Activities and Haiti Earthquake studies, among others. His military education includes completion of the Signal Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Defense Language Institute's Mandarin Chinese course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Joint Forces Staff College. Brad received a commission as a Second Lieutenant in the US Army Signal Corps from the University of Pittsburgh in 1993 after graduating from Carnegie Mellon University with a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering. He also holds a Master of Arts in National Security Studies from American Military University.

BRADFORD (BRAD) BAYLOR is currently deployed to Afghanistan and is working assessments and transition efforts in Regional Command-East. Since retiring from the US Navy in 2002, Brad has worked as a DOD civilian operations research analyst at USJFCOM's Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA). He deployed to Iraq on numerous occasions to support USF-I and participated in several high-priority COCOM studies, including the recent TSO study. Brad graduated with a Bachelor of Science in Operations Analysis from the US Naval Academy and was commissioned an Ensign in the US Navy. He is a graduate of the US Naval Test Pilot School and earned a Master of Business Administration from Jacksonville University.

RUSSELL J. (RUSS) GOEHRING currently works as an operations research analyst at JCOA. While in the US Army, he commanded armored battalions in both CONUS and Germany, and served as the TRADOC Systems Manager for Force XXI, and Inspector General for New York. Since retiring, he has worked in a wide variety of positions within DOD and the corporate sector. Russ received a commission as a Second Lieutenant in the US Army Armor Corps from the US Military Academy, West Point. He holds a bachelor's degree in physics from West Point and a master's degree in Military Art and Science from the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies. From 1995-1996, he was a US Army War College National Security Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

JEANNE L. BURINGTON serves as an analyst and product manager at JCOA and has deployed to Iraq four times in support of various studies. She was the study lead for the Comprehensive Approach: Iraq Case Study looking at the 2007-2008 timeframe, and has contributed to other JCOA studies on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. She has a bachelor's degree in Mathematics and a master's degree in Systems Engineering, both from the University of Virginia.

CONFERENCE SPEAKERS AND PANELISTS

Keynote Speakers

Ambassador (Ret.) John E. Herbst

Director, Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University
Former Department of State, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, Ret.

Former Commander, International Security Assistance Force and US Forces –
Afghanistan

Dr. Rich Yarger

Ministry Reform Analyst, US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

James Young

Enterprise Manager, Google DoD

Panel 1: Theory and Study

Focused on theory and study in regard to transition, looking at the intellectual study of the issues, challenges, threats & opportunities, and processes associated with the successful transition of responsibility and accountability for state and social functions from external authorities and providers to host nation authorities and providers.

Moderator: Michael J. Dziedzic

United States Institute of Peace

Panelists

Dr. Charles (Chip) Hauss

Alliance for Peacebuilding

*“Blind Men and Political Elephants: Phase 4
Democratization, Peacebuilding Transitions”*

Helge Lurås

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

“Politics, Institutions and State-Building: Lessons from Bosnia”

LTC José M. Madera

US Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)

“Leading Through, By, and With: The Challenge of Managing Transitions when the US is Not the Lead Partner”

Alix J. Boucher

Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University

“The Role of Fighting Corruption in Facilitating Transition in Afghanistan”

Dr. Ann Phillips

The Marshall Center

“Local Ownership: Importance and Impediments”

**Panel 2: Government and Civil Society Insights
and Practice**

Explored the experience and knowledge gained from external governments and inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations in transitioning responsibility and accountability for state and social functions from external authorities and providers to host nation authorities and providers.

Moderator: Larry H. Brady

PKSOI/USAID

Panelists

CPT Jennifer Glossinger

350th Civil Affairs Command, US Army

“Women Affecting Economic Stability and Military Operations”

Bryan Kurtz,

Kurtz Group

Patrick M. Bryski,

Deloitte Consulting

“Post Conflict Transformation of Bosnia’s Banking System to Promote Private Enterprise and Generate Employment while Transitioning from USAID to Local Control”

Shakir Jawad, Gregg Nakano MALD,

Maysaa Mahmood, Ph.D., Ali Al-Ameri, MD

Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine

“Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Health Sector: Host Nation Perspective”

Joseph Pak
Office of the Under Secretary for Defense Analysis, Field Support Team-Korea
"Transition – Post Korean War, Republic of Korea"

Howard (Roy) Williams
Center for Humanitarian Cooperation

Bill Hyde
USAID
"Haiti, 2010: Coming out of Disaster"

Panel 3: The Military Role

Examined the roles and experience in the transition process
in various scenarios and from differing perspectives.

Moderator: Angel M. Rabasa
RAND Corporation

Panelists

Col Ian Rigden
United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit
"Transition of Security to a Host Nation"

Brad Baylor,
Jeanne Burington
Joint Center for Operational Analysis
US Joint Forces Command
"Transition to Stability Operations"

Lisa Schirch
3D Security Initiative, Eastern Mennonite University
"A Civil-Military Roadmap on Human Security"

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