

## GRANT AND PETRAEUS: PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL- MILITARY RELATIONS

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**GRANT AND PETRAEUS: PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS**

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## **ABSTRACT**

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Since September 2001, the U.S. military has been engaged in a persistent state of war, which has tested the strength and durability of the nation's civil-military relations. Through rotations of senior commanders on the ground and a turnover of presidential administrations, this relationship has proven crucial to success on the battlefield and to achieving bipartisanship in domestic politics. Dismissals of some commanders and affirmations of others well reflect how national military policy is set and how that strategy is implemented. Furthermore, this unique relationship reveals the role our military plays in carrying out the goals and objectives of respective presidential administrations. This paper analyzes the nature of this civil-military partnership by comparing the relationship of President George W. Bush and General David H. Petraeus with that of President Abraham Lincoln and Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant. Such a comparison will demonstrate and affirm the important role our military plays in executing policy established by the President of the United States.





## GRANT AND PETRAEUS: PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The military establishment is designed, operated, and supported to serve goals and interests--in particular, security goals and interests--of the society at large.<sup>1</sup>

—Andrew J. Goodpaster & Samuel P. Huntington

It was a simple gesture, yet its impact laid the groundwork for a civil-military relationship that has seen the test of time. The year was 1783; George Washington had gathered his officers for a meeting to address their concerns regarding salaries and pensions of continental Soldiers. Known as the Newburgh Conspiracy, the disaffected officers had every intention of marching on Philadelphia and voicing their grievances against Congress. Washington, tired and strained by the rigors of war, quieted the spirited crowd before he began to speak. Then he gently took out a pair of spectacles and prepared to give his remarks. Unaccustomed to seeing their revered leader wearing glasses, the band of officers quickly settled down. Then Washington admitted that the years of campaigning in the service of his country had caused his vision to fade. His simple gesture and straightforward words immediately placated his officers. The incipient conspiracy dissolved.<sup>2</sup>

Since the days of our founders, the United States has enjoyed the most stable and longest serving democracy on earth. From George Washington's graceful recognition of civilian authority to the hotly contested debates during the Iraq War, the criticality of the nation's civil-military relationship has served as a solid foundation for our nation's continued democratic example to the world. Since 9/11, the U.S. military has been engaged in a persistent state of war. Our ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are testing the strength and durability of our nation's civil-military relations.

Through rotations of senior commanders on the ground and a turnover of presidential administrations, this relationship has proven crucial to success on the battlefield and to achieving bipartisanship in domestic politics. Dismissal of some commanders and affirmations of others well reflect how national policy is shaped and how subsequent military strategy is implemented. Furthermore, this unique relationship shows the role our military plays in carrying out the goals and objectives of respective presidential administrations.

This paper analyzes the nature of this wartime civil-military partnership by comparing the relationship of President George W. Bush and General David H. Petraeus with that of President Abraham Lincoln and Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant. Such a comparison will demonstrate and affirm the important role our military plays in executing policy established by the President of the United States. The recent firing of General Stanley A. McChrystal over comments made to the media highlight the importance of civilian control over the military—in essence a vital ingredient to our democracy. The Prussian theorist Carl Von Clausewitz articulated in some detail the essential principles of civil-military relations. His theories provide the analytical basis of the following comparison. First, Clausewitz asserted that “if war is part of policy, policy will determine its character.”<sup>3</sup> He quickly qualified this assertion: “policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details.”<sup>4</sup> Then he confirmed that “no major proposals required for war can be worked out in ignorance of political factors.”<sup>5</sup>

The great American experiment formulated in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution provides the longstanding groundwork for our democracy. Certainly the role of the military during those formative years helped to shape the

democracy we know today. The founding fathers understood that role, even though the new nation did not have a professional officer's corps. In his classic work, The Soldier and State, Samuel Huntington argued that the U.S. Constitution does not posit any formal civilian control over the military. Huntington contends that civilian control of the U.S. military "emerged despite rather than because of constitutional provision."<sup>6</sup>

Huntington further observed that the separation of powers, an essential element of U.S. democracy, is the true impediment to any objective civilian control over the military, at least within the bounds of the Constitution. Certainly the prospect of a large, robust standing Army frightened the leaders of the infant government. Consequently, the checks and balances among the three branches of government ensured stability and security across the government. The president, of course, was made commander-in-chief, while Congress retained the authority to declare war. These provisions helped ease congressional concerns regarding unrestrained executive powers. As such, Huntington questioned whether changing the Constitution to assure civilian control over the military would be worth the time and effort.<sup>7</sup>

Some have observed that the legislative branch determines the size and conduct of the military. Moreover, the division of powers and separation of branches ensures the sustainment of the democratic values fought for during the Revolutionary War.<sup>8</sup> Advocates recognize the importance civil-military relations played in the early deliberations of the nation's founders. Other observers in civil-military relations believe the difference between the military and our civilian society is "instrumental to achieving the military's goals and argued that an effective military's officer corps should stand apart from the society that it is meant to protect."<sup>9</sup> Additional proponents for civil-military

relations believe that civilians and the military must interact on a continual basis and to ensure those bonds remain strong.<sup>10</sup> The underlying principle is simple: “The basic civil-military relationship is simply one of service: the military serves the parent civil society.”<sup>11</sup>

The legal basis for this principle can be found under United States Codes, the *Uniform Code of Military Justice* and within Department of Defense directives and regulations. Such mandates “exist to provide structure and boundaries for behavior that leads to an effective Army; one that also abides by the foundational principle of subordination to civilian authority.”<sup>12</sup> The requirement for exemplary conduct (Title X, US Code, § 3583) and the Posse Comitatus Act (18 US Code § 1385) emphasize civilian control over the military. The former ensures that personnel “show themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination.”<sup>13</sup> The latter, arguably, gets at the heart of military subordination to civilian authority by prohibiting military personnel from enforcing civilian law, except in exceptional circumstances.<sup>14</sup> Article 88 of the *Uniform Code of Military Justice* prohibits the use of disparaging or harsh language against the President, his cabinet or other elected officials. DoD Directive 5700-7R, *Joint Ethics Regulations*; Directive 1344.10, *Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces*; and Army Regulation 600-20, *Army Command Policy* “enforce the traditional concept that Soldiers not engage in partisan political activity while on active duty because, in part, doing so undermines the concept of military subordination to civilian authority.”<sup>15</sup> The civil-military relationships of President Lincoln and Lieutenant General Grant and of President Bush and General Petraeus will be analyzed in the context of the aforementioned legislative, legal, and traditional guidance; such a

comparison will reveal the critical importance of the special relationship that must exist between our senior military leaders and the executive branch in order to achieve national strategic objectives. Should this relationship be flawed or dysfunctional, achieving policy and subordinate strategic goals will likely become problematic.

The American Civil War certainly accentuated the importance of civil-military relations. Arguably, the Civil War provided the first case study in which such relations were thoroughly tested. The length and breadth of the conflict, the sheer numbers of Soldiers involved, and the fundamental organization of the United States government at the time made such a test inevitable. In Supreme Command, respected historian Eliot Cohen observed that ideal civil-military relations include “a political leader who won a war by defining objectives, mobilizing the public, picking the right leader, and handing the war over to him.”<sup>16</sup> President Abraham Lincoln was challenged to find the right leader--one who could take the military reins and help to achieve his presidential objectives.

For the first few years of the war President Lincoln was undoubtedly frustrated with his field commanders. His disappointments in the performances of Generals McClellan, Hooker, and Burnside are well documented and need no further discussion. Simply, those generals either opposed or failed to fully comprehend Lincoln’s policy-strategy objectives. But they also did not exhibit the offensive spirit that the President felt was necessary to achieve victory. Extreme caution and incessant complaining comprised just two examples that tried even Lincoln’s famous patience; however, with Ulysses S. Grant it was a completely different story.

General Grant provided the type of bravado and aggressive demeanor that deeply satisfied the President's needs. Renowned Civil War historian Bruce Catton described Grant as "an organizer and administrator as good as the best...He was determination and strength of will incarnate."<sup>17</sup> Grant's determination and grit were instrumental in his army's success at Vicksburg in the summer of 1863. The President was impressed by this general who threw caution to the wind and who fought aggressively with the army he had – not the army he wanted. Following the union victory, Lincoln explained to one officer that what so attracted him to Grant was that he did not continually ask for more Soldiers, that he would do with the formations he had at the time. In addition, Grant did not pester the president with meaningless and trivial details that were best decided by the men on the ground.<sup>18</sup>

The critical point, however, was that General Grant got it: He understood the civil-military relationship and he capitalized on his military prowess to achieve the administration's objectives. He was not consumed by personal ambition; he had no careerist agenda. He was Lincoln's kind of Soldier. Grant expressed his strategic focus succinctly in an August 1862 letter to his father: I have "but one desire in this war, and that is to put down the rebellion."<sup>19</sup> This single-mindedness perfectly coincided with President Lincoln's strategic objectives for the war.

Regarding civil-military relations, Grant also had an appreciation for his place in the chain of command. Whereas other generals may have overextended their authority, General Grant knew his proper place in the order of things. In a letter to Congressman Elihu B. Washburne prior to the Battle of Shiloh, Grant allowed that "[n]o man can be efficient as a commander who sets his own notions above the law and those who he

has sworn to obey.”<sup>20</sup> He recognized that it was not his place as a military commander to set policy. Rather, he was obliged to execute the orders that come down from the executive branch. He further stated in the same correspondence that if any order should be received that Grant could not execute, for whatever reason, he would resign.<sup>21</sup> President Lincoln certainly did not find such complete and loyal understanding of their civil-military obligation in his previous commanders.

Grant indeed displayed all of the characteristics of generalship that attracted the President’s attention. But did Grant have any political connections or aspirations that may have caused the President to pause in his selection of Grant to command union forces? To alleviate his concerns, the President sent a close advisor out to Vicksburg to ascertain where Grant stood politically. Much to the President’s relief, General Grant convinced the advisor that he supported the President and had no desire to pursue a political office.<sup>22</sup> Thus the stage was set for these two gentlemen to forge a relationship that would alter the course of the war and set it on a path towards final victory.

In March of 1864, General Grant was summoned to a ceremony at the White House for his nomination to Lieutenant General and his appointment as General-in-Chief. It was a defining moment for both men and for the nation. The stakes were never higher. Clausewitz reminds us that no major proposal can be exempt from political considerations. The looming 1864 election, coupled with the increasing war weariness among the general population, made such an appointment critical. President Lincoln was running out of time to achieve his military objectives for the country—the destruction of Confederate Armies in the field, most importantly, Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. During his remarks at the White House, President Lincoln stated

that as the country trusted Grant, so too would the country sustain him.<sup>23</sup> The implication of such a statement was that President Lincoln would provide the necessary governmental support to win the war. In his memoirs Grant captured Lincoln's intent and purpose behind the appointment. Grant recalled that all the President wanted "was someone who would take responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed, pledging himself to use all the power of the government in rendering such assistance."<sup>24</sup> In a typical response that probably only General Grant could provide, the general pledged that he would do the best he could with the assets he had "and avoid as far as possible annoying him."<sup>25</sup>

Though he had never been a Soldier, the President became an ardent student of military history and strategy. He recognized that Lee's Army constituted the South's center of gravity. He deduced that destruction of this army would be instrumental in winning the war. He articulated this guidance to General McClellan early in the war: He informed McClellan that "the war could be won only by fighting the enemy rather than by endless maneuvers and sieges to occupy places."<sup>26</sup> The President was steadfast in his strategic intent to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia. In Grant, he discovered a commanding general who finally shared the same strategic vision.

Prior to Grant's appointment as General-in-Chief, the Union lacked a coherent national military strategy to support the government's policies. Lincoln recognized this and was quickly surprised when, after his first meeting with Grant, he received an overall operational plan for all the Union armies for the rest of the war. Moreover, Grant boldly retained General Halleck as his chief of staff, while Grant remained in the field directing operations against Lee. This detailed planning, consistent with Lincoln's views



on the war, and staff readjustments further solidified Grant's standing with the President. The President informed Grant in a letter prior to the campaign that he had no desire to know the specifics of the plan outlined. The President simply conveyed his desire not to place any undue burdens on the general. In addition, as was emphasized during their first meeting, he was there to provide whatever support was needed to achieve success.<sup>27</sup>

As noted previously, Lincoln had a particularly keen interest in military affairs, at times immersing himself in tactical and operational matters. Lincoln, always the politician, had a remarkable affinity for identifying political considerations when it came to military operations. For example, in late 1863, the Battle for Missionary Ridge was raging. On November 25<sup>th</sup>, the President sent Grant a telegram reminding him to attend to Confederates operating in the Knoxville area. Despite Grant's stunning victory in the mountains surrounding Chattanooga, the President insisted that Grant send Soldiers to Knoxville to deal with this perceived threat. Unfortunately, the divisions sent to this area ended up being of little use. But their diversion denied Grant any potential exploitation of the victory in Chattanooga over General Braxton Bragg.<sup>28</sup> This example, however, highlights that Lincoln never shied away from lending support to unionists, even in the Confederate states. As Clausewitz observed, policy is "wholly and exclusively entitled to decide which events and trends are best for the objectives of the war."<sup>29</sup>

This illustration offers insight into how Lincoln viewed his place in military affairs. He would spend hours upon hours in the telegraph office reading dispatches from the field. As he became more confident in his tactical knowledge; he would share his thoughts on matters in the field. Respected historian Michael Howard claims that at no

time, even with General Grant, did Lincoln ever give up complete control to his generals. Howard offers an excellent example: After receiving a message from General Philip H. Sheridan that his forces were actively pursuing Lee's Army in April 1865, Lincoln directed Grant to urge Sheridan to press on.<sup>30</sup> Eliot Cohen also affirms that "Lincoln did not merely find his generals; he controlled them."<sup>31</sup>

Despite this periodic presidential meddling on certain tactical and operational issues, Grant remained loyal and subordinate to the authority of the President. In his work, The Mask of Command, respected military historian John Keegan describes a heated disagreement between Secretary of War Edwin W. Stanton and General Grant over an issue. The Secretary warned that he would take them both to see the President. Grant quickly concurred: "That is right. The president ranks us both."<sup>32</sup> Grant never wavered in his deference to executive authority. Lincoln was the President; Grant was the obedient subordinate.

In July of 1864, Confederate General Jubal Early had crossed the Potomac River and was threatening the capital. Despite this threat, Union leaders were focusing on the Battle of Petersburg a hundred miles to the south. At Lincoln's insistence, General Grant transferred significant forces from the Petersburg front to handle this Confederate threat to the North. His telegram directed: "I want Sheridan put in command of all troops in the field in the valley, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and to follow him to the death."<sup>33</sup> But should have Grant attended to this politically sensitive threat personally, rather than delegating the responsibility to Halleck and Sheridan? This provides a situation in which the military commander failed to recognize the political consequences of his decisions in the field. Grant focused solely on military

affairs—he did not desire to send any troops in the first place. Bruce Catton theorizes that “[o]ne thing that influenced Grant was the belief that if he himself went to Washington to direct the operations against Early both friend and foe would assume, with much reason, that the whole Petersburg campaign had been a flat failure.”<sup>34</sup> Catton then points out that Grant failed to acknowledge that Early’s threat had unleashed chaos in the nation’s capital.<sup>35</sup>

President Lincoln, of course, recognized the threat and responded to General Grant’s plan accordingly. Lincoln’s telegram to Grant offers very specific direction: “You are exactly right, but please look over any dispatch you may have received from there since you made the order and discover, if you can, if there is any idea in the head of anyone here of putting our Army south of the enemy or of following him to the death in any direction. I repeat to you, it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every hour and day, and enforce it.”<sup>36</sup> In effect, Lincoln was obliged to remind his top field commander of not only his military obligations, but also of the political ramifications of his military decisions. Some critics claim that “Grant had the mistaken notion that from Petersburg he could estimate from the reports of others a military situation at Washington.”<sup>37</sup> He further declared that Lincoln was right in interfering because the head of the Army was not fulfilling his obligations as the military commander.<sup>38</sup> Eliot Cohen best summarized the situation: “Grant’s failure to appreciate early enough Early’s intentions in the attack on Washington and his delays in taking the appropriate organizational and personal decisions to create the force that would destroy the confederate raiders, provide an instructive example.”<sup>39</sup> What we can discern from this case is that commanders in the field, at all levels, must contemplate that their tactical

and operational actions may have political ramifications. As Cohen described, Grant had temporarily lost the bigger picture of the war.<sup>40</sup>

Clausewitz advises us that “no major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of political factors.”<sup>41</sup> President Lincoln recognized the importance politics played in nearly all of his decisions and his commander’s decisions. Cohen lauds “Lincoln’s understanding of the interplay of war and politics, no less than his ability to absorb military detail and to read human character that made him the greatest of American war presidents.”<sup>42</sup> Leading up to the 1864 election, President Lincoln recognized the electorate was very apprehensive about the war and popular support was in decline. The growing casualty figures left him wondering how long the voters would support him in his efforts to restore the Union through unconditional capitulation of the South.

One of the interesting scenarios that came out of the August Republican presidential convention of 1864 was a proposal made by the postmaster general, Montgomery Blair. Realizing that Lincoln was in trouble politically, he proposed that General McClellan, then the Democrat’s nominee, be offered a high position in the Army to drop out of the race. President Lincoln rightly avowed that he would not make such a decision without consulting General Grant first.<sup>43</sup> Lincoln thus put the nation’s welfare ahead of his drive for reelection. He refused to complicate Grant’s military command authority by making a political deal.

The Civil War was truly a test case for civil-military relations. The Founding Fathers had often expressed deep-rooted concerns regarding a standing army. Unfortunately, they did not clearly stipulate the military’s role in this bold democratic

experiment. No prior national conflict had stressed the patience and endurance of the American people to the extent exhibited during the Civil War. When President Lincoln got up in the morning of his inauguration the nation was at peace; when he went to bed that evening it was a nation at war. As Eliot Cohen asserts, “Lincoln had to educate his generals about the purpose of the war and to remind them of its fundamental political characteristics.”<sup>44</sup> Prior to his relations with General Grant, his education of the generals was a most challenging task. Most of his generals were unable to accept their subordination to civilian leadership. They were unwilling or unable to support President Lincoln’s policies with a coherent and effective military strategy. It was not until Grant became General-in-Chief that the President had someone he could trust and rely upon entirely. Even so, the President violated Clausewitz’s warning about intervening in tactical and operational details. Yet, most of the time, the rationale for such incursions was purely political, or designed as a presidential effort to implement grand strategy. Overall, the relationship between President Lincoln and General Grant provides an excellent example of civil-military relations. Despite a few disagreements and misunderstandings, each respected the other’s role. Both put the nation’s welfare first, setting aside personal and political ambitions – as well as egotistical pride.

Nearly a century and a half later, the U.S. would again be confronted with a complex military situation testing the nation’s civil-military relations. Since the days of Lincoln and Grant, the nation had endured two world wars, limited wars in Korea and Vietnam, and numerous other military excursions. From the model relationship of President Franklin Roosevelt and General George Marshall to the tensions between President Harry Truman and General Douglas MacArthur, the nation’s civil-military

relations had run the gamut from productive to disruptive. Near the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, these relations were again tested during operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The military began to question its nation-building assignments. But the events of September 11, 2001 changed the way the U.S. looked at the world and the U.S. military's role in eliminating the terrorist threat.

During the post 9/11 period, General David Petraeus was a rapidly rising star among the Army's senior leadership. An extremely bright, dedicated, and focused officer, Petraeus had all the attributes of a future general officer. Like many officers of his generation, he analyzed as a young major the hard and bitter lessons from the Vietnam War. He observed that the Army, the military and the nation must apply those lessons to similar future conflicts. Regarding civil-military relations, the lessons were especially critical during counterinsurgency operations. He believed our military gained from Vietnam "a heightened awareness that civilian officials are responsive to influences other than the objective conditions on the battlefield."<sup>45</sup> Significantly, he recognized that both sides of the civil-military arena must share a common and respectful understanding of military operations. Like Grant and Lincoln, civilian and military leaders must cast aside their pride for the good of the nation in times of war. Petraeus contends that counterinsurgency operations would especially test the nation's civil-military relations, asserting that such operations require close, on-going cooperation. Indeed, Petraeus believes that counterinsurgency operations require the closest civil-military coordination of all military operations.<sup>46</sup> Petraeus further opines that counterinsurgency operations are "difficult to conclude before domestic support erodes

and potentially so costly as to threaten the well-being of all of America's military forces."<sup>47</sup>

President George W. Bush arrived in office under the shadow of one of the most emotional and difficult elections in U.S. history. Finally resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, the wounds of the nation would fester until a fateful Tuesday in 2001. The Bush administration arrived in Washington bent on defining the role the military would play for the administration. Observers noted that the administration "resolved to reassert civilian control over the military – a desire that became even more pronounced after September 11<sup>th</sup>."<sup>48</sup> Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for example, declared that civilian control over the military was one of his primary responsibilities as Secretary of Defense.<sup>49</sup>

Like President Lincoln, Bush understood his presidential role in regard to civil-military relations. He was well aware of the example of his father during Operation Desert Storm, so he realized that a wartime President must allow his generals the flexibility and initiative to execute their policies. Even modern historians observe that Bush had vowed not to micromanage his generals the way past presidents had done, particularly Lyndon Johnson. As the Army had learned not to repeat mistakes of the Vietnam War, President Bush pledged to do the same. Some critics, however, believe that Bush became too removed from the commander-in-chief's role. They contend that he gave the Secretary of Defense too much latitude to manage military operations.<sup>50</sup> Nonetheless, just as President Lincoln expressed complete confidence in Grant's military leadership, Bush did the same when he assigned General Petraeus as the top commander in Iraq. In Decision Points, President Bush's memoirs, he recalled meeting

with Petraeus after his confirmation hearings: “I assured GEN Petraeus that I had confidence in him and that he could have my ear anytime.”<sup>51</sup> In addition, Bush assured Petraeus that only a close, personal relationship would ensure success in Iraq. This trust between the nation’s civil-military leaders “allowed for Petraeus and [U.S. Ambassador Ryan] Crocker to share frustrations and push for decisions directly from the commander-in-chief.”<sup>52</sup> General Petraeus recognized such close coordination was essential, particularly during a counterinsurgency fight.

The attacks of 9/11 solidified the nation in a way not seen since Pearl Harbor. Images of terroristic destruction of the twin towers, a smoldering Pentagon, and the sacrifices made by some passengers that potentially saved the capital from further damage fueled the nation’s passion for justice and revenge. Shortly thereafter, President Bush ordered military operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Unlike previous administrations that resorted to stand-off weapons, these operations would include boots-on-the-ground. During ongoing efforts in Afghanistan, the administration then undertook the mission to rid Saddam Hussein from Iraq in 2003. The ensuing strain on the nation’s civil-military relations became evident when then Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki informed Congress that post-war operations in Iraq would require hundreds of thousands of American Soldiers. Dismissing completely the professional military judgment of a senior Army commander, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz called Shinseki’s assessment “wildly off the mark.”<sup>53</sup> Clausewitz advised that policy issues should not infringe upon the tactical and operational aspects of civil-military relations; however, key players inside President Bush’s Department of Defense violated this principle. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz “showed



little compunction about meddling in such issues as the number of troops required and the phasing of their deployments for Operation Iraqi Freedom.”<sup>54</sup>

President Bush calculated that Iraq’s notorious dictator made the world too dangerous. So, in the spring of 2003 the President ordered Operation Iraqi Freedom to liberate the Iraqi people. Observers would note that the Bush administration believed ridding the world of Saddam Hussein would provide a “reliable ally in the Arab world. Having troops in Iraq would give heart to the Iranian people and perhaps even inspire them to throw off the yoke of the Mullahs.”<sup>55</sup> The building of democracy in Iraq would inspire democratization in the region and revive the hope for peace in the Middle East. Militarily, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein was surprisingly quick. U.S. and coalition troops rolled into Baghdad; images of falling statues enshrining the fallen dictator were captured for the whole world to see. Military success, however, heralded popular unrest, sectarian violence, and a rising insurgent resistance as Shinseki’s prophetic message to Congress came back to haunt the nation.

It became readily apparent that there were too few troops to handle the post-invasion chaos spreading across the country. Tensions among the Kurds, Shias, and Sunnis fueled the flames of anarchy and chaos. Critics opined that “[M]any of the problems encountered in the aftermath of the invasion could have been avoided had it not been for the determination of the civilian leadership in the Pentagon to control everything in Iraq.”<sup>56</sup> Sectarian violence erupted and the country barely avoided all-out civil war. Rule of law hardly existed as the nation’s law enforcement capabilities failed to protect the citizenry. Likewise, domestic support for Operation Iraqi Freedom began to erode as the search for weapons of mass destruction turned up empty. U.S. political

pundits were accusing the President of going to war over lies. Just as General Petraeus had predicted as a young field grade officer, the military soon began to be included in a rising tide of popular disapproval of the war.<sup>57</sup>

In an article for *Commentary*, noted expert on civil-military relations Peter Feaver argued that by 2005 the situation in Iraq had grown so bad that President Bush would witness “the triumph of our enemies, America’s withdrawal, and Iraq’s descent into a hellish chaos as yet undreamed of.”<sup>58</sup> In his memoirs, President Bush reflected that for two-and-a-half years his top commanders – George Casey and John Abizaid – had advised continued American presence in Iraq, “created a sense of occupation, which inflamed and fueled the insurgency.” Then in February 2006 Sunni extremists destroyed one of the holiest sites in Shiite Islam, the Al Askaria Mosque. An upsurge in sectarian violence swiftly spread throughout the country. President Bush came to the conclusion that “[t]he sectarian violence had not erupted because our footprint was too big. It happened because Al Qaeda had provoked it. And with the Iraqis struggling to stand up, it didn’t seem possible for us to stand down.”<sup>59</sup>

A bi-partisan commission chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former congressman Lee Hamilton was formed to analyze the problems in Iraq and provide recommendations to the administration. In August 2006 the Iraqi Study Group (ISG) flew to Baghdad and interviewed senior commanders. When asked whether additional troops in Baghdad were needed, General George Casey emphatically responded that they were not needed. Likewise, General Peter Chiarelli declared, “You’re not going to win this war at the point of a bayonet. You’ll only win it when you meet the Iraqi people’s basic needs – water, electricity, food, sanitation, jobs.” The

consensus among the commanders was that a surge of coalition forces would not solve the sectarian violence in Iraq. The Study Group's three major recommendations to the President were: shift training to Iraqi security forces, withhold aid to Iraq until timetables were met, and engage in diplomatic efforts with Syria and Iran.<sup>60</sup>

Peter Feaver argued the Iraqi Study Group failed to present adequate solutions to the problems in Iraq. He observed "the Baker-Hamilton commission essentially recommended back to us an accelerated version of the strategy envisioned by the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq: stand them up so we can stand down."<sup>61</sup> In his 2007 report to Congress, General Petraeus observed that the previous commander, General George Casey, "underscored the need to protect the population and reduce sectarian violence in Baghdad."<sup>62</sup> The political pressure on the Bush administration was mounting: The Iraq War was losing the support of the American people. Frustrated by the lack of progress, Bush "concluded that if his administration didn't do something to arrest the decline, Congress was likely to force a withdrawal."<sup>63</sup>

President Bush needed a commander who understood the deteriorating situation in Iraq and who understood that withdrawing U.S. Soldiers was not the solution. During the early phases of the war, General Petraeus commanded the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division. His counterinsurgency strategy called for Soldiers to live alongside their Iraqi counterparts, patrol the streets on foot, and make their presence known throughout an area. In Mosul, this strategy produced stunning results. Subsequently, he was assigned to Fort Leavenworth where he rewrote Army counterinsurgency doctrine, based on his recent experience in Iraq. The manual recommended that security must be established before any political gains could be made. Such a strategy was the

complete opposite of what the general's in Iraq were recommending. President Bush made a mental note to keep his eyes on General Petraeus.<sup>64</sup>

President Bush came to realize that additional troops would be needed - even though such a strategy was not supported by his field commanders, by members of Congress, or by the American people. In his memoirs, he recognized that "cutting troop levels too quickly was the most important failure of execution in the war. Ultimately, we adapted our strategy and fixed the problems, despite almost universal pressure to abandon Iraq."<sup>65</sup> What he needed then was the right commander to implement the strategy. His obvious choice was General Petraeus. In late 2006, President Bush held a secure video-teleconference with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Midway through the conference, Bush asked all aides to leave the room while he had a one-on-one conversation with Maliki. Bush informed Maliki that he had chosen General Petraeus as the new commander in Iraq. Recalling Petraeus' operations in Mosul, some Iraqi leaders expressed concern because of his aggressive approach to security. Nevertheless, President Bush told Maliki he had a lot of respect for Petraeus; he urged Maliki to trust his judgment concerning Petraeus.<sup>66</sup> President Bush had found his General Grant.

General Grant recognized the importance of civil-military relations with President Lincoln. He stated that if he could not fully support a particular policy of the President he would simply resign his commission. General Petraeus echoed similar sentiments during his confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He promised the President and the Congress that he would give his "best professional military advice, and if people don't like it, then they can find someone else to give better

professional military advice.”<sup>67</sup> Prior to assuming command, he met with noted military historian Glenn Robertson, who gave Petraeus a copy of Bruce Catton’s Grant Takes Command. On the leaf he inscribed the following words: “Sir, on the days when casualties mount, subordinates fail, politicians waver, and victory seems utterly unattainable, it may be of some small comfort to consider how another great commander successfully surmounted similar challenges.”<sup>68</sup>

The strategy behind the surge essentially boiled down to security. In a 2008 statement to the press, President Bush said the strategy was designed to “bring down sectarian violence that threatened to overwhelm the government in Baghdad, restore basic security to Iraqi communities, and drive the terrorists out.”<sup>69</sup> General Petraeus summarized the new strategy in his confirmation hearings: it focused on protecting the local populations. The Soldiers would live in outposts throughout a city and protect the citizens from insurgents.<sup>70</sup> Previously the Soldiers “drove” to the fight; now the Soldiers would reside with their Iraqi counterparts. Certainly risks were inherent in this new strategy. The attrition of public support, the increase in U.S. casualties and then the prospect that the Iraqis might not live up to their end of the bargain were all potential risks. President Bush, however, realized that “[t]he surge was our best chance, maybe our last chance, to accomplish our objectives in Iraq.”<sup>71</sup>

Noted historian, and advisor to General Petraeus on the counterinsurgency manual, Conrad Crane observed that Petraeus recognized a need for actually four surges. First, the military surge would provide the security. Second, steadfast U.S. political will was essential for success. Third, Iraqi political will was likewise essential. Fourth, the U.S. interagency contributions had to be bolstered. All four of these lines of

effort would prove crucial to any military and political success emerging from the 2007 surge.<sup>72</sup> Petraeus clearly understood the political realities involved. In accord with Clausewitzian theory, he recognized that coordination and interdependency were critical to any success on the battlefield.

Even so, some of President Bush's fears were realized: Public support wavered and casualties increased. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid proclaimed as the new Soldiers were entering the country that "this war is lost, and this surge is not accomplishing anything."<sup>73</sup> However, the additional 30,000 Soldiers did have a positive impact on the security situation in Iraq: The tide began to turn. President Bush observed that after the surge "sectarian killing [was] down 95 percent from the pre-surge numbers; PM Maliki emerged as a confident leader; Al Qaeda was severely weakened and marginalized; Iran influence reduced; American casualties were down."<sup>74</sup> In his report to Congress in 2007, General Petraeus reported that "the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met."<sup>75</sup>

The strong alliance forged between President Bush and General Petraeus helped repair a fractured policy and strategy in Iraq. Despite calls for withdrawal from the domestic front and standing down U.S. forces on the military front, Bush recognized a change in strategy was necessary to achieve the political goals. The surge had a dramatic impact on Iraq as he attempted to shape a more promising Iraqi environment. President Bush discovered his general: "In our own way, we had continued one of the great traditions of American history. Lincoln discovered Generals Grant and Sherman. Roosevelt had Eisenhower and Bradley. I found David Petraeus and Ray Odierno."<sup>76</sup>

Clausewitz advocated that policy determines the character of war. President Bush and General Petraeus understood this point: They realized that in order for Iraq to become a truly sovereign state, security would have to be established. Thus, it became a matter of national policy, both in the U.S. and Iraq, that security was the fundamental effort in any realistic program of nation-building. The surge thus set the conditions for Iraqi political progress. The security framework signed in early 2009 was due, in large part, to the success of the surge. Iraq was clearly on the road towards autonomy; it was developing sufficient capability to provide for its own security. Arguably, without the surge, such progress was highly unlikely. President Bush admits that there were things that went wrong in Iraq; however, he remains confident the “cause is eternally right.”<sup>77</sup>

Our nation’s civil-military relations are bedrock for our democracy. Whereas Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon and thereby made himself an enemy of the state, Generals Grant and Petraeus served their Presidents honorably. Their leadership and subsequent actions endorsed Clausewitz’s dictum that politics determine the nature of a war. Likewise, their close-knit relationship with their respective Presidents fostered a freedom of discussion and the free flow of ideas that moved the country towards its strategic objectives. Both President Lincoln and Bush acknowledged their role as policy maker. They recognized that ignoring their commanders’ counsel often led to confusion and mistrust from both sides of the aisle. When political necessity trumped a military decision, both Presidents did not hesitate to act accordingly. For Lincoln, Early’s threat to Washington, D.C. forced him to remind Grant of his political duties and responsibilities. Likewise, Bush resisted both public and military advice by ordering the

surge. Fortunately, Presidents Lincoln and Bush could rely totally on two men who recognized their role in civil-military relations.

The discussion of civil-military relations has recently been highlighted again by an article appearing in the *Joint Force Quarterly*. U.S. Marine Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Milburn takes the position that dissent and disobedience by military officers to civilian authority should be accepted. He wrote, "There are circumstances under which a military officer is not only justified but also obligated to disobey a legal order."<sup>78</sup> He further asserts that the military professional provides the proper check and balance to those national leaders who are less skilled than Lincoln or Winston Churchill.<sup>79</sup> Yet, the question one must ask is what defines the skills of a national leader that Milburn alludes to? By all accounts, President Bill Clinton was a remarkably gifted politician; however, he had never served in uniform. Does that serve as criteria for a future national leader when it comes to deciding matters of policy in which the military is involved? Yet, President Clinton ordered troops into the Balkans. If our military leaders had the authority to choose when a particular policy decision might lead to disaster, as Milburn opines, then our entire framework as a democracy would quickly collapse. Civil-military relations expert Richard Kohn, in a rebuttal to the Milburn article, wrote in regard to such dissent, "if attempted by more than one officer, or as the product of discussion, disobedience becomes conspiracy and revolt, not exactly 'moral' or 'professional' by stretch of the imagination."<sup>80</sup> Kohn stated such an attitude if allowed "would unhinge the American military and put the Nation's safety in jeopardy."<sup>81</sup>

Equally disturbing is Milburn's notion that "[s]ound decision making depends on the statesman and Soldier sharing alike a responsibility for the execution of both policy



and strategy.”<sup>82</sup> Such a philosophy runs contrary to everything Clausewitz wrote about civil-military relations. As Clausewitz observed, “No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political.”<sup>83</sup> This paper has attempted to reveal strong civil-military relations are a cornerstone to our democracy and the best formula for achieving political-strategic objectives. Both Grant and Petraeus demonstrated they understood their role with respect to the President they served. For example, Grant had to be reminded by Lincoln of the political ramifications when Early threatened Washington, D.C. Eliot Cohen opined that if such a lapse in judgment, from arguably America’s greatest general, could occur, “it could happen to lesser men.”<sup>84</sup> Senior military leaders can voice their dissent, but they should do so in private to their civilian authorities. The reason America is the longest standing democracy in the world could, arguably, be attributed to the fact that our military leaders, throughout our history, have understood this principle.

The Milburn article also contends that “the military professional plays a key role as a check and balance at the distinct juncture between policy and military strategy.”<sup>85</sup> The U.S. constitution authorizes three branches of government: executive, legislative and judicial. The check and balance debate in those hallowed halls of Philadelphia did not include the military. Again, Richard Kohn rebutted that “the constitution explicitly subordinates the military to each branch and specifically prohibits in every way possible the military from arrogating to itself the ability, much less the obligation, to defy constituted authority.”<sup>86</sup>

On June 23, 2010 President Barak Obama held a briefing in the Rose Garden upon which he accepted the resignation of General Stanley McChrystal as the

commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The incident that led to these turn of events involved disparaging remarks made by members of General McChrystal's staff to *Rolling Stone* magazine about the President and Vice-President. Identifying the importance of civil-military relations, President Obama remarked about the published article that "It undermines the civilian control of the military that is at the core of our democratic system. And it erodes the trust that's necessary for our team to work together to achieve our objectives in Afghanistan."<sup>87</sup> Trust—a key word with respect to the relationship between a President and his commanders. Lincoln had it with Grant and Bush with Petraeus. Whether people agreed with President Obama's decision to accept General McChrystal resignation, one cannot argue that he reconfirmed the relationships necessary between the office of the presidency and generals in the field. Other advocates argued that McChrystal's actions were completely "at odds with the military's professional ethic, the constitutional principle of civilian control, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice."<sup>88</sup>

Both Generals Grant and Petraeus emphasized that if policy decisions were made that they could not support, they would either retire or resign from the service. President Obama's actions vis-a-vis General McChrystal should remind all military professionals that there are consequences to our actions and to our words—through any loose interpretation of ethical behavior, misunderstanding of civilian control over the military, or the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Richard Kohn observed officers that go beyond the normal point of advice and discussions to their civilian superiors do so "to the detriment of their service, national defense, and indeed their professional souls."<sup>89</sup>

Napoleon grabbed the crown during his coronation and placed it upon his own head. The symbology of this act was not left unnoticed by those in attendance-- Napoleon had crowned himself emperor, supreme ruler, and dictator of France. George Washington poses a stark contrast when compared to the arrogance of Napoleon. Washington was a man of humility and modesty. He fully realized the power he had as commander of the Continental Army and then, subsequently, as President of the United States. He was uniquely qualified to judge and stress the importance of civil-military relations. Arguably, Washington's recognition of this highly potential threat to the emerging democracy laid the foundation for Lincoln, Grant, Pershing, Eisenhower, Marshall, Bush, Petraeus and others who have lifted our nation out of the depths of war. Current and future leaders, both military and political, should be reminded of his example, and the example of others who have demonstrated the importance of civil-military relations. Generals Grant and Petraeus clearly understood the criticality of having a loyal and subordinate relationship with their commander-in-chief. In 1783 George Washington gave his farewell address to his Army. Washington addresses the importance of supporting our federal government with all the vigor and loyalty as shown by his Officers and Soldiers during the Revolutionary War. His words should challenge all leaders, reminding each of us of our role and who we are to serve—for the betterment of our nation:

“that unless the principles of the Federal Government were properly supported, and the Powers of the Union increased, the honor, dignity and justice of the Nation would be lost forever; yet he cannot help repeating on this occasion, so interesting a sentiment, and leaving it as his last injunction to every Officer and every Soldier, who may view the subject in the same serious point of light, to add his best endeavors to those of his worthy fellow citizens towards effecting these great and valuable

purposes, on which our very existence as a Nation so materially depends.”<sup>90</sup>

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Andrew J. Goodpaster and Samuel P. Huntington, *Civil-Military Relations* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), 31. The authors stress the importance that such a relationship is the cornerstone of a democratically governed society. Moreover, there was a contrast between nations where military and political powers are combined.

<sup>2</sup> Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State: Reforming the National Security Decision-Making Process at the Civil-Military Nexus* (Stanford University: Hoover Institution, 2008), 91. Because of how Washington handled the situation and the public’s perception of the incident, it actually cast favorable light upon the Army. Gibson wrote, “that the Army actually rejected these notions and acted virtuously, protecting liberty and the nascent government.”

<sup>3</sup> Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., *Carl Von Clausewitz On War* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 606.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* Clausewitz did emphasize that “political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But when plans for a war or a campaign are under study, this point of view is indispensable”.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 608.

<sup>6</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 163.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 191.

<sup>8</sup> James Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 29, No.1 (Fall 2002): 24.

<sup>9</sup> George R. Mastroianni, Ph.D., and Wilbur J. Scott, Ph.D., “After Iraq: The Politics of Blame and Civilian-Military Relations,” *Military Review*, (July-August 2008): 54. In the article, the authors cite a commencement address Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave to the Air Force Academy. During the address, the secretary stressed two vital pillars of our society: Congress and the free press. Moreover, these two pillars, along with a non-political military will “assure a free country”.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> Goodpaster and Huntington, *Civil-Military Relations*, 31.

<sup>12</sup> COL Sean Hannah, “US Army Combined Arms Center Information Paper on American Civil-Military Relations,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Profession and Ethic, Aug 2010), 3.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 4. Under Article 88 of the UCMJ, specific individuals include: the President, Vice President, Congress, Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the Governor or legislature of any state in which the officer is on duty or is present.

<sup>16</sup> Eliot Cohen, *Supreme Command* (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 16. An excellent work with a chapter focusing primarily on President Lincoln and General Grant—Lincoln Sends a Letter.

<sup>17</sup> Bruce Catton, *US Grant and the American Military Tradition* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1954), 105.

<sup>18</sup> T. Harry Williams, *Lincoln and His Generals* (New York: Vintage Books, 1952), 272.

<sup>19</sup> Jesse Grant Cramer, eds., *Letters of Ulysses S. Grant to his Father and His Youngest Sister, 1857 – 78* (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1912), 84-85. Grant, in this same letter, remarked simply that if Congress passes any law, and the Presidents signs it he will execute the order. Grant even emphasized he had no opinion with regard to slavery, leaving one to consider that if the President issued a particular order on slavery Grant would, also, execute that order. His single-mindedness clearly comes through in this letter to his father.

<sup>20</sup> Catton, *US Grant and the American Military Tradition*, 106. Grant stressed that so long as he holds a commission in the Army, he essentially has “no views of my own to carry out”.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> James Harrison Wilson, *The Life of John A. Rawlins* (New York: Neale Publishing Company, 1916), 187. The advisor was a common friend, J. Russell Jones who was then a United States Marshal. Interestingly, Lincoln’s fears of Grants political ambitions were again stirred after his success at Chattanooga.

<sup>23</sup> Julian K. Larke, *General Grant and His Campaigns* (New York: J.C. Derby & N.C. Miller, 1864), 472. Grant, after the President’s remarks, stated, “it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations.” His comments are a reflection on his complete desire to satisfy and support the President for achieving his objectives for the war.

<sup>24</sup> E. B. Long, eds., *Personal Memoirs of US Grant* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 1982), 361-362. With regard to Early’s threat to Washington, D.C in 1864, I could find no reference in Grant’s memoirs that suggest Lincoln’s chastisement of his initial conduct with regard to Early’s threat to the capitol.

<sup>25</sup> John Keegan, *The Mask of Command* (New York: Viking Penguin, Inc., 1987), 232. Keegan emphasizes that Grant took seriously the relationship he would have with the President. Noting that Grant was law-abiding to his fingertips and that no matter how much power he was given, he must never “infringe the authority of Congress or the President.”

<sup>26</sup> Eric Foner, eds., *Our Lincoln: New Perspectives on Lincoln and His World* (New York: W.W. Fortner & Co, 2010), 30. Foner also points out that Lincoln appointed several politicians

with little to no military experience to positions in the Army. The reason being, as Foner observes, was “to mobilize their constituencies for the war effort”.

<sup>27</sup> Trevor N. Dupuy, *Abraham Lincoln: Commander in Chief* (New York: Franklin Watts, 2000), 146 – 148. Grant and Lincoln certainly had an open relationship. Dupuy points out that Lincoln never failed to inform Grant when political considerations or policy would affect strategy or operations.

<sup>28</sup> Geoffrey Perret, *Lincoln’s War: the Untold Story of America’s Greatest President as Command in Chief* (New York: Random House, 2004), 322-323. The author opines that had Grant not had to send some of his best divisions to Knoxville, he could have moved onto Atlanta or to Mobile while confederate forces were too scattered to resist. This does provide an excellent example of where military and political considerations clashed. The President was very much concerned about pro-union supporters in the Knoxville area and thus the primary reason behind his injection in military matters.

<sup>29</sup> Howard and Paret, *Carl Von Clausewitz On War*, 607.

<sup>30</sup> Michael Howard, *Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations* (Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press, 1959), 175. Howard discusses two primary reasons why the “militarization” of the military control occurred: the service academies and the professionalization of the Soldier based upon the experience of the war itself. Howard opines that Lincoln actually reduced civilian control of the military due to these two observations.

<sup>31</sup> Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 18.

<sup>32</sup> Keegan, *The Mask of Command*, 232.

<sup>33</sup> Major General Grenville M. Dodge, *Personal Recollections of President Abraham Lincoln, General Ulysses S. Grant and General William T. Sherman* (Council Bluffs, Iowa: The Monarch Printing Company, 1915), 74-75. An additional telegram from the President to Grant emphasized that he must watch over the situation every hour and day. Given the level of importance Lincoln was attaching to this threat, it is a wonder Grant did not immediately understand the consequences of his stiffness in carrying out the instructions.

<sup>34</sup> Bruce Catton, *Grant Takes Command* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1968), 313. Catton emphasized that Grant was unable to comprehend the chaos that reigned in Washington at the time.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> Dodge, *Personal Recollections of President Abraham Lincoln, General Ulysses S. Grant and General William T. Sherman*, 75.

<sup>37</sup> Williams, *Lincoln and His Generals*, 331.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 332.

<sup>39</sup> Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 50. Not to make an excuse, but Cohen does highlight that generals are mostly focused on the military matters going on in the theater. However, the

successful ones, those rising in the ranks, can observe when the lines of military matters and political considerations cross. Grant, in this instance, had to be reminded of the political ramifications.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Howard and Paret, *Carl Von Clausewitz On War*, 608.

<sup>42</sup> Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 51.

<sup>43</sup> Catton, *Grant Takes Command*, 337-338. Catton does highlight that Grant realized that even military appointments during the time of a presidential election required reflection and much consideration. Catton uses the analogy of the decisions that are made on the battlefield, similar to the political considerations that must be made. This is especially true during the time of an election.

<sup>44</sup> Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 51.

<sup>45</sup> David Petraeus, "Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam", *Parameters*, Vol. XVI, No.3 (1986), 45. Petraeus did opine that the Vietnam era did leave many in the military to question the "abilities and motivations of politicians".

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 48. Again, Petraeus warns that such coordination is contrary to the lessons coming out of the Vietnam War. He gives the example of "political meddling and micromanagement in operational concerns".

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 49.

<sup>48</sup> Michael C. Desch, "Bush and the Generals," *Foreign Affairs* (New York: May/June 2007), <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed September 15, 2010).

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, *The Fourth Star*, (New York: Crown Publishers, 2009), 169. The authors contended that mixed messages were emanating from the White House and the Pentagon. President Bush would say one thing about the situation in the Middle East, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld would say another.

<sup>51</sup> George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 380.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 382.

<sup>53</sup> Desch, "Bush and the Generals", <http://proquest.umi.com>.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush*, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 397. Herspring does contend that Rumsfeld's view of civil-military relations was he was in charge of everything and the military simply acquiesced to his decisions. To violate Clausewitz's principle about

interfering in operational and tactical matters, Herspring does observe that is what Rumsfeld did as Secretary of Defense.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 401.

<sup>57</sup> Petraeus, "Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam", 49.

<sup>58</sup> Peter Feaver, "Rethinking Iraq: Anatomy of the Surge," *Commentary*, 125,4 (Apr 2008): 24.

<sup>59</sup> Bush, *Decision Points*, 363.

<sup>60</sup> Robert Draper, *Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush*, (New York: Free Press, 2007), 402-403. What is immediately apparent within these selected pages is the observations of both Generals Casey and Chiarelli. Both were dead set against the surge and additional troops. General Chiarelli emphasized that the war will not be won at the point of the bayonet.

<sup>61</sup> Feaver, "Rethinking Iraq: Anatomy of the Surge," 26-27.

<sup>62</sup> David Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Situation In Iraq, (Washington, DC: Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, September 2007), 2.

<sup>63</sup> Cloud and Jaffe, *The Fourth Star*, 247. The authors observe that the President did not blame Generals Casey or Abizaid for the situation in Iraq. The mess in Iraq that Casey inherited was based, in large part, upon decisions the administration had made. The President recognized that and wanted to ensure that Casey was not pictured as the fall guy.

<sup>64</sup> Bush, *Decision Points*, 365.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 268.

<sup>66</sup> Draper, *Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush*, 414.

<sup>67</sup> Desch, Bush and the Generals, <http://proquest.umi.com>

<sup>68</sup> Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a way out of Iraq*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 82.

<sup>69</sup> George W. Bush, "Statement by President Bush on Iraq; Bush responds to Petraeus, Crocker's recommendations to Congress," (Office of the Press Secretary: The White House, April 10, 2008)

<sup>70</sup> Cloud and Jaffe, *The Fourth Star*, (New York: Crown Publishers, 2009), 253-254. Of note, Generals Casey and Petraeus did not see eye-to-eye on this new strategy. For General Casey, Iraq taking responsibility for its own security was the critical factor towards eventual stability.

<sup>71</sup> Bush, *Decision Points*, 375.

<sup>72</sup> Conrad Crane of Carlisle Barracks, interview by COL Ed Lowe, November 16, 2010.



<sup>73</sup> Feaver, "Rethinking Iraq: Anatomy of the Surge," 27.

<sup>74</sup> Bush, *Decision Points*, 389.

<sup>75</sup> Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Situation In Iraq, 1.

<sup>76</sup> Bush, *Decision Points*, 389.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 394.

<sup>78</sup> Andrew Milburn, "Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 59, 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter (2010), 101.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 103-104.

<sup>80</sup> Richard Kohn, To the Editor, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/letters-to-the-editor-60.html> (accessed January 25, 2011). Rebuttal to "Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional" found at JFQ 59, 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter, (2010).

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>82</sup> Milburn, "Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional", 104.

<sup>83</sup> Howard and Paret, *Carl Von Clausewitz On War*, 607.

<sup>84</sup> Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 50.

<sup>85</sup> Milburn, "Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional", 106.

<sup>86</sup> Kohn, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/letters-to-the-editor-60.html> (accessed January 25, 2011).

<sup>87</sup> President Barak Obama, "Statement by the President in the Rose Garden", <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-rose-garden> (accessed January 25, 2011).

<sup>88</sup> Matthew Moten, "Out of Order: Strengthening the Political-Military Relationship," *Foreign Affairs*, <http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.usawcpubs.org/pqdweb?index=1&did=2129061071&SearchMode=1&sid=8&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1296060850&clientId=20167> (accessed January 25, 2011)

<sup>89</sup> Richard H. Kohn, "Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," *World Affairs*, Vol. 170, Issue. 3 (Winter 2008), 80.

<sup>90</sup> George Washington, "Washington's Farewell Address to the Army," The papers of George Washington, <http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents/revolution/farewell.index.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).

