



DRDC Toronto CR 2010-136

Collaboration within the JIMP (Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public) Environment

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PWGSC Contract No.: Standing Offer W7711-088128/001/TOR

Order No. 8128-10

On Behalf of

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

as represented by

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Abstract

Canadian Forces (CF) personnel confront a number of challenges and complexities in today's multidimensional security environment. This environment requires the CF to work closely and collaboratively with people from a variety of organizations within a Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public (JIMP) framework, including Other Governmental Departments (OGDs) and Agencies (OGAs) as well as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Thus, this study aimed at identifying key themes associated with collaboration among diverse players in a JIMP framework. Using an unstructured approach, discussions were conducted with subject matter experts (SMEs) representing diverse organizations. These experts provided first-hand accounts of collaboration efforts in theatre.

Results from SME discussions showed that a number of conditions for effective collaboration were not consistently being met in operations. Respondents noted that issues such as shared power and clearly defined roles and responsibilities, shared goals, mutual respect, and mutual trust all impacted on their collaborative efforts with other personnel within the JIMP environment. SMEs also identified communicating, developing rapport, negotiating, planning, and making decisions as particular challenges when collaborating with diverse actors in a JIMP environment. Important insights relevant to the outcomes of collaboration (e.g., the importance of personal relationships in collaborative efforts) were also gained. Although many respondents focused on challenges that they had encountered when collaborating, there were also positive reports of creative efforts used by respondents to promote or enhance collaboration. These included working to promote personal relationships and shared identity with other players. The report concludes with several key themes that could be further elaborated to provide greater conceptual clarity regarding collaboration in a JIMP operational environment with multiple diverse actors, as these seemed to underlie many of the core challenges and issues raised by SMEs. These include power differences, identity, stereotypes and prejudice, and diverse negotiation approaches. Methodological considerations for conducting future research in the JIMP context are also discussed.



Résumé

Les membres des Forces canadiennes (FC) doivent composer avec bon nombre de défis et de problèmes dans l'environnement de sécurité multidimensionnel d'aujourd'hui. Ce contexte exige que les FC travaillent étroitement et collaborent avec du personnel de plusieurs organisations dans un cadre de travail interarmées, interorganisationnel, multinational et public (IIMP) qui inclut d'autres ministères et organismes et des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG). La présente étude visait donc à déterminer les thèmes clés associés à la collaboration avec ces différents protagonistes dans un cadre de travail IIMP. Des discussions, menées selon une approche non structurée, ont eu lieu avec des experts en la matière (EM) représentant différentes organisations. Ces experts ont fourni des comptes rendus de première main des efforts de collaboration sur le terrain.

Les résultats des discussions avec les EM ont démontré qu'un bon nombre de conditions nécessaires à une collaboration efficace ne sont pas respectées de façon constante dans les opérations. Les répondants ont mentionné que des questions comme le partage du pouvoir et une définition claire des rôles et responsabilités, des objectifs communs, le respect et la confiance mutuels ont tous une incidence sur leurs efforts de collaboration avec les autres personnes dans l'environnement IIMP. Les EM ont aussi souligné des défis particuliers survenant lors de la collaboration avec divers intervenants dans le contexte IIMP comme la communication, l'établissement de rapports, la négociation, la planification et la prise de décision. Les discussions ont aussi offert des perspectives importantes quant aux résultats de la collaboration (p. ex., l'importance des relations personnelles lors des efforts de collaboration). Même si de nombreux répondants ont mis l'accent sur les problèmes rencontrés lors de la collaboration, certains ont signalé des efforts créatifs positifs qu'ils ont faits pour promouvoir ou améliorer la collaboration. Ces efforts incluent du travail visant à promouvoir les relations personnelles et le sentiment d'identité commune avec les autres protagonistes. Le rapport se termine par la présentation de différents thèmes importants qui pourraient être élaborés davantage pour faire la lumière sur le concept de la collaboration dans un environnement opérationnel IIMP comprenant divers intervenants, puisque ceux-ci semblent englober une bonne partie des défis principaux et des problèmes soulevés par les EM. Ces thèmes incluent les différences de pouvoir, l'identité, les stéréotypes et les préjugés ainsi que les approches de négociation variées. L'étude présente également des considérations méthodologiques pour la tenue de recherches futures dans le contexte IIMP.

Executive Summary

Collaboration within the JIMP (Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public) Environment

Michael H. Thomson, Barbara D. Adams, Courtney D. Hall, and Craig Flear; Humansystems[®] Incorporated. DRDC Toronto No. CR 2010-136; Defence Research and Development Canada – Toronto; August 2010.

Canadian Forces (CF) personnel confront a number of challenges and complexities in today's multidimensional security environment. This environment requires its members to ensure that defence and security goals as well as development and diplomacy goals are met. The demands of the current operational context are such that the CF cannot conduct operations in isolation. Like never before, the CF is required to work closely and collaborate with people from Other Government Departments (OGDs) and Agencies (OGAs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), as well as other civilian entities. To do this effectively, the CF must adopt a "comprehensive" approach to operations, and collaborate and cooperate with a number of different actors (such as diplomats, development officers, corrections officials, police officers and local populations) who are simultaneously working toward the same goals.

This study aimed at identifying key themes associated with collaboration among diverse players in a Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public (JIMP) framework, with a particular focus on the Interagency (e.g., OGDs, OGAs) and Public (e.g., NGOs) aspects. Using an unstructured approach, discussions were conducted with subject matter experts (SMEs) representing diverse organizations, both civilian and military. These experts provided first-hand accounts of collaboration efforts in theatre. These experiences helped the research team to identify general factors that facilitate or inhibit collaboration among multiple actors in a JIMP operational framework. This study also set out to develop a preliminary conceptual framework for collaboration, using the data from SMEs as well as the relevant literature. The framework included factors influencing collaboration (organizational, individual, and external), the process of collaboration (conditions for collaboration, motivation to collaborate and collaboration), and outcomes of collaboration.

Results from SME discussions showed that a number of conditions for effective collaboration were not consistently being met in operations. Respondents noted that issues such as shared power and clearly defined roles and responsibilities, shared goals, mutual respect, and mutual trust all impacted on their collaborative efforts with other personnel within the JIMP environment. SMEs also identified communicating, developing rapport, negotiating, planning, and making decisions as particular challenges when collaborating with diverse actors in a JIMP environment. Important insights relevant to the outcomes of collaboration were also gained. Although many respondents focused on the challenges that they had encountered when collaborating, there were also positive reports of creative efforts used by respondents to promote more effective collaboration. These included working to promote personal relationships and shared identity with other players. The report concludes with several key themes that could be further elaborated to provide greater conceptual clarity regarding collaboration in a JIMP operational environment with multiple diverse actors, as these seemed to underlie many of the core challenges and issues raised by SMEs. These themes include power differences, identity, stereotypes and prejudice, and diverse negotiation approaches.



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Sommaire administratif

Collaboration dans un environnement interarmées, interorganisationnel, multinational et public (IIMP)

Michael H. Thomson, Barbara D. Adams, Courtney D. Hall, and Craig Flear; Humansystems[®] incorporé. RDDC Toronto n^o CR 2010-136; Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada – Toronto; août 2010.

Les membres des Forces canadiennes (FC) doivent composer avec bon nombre de défis et de problèmes dans l'environnement de sécurité multidimensionnel d'aujourd'hui. Cet environnement exige que les différents intervenants veillent à l'atteinte des objectifs de défense et de sécurité et des objectifs en matière de développement et de diplomatie. Les exigences du contexte opérationnel actuel sont telles que les FC ne peuvent mener leurs opérations seules. Plus que jamais auparavant, elles doivent travailler étroitement et collaborer avec des intervenants d'autres ministères et organismes gouvernementaux, d'organismes non gouvernementaux (ONG) et d'autres entités civiles. Pour accomplir ce travail de façon efficace, les FC doivent adopter une approche « globale » des opérations et coopérer avec un bon nombre de différents protagonistes (comme des diplomates, des agents de développement, des agents des services correctionnels, des agents de la paix et les populations locales) qui travaillent simultanément à l'atteinte des mêmes buts.

La présente étude visait à déterminer les thèmes clés liés à la collaboration entre divers intervenants dans un cadre de travail IIMP, en mettant un accent particulier sur les aspects interorganisationnels (p. ex., autres ministères et organismes) et publics (p. ex., ONG). Des discussions, menées selon une approche non structurée, ont eu lieu avec des experts en la matière (EM) représentant diverses organisations, tant civiles que militaires. Ces experts ont fourni des comptes rendus de première main d'efforts de collaboration sur le terrain. Leur expérience a permis à l'équipe de recherche de déterminer des facteurs généraux qui facilitent ou freinent la collaboration entre les multiples intervenants dans un cadre opérationnel IIMP. L'étude avait également comme objectif de mettre sur pied un cadre conceptuel préliminaire pour la collaboration à l'aide des données provenant des EM et de la documentation pertinente. Le cadre conceptuel inclut des facteurs qui influent sur la collaboration (organisationnels, individuels et externes), le processus de collaboration (conditions et motivation) et les résultats de celle-ci.

Les résultats des discussions avec les EM ont démontré qu'un bon nombre de conditions nécessaires à une collaboration efficaces ne sont pas respectées de façon constante lors des opérations. Les répondants ont mentionné que des questions comme le partage du pouvoir et une définition claire des rôles et responsabilités, des objectifs communs, le respect et la confiance mutuels ont tous une incidence sur leurs efforts de collaboration avec leurs collègues dans le cadre de l'environnement IIMP. Les EM ont aussi souligné des défis particuliers survenant lors de la collaboration avec divers intervenants dans le contexte IIMP comme la communication, l'établissement de rapports, la négociation, la planification et la prise de décision. Les discussions ont aussi offert des perspectives importantes quant aux résultats de la collaboration. Même si de nombreux répondants ont mis l'accent sur les problèmes rencontrés lors de la collaboration, certains ont souligné des efforts créatifs positifs qu'ils ont faits pour promouvoir ou améliorer la collaboration. Ces efforts incluent du travail visant à promouvoir les relations personnelles et le sentiment d'identité commune avec les autres protagonistes. Le rapport se termine par la



présentation de plusieurs thèmes importants qui pourraient être élaborés davantage pour faire la lumière sur le concept de la collaboration dans un environnement opérationnel IIMP comprenant divers intervenants, puisque ceux-ci semblent être à la base d'une bonne partie des défis principaux et des problèmes soulevés par les EM. Ces sujets incluent les différences de pouvoir, l'identité, les stéréotypes et les préjugés qui y sont liés ainsi que les différentes approches de négociation. L'étude présente également des considérations méthodologiques pour la tenue de recherches futures dans le contexte IIMP.





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List of Acronyms

Acronym	Description
3D + C	Defence, Diplomacy, Development + Commerce
ANA	Afghan National Army
AO	Area of Operations
ARPs	Applied Research Projects
CDA	Collaborative for Development Action
CF	Canadian Forces
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
COs	Commissioned Officers
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DLCD	Director of Land Concepts and Designs
DND	Department of National Defence
DRDC	Defence Research and Development Canada
FOB	Forward Operating Base
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IOs	International Organizations
JIMP	Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public
NCOs	Non-Commissioned Officers
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
OGAs	Other Government Agencies
OGDs	Other Government Departments
OPR	Office of Professional Responsibility
PPCLI	Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SAT	Strategic Advisory Team
SMEs	Subject Matter Experts
WoG	Whole of Government



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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Canadian Forces (CF) personnel confront a number of challenges and complexities in today's multidimensional security environment. This environment requires its members to ensure that defence and security goals as well as development and diplomacy goals are met. The CF typically operate in conflict areas that have densely populated urban centres differentiated by ethnic, cultural, and religious affiliation as well as socioeconomic status. In these conflict areas, sometimes referred to as failed or failing states, the CF battle irregular forces that are often dispersed over a large geographic area and use a variety of means (e.g., improvised explosive devices, hit and run tactics) to combat more sophisticated and powerful regular armies. According to Leslie, Gizewski, and Rostek (2008), these foes (e.g., "media savvy" insurgents and terrorists, warlords) seek to erode the will of coalition forces or maintain power over local populations, rather than defeat them militarily. Current operations commonly require convincing the local population that security and development resulting, in part, through the involvement of coalition forces will promote a better, more prosperous way of life compared to the current status quo.

Today, military legitimacy and successful operations are not defined by military power alone. Because conflict is driven by material, ethnic, religious, and ideological demands and requires "winning the hearts and minds" (or the support and confidence) of the local population, the "ability to bear all instruments of national and coalition power and influence upon a problem in a timely, coordinated fashion (i.e., diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) is increasingly essential to achieving effective results" (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008, p. 11). The CF, therefore, cannot conduct operations in isolation. They must adopt a more "comprehensive" approach to operations, and collaborate and cooperate with a number of different actors (such as diplomats, development officers, corrections officials, police officers and local populations) who are simultaneously working toward the same broad goals, such as peace or stability. Such broad or superordinate goals will require the CF to participate in activities that are both traditional (e.g., defence) as well as non-traditional (e.g., development).

In response to the need for a comprehensive approach to operations, in 2005, the Canadian government initiated a new strategy for international operations, involving the CF. Originally called the 3D + C (Defence, Diplomacy, Development + Commerce) approach, and now referred to as the "Whole of Government" (WoG) or "Team Canada" approach, this approach involves laying out a coherent strategy and policy for any given mission that includes the integration and coordination of multiple government departments and agencies. The goal of this integrated and collaborative WoG approach is to achieve, more effectively, national goals in international operations as all of the actors bring something to bear on the mission. Specifically, the WoG approach consists of utilizing "formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government's agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives" [see Department of National Defence (DND) Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, as cited in Scoppio, Idzenga, Miklas, & Tremblay, 2009]. Such an approach has direct impact on how the CF operates in the current and future security environment. Indeed, the most recent CF Doctrine Manual (2009) explicitly addresses this approach to operations: "In complex contemporary crises,



activities and effects from a wide range of government participants need to be coordinated. The CF contribution to this Canadian ‘Whole of Government’ (WoG) approach identifies an effects-based philosophy in seeking to stimulate, wherever possible, a cooperative culture and collaborative working environment between government departments and agencies. Within this philosophy, participants work proactively and share their understanding of situations and conduct planning and activities on the basis of shared favourable outcomes in the short, medium, and long term” (Canadian Forces Joint Publication: Canadian Military Doctrine, 2009, 6-4 – 6-5).

Similarly, the Director of Land Concepts and Designs (DLCD) has referred to the capacity to seamlessly integrate CF activities with other entities, within a Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) framework, as a key enabler to ensure mission success in an increasingly complex land environment. The CF must have the “ability to connect all relevant organizations and agencies with CF architecture and provide liaison to support these agencies in the execution of the mission” (Leslie et al., 2008).

According to Leslie et al. (2008), the benefits of operating in a JIMP framework include increasing the coordinated action on behalf of the CF and other players to secure mission goals and objectives; socializing the CF and other organizations to the challenges that each confront in the security environment and to how their unique contributions can serve to collaboratively address these; increasing awareness of and respect for the resources and contribution of diverse players; desiring to work collaboratively to achieve goals in a non-hierarchical manner; and ultimately fostering more strategic decision-making and action. Effectively working within the JIMP environment, therefore, requires greater cooperation and collaboration among various agencies, such as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) as well as various components of the Public aspect of JIMP, including various non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), the media, and local populations, who presumably have operated more independently of one another in the past. But preparing CF members to work with a multiplicity of players in a non-traditional role (i.e., enabling development and diplomacy) demands a new way of thinking (Thatcher, 2006).

Though well-versed in multinational and joint operations, the interagency and public dimensions of the JIMP framework represent relatively new territory for the CF (Leslie et al., 2008). Indeed, much of the professional development programmes for both non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and commissioned officers (COs) centre around preparing CF members to work in a multinational (e.g., United Nations, coalition, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization operations) and/or joint capacity (e.g., Army, Navy, Air Force). And yet, the interagency and public components of the JIMP framework are gaining more prominence in current CF operations (most notably in Afghanistan). Though this has led to some changes in CF professional development curriculum and CF pre-deployment training (for a review see Thomson, Hall, & Adams, 2010), research shows that the CF faces challenges in fully realizing a JIMP capability.

For example, some of the challenges confronting successful collaboration efforts between various government agencies and the CF include conflicting political agendas, or at least incompatible objectives and goals; organizational structure disparities (hierarchical and centralized vs. flat and decentralized); incompatible financial, knowledge management and communication systems; little or no corporate memory; few formal lessons learned mechanisms; poor funding and personnel shortfalls; and “competition for resources and agency profile” (Olsen & Gregorich, 2007, p. 13, see also DeConing, 2008; Morcos, 2005; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Spence, 2002; Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2006).

Similarly, tensions between militaries and NGOs exist, including differences in organizational structure and culture; tasks and ways of accomplishing them; the control of resources; definitions of success and time frames; and information control and sharing (Winslow, 2002). For example, in terms of approaches to the accomplishment of tasks, militaries tend to emphasize efficient planning, whereas NGOs tend to emphasize the importance of community participation. Further, militaries tend to establish short-term goals and definitions of success (e.g., civil security), whereas NGOs tend to define success in terms of long-term social and economic development. In regard to control of resources, NGOs are sometimes concerned that the use of military resources and contact with them in general will compromise their neutrality, which may undermine their very safety as well as their mission success. Indeed, in a recent study by Holton and colleagues (2010) investigating the relationship between NGOs and the CF, managing optics was identified as a core issue for NGOs when considering collaboration efforts in theatre.

Although conceived as the optimal response to new complex operating environments, such as Afghanistan, reviews of the comprehensive approach show a need to examine collaboration among multiple actors more thoroughly. For example, Patrick and Brown (2007) undertook an in-depth analysis of the efforts of several countries to tackle the problems of fragile states adopting a comprehensive approach. They concluded that although individual successes have occurred, consistent, effective collaboration remains an elusive goal, despite strategic-level endorsement. Similarly, Rietjens (2008) noted that successes in these sorts of collaborations have often appeared to be ad hoc rather than systematic in nature. Thus, “[b]y all accounts, the consensus ... at the policy level often bears little relationship to the messy reality of coordination efforts and practices” (Olson & Gregorian, 2007, p. 26).

Despite the challenges facing the CF, the comprehensive approach demands an increased integration of multiple actors in theatre. The need to better understand the collaboration efforts of CF personnel with various government departments and agencies (e.g., DFAIT, CIDA) and with the public (e.g., NGOs, the media, Canadian and local host nation populations) has become apparent. Moreover, few studies have explored the issue thoroughly from a Canadian operational (or tactical) perspective. The nature of collaboration in an operational setting has not, therefore, been fully explored as it pertains specifically to the CF. As a result, there is a pressing need to better understand the interagency and public aspects of JIMP or the comprehensive approach in order to help inform and support CF mission objectives. To address this need, two Applied Research Projects (ARPs) were developed at Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) – Toronto, within the Collaborative Performance and Learning Section, Organizational Behaviour Group: “JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander,” and “Interagency Trust.” The overall objectives of the former include conceptual clarification of the public aspect of the JIMP capability, its importance, and how this capability may be optimally achieved, focusing on implications for the development of knowledge, education and training for the tactical commander. The objectives of the latter include understanding the social psychological dimensions of collaboration relevant to WoG or interagency contexts primarily as they relate to expeditionary missions.

1.2 Project Purpose

In support of the aforementioned ARPs being conducted by DRDC Toronto, the purpose of this study was to understand the general factors that facilitate or inhibit collaboration among multiple actors in a JIMP operational framework. To this end, a number of subject matter experts (SMEs) representing diverse organizations were consulted to elicit from them first-hand accounts of



collaboration efforts in theatre. Building on previous work conducted by Holton and colleagues (2010), this work aimed to advance conceptual clarity regarding the nature of collaboration among diverse actors attempting to use a comprehensive approach within varying contexts. As well, through first-hand accounts, this study aimed at identifying emerging themes (i.e., the primary categories and their properties) associated with collaboration among diverse players in a JIMP framework. Analyzing the relationships between core themes and their properties as well as matching these to the academic literature on collaboration provided the basis for developing a preliminary conceptual framework for collaboration. Cataloguing first-hand accounts was also meant to identify particular strategies for ensuring successful collaboration among diverse actors in theatre as well as to produce a database of experiences that could be used as vignettes in future research activities and training. As such, this project was largely exploratory in nature. In addition, this study aimed to identify methodological considerations for future work to be conducted in the JIMP context.

2. Method

2.1 Unstructured Feedback Discussion Protocol

This study used an unstructured feedback protocol to elicit from SME's first-hand accounts of civil-military collaboration in an operational context. The literature to date has identified a number of challenges to effective interagency, public, and military collaboration in a comprehensive approach to operations but remains incomplete. As such, understanding the emerging themes (i.e., the primary categories and their properties) and the relationships among these required a methodology that encouraged the participant to speak openly and freely. Allowing SMEs to determine the course of the discussion eliminated the temptation to force any preconceived frameworks or themes on their personal descriptions and experiences. These discussions needed to be dynamic to reveal the themes and relationships and to highlight potential agreement or disagreement across participants. As such, the protocol simply asked participants to share their personal experiences regarding collaboration within a JIMP framework and to include those factors that frustrated or facilitated the process. Participants were also asked to provide as much detail as possible in order to develop a holistic picture of the situation in which the collaboration occurred. This approach was meant to establish the various contexts and identify the motives for collaboration as well as the underlying themes. The unstructured feedback protocol also used probe questions to pursue emerging themes throughout the SME feedback discussions.

2.2 Procedure

2.2.1 Recruitment

SME participants were identified through the existing professional networks of the Principal DRDC Investigator and Co-Investigators as well as the DRDC Toronto military liaison officer. These individuals were contacted by one of the Principal Investigators, Co-Investigators, or military liaison to elicit their consent to participate in the feedback discussions. The purpose and nature of the study as well as the SME's potential contribution to it was shared in the initial contact. Potential participants were informed that their participation was wholly voluntary and that it would be in the form of a face-to-face meeting with trained researchers, that it would take approximately 2 hours, and that the researchers would travel to meet them. Following agreement to participate, SMEs were sent via email an Information Letter describing the study and their role in the study (see Annex A), a Voluntary Consent Form (see Annex B), which they signed prior to the meeting, and a Biographical Data Form (see Annex C for CF participants and Annex D for civilian participants). A time and meeting place were then arranged.

2.2.2 Participants

This study had 10 participants. Four were representatives from NGOs; 3 were CF officers; 2 were public servants from other government departments (OGDs)/other government agencies (OGAs); and 1 was from an IO. Of these, 8 SMEs were men and 2 were women. Ages ranged from 28 to 59. All had recent operational experiences and all had collaborated with multiple actors in theatre at some point in their career.

2.2.3 Feedback Discussion

Ten feedback discussions were conducted, which were scheduled by the Principal Investigator in advance. Feedback discussions were held in various locations across Ontario, including Ottawa, Kingston and Toronto, from 16 February to 2 June 2010.

Following an introduction of the research team to the participant, each SME was then briefed on the purposes of the study, its relevance and potential benefit to the CF, the nature of their participation (i.e., format of interview, time commitment, etc.), and any possible risks. Before proceeding, the research team collected the informed Voluntary Consent Form to ensure that the SME had read, understood and signed it in advance of the meeting.

Before starting the discussion, the Principal Investigator asked permission to record the conversation, as this would provide a more accurate record of the meeting. Participants were told that no one outside of the research team would have access to the recordings and that everything that they raised during the feedback discussion would be kept confidential. All SMEs agreed to participate voluntarily.

Following this, the researchers began the SME feedback discussion. Researchers used an unstructured approach to promote spontaneous discussion of the SME's experiences in collaborating with diverse actors in an operational setting. Each discussion was guided by a trained researcher, who encouraged participants to speak freely, avoiding any interference with or influencing the participant's flow of disclosure or thoughts expressed. When necessary, and appropriate, researchers probed for further clarity regarding important themes associated with collaboration. The average length of the SME feedback discussions was 84 minutes.

Once the discussion was completed, researchers debriefed the participants. It was explained to them that the feedback discussion would be transcribed onto a text document, using the recording to guarantee accuracy. Again, participants were reassured of the confidentiality of the meeting, and that researchers would remove any identifying material, such as names and places. Participants were informed that they could review the transcripts if they chose for verification and to indicate any errors¹, or simply to edit out portions² that they deemed not suitable for any reports or publications. Researchers then answered any questions that participants had about the research. Lastly, participants were told that following the completion of the research, a summary of the findings could be made available to them if they so desired. In the meantime, however, participants were reminded that they could contact the Principal DRDC Investigator at any time if they had further questions.

Each participant filled out a general claim form and submitted it to the research team. Participants were compensated \$32.66 or \$40.40 depending on their status (i.e., CF member or civilian, respectively). A cheque for the appropriate amount was later mailed to each participant who chose to receive the remuneration.³ All forms were collected by the research team following the feedback discussion.

¹ Only one participant asked to see their transcript, mainly to provide clarification around points made in the discussion.

² In principle, this could include the entire interview transcript, even if they had initially agreed to allow the Principal Investigator to quote directly from the interview without attribution of identity on the Voluntary Consent Form.

³ Three participants chose to receive remuneration.

2.3 Data Collection

With the consent of each participant⁴, SME feedback discussions were audio-recorded using a digital voice recorder. After the meeting, researchers then downloaded the audio file to a computer for transcription. SME feedback discussions were transcribed verbatim, except for identifying information, such as names and places, by a member of the research team. Random quality assurance checks comparing the audio file to the transcription were undertaken by a member of the research team by listening to the audio file and simultaneously reading the transcription to ensure accuracy.

2.4 Qualitative Data Analysis and Preliminary Framework Development

Prior to qualitative data analysis, the research team conducted a brief review of the academic literature pertaining to collaboration. From this, the research team identified broad categories of collaboration (e.g., conditions, motivation, etc.) in order to analyze the core themes disclosed in the SME feedback discussions. As well, the research team identified a number of potential factors (e.g., individual, organizational, etc.) thought to impact on the collaboration process. Each factor was discussed in detail by all members of the research team, and operational definitions of each were established. These definitions helped the research team to consistently categorize the data from the SME feedback discussions. Following this, a preliminary framework for collaboration was constructed in order to begin highlighting the relationships between the factors likely to promote or frustrate collaboration in a JIMP operational context.

Content analysis began with a member of the research team reviewing the first transcription, and coding it according to the established categories and factors outlined in the preliminary framework. Following this, another member of the research team reviewed the initial coding, and initiated a collaborative discussion among research team members to assess and revise the initial category framework. Together, the research team created a table that delineated each category and factor deemed relevant to collaboration and provided an exemplary unit of communication taken from the interview transcripts. The purpose of this was to limit and better specify which units of communication came under each variable. A content analysis was then conducted on the remainder of the transcribed feedback discussions as they became available, by matching units of communication to previously established categories as well as identifying (and then defining) other factors not included in the initial model. Because this research was exploratory in nature and used an unstructured approach to SME discussions, researchers remained open to unidentified factors that emerged during discussions, and accommodated these as necessary.

Following the initial coding of the transcribed SME feedback sessions, content analysis was then used to identify the core themes and their associated properties. The core themes were central to the phenomenon under consideration (i.e., collaboration in a JIMP framework with multiple diverse actors). These core themes, and the relationships between them, were used to form the basis for understanding collaboration among multiple diverse actors in a JIMP environment. Key points that either facilitated or frustrated collaboration, as well as those strategies employed to ensure that collaboration occurred, were also highlighted in the analysis.

⁴ Participants were also given the opportunity to conduct the feedback discussion without being recorded. In these circumstances, a member of the research team would take detailed notes of the interview. Two of 10 participants chose not to be audio-recorded.



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3. Results

The following chapter is divided into two sections. The first section provides a brief introduction to the Preliminary Conceptual Framework for CF Collaboration in a JIMP Environment. Following this, the second section considers the core themes and their relationships. The process of collaboration as identified in the preliminary model was then further informed by discussions with SMEs with experience working within the JIMP domain.

3.1 Development of Preliminary Conceptual Framework

Based on a review of relevant literature, a preliminary conceptual framework for CF personnel collaborating in a JIMP environment was developed. As shown in Figure 1, the framework has three broad sections, including the factors influencing collaboration (inputs), the process of collaboration (process), and the outcomes of collaboration (outputs).

Factors Influencing Collaboration **Process of Collaboration** **Outcomes of Collaboration**




Figure 1: Preliminary Conceptual Framework for CF Collaboration in a JIMP Operational Environment

3.1.1 Factors Influencing Collaboration

At the first level, a range of factors are believed to influence collaboration, including individual, organizational, and external factors. Individual factors are the unique characteristics of the individuals who represent an organization during collaboration. Individual characteristics include an individual's knowledge (e.g., of collaboration partners' perspectives, norms, systems, etc.); skills (e.g., communication skills, interpersonal skills, conflict resolution skills, etc.) and abilities (e.g., cognitive abilities); attitudes and values (e.g., willingness to collaborate); and other characteristics (e.g., experience, personality, etc.).

Several organizational factors also impact on the process and outcome of collaboration. The McKinsey 7-S organizational framework (Pascale & Athos, 1981) includes shared values, strategy, structure, systems, staff/skills, and style. Shared values can be understood as the common goals and values to which personnel within the organization adhere. Shared values help the organization maintain a level of coherence and foster a sense of spirit. Strategy, on the other hand, refers to an organization's plan for future action. It is concerned primarily with the transformation of a present state into a future state of change. For example, CF strategy may be to ensure that future counter-insurgency operations are always conducted using a comprehensive approach. Structure refers to how an organization is organized. Organizational structures are usually made up of interdependent departments. The CF structure is primarily hierarchical and consists of a number of units and formations. The systems include the processes, practices and norms of an organization that guide daily routines and operations. Organizational style represents the way in which activities are managed, and as such includes the way in which personnel within an organization interact. Staff refers to the individuals who make up the organization as well as the human resource activities that essentially promote development and reward excellence. Finally, skills represent the actual abilities of the organization's personnel. Staff and skills will be closely related to individual factors. Indeed, as one becomes professionalized within an organization, he or she will be immersed and shaped by its philosophies, values and theoretical approaches (Clark, 1995, 1997, as cited in San Martin-Rodriguez, Beaulieu, D'Amour, & Ferrada-Videla, 2005), which will ultimately influence their own individual attitudes and values.

Governance and organizational culture are two other important organizational factors. Governance includes the policies and laws for appropriate administration of an institution, ensuring accountability for those individuals' acting on behalf of the organization. An organizational culture can be understood as "a pattern of shared assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to these problems" (Schein, 1990, p. 111). Traditionally, deciphering an organization's culture and the effects of this culture on individual members has been a complex undertaking. One way to conceptually simplify the construct is to imagine culture as manifesting at three levels progressing to higher levels of abstraction, ranging from (a) observable artifacts, to (b) the organization's values, norms, ideologies, and philosophies, and finally to (c) its underlying assumptions. The organizational culture will shape the beliefs, attitudes and behaviours of its members.

External factors refer to the conditions of the situation in which collaboration occurs. Factors that appear to be relevant in an operational setting include the level of risk, the uncertainty of the situation, time pressure, and national culture. All of these will likely have an impact on the collaborative process. For example, it is argued that effective collaboration requires time to share information, develop interpersonal relationships and share concerns and issues (Mariano, 1998, and



Warren, Houston, & Luquire, 1998, both as cited in San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005). Time pressure could exert considerable impact on the collaborative process.

The framework shown in Figure 1 posits that these factors influence collaboration, as well as influencing each other, as represented by the double-sided arrows on the illustration.

3.1.2 Process of Collaboration

The factor related to the process of collaboration contains the conditions for collaboration, the motivation to collaborate, and the actual process of collaboration. According to research, there are a number of conditions necessary to ensure effective collaboration among actors representing different organizations. These include shared goals, shared values, shared risk and shared power as well as mutual trust (Austin, 2000, Phillips & Graham, 2000, Rapp & Whitfield, 1999, all cited in Foster & Meinhard, 2002). Other researchers suggest that mutual respect can facilitate collaboration, and that this requires knowledge of another organization and its unique contribution to fulfilling collaborative objectives (San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005). Finally, clearly established roles and responsibilities are important for fostering effective collaboration, and this clarity may be furthered through institutional systems and processes, such as standards, policies, documentation, and so on, which are communicated among collaborative partners through contact and interaction (San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005).

The process of collaboration also includes the motivation to collaborate. According to Foster and Meinhard (2002), organizations may be motivated to collaborate for a number of reasons. For example, organizations may have to collaborate by necessity, in order to fulfil some legal or regulatory requirements placed on them, or because of scarce resources. Collaborating by necessity implies limited choice alternatives and the highest degree of interdependence. According to Foster and Meinhard, another motive to collaborate is reciprocity (i.e., organizations have mutually beneficial goals and interests that are obtained through collaboration). Further, organizations may collaborate because a larger, more powerful organization is looking to take over another smaller organization; thus, the larger organization will direct collaboration with the smaller organization to achieve its goal. Another reason for collaboration is efficiency. In other words, combined effort can help reduce costs. Foster and Meinhard also explain that organizations are motivated to collaborate with other organizations because collaboration increases stability, dependability and predictability. Finally, an organization may collaborate to enhance its institutional legitimacy. For the purposes of this framework, the different motivations to collaborate have been simplified as fitting into two categories of motivations: internally driven interdependence motivations and externally driven interdependence motivations. The former refers to a genuine willingness to collaborate and includes motives like reciprocity, and stability, dependability and predictability, whereas the latter refers to a motivation to collaborate based on external forces, such as necessity, efficiency, and possibly the enhancement of institutional legitimacy.

The conditions of collaboration and the motivation to collaborate will impact one another and this is represented by the double-sided arrow on the illustration. Both also directly influence collaboration.

Finally, collaboration itself is composed of a number of practices, including communication, developing rapport, negotiation, planning and decision-making, and feedback (recalibrating). Communication refers to information sharing, understanding others' points of view and position, and style of communicating. Communication also includes having the means used to enable communication (e.g., face-to-face, phone, email, etc.). Developing rapport requires making positive

connections with others during social interactions. Developing rapport helps establish a collaborator's engagement in the process. It includes appropriately adapting communication style to accommodate a particular collaboration partner, as well as having the capacity to establish relationships during the collaboration process.

Negotiation is also an essential part of collaboration, and to some it “requires that the parties forego a competitive approach and adopt one based on collaboration” (San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005). Competitive negotiators typically pursue their own needs and goals, whereas cooperative (or collaborative) negotiators ensure that the needs of all parties are met and that maximal value for everyone is also attained (Goodwin, 2005). Of course, there are other negotiating styles or approaches, including avoiding (i.e., choosing not to negotiate), compromising (i.e., both parties accept a number of concessions to meet halfway), and accommodating (i.e., giving in to another's wants or needs often by relinquishing one's own) (Kilmann & Thomas, 1975). Relationship-preserving negotiation styles include collaborating, compromising, and accommodating. Collaborating differs from simply compromising or accommodating because true collaboration seeks a win-win result rather than simply acceding to the needs of other negotiating parties. This will only be accomplished by generating innovative strategies and solutions. Some argue that collaborative negotiation requires, to some extent, a competitive approach (Goodwin, 2005), as this will prevent one from being taken advantage of (accommodating) or settling on less than what can truly be achieved through negotiation (compromising). Of course, it should be pointed out that there are instances in negotiation where the best choice given the circumstances may be accommodating (e.g., have violated another's trust), compromising (e.g., short time frame and trust in one's negotiation partner) or avoiding (e.g., when one is unprepared to take alternative action).

Following negotiation, collaborative partners must plan and choose the appropriate strategy to achieve their respective goals and fulfil their needs. As such, planning and decision-making will also be components of collaboration. And as collaboration is a dynamic process, those involved must continuously monitor and evaluate the process and recalibrate their position as a consequence. In the current framework, this is referred to as feedback.

3.1.3 Outcomes of Collaboration

Collaboration leads directly to the outcomes or effects of collaboration. Within this category is cumulative impact, which refers to the direct and indirect impacts of the collaboration. For example, a direct impact of collaboration between an NGO and the CF might be the distribution of aid to those in need. On the other hand, an indirect impact of collaboration could be an “implicit ethical message” that accompanies this activity (The Do No Harm Handbook, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects – Collaborative for Development Action, Inc., 2004), and this may not always be positive. For example, the activity may suggest that those who carry arms and hold power are the ones who determine who gets aid (The Do No Harm Handbook, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects – Collaborative for Development Action, Inc., 2004), when in fact this, according to the NGO community, should be determined primarily by the need itself. Gauging the cumulative impact of a collaboration effort will require consideration of both positive and negative consequences. A single negative impact could be offset by a number of positive impacts from collaboration. Performance is also an outcome of collaboration. This refers to the particular goal of any given collaborative effort and its fulfilment (e.g., was the goal obtained or not?). Personal relationships will also be an outcome of collaboration, as will collective understanding of the collaborative partners (i.e., knowledge of other organizations and their unique contributions, etc.) and general satisfaction with the process. General satisfaction is based on a number of outcomes

from the process of collaboration, including instrumental outcomes (i.e., what each collaborator got from the process), personal outcomes (i.e., how competent were individual collaborators in achieving their goals of collaboration), feelings about the process of collaboration (i.e., was it fair or constructive?), and feelings about the personal relationships resulting from the collaborative effort (i.e., did they become stronger or weaker?) (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006). All of the outcomes will then feed back to the factors influencing collaboration and the process of collaboration. Importantly, the experience of collaboration has been shown to influence the motivation to engage in a collaborative process in the future (Henneman, Lee, & Cohen, 1995, as cited in San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005).

3.2 SME Feedback Regarding Collaboration in a JIMP Operational Environment

The following section identifies the core themes that emerged during SME feedback discussions that are relevant to collaboration in a JIMP operational environment. This analysis attempts to establish the relationships associated with these themes and to highlight the most critical issues facing individuals when collaborating with others from other organizations or the public. This analysis included the interconnections among the factors influencing collaboration and the process of collaboration. It is important to note that not all of the possible interconnections posited in the model emerged from the small sample of SME discussions in this project. Only those that were noted by SMEs are discussed in this report. As well, in order to protect the identity of the participants, in the context of a direct quote, we have included only their affiliation (e.g., OGD/OGA, CF, or NGO).

3.2.1 Conditions for Collaboration

SME recollections suggest that many of the conditions for collaboration are not presently being met in an operational context because of a range of individual factors (specifically, knowledge, skills and abilities, attitudes and values) and organizational factors (specifically, shared values, systems, structure). These conditions may well hinder collaboration efforts among multiple actors in the JIMP operational environment.

3.2.1.1 Shared power, roles and responsibilities

The findings from the present study suggest that imbalances of power and the potential to exploit power during collaboration with diverse actors in a JIMP operational environment will be a significant challenge to overcome. Indeed, this issue was a core barrier to working effectively with representatives from different organizations and professions. Specifically, power differences between the CF and OGDs/OGAs, and between the CF and NGOs, were identified as a negative influence on collaboration, especially for those individuals operating in an interagency capacity where the need for interdependence was more pronounced. In other words, driven by a national strategy, a number of Canadian government departments are required to collaborate to achieve the super-ordinate mission goals in Afghanistan. As the data show, the high level of interdependence required between the CF and OGDs/OGAs resulted in struggles to maintain or exert power during collaborative interactions. In comparison, most NGOs could choose whether or not to coordinate efforts with the CF, and consequently, though struggles of power were revealed, they were less prevalent. In some cases, the NGOs could choose to avoid interacting with the CF or not. This option was not necessarily available to members of OGDs/OGAs.

For example, given security requirements in Afghanistan, the CF has essentially controlled the movement of personnel from OGDs/OGAs, restricting their freedom. As one OGD/OGA participant explained, the “*military decided when and where you go.*” This was reinforced by a CF member who participated on the Strategic Advisory Team (SAT). He explained that “*because of what we were and how we were equipped, we were able to go to places that they [CIDA representatives] were not able to go. We basically had freedom within the city of Kabul... whereas the CIDA representatives... whenever they had to go anywhere, they had to go with armed guards or with one of us.*” However, this control of movement and resources could lead to abuses of power, especially when personal conflicts exist. As one CF participant explained,

“There is definitely a lot of animosity on the part of the infantry [to support OGD/OGA operations]. The guys that have to do the force protection, to be their [OGD/OGA representatives’] taxi cab, essentially, there’s a lot more animosity on their part. I heard some stories from the infantry... they were the OPR [Office of Professional Responsibility] district security. Ultimately, if there is any kind of security incident or sense something was upset, they had the authority to call off the patrol... they were escorting one of the [OGD representatives] to a location in Kandahar City, and because they didn’t like [the OGD representative’s] attitude or whatever... he said, ‘You know what, I just decided I didn’t like [the OGD representative’s] attitude, and I said, you know what, too dangerous, we’re going back home.’ He effectively exercised abuse to his field to cancel [the OGD representative’s] meeting with whatever departmental minister... You do have some very stubborn, old school, crusty, infantry force protection sergeants and warrants, and even junior officers that will bring that attitude in.”

Interdependence based on necessity has the potential to lead to abuses of power by those who control the resources (e.g., vehicles, security information, etc.), frustrating collaboration efforts. As the data suggest, this can be exacerbated by individual attitudes.

Some participants thought that the CF overstepped their jurisdiction, taking on the roles and responsibilities of other professions (i.e., development and diplomacy), leading to territorial struggles and conflict. One OGD/OGA participant explained, “*the CF perceives themselves to have control of everything typically... The end result is impingement on [OGD/OGA] territory... The General is the only authority of concern for the CF, but this doesn’t translate into the General having full discretion in all areas.*” Others also acknowledged the challenge associated with establishing a clearly defined jurisdiction within a JIMP operational environment. For example, one OGD/OGA SME stated that they “*see this [activity] as a civilian lead, where they [CF] see this as a military lead.*” As Meharg (2007, p. 120) stated, “the lure of control and of staking a claim in a particular locale to declare ownership, autonomy, and identity are strong factors within the shared military and humanitarian space.” However, this lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities will exacerbate efforts to collaborate.

One NGO participant believed that CF development efforts (e.g., digging wells, fixing schools) should remain in the immediate vicinity of their forward operating base (FOB), “*so that their immediate neighbours get a little bit of benefit and [the CF] avoid animosity.*” However, he argued that the CF should not be involved in large-scale development projects or humanitarian actions, because these are not their roles. He cautioned the CF, stating, “*It’s not your mandate, you don’t have the expertise, you don’t have the right approach, and ultimately, you’ll fail.*” Moreover, he shared his concern regarding the potential impact of CF personnel adopting multiple roles (e.g., soldier, diplomat, humanitarian) in terms of the messages that this may send to the local

population. He said, “you can’t expect the population to understand why you’re giving food and aid one day and then, you know, carpet bombing them the next.”

One CF SME argued that the perception of the CF overstepping its jurisdiction may be fuelled by envy on the part of OGD/OGA members, arguing that “*The [Canadian] embassy thought we were getting into their business. Maybe it’s because they could not do what we were doing, and they didn’t seem to have the level of contact that we had... Many people were envious of what we were able to do.*” Moreover, one CF member said that he adopted the role of diplomat because “*a lot of the times, when we look[ed] to [OGD/OGA representative] to take the lead on governance issues, he just wasn’t there and so that fell right back on me, the CIMIC⁵ guy, to do that.*” This, he continued, meant that the OGD/OGA representative was “*a bit of a puppet master in the background because I was the one who had the relationships with all of the key individuals*” and “*I essentially had to be the implementer on the ground because he wasn’t able to be up there.*” In some cases, CF personnel could not understand why OGD/OGA representatives were not “*stepping up to the plate*” and “*taking the lead*” on what the CF perceived to be legitimate development projects. Moreover, these personnel also said that it was often unclear why certain projects were chosen over others, especially when these diverged with CF considerations for development projects, and that this needed to be communicated “*a bit better.*”

Many NGO and OGD/OGA participants were adamant that there were clearly demarcated jurisdictions where the CF belonged (e.g., defence) and others where they did not (e.g., development and diplomacy). There was evidence that this led to negative exchanges between OGD/OGA representatives and CF personnel. As one CF participant explained,

“The territorialism that [OGD/OGA representatives] were displaying in some cases was unbelievable. They said... ‘What the hell are you doing funding development projects in our AO [Area of Operations]. This is our turf blah, blah, blah.’ ...I don’t think that they understood that we’re all on the same team...”

Attempts by CF personnel to cross these boundaries, therefore, were viewed by OGD/OGA and NGO members as adopting roles unsuited for the military profession.

Power differences, jurisdiction, and roles and responsibility were identified as particular challenges to collaboration, and these appear to derive, in part, from organizational factors. For example, a few participants from NGOs and OGDs/OGAs accused the CF of maintaining the military hierarchical structure and style when interacting with individuals from different organizations, and felt that this may compromise the capacity to collaborate effectively. As one NGO participant put it,

“...when I met CIMIC guys and they introduced themselves by their rank, which means little to NGOs... That’s a bit odd for civilians in many cases. They find that really strange... The guys who walks in and says, ‘I’m Major Jones.’ People are like, ‘Whatever. Do you have a name there, Jones?’ And I’ve honestly heard people say those kinds of things... Informal, I think, is really important. And it’s often tough for someone in the Canadian Forces to be informal because their whole culture is about formality.”

Research from the health care domain (a system that, like the military system, is also based on professionalization and hierarchy) suggests that a shift from a hierarchical structure to a horizontal structure may be necessary for effective collaboration with people outside one’s respective

⁵ CIMIC refers to Civil-Military Cooperation.

profession (Henneman, Lee, & Cohen, 1995, and King, 1990, both as cited in San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005). As was stated by an NGO SME in this study, *“The CIMIC guys who walk in and introduce themselves by their first name are 10 steps ahead of anybody else this fast. Because it builds a certain amount of rapport I think.”* This view suggests that maintaining hierarchical structures and using a traditional military style of communicating (e.g., leading with one’s rank) may hinder collaboration (specifically, communication and the development of rapport) from the start. Stepping outside the conventions of one’s organization may be required by the military in order to communicate effectively and to develop rapport with collaboration partners from civilian organizations.

Some non-CF participants believed that the CF tried to fit OGDs/OGAs and NGOs into their structure, systems and processes as opposed to trying to fit into the systems and processes of other JIMP partners. The CF was accused of failing to take the time to get to know the other actors in theatre. Instead, they were viewed, in the words of one NGO SME, as *“trying to program them, coordinate them, or ignore them.”* Speaking for the NGO community, one NGO participant explained, *“NGOs don’t want to be coordinated by anybody, least of all, military. But it’s a phrase you hear often. ‘I’m CIMIC. My job is to coordinate the civil society. The civil society is made up of you people, let me coordinate you.’ Yeah, doesn’t work well.”* The apparent willingness of the CF to subsume or assimilate other systems, rather than to integrate with them, seemed to have been construed by others as an exercise of control.

The data, therefore, suggest that power differences will impact collaboration efforts (e.g., communication, negotiation styles, etc.), and that these issues of power may arise from both individual factors (e.g., attitudes and values) as well as organizational factors (e.g., structure, styles, culture). Participants from NGOs and especially those from OGDs/OGAs indicated that the CF was crossing boundaries, by taking on roles and responsibilities that were more the domain of other professions (i.e., diplomacy and development) than of the military profession.

3.2.1.2 Shared goals

The literature suggests that a condition for effective collaboration is having shared goals or, at minimum, attempting to align goals in order to ensure that these are mutually achieved and non-contradictory. When both parties are willing to adopt a common super-ordinate goal, collaboration may be more effective. For example, NGOs and CF may both desire a peaceful, stable environment for the distribution of aid to Afghans. However, these organizations may diverge with respect to how these goals ought to be achieved. These differences will have a consequence on the capacity to collaborate effectively. As the data show, diverging goals was a serious challenge to collaboration in a JIMP operational environment. In some cases, according to OGD/OGA SMEs, this appeared to be a result of the CF lacking complete understanding at the organizational level of the development and diplomatic domains.

Considering development projects, a few participants explained that the CF did not fully appreciate the time required for development activities and the potential for the CF to impact negatively on development objectives. In the words of one OGD/OGA member:

“Our first battle was on slowing them down. You can’t stabilize a village and move on after 3 months... Mixing good intentions with a common military ethic of ‘get it done’ is difficult when the problems you’re seeking to address are governance and development related. These are inherently long-term issues. So we fought that battle and moved them back to a more logical timeframe, 8-12 months to stabilize a village.”



The SME continued,

“The military wants to give everything. The military’s initial assessment, let’s go in, we’ll dig some irrigation, we’ll give them some blankets and stuff, and then we’ll move on to the next village. So at the operational level of the military, that has been the perception of what development is. We give them a bunch of stuff and they are happy, we win hearts and minds by giving them stuff, and then we walk out. We had to change their mindsets on that...”

“The CIMIC team...were going to build a village market. For them [it is] a straight infrastructure job and when can you have it built? Absolutely not! It’s a governance project...they need to be forced to think about it...they just see it as a straight infrastructure job.”

It was argued that CF members collaborating with other parties in theatre needed to enhance their knowledge of other organizations’ systems, processes, norms, and practices in general. Specifically, it was felt that they needed, in the words of this OGD/OGA member, to “*understand some basic concepts...a broad understanding of development, the longer term nature of it, the implications of it, where development is*” and to start to consider “*governance and accountability thought processes*” in order to effectively collaborate with OGDs/OGAs and NGOs on development activities. Accordingly, this would help the CF to more realistically align and fulfil goals. Thus, the CF’s lack of knowledge about the requirements of development projects may impact the outcomes of collaboration, most notably goal attainment and cumulative impacts.

Another organizational factor that may hinder the development of shared goals is the quick rotation of CF personnel and the changing priorities of CIMIC teams. Recalling her experience, one NGO participant explained that “*every CIMIC team seems to have the authority to choose their own priorities. I don’t know if that’s the case, but it certainly appears that one group is focused entirely on orphanages...The next group may be entirely focused on something else.*” According to this SME, such changing priorities made it very difficult to collaborate as the goals and priorities of CF personnel were altered as different rotations changed, sometimes to match the current commander’s intent. Indeed, she explained how this constant shift of goals and priorities would make a collaborative partnership difficult and, more significantly, undesirable.

Interestingly, one CF member also thought that short rotations impacted the CF’s ability to align goals and promote effective collaboration activities – in this instance with Afghan nationals. He stated, “*Three to 6 months, forget it. You won’t even get to know them. You won’t even get to gain their trust and you’re leaving...I think a year is probably about right. Six months would be minimum. Nine months may be okay, but a year, I think is much better.*” Another CF member also spoke of the lack of time for establishing goals, let alone fulfilling them. He described the 6-month rotation in the following way:

“The first few months of every 6-month rotation the guy comes and he’s naturally, ‘Oh my god, I’m freaked. I’m in Kandahar. I don’t know what’s going on.’ Or worse, ‘Oh my god, I’m in Kandahar again and I’m pissed off.’ Then month 3, ‘Okay, I’m sort of working, sort of getting understanding.’ Month 4, ‘Yeah I’m making some good contacts.’ Month 5, ‘I’m really getting to work.’ Month 6, ‘I can’t wait to get out of this shit hole.’ And it goes, again and again...”

This description underscores the challenge facing collaboration efforts for long-term goals, such as development projects. At a systemic level, short rotations will make collaboration and aligning

goals difficult. At the individual level, the organization representative's attitudes will also largely shape the capacity to fulfil goals, especially if there are a number of equally competing goals.

Participants from the NGO community argued that it may be unrealistic to think that the CF can share its goals. As one NGO participant explained, in conflict situations, as opposed to humanitarian situations where there is some “*give and take*,” any service the military provides is simply “*incidental*.” And, she continued, this is more challenging given that NGOs themselves have “*completely different views and policies*” regarding “*how things work*.” In fact, she went on to state that “[the CF are] *so mission-focused that they can't understand that somebody else can have a different mission. And that doesn't make it a wrong mission. It's just different from yours.*” Accordingly, the potential need for the CF to at least somewhat align goals with the NGO community may be a challenge that impacts their ability to effectively collaborate.

On the other hand, the WoG approach requires alignment of goals among the various actors in theatre (i.e., DFAIT, CIDA, CF). To accomplish this, one OGD/OGA participant indicated that the best approach may be to “*stick to the national plan*” and “*resist doing things outside the plan*” in order to ensure that goals are shared and achieved. This would require closing the knowledge gap and gaining a greater understanding of the systems, processes, norms and practices of each profession (diplomacy, development, and defence). This would also require recognition of the relative contribution that each actor provides in fulfilling these goals as part of a collaborative team. However, knowledge acquisition that will be meaningful for goal alignment in theatre may be compromised by differences in organizational culture, such as differences in the approach to fulfilling these goals. As one OGD/OGA participant explained, “*the biggest cultural difference is that they are A type personalities...with agendas*,” meaning “*they want to achieve, right now, really quick. And development doesn't happen that way.*”

From the perspective of participants, sharing goals will require broader knowledge of the various organizations and a more aligned approach to fulfilling them. Failing to embrace shared goals and to develop a common understanding about how these goals will be met will likely negatively impact the process of collaboration.

3.2.1.3 Mutual respect

Another condition that is critical for collaboration is mutual respect. This condition implies that collaborators recognize the unique contributions that their partners bring to the table. These contributions can be assessed by understanding the history of an organization or by having had previous interactions with the organization. However, as one NGO participant reflected regarding the NGO-military interaction, there is sometimes no opportunity to develop this knowledge base in advance of operations. Consequently, this situation may impact the CF's perception of NGOs in general. As one participant from the NGO community explained,

“That's the problem... Canadian Forces, in particular, they think they work with all these NGOs. But they don't work with the professional NGOs usually. They usually end up working with the 'one-off NGOs' – the mom-and-pop organizations, the church groups – not with what the NGOs consider to be the professionals in the game, because the professionals in the game don't want to work with them... Generally, the groups knocking on the door of the military asking for help are the disorganized unprofessional groups. Unfortunately, that's how they [the CF] see the community, a bunch of rag-tag, disorganized, unprofessional groups. Those are the ones that come begging for help.”



As she further explained, the “*professional*” NGO organizations are essentially self-sufficient because of their size, and they neither need nor want the assistance of the military. On the other hand, the “unprofessional” NGOs do need the assistance of the military. As a consequence, accurately gauging contributions of NGOs in collaborative activities may be difficult because NGOs are extremely diverse. Smaller, less professionalized NGOs could distort the perceived level of contribution and capacity of the wider NGO community, and interactions with “*disorganized unprofessional groups*” who come “*begging for help*” may foster a negative stereotype of the NGO community in general. Indeed, participants from OGDs/OGAs and NGOs believed that members of the NGO community are stereotyped by the CF (and other militaries) as being “*not professionalized,*” “*a bunch of do-gooders,*” “*overpaid,*” “*lazy,*” “*Birkenstock wearing,*” “*tree hugger[s],*” “*naïve,*” “*peacenik[s].*” Meeting only with NGOs that require assistance may also reinforce the stereotype among CF or other military personnel. Research has shown that those who exercise power over others (and this is not limited to any particular organization, but rather speaks to those people in established positions of power) tend to increase attention to stereotypic attributes and to pay less attention to counter-stereotypic attributes (Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000). Therefore, addressing potential negative attitudes and stereotypes about others will be important in order to establish mutual respect for representatives of diverse organizations and professions.

A failure to acknowledge the field experience, expertise and, most importantly, the potential contribution to the collaboration process of other actors in the field will shape the interactions. This core lack of respect may be worsened by stereotypes and attitudes of superiority. Recounting previous civil-military interactions, one NGO participant said,

“They [militaries] felt they knew better than everybody else, even though they just arrived and other agencies had been there for 20 years. That’s the sort of standard military attitude... It’s not necessarily wrong. They easily have the best equipment. Their people are very well trained. And they have a huge resource base. But what they often don’t have is on-the-ground knowledge and cultural knowledge and knowledge of the community and knowledge of how things work within that local government. And so sometimes their confidence is a little misplaced.” pride

This “*standard military attitude,*” perhaps fostered by an emphasis on professionalism and an organizational culture that promotes pride and confidence, can inadvertently negatively shape the interactions and the ways in which counterparts are treated. As one NGO SME recounted,

“...initially, they didn’t understand... They would have a condescending attitude. You know, ‘Get me a coffee and a cookie’... basically offered a few descriptions of enemy combatants. And then when you ask them for anything else, ‘Oh we can’t possibly do that.’ It was a very one-sided relationship.”

In this instance, the end result was a failure of the NGO to be treated as an equal in the interaction. Another NGO participant described a familiar interaction between military and civilian actors as follows:

Military: “*Well listen here young man, let me tell you how things work.*”

NGO: “*What the hell do you know old man, the only place you’ve ever been is Bosnia and that was in an office in the early 90s and I’ve been in a war zone for 10 years, so don’t you tell me how to...*”

Following this anecdote, the NGO SME said that this lack of respect always leads to a breakdown of cooperation. As she stated, “once that argument starts, forget coordination.” This style of interaction may emerge from overemphasis on one’s function, role, title or age as opposed to being based on one’s knowledge and experience. As one NGO participant explained,

“CIMIC teams tend to be run by Majors more or less from my experience. That tends to be the person in charge at that level. And that’s often people in their 40’s and early 50’s. The person in charge of an NGO, who is the head of sort of their agency, is often in their early 30’s. So you have a pretty major age gap often and the military officer, who’s 50, has the perception that the aid worker who is 32 doesn’t have a clue about a war zone and doesn’t have a clue about how things work, which is an erroneous assumption. Many aid workers spent 10 years in a war zone... They are very savvy about how to work in a war zone... A person that has been on the ground for many years does not want to speak directly to a 25-year-old Second Lieutenant that is just all hyper to be there and has no idea where he is, who you are, or what your purpose is. You know, you want to speak to someone that has a least some experience, the perspective that you have. So match peer to peer.”

Gaining equal status (or mutual respect) in the process of collaboration is vital because it is argued that this is one way to diminish intergroup prejudices (Allport, 1954). As mentioned above, it is likely that both communities (i.e., civilian and military) have stereotypes about the other. Indeed, as Meharg (2007, pp. 124-125) stated, “looking in from the outside, each perceives the other as being homogenous despite detailed sub-group identities that inform their activities in the military and humanitarian space.” Cultivating mutual respect, therefore, demands recognition of the contribution and value that other parties can provide in collaboration. This can be accomplished by acknowledging the professional nature of the organizations in theatre as well as acknowledging the merits of field representatives (i.e., their experience and expertise). Establishing mutual respect, therefore, is important in order to level the collaboration playing field.

3.2.1.4 Mutual trust

Trust is a critical condition to ensure effective collaboration. Indeed, negotiation research shows that when there is a lack of trust, people are unwilling to communicate (Parks, Henager, Scamahorn, 1996, as cited in Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010). Specifically, there is an unwillingness to share information because, on the one hand, those who distrust believe that their negotiation partners will take advantage of the shared information and will respond dishonestly to questions. On the other hand, those who trust believe that shared information is sincere and correct, and that sharing information leads to win-win collaboration. Consequently, a trusting relationship promotes a free exchange of information that highlights negotiation partners’ interests and priorities, leading to more integrative outcomes in which all parties’ interests are satisfied as best possible (Butler, 1995, Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977, both as cited in Thompson et al.). If distrust diminishes the desire to communicate, then there can essentially be no collaboration.

Data suggest that trust is an issue in JIMP contexts, especially in the NGO community. Specifically, some NGO participants said they distrusted sharing information with the military because they were not clear what the military would do with the information. As one NGO SME explained,

“Quite frankly, the NGOs are nervous sharing operational information with the military. Because you have no way of knowing where it is going to go... The military keeps such meticulous records that it might come back to you. You know if they write in their report, NGOs ABC says such and such about this community, then your relationship with the

community is destroyed. So NGOs are often very wary about sharing their operational information with the military.”

A failure to trust the intentions of fellow collaborators will prevent the sharing of information, and this may lead to ineffective collaboration or terminate it altogether. Without communication, interests and priorities essentially remain unknown.

Another NGO participant said that members of the NGO community in general think that “*guys in green uniforms*” have an “*ulterior motive.*” This suspicion concerning military motivation to collaborate in theatre with NGOs will directly influence the development of trust as well as attitudes toward collaboration.

Moreover, members of the NGO community worry that military personnel disguise themselves as aid workers in order to gather information or intelligence. One NGO SME stated that “*it’s a huge concern... amongst the NGO community that military are going to dress up in NGO clothes and show up at our meetings and pretend they are NGOs. And it’s happened many times.*” This behaviour on the part of the military may compromise aid workers’ neutrality and safety if, for example, hostile groups (e.g., insurgents) perceive the existence of a mutual relationship between aid workers and the military. It is important to balance the needs of the CF against the needs of other organizations. However, if the CF fails to demonstrate concern for the well-being of other partners, then this lack of concern may lead to a decrease in trust on the part of potential collaborators.

A few participants, both military and civilian, mentioned that failure to make good on promises impacts negatively both the motivation to collaborate and the development of trust. For example, a CF member explained how one representative from an OGD/OGA made promises that could not be fulfilled, and that this had a serious impact on personal relationships with CF counterparts. An OGD/OGA participant commented that her organization said that they would help development efforts by providing resources (people and money), but in the end the organization could not come up with the funding. In her words, the organization was “all talk and no action,” and this impacted negatively on her personal relationships in the field as she had to mitigate the negative effects of fellow collaborators’ unfulfilled expectations on behalf of her organization. As predictability is one of the dimensions of trust, failure to fulfil promises will essentially erode trust and prevent successful collaboration. Moreover, it has been argued that, following trust violations, trust may never be fully restored, despite multiple attempts by the trust violator to demonstrate trustworthy behaviour (Schweitzer, Hershey & Bradlow, as cited in Thompson et al., 2010). Collaborative efforts then should at minimum avoid making promises unless their fulfilment can be guaranteed.

Perceptions of trust will exist at both the individual level and at the organizational level. Thinking about collaboration in the field, it is probable that though trust in an organization may be low, the trust in an organization’s representative may be high based on the development of personal relationships. For example, one CF SME implied that though he did not fully trust the competency of a particular OGD/OGA, he did trust its representative because over the course of the operation, the two of them shared information and developed plans together in an attempt to fulfil CF and OGD/OGA objectives.

Mutual trust will be a vital condition for effective collaboration, especially as a lack of trust leads to a breakdown in communication.

3.2.2 Motivation to Collaborate

True collaboration relies on the genuine motivation of all parties to work cooperatively with others, as well as on the belief in the motivation of other partners to collaborate. Some participants, most notably those from the NGO community, questioned the motives of the CF for collaborating with them. For example, one NGO participant did not believe that the CF motives for conducting development activities in Afghanistan were legitimate. He stated, “*I would say 95% is aid for a reason – force protection, hearts and minds, commander’s intent...it’s not done with the theoretical impartiality or development impetus or economic prospects that aid agencies in the government basis do.*” Accordingly, the military’s motivation can be construed as an effort to increase its institutional legitimacy. As Meharg (2007, p. 127) argues, “winning hearts and minds campaigns are seen as psychological, effects based operations by humanitarians, and most organizations [i.e., NGOs] intend to keep their distance from such activities.”

The link between trust and motivation to collaborate will be important to understand in a JIMP context, both at the organizational and individual level. One participant from the NGO community said that the CF should make outreach a priority, because when it comes to motivation to collaborate, she said, “*the aid agencies don’t see any value added I think in trying to coordinate with the military because the military hasn’t made its case.*” From this NGO SME’s perspective, the motivation of the CF to collaborate with aid agencies seems unclear, and this may lead to distrust by default.

On the other hand, the WoG approach to operations requires OGDs/OGAs and the CF to collaborate (i.e., interdependence by necessity) to achieve national goals. Clear statements about each party’s motives for collaboration ideally should be established and documented at the highest levels of government and disseminated at the organizational and individual levels.

3.2.3 Collaboration

3.2.3.1 Communication and developing rapport

Evidence from previous research suggests that military styles of communication may present barriers to effective collaboration with civilian actors (Holton et al., 2010; Winslow, 2002). For example, CF communication has been described as hierarchical, overly direct, aggressive, and incomprehensible (because of the overreliance on acronyms and “*incomprehensible lingo*”) to parties outside of the CF system. SME feedback discussions revealed similar challenges in communications between the military and civilian actors, and this was noted to be a particular problem with members of the NGO community, who sometimes have little knowledge about the military. Moreover, participants from NGOs indicated a reluctance to share information with the military because they do not know how the military will use this information. Other instances noted above suggest that communication between civilians and military personnel can at times be perceived as condescending, as well as reflective of stereotypes, and that this type of stereotyping occurs in both directions. Based on previous work and SME feedback, communication challenges seem to be an important issue to address to promote positive civil-military relationships and collaboration efforts.

Aside from the general challenges of communication between civilians and soldiers, SMEs from OGDs/OGAs and NGOs explained that establishing rapport with collaborating partners from the CF can be a challenge and consequently had the potential to frustrate collaboration. Moreover, such challenges seemed to arise from the organizational level. As mentioned earlier, one NGO



participant argued that formal introductions and maintaining rank on the part of the military did not help build rapport with members of the NGO community. Another organizational factor that presented challenges to the ability to build rapport was the short rotations employed by the military. For example, one NGO SME stated that NGOs have to continuously re-educate the new CF personnel, which runs counter to effective collaboration:

“You have to teach them about you, what you have to do and why. Over and over and over again... Coordination is work and it takes time and work... There’s a point, where, I’m sure the perception of the military is that NGOs don’t want to work with them. No. NGOs are just sick of telling the story over and over again.”

On the other hand, a short rotation can have its advantages. Reflecting on the potential for a clash of personalities while collaborating with the military, one NGO participant said, *“Don’t worry, they’ll be gone soon... That guy, you can’t work with him, don’t worry, he’ll be replaced... Many NGOs go in with a 25-year plan. This guy on a 6-month rotation is no skin off my nose, right?”*

Another potential organizational-level barrier to developing rapport with a collaboration counterpart is having access to the right person. Security surrounding military installations and compounds makes it very difficult for non-military personnel to gain access to the relevant decision makers. As one NGO participant said,

“The soldier who was unloading things at the airport didn’t have a whole lot of time for us... The senior officials were actually very, very easy to deal with once you can get into the office. But good luck getting past security at the gate if you’re not in uniform. So once you actually got to the office, you met really well trained people who knew what they were doing, who were more than happy to work with you and coordinate with you... But getting to that person is always complicated because that style of information doesn’t seem to trickle down, certainly not to the local guys they’ve hired to guard their compound. Which is a bit frustrating if you’re on the outside of the that compound because if you don’t have an ID badge or uniform, you’ll never get in to meet the guy who says he wants to coordinate with you, and who I believe genuinely does, but doesn’t realize the system below him.”

For civilians, then, a challenge in developing rapport with collaboration partners may reside in organizational factors, such as difficulties in navigating an impenetrable security system or having limited time to work with particular individuals. Moreover, rapport can be frustrated if formal procedures are required during collaboration activities, as this can distance collaboration partners. Differences in communication styles and the ability to develop rapport can be barriers to effective civil-military collaboration.

3.2.3.2 Negotiation

Negotiation will be fundamental to the collaboration process as actors attempt to get their interests and needs met without making too many concessions. As such, adopting the appropriate style of negotiation will be necessary in order to achieve goals but also maintain strong personal relationships with collaboration partners that enable further collaboration opportunities. In the JIMP operational environment, the situation may demand a particular kind of approach to negotiation in order to fulfil one’s needs and interests. For example, under time pressure (as is often the case in combat and humanitarian relief operations), collaborators may be more willing to compromise to achieve their own goals. Alternatively, if developing a relationship is central, then one might be more willing to accommodate. Depending on the level of interdependence, parties

who hold power may act more competitively and may work to ensure that their own needs are met above others because they control the necessary resources.

The data from the present study did not provide many examples of negotiation styles *per se*. However, one participant from an NGO recounted an instance in which having the resources that other parties needed (i.e., transport vehicles) provoked a competitive style of negotiation on the part of the CF. For example, when establishing the terms for delivering food, a CF member demanded compliance of an IO and issued threats regarding cooperation: “*You want to deliver food or not?*” The NGO SME also said that the CF do not realize that sharing information during collaboration is a “*quid pro quo*,” and that they (the CF) need to demonstrate goodwill and also share information during collaboration. This observation was shared by another participant from an NGO. She explained,

“...militaries in general, like to classify everything... They are always showing up at NGO coordination meetings asking for information. You feed them all kinds of information, and then they classify it and you can’t get it back... They took it and ran...”

This style of collaboration (i.e., taking without providing) unfortunately may have serious ramifications for future collaborative efforts. As one NGO participant stated it, the workaround is simply to stop sharing information: “*The way the NGOs have gotten around it is the NGOs hold coordination meetings and don’t allow the military to come. I mean, that’s how they get around it.*”

This one-sided approach to collaboration or negotiation was described not only in terms of information sharing. As one NGO SME explained,

“The bad coordination is when the military demands to see and says, ‘Tell me what’s going on here A, B and C.’ Give[s] you coffee and a cookie, and tells you to go...and you say, ‘Well what’s in it for us? I mean what can you provide us? Medivac or anything?’ ‘No we can’t do that.’ ‘Could you perhaps give us some information back?’ ‘Well Kandahar is a dangerous place.’ I mean he just gives like nothing.”

Another NGO participant remarked on the CF negotiation style, stating that “*when push comes to shove, the military usually never does anything for civilian actors.*” As such, the civilian perception of a one-sided approach in negotiating with the military, as reflected in the present study, may result in a tentative approach to collaboration at best.

In contrast, one NGO participant shared a positive *quid pro quo* collaboration experience that he had with the CF:

“This is way back in Kosovo. There’s a major in the PPCLI⁶...and I’m running a...shelter at the time. And there was like...20 000 shelter units, big program. And for some reason, he wants to reach this mountain village and distribute shelter packages. And, you know, these people need them just as much as anyone else. But, of course, he’s doing it because he wanted to help the people... He approached us and said, ‘Hey, do us a favour and I’ll do you a favour’... ‘What can I do for you to help you?’ And so we made a deal and I gave him a few hundred kits or whatever it was and I got to use his trucking for a day... which would help me out... Both sides had their own agenda and it worked out well.”

There will be a variety of different approaches to negotiation that collaborators can adopt, and this will be largely influenced by external factors, organizational factors, and individual factors. As the

⁶ PPCLI refers to Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry.

data have shown, the approach to negotiation will likely have lasting impacts on the outcomes of collaboration and more significantly on future motivations to collaborate.

3.2.3.3 Planning and decision-making

Like negotiation, planning and decision-making are critical elements of collaboration. Collaboration works because individuals can make decisions and plan to achieve mutual outcomes that satisfy interests and needs. Recounting their experiences of collaborating in a JIMP operational environment with multiple actors, participants identified a number of challenges related to planning and decision-making. For example, one CF participant expressed the challenges that he encountered while planning and hence collaborating with personnel from OGDs/OGAs. He explained,

“The civilians have so many places they want to go in Kandahar City in particular. The military has so many places that they want to go. We only have so many vehicles and soldiers to protect us so we’ve got to rationalize our efforts – find a common effort. We would submit all the military organizations that wanted to go places, would submit their next week of patrol, their forecasts. These are where we would like to go and the days we would like to go on and we would have this meeting every Wednesday or something like that... They would try and combine patrols so they could make everyone happy and this and that. It only works if everybody is on board a full week ahead and plans ahead and so on.

“The main effort of the PRT⁷ were civilian agencies and to some extent they would abuse this fact to make up [for] the fact that they didn’t tend to plan as well and so even though they were aware of these rules and we would constantly hound them, ‘Hey have you got your patrols for next week?’ Most of the [OGD/OGA] officers seemed to only plan about two days ahead. So after our patrol matrix for the entire week has already been established, they would come in and say, ‘Oh, I want to go here in 2 days.’ ‘Why do you want to go here in 2 days?’ ‘Well because we’ve got the weekly meeting with so and so.’ ‘The weekly meeting? You mean this happens every week? You knew about this, this many days ago? Why didn’t you tell us this, this many days ago because we’ve already come up with the patrol matrix for the week, you know, if we send you here now, we’re going to have to cancel this patrol... The civvies would come in disorganized, not thinking about the week ahead, about what it is they wanted to do to make everyone’s lives easier and instead it caused twice as much work for everyone because they would have to go back every single day and re-jig the patrol matrix almost because in a lot of cases the civilians didn’t take it up upon themselves to plan ahead...”

In this account, planning processes were not synchronized. This, the CF SME argued, was a result of differences in organizational cultures and a failure of OGD/OGA personnel to understand and appreciate the CF’s systems and processes. Another organizational factor that hindered CF planning was the excessive vacation time that OGD/OGA personnel received while deployed. One CF participant shared his frustration about planning operations as a consequence:

“...A mental health nurse from Canada came out and met with all the civilians at the PRT... Apparently she came away with the assessment that all the civilians were on the verge of suicide because they were so stressed out... They seemed to be coping perfectly

⁷ PRT refers to Provincial Reconstruction Team.

well and they admitted to me that they thought that this was a ridiculous assessment, at least some of them that I spoke to, and nevertheless the mental health nurse said they were on the verge of suicide and they needed more vacation... The new vacation plan came down to 8 days off for every 56 days in the field... So what that works out to, if you're at the PRT, you're gonna have, well actually, and it's even worse if you're out in the field, but let's just say you are at the PRT where most of the civilians are, it's going to be a day or two for you to go from the PRT to the Kandahar Airfield. It will probably be another day or two for you to get from Kandahar Airfield to the staging base in the Middle East and then from there, we'll tack on another day to catch your flight to wherever it is you're going on vacation because it's supposed to be 8 days vacation. So let's say 3 days. So, 3 days to get there. Eight days that you're on vacation and another 3 days to come back. That adds up to 2 weeks: 14 days. So, essentially for every 6 weeks, you are away from your desk for 2 weeks and I found that to be such a disruptive schedule... It would only add to the delays that were inherent with the civil agencies..."

Not only did the amount of vacation time impact the ability to plan operations, but as this participant stated, it also “*stymied relationships*” and rapport.

One participant from the NGO community mentioned that he was rarely included in any CF planning while he was deployed. He stated, “*they [CF] rarely coordinate with us on what they are doing. I can't remember ever getting a briefing on what they planned to do.*” Another participant from the NGO community said that it was difficult to plan anything with the CF given their short rotations. She recalled, “*it certainly impacted the ability to collaborate, because I couldn't make a plan very far in the future not knowing who was going to be there.*”

Another participant from an NGO mentioned that the challenge facing the OGD/OGA and the NGO communities is the decision-making process. She described the military as structured, organized, and mission-driven, resulting in decision makers knowing what they can do, when they can do it, and who authorizes it. In contrast, she described very differently the “*aid bureaucracy*” decision-making process in theatre. She explained that people from aid agencies (who are sometimes required to meet with the military) often do not have the authority, experience, or background knowledge to make the decisions that need to be made. She further explained that the aid culture requires everyone to sit down in a meeting and collaboratively make a decision. In other words, everyone needs to agree on a decision. This consensus approach to decision-making, she continued, bogs the system down. Because the military is a “*very yes/no*” culture, she added, they will put an NGO representative on the spot during a meeting and ask them to make a yes/no decision. She said that this is very “*intimidating*” to an NGO, because military personnel often take a direct approach and a very agentic stance, whereas NGO personnel are slower to make decisions. As an OGD participant explained, “*if you're wishy-washy with them [the CF], they don't understand... They're not subtle guys. They want straightforward answers.*” To counter this, it was suggested by the NGO SME that OGDs/OGAs and NGOs send “*higher level people*” to meet with military personnel to promote decision-making. However, it was said by an OGD participant that some OGDs/OGAs have “*trouble getting seasoned officers to go to these places.*” This means that decision makers in some OGDs/OGAs may be located outside of theatre, making collaboration slower and less effective, especially when time is a critical factor. And one CF participant remarked, “*I don't see why a person with enough authority can't be just placed in Kandahar to make those decisions and not have to seek authority on every single decision from Ottawa... It seemed that they were being micro-managed.*”



The data, therefore, suggest challenges with respect to institutional approaches to planning and decision-making that may impact the process of collaboration.

3.2.4 Outcomes of Collaboration

3.2.4.1 Performance

Collaborative efforts are initiated in order to achieve some sort of goal or final end state. The ability to achieve this end state is a gauge of the performance of the collaborative team, and the outcome of the collaborative effort. Performance will be a result of collaborators' negotiation, planning and decision-making and it will impact the cumulative impact of collaborations as well as the any subsequent collaboration. In the current study, participants did not directly discuss specific performance outcomes. However, there is some evidence described earlier in the negotiation section suggesting that collaboration activities did not always ensure that one's needs and interests were met.

3.2.4.2 Cumulative impact

The effects of collaboration can be direct and indirect, and short-term and long-term, and the cumulative impact construct is intended to represent the sum of all these influences. The importance of thinking at an effects-based level was evident in the SME discussions. Some SMEs explained how militaries do not always consider the cumulative impact of their collaborative activities, and that this needs to be a priority to ensure effective collaboration for all of the parties involved. For example, setting meetings with NGOs in conspicuous locations may compromise their neutrality in the eyes of their stakeholders (i.e., local populations). As one participant from an NGO stated,

“We made a valiant effort to appear to be as separate as possible. But the military would do goofy things like invite all the NGOs to a meeting at the US embassy... And that just didn't show any forethought whatsoever. So everybody of course had to go because you needed the information, and you had to go because your donor said you had to go, so you had to go. So you would take taxis and park away and essentially try to sneak in... And then you get there and it's a bunch of reservists who have never actually left Tennessee telling you how to do a convoy in a war zone where you have spent the last 10 years. It was an entire waste of a day... And potentially jeopardized your life, the safety of my staff and my program. And these guys didn't give it any thought whatsoever.”

Ensuring neutrality is a core principle for NGOs. Failure to live up to the principle of neutrality can, as mentioned above, jeopardize the safety of the NGO staff. For instance, as one NGO SME stated, *“In Afghanistan, local communities came up to us and said point blank, ‘If we see you coordinating with anybody in a uniform, you'll be in danger.’ Period. Like ‘We'll shoot you because you're them at that point.’”* Maintaining optics is vitally important for the NGO community, and the CF, NGO SMEs advised, should acknowledge this as critical to the survival and effectiveness of NGOs.

According to some NGO participants, humanitarian action conducted by the CF can sometimes erode the effectiveness of the humanitarian actors. As one NGO participant explained,

“...The military has all these great resources... We know the prices of things, military guys often pay 2, 3, 5 times the cost... They overpay for materials and people. Now if someone working for me works for \$400 a month, which is unbelievably good money, and they get

\$1500 or \$2000 from the military, where are they going to go... The way they distribute [aid] is going to be much more tainted than the way we distribute it..."

According to this participant, the CF was not fully assessing the situation so as to understand the market value of things and this, he argued, was because of the CF's "laziness" and limited time. He stated that "there's not even an attempt to be equivalent, to maintain market price." The outcome of inflating the market was essentially to make NGO activities "redundant." Such behaviour on the part of the CF also hindered NGO efforts to bargain with locals, as many NGOs have much smaller budgets than the CF.

Another participant from an OGD/OGA also thought that the CF needed to reconsider how they conduct operational assessments and the overall cumulative impact that their approach has on future collaboration efforts. Specifically, he said that they needed to more accurately assess the risks and the rewards of their military operations as well as the overall impact that their operations will have on the perceptions of the local population. He explained,

"The battle group thinks nothing of running out and running a tank through a grape field. They understand that it pisses the guy off, but they need to see how destroying a grape field impacts someone's livelihood and what that means. How long it takes to mend that fence, and not just paying them off, because they go out and they pay them. Understanding as well from our side that there are issues and that they do occasionally need to drive through a grape field because if, I'm told, do you want to lose that guy or do you want to save the grapes?..."

"There hasn't been a guy killed by a bullet in years. And yes I understand the risk of IEDs⁸, but that's not usually why they are doing this, to avoid an IED. It's usually because they are trying to get to a convoy from a different angle because there are guys in there with guns. Well, sit it out. Wait it out if you have to. You've got the night vision goggles. You've got all the equipment. Or drop a frickin' missile on them or whatever. Don't drive through. Anyways, weigh it out and look at all the options."

In general, this participant argued that the CF has to reconsider the cumulative impact of their activity on the ability to collaborate with OGDs/OGAs and NGOs as well as the impact of their operations on the local population. More to the point, it is important for the military to respect the humanitarian space given that "military members are unlikely to possess the expertise of the humanitarian profession and can, inadvertently, erode rather than earn community support when they engage in aid activities without full understanding of the perceptions created or the consequences of their actions" (Okros & Keizer 2007, p. 105). For example, support may be eroded "when the military distributes aid without consideration for, or even understanding of, kinship, gender, hierarchy or other social factors, and as a result, empower one group at the expense of others" (p. 113). As such, it is important that the CF understand more comprehensively the humanitarian space and how their varied actions will impact that in the long term. As the framework shows, there is a feedback loop from outcomes of collaboration to future collaborative efforts. Cumulative impacts will, therefore, directly impact the motivation to collaborate in future.

⁸ IEDs refer to Improvised Explosive Devices.



3.2.4.3 Personal relationships

As well as being embedded in the process of collaboration, personal relationships are an important outcome of collaboration. Successful collaborations will likely result in positive personal relationships, whereas unsuccessful collaboration may result in negative personal relationships. Of course, it is very possible that the outcome of the collaboration (success) may not impact the personal relationship at all. Nevertheless, personal relationships will be an important outcome of collaboration.

As noted earlier, however, some SME responses suggested that developing personal relationships between the NGO community and the CF was a challenge because of the short rotations for CF personnel. As one participant from the NGO community explained, you have to re-educate military personnel “*over and over and over again*” about one’s role and purpose. Also mentioned earlier, one CF participant complained that OGD/OGA systems (i.e., excessive vacation time) impacted his capacity to establish relationships. Another participant from an OGD/OGA indicated that his approach to developing personal relationships and to demonstrating that he was committed to the collaborative process between his organization and the CF involved him “*being present*” on the CF base as much as possible. This allowed CF members to get to know him and his intentions. Importantly, he indicated that although this commitment helped at the interpersonal level, it did not necessarily extend to breaking down organizational boundaries. He stated that, “*At a personal level, barriers broke down. But not there at the institutional level.*” So, the interactions and personal relationships that emerge between organization representatives will be a critical outcome of the process of collaboration.

3.2.4.4 Collective understanding

Collective understanding refers to the shared knowledge of one’s collaboration partners. The data in the present study showed very little evidence of collective understanding among collaboration partners in the JIMP operational environment. In fact, as mentioned above, in the case of the NGO community, the CF may not have a very good understanding of the community in general as a result of collaborating only with the “*disorganized unprofessional groups.*” One participant from the NGO community highlighted the CF’s lack of comprehensive knowledge of the other actors in operations. After providing examples of some of the terrifying experiences NGO workers have faced in Afghan operations (e.g., abduction and execution), he stated,

“...putting some thought into how these people [NGOs] live would help them [militaries] understand them. Because I think all the NGOs think about the military. It’s hard not to. It’s the elephant in the room right? So they think about them and they think, ‘Well it’s dangerous and scary out fighting.’ And most of them are quite sympathetic, empathetic about their [militaries’] plight and various degrees of support, depending on where they are from and what their personal and organizational philosophies are. I don’t necessarily think there’s a lot of reciprocation. The military thinks about itself and their mission in Afghanistan and that’s where it stops.”

It appears that this one-way kind of thinking does not allow the CF to fully appreciate the challenges facing the NGO community. However, it was also suggested that non-military partners (e.g., NGOs) also show a lack of understanding of other partners within the JIMP environment. For example, one CF SME argued that those outside the military system do not always understand its culture (e.g., “*they don’t know the difference between a Corporal and a Colonel*”), suggesting a lack of collective understanding.

Moreover, as mentioned by one CF participant, the failure to understand the justification for development projects suggests a disconnect in understanding OGD/OGA systems and processes as well as strategies from the point of view of the CF, and this impacts the ability to collaborate. For example, a CF participant shared his frustration relating to specific OGD/OGA development strategies. He explained,

“The CIMIC operator...had identifying issues and one of them was the school that was right across the street from our Forward Operating Base in [CF AOR]...It was the functioning school in the entire district, but it was in a state of disrepair, and he identified several projects that would be really good to upgrade this school. I guess [OGD/OGA] wasn't going to bite. [OGD/OGA] at this point had announced one of their senior projects was to build 50 new schools. They had come up with this list. I'm not sure how they came up with this list. I'm sure there was some rhyme or reason to it, but this school was not on their list, so they wouldn't touch it. Meanwhile, all the other schools that were on their list were in areas until such time as the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police are up to see where they can hold an area after we've cleared it. It will not be safe enough for them to build a school let alone for kids to walk down the street to go to it or teachers to work there. There was one example...only about 5 or 10 minutes drive south of this school in [CF AOR] where they wanted to build a new school from scratch and they awarded the money to a contractor to build it and he gave it back and said 'Look, I went down there. There's no way anybody will build a school down here. You can have the money back. If you can find another contractor who is willing to go down there and work, good luck to you.' Meanwhile, we have this school that is at half of its capacity because it is in a state of disrepair that they were refusing to put on the list and make it one of the 50 schools that they either built or repaired. My predecessor...was pushing this forward, saying 'What is going on? Why can't you approve this school project?' There is a lot of cases where if [OGD/OGA] refused to fund a project that we felt was clearly in their sphere of influence, the military in a lot of cases would step up and just pay for it...”

This lack of understanding regarding the motives of the OGD/OGA led to a breakdown in collaboration between CF and OGDs/OGAs in operation:

“So, my predecessor in [CF AOR], when [OGD/OGA] was refusing to fund the school, he said, 'Well you know what, forget you guys then. Even if you did approve this, it would probably take you 5 months. You might tell me you're gonna support it, but it will take 5 months for your headquarters in Ottawa to approve it, for you to get all the signature and this and that, do the proper tendering of a contractor and this and that. Before work even starts, it'll be several months away. I'm gonna walk over to the American military mentors and tell them about this say hey you know what, we'll do this as a PR piece for the ANA [Afghan National Army] commander in [CF AOR] district'... When [OGD/OGA] got word of this that we were going to go to a different budget source, all of a sudden they became interested in the school and said 'Oh okay....wait, wait, wait, we'll take a look at it.'”

Having another alternative to provide the desired funding for the development project diminished the dependence of the CF on OGD/OGA in operations and placed the CF in a more favourable position to negotiate. However, this example shows that a lack of understanding and communication of strategies can negatively influence collaboration between the CF and other actors in theatre.



Overall, the data seem to suggest a general knowledge gap between the various professions, and this may be a consequence arising from the limitations of current collaboration skills and strategies within the JIMP context.

3.2.4.5 Satisfaction with the process

Satisfaction with the process of collaboration will have a serious impact on future collaboration efforts. In fact, negotiation research highlights the role of bargaining history in future negotiation situations, in that history tends to repeat itself (O'Connor, Arnold, & Burris, 2005, as cited in Thompson et al., 2010). For example, the deals that people reach in one negotiation instance influence their subsequent bargaining experiences (good leads to good, bad leads to bad). Moreover, reaching an impasse in one negotiation increases the probability of reaching an impasse or obtaining low joint value in the next negotiation. Negotiation will have an obvious impact on collaboration in the JIMP operational environment. Indeed, one NGO participant recognized that current collaboration experiences in Afghanistan will shape the perceptions of the civilian community and their future civil-military interactions.

Overall, there were very few participant remarks that spoke directly to satisfaction with the collaboration process, but inferences about satisfaction may be made by reflecting on the passages detailed above. For example, the data suggest that there were many challenges and issues that arose when collaborating with multiple, diverse actors in a JIMP operational environment. In some cases, the data suggest that instrumental outcomes may have favoured the CF over the OGDs/OGAs and NGOs. For example, participant responses seemed to suggest that information was not shared equally across all parties. As mentioned earlier, one NGO participant explained that the military took the information and “*ran.*” Moreover, speaking about evacuation from personal experience, one NGO participant felt that, when push came to shove, the CF would not be there to assist civilians, and the CF had to “*accept they’re [the CF] not going to do anything,*” because, as stated above, “*the military [including the CF] thinks about itself and their mission in Afghanistan and that’s where it stops.*” He argued that the CF style of collaboration is very one-way, leaving him largely dissatisfied with the process of collaboration. On the other hand, because of OGD/OGA bureaucracy and limited presence in the field, one CF member explained how he had to take on the role of the OGD/OGA representative, which made him frustrated with the process. These examples, from both the CF and NGO communities, demonstrate the dissatisfaction with the process of collaboration in a JIMP operational environment. Further, participant descriptions suggest the potential for negative consequence for future collaboration, such as a lack of motivation to collaborate in the future, or adopting a more competitive approach to negotiating one’s needs and interests, or lack of trust.

Instrumental outcomes will likely influence one’s perception about the fairness of the process. From the passages documented above, it also appears that collaboration is not always perceived to be fair because of differences in resources. The CF often has greater access to resources (e.g., vehicles), so they are better able to determine who goes where and when, literally limiting the movement of other actors. This can be perceived by civilian actors as the CF having an unfair advantage in collaboration.

Nevertheless, most participants did emphasize the importance of personal relationships in ensuring successful collaboration among diverse actors in the JIMP operational environment. Participants shared their positive personal interactions with members from different organizations. For example, an NGO SME described one military cell in particular as “*very collaborative and good guys and willing to share and interact and work on things together.*” Another NGO reported that she had

“nothing but good experiences with the Canadian military.” One CF member described his OGD/OGA counterpart as “phenomenal,” despite the challenges to collaboration arising at the organizational level. As can be seen by these recollections, overall satisfaction with the process of collaboration can be largely impacted by these strong relationships.

3.3 Strategies for Enhancing Collaboration

Our discussions with SMEs also yielded information about specific strategies used to promote more effective collaborative relationships. The data suggest that the greatest strategy for enhancing collaboration was through the development of personal relationships. In fact, a number of participants said that it all comes down to “*personality*” (i.e., the individuals collaborating on the ground). As one OGD/OGA member summed it up, *“the biggest core element is how do we work together... It really comes from people sitting down, on the ground, working together. It always comes down to personal relationships.”* So despite initial negative perceptions about another organization and the challenges associated with different systems, structures, and so on, these challenges can be overcome by positive interactions among organization representatives.

For example, it was noted that sharing experiences through story-telling both develops relationships and establishes one’s credibility. As one NGO member stated, *“Someone starts telling a story and then everyone starts swapping stories and then the other... ‘the other’ gains credibility. You realize, if he faced a few tours in Afghanistan, he can’t be a complete idiot.”* This story-telling activity also sheds light on general similarities among OGD/OGA, NGO, and military personnel. Common similarities reported were interest in world affairs and familiarity with international cultures, speaking more than one language, giving up creature comforts for something nobler, and taking personal risks (see also Winslow, 2002).

This contact may also help to diminish stereotypes and intergroup prejudice. As one participant from an OGD/OGA mentioned, his perception (or prejudgement) of military personnel changed following extended interactions with them. As he put it, *“I’ve always perceived them as guys with guns and not much else. So it went from guys with guns to after 8 months wow these guys have excellent training.”* One CF participant said that the intergroup contact with OGD/OGA representatives increased his trust in their competency, which promoted positive personal relationships and collaboration. In fact, research has shown that collaborating professionals trust their counterparts more when they are perceived to be experienced and competent (San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005).

One CF participant explained how he built relationships in order to improve collaborative efforts among his co-workers by moving out of his personal office and sharing their open office space. Consequently, he established greater rapport and engagement. This is consistent with previous research showing that close physical proximity can diminish territorialism and promote collaboration among diverse professionals (Mariano 1998, and Baggs & Schmitt, 1997, both as cited in San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005). Of course, intergroup contact can also lead to negative relationships if one identifies a person’s shortcomings. Nevertheless, these participant recollections show deliberate strategic efforts to establish personal relationships in order to promote more effective collaboration.

Another strategy employed in enhancing collaboration efforts involved making shared identity salient. One NGO participant explained how she eluded military security and managed to see the CO: *“I called friends at the UN and found out that it was a Canadian in charge and then I told them, I put up my Canadian passport and said, ‘I need to speak to the Canadian in charge.’ And*



that's how I got in. It had nothing to do with the military.” Social identity theory suggests that belonging to a shared group increases the perception of the similarity of its members, which may promote positive outward attitudes and behaviours toward other group members. Some research shows that group identity salience coupled with shared fate will contribute to cooperative behaviours to resolve social dilemmas (Kramer, Brewer, & Hanna, 1996). Indeed, one CF participant said that downplaying his military identity and instead emphasizing his competency and desire to help as a civilian allowed him to “*get a little bit further*” with his civilian counterparts.

The data suggest that both developing strong, positive personal relationships with collaboration counterparts as well as affirming a shared identity are two ways to enhance collaboration.

4. Emergent Themes

The goal of this exploratory study was to further map the domain of collaboration within the JIMP operational environment. This required investigating a sample of the relevant literature pertaining to collaboration as well as collecting data from experts with experience collaborating with multiple actors in theatre. From these first-person accounts, we identified some of the core challenges and issues that emerged, and began drawing the interconnections among the many factors. In an effort to attempt to understand how the many different factors fit together, we created a preliminary conceptual framework for collaboration, showing the processes and factors that either promoted or frustrated collaboration. To conclude, this chapter highlights a few areas that we believe require further elaboration to provide both theoretical and empirical support for understanding collaboration among multiple actors in a JIMP operational framework. Pragmatically, greater comprehension around the most prominent issues and challenges will then help inform future CF training needs.

Our discussions with SMEs about collaboration revealed a number of key insights. For example, at the most general level, the sheer complexity of the environment within which JIMP players must collaborate is truly daunting. Relevant levels of analysis include the intrapersonal domain, the interpersonal domain, the group level, and the organizational level. Critical factors at each of these levels are likely to influence the collaborative processes. To attempt to disentangle all of these factors may be an unrealistic objective. Because there is a good deal of consistency between the issues and challenges identified in this research effort and previous efforts (e.g., Holton et al., 2010), it may be more pragmatic at this point to focus on a selected set of factors in order to allow for a deeper level of analysis. Narrowing the scope of investigation to the core themes arising from collaboration with multiple, diverse actors will move the research closer to providing the concrete recommendations necessary for future CF training.

In our view, the core phenomena that underlie many of the issues and challenges during collaboration in the JIMP operational framework are as follows:

- the imbalance of power;
- identity;
- the potential to misunderstand and disrespect collaboration partners because of negative stereotypes and prejudice; and
- the diverse negotiation approaches.

For example, the inability to negotiate, plan and choose a course of action effectively could be the consequence of struggles in power. Similarly, challenges to developing rapport might stem from the activation of stereotypes and inaccurate expectations. The sections that follow describe the significance of these four underlying themes in the collaboration process (and their interconnections) as they pertain to a JIMP operational environment, and the way forward.

Power – Imbalances of power and the potential to abuse power emerged as a core underlying theme that has the potential to seriously frustrate collaboration efforts among JIMP players. Power imbalances seem to be prevalent in the JIMP operational environment because collaborators are inherently diverse in terms of their mandates, their experience, and the resources that they can utilize at will. As depicted in the preliminary conceptual framework, shared power was identified as a key aspect of the conditions for collaboration, which we posit will likely impact the motivation to collaborate as well as the capacity to collaborate.

The literature does show that power imbalances can be antithetical to effective collaboration. For example, some negotiation research has shown that failure to establish a balance in power may lead to increased use of threats and punishments among partners, thereby escalating conflict among diverse collaborators (De Dreu, 1995, De Dreu, Giebels, & VanVliert, 1998, both as cited in De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2003). There was good evidence from SMEs suggesting that imbalances of power led to conflict between collaboration partners from diverse organizations in a JIMP operational environment. Our data also suggest that power imbalances emerged from organizational factors (e.g., style and structure) as well as individual factors (e.g., attitudes and values). Both of these conclusions, of course, need to be further supported by exploring the theoretical literature in greater detail and through further in-depth discussions with SMEs. Specifically, future work should explore the nature of power dynamics when enacting the comprehensive approach. Understanding the causes of these power dynamics and the means to overcome these dynamics may provide useful knowledge and tools for future collaboration efforts among various parties in JIMP operations.

Identity – Another underlying phenomenon that emerged from SME discussions, and closely linked to power, is the significance of identity when working within the JIMP domain. Personal identity and identities associated with belonging to particular social groups and professions are relevant to the current discussion. At least some of the resentment that surfaced during the SME feedback discussions seemed to have identity at its roots. For example, participants spoke of the ambiguity of roles and responsibilities when operating in a JIMP context, which led to struggles to maintain power in particular jurisdictions. Issues of identity are also evident in literature exploring the tension between humanitarian aid organizations and military systems as unique professions. In referring to the blurring of functions and overlapping responsibilities, Meharg (2007, p.102) noted that “the issue of identity in contested jurisdictions is considered to be a central issue in this case... a clear professional identity is needed to ensure that people know who they are dealing with and do not confuse one for another.” Perhaps the root cause of this conflict is that the CF and NGOs, for example, inhabit distinct professions, having different vocational ethics, expertise, responsibilities and identities. When another party is perceived to impinge on the areas of responsibility that one most values and wants to protect as a core part of one’s own identity, then this can lead to interpersonal conflict and a failure to collaborate successfully. The issue of identity will need to be better understood in future research.

Stereotypes and Prejudice – Other phenomena that underlie the challenges in collaboration are stereotypes and prejudice, and this, we argue, leads to disrespecting collaboration partners. Given that mutual respect and mutual trust were identified as conditions for effective collaboration, failure to achieve these may seriously limit collaborative activities. Part of the reason these are not achieved, we believe, stems from the activation of stereotypes.

A stereotype is a cognitive structure containing the perceiver’s knowledge, beliefs, and expectancies about some human social group (Troler & Hamilton, 1986). Stereotypes about other people can be formed on the basis of any dimension that makes them distinct, including gender, race, occupation, or social status. As noted by one OGD/OGA participant, his initial views about CF personnel conformed to the typical stereotype about military personnel (i.e., “guys with guns”). Similarly, humanitarian aid personnel may sometimes be viewed by their military counterparts as “do-gooders” or “bleeding hearts.” These expectations and attitudes about JIMP partners have the potential to stymie collaboration in both obvious and less obvious ways. For example, negative stereotypes could have an impact on the motivation to collaborate as well as on the collaborative processes that are enacted, such as developing rapport and communication. Stereotypes have been shown to effect interactions with other group members even in the absence of conscious awareness

and deliberate intention to behave in prejudicial ways (Chen & Bargh, 1996; Devine, 1993). Stereotypes shape attitudes and expectations as well as actual behaviour toward members of a stereotyped group, and even more insidiously, stereotypes can impact how ambiguous behaviour is interpreted (Kunda, 1999).

It is also important to note that negative stereotypes can come to have less impact on interactions with other parties. As mentioned earlier, the OGD/OGA participant who initially viewed CF personnel as “guys with guns” came to see them as personnel who had received excellent training, a more positive attribution resulting from greater contact with this group. Indeed, it is a core tenet of intergroup contact theory that positive exposure to other members of a stereotyped group can lessen preconceptions and even prejudices (Pettigrew, 1998). This example seems to indicate that such exposure did lessen a somewhat unflattering stereotype.

For the longer term, the key issue is how the CF can work to promote awareness of stereotypes, and what intergroup models might be most conducive to breaking down some of the current attitudes and expectations that could hinder collaboration. As stereotypes often operate outside of conscious awareness (Kunda, 1999), greater awareness of stereotypes and their potentially harmful consequences within the JIMP environment should be elaborated. Moreover, how stereotypes impact the conditions of collaboration should be carefully examined, because as the data here suggest, stereotypes prevent mutual respect and trust among collaboration partners.

Negotiation - A common theme both explicit and implicit in SME responses was the constant need to negotiate with JIMP partners. Whether working to understand which agency should be in charge of a development project or establishing the allocation of critical resources, negotiation is a key activity within this context. There will be a variety of different approaches to negotiation that one can adopt and the chosen approach will be largely influenced by external factors, organizational factors, and individual factors.

Data did reveal that non-military SMEs’ accused the CF of failing to negotiate with a quid pro quo approach. This will likely have lasting impacts on future desires to collaborate, and as such should be considered in order to understand more comprehensively collaboration. Research shows that when people believe that their counterpart is competitive, they are likely to view them as a potential threat, invoking caution, selective information processing, and conservative judgements (Vonk, 1998, as cited in De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2003). As our data showed, without a give-and-take approach, one collaborator may need to make more concessions than the other, and this (according to SMEs) may lead to an avoidance of collaboration altogether. On the other hand, research suggests that individuals are more cooperative when they believe that their negotiation partners are cooperative as opposed to competitive or non-cooperative (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977, as cited in De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2003).

Future work should be directed at understanding the process of negotiation as well as exploring what issues are most critical to negotiation partners when collaborating. This will require more linkage to the current negotiation literature. An important achievement would be to understand how JIMP partners view each others’ negotiation approaches and why, and what kinds of strategies they have used to work collaboratively as the result of this knowledge. Better understanding of the motives of negotiation partners and the process itself seem key to understanding collaboration within the JIMP domain. Moreover, the external factors that influence the decisions surrounding negotiation should also be better understood, because these may force one approach over another, irrespective of the negotiator’s favoured approach. In other words, time constraints may require an accommodating approach even though the preferred choice would be to negotiate more



collaboratively. Ultimately, learning how to negotiate win-win outcomes may result in more successful collaboration and may help establish more positive civil-military interactions.

Relationships Among Key Phenomena - The interrelations among all of these phenomena must also be considered as collaboration will not be linear and will have numerous variables influencing the process. Citing a number of research efforts, San Martin-Rodriguez and colleagues (2005, p. 134) explain that “equality among professionals, one of the basic characteristics of collaborative practice is impeded when there are power differences based in gender stereotypes and disparate social status among the professionals in a team, and this constitutes an important barrier to interprofessional collaboration.” As many NGO representatives are female, whereas their military counterparts are male, this could be a potential barrier to effective collaboration between these actors. Further research might examine the relationships among power, stereotypes, negotiation approaches (including conflict resolution strategies), and identity in order to determine whether these phenomena and their relationships will present challenges to collaboration efforts in a JIMP operational environment. Moreover, consideration of these relationships should include the impact that each uniquely has on the outcomes of collaboration as this will help provide a more comprehensive understanding of the collaboration process itself.

The Way Forward - In the long term, education and training will likely be a critical means through which to promote collaborative attitudes and values across an organization. As San Martin-Rodriguez and colleagues (2005, p. 144) hold, a critical role for developing interprofessional collaboration is through the implementation of professional education programs, as “collaborative practice requires the mastery of new competencies (skills, knowledge, and attitudes).” Moreover, they argue that understanding “all of the key characteristics of organizations that foster collaboration,” like structure and culture, is important for understanding collaboration among diverse organizations.

It is also important to point out that truly enhancing the ability of the CF to collaborate within the JIMP context will require attention to developing and continually promoting a culture of collaboration. Some argue that organizations that espouse the values of participation, fairness, freedom of expression and interdependence (Evans, 1994, Henneman et al., 1995, both as cited in San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005) and promote a climate of openness, integrity and trust (Stichler, 1995, as cited in San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005) will likely produce the appropriate attitudes and values for successful collaboration. Thus, ensuring that these values disseminate across the organization may help foster a positive attitude toward collaboration.

It will be critical to consider the nature of the CF organization as a whole rather than at a piecemeal level. Some of the issues that seem to currently hinder collaborative efforts (on the part of the CF) may be the product of long-term socialization processes as the military profession has evolved. The SME data pointed to a number of organizational factors (e.g., structures, systems, style) that frustrated collaboration with multiple diverse actors (i.e., OGDs/OGAs, NGOs and IOs) in theatre. For example, the notion of territorialism may be a product of the process of professionalization as personnel learn the roles and responsibilities of their profession. Referring to research by Freidson (1986) and D’Amour (1997), San Martin-Rodriguez et al. (2005) explain, “the process of professionalization is characterized by the achievement of domination, autonomy and control, rather than collegiality and trust...the dynamics of professionalization lead to a differentiation and to territorial behaviours.” Research has shown that the desire to maintain professional territories hampers collaboration among diverse professionals (D’Amour, Sicotte, & Levy, 1999, as cited in San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005). As many of the actors in theatre will construe themselves as belonging to a particular profession, learning how to overcome this barrier will be critical.

Participants highlighted the territorial nature of interactions between the CF and OGDs/OGAs and NGOs, particularly when the CF adopted roles typically reserved for the professions of development and diplomacy. But participant recollections also revealed that OGDs/OGAs and NGOs also made claims to areas of responsibility and control in these professions. Achieving full collaborative capability on the part of the CF may require a substantial shift in organizational culture and socialization. Such a shift is certainly underway. This report is intended to contribute to a better understanding of some of the elements impacting both collaboration challenges and achievements as these efforts move forward.



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5. Methodological Considerations and Limitations

There are a few methodological considerations and limitations that should be noted in the context of the current study. One limitation is that there is little empirical research investigating the impact of various factors on collaboration, especially in relation to collaboration between the CF and OGDs/OGAs and NGOs. Due to this lack of empirical research, this study was largely exploratory in nature. Further empirical research will be needed in order to support the relationships illustrated in the preliminary conceptual framework.

The unstructured one-on-one interview protocol used in this study allowed the research team to uncover the various themes of collaboration in the JIMP context. However, for the purposes of future research, a more focused semi-structured approach may be more beneficial to target the specific topics of interest. The topics that should be pursued in follow-on work include negotiation, stereotypes, trust, power, and identity within collaboration.

Another limitation of the current study is the small sample size and the distribution of the sample. For the current work only 10 individuals were consulted, and these ranged from CF members to OGD/OGA members to NGO members. As this work captures a limited set of opinions, the findings may or may not be representative of the experiences of all personnel working within JIMP environments. Further research with larger sample sizes will be needed to help to further refine the conceptual framework.

It is also important to acknowledge that the SME descriptions of collaboration within this report are generally more negative than positive, and that the descriptions typically focus on the challenges rather than the achievements of collaboration efforts within the JIMP context. The process used during discussions was one intended to allow respondents to discuss the issues, challenges and achievements of their efforts in terms of collaborating within the JIMP domain. In our view, the prominence of the challenges reported by respondents is indicative of the true frustrations felt in working collaboratively within the JIMP domain. This may be indicative of the relatively short period of time that the comprehensive approach to operations has been pursued, and the need to further define how this approach is implemented. If collaborative efforts are not currently optimal within this domain from the perspective of all players, then this is an important issue to highlight. However, it is also important not to overlook the positive examples of collaboration noted in this report. Even though less prominent, these positive efforts and achievements in collaborating will, it is hoped, provide a strong basis for further development and elaboration. Especially given the limited sample size of this study, it will be important to further explore both the challenges and achievements noted in this report.



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Annex A

Information Letter

Dear Participant:

You are being asked to participate in a study exploring collaboration among diverse actors in an operational field setting. The purpose of the study, entitled “Subject Matter Expert (SME) Feedback on the Comprehensive Approach to Operations,” is to increase our understanding of the nature of collaboration between the Canadian Forces and those other important organizations in operations, such as governmental and non-governmental agencies and organizations, to identify factors that facilitate or frustrate collaboration, and to identify strategies to improve collaboration among the various diverse organizations in a contemporary operational setting, such as Afghanistan.

As you may be aware, in the years since the Cold War, the changing nature of international conflict has resulted in militaries increasingly taking on roles in support of humanitarian relief and reconstruction, a field traditionally belonging to civilian organizations. Although there is an emerging international literature in the area, few studies have explored the issue thoroughly from a Canadian perspective. Thus we want to gain a better understanding of what kinds of issues may arise when various parties acting within these new operational environments must work together in order to accomplish their respective goals. The goal of this research is to meet with experienced individuals, like yourself, and to understand the issues from your perspective. Your experiences and insights will be used in a variety of ways:

- 1) to begin to identify the core elements and themes for promoting collaboration among diverse actors in an operational setting;
- 2) for the potential future development of realistic training and education vignettes;
- 3) as the basis of future laboratory and field/survey studies.

Thus, your candid experience operating in this capacity is vital for developing an inclusive and detailed picture of collaboration among diverse actors.

To assist in this study, you are being asked for approximately 2 hours of your time to participate in a one-on-one meeting to share your personal experiences of collaborating while in the field. SME meetings will be held in person. We will travel to meet with you.

The idea for the discussion is that you will describe the collaboration context(s) in which you have been involved, the factors that either facilitated or frustrated collaboration, and any strategies that you used to ensure effective collaboration. We will also ask you what kinds of things you would do differently in hindsight and why, and what kinds of things you would like in advance of operations that would facilitate effective collaboration.



We recognize that participating in this study takes up your time. We are able to give you a small remuneration for your time in the amount of \$40.40⁹ as authorized by the Department of National Defence.

The information that you provide in the meeting is strictly confidential and in order to ensure the confidentiality of yourself and others, we ask that you do not mention specific individuals or groups by name or provide enough details to identify individuals or groups, in the course of this meeting. This acts as protection to you in the unlikely event of an Access to Information request. Please also note that your comments during the meeting are covered by the Privacy Act, and that any information that may identify you personally cannot be released without your consent.

With your consent, the meeting will be audio-recorded and transcribed for analysis and will be kept in a secure location accessible only to the researcher teams involved with this or ensuing projects. We will use a code number rather than a name to ensure confidentiality. At no time will the content of our meeting be made available to anyone outside of the research team. The same consideration will apply should you grant permission for the secondary use of data, and at no time will the content of our meeting be made available to anyone outside of the subsequent research team(s). Once our meeting has been transcribed, if you would like, you will be provided with a copy so that you may review the contents, point out any errors in the transcription, and indicate any aspects you feel might be identifying characteristics. Any material used in the write up of the final report or subsequent publications or presentations will have any and all identifying characteristics removed. If you wish, you can choose not to be audio-recorded but still participate in this research (in this event, the researcher will take detailed notes during your meeting).

The risks associated with your participation in this study are minimal and are anticipated to be no greater than what you would encounter in your daily life or occupation. If, however, a topic of discussion makes you feel uncomfortable, you may refuse to answer or skip any question, end the discussion, or withdraw from the study at any time, without penalty. Your participation in the study is completely voluntary

If you are interested in participating in this study, please complete the attached Voluntary Consent Form, as well as the Biographical Data Form. We will collect these when we convene for our meeting with you.

The Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) has approved this study (Revised Protocol L-692A Amendment #1 coordination #842/10). If you have any questions, please feel free to contact the Principal DRDC Investigator, Dr. Tara Holton, and the DRDC Co-Investigators, Dr. Angela Febbraro and Dr. Megan Thompson, whose contact information is listed below. You may also contact the Chair of the HREC at DRDC Toronto, Dr. Jack Landolt, at Jack.Landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca or (416) 635-2120.

Sincerely,

⁹ For CF personnel this remuneration will be \$32.66. Information sheets for CF personnel will include the figure \$32.66.



Dr. Tara L. Holton (416) 635-2000, Ext. 2101 Tara.Holton@drdc-rddc.gc.ca	Dr. Angela R. Febbraro Tel: (416) 635-2000, Ext.3120 Angela.Febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca	Dr. Megan M. Thompson 416-635-2040 Megan.Thompson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca
Principal DRDC Investigator	“JIMP Essentials” Project Manager DRDC Co-Investigator	“Interagency Trust” Project Manager DRDC Co-Investigator
<p>DRDC Toronto 1133 Sheppard Avenue West P.O. Box 2000 Toronto, Ontario M3M 3B9</p> <p>Fax: (416) 635-2191</p>		



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Annex B

Voluntary Consent Form

Title: Subject Matter Expert (SME) Feedback on the Comprehensive Approach to Operations

Principal Investigator: Michael Thomson, Humansystems Inc.

Principal DRDC Investigator: Dr. Tara L. Holton, Defence R&D Canada – Toronto

Co-Investigators: Dr. Angela R. Febbraro, Defence R&D Canada - Toronto; Dr. Megan Thompson, Defence R&D Canada – Toronto; Dr. Barb Adams, Humansystems Inc.

Thrusts: 12og, JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander; 14ci, Interagency Trust

I _____ (name) of _____ (address and phone number) hereby volunteer to participate in the study entitled, “Subject Matter Expert (SME) Feedback on the Comprehensive Approach to Operations” (Protocol #L-692A Amendment #1 coordination number 842/10). I have read the information letter, and have had the opportunity to ask questions of the Investigators. All of my questions concerning this study have been fully answered to my satisfaction. However, I may obtain additional information about the research study and have any questions about this study answered by contacting Dr. Tara L. Holton at 416-635-2000 Extension 2101, Dr. Angela R. Febbraro at 416-635-2000 Extension 3120, or Dr. Megan M. Thompson at 416-635-2040.

I have been told that I will be asked to participate in a single one-on-one meeting lasting approximately 2 hours, which will be audio-recorded only with my consent. I will also be asked to complete a short Biographical Data Form. I understand that the audio-recorded meeting will be transcribed, and that I will have an opportunity to read and comment on the transcription. I also have the option of participating in this study without being audio-taped, in which case the researcher will take notes during the meeting.

I have been told that risks associated with this research are minimal. However, if when discussing topics I feel uncomfortable, I may move on to another topic. I also understand that I may terminate my participation at any time. Also, I acknowledge that my participation in this study, or indeed in any research, may involve risks that are currently unforeseen by DRDC.

I have been advised that all data I provide will be treated as strictly confidential and will not be revealed to anyone other than the research team without my consent, except as data unidentified as to source. I also understand that the data concerning me may be used in future research projects by researchers in collaboration with the Investigators.

I have been told that I should not mention specific individuals or groups by name or provide enough details to identify individuals or groups in the course of this meeting, as protection to me in the unlikely event of an Access to Information request. I have also been told that my meeting is covered by the Privacy Act, and that any information that may identify me personally cannot be released without my consent.



I understand that I am free to refuse to participate and may withdraw my consent without prejudice or penalty at any time. Should I withdraw my consent, my participation will cease immediately. In this case I will have the option of requiring that any data that I have provided be destroyed. I also understand that the Investigator(s), or their designate, may terminate my participation at any time, regardless of my wishes.

I understand that for my participation in this research project, I am entitled to remuneration in the form of a stress allowance in the amount of \$40.40¹⁰. My Social Insurance Number (SIN) is required for remuneration. Please note that stress remuneration is taxable. T4A slips are issued only for amounts in excess of \$500.00 paid during a year.

Also, I understand that my name will not be identified or attached in any manner to any publication or presentation arising from this study.

For Civilian Participants:

Participant's name: _____

Signature: _____

Date: _____

For Canadian Forces (CF) members only: I understand that I am considered to be on duty for disciplinary, administrative and Pension Act purposes during my participation in this study.

Participant's name: _____

Signature: _____

Date: _____

FOR SUBJECT ENQUIRY IF REQUIRED:

Should I have any questions or concerns regarding this project before, during or after participation, I understand that I am encouraged to contact Defence R&D Canada - Toronto (DRDC Toronto), P.O. Box 2000, 1133 Sheppard Avenue West, Toronto, Ontario, M3M 3B9. This contact can be made by surface mail at this address or in person, by phone or e-mail to any of the DRDC Toronto members and addresses listed below:

- Principal Investigator: Tara L. Holton, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 2101, Tara.Holton@drdc-rddc.gc.ca
- Co-Investigator and Project Manager: Dr. Angela Febbraro, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 3120, Angela.Febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca
- Co-Investigator and Project Manager: Dr. Megan M. Thompson, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2040, Megan.Thompson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca
- Chair, DRDC Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC): Dr. Jack Landolt, 416-635-2120, Jack.Landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca

I understand that I will be given a copy of this consent form so that I may contact any of the above-mentioned individuals at some time in the future should that be required.

¹⁰ Voluntary consent forms for CF personnel will include the figure \$32.66.

Annex C

Biographical Data Form For Canadian Forces Participants

1. Age: _____
2. Gender (please check the appropriate box):
 - Male
 - Female
3. Marital Status: (please check the appropriate box):
 - Single
 - Married
 - Divorced
 - Widowed
 - Common-Law
4. Highest Level of Education (please check the appropriate box):
 - Some High School
 - Completed High School
 - Some College
 - Completed College
 - Some Trade School
 - Completed Trade School
 - Some University
 - Completed Undergraduate Degree



- University Professional Degree
 - Some Graduate Courses
 - Master's Degree
 - Doctorate
5. Did you graduate from a CF military college? Y N
6. Country of birth: _____
7. Heritage/ethnicity: _____
8. What uniform do you wear? Army Navy Air (please circle)
9. Number of years in the military: _____
10. Rank: _____
11. Current position : _____
12. Regular Force or Reserve Force (please circle)
13. Contact with NGOs, IOs, OGDs, OGAs, in your work with the CF? Y N
14. Have you ever worked for a humanitarian or development agency? Y N (If yes, please specify which ones and length of service)

15. Deployments (overseas and domestic, including Op name, date and duration):

16. First language:
- English
 - French
 - Other (please specify) _____

Annex D

Biographical Data Form For Civilian Participants

1. Age _____
2. Gender (please check the appropriate box):
 - Male
 - Female
3. Marital Status: (please check the appropriate box):
 - Single
 - Married
 - Divorced
 - Widowed
 - Common-Law
4. Highest Level of Education (please check the appropriate box):
 - Some High School
 - Completed High School
 - Some College
 - Completed College
 - Some Trade School
 - Completed Trade School
 - Some University
 - Completed Undergraduate Degree



- University Professional Degree
- Some Graduate Courses
- Master's Degree
- Doctorate

5. Country of birth: _____

6. Heritage/ethnicity: _____

7. Number of years working for...: _____

8. Current occupation with...: _____

9. Names of organizations worked for: _____

10. How long have you worked (in months) for the following other organizations:

11. Frequency of contact with the Canadian Forces or other military in field work?
very frequent ___ frequent ___ infrequent ___ very infrequent ___ not at all ___

12. Have you ever served in the Canadian Forces or another military? Y ___ N ___ (if yes, please specify) _____

13. Operations (overseas and domestic, purpose, organization, time and duration):

14. First language:

- English
- French
- Other (please specify) _____

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1. ORIGINATOR (The name and address of the organization preparing the document, Organizations for whom the document was prepared, e.g. Centre sponsoring a contractor's document, or tasking agency, are entered in section 8.) Publishing: DRDC Toronto Performing: Humansystems Incorporated. Guelph, ON Monitoring: Contracting:		2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <small>(Overall security classification of the document including special warning terms if applicable.)</small> UNCLASSIFIED
3. TITLE (The complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification is indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S, C, R, or U) in parenthesis at the end of the title) Collaboration within the JIMP (Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public) Environment (U) Collaboration dans un environnement interarmées, interorganisationnel, multinational et public (IIMP) (U)		
4. AUTHORS (First name, middle initial and last name. If military, show rank, e.g. Maj. John E. Doe.) Michael H. Thomson; Barbara D. Adams; Courtney D. Hall; Craig Flear		
5. DATE OF PUBLICATION <small>(Month and year of publication of document.)</small> September 2010	6a NO. OF PAGES <small>(Total containing information, including Annexes, Appendices, etc.)</small> 70	6b. NO. OF REFS <small>(Total cited in document.)</small> 33
7. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (The category of the document, e.g. technical report, technical note or memorandum. If appropriate, enter the type of document, e.g. interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.) Contract Report		
8. SPONSORING ACTIVITY (The names of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development – include address.) Sponsoring: Tasking:		
9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant.)	9b. CONTRACT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable number under which the document was written.)	
10a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER (The official document number by which the document is identified by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document) DRDC Toronto CR 2010–136	10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO(s). (Any other numbers under which may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor.)	
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- (U) Canadian Forces (CF) personnel confront a number of challenges and complexities in today's multidimensional security environment. This environment requires the CF to work closely and collaboratively with people from a variety of organizations within a Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public (JIMP) framework, including Other Governmental Departments (OGDs) and Agencies (OGAs) as well as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Thus, this study aimed at identifying key themes associated with collaboration among diverse players in a JIMP framework. Using an unstructured approach, discussions were conducted with subject matter experts (SMEs) representing diverse organizations. These experts provided first-hand accounts of collaboration efforts in theatre. Results from SME discussions showed that a number of conditions for effective collaboration were not consistently being met in operations. Respondents noted that issues such as shared power and clearly defined roles and responsibilities, shared goals, mutual respect, and mutual trust all impacted on their collaborative efforts with other personnel within the JIMP environment. SMEs also identified communicating, developing rapport, negotiating, planning, and making decisions as particular challenges when collaborating with diverse actors in a JIMP environment. Important insights relevant to the outcomes of collaboration (e.g., the importance of personal relationships in collaborative efforts) were also gained. Although many respondents focused on challenges that they had encountered when collaborating, there were also positive reports of creative efforts used by respondents to promote or enhance collaboration. These included working to promote personal relationships and shared identity with other players. The report concludes with several key themes that could be further elaborated to provide greater conceptual clarity regarding collaboration in a JIMP operational environment with multiple diverse actors, as these seemed to underlie many of the core challenges and issues raised by SMEs. These include power differences, identity, stereotypes and prejudice, and diverse negotiation approaches. Methodological considerations for conducting future research in the JIMP context are also discussed.
- (U) Les membres des Forces canadiennes (FC) doivent composer avec bon nombre de défis et de problèmes dans l'environnement de sécurité multidimensionnel d'aujourd'hui. Ce contexte exige que les FC travaillent étroitement et collaborent avec du personnel de plusieurs organisations dans un cadre de travail interarmées, interorganisationnel, multinational et public (IIMP) qui inclut d'autres ministères et organismes et des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG). La présente étude visait donc à déterminer les thèmes clés associés à la collaboration avec ces différents protagonistes dans un cadre de travail IIMP. Des discussions, menées selon une approche non structurée, ont eu lieu avec des experts en la matière (EM) représentant différentes organisations. Ces experts ont fourni des comptes rendus de première main des efforts de collaboration sur le terrain. Les résultats des discussions avec les EM ont démontré qu'un bon nombre de conditions nécessaires à une collaboration efficace ne sont pas respectées de façon constante dans les opérations. Les répondants ont mentionné que des questions comme le partage du pouvoir et une définition claire des rôles et responsabilités, des objectifs communs, le respect et la confiance mutuels ont tous une incidence sur leurs efforts de collaboration avec les autres personnes dans l'environnement IIMP. Les EM ont aussi souligné des défis particuliers survenant lors de la collaboration avec divers intervenants dans le contexte IIMP comme la communication, l'établissement de rapports, la négociation, la

planification et la prise de décision. Les discussions ont aussi offert des perspectives importantes quant aux résultats de la collaboration (p. ex., l'importance des relations personnelles lors des efforts de collaboration). Même si de nombreux répondants ont mis l'accent sur les problèmes rencontrés lors de la collaboration, certains ont signalé des efforts créatifs positifs qu'ils ont faits pour promouvoir ou améliorer la collaboration. Ces efforts incluent du travail visant à promouvoir les relations personnelles et le sentiment d'identité commune avec les autres protagonistes. Le rapport se termine par la présentation de différents thèmes importants qui pourraient être élaborés davantage pour faire la lumière sur le concept de la collaboration dans un environnement opérationnel IIMP comprenant divers intervenants, puisque ceux-ci semblent englober une bonne partie des défis principaux et des problèmes soulevés par les EM. Ces thèmes incluent les différences de pouvoir, l'identité, les stéréotypes et les préjugés ainsi que les approches de négociation variées. L'étude présente également des considérations méthodologiques pour la tenue de recherches futures dans le contexte IIMP.

14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

(U) Collaboration; Interagency; JIMP; Joint; Multinational; Public

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