

CHALLENGES OF GERMAN LAND FORCES 2030 AND BEYOND

BY

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CHALLENGES OF GERMAN LAND FORCES 2030 AND BEYOND

by

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ABSTRACT

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Germany needs to develop a new or at least modified concept for the long-term perspective, focusing on deriving conclusions for a future mission-capable and mission-ready Bundeswehr, able and willing to be an important means of German strategy. The overall intent must be to enable the Bundeswehr to better address current as well as future threats and missions. This approach could become a stronger orientation of the Bundeswehr as a means for a more proactive German foreign and security policy, but this approach also seems threatened by current and possible future cuts to the defense budget. This paper mainly focuses on deriving conclusions for the future of balanced German Land Forces as a means for a balanced German strategy. Based on the national interests of Germany as well as the analysis of future “most dangerous” and “most likely” threats, there is no alternative to transform the German Land Forces into balanced, all-volunteer and mainly expeditionary Land Forces for full spectrum operations. A future use of German Land Forces as an important means of German policy toward achieving political ends not only in war but also in full spectrum operations gives Carl von Clausewitz a timeless relevance.

CHALLENGES OF GERMAN LAND FORCES 2030 AND BEYOND

We maintain...that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase 'with the addition of other means' because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different.¹

—Carl von Clausewitz,
On War

“Far from promoting peace and stability, the end of the Cold War invited disorder and conflict.”² The fundamental documents for the current and future Bundeswehr³ are the Defence Political Guidelines 2003, the Bundeswehr Concept 2004, and the White Paper on German security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr 2006.⁴ The White Paper defines that international conflict prevention and crisis management – including the fight against international terrorism – will be the more probable tasks of the Bundeswehr.⁵

Germany⁶ needs to develop a new or at least modified concept for the long-term perspective, focusing on deriving conclusions for a future mission-capable and mission-ready Bundeswehr, able and willing to be an important means of German strategy. As we evaluate any military means we must ask, how can it contribute to the achievement of political ends either in peacetime, or in war?⁷ The overall intent must be to enable the Bundeswehr to better address current as well as future threats and challenges.⁸ This approach might become a stronger orientation of the Bundeswehr as a means for a more proactive German foreign and security policy, but this approach also seems threatened by current and possible future cuts to the defense budget.

This paper mainly focuses on deriving conclusions for the future of German Land Forces as balanced German Land Forces for a balanced German strategy.⁹ Based on the national interests of Germany as well as the analysis of future “most dangerous” and “most likely” threats, there is no alternative to transform the German Land Forces into balanced, all-volunteer and mainly expeditionary Land Forces for full spectrum operations. To approve this thesis, the paper first considers the national interests as well as the foreign and security policy of Germany in context of the vision, ends, ways, and means. Second, it describes the current situation of the Bundeswehr. Third, it analyses global trends, future risks, and conflicts. Fourth, it develops the consequences for German Land Forces. Fifth, it proves future German Land Forces on three courses of action (COAs) concerning feasibility, acceptability, and suitability. Finally, it takes the recommended COA, to transform the German Land Forces towards balanced, all-volunteer and mainly expeditionary Land Forces for full spectrum operations, through the risk assessment.

National Interests of Germany

Henry Kissinger expressed the importance of the national interests regarding the use of military as an instrument of policy: “When you’re asking Americans to die, you have to be able to explain it in terms of the national interest”.¹⁰

The preamble of the Basic Law names the German vision: “Inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have adopted this Basic Law.”¹¹ The protection of the human rights is the highest value.

The national interests of Germany are:¹² (1) Preserve justice and freedom, democracy, security and prosperity for the citizens of Germany and protecting them from dangers. (2) Ensure the sovereignty and integrity of German territory. (3) Prevent regional crises and conflicts that may affect Germany's security, wherever possible, and helping to control crises. (4) Confront global challenges, above all the threat posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. (5) Help to uphold human rights and strengthen the international order based on the international law. (6) Promote free and unhindered world trade.

Germany mainly uses nine ways to accomplish the national interests:¹³ (1) internal balance of German unification, (2) transatlantic partnership, (3) European Union, (4) Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, (5) bi- and multilateral agreements worldwide, (6) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (7) United Nations, (8) World Trade Organization, (9) International Monetary Fund.

There are ten means:¹⁴ (1) diplomatic means, (2) information means, (3) economic means, (4) ecological means, (5) finance means, (6) technologic means, (7) military means, (8) intelligence means, (9) law enforcement means in human rights, and international law, and (10) social, cultural, and educational means.

Foreign and Security Policy of Germany

The vision is the fundamental condition of a balanced German strategy. This vision of German foreign policy is characterized by cooperation in a spirit of partnership and a wish to balance interests, and not by dominance in a spirit of leadership and a wish to achieve first of all the own interests. With the history of World War I, World War II, and Holocaust in mind, key parameters are the twin lodestars of "never again" and

“never alone.”¹⁵ Overall intent is to achieve the primary ends of German foreign policy, which are to preserve peace and security in the world, with the ways of an expanded concept of security.¹⁶

Germany’s expanded concept of security covers not only questions of conflict prevention, defense, disarmament and arms control, but also economic, ecological, and social issues as well as human rights. Education institutions focused on knowledge of German culture and science actors, e.g., the Goethe-Institute, the German Academic Exchange Service, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations, and the German Commission of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), support policy that forms an integral part of German foreign and security policy.¹⁷ As means are concerned, the Bundeswehr is one instrument of a comprehensive and proactive security and defense policy.¹⁸

The Bundeswehr

The foundation of the Bundeswehr marked German rearmament in 1955, and at the same year Germany joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since this time, the German soldiers give the following oath: “I swear to serve the Federal Republic of Germany faithfully, and to defend the right and the liberty of the German people courageously – so truly God help me.”

The five ends (missions) of the Bundeswehr are:¹⁹ (1) Guarantee the capacity for action in support of foreign policy. (2) Contribute toward European and global stability. (3) Maintain national security and defense. (4) Provide assistance in the defense of our allies. (5) Foster multinational cooperation and integration.

The seven ways (functions) of the Bundeswehr are derived from its constitutional mission and from the values, goals, and interests of German security and defense policy:²⁰ (1) international conflict prevention and crisis management, to include the fight against international terrorism, (2) support of allies, the EU, and NATO, (3) protection of German territory and its citizens, (4) rescue and evacuation operations, (5) partnership and cooperation, (6) subsidiary assistance (legal and administrative support), and (7) help in the wake of natural disasters and particularly grave accidents.

Concerning its means the Bundeswehr consists of ~244,000 soldiers, structured in five services: (1) Army ~104,000, (2) Air Force ~44,000, (3) Navy ~19,000, (4) Joint Service Support ~57,000, (5) Medical Service ~20,000. The term of German Land Forces include the Army as well as parts from the Joint Service Support and the Medical Service. Nearly 8,000 personnel are present deployed, to include approximately 4,000 personnel in Afghanistan (AFG). The Bundeswehr and all German Land Forces still depend on a conscript system.²¹

This German Land Forces, which mission is to support national interests and obligations in global perspectives, is permanent challenged by five major factors: (1) The German National Level of Ambition is very ambitious. (2) The German Land Forces are in a permanent process of transformation since the reunification of Germany in 1990. (3) In parallel, the German Land Forces are the point of main effort in missions abroad since Somalia in 1993. (4) The primacy of policy cuts of the defense budget over years, or in the best case limited the defense budget to the level of previous years with the consequence, that all limited resources focus on the short-term of the next 1-5 years, the missions abroad including force protection. (5) In addition, the near future will

bring significant cuts to the defense budget with the consequence that the once more reduced resources will prevent the transformation in the long-term of the next 15-20 years.

Today's ends, ways, and means of the German Land Forces are not in balance, and they will not become in balance in the foreseeable future. In consequence, a whole approach of balanced German Land Forces for a balanced German Strategy must overcome the current approaches of transformation as military emergency solutions in the fog of cuts to the defense budget.

Global Trends, Future Risks, and Conflicts

The future is fundamentally uncertain,...we are confronted by *true uncertainty*: we really do not know what will happen, but we know it is going to happen more quickly. The future cannot be predicted. The word 'futures' in futures studies is plural because there is no one preordained future that is fated to occur. Rather, there are many different possible alternative futures.²²

The Center for Applied Strategic Excellence (CASE 2010) identifies humanity's top ten risk domains for the next 50 years as follows:²³ (1) energy, (2) water, (3) food, (4) environment, (5) poverty, (6) terrorism and war, (7) disease, (8) education, (9) democracy, and (10) population. The world population was ~6.5 billion people in 2004, and the world population will be ~10 billion people in 2050. CASE 2010 argues that the identification of these risk domains is useful today and will be useful in 50 years.

The Joint Operating Environment (JOE 2008) outlines a strategic framework, possible threats, and examines changes and trends in the geopolitical and military landscape such as (1) demographics, (2) energy, (3) climate change and natural disasters, (4) globalization, (5) cyber and space, (6) economics, (7) pandemics, and

(8) resource scarcity.²⁴ It also examines the context of the future security environment joint force of the future will face in areas such as competition and cooperation among conventional powers, potential challenges and threats, weak and failing states, the threats of unconventional power, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, technology, the battle of narratives, and urbanization.²⁵

The National Intelligence Council describes global trends 2025 in a transformed world as follows:

The next 20 years of transition toward a new international system are fraught with risks to include the growing prospect of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and possible interstate conflicts over resources. The breadth of transnational issues requiring attention also is increasing to include issues connected with resource constraints in energy, food, and water, and worries about climate change. Global institutions that could help the world deal with these transnational issues currently appear incapable of rising to the challenges. The rapidly changing international order increases the likelihood of discontinuities, shocks, and surprises. No single outcome seems preordained.²⁶

In an increasingly interdependent world, local risks and conflicts will have a destabilizing effect that goes far beyond their immediate environment. They affect the security of the international community in numerous ways, and global trends will exacerbate the current ideological struggle.²⁷ The trends of the 21st security environment are:

(1) globalization, (2) technology, (3) resource demands, (4) failed or failing states, (5) population growth, (6) climate change and natural disasters, (7) proliferation of WMD.²⁸ “The combined impact of these trends yields a strategic environment of *Persistent Conflict: protracted competition and friction among state, non-state, and individual actors that use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.*”²⁹ The evolving character of conflicts in the 21st Century will be determined by (1) conflicts among the people, (2) diverse actors, state and non-state, (3) unpredictability

concerning location, adversaries, context, and duration, (4) unblinking scrutiny of global media, and (5) hybrid threats, the combination of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal capabilities.³⁰ The described complexity makes it clear that just one form of conflict is not sufficient to understand possible future developments in their entirety. On the contrary, a variety of possible alternative developments to come must be assumed, which requires a dynamic instead of a static evaluation and includes combinations and forms of future alternative types of conflict who are unimaginable at present.

At present, there is no foreseeable threat to Germany posed by any adversary capable of conducting large-scale offensive operations. As this cannot, however, be ruled out in the long-term perspective, the capability to conduct national defence together with our allies and after build up is to remain a task of the armed forces. Land forces must be empowered to augment personnel and equipment and remain adaptive and combat-ready. According to the current risk-analysis, the necessary build up can be accomplished over a period of several years.³¹

The proliferation of WMD and their delivery means constitute the largest potential threat to Germany, the international community and world peace. This possibility of a direct and existential threat through WMD – and/or conventional means – is the “most dangerous threat” for Germany and its allies. International terrorism constitutes the “most likely threat” to Germany and its allies at present and presumably also in the future. The Western states, their allies, Western symbols and western-oriented governments will continue to serve as enemy image. Conflicts and the collapse of states will increase the number of potential theatres of operation and the pressure of migration on Europe. The stability of the countries rich in raw materials as the prerequisite for

global security and economic stability will become even more important. It remains in the German national interest to maintain free world trade, including unlimited access to resources as well as protection of international trade routes, key industries and infrastructure.

Conflicts of the 21st century will manifest in various forms. Small wars, low-intensity conflicts and asymmetric wars, during which the rules of the international law of war are not observed, will probably continue to be the dominant forms of conflict. Interstate wars will not cease to form part of the spectrum of conflicts. Mixed forms will often represent the operational reality of the land forces. In the future, the focus will probably be on full spectrum operations of German Land Forces conducted under an asymmetric threat outside the territory of Germany and its allies.

Nevertheless, the possibility of high-intensity operations is not ruled out.³² Symmetric forms of conflict do not vanish – they will merely lie dormant. Considering the potentials still existent in 2030 and the ongoing armament efforts, high-intensity combat operations between regular forces will continue to be possible. Terrain-oriented conventional operations, conducted for instance by states to ensure the supply with raw materials, remain conceivable. What is more, if we did not maintain a sufficient superiority, this could even become an incentive to reactivate a direct symmetric threat or conflict. It is exactly this situation, that is to say a direct threat to Germany, which would be the “worst case scenario” (war as national and/or allied defense) – and not the “most likely scenario” (international conflict prevention and crisis management – including the fight against international terrorism) in the framework of full spectrum operations.³³

Consequences for German Land Forces

Land operations thus take place in an initially unclear and extremely complex environment with interdependencies and partly diverging, changing and often unknown objectives of the respective actors. It becomes more difficult to distinguish between allies and adversaries, opposition groups and supporters of the own mission.

Interconnected violent actors are able to simultaneously conduct operations of varying intensity in different, partly widely separated, areas of employment and operation. Asymmetrically operating and irregularly fighting actors will search for advantageous and easily accessible areas. Operating bases and areas for recruiting and training will be mainly located in complex and difficult-to-control areas, on the territory of weak or disintegrating states, disputed border regions and thus predominantly in regions where the central government exerts only little influence. In 2030, conflicts may be conducted on land, sea, space and in the information environment worldwide and in all climatic zones. The ground area of operations is of decisive importance because it is the settlement area, the source of important resources, the area of industry and trade, accommodates headquarters of governmental, social and cultural organizations and is the home of people. Conflicts, wherever and however they may start, eventually reach a point where it is important to reach/gain/seize/hold and/or control an area.³⁴

Ends, location, duration, and nature of the future use of military means remain politically defined, and risks and threats must be countered at those places where they arise. Germany is moving away from defending itself against external threats to actively

shaping its security environment through prevention and the limited employment of forces and means.³⁵

Therefore, Germany needs balanced Land Forces to (1) prevail in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns, (2) engage to help other nations build capacity and assure friends and allies, (3) support civil authorities at home and abroad, (4) deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors.³⁶ Balanced Land Forces are defined by the current vision of the U.S. Army:

A versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for Full Spectrum Operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies – at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for our all-volunteer force.³⁷

Balanced German Land Forces must transform from the Cold War environment of air land battle toward the 21st century environment of full spectrum operations. They have to shift from (1) predictable symmetric threat toward unpredictable range of hybrid threats, (2) deterrence toward prevention, (3) alliance toward partnership, (4) forward based toward expeditionary, (5) tiered readiness toward progressive readiness, (6) sequential mobilization toward cyclic force generation, (7) operations – exception & episodic toward operations routine & protracted, (8) well trained toward operationally experienced.³⁸

The diversity of future conflicts requires that balanced German Land forces must be able to cover full spectrum operations. These possible forms of conflict may in future necessitate a capability spectrum not required in current operations. Full spectrum operations must become the German Land Forces operational concept as defined as the U.S. Army's operational concept:

Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as a part of an independent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action – lethal and nonlethal – proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces.³⁹

Six qualities are characterizing balanced land forces:⁴⁰ (1) Versatility – This is the central organizing principle of land forces. Precision is impossible in predicting force requirements. Versatile land forces provide a balanced mix of multipurpose capabilities and sufficient capacity to accomplish a broad range of tasks. (2) Expeditionary – That means for land forces to be organized, trained and equipped to go anywhere in the world, fight upon arrival, and sustain that response for uncertain durations. (3) Agility – Agile land forces must have forces able to quickly adapt to exploit opportunities in complex environments. Therefore, they require agile doctrine, institutions, soldiers and leaders. (4) Lethality – This is the core competency of land forces, the application of lethal force to overmatch any enemy as part of a joint team with air, naval, and special operations forces. (5) Sustainability – The long-term sustainability is linked to how the land forces balance force structure, readiness, equipment priorities, and our ability to sustain the all-volunteer force. (6) Interoperability – The land forces must cooperate with other governmental and non-governmental agencies, indigenous forces and international partners to build unity of effort.

Balanced German Land Forces for full spectrum operations that fit for the future must counter all challenges in a timely and appropriate manner. Yet, it will not be able to keep all forces and means constantly available.⁴¹

Land forces operate in a complex and dynamic environment to which they are directly exposed. They are directly confronted with the adversary and find themselves in the middle of the population of the country of deployment, at least in stability operations. The brigade level and the boots-on-the-ground forces below brigade level should be strengthened, since those levels will continue to be the mainstay of operations, increase sustainability and contribute considerably to the augmentation capability of the German Land Forces.⁴²

To succeed in the future operational environment, Army forces must be able to conduct full-spectrum operations, rapidly transition between types of operations, and conduct operations decentralized consistent with the concept of mission command....To achieve a high degree of agility, or the ability to move and adjust quickly and easily, small units require the resources, combined arms capabilities, access to relevant intelligence and combat information, and authority to act.⁴³

Future Mission Spectrum for German Land Forces

The future mission spectrum of German Land Forces operations will be characterized by full spectrum operations⁴⁴ (1) worldwide in all climatic zones, (2) in cooperation with forces of other components of the armed forces, departments, allies and partners, (3) under the conditions of a networked, effects-oriented conduct of operations, (4) in all types of operations, with the focus probably on stabilization operations, (5) in changing intensities within the framework of composite land force operations, (6) mostly in large areas, (7) frequently in an urban environment and in the midst of the population, (8) permanently accompanied by the media, and (9) against state or non-state actors or possibly quickly changing coalitions of these actors that combine regular and irregular methods of fighting and operations in the information environment.

Future Task Spectrum for German Land Forces

The future task spectrum of German Land Forces for full spectrum operations will include⁴⁵ (1) to make a contribution to preventive stabilization through assistance, counselling, partnership and cooperation with security partners in key regions, (2) to conduct initial and exit operations, (3) to conduct high intensity and major composite land force operations against a predominantly militarily organized enemy as a precondition for peace stability measures, (4) a spectrum of peace stability measures,⁴⁶ (5) to conduct independent and supporting airmobile operations, (6) to contribute to deep operations, including the neutralization of dangerous single threats (e.g. WMD) from stand-off distances, (7) to conduct rescue and evacuation operations including combat recovery operations, (8) to conduct operations to obtain key information for the protection of friendly forces from a distance and persons in special situations, to rescue from terrorist threat and to defend against terrorist threats and to conduct covert operations within the area of responsibility of the armed forces, and (9) to protect Germany and its allies from direct threats and attacks with CBRN and/or conventional weapons within the framework of national and Alliance defence, depending on the situation and after augmentation.

Courses of Action

The analysis of the vision, ends, ways, and means of the national interests, the foreign and security policy, the current situation of the German Land Forces, the global trends, risks, conflicts, and the consequences for future German Land Forces lead to three courses of action (COAs):⁴⁷

COA I is a mid-term focused, passive approach. The point of main effort of this approach is to focus and optimize the capability as well as sustainability of the German Land Forces toward passive defense of Germany, the EU, and NATO.

COA II is a mid-term focused, status quo approach. The point of main effort of this approach is the passive defense of Germany, the EU, and NATO, and in parallel, to maneuver the German Land Forces over time to missions worldwide on a case by case basis, but with limited capability and limited sustainability.

COA III is a long-term focused, proactive approach. The point of main effort is the transformation of the German Land Forces toward balanced, all-volunteer and mainly expeditionary land forces for full spectrum operations.

Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability (FAS) of the COAs

The intensities of German national interests are survival in context with the “most dangerous” threats, and vital to important in context with the “most likely” treats. They require a successful balanced German foreign and security policy.⁴⁸ The following process enables evaluation at the likelihood of success for COA I - III and to select that COA deemed most likely to attain the balanced German foreign and security policy with available means and in an acceptable way. This FAS-test is based on the following definitions:⁴⁹ (1) Feasibility– will the COA be accomplished with the available resources within the contemplated time? (2) Acceptability – is the COA proportional (costs vs. gain concerning the national interests) and worth the costs (personnel, equipment, material, time involved, or position) as well as consistent with the law of war, and politically and militarily supportable? (3) Suitability – will the COA reasonably accomplish the objectives?

COA I (passive approach) – First, the feasibility of this COA is low. Because of the limited resources and capabilities of the German Land Forces even the current and future defense of the homeland of Germany and its neighbors depends on NATO and EU. In this COA German Land Forces will not generate the means necessary for the passive approach. Second, the acceptability of this COA is also low. The required reinforcement and modernization of German Land Forces would be a huge fiscal burden and exactly the opposite of the political intent concerning defense budget cuts. The German government would not be able to convince the German people to spend the young people, money, and time on German Land Forces focusing on a mission not justified by the global challenges, threat analysis, and perception of the people. In addition, this approach would neither allow Germany to use their Land Forces as a means to reach strategic ends as a global player nor to fulfil its commitments to coalitions and allies. Third, the suitability of this COA is also low. This COA seems to be a “lose - lose - situation” concerning the political ends, the ways, and the military means, because the German Land Forces would not be able to optimize its capabilities for passive defense of the homeland, EU, and NATO territory. Furthermore, this passive COA fails to build up important means toward the primary ends of German foreign policy to preserve peace and security in the world.

COA II (status quo) – First, in this COA the feasibility is low. German Land Forces will not be able to optimize the capability and sustainability as expeditionary forces for full spectrum operations. Also in the future they have to contribute with limited capabilities over time. Second, the acceptability of this COA is also low. Both approaches, the permanent transformation and modernization of the German Land

Forces will overstretch the costs with the result of less capable and sustainable German Land Forces for both passive defense as well as missions abroad.

Therefore, this COA is politically and militarily not acceptable. Third, the suitability is also low. This COA is not suitable for the primary goal of German foreign policy to preserve peace and security in the world because the German Land Forces cannot optimize itself to a mainly expeditionary force for full spectrum operations worldwide. Therefore, this COA also seems to be a “lose - lose - situation” concerning the political ends, the ways, and the military means because the German Land Forces will not to be able to optimize its capabilities for full spectrum operations worldwide as well as for passive national, and allied defense at the same time.

COA III (proactive approach) – First, the feasibility of this COA is low in the short-term spectrum but could be medium to high in the long-term spectrum by focusing the limited resources available on one point of main effort – to build up mainly expeditionary German Land Forces for full spectrum operations. This approach is expansive and therefore needs time for realization because of the fiscal limitations, necessity of modernization and technological challenges. Second, the current acceptability of this COA might be low because of the fiscal burden, but the German government can win the minds of the German people because mainly expeditionary German Land Forces will best protect the homeland by fighting the threats before they directly hit Germany. Furthermore, the decision of the German government, that the future Bundeswehr will be an armed force of all-volunteers, will support the transformation. In addition, the decision of the German government for further force reductions will also support this transformation. The Bundeswehr could become relatively small and less expensive, but

the mainly expeditionary land forces could become a capable and sustainable means of German foreign and security policy. This approach is the most decisive COA because it focuses the resources on one point of main effort. Only this COA underlines the ambition of Germany as a first level global player. Third, the suitability of this COA is also low in the short-term spectrum but could be high in the long-term spectrum by focusing the resources available for full spectrum operations. COA III seems best suitable for the ends of German foreign and security policy. It also best supports partners and allies, who expect a larger German contribution. This COA seems to become a “win - win” situation concerning the political ends, the ways, and the military means because the German Land Forces would be able to optimize its capabilities for full spectrum operations worldwide.

Risk Assessment of COA III

COA III (proactive approach) is the most decisive approach to transform German Land Forces to become an efficient instrument for a balanced German foreign and security policy. Before recommending this COA, a risk assessment is required.⁵⁰ For Germany, COA III only might be realized in a long-term approach until 2030 and beyond as a permanent process of agility. The external risk (international) is medium to low, because the transformation could be conducted step by step toward balanced, all-volunteer and mainly expeditionary land forces for full spectrum operations, and Germany will contribute to scenarios like national defense or Afghanistan in coalitions, but “never alone.” On the other side, the internal risk (national) is high. If the political decision makers, the public or the economy will not support a high defense budget, the transformation of the German Land Forces as described in COA III will fail with the

consequence that Germany will have a very limited military means to reach the political ends related to the national interests. In first priority, the political will of the German leadership is needed to build up balanced German Land Forces for a balanced German foreign and security policy.

Furthermore, second and third order effects are important. First, the transformation of the German Land Forces toward mostly expeditionary forces, ready and willing for full spectrum operations in global terms, will be relatively expensive and is a shift in German foreign and security policy to stronger proactive action. The German political leadership must convince the German people to provide the support needed, and the German economy must stay strong. If one or both of these will fail, the defense budget might never hold the level necessary to support COA III with the consequence of a further reduction of the German national level of ambition. Second, the friends, partners, and allies are waiting for Germany to share the duties, burden, and risk. They all would welcome a stronger German contribution with the necessary resources. Third, the states, groups, and organizations supporting international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, are especially not waiting for Germany. They would get the clear message that Germany will contribute to find, and if necessary, fight them.

Conclusion

The analysis of future global trends and possible future challenges makes it obvious that discussion of just one form of conflict is not sufficient to understand future developments in their entirety. On the contrary, a variety of alternative developments is possible, which requires a dynamic instead of a static evaluation and includes combinations and forms of future alternative types of conflict. To be prepared to counter

these challenges and threats as good as possible, transformation must continue forward joint operations, coalitions, and a whole of government approach. War, starting as an extension of policy, will continue to be a human endeavour. Friction is unavoidable, and technology cannot erase it. Friendly forces can be beaten, and surprise by potential adversaries might be limited, but not totally prevented.

The proliferation of WMD and their delivery means constitute the largest potential threat to Germany, the international community and world peace. This possibility of a direct and existential threat through WMD – and/or conventional means – is the “most dangerous scenario” for Germany and its allies. International conflict prevention and crisis management – including the fight against international terrorism – will stay as the “most likely scenario” to Germany and its allies presumably also in the future.

Conflict prevention and crisis management operations require a long-term and holistic use of military and non-military assets. Their temporal dimension will depend on political requirements and potential success. Future operational readiness and long-term success largely depends on the quality of the Bundeswehr as a means.

The German Land Forces make a fundamental contribution to achieve the strategic ends of Germany. Also in the long-term perspective, the German Army will remain as the core of German Land Forces and the mainstay of joint and multinational, mostly also interagency, ground operations.

The German Land Forces must remain adaptive and flexible to accomplish its mission of full spectrum operations. The budgetary situation will require a clear focus on those forces, which will conduct land operations across the entire spectrum of activities in the future, irrespective of force categories, types of operation and intensities. Since,

within the variety of possible alternative developments, many forms of conflict are conceivable from today's point of view, restrictions and/or the calculation of probabilities and/or the clear concentration on capabilities whose focus is exclusively on stability operations must not lead to an inappropriate adaptation of the capabilities of land forces. This is both a dilemma and a risk, as this could, due to short-term adjustments and specializations, while exploiting the tight budgetary constraints, result in a long-term inability to act.⁵¹

Based on German interests, a critical reflexion of the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of three COAs, there seems no alternative to the long-term approach of COA III. Because this approach best serves balanced land forces for a balanced German strategy, there is no alternative to transform the German Land Forces into balanced, all-volunteer and mainly expeditionary land forces for full spectrum operations. The external risk of COA III is medium to low, and this is in comparison to a future most often characterized by VUCA⁵² as very acceptable.

A future use of German Land Forces as an important means of German policy towards achieving political ends not only in war but also in full spectrum operations gives Carl von Clausewitz a timeless relevance.

We maintain...that war is (full spectrum operations are) simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase 'with the addition of other means' because we also want to make it clear that war (full spectrum operations) in itself does (do) not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different.⁵³

This long-term transformation will be expansive, and the approach depends on the political intent, the economic power, and the will of the German people to build up or not to build up the military means.

Endnotes

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605.

² Moodie, Michael, "Conflict Trends in the 21st Century", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 2nd Quarter (April 2009), 20.

³ "Bundeswehr" is the official name of the German Armed Forces.

⁴ German Federal Ministry of Defense, *Defense Political Guidelines* (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2003), and German Federal Ministry of Defense, *Concept of the Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2004).

⁵ German Federal Ministry of Defense, *White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2006). The second last White Paper was from 1994.

⁶ The official name of Germany is "Federal Republic of Germany."

⁷ Biddle, Tami D., *The Airplane and Warfare: Theory and History*. United States Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy, *Theory of War and Strategy, Readings Lesson 14, AY 11* (U.S. Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, 2010), 1.

⁸ Because of the limited resources as well as the priority on force protection, the transformation approach of the German Ministry of Defense focuses on the present deployments of German Armed Forces as well as on the short-term perspective until 2015. This strategic research paper will focus on the long-term approach of transformation until 2030 and beyond.

⁹ These are not new terms. The present U.S. Army transformation process focuses on "Building a Balanced Army for the 21st Century." Unclassified briefing "Balanced Land Forces for a Balanced Strategy," U.S. Army (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, U.S. Army, Summer 2010), 1.

¹⁰ Alan G. Stolberg, "Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century." In *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, 4th ed., Vol. II: *National Security Policy and Strategy*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2010, 3.

¹¹ Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, *Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany*, Promulgated by the Parliamentary Council on 23 May 1949 (Bonn: Public Document, 1998), 39.

¹² German Federal Ministry of Defense, *White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2004), 6.

The four enduring interests of the United States of America to achieve a world they seek are: security, prosperity, values, and international order. The White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2010), 17.

¹³ German Federal Foreign Office, *Facts about Germany* (Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, 2010), 70-71.

¹⁴ DIME – The United States of America define four elements of national power / tools of national security policy: diplomatic, information, military, and economic.

¹⁵ German Federal Foreign Office, *Facts about Germany* (Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, 2010), 68.

¹⁶ Ibid, 67. Comparable to the U.S. strategy, the German expanded concept of security includes joint operations, the whole of government approach, and the comprehensive approach.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ German Federal Ministry of Defense, *White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2004), 9.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ The German Government made several decisions concerning the future of the Bundeswehr in November 2010. One decision is to transform the Bundeswehr to an all-volunteer force. Furthermore, the decision is to reduce 25% of the present personnel of the Bundeswehr. All decisions are in context with significant cuts of the defense budget. These decisions will become effective in the short-term period of transformation until 2015.

²² Institute for Alternative Futures, “The Future Belongs to Those Who...a guide for thinking about the future,” United States Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, *Strategic Leadership, Core Curriculum, Selected Readings, AY 11* (U.S. Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, 2010), 112.

²³ Guest lecture “The Center for Applied Strategic Excellence” (U.S. Army War College: Bliss Hall, September 2010).

²⁴ See <http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pdf>. (USJFCOM fact sheet). United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force* (Suffolk: United States Joint Forces Command, Center for Joint Future, 2008).

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ United States Army, Department of the Army Headquarters, *The United States Army Operating Concept 2016 - 2028*, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army Headquarters, 2010), 8.

²⁷ Briefing (Unclassified/For Official Use Only) “Balanced Land Forces for a Balanced Strategy,” U.S. Army (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, U.S. Army, July 2010), 3.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid, 4.

³¹ Results and thoughts (Unclassified) from workshops “Land Operations 2025” (not published) as well as briefings on “Transformation” (Unclassified) in the Army Staff, Branch Concept Development and Capability Analysis, Branch Head COL (GS) Thomas Falkenberg, Deputy Branch Head LTC (GS) Michael Kiesewetter (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defense, Army Staff, February 2009 - May 2010).

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Briefing (Unclassified) “Balanced Land Forces for a Balanced Strategy,” U.S. Army (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, U.S. Army, July 2010), 6.

³⁷ Briefing (Unclassified) “US Army Transformation, Building a Balanced Army for the 21st Century,” U.S. Army G3/5/7 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, U.S. Army, July 2010), 7.

³⁸ Briefing (Unclassified) “Balanced Land Forces for a Balanced Strategy,” U.S. Army (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, U.S. Army, July 2010), 7.

³⁹ United States Army, Department of the Army Headquarters, *Operations*, Field Manual No. 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army Headquarters, 2008), 3-1.

⁴⁰ Briefing (Unclassified) “Balanced Land Forces for a Balanced Strategy,” U.S. Army (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, U.S. Army, July 2010), 9-11, 16-19.

⁴¹ Results and thoughts (Unclassified) from workshops “Land Operations 2025” (not published) as well as briefings on “Transformation” (Unclassified) in the Army Staff, Branch Concept Development and Capability Analysis, Branch Head COL (GS) Thomas Falkenberg, Deputy Branch Head LTC (GS) Michael Kiesewetter (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defense, Army Staff, February 2009 - May 2010).

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ United States Army, Department of the Army Headquarters, *The United States Army Operating Concept 2016 - 2028*, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army Headquarters, 2010), 26.

⁴⁴ Results and thoughts (Unclassified) from workshops “Land Operations 2025” (not published) as well as briefings on “Transformation” (Unclassified) in the Army Staff, Branch Concept Development and Capability Analysis, Branch Head COL (GS) Thomas Falkenberg, Deputy Branch Head LTC (GS) Michael Kiesewetter (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defense, Army Staff, February 2009 - May 2010).

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid. This includes:

- separation of parties to a conflict;
- monitoring cease-fire agreements;
- neutralization of peace disturbers;
- defence against local attacks by regular and irregular forces on own assets and facilities;
- offensive action to permanently eliminate irregular forces;
- protection of the population, government authorities and public infrastructure;
- contributions to the support of the population and the continuous improvement of its living conditions;
- contributions to the maintenance of law and order in the theatre of operations;
- support of other departments, IOs/NGOs and governmental organizations in building up state and social structures;
- monitoring and controlling areas that may be quite large as well as facilities and lines of communication;
- contributions to (re)construction and to train and operate together with local security forces, if necessary also to conduct demobilization;
- contributions to achieving and maintaining information superiority.

⁴⁷ All three COAs have in common, that the future German Land Forces will be all-volunteer forces.

⁴⁸ United States Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy, *National Security Policy and Strategy, Course Directive* (U.S. Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, 2010), 113. If not, catastrophic results could happen (intensity of national interest is survival), immediate consequences could occur (intensity of national interest is vital), or damage could happen that eventually affect the national interests (intensity of national interest is important).

⁴⁹ Definitions as by Prof Dr. Alan Stolberg, Instructor Seminar 2, AY 11 (US Army War College: Department of National Security and Strategy, November 2010).

⁵⁰ United States Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy, *National Security Policy and Strategy, Course Directive* (U.S. Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, 2010), 113. This strategic research paper will only subject COA III to a risk assessment.

⁵¹ Results and thoughts (Unclassified) from workshops “Land Operations 2025” (not published) as well as briefings on “Transformation” (Unclassified) in the Army Staff, Branch Concept Development and Capability Analysis, Branch Head COL (GS) Thomas Falkenberg, Deputy Branch Head LTC (GS) Michael Kiesewetter (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defense, Army Staff, February 2009 - May 2010).

⁵² VUCA - volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. Gerras, Stephen J., ed., *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 3rd ed. (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2010), 1.

⁵³ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605.

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