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**Synchronizing Information Operations and Public Affairs in a Counterinsurgency:  
Using Information to Shape the Operational Environment**

**by**

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

**Signature: \_\_\_\_\_**

**27 October 2010**

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## **Abstract**

Information plays a significant role in a counterinsurgency. Gaining the support of the population is critical to winning against a competing and often persuasive insurgent narrative. In order to be successful, commanders must be proficient in using information to shape the operational environment. An assessment of current IO and PA doctrine and the emerging concept of strategic communication illustrate the lack of guidance on how to properly integrate and synchronize these capabilities in a counterinsurgency. This paper expounds on the recommendation to establish a Joint Information Review Board (JIRB) at the joint-force level in order to effectively govern the integration and synchronization of IO and PA. It explains how the JIRB formally facilitates integration and synchronization of information into the staff battle rhythm without compromising DOD policies, directives or doctrine. Finally, the paper draws conclusions from real-world examples along four counterinsurgency lines of operation that illustrate how the integrated and synchronized use of information improves the commander's ability to shape the operational environment.

## **Integrating and Synchronizing Information Operations and Public Affairs in a Counterinsurgency: Using Information to Shape the Operational Environment**

*The Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I) Information Operations (IO) officer had just completed preparing his inputs for the weekly targeting meeting. He highlighted each IO effort as it pertained to supporting the Corps Commander's lines of operation (LOOs). Of most significance was the recent work being done to promote the upcoming re-opening of the Salman Pak hospital in the Mada'in Qada.<sup>1</sup> This was a major counterinsurgency accomplishment as Salman Pak was once an insurgent safe haven and base of operations. Increasing health-services capacity was a major Corps-level counterinsurgency objective and it supported both the governance and economic LOOs. The IO officer had worked closely with the Corps Civil Affairs Officer to synchronize the project's marketing with its reconstruction in order to gain public awareness and support. Although the Salman Pak residents – mainly through Psychological Operations (PSYOP) products – had knowledge of the undertaking, few others beyond the city knew of its strategic importance in reestablishing infrastructure while diminishing the insurgency's influence over the population. During the targeting meeting, the Corps Commander, viewing the hospital as an opportunity to further exploit with information, tasked the Public Affairs (PA) officer to share the story with the local and international media. His intent was not only to inform the international community of Iraq's progress but, more importantly, to favorably shape Iraqi perceptions of its government's ability to provide essential services. Equally as important was to use this story to mitigate recent insurgent rhetoric instilling doubt as to the Iraqi government's credibility. Once the meeting adjourned, the Chief of Staff pondered why the IO and PA officers had not coordinated efforts on the Salman Pak hospital. To a larger degree, he wondered what was deficient with the current staff organization and process in integrating and synchronizing these two disciplines as they pertained to advancing the commander's information objectives outlined in the counterinsurgency strategy. He also believed there was merit in establishing a governing entity responsible for the coordination, integration, and synchronization of not only IO and PA, but all other joint force information activities supporting the shaping of the operational environment.*

### **Introduction**

Since prosecuting a counterinsurgency in operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF), there has been much debate within the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) on employing information as a weapon of influence and as a tool to inform targeted populations. At the center of this debate are two military disciplines focused on the use of information: Information Operations (IO) and Public Affairs (PA). Each discipline has fairly well-established policies, directives, and doctrine guiding commanders in their application as separate capabilities. However, there remains controversy on integrating the two capabilities

to support the achievement of information objectives, which include shaping attitudes, perceptions, and behavior. Given that PA focuses on the truthful and impartial dissemination of information, there is risk involved in aligning it with IO as to not jeopardize its integrity. As IO employs PSYOP as its main core capability to communicate with selected audiences, it has the ability to slant or misuse information, which is not congruent with the PA mission. These conceptual differences present a unique challenge for the joint force commander (JFC) as PA inherently has an influencing effect of which he can leverage to achieve information objectives. Undoubtedly, integrating and synchronizing IO and PA efforts in a counterinsurgency will significantly improve the commander's use of information to shape the operational environment (OE).

To better understand the importance and necessity of integrating and synchronizing IO and PA, we must first examine the nature of the OE in a counterinsurgency and how information plays a role in its shaping. The OE is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of joint capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.<sup>2</sup> The use of information impacts the setting of conditions, circumstances, and influences that frame the OE and directly supports the attainment of JFC's objectives. Using information to assist the commander in achieving objectives is a challenge as the OE is dynamic. Conditions, circumstances, and influences can and often change rapidly and are susceptible to a number of forces and variables outside the control of the JFC.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, commanders must be adept at employing all means available to gain and maintain accurate situational awareness as grasping the complexity of the OE will aid in making decisions that favorably support accomplishing counterinsurgency objectives. One of the main objectives in any counterinsurgency is to separate the population from the

insurgents while strengthening the linkage between the population and the host nation (HN) government. By doing so, the insurgents lose their vital base of support – the population – and the HN government increasingly becomes the dominant entity in the insurgency.

Information plays a pivotal role for the commander as it is the primary means with which to communicate with the audiences central to the insurgency. When properly coordinated, information can be a powerful asset in countering insurgent themes and messages, exploiting insurgent atrocities and operational failures, as well as promoting HN programs and efforts that address population grievances. Of note, in a counterinsurgency where the goal is to win the support and confidence of the population, it is a good practice to use information in a truthful manner. As the commander is orchestrating many improvements along each LOO, there is relatively little need to inflate or fabricate messages in order to favorably influence perceptions.<sup>4</sup> Using Iraq and Afghanistan as contemporary examples, there is no shortage of good works with which to exploit using elements of information. Exploiting or leveraging progress within the information environment directly affects the shaping of the operational environment. Success therefore, hinges on the commander's ability to properly integrate and synchronize IO and PA.<sup>5</sup> Thorough integration and synchronization of IO and PA eliminates duplication of efforts and ensures themes and messages are mutually supporting. Contradictions in themes and messages could result in unintended consequences unfavorable to the joint force.<sup>6</sup> Critics opposed to the integration of IO and PA believe that current doctrinal publications are sufficient in governing and guiding their "separate" application. A review of the doctrinal differences between IO and PA as they apply to communicating with target audiences is necessary to illustrate their ineffectiveness in achieving integration and synchronization.

## **Doctrinal Shortfalls**

IO, by joint doctrine, “is the integrated employment of Electronic Warfare (EW), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Operations Security (OPSEC), Military Deception (MILDEC), and Computer Network Operations (CNO) in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”<sup>7</sup> The key term in its definition is “the integrated employment” as the concept of integration of capabilities serves to maximize effects – the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. As IO is designed to employ against adversaries and host nation populations, planning and executing IO in an integrated fashion provides the joint force multiple means with which to promote successes while combating insurgent strategies, activities, and efforts.<sup>8</sup> PSYOP is the primary core IO capability designed to develop, produce, and disseminate cognitive products to communicate JFC’s objectives directly with targeted audiences.<sup>9</sup> It is through these means that the commander is able to influence perceptions, attitudes, and behavior within his battle-space. Surprisingly, given the similarities of purpose between IO and PA, the latter was excluded as both a core and supporting IO capability. Designating PA as a related IO capability was an action taken to maintain physical separation as mandated by DOD policy, but nonetheless this arrangement makes coordinating the use of information in a counterinsurgency problematic.<sup>10</sup> Unlike PA, there are no doctrinal restrictions impeding integration of any of the other IO core, supporting or related capabilities.

According to Joint Publication 3-13 (Information Operations), the five supporting and three related IO capabilities, when properly integrated, provide the commander a high degree of mobility and synergism within the information environment.<sup>11</sup> As an example, the



supporting IO capability of Combat Camera (COMCAM), traditionally established to support PA efforts, provides photographs and full-motion video that now routinely supports the development of PSYOP products.<sup>12</sup> Integrating relevant and applicable operational COMCAM images with PSYOP products enhances the legitimacy, effectiveness, credibility, and acceptance of messages. Likewise, as the Salman Pak opening scenario described, the related capability of Civil Affairs (CA) coupled with PSYOP equally plays a significant role in promoting JFC's information objectives. Although these capabilities assist the commander in achieving positive effects within the information environment, IO doctrine does not adequately provide clear guidance and specifics on how planners are to integrate and synchronize IO with its supporting and related capabilities. This lack of guidance is most apparent as it applies to PA. The challenge therefore is to integrate and synchronize IO and PA in a manner that does not conflict with current PA policies and doctrine.

The mission of PA is to support the JFC with the dissemination of truthful, factual, and impartial information about DOD activities to U.S., allied, national, international, and internal audiences with the intent to inform.<sup>13</sup> One clear omission in PA's mission statement is the reference to "influence." Including influence in PA's mission statement would imply that there is some other guiding principal – perhaps manipulative – behind the creation of its themes and messages.<sup>14</sup> As Morgan and Pool states, "For PA to remain relevant in current and future conflicts, it is imperative that the PA community actively acknowledge that communication is an act undertaken with intent and thereby eliminate the artificial distinction between PA and influence."<sup>15</sup> Given today's communication's technology and global connectivity, it is unrealistic to assume that populations external, and more specifically, internal to an insurgency are not influenced by PA products. By accepting this notion, one

can realize the intrinsic value of integrating and synchronizing PA with IO as both strive to favorably shape the operational environment. Apart from the absence of influence in its mission statement, PA doctrine has the purpose of shaping the environment, deterring adversaries, promoting U.S. security interests, and countering adversary disinformation.<sup>16</sup> As such, IO and PA should be harnessed at the joint force level – through an acceptable process – to optimize the commander’s means in using information to shape his operational environment. Unfortunately, and similar to IO doctrine, PA doctrine is deficient in it does not articulate how PA planners are to integrate efforts and activities with other IO capabilities. The challenge today, given the doctrinal-imposed restrictions on IO and PA integration, is to organize the staff around a common architecture and develop a formalized process with which to develop objectives and execute coordinated information activities. The emerging concept of strategic communication (SC) as an overarching umbrella governing all information efforts and activities warrants a closer look to determine if its application accomplishes the integration and synchronization of IO and PA.

### **Strategic Communication Shortfalls**

Critics opposed to altering traditional staff structures or creating new processes for the integration of IO and PA are optimistic that the concept of SC will provide planners the means with which to formally synchronize these two disciplines. As promising as this seems, SC has not evolved to the point where it is clearly understood or acknowledged as the way forward in integrating and synchronizing all elements of information. As pointed out by Blankley and Horn in 2008, “The fact that there is no national security strategy for strategic communication or even a government-wide definition of „strategic communication“ seven years into the War on Terror is nothing less than a travesty.”<sup>17</sup> SC, by DOD definition, “is

focused U.S. government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of U.S. government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.”<sup>18</sup> Joint Publications 5.0 (Joint Operation Planning), and JP 1-02 (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms), include SC in its lexicons and place emphasis on engaging key audiences to favorably create conditions to advance objectives through the use of “coordinated” themes and messages. While SC, in concept and by DOD definition, endeavors to link information activities to operational objectives, a single organizational construct or template to guide its application in practice has not yet been established. More troubling, SC is not applied uniformly across joint commands. According to Eder, the organizations created to conduct SC “vary in focus, size, and structure within DOD, State, and the combatant commands.”<sup>19</sup> Contrasting organizational SC constructs are also susceptible to duplication of efforts and the indiscriminate allocation of assets.<sup>20</sup> The main problem with SC is too much effort has been applied to organizing – with little effect – as opposed to embracing it as a way of thinking about how to use information.<sup>21</sup> As Admiral Mullen states, “Strategic communication should be an enabling function that guides and informs our decisions and not an organization unto itself. Rather than trying to capture all communication activity underneath it, we should use it to describe the process by which we integrate and coordinate.”<sup>22</sup>

As there is no single standard DOD-approved SC organizational construct to govern the integration and synchronization of information, joint headquarters are forced to organize SC directorates as they deem necessary in order to accomplish information goals and

objectives.<sup>23</sup> This approach is not optimal as factors such as duration or scope of mission, communication strategy requirements, and campaign or joint operational phasing may not be taken into account.<sup>24</sup> Often, commanders, if they decide to establish an SC directorate, organize it based upon whose available and who the commander believes can get the job done. Moreover, the commander often chooses to subordinate IO under the SC directorate, however, PA remains a special staff section under the COS with no formal link to the SC directorate. As a result, information sharing, collaboration, and synchronization between IO and PA remain fragmented. Despite the good intentions of establishing an SC directorate, commanders are reluctant to subordinate PA as this action, as stated earlier, stands the risk of violating the tenets of PA under current doctrine – IO and PA should not be joined under one governing authority.<sup>25</sup> It is for this very reason that planners and staffs cannot rely on SC as the optimal architecture to best integrate and synchronize IO and PA.

As is the case with large joint or multi-national coalition headquarters like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, the commanders have opted to establish information directorates to link operational-level actions with higher strategic-level guidance and objectives. These information directorates also serve the purpose of overseeing the management of operational to tactical-level information activities, to include those generated by IO, CMO, and other influencing capabilities.<sup>26</sup> However, in both of these headquarters, the integration of IO and PA are not truly optimized as PA remains a separate staff section and does not answer directly to the information directorate. Further complicating the problem of achieving integration at the joint-force level is the common approach to viewing IO and PA as strictly non-lethal capabilities. Commanders that have designated or labeled capabilities by either being lethal or non-lethal are vulnerable to disjointed planning as planners generally view the

two categories as separate and distinct.<sup>27</sup> Categorizing capabilities as either lethal or non-lethal often requires more than one planning process to properly and adequately integrate them into the battle rhythm. This clearly is not an optimal approach to planning and places a significant burden on the staff while greatly increasing its operational tempo. Information, to include the capabilities of IO and PA, is an integral part of planning and should not be treated separately in the planning or targeting process.<sup>28</sup>

In light of the problems associated with organizing and managing information capabilities, commanders need to explore workable options for integrating and synchronizing IO and PA. A workable solution is to establish a governing body that can integrate and synchronize the two disciplines as they pertain to shaping the operational environment while functioning effectively and legally within current policy and doctrinal frameworks. As there are numerous approaches to establishing such an entity, the critical component to any solution, regardless of architectural type, is having adequate representation of experienced members from across the staff. Typical joint headquarters organize their staffs using a model where the Chief of Staff (COS) manages the day-to-day integration of staff activities to achieve the commander's objectives.<sup>29</sup> The staffs are organized minimally by functions of operations, planning, intelligence, logistics, communications, and personnel. In many instances, especially with large headquarters, IO is a subordinate component of operations and as such, falls under the J3 operations directorate.<sup>30</sup> PA in all cases, at the joint force level, is treated as a special and separate staff directorate and works for and answers directly to the commander. An apparent flaw in this commonly-accepted organizational construct is that it does not provide a unified or central authoritative approach to coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing IO and PA activities and efforts. Establishing a single

authoritative entity to oversee the management of all information activities and objectives is an important first step to effectively synchronizing IO and PA efforts.

### **The Joint Information Review Board**

To formally bridge the gap within the staff and to serve the purpose of synchronizing IO and PA, the creation of a Joint Information Review Board (JIRB) is necessary.<sup>31</sup> The JIRB will serve as a formalized committee responsible for providing guidance, decisions, and coordination of staff efforts that support achieving information objectives. As Jones, et al describes, establishing a coordinating committee to oversee the management of all information activities is crucial to ensuring the commander's communications plan is congruent with his operational strategy.<sup>32</sup> The JIRB will ensure information objectives are thoroughly reviewed, selected, and aligned with operational objectives. This function will serve to take full advantage of information in support of shaping the operational environment. The JIRB's director serves as the primary coordinating authority and facilitates senior-level discussion on the creation and management of information objectives. Senior representation includes all staff heads that impact the use of information. Equally important is the CA officer (J9) as civil military operations (CMO) is a major component to any counterinsurgency line of attack. As noted earlier, any efforts increasing capacity or reinforcing the government's credibility with the populace should be exploited from an information perspective as the HN government is a major element within the counterinsurgency. The comptroller (J8) and the Rule of Law (ROL) officers are also key members of the JIRB as funds available and legal considerations impact the nomination and approval of infrastructure or capacity-enhancing projects.<sup>33</sup> Most importantly, since the JIRB is not a standing staff directorate, the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) can serve as a senior

representative alongside the IO officer without violating established DOD policy or doctrinal directives.

The JIRB is an integral part of the overall staff process and its internal working group provides inputs to support the targeting cycle, which aligns joint resources and capabilities to targeting efforts – infrastructure, equipment, and human.<sup>34</sup> Through the efforts of the working group, the JIRB’s primary responsibilities include analyzing current operational objectives and identifying how and where the use of information can support; reviewing recommendations and analyzing which information assets are best to employ and in what fashion; prioritizing the use of information assets; and most importantly, providing guidance and tasking authority for planning and execution of all information efforts and activities. The key function the JIRB serves is to focus the staff’s attention on aligning information resources and capabilities with operational efforts. In regards to the integration and synchronization of IO and PA, the JIRB concentrates its efforts on coordinating only those efforts that serve to influence the targeted audiences. It does not serve the purpose of directing the internal affairs of PA in support of its other information objectives.

In order for the JIRB to be effective, it must integrate seamlessly with the existing staff construct and organize its efforts to assimilate into the existing battle rhythm.<sup>35</sup> Simply adding another component to the process of synchronizing and coordinating current and future operations does increase efficiency nor is it the intent of creating an information review board. The JIRB will fill a seam in planning and optimize the staff process of aligning information efforts with those of operational efforts. The JIRB supports the planning process through the targeting cycle as this is the focal point for determining what critical information activities must be employed in order to create desired effects that support

achieving operational objectives.<sup>36</sup> The JIRB becomes an important element within the planning process and compliments, supports, and leverages the efforts of the Joint Targeting and Coordination Board (JTCB), which is responsible for managing the joint targeting process. Having a clear understanding of operational objectives – via the targeting cycle – will enable the JIRB to identify, prioritize, and allocate information assets to employ in support of all targeting efforts. Highlighting the JIRB’s actions along each counterinsurgency LOO will illustrate how integration and synchronization of IO and PA supports the shaping of the OE.

### **Shaping the Operational Environment**

Designating LOOs in a counterinsurgency affords the commander the ability to organize, manage, assign, and assess actions as they pertain to achieving specific objectives. As a contemporary counterinsurgency example, the Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I) commander had established four LOOs: security, transition, governance, and economics. These LOOs were directly linked to Multi-National Force Iraq’s (MNF-I) strategic objectives of establishing a stable, free, and democratically-elected Iraqi government favorable to U.S. interests.<sup>37</sup> At the operational level, the four LOOs supported securing the nation, transitioning authority and control of the counterinsurgency campaign to the Iraqi government and its security forces, and promoting an environment conducive to political and economic development.<sup>38</sup> Using MNC-I’s counterinsurgency LOOs as examples, we will examine how the JIRB can effectively integrate and synchronize IO and PA in order to favorably shape the operational environment.

First and foremost, security is paramount to creating an environment that is conducive for the achievement and prospering of all other LOOs. Initially, security is the most



important LOO and as such, requires considerable operational efforts to accomplish effectively. Security efforts that work toward defeating, mitigating or eliminating insurgent capabilities, ideologues, and nefarious activities have a significant effect on the populace's perceptions of progress. A significant turning point in Iraq in regards to security was defeating insurgents in areas where they had significant presence and influence over the population. Successful coalition activities and efforts in this area to include direct action, presence patrolling, and capture/kill operations warrant portrayal in the media as they depict the government as being effective in providing for the populace's safety and well being. Supporting the security LOO, the JIRB analyzes all operations focusing on securing the population and prioritizes which ones to focus and allocate IO and PA assets. The JIRB will task IO to develop themes and messages targeting both the insurgents and the mainstream population. IO themes and messages will serve the purpose of dissuading insurgents from taking further actions against the government and coalition; informing the local-area population of arrests and elimination of threats; and soliciting actionable intelligence. The JIRB will also task PA to inform the larger national and international audiences of security accomplishments by leveraging all available media – indigenous and international. PA's portrayal of security successes, which rarely make the news, can serve the purpose of persuading key audiences to continue their support for the counterinsurgency.

Transition is defined as the process with which to transfer control over the counterinsurgency from the joint force or coalition to the established host-nation government. The development, competence, and effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in combating insurgents supported both the security and transition LOO. At some predetermined point in time or upon a specific condition, the joint force will relinquish its

lead in prosecuting the counterinsurgency. The responsibility will go to the host-nation government. This event is significant as it illustrates the capacity of the government to fulfill its role as a capable governing body. In Iraq, the transfer of authority was dependent largely on its security forces capability to conduct unilateral operations. Supporting the transition LOO, the JIRB will task IO to develop messages highlighting successful security force operations as well as promoting recruiting drives to enhance quality and numbers of personnel desiring entry into the ISF. The JIRB will determine high-payoff ISF events and task PA to coordinate media access to professional development training and recruiting drives to further highlight their competence and significance among national and international audiences.<sup>39</sup> Gains in the other LOOs also support achieving transition objectives and the JIRB will appropriately task IO and PA to highlight these efforts.

Building governance capacity is an integral part to strengthening the position and effectiveness of the HN government in controlling the population and orchestrating diplomacy with bordering nations. It requires myriad efforts to establish or reestablish links and processes between all levels of government and it is here where the synchronization of information efforts is most critical. In Iraq, a significant challenge was understanding the linkages between the local, provincial, and central government, and more importantly, who was the true government representative in these areas.<sup>40</sup> In support of the governance LOO, the JIRB will review all activities designed to enhance or promote government capacity. HN efforts such as developing a constitution and body of laws, electing and assigning officials to key positions, building or rebuilding administrative offices and centers, and forming processes with which to air grievances are all essential to depicting a functioning government. As such, the JIRB will task IO and PA to develop and disseminate products to

inform the population of increasing government capacity and to influence them to be an integral part of the political process. In Iraq, a major governmental capacity milestone was developing the infrastructure and process with which to have free and safe elections. PA was instrumental in developing stories to highlight the successes and providing media access to key events during the elections. Additionally, as part of the governance LOO, establishing rule of law is crucial to reinforcing the government's ability to dispense fair and impartial justice. The JIRB will coordinate and synchronize the promoting of ROL accomplishments in order to foster trust and build confidence in the judicial system and to ensure the population clearly understands that violating the law has consequences.<sup>41</sup>

Lastly, the economics LOO provides a ripe environment of activity to exploit using IO and PA. In a counterinsurgency, it is vital to provide the population with viable and long-term employment opportunities as this decreases the likeliness or necessity to rely on the insurgents for support. IO plays a major role in promoting coalition and governmental efforts that are designed to provide or increase employment opportunities. Micro-grant and loan programs to facilitate small businesses should be a component to the counterinsurgency strategy and as such require substantial promotion and marketing among the local nationals using IO. CMO efforts also work toward increasing economic capacity as rebuilding or repairing infrastructure supports many types of businesses and industries. In Iraq, CMO played a significant role with the government in rebuilding vocational-technical training (VOTEC) institutes to provide employment skills most needed throughout the country. This was a crucial endeavor as many skilled laborers fled the country after the invasion leaving a void in the work force. IO supported the VOTC project by informing the local population of available training and governmental grants for tuition assistance. Additionally, promotion of

the VOTEC project through IO served to counter insurgent propaganda aimed at recruiting support. PA supported the VOTEC project by providing access to the international media as well as developing a series of articles for international media consumption. In support of the economic LOO, the JIRB will task IO to promote all opportunities designed to increase employment and jumpstart the establishment of businesses and industry. The JIRB will task PA to highlight these efforts in the national and international media with the intent to show economic stability and progress and to provide situational awareness on potential opportunities for international partnership and investment.

### **Conclusion and Recommendation**

Information plays a significant role in a counterinsurgency. Gaining the support of the population is critical to winning against a competing and often persuasive insurgent narrative. In order to be successful, commanders must be proficient in using information to shape the operational environment. Communicating effectively to achieve objectives requires using information capabilities in an integrated and synchronized fashion. Audiences internal and external to the counterinsurgency are equally important as today's communication technology allows unprecedented access. Influencing and informing audiences through IO and PA work in tandem to persuade individuals to rebuke insurgent propaganda and offer unconditional support to the HN government. Given today's inadequacies with doctrine and a lack of progress in maturing SC beyond a concept, commanders are faced with the challenge of creating a governing body and process to integrate and synchronize all elements of information. Establishing a Joint Information Review Board provides the means with which to effectively govern the integration and synchronization of IO and PA without compromising current DOD policies, directives or

doctrine. Integrating and synchronizing IO and PA along prescribed counterinsurgency LOOs significantly improves the commander's use of information to shape the operational environment (OE).

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## Notes

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- <sup>1</sup> The Arabic term Qada refers to an area similar in size to a U.S. county and is used for purposes of governance and jurisdiction. Qada is one level of governance above a Nahia, which is similar to a U.S. township.
- <sup>2</sup> Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, II-20
- <sup>3</sup> Petraeus and Amos, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. 82, III-2.
- <sup>4</sup> Scanlon, *In Defense of Military Public Affairs Doctrine*, 95.
- <sup>5</sup> Richter, *The Future of Information Operations*, 104.
- <sup>6</sup> Miramontes, *Integrating IO and PA: Integration without compromising PA*, 57.
- <sup>7</sup> Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations*, II-I.
- <sup>8</sup> Richter, p. 105
- <sup>9</sup> PSYOP forces have many means available to disseminate themes and messages and include handbills, leaflets, radio, print, television, loud-speaker broadcast, and face-to-face (F2F) engagement.
- <sup>10</sup> Sholtis, *Public Affairs and Information Operations: A Strategy for Success*, 99.
- <sup>11</sup> Joint Publication 3-13 lists five supporting IO capabilities (IA, physical security, physical attack, CI, and COMCAM) and three related IO capabilities (civil affairs, public affairs, and DSPD), p II-I.
- <sup>12</sup> Dunbar, *Achieving Irreversible Momentum*, 13.
- <sup>13</sup> Joint Publication 3-61, *Public Affairs*, I-3
- <sup>14</sup> Morgan and Pool, *Public Affairs and Information Operations: An influence capability*, 28.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid, p. 29
- <sup>16</sup> Joint Publication 3-61, *Public Affairs*, 1-5
- <sup>17</sup> Blankley and Horn, *Strategizing Strategic Communication*, 3.
- <sup>18</sup> Joint Publication 5.0 *Joint Operation Planning*, II-2.
- <sup>19</sup> Eder, *The Missing Element: Strategic Communication*, 28.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid
- <sup>21</sup> Mullen, *Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics*, 4.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid
- <sup>23</sup> Eder, *The Missing Element: Strategic Communication*, 28.
- <sup>24</sup> Joint Publication 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, II-1, II-2
- <sup>25</sup> Miramontes, p. 56.
- <sup>26</sup> Key Leader Engagements (KLE) have become commonplace in counterinsurgency operations and are generally planned and executed by tactical units assigned or attached to the joint force
- <sup>27</sup> Miramontes, p. 57
- <sup>28</sup> Davis, *Information Operations and the Marine Corps Planning Process*, 59.
- <sup>29</sup> Joint Publication 3-33, p. II-2
- <sup>30</sup> The Army has implemented the G7/S7 Information Directorate for managing Information Operations.
- <sup>31</sup> As defined in JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, a board is an organized group of individuals, appointed by the commander that meets with the purpose of gaining guidance and decisions.
- <sup>32</sup> Jones, et al., *Strategic Communication and the Combatant Commander*, 106.
- <sup>33</sup> In a joint organization, the J8 directorate is charged with the responsibility of managing expenditures.
- <sup>34</sup> Information is an integral part to targeting, especially against high-value individuals, as focused information products can serve to solicit actionable intelligence
- <sup>35</sup> Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines battle rhythm as the deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations
- <sup>36</sup> Joint Publication 3-60, *Joint Targeting*, p. I-I
- <sup>37</sup> United States Forces – Iraq website, mission: available at [www.usf-iraq.com](http://www.usf-iraq.com)
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid
- <sup>39</sup> MNC-I's Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC) coordinates Iraqi media engagements and battlefield circulations, often authorizing indigenous media teams to accompany coalition-led forces on combat operations
- <sup>40</sup> Oskey and Williams, *Developing Collaborative Governance in Iraq: 'Reverse Helicopter' ideology fosters political progress*, 28.
- <sup>41</sup> Local nationals understanding and having trust in the judicial system aids law enforcement authorities in combating crime and prosecuting criminals. In Iraq, citizens were reluctant in providing testimony for fear of corruption and distrust in the judicial system.