

CURRENT ISSUES CONCERNING KOREA'S
ANTI-TERRORISM PROGRAMS

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Strategic Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

CURRENT ISSUES CONCERNING KOREA'S ANTI-TERRORISM PROGRAMS, by Major Joocheon Kim, 91 pages.

The Korean people are exposed to diverse threats from terrorist organizations at home and abroad despite the government's recently increased efforts to cope with terrorist threats. The 9/11 attacks were an important turning point in terrorism and raised questions concerning the effectiveness of anti-terrorism programs to prevent terrorist attacks. As a result of these attacks, the US and the UK undertook great preventive measures in the field of the legal framework, organization, and leadership. Given that these two countries are now the targets of various terrorist organizations both domestically and abroad, Korea can learn lessons from both countries. Improving anti-terrorism programs could potentially provide Koreans with safety and establish conditions for better stability in the world. Accordingly, the findings of this study include recommendations regarding what's required to improve Korean anti-terrorism programs and efforts.

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ACRONYMS

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CONTEST	Counterterrorism Strategy
DC	Deputies committee
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DNI	Director of National Intelligence
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
HSC	Homeland Security Council
JTAC	The Joint Terrorism Analysis Center
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NSB	National Security Branch
NSC	National Security Council
NIS	National Intelligence Service
OSCT	Office for Security and Counterterrorism
PC	Princial Committee
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TSC	Terrorist Screening Center
TIIS	Terrorism Information Integration Center

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the world community came to recognize terrorism as the most severe method of shattering world peace. The attacks left approximately 3,000 people dead. More lives were claimed in that attack than in the attack on Pearl Harbor and showed the world that terrorist attacks could claim more lives than traditional warfare.¹

The 9/11 attacks were an important turning point in terrorism and raised questions concerning the effectiveness of anti-terrorism programs.² As a result of these attacks, the world community undertook great preventive measures. Nations have signed on to international regulations, made anti-terrorism declarations, created organizations to combat terrorism, and modified the structure of national laws regarding terrorism.

After 9/11, late in the evening of 12 October 2002, two powerful bomb blasts at a popular night club in Kuta, Bali, killed more than 200 people.³ This horrendous act carried out on a peaceful island brought the world's attention to the grim reality of rising terrorism in Southeast Asia.⁴ In March 2004, the Madrid attacks took place, and in June 2005, a terrorist attack occurred in London. Targets for terrorism are quite varied, and attacks can be simultaneously coordinated; moreover, the methods of attack are ever growing, meaning no place in the world is safe from terrorism.

However, Korea has not made significant changes in its anti-terrorism programs. The majority of its programs rely on the "47th Presidential Directive" declared in 1982. This directive was merely an administrative principle and can provide only the framework for anti-terrorism activities; it lacks the legal precedents to be the comprehensive set of laws needed.

The foundation of this thesis is the premise that terrorism is a rising threat to Korean society, and that serious countermeasures are required. The thesis cites terrorism-related cases at home and abroad in order to define the challenges facing the Korean anti-terrorism programs. It may be necessary to improve Korean anti-terrorism programs if Korea's anti-terrorist system is considered relatively less prepared than those of the comparison countries used in this study. The purpose is to become more effective in deterring terrorism in and out of Korea and to determine the possible form any such improvements might take.

Definitions

Terrorism: Definitions of terrorism differ among nations and organizations, because the social and cultural characteristics of each nation differ. Scholars do not agree on definitions of terrorism. Even within one country, definitions of terrorism may differ.⁵

In Korea, Presidential Directive 47 defines terrorism as ~~the~~ acts of violating the National Guidelines for Counter-Terrorism Measure for the purpose of endangering national security and public safety⁶ (see table 1). Outside the Korean government, there are greater variations in what features of terrorism are emphasized in definitions.⁷

In the United States, no consensus on a definition had been reached prior to 9.11. Indeed, over the past thirty-five years, the US Congress has held numerous hearings, considered bills, adopted resolutions, and passed laws on terrorism.⁸ The US State Department uses the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d): ~~premeditated,~~ politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."⁹ The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as ~~the~~ unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof,

in furtherance of political or social objectives.”¹⁰ The US Department of Defense defines terrorism as ~~the~~ unlawful use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.”¹¹ The USA PATRIOT Act defines terrorism as ~~a~~activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the US or of any state, that appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping, and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the US.”¹² In this thesis, the definition of terrorism described in the US PATRIOT Act is used¹³ (see table 1).

The United Kingdom's Terrorism Act 2000 defined terrorism as follows: ~~(1)~~ In this Act ~~terrorism~~” means the use or threat of action where: (a) the action falls within subsection (2), (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (3) Action falls within this subsection if it: (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system”¹⁴ (see table 1).

Table 1. Three Nations' Definitions of Terrorism

Country	Acts	Definition
Korea	The National Guidelines for Counterterrorism Measures (2005)	The acts of violating the National Guidelines for Counterterrorism Measures for the purpose of endangering national security and public safety.” (Presidential Directive 47)
US	The Patriot Act (2001)	Activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the US or of any state, that appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping, and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the US”
UK	The Terrorism Act (2000)	The United Kingdom's Terrorism Act 2000 defined terrorism as follows: (1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where: (a) the action falls within subsection (2), (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (2) Action falls within this subsection if it: (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.”

Source: Created by author using data from Charles Doyle, *USA PATRIOT Act: A Sketch* (Washington, DC: CRS Report for Congress, 18 April 2002), <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21203.pdf> (accessed 8 December 2010); 국가대테러활동지침대통령훈령 제 47 호, [Presidential Directive No. 47], <http://www.tiic.go.kr> (accessed 20 September 2010); Marianne Van Leeuwen, *Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies* (London: Kluwer Law International. 2003), 14.

Anti-terrorism: This term describes programs and efforts intended to prevent acts of terrorism. Anti-terrorism is to be distinguished from the term counterterrorism.

Counterterrorism: Counterterrorism means the measures, tactics, and techniques used to respond after terrorism occurs.

Korea: The word Korea refers to the Republic of South Korea in this study. In all places where the word Korean is used it means South Korean.

Current issues: Current issues are defined as anti-terrorism programs and efforts that need to be improved in order to respond to domestic and international terrorist threats towards the Korean people and Korean national interests.

Research Questions

The primary research question is “How should the current Korean anti-terrorism programs be improved?” There are two secondary research questions that aim to determine areas where Korean anti-terrorism work needs to be improved.

The first secondary research question is “What is the state of the Korean government’s anti-terrorism program?” Answering this question requires the fundamental causes of terrorism and domestic and foreign terrorist threats to Korea to be explored and defined.

The second secondary research question is “How do the current Korean anti-terrorism programs compare to those in the US and UK?” This study will determine whether current Korean anti-terrorism programs effectively address all terrorist threats, including threats from North Korea, domestic groups, and transnational groups. Examining the current anti-terrorism situation from the perspective of meeting these three threats will help to support any recommendations for improving Korean anti-terrorism programs and efforts.

Assumptions

This study assumes that the Korean people have the desire to prevent terrorist attacks against them domestically and abroad. This paper highlights diverse emerging threats for the Korean people and the need to protect Koreans in foreign countries as well as in Korea, while recommending ways to provide stability for the region.

The study assumes that Korea may face terrorist acts by different threat groups: first, terrorism caused by North Korea such as direct or indirect attacks by spies, guerrillas, or special agents; second, terrorism such as a bombing attack on major facilities or the general public targets by domestic anti-government groups; and third, terrorism by international terrorist groups.

Scope and Limitations

First, this research delves into anti-terrorism programs. Therefore, the difference between anti-terrorism and counterterrorism is described, and the research concentrates on the preventive programs of anti-terrorism.

Second, the examination is not limited to Korean terrorism issues alone. Comparing the methods of current anti-terrorism programs in Korea, the US, the UK provides sources necessary to answer the research question –“How should the Korean anti-terrorism programs be improved?” International terrorism case studies articulate the research background describing recent threats and actual attacks by terrorist groups.

Third, because the Combined Armed Research Library (CARL) does not have about Korean anti-terrorism programs, it was necessary to use Korean websites and electronic books to conduct this study.

Significance

This study is significant because the Korean people are exposed to diverse threats from terrorist organizations at home and abroad despite the government's recently increased efforts to cope with those threats. The three sources of terrorism Korea may face are terrorism caused by North Korean factors; terrorism conducted by domestic anti-government groups; and terrorist acts committed abroad by transnational or non-state groups. Each of these three potential sources of terrorism poses a special challenge.

However, Korea still does not have an organization or formal approach for taking appropriate measures against terrorism. In addition, the legal framework for anti-terrorism is currently suspended in the National Assembly because of concerns over conflicts between personal privacy and the firm resolve of the government's stance against terrorism.

Improving anti-terrorism programs could potentially provide Koreans with safety and establish conditions for better stability in the world. Accordingly, the findings of this study will include recommendations regarding what is required to improve Korean anti-terrorism programs and efforts.

Summary

This chapter has described the background of this thesis and defined terrorism, anti-terrorism, and counterterrorism. In addition, it presented the primary and secondary research questions, the assumptions, the scope and limitations, and the significance of the thesis.

Since the tragic division of the Korean peninsula some 60 years ago, South Korea has been the main target of North Korean terrorism. Moreover, the nation is not safe from attacks by international terrorist groups. Ever since Korean troops were deployed to Afghanistan, the Taliban has warned that "Korea should be prepared for the consequences" of joining the US-led

war on terrorism. Koreans' increased presence in such war-torn nations as Afghanistan may invite terrorist attacks from these international groups as well.

Although Korea and its people are now the targets of various terrorist organizations, both domestically and abroad, Korea has relatively few programs for dealing with terrorism, compared with the US and the UK.

This study will begin with an introduction to the current issues, such as terrorist threats abroad and domestically. It will analyze the problems of Korean anti-terrorism programs and compare them with other nations' programs in terms of legal framework, organization, and leadership. It will then offer suggestions for improving Korean anti-terrorism programs.

¹The 9/11 Commission Report-2004, –Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,” http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.htm (accessed 17 September 2010).

²Maya Arakon, –The fight against terrorism and security strategies in the European Union after 9/11,” 2009, <http://yeditepe.academia.edu/MayaArakon/Papers/> (accessed 15 September 2010).

³Mizukoshi Hideaki, –Errorists, Terrorism, and Japan's Counter-Terrorism Policy,” *Gaiko Forum* (Summer 2003): 2, www.gaikoforum.com/53-Mizukoshi.pdf (accessed 20 September 2010).

⁴*Ibid.*, 2.

⁵Although the two countries' definitions of terrorism differ, there are some characteristics in common: First, the purpose of a terror attack is to achieve a symbolic effect by changing the laws of the government or throwing them into disarray, and to do this, terrorists try to create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or security of the government; second, the main perpetrators of terror attacks are individuals or groups wishing to make broad statement; third, most terror attacks are elaborately planned down to the smallest detail; fourth, a terror attack can take place anywhere, at home or abroad. Fifth, terror attacks targets unspecified individuals, sometimes symbolic persons, major national facilities, transportation, and other facilities. Finally, the means of a terror attack include murder, kidnapping, threat, coercion, and destruction of facilities in order to intimidate the public.

⁶‘국가대테러활동지침’ – 1982. 1. 21. 대통령훈령 제 47 호 [Presidential Directive No. 47], <http://www.tiic.go.kr> (accessed 20 September 2010).

⁷S. Anams, "Faces of Terrorism Part I," *Bukisa*, January 2010, http://www.bukisa.com/articles/439609_faces-of-terrorism-part-i (accessed 25 February 2011).

⁸United States House of Representative, <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/im12500.htm> (accessed 8 March 2011). U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, an oversight hearing on terrorist threats to the United States, 26 January 2000; H.R. 2507, a bill initiated to establish a commission on aviation security and terrorism, seeking to investigate the destruction of Pan Am 103 on December 21, 1988, and KAL on August 31, 1986, 101st Cong., 1989.

⁹David Rapoport, "Terrorism," in, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*, vol. 2, ed. Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (New York: Routledge, 1992), 1073.

¹⁰U.S. Department of Justice, *Terrorism in the United States 2000/2001: Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, FBI Publication #0308, 2002), 3.

¹¹Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 39.

¹²U.S. Congress, "Homeland Security Act of 2002, HR 5005-7," 107th Cong., <http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/public/display?theme=46&content=410>. (accessed 17 September 2010).

¹³Yonah Alexander, *Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations* (Virginia: Potomac Books, 2006), 192.

¹⁴Marianne Van Leeuwen, *Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies* (New York: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 14.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The focus of current research on anti-terrorism is on the ways in which terrorism is a threat to Korean society; this includes an analysis of general history, attacks, and anti-terrorism programs as they relate to Korea. This study also looks at the current approaches adopted by the US and the UK to prevent terrorism after 9/11 so that Korea can learn lessons regarding how Korea can best improve their anti-terrorism programs and efforts.

The most intense study on the subject is *테러시대 한국의 대테러 발전방안*, [How to Develop a Korean anti-terrorism System]” completed by *최진태* [Jintae Choi], 2007, and *Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations*,” by Yonah Alexander, 2006. Also, terrorism in South Korea is of interest, as discussed in the article *“Terrorism in South Korea”* by Soon Joo Wang, Jin tae Choi, and Jeffrey Arnold, 2004, and *Issues for Engagement: Asian Perspectives on Transnational Security Challenges”* by Steven Kim, 2010. In addition, the theses *9.11 이후 미국의 대테러 정책*, [US Counterterrorism after 9/11 Terror: Organization, Policy and, Implications for South],” *윤태영*, [Taeyoung, Yoon], *뉴테러리즘에 대한 군의 대응책*, [The ROK Armed forces‘ Measures against New Terrorism],”by *한국전략문제연구소*, [the Korea Research Institute for Strategy], 2008, *“Homegrown Terrorism”* by Steve S. Sin, 2009, and *“Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy”* by Raphael Perl, 2003 have also proved useful. Of particular relevance is *“Terrorism in South Korea”* by Soon Joo Wang, Jin tae Choi, and Jeffrey Arnold, 2004.

To better understand terrorism issues in Korea and find possible approaches for improving its anti-terrorism programs, it is necessary to differentiate the threats from North Korea, domestic elements, and international groups. Although the majority of terrorist attacks may have been perpetrated by N.K., Korea also faces domestic threats and international challenges created by transnational organizations such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Some commentaries fail to highlight or address domestic and international threats to Korea. Therefore, they do not develop ways to respond to these threats. This chapter will briefly describe terrorism and introduce major threats. It will also present current Korean anti-terrorism programs and introduce other nations' efforts after 9.11 that have been taken to prevent another tragedy of that proportion.

This chapter is divided into three main sections. First, it describes the history and background of terrorism. Then, it deals with Korea's anti-terrorism in doctrine and practice. Finally, it will examine the US and UK's anti-terrorism programs after 9/11.

History and Background

Although terrorism has existed throughout human history, the threats of terrorism have increased in recent times, and international norms to control terrorism have not been effective. Terrorism was widely used in the era of the Roman Empire to eliminate opposition political groups or leaders. During the French Revolution, terrorism was publicly conducted under the term politics of terrorism.¹ During the early 20th century, nationalism became an especially powerful force of stimulating terrorism by subject peoples of various colonial empires throughout the world.²

After World War I, a Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism was established in Geneva in 1937.³ However, due to different interpretations of terrorism among

different countries, the Convention has not been effective in controlling terrorism.⁴ Various international conventions to control terrorism in the form of hijacking, harm to diplomats, and bombing have been established, but international society has not found effective means to eliminate terrorism.

In the 1960s, terrorism was used a method for achieving specific purposes while avoiding massively destructive confrontations, such as direct retaliation or even nuclear war. In addition, due to ineffective international norms for controlling terrorism, Palestinian liberation movement groups and Arab nationalists depended on terrorism to achieve their political goals in the 1960s and 1970s.⁵

It transformed in the 1980s into what is known as new-terrorism—indiscriminate attacks on par with all-out wars, causing unimaginable damage—with the attackers not presenting their conditions or identifying themselves.⁶

The threats by terrorism further increased in the 1990s. Since the attack of September 11, 2001, countries worldwide have become well aware of the danger of terrorism and have made strenuous efforts to prepare effective measures against terrorism.⁷ Korea cannot expect to be an exception in this era of widening terrorism. Due to certain political circumstances, the rulers of North Korea have targeted the people of South Korea since 1958. The threat that North Korea poses goes well beyond the traditional concept of terrorism, as some of its past activities show all too clearly.⁸ In 1983 North Korea carried out a bombing that killed South Korean cabinet members on a state visit to Rangoon, Burma. In 1987 North Korea shot down a Korean Air Lines commercial flight.⁹

Besides the North Korean threat, South Korea faces attacks from international terrorist groups. Since South Korean forces have participated in the War on Terror, the nation has

increasingly become a target of terrorism around the world. The beheading of Kim Sun Il in Iraq in 2004 as part of demands for the immediate withdrawal of Korean forces from Iraq made everyone realize that Korea was truly a target of international terrorist groups.¹⁰ In addition, Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan detained 23 Korean missionaries and murdered two of them in 2007.¹¹ The presence of Koreans in this war-torn nation may invite another terrorist attack against Korea and its citizens.¹² Terror attacks on Koreans and Korean businesses, not only in the Middle East but also in developing countries, are also on the rise. More cases of Korean employees in expansion branches in Africa being kidnapped are being reported. On March 15, 2009, a teenage suicide bomber, an al-Qaeda operative, killed four Korean tourists in Yemen.¹³ Korea and its people are now the targets of various terrorist organizations both domestically and abroad.

Korea Anti-terrorism in Doctrine and Practice

Korea has sought to strengthen its domestic anti-terrorism capacity by consolidating its domestic legal arrangements. It first established guidelines for countering terrorism in response to the terrorist attack during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games and the North Korean terrorist attacks in the 1980s.¹⁴ But the Korean government established a national emergency program for terrorism-related events with the passage of the Presidential Order for Counterterrorism in 1982.¹⁵ The original law was amended in its entirety in 2005 to better respond to unconventional terrorist events after 9/11.¹⁶ The law was further revised in 2008.¹⁷ The Korean government, moreover, has passed anti-terrorist financing legislation to curb money laundering by terrorist organizations, either in or through the country.¹⁸ But, it has yet to pass a comprehensive anti-terrorism Bill, which has been pending in the national assembly for years.¹⁹ Although the Bill would provide a solid legal basis for government-led efforts to curb terrorism, human rights

activists have raised concerns about the possibility of granting excessive power to the state intelligence agency, which opponents feel may lead to violations of the right to privacy and other civil liberties.²⁰

The efficiency of the national emergency response system in conducting anti-terrorism operations has been improved through the creation of a unified system of command and interagency cooperation. In recognition of the unique challenges of unconventional terrorism-related events, five new Divisions of Terrorism Response were also formed. These divisions and their respective ministries are (1) Division of Response to Terrorism by Physical Force (Ministry of Administration); (2) Division of Response to Bioterrorism (Ministry of Health and Welfare); (3) Division of Response to Chemical Terrorism (Ministry of Environment); (4) Division of Response to Radiological Terrorism (Ministry of Science and Technology); and (5) Division of Response to Cyber-terrorism (Ministry of Information and Communication).²¹ The chief of each division is the vice-minister of the corresponding ministry.²²

Each division is responsible for planning, preparedness, and response functions in their respective areas, including education, training, command and control, information acquisition and sharing, and public relations.²³ According to the current national emergency plan, when a specific type of terrorist event occurs, the corresponding Division of Terrorism Response becomes the lead organization in the field command and control system for that event.²⁴ The next level of command and control is the Field Headquarters, which is established according to the location of the event.²⁵ This system also includes three response teams: the Initial Response Team, the Comprehensive Examination Team, and the Rescue and Treatment Team.²⁶

United States Anti-terrorism in Doctrine and Practice Post 9/11

The 9/11 attacks demonstrated the nature and intensity of the new global terrorism. It is not surprising, therefore, that President George W. Bush immediately began to develop and implement policies to improve homeland security and to form a global coalition to combat terrorism abroad.²⁷

There have been four dramatic actions have been undertaken in the post-9/11 era. First is the enactment of the Patriot Act, signed by President Bush on 26 October 2001.²⁸ This measure allows intelligence and law enforcement officials to continue sharing information and using the tools already employed against terrorists.²⁹ The act includes clauses specifying that the following are permitted: extension of interception of terrorist suspects; permission for extensive eavesdropping; application and issuance of secret warrants; unannounced house searches; and information sharing between domestic investigation bodies and overseas information collecting agencies.³⁰ This law also stipulates that detention of foreign suspects may be extended from 48 hours to seven days. In addition, it stipulates that foreigners who support and contribute to a terrorist group and who join this group can be expelled. In other words, this Act established a domestic law system to effectively investigate and report terrorist activities while not infringing on such civil rights as freedom of assembly, religion, and the press. It also established a legal basis so that other countries may investigate and report all terrorist activities ranging from physical support to commission of the activities in their countries, thus encouraging them to cooperate regarding accusations of terrorist activities in foreign countries.³¹

The second important action was the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on 16 July 2003.³² It consists of twenty-two agencies for the purpose of providing a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.³³ This extraordinary structure, employing

some 180,000 people, focuses on national, state, and local cooperation to ensure shared responsibility for homeland security.³⁴

The third significant move was the creation on 27 November 2002, of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.³⁵ Otherwise known as the 9/11 Commission, this group was charged with determining how the tragedy happened and how the United States can avoid future attacks.³⁶

The fourth critical measure undertaken by the United States relates to the role of intelligence in combating terrorism.³⁷ The 9/11 Commission reported on the need for the intelligence community to improve information-sharing between governmental agencies and produce a central counterterrorism database.³⁸ The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2005 created the position of Director of National Intelligence(DNI), bringing together about fifteen agencies under one structure.³⁹

In addition, the White House National Security Council (NSC) has published National Security Strategy of the United States (2002/2006) related to “National Security Strategies” and “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” (2003/2006) related to counterterrorism strategies.⁴⁰ The US has also strengthened preventive measures such as detection, warning, deterrence, and preemptive strikes. In addition, it operates special forces such as Delta Force, Navy SEALs, and Green Berets to confront terrorism. On 1 May 2011, the elite team of Navy SEALs contributed to the killing of Osama bin Laden.⁴¹

United Kingdom Anti-Terrorism in Doctrine and Practice Post 9/11

The Terrorism Act was passed in 2000 and remains the UK’s primary anti-terrorism legislation, with amendments made in 2001 and 2005, and again in 2006.⁴² At each juncture, the definition of terrorist offenses and police powers has been expanded. The additions criminalized

incitement to terrorism, providing assistance to terrorists, and providing instruction in the use of firearms and explosives. The Prevention of Terrorism Bill was published in February 2005 as part of the government's continuing efforts against the threat.⁴³ These efforts acquired a new urgency after suicide bombers struck the London transport system without warning on 7 July 2005, killing fifty-two people and injuring over seven hundred.⁴⁴

After 9/11, the UK government worked to counterterrorism under the government's counterterrorism strategy, known as CONTEST (Counterterrorism Strategy).⁴⁵ This strategy has brought together the work of all ministries including that of the intelligence and security agencies. The strategy divides work between that which seeks to reduce the threat of an attack and that which reduces the UK's vulnerability to an attack.⁴⁶

CONTEST programs are organized into four workstreams: Pursue—to stop terrorist attacks; Prevent—to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism; Protect—to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack; and Prepare—where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact. Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare reinforce and complement each other to reduce the terrorist threat to the UK and its overseas interests.⁴⁷

After 9/11, the UK extended the roles of the intelligence services and police for counterterrorism, established a Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC)⁴⁸ in 2003, and established the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT)⁴⁹ in 2007. This strengthened its ability to analyze information on terrorism and cooperate internationally in managing risks arising from terrorism. Finally, in 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair created a new Department for Community Affairs which, in 2007, assumed responsibility for the government's program for de-radicalization and the "Preventing Extremism" agenda. Later this was renamed the department for Communities and Local Government (CLG).⁵⁰

Summary

This chapter has presented a literature review and explained how it relates to the primary research question –“How should the current Korean anti-terrorism programs be improved?”

Since 9/11, governments around the world have made numerous advances in the way they combat terrorism.⁵¹ Already accustomed to terrorism, governments had previously been content to adapt existing legislation to meet the new terrorism threat made apparent by the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

However, Korea still does not have appropriate programs against terrorism. A comprehensive legal framework for anti-terrorism is currently suspended in the National Assembly because of concerns over personal privacy. In addition, there is still much room for improvement in organization and leadership.

The US enacted the USA PATRIOT Act in October 2001 and established a Department of Homeland Security designed to prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and dangers to the nation. Also, it established the National Counterterrorism Center in August 2004. In December 2004, the position of Director of National Intelligence was created on the basis of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2005. The goal was to integrate intelligence matters related to national security and overseas threats and to direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.

The UK has faced a far greater threat from Muslim extremist terrorism than other European countries and was forced to reconsider how its existing terrorism policies had developed. For new approaches to anti-terrorism, the Terrorism Act, which was passed in 2000, was amended in 2001 and 2005, and again in 2006. After the 9/11 attack in 2001, the UK extended the roles of the intelligence services for anti-terrorism and strengthened its ability to

analyze information on terrorism and to cooperate internationally in managing risks arising from terrorism.

Therefore, the Korean government can pursue similar programs based on the anti-terrorism experiences of the US and UK.

¹S. Anams, “Faces of Terrorism,” *Bukisa*, January 2010, http://www.bukisa.com/articles/439609_faces-of-terrorism-part-i (accessed 25 February 2011).

²Ibid.

³구본학, 이규열, 차규현, “뉴테러리즘에 대한 군의 대응책, [The ROK Armed forces‘ Measures against New Terrorism],” (Seoul: 한국 전략문제연구소, [Korea Research Institute for Strategy]. 2008), abstract.

⁴Ibid..

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Mizukoshi Hideaki, “Errorists, Terrorism, and Japan's Counter- Terrorism Policy,” *Gaiko Forum* (Summer 2003): 2, www.gaikoforum.com/53-Mizukoshi.pdf, 2003 (accessed 20 September 2010).

⁹Ibid., 3.

¹⁰Steve S. Sin, “Homegrown Terrorism: South Korea’s Next Challenge against Terrorism,” *Asian Affairs*, no. 29 (Winter 2008/2009).

¹¹The Korea Times, “Korea in 2007 From A to Z,” http://m.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2011/01/236_16108.html (accessed 10 March 2011).

¹²Kang Hyun-kyung, “Counter-terrorism drive still slow in Korea,” http://www.korea-times.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/02/116_69400.html (accessed 10 March 2011).

¹³The Korea Times, “Korea in 2007 From A to Z.”

¹⁴Seven Kim, “Issues For Engagement: Asian Perspective on Transnational Security Challenges: Republic of Korea: Meeting the Challenge of Transnational Threats in the twenty-first Century” (Washington, DC: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. 2010), 109.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸U.S. Department of State, "Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview," <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103706.htm> (accessed 7 March 2011).

¹⁹Kim, "Issues For Engagement," 109.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Soon Joo Wang, Jin tae Choi, and Jeffrey Arnold, "Terrorism in South Korea," *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine* 18, no. 2 (2003), <http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu> (accessed 15 December 2010).

²²Ibid., 145.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., 145-146.

²⁵Ibid., 146. In events that occur on land, the Headquarters Chief is the Director of the Local Police Agency, while in events that occur at sea, the Chief is the Director of the Marine Police Agency. In events that occur in regions occupied by the military, the Chief is the ranking military officer.

²⁶Ibid., 146. The Initial Response Team establishes a secure perimeter via a police line, performs emergency rescue and relief activities, and comprises personnel from military, police, fire, health, and customs services. The Comprehensive Examination Team comprises experts from military, police, and customs services. This team analyzes events for suspected terrorism, examines the results of the initial response, and collects forensic specimens. The Rescue and Treatment Team performs on-scene rescue, emergency treatment, and transport, and comprises personnel from fire stations and health offices.

²⁷Yonah Alexander, *Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations* (Virginia: Potomac Books. 2006), 192.

²⁸Ibid., 193.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid., 37.

³¹Ibid., 193.

³²Alexander, *Counterterrorism Strategies*, 192; Raphael Perl, “Issue brief for congress: Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*,” 11 April 2003. On October 8, 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order 13228 establishing the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) to lead, oversee, and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to protect the nation against domestic terrorism as part of a complex web of new organizational structures and relationships. The OHS is chaired by former Governor Tom Ridge of Pennsylvania. A Homeland Security Council (HSC) including subordinate councils similar in structure and function to the existing NSC system was established as well. Responsibility for international counterterrorism planning still lies with the NSC. In a further reorganization in June 2002, the President announced a plan to create a single permanent government department “whose primary mission is to protect the American homeland.” The proposed reorganization, which went far beyond the above-mentioned congressional initiatives, would consolidate at least 22 separate federal agencies, offices, and research centers comprising more than 169,000 employees into a new cabinet Department of Homeland Security with a budget of \$37.4 billion. Major agencies affected include the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Transportation Security Agency, the Secret Service, the Agriculture Department’s Plant and Animal Health Inspection Service, and FEMA. The new structure would comprise 4 major components: chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures; information analysis and infrastructure protection; border and transportation security; and emergency preparedness and response.

³³Ibid., 193

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰윤태영 [Taeyoung, Yoon], “9.11 이후 미국의 대테러 정책, [US Counterterrorism after 9/11 Terror: Organization, Policy and, Implications for South],” *세계지역연구논총* 26 집 3 호, [World Regional Research], no. 26-3 (2008), 454.

⁴¹Elizabeth Flock, “Navy SEALs who killed Osama bin Laden are from the elite Team 6,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/navy-seals-who-killed-osama-bin-laden-are-from-the-elite-team-6/2011/05/02/AFCC93YF_blog.html (accessed 4 May 2011).

⁴²Marianne Van Leeuwen, *Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies* (New York: Kluwer Law International. 2003), 14.

⁴³The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act was also passed in 2001 following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US.

⁴⁴The Rt. Hon. Paul Murphy, *–Intelligence and Security Committee Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005,*” UK Intelligence and Security Committee (July 2005), 2.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 5.

⁴⁶James Wither, *–A Work in Progress: The United Kingdom’s Campaign against Radicalization,*” George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (February 2007), 13.

⁴⁷Homeoffice, *–The UK counterterrorism strategy(Contest),*” <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/uk-counter-terrorism-strat/> (accessed:12 December 2010); The Rt. Hon. Paul Murphy, *–Intelligence and Security Committee Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005,*” UK Intelligence and Security Committee (July 2005), 5. The UK counterterrorism strategy has brought together the work of all departments under one aim: *–to reduce the risk from international terrorism so that people can go about their business freely and with confidence.*”

⁴⁸The Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC) integrates and assesses intelligence from 16 agencies.

⁴⁹The Office for Security and Counterterrorism (OSCT) takes charge of all operations in the case of a terrorist attack and manages the National Counterterrorism. Exercise Program to prepare for a terrorist attack.

⁵⁰Wither, *–A Work in Progress,*” 13.

⁵¹Steve S. Sin, *–Homegrown Terrorism: South Korea’s Next Challenge against Terrorism,*” *Asian Affairs*, no. 29 (Winter 2008/2009).

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodology used to collect data and the procedures for analyzing data used to answer the research questions. This study compares the legal framework, organization, and leadership of Korea, the US, and the UK in order to answer the primary research question: “How should the current Korean anti-terrorism program be improved?” The previous chapter presented Korean, US, and UK anti-terrorism doctrine and practice, as well as the issues raised by diverse kinds of terrorist threats. The Korean government faces many challenges as it aims to prevent terrorism originating domestically and abroad. The comparison method and approach will allow an analysis to determine if Korean anti-terrorism programs and efforts are as complete as they could be.

For the purposes of this study, a qualitative approach was chosen to describe current anti-terrorism programs and an interpretation of the data obtained through various materials. Sources of materials were the CARL, the Internet, and more specifically, Korean electronic books and previous theses, as well as US sites for homeland security, the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and other agencies. A quantitative research approach was also utilized to gain and analyze the maximum amount of information from past terrorism cases.

This chapter will describe the research methodology by building on the major findings from the literature review before describing the research methodology and design of this thesis. Then, it will introduce the analytical models used to define the threats facing Korean anti-terrorism programs, describe the domestic and international

issues, and analyze the problems of current Korean anti-terrorism programs and efforts. Finally, Legal framework, organization, and leadership perspective will be articulated to analyze Korean/other nations' anti-terrorism efforts.

Broad Research Methodology

Major findings from the literature research show that the Korean government faces threats domestically and internationally. This implies a need to identify terrorist threats to prevent terrorist attacks against Korean people and national interests. To do this, it is helpful to examine present Korean anti-terrorism doctrine and practice and compare Korean programs with other nations' programs. By comparing different countries' anti-terrorism efforts with Korean anti-terrorism programs, possible areas for improving Korean efforts in this area can be identified.

Figure 1 shows the methodology and research design of this thesis. After the literature research, this study will answer the first secondary question of "What is the state of the Korean government's anti-terrorism program?" by identifying the current issues that the Korean government should tackle with respect to terrorism. To answer the second secondary question of "How do the current Korean anti-terrorism programs compare to those in the US and UK?", it will compare the programs in those three countries. Then, it will answer the primary research question of "How should the current Korean anti-terrorism program be improved?" by drawing implications from the US and UK's anti-terrorism programs and efforts. Finally, it will propose recommendations consistent with its approach toward current issues regarding Korean anti-terrorism programs and efforts.




Figure 1. Thesis Methodology and Research Design

Source: Created by author.

Analysis and Recommendations

The primary aim of chapter 4 is to determine potential threats Korea is facing and to draw the implications for Korean anti-terrorism programs from the US and UK programs. Then, the purpose of chapter 5 is to provide recommendations for Korea's anti-terrorism issues. This thesis uses a four-step approach. First, it presents the terrorist

threats from N.K., along with domestic and foreign threats (table 2-column 1). Second, it introduces Korean anti-terrorism programs, as well as those of the US and UK (table 2-column 2). Third, terrorist threats toward Korean society are listed, followed by Korean and US/UK anti-terrorism programs. Then, it identifies the differences between Korean anti-terrorism programs and those of the US/UK in the categories of legal framework, organization, leadership (table 2-column 3). The identification of issues and problems will facilitate the improvement of programs aimed at tackling the terrorist threats facing Korea. Finally, Korea’s future efforts toward anti-terrorism will be recommended (table 2-column 4).

Table 2. Template to classify an approach for analysis and recommendations

Column 1 Threats	Column 2 Anti-terrorism doctrine and practice (Korea, US, UK)	Column 3 Implications from US, UK	Column 4 Recommendations
This column identifies various threats, including threats from N.K, domestic threats, and threats abroad against Korean people.	This column identifies Korean anti-terrorism programs, as well as other nations’ programs, as researched in Chapter 2. Based on threats identified in Column 1, the Korean government needs to tackle Korean anti-terrorism programs and efforts. The column will then identify the problems existing in anti-terrorism programs and efforts in Korea.	This column identifies differences between Korea and the US and UK in anti-terrorism efforts. (Problems and Issues to be resolved) The identification of differences will facilitate the analysis of programs aimed at tackling the terrorist threats for Korea. Those differences can be identified using comparison method.	Based on columns 1, 2, and 3, this column identifies issues to be improved to prevent threats identified in Column 1. These options may provide some ideas for Korea to develop Korean anti-terrorism programs.

Source: Created by author.

This study places the terrorist threats against Korea in three categories: threats from N.K, domestic threats, and threats abroad against Korean people. Within each category, the study shows the threats that Korea is exposed to domestically and abroad (table 3). These threats encompass North Korea (table 3-column 1), threats abroad against Korean people (table 3-column 2), and domestic threats (table 3-column 3).

Table 3. Template to classify potential threats in Korean anti-terrorism

Column 1 North Korean threats	Column 2 Threats abroad against Korean people	Column 3 Homegrown threats
<p>This column lists the various terrorist attacks conducted by N.K. in the past. Key factors include: (1) the possibility of bombing; shooting, hijacking, and kidnapping; (2) the possibility of the N.K's shelling near Korea's disputed western sea border; and (3) the attack of potential terrorist targets in South Korea, including 18 nuclear power plants and numerous oil refineries situated in densely populated areas by special forces.</p>	<p>This column lists the various terrorist attacks conducted abroad against Korean people in the past. Events in which Korean people were targeted abroad include: (1) South Korean tourists and missionaries; (2) South Korean workers and businessmen; (3) South Korean military soldiers and government officials in foreign countries; and (4) South Korean cargo ships passing the area near Somalia.</p>	<p>This column lists the potential terrorist attacks that could be conducted domestically in the future. Potential threats include: (1) dissatisfied citizens; (2) the growing number of entrants including skilled labor, Multinational Firm Workers, Students, Unskilled Labor, International Marriage, Naturalized Korean Citizen, and Children of International Marriage; (3) N.K defectors who fail to stabilize in Korean society; and (4) terrorists from Muslim backgrounds.</p>

Source: Created by author using data from Soon Joo Wang, Jin tae Choi, and Jeffrey Arnold, "Terrorism in South Korea," *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine* 18, no. 2 (2003), <http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu> (accessed 15 December 2010).

The "North Korean" threat column lists the various terrorist attacks conducted against Korean people in the past. The "threats abroad" column also lists the various terrorist attacks conducted against Korean people in the past. The "homegrown threats"

column lists potential terrorist attacks that could occur in the future. In addition, tables and graphs are presented to identify diverse terrorist events in the past and to show recent terror-related changes in Korean society.

Table 4 explains the legal framework, organization, and leadership categories. Legal framework includes the definition of terrorism, strategy, and comprehensive anti-terrorism law. Organization and Leadership involve the how Korea integrates organization of efforts to fight terrorism and the command and control structure for terrorism reaction.

Table 4. Template for analyzing anti-terrorism efforts

Category	Description
Legal framework	Legal framework encompasses the definition of terrorism, strategy, and comprehensive anti-terrorism law.
Organization	Organization includes how Korea integrates organizations for fighting terrorism.
Leadership	Leadership includes terrorism-related organization and command and control structure for terrorism reaction.

Source: Created by author.

This study will identify problems existing in anti-terrorism programs and efforts in Korea. To do this, it draws on US/UK anti-terrorism doctrines and practice. This thesis then identifies areas where Korea can improve anti-terrorism efforts and solve current problems regarding its anti-terrorism programs. The identification of issues and problems will facilitate the improvement of programs aimed at tackling the terrorist threats against Korea.

Summary

This chapter has described the research methodology of this thesis by reiterating key findings from the literature review and explaining how the various research tools and tables will answer the primary research question. To identify the problems of Korean anti-terrorism programs, this thesis compares Korean programs with other nations' programs. To determine the current issues concerning Korean anti-terrorism programs, this thesis compares the legal framework, organization, and leadership in anti-terrorism programs in Korea, the US, and the UK. The next chapter will identify terrorist threats against Korean society, analyze the anti-terrorism programs of Korea, the US, and the UK, determine the current issues in Korean anti-terrorism programs, and propose recommendations for how the Korean government can deal with these issues.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Korean citizens remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Recently, 2010 saw a number of provocative actions by N.K. against Korea, including an attack against Yeonpyeong Island, killing four people.¹ On 15 March 2009, four Korean tourists were killed in a suicide bomb attack in the city of Shibam in Southern Hadramout province in Yemen.² These incidents raise questions about whether or not Korea's anti-terrorism programs are effective.³ Amidst this growing turmoil, the issue of establishing an effective anti-terrorism program has emerged as a matter of grave concern.⁴ This debate has become even more intensified in the aftermath of the government's inability to act in the case of Kim Sun-il, who was kidnapped and beheaded in Iraq 2004 by al-Qaeda.⁵

This chapter first explores the terrorist threats toward the Korean people at home and abroad as a way to address the question –“What is the state of the Korean government's anti-terrorism program?” It does so by showing domestic and foreign terrorist incidents in the past. Next, it examines three nations' (Korea, US, and UK) anti-terrorism programs and efforts, and approach the question –“How do current Korean anti-terrorism programs compare to those in the US and the UK?” by comparing Korean anti-terrorism programs and efforts with those of the US and the UK. This chapter also explores the implications from the US and UK's anti-terrorism efforts and concludes with recommendations the Korean government can adopt to improve its anti-terrorism programs.

Challenges and Expectation

Table 5 shows that prior to 1990, almost all of the terrorist-related events occurred inside the country and were carried out by the North Korean regime. The most common types of terrorist tactics used against Korea's interests have included bombing, shooting, hijacking, and kidnapping.⁶ N.K. has been responsible for almost all terrorism-related events against the Korean people.⁷ Although it has conducted relatively few terrorist attacks against South Korea since 1990, the risk of future terrorism within South Korea persists. Seoul's state-funded think tanks project that "the North will continue with local provocations, including a possible invasion of the five islands near the western sea⁸ in the coming year."⁹

Table 5. Terrorism-related events affecting Korea prior to 1990

Year	Event	Location	Target	Dead/Injured
1958	Hijacking	Aircraft	32 passengers	0 / 0
1968	Shooting	Blue House, Seoul	President	68 / 66
1969	Hijacking	Aircraft	51 passengers	0 / 0
1974	Shooting	Presidential Speech site, Seoul	President	2 / 0
1978	Kidnapping		2 movie actors	
1981	Shooting	Canada	President	0 / 0
1983	Bombing	Myanmar	President	21 / 46
1986	Bombing	Kimpo Airport, Seoul	Public	30 / 0
1987	Bombing	Aircraft	Passengers	115 / 0

Source : Soon Joo Wang, Jin tae Choi, and Jeffrey Arnold, "Terrorism in South Korea," *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine* 18, no. 2 (2003), <http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu> (accessed 15 December 2010).

Other possibilities include: (1) bombing, shooting, hijacking, and kidnapping; (2) the N.K.'s shelling near Korea's disputed western sea border;¹⁰ and (3) an attack by special forces on potential terrorist targets in Korea, including 18 nuclear power plants and numerous oil refineries situated in densely populated areas.¹¹

Table 6 shows terror incidents since 1990. It also indicates that many Korean nationals in foreign countries have been assaulted, kidnapped, and even killed. A number of cases were aimed at company employees, tourists, and missionaries. Since 1990, most of the terrorist attacks against Korean citizens have occurred abroad and have been related to the emerging worldwide pattern of terrorism by international terrorist organizations, or by deranged individuals.¹²

Since four Korean workers employed by Daewoo construction company in Iran were kidnapped in 1992, Korean people have been targeted by terrorists in foreign countries. Most cases were motivated by political purposes and desire for economic compensation.¹³ According to the Terrorism Information Integration center under the Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS), there have been 49 cases of Korean people being killed or injured by terrorists in foreign countries since 1990.¹⁴

In April 2001, Chechen extremists kidnapped and took 60 tourists hostage, including two Korean people in Istanbul, Turkey.¹⁵ Koreans have become targets of international terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda since Korea joined the US-led campaign to fight terrorism in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.¹⁶ On 22 June 2004, an Islamist extremist group in Iraq kidnapped and beheaded Kim Sun-il, a translator and missionary. The Iraqi militant group that killed the Korean hostage claimed "We have killed an infidel who tried to propagate Christianity in Iraq."¹⁷

Table 6. Terrorism-related events affecting Korea after 1990

Year	Event	Location	Target	Dead/Injured
1992	Kidnapping	Iran	Construction workers	0 / 1
1993	Bombing	Egypt	Tourists	0 / 0
1994	Shooting	Algeria	Company vice-president	1 / 0
1995	Kidnapping	Russia	Construction workers	0 / 0
1996	Shooting	Libia	A Construction worker	1 / 0
1997	Shooting	Sri Lanka	A company employee	0 / 2
1998	Bombing	Greece	A company employee	0 / 0
1999	Bombing	South Africa	A company employee	1 / 0
2001	Kidnapping	Turkey	Tourists	1 / 60
2003	Shooting	Iraq	Company employees	2 / 0
2004	Kidnapping	Iraq	A translator and missionary	1 / 0
2005	Bombing	Indonesia	Tourists	0 / 6
2006	Kidnapping	Indian ocean	Cargo ship sailors	0 / 0
2006	Kidnapping	Nigeria	Construction workers	0 / 0
2007	Kidnapping	Nigeria	Construction workers	0 / 0
2007	Bombing	Afghanistan	A military soldier	1 / 0
2007	Kidnapping	Nigeria	Construction workers	0 / 0
2007	Kidnapping	Indian ocean	Cargo ship sailors	0 / 0
2007	Kidnapping	Afghanistan	Missionaries	2 / 0
2008	Kidnapping	Indian ocean	Cargo ship sailors	0 / 0
2009	Bombing	Yemen	Tourists	4 / 3
2009	Bombing	Yemen	Terror investigation team	0 / 0
2010	Bombing	Yemen	An oil pipeline run by Korea	0 / 0
2011	Kidnapping	Indian ocean	Cargo ship sailors	0 / 1

Source : Created by author using data from Soon Joo Wang, Jin tae Choi, and Jeffrey Arnold, "Terrorism in South Korea," *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine* 18, no. 2 (2003), <http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu> (accessed 15 December 2010); Terrorism Information Integration Center, <http://www.tiic.go.kr/service/info/damagecase.do> (accessed 27 February 2011).

In January 2005, six Korean people were injured from explosions set off by terrorists at a restaurant in Bali, Indonesia.¹⁸ In July 2007, Taliban insurgents kidnapped 23 Korean missionary volunteers.¹⁹ Two of them were killed. On 15 March 2009, four Korean tourists²⁰ were killed in a suicide bomb attack in the city of Shibam in Southern Hadramout province in Yemen.²¹ On 18 March 2009, three days after that attack occurred, an al-Qaeda suicide bomber attacked a car carrying a high-ranking Korean government official who had come to Yemen to investigate the killing of the four tourists, on a highway to the airport.²² After the second attack, al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the two incidents, saying their motives were to “expel the infidels from the Arabian Peninsula” and to make Korea face the consequences of joining the US-led alliance to fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq.²³

Table 6 also shows that Korean company employees in foreign countries have been targets of terrorists. Five terrorist attacks have taken place since 2003. In November 2003, a terrorist killed two Korean electric company employees in Tikrit, Iraq.²⁴ In June 2006, more than 30 members of Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) attacked a Korean construction company and kidnapped five Korean employees in Nigeria. In January 2007, five Daewoo construction site workers were kidnapped in Nigeria. In May 2007, three Daewoo power plant construction site workers were kidnapped in Nigeria. On 2 November 2010, suspected al-Qaeda militants blew up an oil pipeline run by Korea National Oil Corp in Yemen.²⁵

Korean troops stationed in foreign countries can be the victim of terrorists, too. In February 2007, Sergeant Yoon Jang-ho, a soldier with a Korean unit in Afghanistan, was killed during the suicide bombing attack on Bagram Air Base.²⁶ Moreover, in October

2009, a Taliban spokesman warned that Korea should be prepared to deal with the consequences of sending troops back to Afghanistan.²⁷ Despite the warning, Korea sent up to 350 soldiers to protect around 100 civilian reconstruction workers in July 2010.²⁸

Somali pirates have targeted Korean commerce ships passing through the area near Somalia.²⁹ In April 2006, Somali pirates abducted 25 crew members on a Korean ship called Dongwon, including eight South Koreans; they were released 117 days later.³⁰ In May 2007, twenty-four crew members of Mabuno No. 1 and No. 2, including four Koreans, were kidnapped and then released 174 days later in November by Somali pirates.³¹ In September 2008, a Korean cargo ship was hijacked by pirates on the sea off Somalia, and eight South Korean crew members were held hostage.³² On 21 January 2011, Korean Navy special forces from the Cheonghae Naval Unit rescued *the Samho Jewelry*, an 11,500-ton Korean chemical freight vessel hijacked by Somali pirates.³³ The successful rescue carries great meaning for Korean trade, as 30 percent of Korean commerce ships pass through the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea.³⁴

Korea is different from other nations where immigrants from Muslim backgrounds or former colonies have committed acts of terrorism. Because, it doesn't have a tradition of multiculturalism. Korea has been threatened by al-Qaeda outside the country. In addition, around 500,000 people have created a Muslim community within the Korean territory. Some of these people may face discrimination, exploitation and abuse from their employers and the surrounding Korean community.³⁵ Such discrimination could lead to additional terrorism in Korea. There is a growing number of foreign entrants in Korea. This includes skilled labor, multinational Firm Workers, Students, Unskilled Labor, International Marriage, Naturalized Korean Citizens, and

Children of International Marriage (see figure 2). According to the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs, foreigners residing in Korea totaled 722,686 as of August 2007, a 35 percent increase over 2006 figures (536,627)³⁶ (see figure 2). The Korea Migrants Center,³⁷ a part of the Ministry of Labor, has said that the number of foreigners seeking redress for discrimination or other racial incidents in and out of the workplace is increasing.³⁸ If the government does not deal with these issues to foster a multicultural environment, the ethnic minorities in Korea may begin expressing their frustration over perceived discrimination through acts of terrorism. The 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005 suicide attacks in London are pertinent examples. Both incidents were committed by residents, who felt discriminated against and frowned upon in their adopted countries.




Figure 2. Total Foreign Population Residing in South Korea
 Source: Steve S. Sin, "Homegrown Terrorism: South Korea's Next Challenge against Terrorism," *Asian Affairs*, no. 29 (Winter 2008/2009).




Figure 3. The annual arrivals of North Korean defectors
Source: kostat.go.kr, –Statistics Korea,” <http://kostat.go.kr/eng> (accessed 20 February 2011).

Table 7. The annual arrivals of North Korean defector

Year	99	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
personnel	305	312	583	1,138	1,281	1,894	1,383	2,018	2,544	2,809

Source: kostat.go.kr, –Statistics Korea,” <http://kostat.go.kr/eng> (accessed 20 February 2011).

Table 7 indicates the number of N.K. defectors coming to South Korea annually. More North Koreans are risking everything to cross the border because they are hearing more about the relatively affluent economic conditions of Korea. A total of 2,809 North Koreans fled south in 2008, up from 2,544 in 2007. However, among the growing volume of defectors, many still struggle to become fully integrated Korean citizens. In fact, most defectors face severe prejudice from their fellow citizens. –There is still much stigma attached to being a defector here,” said Kim Yong-hyun, assistant professor of North

Korean Studies at Dongguk University Lee Man-jong, head of the Korean Association for Terrorism Studies, said, “There is a possibility that the discrimination, scorn, and frustration felt by migrant workers, multicultural children and N.K. defectors may erupt in acts of terrorism.”³⁹ In addition, the unemployment rate among N.K. defectors has soared to as high as 13.7 percent, while Koreans’ overall jobless rate is around four percent.⁴⁰ Therefore, Korea might face internal terrorism from frustrated N.K. defectors if it does not actively deal with N.K. defectors’ difficulties.

Korea Anti-Terrorism Programs

Legal Framework

Korea defines “terrorism” in the National Guidelines for Counterterrorism Measures (Presidential Directive 47). Before 1982, it maintained counter-guerrilla measures rather than counterterrorism measures.⁴¹ The Korean government formulated in January of 1982 the National Guidelines for Counterterrorism Measures. This became the foundation for later efforts to efficiently deal with possible terrorist activities by North Korean and global terrorist networks.⁴²

The original guidelines were amended in 2005 to better respond to unconventional terrorist events after 9/11.⁴³ The law was further revised in 2008 to define terrorism as “acts violating the National Guidelines for Anti-Terrorism Measures (Presidential Directive 47) for the purpose of endangering national security and public safety.” The table below describes the National Guidelines of this directive.”⁴⁴

Table 8. National Guidelines for Counter-Terrorism Measures

	Description
a.	Acts as stipulated in Article 2 of the Convention of Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents
b.	Acts as stipulated in Article 1 of the Convention against the Taking of Hostages including detention and hostage-taking for the purpose of coercing feissance or nonfeasance against the nation or international organizations
c.	Acts as stipulated in Article 2 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, including bombing of national major facilities or public equipment
d.	Acts stipulated in Article 1 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft including kidnapping and illegal seizure of aircraft
e.	Acts stipulated in Article 1 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation including destruction of aircraft and related facilities
f.	Acts stipulated in Article 2 of the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation passed on September 23, 1971, in Montreal including killing people or destroying facilities in airports, etc.
g.	Acts stipulated in Article 3 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation including acts that can endanger safety of maritime navigation
h.	Acts stipulated in Article 2 of the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf including destruction of fixed platforms
i.	Acts stipulated in Article 7 of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material including killing people using nuclear substance or depredation of nuclear materials

Source: Created by author using data from 국가대테러활동지침대통령훈령 제 47 호 [Presidential Directive No. 47], <http://www.tiic.go.kr> (accessed 20 September 2010).

However, the Korean National Guidelines for Counterterrorism Measures, which constitutes the only anti-terror regulations in Korea, does not clearly describe the concept and range of a terror attack. Furthermore, it has many limits and shortcomings in coping with Korea's three potential terrorist threats described in the challenges and expectations section of this chapter. After 9/11, amid the international community's efforts to legislate counterterrorism laws in search of a solution to contemporary terrorist threats, Korea also made strenuous efforts to prepare against terrorism by considering what was called the

Law on Prevention of Terrorism.” However, this bill has been pending in the National Assembly for years waiting to be enacted. Human rights activists have raised concerns about the possibility of granting excessive power to the state intelligence agency, which might lead to violations of privacy rights and other civil liberties.⁴⁵

What this bill does is define ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist group,’ stipulate punishment for terrorism-related crimes, and regulate special measures against terrorist suspects. Following the trend of global society, this bill proposes regulating the financing of terrorism and assigns the right of control over special troops to suppress terrorism after establishing the counterterrorism organization under the auspices of the National Intelligence Service.⁴⁶ Article 2 of the bill defines terrorism as premeditated illegal acts by an individual or group having political, ideological, religious, or ethnic motivations. It includes kidnapping and assassination of national agents, bombing of major national facilities, kidnapping and bombing of the means of transportation such as aircraft, and mass murder using explosives.⁴⁷ Article 9 describes the role heads of relevant organizations in implementing safety management measures against explosives, firearms, and harmful chemical substances.⁴⁸ Article 17-1 stipulates that the persons who commit a terror attack should be sentenced to punishment regulated by relevant laws such as the Criminal Act, Military Law, Aviation Law, the Nuclear Act, Railway Law, and the Military Facilities Protection Act, and in this case the punishment is subject to additional punishment of up to half the sentence already given.⁴⁹ Articles 19 through 22 describe punishment for persons belonging to or financing terrorist groups, persons failing to report terror attack plans they had knowledge of, and persons reporting false information regarding terrorism.⁵⁰

Organization and Leadership

In 2005, the Korean government, through the revised National Anti-terror Action Directive (Presidential Directive 47), mandated the establishment of interagency committees on counterterrorism, including a ministerial-level standing committee, a weekly working group meeting, and a National Anti-terrorism Countermeasure Committee⁵¹ chaired by the Prime Minister.⁵² The ministries each have specific responsibilities toward terrorism as shown below in table 9.

Table 9. Template to define the responsibilities of ministries

Ministry	Responsibilities
Ministry of Public Administration and Security	Secure and protect potential terrorist targets, enforce international antiterrorism treaties, improve the capability of regional police to manage explosive devices, and organize and maintain special police attack teams
Ministry of National Defense	Organize and maintain special attack teams, research and develop counterterrorism tactics, prepare the equipment needed in counterterrorism operations, and provide military operational assistance
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	Prepare response plans for terrorism-related events occurring in foreign countries
Ministry of Land, Transportation and Maritime Affairs	Develop measures to prevent hijacking including participation in international anti-hijacking organizations and treaties and facilitation of international information
National Intelligence Service	Gather and spread information related to terrorism; prepare the basic anti-terrorism management plan and operational guidelines; develop risk management capability; provide information, technology, equipment,; and establish an international anti-terrorism information assistance system
Customs Service	Develop measures to block the entry of terrorism-related material into the country including developing the technology to search for weapons and explosives
Others	Ministry of Environment (chemical terror), Ministry of Health and Welfare (biological terror), Ministry of Science and Technology (radiological terror), Korea Coast Guard (terror on the sea)

Source: Created by author using data from Jun suk, Park, “The study on the Response and the Strategy of New terrorism,” 한국공안행정학회보-제 34 호 [Korea Institute of Public Administration research paper No. 34] (February 2009), 108.

As shown in figure 4, at the top of this hierarchy is the National Security Council, headed by the president. Reporting to the National Security Council and the President is a National Anti-Terrorism Countermeasure Committee. The major responsibilities of this Committee are to evaluate the overall emergency response plan for terrorism-related events and to command and control operational activities once an event is underway.⁵³




Figure 4. Anti-terrorism-related organizations in Korea after 9.11.
 Source: Soon Joo Wang, Jin tae Choi, and Jeffrey Arnold, "Terrorism in South Korea,"
Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 18, no. 2 (2003), <http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu>
 (accessed 15 December 2010).

The government also established an Anti-Terrorism Center as a suborganization in charge of planning and coordinating counterterrorism activities, including detection, early warning, information collection, investigation, etc. There are also divisions of response to terrorism by areas - physical force, biological, chemical threats, radioactivity, cyber attack, and Local Anti-terrorism Countermeasure Committees for effective counterterrorism activities at cities, provinces, airports, and seaports. Divisions of response to terrorism within respective ministry-level organizations are provided with detailed responsibilities during terrorism-related events. However, the divisions are not standing organizations dedicated to the prevention of terrorism, but are ad hoc committees that are convened composed in the event of a terror attack.

In addition, a Joint Terror Task Force (JTTF) is established under the control of the National Anti-Terrorism Countermeasure Committee in order to strengthen field command and control systems for a terrorism event, when a specific type of terrorist event occurs. As shown in figure 5, the JTTF is the lead organization coordinating with the local anti-terrorism countermeasure committees and Terrorism Information Integration Center (TIIS). The TIIS was established at the headquarters of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) to integrate information. The revised National Antiterror Action Directive (Presidential Directive 47) established the TIIC with responsibility for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of potential intelligence on terrorist activities targeting Korea's interests.⁵⁴




Figure 5. Field command and control system for terrorism events in Korea after 9/11

Source: Jun suk, Park, “The study on the Response and the Strategy of New terrorism,” 한국공안행정학회보-제 34호 [Korea Institute of Public Administration research paper No. 34] (February 2009), 108.

The Field Headquarters, which is established depending on the location of the event, is the next level of JTF command and control. The Headquarters also includes six response teams: the Joint investigation Team, the HQ team, the negotiation team, the Initial Response Team, the support team, and the Rescue and Treatment Team.

The Joint investigation Team, which comprises experts from the military, police, and customs services, analyzes events for suspected terrorism, examines the results of the initial response, and collects forensic specimens.⁵⁵ The Response Team, comprising personnel from the military, police, fire, health, and customs services, establishes a secure perimeter via a police line, and performs emergency rescue and relief activities.⁵⁶ The Rescue and Treatment Team, comprising personnel from fire stations and health offices, performs on-site rescue, emergency treatment, and transport.⁵⁷

US Anti-Terrorism Programs

Legal Framework

After the 9/11 terror attack, the US enacted the USA PATRIOT Act in the 107th Congress in order to frame new responses to terrorism.⁵⁸ The Act defines terrorism as ~~activities~~ activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the US or of any state, that appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping, and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the US.”⁵⁹ It also gave law enforcement increased authority to investigate suspected terrorists, including enhanced surveillance procedures such as roving wiretaps. It also provided for strengthened controls on international money laundering and financing of terrorism, and it authorized disclosure of foreign intelligence information obtained in criminal investigations to Intelligence and national security officials.⁶⁰ In December 2004, the US passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA)⁶¹ and realigned organizations to cope with terrorism. The goal was to integrate intelligence matters related to national

security and overseas threats and to direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.⁶² Subsequently, certain clauses of the USA PATRIOT Act expired, some become permanent, and a few were extended. Such changes were part of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act,⁶³ which is a comprehensive law-enforcement tool against terrorism. It mandates effective anti-terrorism measures, seriously strengthening the investigative rights of intelligence agencies and justice institutions.

Organization and Leadership

After the 9/11 terror attack, the US took immediate measures to supplement relevant organizations and prevent a reoccurrence of such an attack. On 8 October 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order 13228 establishing the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) to lead, oversee, and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to protect the nation against domestic terrorism as part of a complex web of new organizational structures and relationships.⁶⁴

Figure 6 shows the US Command and control system to combat terrorism. It runs from the President through the National Security Council (NSC) and the Homeland Security Council (HSC).

The newly created HSC, at a level similar to that of the National Security Council, is the organization tasked to secure development and implementation of security measures and seek cooperation⁶⁵ among departments and organizations of the government. The Homeland Security Council (HSC) advises and assists the President in all matters relating to homeland security.




Figure 6. Command and control system to combat terrorism

Source: Created by author using data from Jun suk, Park, “The study on the Response and the Strategy of New terrorism,” 한국공안행정학회보-제 34호 [Korea Institute of Public Administration research paper No. 34] (February 2009), 99.

The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) mission is to develop government strategies and coordinate implementation of such strategies in order to protect the nation from terror threats and attacks.⁶⁶ To do this, the DHS carries out the functions shown in table 10. To perform duties embracing the establishment of strategies for counterterrorism from detection to response, the Office has integrated and coordinated

efforts among state and local governments, the FBI, CIA, DOD, and government authorities, private institutions, etc.⁶⁷

The Department of Homeland Security's major components include US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS), the Secret Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the Coast Guard.⁶⁸ The Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) supports citizens and serves as first responder to ensure that government and citizens work together to build, sustain, and improve national capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.⁶⁹

The responsibilities of organizations for response to terrorism are assigned as follows: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under the control of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is in charge of aviation terrorism; the Justice Department's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)⁷⁰ is the lead agency for domestic terrorism cases, controlling the National Security Branch (NSB)⁷¹ and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC); the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) collects information on terrorists and develops counter-terrorism equipment and technologies; the Department of Defense (DOD) supports special forces; and the Department of State's (DOS's) Office of the coordinator for counterterrorism is the lead agency for countering terrorism overseas.⁷²

Table 10. Functions of the Department of Homeland Security

Functions	Details
National Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Confirm validity of national strategy for detection, preparedness, prevention, protection, response, and relief . Carry out regular reviews in cooperation with the federal government organizations, local government, and private organizations in order to amend strategies
Detection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Encourage activities to obtain intelligence on terrorism through federal, state, and local governments, and private organizations . Prioritize foreign information and provide this information to the CIA and other information-collecting agencies . Coordinate efforts of departments involved in collect information and data . Prepare protocol and develop equipment to be used for detection using chemical, biological, and radiological agents(CBR) . Within the limits approved by law, share and exchange all required information with government organizations, local government, and private organizations
Preparedness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Review and assess all federal contingency plans related to terror threats and attacks . Coordinate simulation tests and implementation systems for domestic practice and assessment, and revise plan and activities of each organization and the persons concerned with training . Review vaccination policy and increase inventories of preventive medicine and hospital capacity . Coordinate federal government's aid for each related organization . Assess continuous development of the government plan against terrorism on a regular basis, and confirm the progress of preparedness and distribution of resources
Prevention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Exchange information concerning immigration, visa, and the shipping of cargo, and strengthen cooperation with relevant organizations to prevent transport of supplies by terrorists. . Expulsion of terrorist suspects outside the USA is available if deemed necessary . Coordinate and control efforts to obtain information on terror threats and attacks . Improve security capabilities at the borders, territorial seas, and sovereign airspace, etc.
Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Beef up protective measures for important facilities and infrastructure (energy production, power transmission, communication, and nuclear substances) . Protect important information owned by the public and individuals . Review distribution of adequate alert tools within major public and private facilities . Protect national transportation means (railways, expressways, ports, aircraft, etc.) . Protect domestic livestock and agriculture and make effort to supply water and food . Coordinate efforts to prevent importation of unauthorized supplies
Response and Relief	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Recover important infrastructures such as transportation, energy generation, electrical supply. . Recover important public and private information systems . Coordinate efforts with the National Economic Council to stabilize financial markets . Adjust federal plans and budgets to provide medical, monetary, and other aid for victims and their family members . Reduce the effect of a terror attack by blocking or removing dangerous material at the outset

Source : Created by author using data from Department of Homeland Security, <http://www.dhs.gov/files/counterterrorism.shtm> (accessed 22 February 2011).

Meanwhile, intelligence-related organizations have been reshaped in order to effectively unify the efforts of various units. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)⁷³ was established on the basis of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).⁷⁴ The DNI serves as the head of the Intelligence Community (IC), overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program (budget) and acting as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security.”⁷⁵ The DNI operates the open information centers to collect and disseminate information among other information agencies. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) gave the DNI the authority to coordinate intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the INR.⁷⁶ Also, the DNI controls three major sub-organizations: the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC),⁷⁷ the National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC),⁷⁸ and the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX).⁷⁹ The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is where members of various units cooperate in order to integrate and analyze all information on terrorism threats at home and abroad related to US national interests. In addition, NCTC develops, implements, and assesses effective tactics against terrorism in an attempt to achieve counterterrorism goals. The NCPC was established to help the United States counter threats caused by the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.⁸⁰ The NCIX was established to lead an integrated national counterintelligence⁸¹ effort against foreign intelligence threats to the United States.

UK Anti-Terrorism Programs

Legal Framework

The UK, in taking counterterrorism measures, enacted the Terrorism Act of 2000 on 20 July 2000, by arranging and integrating temporary terrorism legislation.⁸² This act defines terrorism as an action that falls within a subsection, which involves serious violence against a person, involves serious damage to property, endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, is designed to seriously interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system, the use or threat is designed to influence the government⁸³ or an international governmental organization or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause."⁸⁴

This act also defines terrorist as "someone who either is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism" or has committed one or more of a number of specific offences."⁸⁵ This act is an example of legislation centering on international terrorism that has advanced to a new phase of anti-terrorism from the former domestic terrorism.

In the wake of the 9/11 terror attack, in order to add legal countermeasures and to impose strong sanctions, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act was enacted on 14 December 2001.⁸⁶ It amended clauses concerning emigration and immigration, asset freezing, and procurement of communications data, etc., and it increased the authority of investigators. On 18 November 2004, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 was enacted, defining various contingencies including terrorism and emphasizing adequate responses

to manage a crises.⁸⁷ In addition, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was passed the following year, establishing controls concerning the use of certain communication devices and enabling individual relocation of terrorist suspects regardless of whether they are from the UK or foreign countries.⁸⁸ On 30 March 2006, the Terrorism Act 2006⁸⁹ was amended to comprehensively specify all the means that police, information agencies, and the courts can use to bring terrorists to justice. This act permitted detention of terrorist suspects for up to 28 days. Afterwards, on 11 June 2008, the UK's Lower House passed the Counterterrorism Act 2008,⁹⁰ intended to extend the detention period from 28 days to 42 days, but this clause was rejected by the Upper House on October 13, 2008, and the detention period remained at 28 days. The main contents of this Act took effect on 16 February 2009.⁹¹

Meanwhile, the UK counterterrorism strategy, known as CONTEST (counterterrorism strategy),⁹² focuses on the threat from international terrorism. The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.⁹³

Organization and Leadership

After the 9/11 attack in 2001, the UK extended the roles of the intelligence services and police for counterterrorism, established a Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC) in 2003, and established the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in 2007, thereby strengthening its ability to analyze information on terrorism and cooperate internationally in managing risks arising from terrorism.⁹⁴

Figure 7 shows that the Home Office's Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) has the responsibility for counter-terrorism.⁹⁵ It provides strategic direction to

the UK's work in countering international terrorism and protects the public by working with others to develop and deliver the UK's counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST.⁹⁶ A deputy chair, along with the Home Secretary under the Prime Minister, oversees the Cabinet Committee on National Security (NSID) bringing together security, intelligence and military authorities to hammer out National Security Strategy (NSS) and supervise the OSCT.⁹⁷

As depicted in figure 7, the OSCT coordinates all of the government's anti-terrorist operations in the field of Intelligence, Influence, Police, Financial Investigation, Protection of Critical Infrastructure, and Attack Response Organization.




Figure 7. UK's Anti-Terrorism Organization

Source: "Cornerstone of Britain's Anti-Terrorist Program," <http://www.intelligenceonline.com/c/illustrations/io/pdf/INT591%209.pdf> (accessed 11 March 2011).

Regarding intelligence, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC), created in 2003, dovetails with and assesses intelligence from 16 agencies. The Research, Information and Communication Unit (RICU) is a strategic communications unit aimed at influencing the public by disseminating anti-terrorism information. The police operate the counterterrorism network and coordinate Counter-Terrorism Units and Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Units. Policemen are also deployed outside the UK through a web of Counter-Terrorism and Extremism Liaison Officers (CTRELOs).⁹⁸ Financial investigations are done by the National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit (NTFIU). Critical infrastructure is protected by the Center for Protection of National Infrastructure, the UK Border Agency (UKBA), and the National Counterterrorism Security Office.⁹⁹

Implications

The USA PATRIOT Act strengthened legal authority to investigate suspected terrorists, enhanced controls to preclude the financing of terrorism, and authorized disclosure of foreign intelligence information obtained in criminal investigations to intelligence and national security officials.¹⁰⁰ The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act enacted in December 2004 integrated intelligence matters related to national security and overseas threats and supported implementation of the National Intelligence Program.¹⁰¹ The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 31 December 2005, strengthened the investigation rights of intelligence agencies and justice institutions.¹⁰²

After 9/11, the US established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)¹⁰³ in order to develop government strategies and to coordinate implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to protect the nation against domestic terrorism. Also,

the Homeland Security Council (HSC), at a level equal to that of the National Security Council, was established to secure development and implementation of security measures and seek cooperation among departments and organizations of the government.

In addition, the DNI position was established on the basis of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) in order to effectively unify the efforts of various units.¹⁰⁴ The director serves as the head of the Intelligence Community (IC), advising the president, the NSC, and the HSC. He also contributes to rapid and correct decision making by promoting unity of effort and integrating information efforts.

The UK enacted the Terrorism Act of 2000 on July 20, 2000, by integrating temporary terrorism legislation.¹⁰⁵ The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 strengthened controls to prevent the malicious use of communication devices and provided for individual relocation of terrorist suspects. Afterwards, the Terrorism Act 2006, amended on 30 March 2006, specified all the means that police, information agencies, and the court could use comprehensively to cope with terrorism and bring terrorists to justice. In addition, the Counterterrorism Act 2008 amended and added details necessary to deter terrorism at home and abroad.

The UK has strengthened the roles of intelligence services and police for counterterrorism. As explained previously, it established the JTAC in 2003.¹⁰⁶ It also established the OSCT in 2007,¹⁰⁷ thereby strengthening its ability to analyze information on terrorism and cooperate internationally in managing risks arising from terrorism.

The Korean government formulated in January of 1982 the National Guidelines for Counterterrorism Measures. This became the foundation for later efforts to efficiently deal with possible terrorist activities by North Korean and global terrorist networks.¹⁰⁸

After the 9/11 attacks, the original guidelines were amended to better respond to terrorist events in 2005.¹⁰⁹

However, the guidelines still lack a solid legal basis for government-led efforts to curb terrorism. So, it is necessary for Korea to enact and promulgate anti-terrorism law. Further, Korea's comprehensive anti-terrorism act, like those in the US and UK, should be established so as to meet the current anti-terror conditions of Korea and clarify the concept of terror and anti-terror activities. However, the bill has been pending in the National Assembly for years waiting to be enacted.

For comparison of organizations, Korea's national anti-terrorism committee is equivalent to the US Homeland Security Council (HSC) or the UK's Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS). However, Korea's anti-terrorism center under the National Intelligence Service (NIS) is not sufficient to play a role comparable to the US's Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the UK's Office for Security and Counterterrorism (OSCT). Most of all, in the US and UK, these agencies integrate major terrorism-related functions into one organization, which leads to rapid decisions and responses through unity of command. To improve intelligence organization, the Terrorism Intelligence Integration Center as a suborganization under the National Intelligence Service (NIS) needs to be strengthened to make it an adequate intelligence organization comparable to the US's Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the UK's Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC).

Therefore, given that Korea is vulnerable to potential threats at home and abroad, the nation needs to establish an organization comparable to the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the UK Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism

(OSCT) to integrate the efforts of all terrorism-related organizations. Also, like the US office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the UK Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC), Korea's terrorism-related national intelligence organization should be separated from the National Intelligence Service (NIS), and the function of the current terrorism intelligence integration center (TIIC) within the National Intelligence Service (NIS) should be strengthened. The establishment of such a terrorism-related organization could contribute to prevention of terrorism and a rapid command and control system through the unity of effort and the unity of command.

Summary

So far, the three sources of terrorism Korea may face are presented to answer the first secondary research question of "What is the state of the Korean government's anti-terrorism program?" The anti-terrorism efforts of Korea, the US and the UK have also been analyzed on the basis of legal framework, organization, and leadership. By comparing the programs and efforts of the three respective countries, this research provides implications for Korea from the other two nations, answering the secondary research question of "How do the current Korean anti-terrorism programs compare to those in the US and UK?" In addition, it answers the primary research question of this thesis: "How should the current Korean anti-terrorism program be improved?" Furthermore, it identifies problems with Korea's current anti-terrorism programs.

¹UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Travel and living abroad: South Korea," <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/asia-oceania/republic-korea> (accessed 25 February 2011).

²U.S. Department of State, "Country specific information: Yemen," http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1061.html (accessed 10 March 2011).

³Jhe Seong-Ho, “Anti-terrorism Law Needs to Be Enacted Immediately,” http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design1/layout/content_print.asp?group_id=25 (accessed 16 March 2011).

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Seven Kim, “Issues For Engagement : Asian Perspective on Transnational Security Challenges: Republic of Korea: Meeting the Challenge of Transnational Threats in the twenty-first Century” (Washington, DC: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. 2010), 107.

⁷In 1958, North Korea carried out its first terrorist attack against South Korea, the hijacking of a South Korean commercial flight from Seoul to Pusan; this act marked a major policy shift in North Korea from conventional war to terrorism. J. S. Bermudez, *Terrorism-North Korean Connection* (London: Crane Russak. 1990), 25-43. During the 1960s, terrorist attacks by North Korea became a regular occurrence in South Korea, as evidenced by frequent kidnappings of fishermen. By 1968, South Korea was undergoing steady economic development under President Chunghee Park. In an attempt to destabilize the country and murder its leadership, North Korea carried out a full-scale terrorist assault on the Blue House in Seoul, the residence of the South Korean President, although it turned out to be failure. Soon Joo Wang, Jin tae Choi, and Jeffrey Arnold, “Terrorism in South Korea,” *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine* 18, no. 2 (2003), <http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu> (accessed 15 December 2010). During the 1970s, rapid economic development led to political and social gains in South Korea, dubbed the “Miracle of the Han River.” North Korea responded to these advances with two more assassination attempts on President Park, both unsuccessful. These assassination attempts corresponded to the international trend of terrorist attacks against political officers at the time, as evidenced by more frequent attacks against diplomats and the terrorist occupations of embassies. R. Clutterbuck, *Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion: The Response* (London: Macmillan. 1987), 191-192. During the 1980s, the South Korean economy continued to grow, prompting North Korea to plan two further assassination attempts against President Doohwan Chun during international visits in 1981 and 1983. As a result of its prospering economy and diplomatic gains, South Korea was invited by the international community to host the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games. North Korea responded to the growing international stature of South Korea with even larger and more lethal terrorist attacks, including the 1986 Kimpo International Airport bombing and the 1987 bombing of Korean Airlines Flight 858. This escalation in the magnitude of terrorist attacks against South Korea paralleled the worldwide increase in terrorist attacks during this decade. Bruce Hoffman, *Terrorism Trends and Prospect* (Santa Monica: RAND. 1999), 12-13; Soon Joo Wang, Jin tae Choi, and Jeffrey Arnold, “Terrorism in South Korea,” *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine* 18, no. 2 (2003), <http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu> (accessed 15 December 2010).

⁸Hannah Fisher, “North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007,” *CRS Report for Congress*, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30004.pdf> (April 2007), 19 (accessed 18 March 2011). The NLL was drawn (“unilaterally,” according to Pyongyang) by the United Nations Command (UNC) after the Korean War to prevent armed clashes between the two Koreas. While North Korea never accepted its validity, the NLL as the de facto maritime border was honored by the North until it decided to force the issue in June 1999. Pyongyang reportedly violated the NLL 37 times from 1994 to 1997 and 35 times in 1998, more in the seasonal crab-catching months of May to September.

⁹Kim So-hyun, “North Korea may continue provocations in 2011,” <http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20101231000545> (accessed 10 March 2011).

¹⁰In this thesis, Republic of Korea ship Cheonan sinking occurred in 26 March, 2010 is not considered terrorist attack. The U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said, “North Korea’s torpedoing of a South Korean warship is a violation of the armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War . . . and “The sinking the Cheonan is not an act of international terrorism and . . . It was provocative action, but one taken by the military of a state against the military of another state.” (Hwang Doo hyong, “Cheonan’s sinking does not ensure relisting N. Korea as state terror sponsor: State Dept,” <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2010/06/29/0200000000AEN20100629000100315.HTML> (accessed 11 March 2011).)

¹¹Soon Joo Wang, Jin tae Choi, and Jeffrey Arnold, “Terrorism in South Korea,” *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine* 18, no. 2 (2003), <http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu> (accessed 15 December 2010).

¹²Ibid.

¹³최진태, “테러시대 한국의 대테러발전방안[The issue development for Korean anti-terrorism in the era of terrorism], (Seoul: CFE Report, 17 September 2007), cfe.org/mboard/bbsDetail.asp?cid=mn2006122120174&idx=9045 (accessed 18 September 2010).

¹⁴Terrorism Information Integration Center, <http://www.tiic.go.kr/service/info/damagecase.do> (accessed 27 February 2011).

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Kang Hyun-kyung, “Counter-terrorism drive still slow in Korea,” *Korea Times*, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/02/116_69400.html (accessed 10 March 2011).

¹⁷Suh-Jung Min, “Terrorists cite religion as basis for a beheading,” <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2441923> (accessed 15 February 2011).

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹The Korea Times, “Korea in 2007 From A to Z,” http://m.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2011/01/236_16108.html (accessed 10 March 2011).

²⁰Kang Hyun-kyung, “Counter-terrorism drive still slow in Korea.” “On 18 March 2009, 3 days after an 18-year-old suicide bomber killed four Korean tourists in Shibam, Yemen, a Korean high-ranking government official escaped unhurt after an al-Qaida suicide bomb attack on a car carrying him on a highway to the airport.” “After the second attack, al-Qaida claimed responsibility for the two incidents, commenting their motives were to expel the infidels from the Arabian Peninsula” and to make Korea face the consequences of its joining the U.S.-led alliance to fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq.” “On 2 November 2010, suspected al-Qaida militants blew up an oil pipeline run by Korea National Oil Corp in Yemen.”

²¹Terrorism Information Integration Center, <http://www.tiic.go.kr/service/info/damagecase.do> (accessed 27 February 2011).

²²Ibid.

²³Kang Hyun-kyung, “Counter-terrorism drive still slow in Korea.”

²⁴Department of State, “Chronology of Significant International Terrorist Incidents,” <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/33890.pdf> (accessed 12 March 2011)

²⁵Associated Press, “Suspected al-Qaeda militants blow up oil pipeline in Yemen,” <http://www.nwcn.com/news/world/106529898.html> (accessed 10 March 2011).

²⁶Robert Koehler, “Korean soldier killed in Afghanistan,” <http://www.rjkoehler.com/2007/02/28/korean-soldier-killed-in-afghanistan> (accessed 11 March 2011).

²⁷Kang Hyun-kyung, “Counter-terrorism drive still slow in Korea.”

²⁸Ministry of National Defense, “The Korean forces to protect members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan, named “Ashena” unit embarked on its full mission on July 2010,” http://www.mnd.go.kr/mndEng_2009/WhatsNew/RecentNews/ (accessed 11 March 2011).

²⁹Mooyoung Lee, “Navy storms hijacked ship, rescues,” <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2931699> (accessed 12 March 2011).

³⁰Terrorism Information Integration Center, <http://www.tiic.go.kr/service/info/damagecase.do> (accessed 27 February 2011).

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Mooyoung Lee, “Navy storms hijacked ship, rescues.”

³⁵Steve S. Sin, “Homegrown Terrorism: South Korea’s Next Challenge against Terrorism,” *Asian Affairs*, no. 29 (Winter 2008/2009).

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷ Korea Migrant Center, <http://www.migrantok.org/english/portal.php> (accessed 12 March 2011).

³⁸Nathan Schwartzman, “Foreigner Hate Groups Growing on Korean Internet Nathan Schwartzman,” <http://asiancorrespondent.com/23022/anti-foreigner-hate-groups-growing-on-korean-internet/#> (accessed 8 March 2011).

³⁹Kim Ji-hyun, “S. Korea far from prepared for NK defectors; Number of North Koreans defecting to the South expected to reach 20,000 by October,” <http://www.asia-newsnet.net/home/news.php?id=13002&sec=1> (accessed 7 March 2011).

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹구본학, 이규열, 차규현, “뉴테러리즘에 대한 군의 대응책 [The ROK Armed forces’ Measures against New Terrorism], 한국 전략문제연구소 [Korea Research Institute for Strategy], abstract.

⁴²Korea National Intelligence Service—Counterterrorism, <http://eng.nis.go.kr/docs/terror/cta.html> (accessed 8 March 2011).

⁴³Seven Kim, “Issues For Engagement: Asian Perspective on Transnational Security Challenges: Republic of Korea: Meeting the Challenge of Transnational Threats in the twenty-first Century” (Washington, DC: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2010), 109.

⁴⁴국가대테러활동지침대통령훈령 제 47 호 [Presidential Directive No. 47], <http://www.tiic.go.kr> (accessed 20 September 2010)

⁴⁵Kim, “Issues For Engagement,” 109.

⁴⁶원정훈, “한국의 테러대응체제에 관한 연구[Reserch on the Korean anti-terrorism system], (Yongin, Korea: 용인대 대학원. 2008), 17-19.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Committee members included Minister of Public Administration and Safety, the Minister of Diplomacy and Commerce, Minister of Defense, Minister of Land, Transportation and Maritime Affairs, Director of National Intelligence Service, Director of Custom Service, Minister of Justice, and other key personnel appointed by the Prime Minister.

⁵²US Department of State, “Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview,” <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64336.htm> (accessed 7 March 2011).

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Soon Joo Wang, Jin tae Choi, and Jeffrey Arnold, “Terrorism in South Korea,” *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine* 18, no. 2 (2003), <http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu> (accessed 15 December 2010).

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act (the Act) in response to the terrorists’ attacks of September 11, 2001. The Act gives federal officials greater authority to track and intercept communications, both for law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering purposes. It vests the Secretary of the Treasury with regulatory powers to combat corruption of U.S. financial institutions for foreign money laundering purposes. It seeks to further close our borders to foreign terrorists and to detain and remove those within our borders. Charles Doyle, *USA PATRIOT Act: A Sketch* (Washington, DC: CRS Report for Congress, 18 April 2002), <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21203.pdf> (accessed 8 December 2010).

⁵⁹US Department of Homeland Security, “107th Congress of the United States of America: Homeland Security Act of 2002, HR 5005-7,” January 2002, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,NATLEGBOD,USA,3deba3364,0.html> (accessed 7 March 2011).

⁶⁰Rensselaer Lee and Raphael Perl, "Terrorism, the Future, and US Foreign Policy," *Federation of American Scientists*, www.fas.org/irp/crs/IB95112 (accessed 27 August 2010).

⁶¹Todd B. Tatelman, *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: National Standards for Drivers' Licenses, Social Security Cards, and Birth Certificates* (Washington, DC: CRS Report for Congress, January 2005), <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32722.pdf> (accessed 27 August 2010). The final legislation that was approved by Congress on December 8, 2004, and signed by the President on December 17, 2004. the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) recommended that the federal government set national standards for the issuance of identification documents including drivers' licenses, social security cards, and birth certificates. The Commission noted that identification fraud is no longer simply a matter of theft, but now complicates the government's ability to adequately ensure public safety at vulnerable facilities including airport terminals, train stations, bus stations, and other entry points.

⁶²윤태영 [Taeyoung, Yoon], "9.11 이후 미국의 대테러 정책 [US Counterterrorism after 9/11 Terror: Organization, Policy and, Implications for South]," (세계지역연구논총 26집 3호 [world Regional Research], no. 26-3 (2008), 454.

⁶³Brian T. Yeh, *USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005: A Legal Analysis* (Washington, DC: CRS Report for Congress, 21 December 2006), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33332.pdf> (accessed 7 September 2010). Several sections of the USA PATRIOT Act and one section of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 were originally scheduled to expire on December 31, 2005. In July 2005, both Houses approved USA PATRIOT reauthorization acts, H.R. 3199 and S. 1389.

⁶⁴Rensselaer Lee and Raphael Perl, *Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: CRS Report for Congress 25 February 2002), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9040.pdf> (accessed 9 March 2011); Homeland Security, "About," <http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/> (accessed 7 March 2011). Homeland Security leverages resources within federal, state, and local governments, coordinating the transition of multiple agencies and programs into a single, integrated agency focused on protecting the American people and their homeland. More than 87,000 different governmental jurisdictions at the federal, state, and local level have homeland security responsibilities. The comprehensive national strategy seeks to develop a complementary system connecting all levels of government without duplicating effort. Homeland Security is truly a national mission." Department Components are as follows: the Directorate for National Protection and Programs; the Directorate for Science and Technology; the Directorate for Management; the Office of Policy; the Office of Health Affairs; the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning; the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office; the Transportation Security Administration (TSA); United States

Customs and Border Protection (CBP); United States Citizenship and Immigration Services; United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); the United States Coast Guard; the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); the United States Secret Service (USSS).

⁶⁵Margi Williams, “Primary Functions of Homeland Security,” http://www.ehow.com/list_6008165_primary-functions-homeland-security.html (accessed 4 December 2010). “DHS coordinates the work of more than 87,000 federal, state, and local governmental jurisdictions into one department with 16 major divisions.”

⁶⁶U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/> (accessed 7 March 2011)

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸The Senate of the United States U.S. 107th Congress, “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT),” <http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.html> (accessed 21 March 2011).

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/tsc/tsc_faqs (accessed 8 March 2011). “Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 6, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) now provides “one-stop shopping” so that every government screener is using the same terrorist watchlist—whether it is an airport screener, an embassy official issuing visas overseas, or a state or local law enforcement officer on the street. The TSC allows government agencies to run name checks against the same comprehensive list with the most accurate, up-to-date information about known and suspected terrorists.”

⁷¹The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb> (accessed 8 March 2011). “The National Security Branch (NSB)—created in September 2005 in response to a presidential directive—combines the missions and resources of our counterterrorism, counterintelligence, weapons of mass destruction, and intelligence elements under the leadership of a senior Bureau official. It also includes the Terrorist Screening Center, which plays a crucial role in providing actionable intelligence to state and local law enforcement.”

⁷²US Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16570.htm> (accessed 9 March 2011). “The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) coordinates and supports the development and implementation of all U.S. Government policies and programs aimed at countering terrorism overseas. The mission of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) is to develop and lead a worldwide effort to combat terrorism using all the instruments of statecraft: diplomacy, economic power,

intelligence, law enforcement, and military. S/CT provides foreign policy oversight and guidance to all U.S. Government international counterterrorism activities. The predecessor organization to S/CT was the Office for Combating Terrorism, created in 1972 upon the recommendation of a special committee appointed by President Richard Nixon following the Munich Olympics terrorist attack. The committee determined that an office was needed within the Department of State to provide day-to-day counterterrorism coordination and to develop policy initiatives and responses for the U.S. Government. The Office for Combating Terrorism became the Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism in 1985, and the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in 1989. In 1994, Congress officially mandated the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in Public Law 103-236 [H.R. 2333].”

⁷³Office of the Director of National Intelligence, http://www.dni.gov/faq_about.htm (accessed 9 March 2011). —The ODNI began operations on April 22, 2005. However, the idea of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) dates to 1955 when a blue-ribbon study commissioned by Congress recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence should employ a deputy to run the CIA so that the director could focus on coordinating the overall intelligence effort. This notion emerged as a consistent theme in many subsequent studies of the Intelligence Community commissioned by both the legislative and executive branches over the next five decades. It was the attacks of September 11, 2001, however, that finally moved forward the longstanding call for major intelligence reform and the creation of a Director of National Intelligence. The report of the 9/11 Commission in July 2004 proposed sweeping change in the Intelligence Community, including the creation of a National Intelligence Director. President Bush signed four Executive Orders in August 2004, which strengthened and reformed the Intelligence Community as much as possible without legislation. In Congress, both the House and Senate passed bills with major amendments to the National Security Act of 1947. Intense negotiations to reconcile the two bills ultimately led to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which President George W. Bush signed into law on December 17.”

⁷⁴Office of the Director of National Intelligence, http://www.dni.gov/faq_about.htm (accessed 9 March 2011). Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) was approved by the Senate (bill 89-2), and President George W. Bush signed the Act on December 17, 2004, making it law. This act set into motion the reform of the US Intelligence Community. The Act is divided into eight Titles, as follows: —Reform of the intelligence community” ; —Federal Bureau of Investigation” ; —Security clearances” ; —Transportation security” ; —Border protection, immigration, and visa matters” ; —Terrorism prevention” ; —Implementation of 9/11 Commission recommendations” ; —Other matters.” The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 also established the National Counterterrorism Center, National Counterproliferation Center, National Intelligence Centers, and Joint Intelligence Community Council—all with the single mission of protecting the United States of America's people and interests from enemies both at home and abroad.

⁷⁵Office of the Director of National Intelligence, http://www.dni.gov/faq_about.htm (accessed 9 March 2011).

⁷⁶Todd B. Tatelman, *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: National Standards for Drivers' Licenses, Social Security Cards, and Birth Certificates* (Washington, DC: CRS Report for Congress, 6 January 2005), <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32722.pdf> (accessed 28 August, 2010). The final legislation that was approved by Congress on 8 December 2004, and signed by the President on 17 December 2004. the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) recommended that the federal government set national standards for the issuance of identification documents including drivers' licenses, social security cards, and birth certificates. The Commission noted that identification fraud is no longer simply a matter of theft, but now complicates the government's ability to adequately ensure public safety at vulnerable facilities including airport terminals, train stations, bus stations, and other entry points.

⁷⁷National Counterterrorism Center, http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html (accessed 10 March 2011). –The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established by Presidential Executive Order 13354 in August 2004, and codified by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). NCTC's mission statement succinctly summarizes its key responsibilities and value-added contributions: –Lead our nation's effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.” NCTC is staffed by more than 500 personnel from more than 16 departments and agencies.”

⁷⁸National Counterproliferation Center, <http://ncpc.dni.gov/>(accessed 10 March 2011). –The National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) was founded on 21 November 2005 in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. NCPC works with the Intelligence Community to identify critical holes in our WMD knowledge—resulting from shortfalls in collection, analysis or exploitation - and then develop solutions to reduce or close these gaps. In conjunction with the policy community, NCPC also helps to identify long-term proliferation threats and requirements, and develops strategies to ensure that the Intelligence Community is positioned to address these over-the-horizon threats.”

⁷⁹The National Counterintelligence Executive, <http://www.ncix.gov/about.html> (accessed 10 March 2011).

⁸⁰The National Counterproliferation Center, <http://ncpc.dni.gov/>(accessed 10 March 2011).

⁸¹National Counterintelligence Executive, <http://www.ncix.gov/about.html> (accessed 10 March 2011). –As defined in Executive Order 12333, Counterintelligence is information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations

conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities.”

⁸²The National Archives, <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/> introduction (accessed 16 February 2011). Terrorism Act 2000 is an Act to make provision about terrorism; and to make temporary provision for Northern Ireland about the prosecution and punishment of certain offences, the preservation of peace and the maintenance of order.

⁸³The National Archives, <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/> introduction (accessed 16 February 2011). –“The government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom.”

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Hossein Zahir, Birnberg Peirce and Partners Matthew Ryder, and Matrix Chambers, –“The Terrorism Act 2000: Know Your Right-A Practical Guide,” http://www.oocities.org/mutmainaa/active/know_rights_2000.html (accessed 16 February 2011).

⁸⁶The National Archives, <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga> (accessed 18 February 2011). –“An Act to amend the Terrorism Act 2000; to make further provision about terrorism and security; to provide for the freezing of assets; to make provision about immigration and asylum; to amend or extend the criminal law and powers for preventing crime and enforcing that law; to make provision about the control of pathogens and toxins; to provide for the retention of communications data; to provide for implementation of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union; and for connected purposes.”

⁸⁷Ibid. –“An Act to make provision about civil contingencies. Neither strand had seen any significant amendments in a number of years and, unfortunately, were not able to cope in the event of domestic threats to services—such as the fuel protests of 2000—or natural threats like the mass flooding in 2000 and the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in 2001.”

⁸⁸Ibid. –“An Act to provide for the making against individuals involved in terrorism-related activity of orders imposing obligations on them for purposes connected with preventing or restricting their further involvement in such activity; to make provision about appeals and other proceedings relating to such orders; and for connected purposes.”

⁸⁹Ibid. –“An Act to make provision for and about offences relating to conduct carried out, or capable of being carried out, for purposes connected with terrorism; to amend enactments relating to terrorism; to amend the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000; and for connected purposes.”

⁹⁰Ibid. —An Act to confer further powers to gather and share information for counter-terrorism and other purposes; to make further provision about the detention and questioning of terrorist suspects and the prosecution and punishment of terrorist offences; to impose notification requirements on persons convicted of such offences; to confer further powers to act against terrorist financing, money laundering and certain other activities; to provide for review of certain Treasury decisions and about evidence in, and other matters connected with, review proceedings; to amend the law relating to inquiries; to amend the definition of “terrorism”; to amend the enactments relating to terrorist offences, control orders and the forfeiture of terrorist cash; to provide for recovering the costs of policing at certain gas facilities; to amend provisions about the appointment of special advocates in Northern Ireland; and for connected purposes.”

⁹¹Cornerstone of Britain’s anti-terrorism program, <http://www.intelligenceonline.com/c/illustrations/io/pdf/INT591%209.pdf> (accessed 18 February 2011). First, suspected terrorists could be registered and their movements could be observed. Their overseas trips could be restricted in advance. Second, individual fingerprints, DNA, and other samples could be obtained and used for investigation. Under the rule of reasonable judgment, houses of suspects could be forcibly searched by force. Third, information collection was limited to police, the military, and agents of information agencies engaged in counter-terrorism activities, and search rules being violated could be subject to a maximum 10-year imprisonment.

⁹²The Rt. Hon. Paul Murphy, *Intelligence and Security Committee Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005* (London: UK Intelligence and Security Committee, 2005), 5. Strategies of counterterrorism consist of the 4Ps based on four sub-strategies. They propose performance of the core duties as specified below: First, the “Pursue” strategy is the top priority task of the UK government to prevent attacks from terrorists. The goal is to detect and investigate terrorist networks and prevent their activities, which will lead to a decrease in the threats from terrorists’ targeting UK national interests at home and abroad (HM Government, 2009: 60). Second, the “Prevent” strategy emphasizes not only preventing attacks but also removing incentives for terrorism and support for violent extremism. This strategy seeks to understand the causes of extremism and find adequate responses (HM Government, 2009: 80). Third, the “Protect” strategy is to shield the UK’s national interests at home and abroad from attack. Here, the focus is on the national core infrastructure, densely-populated areas, transportation systems, border protection, and protection against threats arising from the misuse of dangerous substances (HM Government, 2009: 104). Fourth, the “Prepare” strategy seeks to mitigate the effects of an attack if it cannot be prevented. For this aim, this strategy focuses on countermeasures against an ongoing attack and recovery measures afterward (HM Government, 2009: 118). “Pursue” and “Prevent” emphasizing the reducing the threat of terrorism, and “Protect” and “Prepare” focus on decreasing the UK’s vulnerability to attack (HM Government, 2009: 53).

⁹³UK counterterrorism strategy, <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/uk-counter-terrorism-strat/> (accessed 17 February 2011).

⁹⁴Cornerstone of Britain's anti-terrorism program, <http://www.intelligenceonline.com/c/illustrations/io/pdf/INT591%209.pdf> (accessed 18 February 2011). The new anti-terrorism strategy underscored the central role played by the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism(OSCT).

⁹⁵UK counterterrorism strategy, <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counterterrorism/OSCT/> (accessed 23 February 2011). The OSCT's main responsibilities are to: support the Home Secretary and other Ministers in directing and implementing CONTEST—the government's strategy for countering international terrorism; deliver aspects of this strategy directly, through legislation, guidance and funding ; set the strategic government response to terrorism-related crises through the Cabinet Office briefing rooms (COBR) mechanism; manage the Home Secretary's statutory relationship with the Security Service; manage the Olympic and Paralympic safety and security programme for the London 2012 Games.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Cornerstone of Britain's anti-terrorism program.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Rensselaer Lee and Raphael Perl, *Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: CRS Report for Congress, 25 February 2002), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9040.pdf> (accessed 28 August, 2010).

¹⁰¹윤태영[Taeyoung, Yoon], 「9.11 이후 미국의 대테러 정책 [US Counterterrorism after 9/11 Terror: Organization, Policy and, Implications for South],」 (세계지역연구논총 26집 3호 [world Regional Research], no. 26-3. 2008), 454.

¹⁰²Brian T. Yeh, *USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005: A Legal Analysis* (Washington, DC: CRS Report for Congress, 21 December 2006), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33332.pdf> (accessed 28 August 2010). Several sections of the USA PATRIOT Act and one section of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 were originally scheduled to expire on December 31, 2005. In July 2005, both Houses approved USA PATRIOT reauthorization acts, H.R. 3199 and S. 1389.

¹⁰³Department of Homeland Security, <http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/> (accessed 8 March 2011). Homeland Security leverages resources within federal, state, and local governments, coordinating the transition of multiple agencies and programs into a single, integrated agency focused on protecting the American people and their homeland. More than 87,000 different governmental jurisdictions at the federal, state, and local level have homeland security responsibilities. The comprehensive national strategy

seeks to develop a complementary system connecting all levels of government without duplicating effort. Homeland Security is truly a national mission.” Department Components are as follows: the Directorate for National Protection and Programs; the Directorate for Science and Technology; the Directorate for Management; the Office of Policy; the Office of Health Affairs; the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning; the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office; the Transportation Security Administration (TSA); United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP); United States Citizenship and Immigration Services; United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); the United States Coast Guard; the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); the United States Secret Service (USSS).

¹⁰⁴Director of National Intelligence, http://www.dni.gov/faq_about.htm (accessed 9 March 2011). —The ODNI began operations on 22 April 2005. However, the idea of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) dates to 1955 when a blue-ribbon study commissioned by Congress recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence should employ a deputy to run the CIA so that the director could focus on coordinating the overall intelligence effort. This notion emerged as a consistent theme in many subsequent studies of the Intelligence Community commissioned by both the legislative and executive branches over the next five decades. It was the attacks of 11 September 2001, however, that finally moved forward the longstanding call for major intelligence reform and the creation of a Director of National Intelligence. The report of the 9/11 Commission in July 2004 proposed sweeping change in the Intelligence Community, including the creation of a National Intelligence Director. President Bush signed four Executive Orders in August 2004, which strengthened and reformed the Intelligence Community as much as possible without legislation. In Congress, both the House and Senate passed bills with major amendments to the National Security Act of 1947. Intense negotiations to reconcile the two bills ultimately led to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which President George W. Bush signed into law on December 17.”

¹⁰⁵The National Archives, <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1> (accessed 17 February 2011).

¹⁰⁶The Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC) integrates and assesses intelligence from 16 agencies.

¹⁰⁷The Office for Security and Counterterrorism (OSCT) takes charge of all operations in the case of a terrorist attack and manages the National Counterterrorism Exercise Program to prepare for a terrorist attack.

¹⁰⁸National Intelligence Service, <http://eng.nis.go.kr/docs/terror/cta.html> (accessed 8 March 2011).

¹⁰⁹Kim, —Issues For Engagement,” 109.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Given that terrorism has changed and is developing in new directions, it is most important to come up with anti-terrorism measures that can stay ahead of these changes. It is crucial to not only detect and prevent terror attacks , but also to take direct measures to root out and incapacitate terrorist groups. Widely used measures include locating and detaining terrorists and terrorist groups in order to reduce direct threats, to blocking the financing of terrorist activities, and removing bases or shelters for terrorists. Another measure is to make terrorists abandon attacks by reducing their possibilities of success and increasing the risks associated with their activities. This involves strengthening the security of potential terrorist targets. In addition, having the legal means to arrest terrorist suspects or block their entry into the country can be an important tool. Preventive measures include intensifying security for facilities in risky areas or persons who might be targeted, and strengthening the collection of information on terrorism. At present, in order to prevent terrorism, enhancing activities to obtain information on potential terrorism is essential. Therefore, information-gathering activities are very important for identifying terrorist groups, arresting terrorist suspects before they act, banning their entry into the country, blocking funding and the supplies of weapons, and breaking international terror networks. Lastly, in an effort to effectively respond to international terrorist groups, global-level cooperation and the sharing of information is absolutely essential.

Recommendations

With Korea tragically divided due to ideology, South Korea has been a target of North Korean terrorism, and the nation is not safe from attacks by international terrorist groups. Moreover, homegrown terrorists are emerging as threats in Korean society.

Despite such dangerous circumstances, Korea has not established a system for dealing with terrorism that matches those of the US and the UK. This is exemplified by the fact that the majority of Korea's anti-terrorism policy relies on the "47th Presidential Directive" declared in 1982 and amended in 2005. This directive is merely an administrative principle and can only provide the framework for anti-terrorism activities. It lacks the legal standing to be an effective anti-terrorism tool. Therefore, a first step for the Korean government is to pass a comprehensive anti-terrorism act in order to address these weaknesses. It should establish a terrorism-related government organization like the US's DHS or the UK's OSCT so that the organization can integrate all of Korea's anti-terrorism efforts. Steps must also be taken to prevent terrorism by stating specific measures that the government has taken, which will help to relieve the worries of citizens. To systematically deal with these issues, a legal framework must be put in place for both terrorism deterrence and the management of consequences.

Details of an anti-terrorism act also should include procedures to identify terrorism suspects at home and abroad in order to detect potential attacks, improve surveillance methods, broaden the scope and conditions for interception of communications, define a detention period, refine methods to prevent funding of terrorist groups, commit resources for personnel and equipment, and create an action plan in case of an attack. Those in Korea who object to new laws for interception and detention

recognize the need to prevent terrorism, but they emphasize that these actions may conflict with the guarantees of human rights. Measures taken by the government that prevent, suppress, investigate, and punish terrorism have the possibility of infringing on human rights. However, the most important responsibility of a nation is to protect the life, safety, and properties of its people, and therefore an anti-terrorism act must include interception and detention conditions. An act that aims to protect people from terrorism is not a law intended to infringe on human rights, but rather to protect human rights. These days, the interception of wire and wireless communication is a useful surveillance tool to detect signs of terrorism. Terrorist groups have prepared and implemented terror attacks with the support of a global network, and therefore interception aimed at communication tools such as cellular phones and the internet is deemed inevitable in order to collect information on terrorism and trace terrorists. Therefore, a Protection of Communications Secrets Act should be passed in order to prevent terrorism.

The second step that needs to be taken is to establish a systematic apparatus within the government that will ensure efficient counterterrorism action. This organization would need to show strong leadership and control and integrate current counterterrorism organizations that previously acted separately. Also, there should be a comprehensive anti-terrorism organization that could prevent terror attacks and build organic cooperation among multiple agencies. The US and the UK put the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office for Security and Counterterrorism (OSCT) exclusively in charge of anti-terrorism duties, which had not previously been handled by a single organization. If a single organization could be legally designated as the final authority, cooperation with related agencies could be arranged to wage a more effective

war on terrorism. Therefore, to create within the Korean government an effective administrative anti-terrorism organization, core agencies that are responsible for anti-terrorism must be restructured and fully prepared to address today's domestic situation. The Korean government must endeavor to concentrate anti-terrorism-related operations that are currently scattered among numerous ministries, divisions, and agencies into one central organization that would control and coordinate future anti-terrorism operations. In addition, for a rapid and efficient confrontation against terrorist threats, South Korean officials need to display strong leadership and enforce strict regulations. In addition, the present makeshift anti-terrorism organization must be made to operate at all times, other practical agencies must be created to give direct support to this organization, and a program must ensue to cope with a variety of novel situations.

Third, a unified intelligence organization should be established or the current organization should be reorganized to achieve the desired efficiency. The DNI in the US and the JTAC in the UK have focused on the integration of intelligence coming from anti-terrorism-related organizations. Korea also established the Terrorism Information Integration Center (TIIC) at the headquarters of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), with responsibility for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of potential intelligence on terrorist activities targeting Korea's interests.¹ Efficiency could be gained by unifying intelligence and action organizations, but this might create negative side effects arising from concentrating power, so it is necessary to establish separate organizations to collect and analyze information on terrorism. The regulating agency should connect all information to a network, allowing for the sharing of information both domestically and internationally. Civilian organizations conducting anti-terrorism research in cooperation

with the government should be supported, and public education materials on terrorism should be developed and disseminated.

Finally, as demonstrated by the US and the UK initiatives and programs described in this thesis, a system that transcends international boundaries and works in the mutual interest of anti-terrorism must be formed. International terrorism lacks a base of operations, or a specific operating or support area, so international terrorist groups cannot be confronted without an international anti-terrorism organization. Korea must maintain close relations with and provide mutual assistance to both leading nations and to developing nations, exchanging relevant information, conducting joint research, and sponsoring seminars and training in order to maximize anti-terrorism capabilities.

¹US Department of State, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1061.html (accessed 10 March 2011).

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