“IMPROVING FRIENDLY NETWORKS TO EFFECTIVELY COMBAT VIOLENT EXTREMIST NETWORKS”

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The complexity of the contemporary international environment has created a significant shift to U.S. national security objectives. These new challenges have made it apparent that the U.S. is unable to absorb the resource costs of conducting sustained operations in multiple regions. The U.S. President’s National Security Strategy emphasizes a national security requirement to improve our nation’s building partner nation capacity (BPC) capabilities. This paper examines U.S. Government (USG) efforts to develop networks to counter violent extremist networks. The examination includes: (1) a description of the complex contemporary environment resulting in a renewed focus on stability operations compared to combat operations; (2) a review of USG principal documents relating to BPC; (3) a comparison of the intent behind Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 7500 and related guidance in USG principal documents; (4) a description of Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD) friendly network shortfalls; (5) a description of DoS and DoD efforts to improve friendly network processes; and (6) possible solutions to improve DoS and DoD processes to better meet the intent of USG principle documents.
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The complexity of the contemporary international environment has created a significant shift to U.S. national security objectives. These new challenges have made it apparent that the U.S. is unable to absorb the resource costs of conducting sustained operations in multiple regions. The U.S. President’s National Security Strategy emphasizes a national security requirement to improve our nation’s building partner nation capacity (BPC) capabilities. This paper examines U.S. Government (USG) efforts to develop networks to counter violent extremist networks. The examination includes: (1) a description of the complex contemporary environment resulting in a renewed focus on stability operations compared to combat operations; (2) a review of USG principal documents relating to BPC; (3) a comparison of the intent behind Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 7500 and related guidance in USG principal documents; (4) a description of Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD) friendly network shortfalls; (5) a description of DoS and DoD efforts to improve friendly network processes; and (6) possible solutions to improve DoS and DoD processes to better meet the intent of USG principle documents.
In the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States’ safety and security...are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves....

—Robert M. Gates

The complexity of the contemporary international environment has created a significant shift to both U.S. national security objectives and the necessary means to meet those objectives. These new challenges have made it apparent that the U.S. is not only unable to unilaterally absorb the resource costs of conducting sustained operations in multiple regions, but that building partner nation capacity (BPC) is the most effective way to create a global security network to counter the intent of violent extremist organizations (VEO). The U.S. President’s National Security Strategy (NSS) emphasizes a national security requirement to improve our nation’s BPC capabilities. There have been many efforts by both the Departments of Defense and State (DoD, DoS) to meet the intent of the NSS. However, there is strong evidence that both departments are struggling to meet this objective. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of improving friendly network capabilities to more effectively combat al Qaeda and associated extremist organizations’ terrorism. To accomplish this, this paper will include the following: a review of the background and description of the complex contemporary environment resulting in a renewed focus on stability operations compared to combat operations, a brief review of principal documents that articulate the United States Government’s (USG) grand strategy to further develop the effectiveness of friendly networks, a comparison of the intent behind Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 7500 and related guidance in the principal documents, and a description of
DoD and DoS network deficiencies. Finally, this paper will provide a variety of proposed solutions to improve friendly network capabilities to meet NSS objectives related to BPC.

**Background and Contemporary Environment**

In the near future, the most damaging threats to U.S. interests and national security are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately provide the necessary social programs or security for their people. Securing a successful process to strengthen both the U.S. Government’s internal networks and that of international partners is the predominant security challenge. However, a successful process is an extremely complex institutional challenge. Soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the George W. Bush Administration linked the development of our partners with national security goals in the 2002 and 2006 NSS.\(^2\) However, almost ten years later, the USG continues to struggle with developing the capability and capacity to effectively develop the security of our partners. The challenge is one that the U.S. must overcome. U.S. President Barack Obama reinforced the necessity of the issue in the 2010 NSS:

> The United States must improve its capability to strengthen the security of states at risk of conflict and violence. We will undertake long-term, sustained efforts to strengthen the capacity of security forces to guarantee internal security, defend against external threats, and promote regional security and respect for human rights and the rule of law.\(^3\)

The Secretary of Defense has identified “building partner capacity” (BPC) as a critical “way” to “helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance.\(^4\) The U.S.’ utilization of a form of BPC began prior to its entrance into World War II via the Lend-Lease program with the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Lend-Lease was devised to allow the U.S. President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, to
ship weapons, food, and/or equipment to countries struggling against the Axis powers (Germany, Japan, and Italy) which, in turn, assisted U.S. defense. BPC was also a key U.S. strategy during the Cold War with allies and partners to include Western Europe, Greece, and South Korea. For these reasons, U.S. military and diplomatic instruments of power were established during the Cold War era for Cold War threats, and are intuitively outdated. Secretary Gates points out that the military was designed to “defeat other armies, navies, and air forces, not to advise, train, and equip them.” Similarly, in referring to the diplomatic arm, he states their design was to “manage relationships between states, rather than to help build states from within.”

One of the most important lessons learned from U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not enough. Soft power capabilities along with military power (now collectively termed “smart power”) are indispensable to lasting victory and achieving political objectives. Citing an unpublished RAND study, Thomas Ricks argues that DoD’s lack of capabilities to oversee a large interagency and primarily civilian mission for postwar Iraq was problematic and most likely doomed the effort from the start. Secretary Gates argues for additional soft power capacity in order to overcome the U.S. Government’s challenges of the future: “[Challenges] cannot be overcome by military means alone… and will require devoting considerably more resources to non-military instruments of power.” Additionally, many observers argue that the lack of soft power capacity isn’t the single causal factor to postwar Iraq challenges, but that tasking one instrument of power (DoD) at the regional level to integrate the capabilities of the other instruments of power is problematic as well.
Additionally, many argue (notably the U.S Secretary of Defense) that DoD’s increasing role in disbursing foreign aid has led to a “militarization” of USG foreign policy.\(^9\) Susan Epstein, in her Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, cites that DoD disbursement of foreign aid has risen over 30% from 2001 to 2007. Although a significant portion of that increase is due to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, if those numbers are excluded, DoD’s share has still risen almost 10% in the same timeframe.\(^{10}\)

Additionally, Secretary Gates warns of “a ‘creeping militarization’ of aspects of foreign policy if imbalances within the national security system were not addressed.”\(^{11}\)

Following the attacks of 9/11, the USG failed in quickly getting numerous programs started, e.g., long delays in reimbursing the government of Pakistan for overflight rights and building a formal Afghan Army.\(^{12}\) Failures were due to both security cooperation and security assistance (both Title 10 and Title 22 U.S. Code) system that had been developed for a predictable Cold War scenario, causing DoD to rely heavily on contractors and reservists.

Reaction to these inefficiencies led the USG to issue National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44) and Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (DODD 3000.05). NSPD 44 empowered the DoS to coordinate and lead a whole-of-government approach to bolster the sovereignty of governments abroad in order to “prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.”\(^{13}\) NSPD 44 further specifies that the DoS and DoD will coordinate stabilization plans where appropriate, delineates planning
responsibilities, and restates DoD Directive 3000.5 taskings that commit the military to supporting stabilization efforts.\textsuperscript{14}

DODD 3000.05 cemented a significant shift in DoD policy in meeting the requirements outlined in NSPD 44 by establishing stability operations as a core mission and a priority “comparable to combat operations.”\textsuperscript{15} Recognizing a deficit in U.S. “soft power,” the directive reinforces that integrated military and civilian efforts are critical to successful stability operations and that military-civilian teams are a critical tool that the military will continue to lead or support.\textsuperscript{16}

Because stability operations are now considered comparable to combat operations, it is understandable that the stability operations community of interest will expand. With stability operations’ new importance comes an increased importance with the proper use of the correct terminology. Understandably, until both the novelty of the high prioritization of stability operations subsides and conceptual terminology becomes doctrinal, there will continue to be ambiguity among the terminology used when referring to collective security activities. Case in point, the term “building partnership capacity,” although used by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, remains a conceptual term in that it is not officially defined in policy documents or doctrine. The U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Command’s Pamphlet 525-5-301, \textit{Building Partnership Capacity}, is an outstanding resource for understanding BPC-related terminology (both doctrinal and conceptual), and is provided in a way that helps the reader understand their nuanced differences and context for interagency use. Devoting a chapter to \textit{Unraveling the Language}, the TRADOC pamphlet reduces the convolution of both the doctrinal and conceptual terminology of BPC-related activities. It begins the chapter by demystifying
the complexity of BPC related terminology by explaining BPC is the broadest term in the family of USG collective security activities conducted outside the U.S. with host nation and/or coalition partners. For the purposes of this paper, BPC is defined as the “[U.S. Government’s] targeted efforts to improve the collective security of the United States and its partners.”

Principal Documents

Almost ten years after al Qaeda’s attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, the USG’s strategic leaders of military and diplomatic instruments of national power continue to struggle with effectively countering al Qaeda and associated networks’ terrorism. Strategic and supporting guidance continues to be improved but is not generally understood at the operational and tactical levels. Following is a short review of the framework of U.S. strategies and directives and the most recent published guidance recognizing the importance of a global security network.

National Security Strategy. The National Security Strategy is a document prepared periodically by the USG’s executive branch for Congress. It outlines the major national security concerns and how the administration plans to deal with them. In the recently released NSS of May 2010, President Obama is clearly dedicated to improving the USGs’ capabilities to counter VEO intent. In Chapter III, Advancing Our Interests, he states:

Wherever al-Qa’ida or its terrorist affiliates attempt to establish a safe haven—as they have in Yemen, Somalia, the Maghreb, and the Sahel—we will meet them with growing pressure. We also will strengthen our own network of partners to disable al-Qa’ida’s financial, human, and planning networks; disrupt terrorist operations before they mature; and address potential safe-havens before al-Qa’ida and its terrorist affiliates can take root. These efforts will focus on information-sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and establishing new practices to counter evolving adversaries. We will also help states avoid becoming terrorist safe havens
by helping them build their capacity for responsible governance and security through development and security sector assistance.\(^{19}\)

Although the NSS is general in content by design, the U.S. President furthers both the importance and clarity of his guidance when highlighting his strategy for security of “At-Risk States.”

The United States must improve its capability to strengthen the security of states at risk of conflict and violence. We will undertake long-term, sustained efforts to strengthen the capacity of security forces to guarantee internal security, defend against external threats, and promote regional security and respect for human rights and the rule of law.\(^{20}\)

**Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).** The 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established the requirement for the Secretary of Defense to develop the QDR every four years. The QDR is intended to be a comprehensive examination of national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget, and various other policies for the next 20 years. The most recent QDR was released in February 2010. Recognizing the importance of “smart power,” it emphasizes both improved integration with civilian agencies and highlights security cooperation (SC) activities, specifically security force assistance (SFA) missions, as a primary means to develop partner nation capacity.\(^{21}\) SC includes all *DoD interactions* with foreign defense establishments in order to build relationships, develop capabilities, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime or contingency access to the host nation. SC activities are in support of a Combatant Commander’s theater security cooperation plan. SFA is very similar to SC in that it is a tool to assist with BPC, but SFA is an umbrella term that includes DoD activities within a whole-of-government approach, i.e., unified action by all USG departments and agencies.\(^{22}\)
National Security Presidential Directive. The President announces national security decisions via National Security Presidential Directives. NSPD 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, was signed in early 2005 by President Bush. Its purpose was to improve interagency coordination, planning, and implementation of USG reconstruction and stabilization efforts. As mentioned earlier, it was designed to empower the DoS to coordinate and lead a whole-of-government approach in said efforts in order to promote the security of the U.S.23

Department of Defense Directive (DODD). DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR), was signed in November 2005. It is the cornerstone guidance document designed to meet DoD’s requirements outlined in NSPD 44. As mentioned earlier, this one document established stability operations as a core mission and on par with combat operations.24 Germaine to BPC, it requires the military to “develop greater means to help build other countries’ security capacity quickly to ensure security in their own lands or to contribute forces to stability operations elsewhere.”25

Comparison of Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 7500 and Principal Documents

CONPLAN 7500 was crafted at U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and approved by the U.S. Secretary of Defense. CONPLAN 7500 serves as both DoD’s guiding plan and the interagency’s supporting plan for combating violent extremist organizations.26 In 2009, USSOCOM Commander, Admiral Eric Olson, suggested during his remarks to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy that the likelihood of major war is lessening: “We see the probability of major military conflict between developed nations decreasing. Even if you accept that state-on-state confrontation is a
realistic possibility, it is still probable that states will employ asymmetrical methods of warfare.”  

As often discussed, the world has grown increasingly flat through globalization. The center of gravity is now with the people. This is evidenced today in America’s limited wars with non-state actors. Theater commanders routinely place the “population” at both the friendly and enemy centers of gravity. Admiral Olson maintains this point:

> The conflicts in which we are engaged are not going to be resolved by… the Department of Defense. These conflicts are bigger than us; they will require a global effort to complete successfully….We see Westphalian states dominating the political construct, but non-state actors will compete more vigorously with nation-states for influence over populations [emphasis added].

CONPLAN 7500 utilizes direct (kinetic) and indirect (non-kinetic) approaches to build an environment that minimizes an insurgency or extremist organization’s influence on the population. Direct and indirect approaches are various but are evidenced in George C. Herring’s book *America’s Longest War*. In 1961, the U.S. and South Vietnam Governments launched a two-pronged counterinsurgency (COIN) plan. The South Vietnamese began their strategic hamlet program, a program to gain active participation of the rural population in the war against the insurgency known as the National Liberation Front (NLF). The strategic hamlet program was an indirect approach to shape the environment. The program’s intent was to bring peasants together from scattered villages and protect them with military forces. The hamlets were designed not only to protect them from NLF terror, but to introduce an environment for social and economic efforts that would convince the villagers that life under the South Vietnam Government would be better than the life provided by the insurgents.
During the same timeframe, the U.S. expanded its role in Vietnam through a program
called “Project Beefup,” in which both direct and indirect approaches were utilized. The
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) program utilized 9,000 “advisors” to
conduct Civic Action programs by Army Special Forces (indirect approach),
insert/extract Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) personnel into battle zones
(direct approach), accompany Vietnamese pilot trainees on bombing runs, and fight with
ARVN units at the battalion level. Thus, it illustrated building partner capacity, which is
an indirect approach, and fighting, which is a direct approach. During the same
timeframe, U.S. military assistance more than doubled, including the delivery of
armored personnel carriers and hundreds of aircraft (indirect approach).\(^{29}\)

However, the indirect approach is the more important of the two. Admiral Olson
captures the importance of indirect vs. direct in contemporary wars best when he wrote:

> The direct approach is urgent, necessary, chaotic and kinetic, and the
effects are mostly short term. But they are not decisive. Enduring results
come from the *indirect* [emphasis in original] approaches—those in which
we enable partners to combat violent extremist organizations themselves
by contributing to their capabilities through training, equipment, transfer of
technology, wargaming, and so forth.\(^{30}\)

The indirect approach, over time, increases the capabilities of partner nations to fight
the enemy within/outside their borders and encourages an environment in which the
population ceases, or more realistically, minimizes their support to violent extremists or
an insurgency.

**Interagency Process Shortcomings**

Many observers have argued the USG is slow to move toward fighting the
current asymmetric threat, in which the population is the center of gravity. Just as
Secretary Gates described the U.S. military as ill-designed to advise, train, and equip
foreign security forces, he noted “the United States’ civilian instruments of power were
designed primarily to manage relationships between states, rather than to help build
states from within.”

NSPD 44 is significant because it empowers the DoS to coordinate and lead
USG efforts to bolster foreign governments’ sovereignty, i.e., stability operations. Since
DoS is in the lead for stabilization efforts, it is important to clarify that it is the U.S.
ambassador’s responsibility to manage relations with the partner nation in which DoD
conducts SC efforts. Within the country team, the Security Cooperation Officer (SCO),
formerly known as the Security Assistance Officer, manages the embassy’s SC and
security assistance (SA) efforts supporting U.S. foreign policy on behalf of the
Ambassador.

Funding is one significant area where difficulties lie with DoS and DoD efforts
with BPC via SC. Because SC is an umbrella term which SA falls under, DoD normally
refers to Title 10 missions as SC, and those missions that fall under Title 22 authorities
as SA. The recent RAND study, Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country
Team, defines well the inefficiencies with respect to funding authorities for stability
operations:

**Title 22** funds are appropriated to the State Department, which often
transfers them to DoD, which in turn manages and executes most security
assistance programs.… Title 22 is less flexible in some ways, mainly
because Congress authorizes and appropriates these funds on a by-
country and by program basis, and requires congressional notification and
permission to move funds from one effort to another.

**Title 10** funds are appropriated to DoD and are intended for operations
and maintenance of the U.S. military. These funds are often used to fund
international participation in U.S. joint exercises, military personnel
exchanges, or military-to-military contacts as a way to enhance the
relationships between partner militaries and U.S. forces.
In addition to the Rand study, a Joint Special Operations University Monograph by George A. Crawford categorize USG dysfunctional efforts at combating terrorism using three categories: strategic, or national level; operational, or regional level; and, tactical, or local level.\textsuperscript{34} For purposes of this paper, I will use the national, regional, and local levels to separate further analysis or descriptions.

**National Level.** At the national level, because of the different authorities between Title 10 and Title 22 discussed previously, each funding code has intuitively created separate organizations and cultures leading to stovepiped approaches when working with partner nations. Additionally, DoD produces multiyear funding programs while the DoS works on a single-year mentality.\textsuperscript{35} One can easily see this de-linked planning effort detracts from a synchronized strategic effort to build critical allies’ security capacity.

Most likely the most significant causal factor is the disproportion between the DoD and the DoS workforce. With such fewer people working in DoS compared to the DoD, it would be impossible for DoS personnel to match man-for-man DoD’s planning and expeditionary capacity. As of September 2010, the DoS comprised 29,098 full time employees, whereas the DoD comprised approximately 2.2 million active duty and civilian personnel (1.4 million active duty and 750,000 civilians).\textsuperscript{36} Stated bluntly, the FY10 DoS manpower level is “decimal dust” when compared to DoD levels.

Although NSPD 44 and DODD 3000.05 recognize the renewed importance of BPC to further U.S. national interests, the bureaucratic inefficiencies of the interagency process, by design, equate to dysfunction in the contemporary environment. Created primarily by the National Security Act of 1947, the interagency process is characterized
by constant turf battles between agencies and departments and is further complicated with biased cultures within each organization. In a world where great power is exercised by primarily one nation, the U.S. is encumbered by the 1947 Act, and therefore is slower to act than its enemies and partners to quickly fund projects, sell equipment, and build necessary relationships. The various functions of BPC are also scattered within DoD itself, making efficiency a significant institutional challenge.

Secretary Gates clarifies the interagency dysfunction: “For all the improvements of recent years,” the tools of the interagency remain to be “a hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities…and unwieldy processes.”

**Regional Level.** Various difficulties at the regional level are fundamental to the “complex institutional challenge” of BPC. Geographically, the DoS does not have an equivalent DoD partner at the regional level. DoD of course has the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) and his various service components to include the Theater Special Operations Command. The GCC and component staffs often live in the region and conduct most of the SC planning. Their functional counterparts within the DoS, the regional bureaus, are generally located in Washington, D.C. This exacerbates the stovepiped organizations and culture differences originating at the national level.

Recognizing a lack of efficiency at the national level, President Obama’s administration decided that the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and the National Security Council (NSC) “should be supported by a single National Security Staff.” In principle, strategic policy and strategy decisions should be markedly more efficient with
the merging of the NSC and HSC staffs under the National Security Staff. However, as mentioned earlier with postwar Iraq, the inherent problems with successful national strategy execution lie below the strategic level when one instrument of power is tasked to integrate the efforts of other instruments of power.\textsuperscript{40}

At the regional level, no true integration of U.S. instruments of power exists, while quality results are based on quality cooperation.\textsuperscript{41} Understandably, it could easily be argued that the same causal factors that led to forming the National Security Staff at the national level are present at the regional and local levels. Execution of strategy at the regional level is inherently prone to problems due primarily to instruments of power being organized differently and lack of directive authority. DoD is organized with six GCCs responsible for various regions. The DoS also has six regional bureaus (led by Assistant Secretaries of State), but the boundaries do not match those of the GCCs. The mismatch in boundaries leads to difficult coordination even for those aspiring for cooperation. An example is U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), where the Combatant Commander (CCDR) must coordinate efforts with three assistant secretaries and 27 embassy-level country teams. Likewise, the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs must coordinate with USCENTCOM, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). Adding to the complexities is the fact that many organizations outside DoD have not developed a significant expeditionary capability.\textsuperscript{42} In summary, the State and Defense departments coordinate policy at the national level, but coordination is much less and is executed in makeshift fashion at the regional level.
Local Level. At the local level for the DoS is the U.S. Embassy in a specific country. It is here where Title 10 and 22 funds are managed in support of SC/SA via the Security Assistance Officer/Organization (SAO). Title 22 SA funds are based on the President’s budget submission, are normally year to year as mentioned earlier, and are set by program and country. Understandably, the GCC may want to shift SC efforts within his region because of the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment. Because Title 22 SA funds cannot be moved from country to country, the GCC has limited flexibility to meet the ever-changing SC requirements within his region. Additionally, the ambassador, via the SAO, has no authority to move monies between accounts or activities, reducing his/her flexibility to meet SC requirements within the country.

Interagency Efforts to Improve Efficiency

National Level. One possible way to improve USG efforts at BPC is to counter the difficulties created by separate funding authorities. The U.S. Secretary of Defense has recommended pooling funds to support SC efforts. One intended effect would be forced collaboration. Before any money was to be spent, both DoD and the DoS representatives would have to approve any action within the partner nation. This would lend to breaking down the communication gap between stovepiped organizations. The Secretary of Defense suggests there is a precedent for the effectiveness of pooled funds in the United Kingdom (U.K.). In Wolfgang Koerner’s Security Sector Reform: Defence Diplomacy, he describes the United Kingdom (U.K.) Government’s efforts and successes with pooled funds via the establishment of the Global Conflict and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools. These “pools” are funded via overseas development assistance (ODA) and non-ODA funds. Programs funded from these “pools” are agreed
to by U.K.’s Ministry of Defence, Department for International Development, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The U.K.’s intent behind pooling funds parallel Secretary Gates’ goals to “improve…conflict prevention…through joint analysis, long-term strategies, and improved coordination….” Koerner further adds there is “consensus…that U.K. interventions have proven more effective when based on a shared analysis of a conflict and joint response.”

Regional Level. The most recent effort to improve coordination and operational integration is the introduction of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) at the geographic and functional combatant commands. JIACGs are tailored to meet geographic CCDR’s requirements and may be comprised of representatives from both non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the full spectrum of U.S. interagency organizations and departments. Most importantly, the JIACG is composed of advisors who represent the civilian departments and agencies, i.e., the advisors only represent; they do not have authority to commit resources of the organization they represent. Observers argue that representatives or advisors in organizations such as the JIACG lack the directive authority necessary and are “reluctant to support interagency headquarters outside of Washington out of fear they will usurp policymaking authorities.” Lack of complete authority and resources detracts from the flexibility and agility required for a successful whole-of-government approach in the contemporary environment.

Local Level. The RAND study mentioned earlier provides a case study identified as the “Team Ukraine” model. Team Ukraine proved very successful in improving SC/SA efforts between most major political-military stakeholders in that country. Briefly,
the stakeholders were representatives from DoD, DoS, and intelligence community officials. They agreed on objectives and drafted a “Joint U.S.-Ukraine Action Plan.” They vetted the plan with their Ukrainian counterparts and then had the plan signed by the Ukrainian Chief of Defense as well as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense. The model flourished for two main reasons: (1) The political climate was ideal for BPC, and (2) U.S. action officers agreed to work toward common objectives. 

Possible Solutions to Increased BPC Effectiveness

As mentioned earlier, the U.S. NSS repeatedly states it is in the interests of the U.S. to more effectively build partner nation capacity in order to reduce conflict and prevent weak and failing states from becoming havens for terrorists. Solutions range from legislative actions to restructuring or adding agencies outside DoD (minimalist approach) to total dissolution of and restructuring the existing GCCs (decisive approach).

**National Level.** A long-term option, unlikely in an era of reduced Federal budgets, could be to establish DoS regional offices, both functionally and geographically comparable to the GCCs. This would provide the ideal scenario for synchronization at the DoS and DoD level required for efficient planning and execution of stability operations at the regional level. In addition to the difficulty in the cost of establishing regional offices, the DoS would similarly need to realign its regional bureaus in D.C.

The least invasive would be restructuring of organizations that already exist, thereby minimizing the need for additional manpower. Nora Bensahel and Anne Moisan propose bolstering the NSC leadership role. Grounded by the argument that the “interagency process is broken,” and that the NSC is the only organization that maintains “enforceable directive authority,” they propose legislative action to create
additional national level bureaucracy to coordinate interagency activities known as the Prevention, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Cell (PRSC). The director of the PRSC would answer directly to the National Security Advisor. The PRSC would create a flat organization with “directive authority over supporting interagency departments in policy development and strategic planning and execution of crisis management, conflict, and postconflict operations.” The PRSC would be comprised of 10-15 permanent members. The bulk of resources exist currently within the DoS’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) Headquarters with additional resources being drawn from DoD.

However, political acceptance of the PRSC would most likely be difficult. The S/CRS, developed from tasking within NSPD 44, has become the cornerstone of Secretary Clinton’s model of “smart power” to “enhance [USG’s] institutional capacity to respond to crises involving failing, failed, and post-conflict states and complex emergencies.” Similarly difficult with the Secretary of Defense, PRSC competes with DODD 3000.05 initiatives to establish stability operations as a core mission comparable to combat operations. Additionally, development of a PRSC continues to depend upon DoD to conduct a large majority of BPC activities and does not improve the directive authority problems at the regional level. Lack of political support, the remaining issue of “militarization” of foreign policy, and lack of unity of command in a region, i.e., directive authority for interagency efforts, detracts from the likely success of this proposal.

Regional Level. The most extensive option in academic circles begins by replacing the U.S. geographic combatant commands with civilian-led interagency
organizations, identified as Joint Interagency Commands (JIACOM). These organizations are led by a highly credentialed civilian with a four-star military deputy. The structure would include representatives from all major federal government agencies. Their charter would include true directive authority to all agencies below the NSC relative to activities within their assigned region, to include the U.S. embassies. Regional lines of authority could be along current DoS or GCC boundaries, or redrawn entirely. The NSC would be responsible for integrating policy among these regional entities and proposing solutions to the President for inflexible resource or mission clashes.  

Although the U.S. DoD would most likely be reluctant to dissolve the current GCC structure, the new construct changes are limited to the directive authority to integrate USG instruments of power at the regional level; the most common underlying theme detracting from civil-military success at the regional level. Importantly, Title 10 military administrative command responsibilities continue to run from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the JIACOM deputy. A secondary benefit to regional interagency directive authority is a dramatic increase in unity of effort across all the instruments of power, through all phases of operations, thus significantly improving chronological integration. An additional and critical benefit is the increased development of regional expertise for both DoS and DoD personnel. Although professional development programs exist, a JIACOM organization would force more robust experience overall. Lastly, the potential facilitation of coalition and alliance-based operations from a political standpoint is significant and would counteract contemporary concerns with the militarization of USG foreign policy.
Local Level. The 2010 RAND study on security cooperation prepared for the Army proposed a “Shape and Assist” option. This option, focused on better enabling the SAO, is designed to increase unity of effort for SC and train, assist, and advise (TAA) endeavors at the country level. This option would not be necessary for every embassy, but applied to priority and/or high priority countries. Recognizing that SAOs are not sufficiently staffed to plan and execute difficult SC activities, this option provides the Senior Defense Official (SDO) additional authority over SC and TAA efforts, and additional staff to manage increased responsibilities. The SDO becomes responsible for and directs all military personnel in country (minus those directly under the CCDR) with sufficient staff capable of managing a robust TAA effort. Additionally, SAO military personnel would receive robust professional development in the execution of SC/TAA missions and high degree of understanding of U.S. foreign policy goals within context of military missions supporting policy intent.

Difficulty with this proposal begins with the increased manpower requirement for the security cooperation skillset needed to meet the expanded responsibility of the SDO and his staff. Increases are beyond the DoD capacity that currently exists for the germane skillset. As such, programs to recruit, retain, and develop training for such capabilities will need to be further developed. Other challenges with this proposal are the concerns regarding militarization of foreign policy and a lack of true directive authority to integrate interagency operations from the national and regional levels. However, lessons learned from SC/TAA best practices in Vietnam, El Salvador, and Colombia reinforce the requirement for a focused and unified approach, which this option provides, to better achieve USG foreign policy goals.
Conclusion

The DoD and DoS are adapting to the President’s call to “strengthen the security of states at risk of conflict and violence.” The Navy is the latest to get onboard with its “Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges” signed in January 2010. The National Military Strategy signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 2011 reinforces the argument for “pooled-funds” suggested earlier by Secretary Gates. Secretary Clinton is aggressively pursuing her “smart power” initiative vis-à-vis the S/CRS. A pillar for SC success in the “Team Ukraine” model was that the “political climate was ripe.” The above mentioned indicators represent that the USG’s pol-mil environment is ripe for stability operations to succeed on a global scale where USG national interests are concerned. The difficulty is recognizing whether ongoing efforts are enough to meet the objective. This author suggests that they are not enough. The risk of “militarization” of foreign policy, as Secretary Gates warns, is real and detracts strongly from the USG achieving its NSS goal of “strengthening the security of at risk states.” A truly “long term and sustained effort” recognizable by USG allies, partners, and non-state actors would be to embrace the JIACOM option described earlier. The monumental shift of placing a diplomatic lead in GCC “like” commands across the world would de-militarize USG foreign policy and be a balancing enforcement measure within the national security system. The JIACOM option is the best solution to actuate a USG pol-mil focus of effort to streamline the national/regional level dysfunction at the core of the USG’s diplomatic and military instruments of power. By means of an epic strategic shift such as the JIACOM, the USG may be able to realize Sun Tzu’s proverb, “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”
Endnotes


5 Ibid., 3.


10 Epstein, *Foreign Aid Reform, 1*.


12 Ibid., 3.


14 Ibid., 4.

16 Ibid., 3.


18 Ibid., 20.


20 Ibid., 27.


22 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 12, 2001 (as amended through July 31, 2010), 416-417.


25 Ibid.


27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.


38 Ibid.


41 For background on cooperation at the operational level, see Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I, Joint Publication 3-08, (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 17, 2006), I-1.


46 Ibid.


48 Ibid.

49 Whittaker, Frederick, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 58.


51 RAND Arroyo Center, “Security Cooperation Organizations,” 44.

Ibid., 107.


Department of Defense, “DODD 3000.05”.


Ibid., 24.

Ibid., 28.

Ibid., 34.

Ibid., 34.

Ibid., 44.
