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**AFRICOM'S ROLE IN INTERAGENCY COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS:  
AN ASSESSMENT IN 3D**

**by**

**Martin F. Kindl**

**Defense Intelligence Agency**

**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

**Signature: \_\_\_\_\_**

**27 October 2010**

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## **Abstract**

In its two years of operation, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has pioneered an innovative interagency strategy to address the continent's challenges, with DOD representing the third pillar of an integrated 3D – diplomacy, development, and defense – approach. AFRICOM's whole-of-government commitment is most evident in counterterrorism (CT) initiatives conducted by the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in the continent's east and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in the northwest. This paper evaluates the implementation of these two programs and argues that, while both represent tactical successes of program execution and service provision, their contribution to the achievement of U.S. government strategic objectives in the CT realm remains less apparent. The author argues that this strategic shortfall is due to a combination of factors, including an unclear delineation of DOD responsibilities within the 3D construct and shortcomings in interagency program management. Based upon the research presented, the author provides programmatic and structural recommendations to improve these and subsequent AFRICOM initiatives.

## INTRODUCTION

The continent of Africa has assumed increasing geopolitical importance in the past decade. While the authors of the 1995 U.S. Security Strategy for sub-Saharan Africa conceded “ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa,”<sup>1</sup> the continent has emerged as a national security priority in both the Bush and Obama administrations.<sup>2</sup> Key national policy concerns – to include fostering democratization and economic stability, maintaining access to resources, and preventing humanitarian disaster – intersect on the continent, and the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) underscores this burgeoning interest in Africa and its challenges.

When AFRICOM became fully operational on 30 September 2008, it inherited a distinct group of programs, initiatives, and problems from the three geographical combatant commands formerly responsible for the 53 nations with which it was charged.<sup>3</sup> Recognizing the unique nature of the continent’s challenges and the resulting overlap between military and civilian imperatives, AFRICOM enhanced outreach to interagency partners within the U.S. government and, in a departure from traditional command staffing, incorporated senior civilian officials into its leadership ranks. As a result of this hybrid configuration, AFRICOM has been referred to as a “combatant command-plus” with a mandate

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<sup>1</sup> DOD Office of Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 1995), 3.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, U.S. President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 45. Of note, sub-Saharan Africa was not incorporated into the U.S. military combatant command structure until 1960, and was again left out of the framework between 1971 and 1983.

<sup>3</sup> The AFRICOM area of responsibility includes all countries on the African continent except Egypt, as well as the Indian Ocean island nations of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles. These nations had formerly been divided between European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM). Egypt remains aligned to CENTCOM.

encompassing both military and soft power operations.<sup>4</sup> This dynamic is reflected in a pledge made by its first commander, General William Ward, to “provide better informed and more effective support to initiatives led by civilian Departments and Agencies.”<sup>5</sup>

From the outset, AFRICOM’s whole-of-government approach favored conflict prevention over warfighting, and its counterterrorism (CT) methodology is no exception.<sup>6</sup> While U.S. military forces have engaged in occasional lethal operations against designated high-value targets on the continent,<sup>7</sup> the majority of command effort addresses the broader security environment in which terrorist elements operate – as stated in its Commander’s Intent, AFRICOM aspires to “help prevent crises rather than only react to them.”<sup>8</sup> The continent’s two key non-kinetic CT initiatives, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in east Africa and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in northwest Africa represent the cornerstones of this effort and, while they differ from one another in important ways, are viewed by AFRICOM leadership generally as models of future nontraditional combatant command engagement.<sup>9</sup> By pursuing an integrated 3D approach that balances the government’s diplomatic, development, and defense

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<sup>4</sup> John Tierney, “Opening Statement,” House, *Hearing On AFRICOM: Rationales, Roles, And Progress On The Eve Of Operations*, 110<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., 2008, <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1921> (accessed 28 August 2010).

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs Office, “AFRICOM Posture Statement: Ward Updates Congress on U.S. Africa Command,” U.S. Africa Command, <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1679&lang=0> (accessed 15 September 2010).

<sup>6</sup> Throughout this paper, the term “counterterrorism” will be used to refer to all techniques and strategies employed by governments to prevent or respond to terrorist acts. While some scholars characterize preventative actions as “antiterrorism” and offensive actions as “counterterrorism”, the author believes that there is significant overlap between the two and that differentiation complicates rather than clarifies further analysis.

<sup>7</sup> Notably the 1 May 2008 missile strike against militant leader Adan Hashi Ayrow and the 14 September 2009 special operations action against al-Qaeda operative Saleh ali Saleh Nabhan; both in Somalia. The two attacks each resulted in the death of their intended target and several associates. See *CNN.com*, “U.S. kills Somali with links to al Qaeda, officials say,” 1 May 2008, <http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/05/01/somalia.airstrike/index.html> (accessed 28 August 2010) and *CNN.com*, “Key al Qaeda operative killed in U.S. strike, Somalia says,” 15 September 2009, <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/09/15/somalia.strike/> (accessed 28 August 2010) for further information.

<sup>8</sup> William Ward, “Commander’s Intent,” U.S. Africa Command, <http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/Commander's%20Intent%20January%202010.pdf>, January 2010 (accessed 28 August 2010).

<sup>9</sup> Isaac Kfir, “The Challenge that is USAFRICOM,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 49, (2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter 2002), 110.

capabilities, AFRICOM and its interagency partners endeavor to limit safehaven for established transnational terrorism and the emergence of homegrown African extremists.

After a decade of interagency emphasis on African counterterrorism and two years of AFRICOM stewardship of these programs, clear and demonstrable progress has been made. Relationships between the command and its partners on the continent have been fostered, thousands of African troops have been trained, millions of dollars of assistance have been provided, and humanitarian projects have been conducted. These successes, however, remain largely confined to the tactical level – evaluated against the strategic objective of combating terrorism on the continent, results are less definitive. A 3D approach to CT will by its nature fail to achieve true unity of command, because each interagency partner is answerable to its own separate leadership element. At the same time, an analysis of CJTF-HOA and TSCTP reveals shortcomings in an overall unity of effort that, if addressed, could increase strategic effectiveness and inform future engagement efforts on the continent.

### **A TALE OF TWO PROGRAMS: CT ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA**

**Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.** CJTF-HOA was established under U.S. Central Command in 2002 as a component of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and, after operating temporarily afloat from the USS *Mount Whitney*, the Task Force relocated to Djibouti's Camp Lemonnier in 2003. CJTF-HOA oversight shifted to AFRICOM after the command's 2008 establishment, with a mission to ~~promote~~ regional security and stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. and coalition interests."<sup>10</sup> Force strength at the Camp fluctuates, but typically consists of 1,500 to 2,000 U.S. personnel and a small number of international staff officers. It is AFRICOM's only task force in Africa with assigned forces;

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<sup>10</sup> U.S. Africa Command, "Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa," U.S. Africa Command, <http://www.africom.mil/AboutCJTF-HOA.asp> (accessed 19 October 2010).

none of the command's service components has forces assigned.<sup>11</sup> CJTF-HOA's area of responsibility includes seven countries – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan – with an additional 11 named as areas of interest (fig.1).<sup>12</sup> The task force maintains forward operating locations at two sites in Kenya and one in Uganda; as well as a small Country Coordination Element at most regional embassies.<sup>13</sup> As the Combatant Command Support Agent for CJTF-HOA, the U.S. Navy funds the majority of the camp's \$238 million annual budget and an estimated \$80 million for the task force itself.<sup>14</sup>

The environment in which CJTF-HOA operates presents a challenging array of security threats and challenges. In the wake of the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the Horn of Africa emerged as a key focus of international counterterrorism efforts. Attacks on an Israeli hotel and airliner near Mombasa, Kenya in 2002 underscored the terrorist threat, as has the emergence of the al-Qaeda-associated al-Shabaab terrorist group in south-central Somalia. Without a functioning national government since 1991, Somalia serves as the epicenter of terrorist safehaven and insecurity in the Horn; however, weak governments and disaffected populations throughout the region have made all countries vulnerable to security threats. In addition, transnational challenges such as piracy and drug trafficking have stretched the already-limited capabilities of east African security forces.

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<sup>11</sup> AFRICOM's service components consist of U.S. Army, Africa (USARAF) in Vicenza, Italy; U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF) in Naples, Italy; U.S. Marine Forces, Africa (MARFORAF) in Stuttgart, Germany; and U.S. Air Forces, Africa/17<sup>th</sup> Air Force (AFAFRICA) in Ramstein, Germany.

<sup>12</sup> Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, "Interactive Map Search," <http://www.hoa.africom.mil/interactiveMap.asp> (accessed 20 August 2010). The area of interest includes Yemen, Tanzania, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, Burundi, Rwanda, Comoros, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda (see fig.1).

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force*, GAO-10-504 (Washington, DC: GAO, April 2010), 5.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 5. CJTF-HOA operations to date have largely been funded through emergency supplemental appropriations rather than the base DOD budget. DOD's FY2010 military construction budget request also included nearly \$42 million for projects at Camp Lemonnier. See Lauren Ploch, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*, CRS report 7-5700 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 13.



The CJTF-HOA mission initially focused on a more direct kill/capture approach to CT, but has since shifted to emphasize mil-to-mil engagement, public outreach, and humanitarian initiatives – current task force efforts cover a spectrum from security assistance and training to a robust civil affairs program. Though U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and State Department representatives at the responsible embassy approve its activities, the task force is a Defense-led initiative that primarily employs DOD military and civilian resources.<sup>15</sup> The implications of this mission shift and interagency dynamic present challenges for the achievement of CJTF-HOA objectives that will be examined below.

**Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.** Focused on northwest Africa, TSCTP was established in 2005 to build on the efforts of a more limited predecessor program, the 2002-04 Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI).<sup>16</sup> TSCTP is led by the U.S. Department of State (DOS); AFRICOM assumed responsibility for the military component in fall 2008. The program engages with 11 partner countries: Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia in northern Africa; Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal in sub-Saharan west Africa.<sup>17</sup> Unlike CJTF-HOA, TSCTP does not maintain a dedicated DOD presence on the continent; instead, its operations are conducted through the existing embassy infrastructure or via mission-oriented teams that travel as necessary to recipient nations.

While arguably more limited than those in the Horn of Africa, the challenges posed by terrorist organizations in northwest Africa are nonetheless significant. In January 2007, the Algeria-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) became a formal affiliate of al-Qaeda, re-branding itself as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – it has since


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<sup>15</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management: DOD Needs*, 11.

<sup>16</sup> The Department of Defense's Pan-Sahel Initiative, which was initiated in 2002, provided military assistance to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.

<sup>17</sup> U.S. Africa Command, "The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership," U.S. Africa Command, <http://www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp> (accessed 24 September 2010).

increased the geographical breadth, sophistication, and lethality of its operations.<sup>18</sup> Algeria's effectiveness against AQIM in the past three years has driven the group's base further south into the Sahel, with Mali and Mauritania gaining ground as centers of operations and safehaven, and AQIM relying upon kidnapping for ransom as its primary source of income.<sup>19</sup> Regional insecurity and a lack of state capacity in the Sahel do not benefit only AQIM, however; in recent years, the region has become a major narcotics transshipment node from South America to Europe, and relations between regional governments and local tribal



**Figure 1.** Geographic boundaries of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) operations.

<sup>18</sup> Andrew Hansen and Lauren Vriens, "Backgrounder: al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)," Council on Foreign Relations, [http://www.cfr.org/publication/12717/alqaeda\\_in\\_the\\_islamic\\_maghreb\\_aqim.html#p3](http://www.cfr.org/publication/12717/alqaeda_in_the_islamic_maghreb_aqim.html#p3) (accessed 11 October 2010).

<sup>19</sup> Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, "Testimony," Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, *Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategies Across Africa's Sahel Region*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 28-29.

groups remain strained and occasionally violent.<sup>20</sup> As with the Horn of Africa, threat of terrorist and criminal escalation in the Sahel has prompted increased U.S. CT engagement.

TSCTP's stated objectives are to strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhance cooperation among the region's security forces, promote democratic governance, discredit terrorist ideology, and reinforce bilateral military ties with the U.S.<sup>21</sup> The DOD component of the partnership is known as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS); its activities include tactical- and operational-level training and exercises, equipment provision, humanitarian assistance, and intelligence sharing.<sup>22</sup> Based on an assessment of the recipient nation's needs and willingness to receive the assistance, the majority of funding and support is currently obligated to Sahelian nations of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.<sup>23</sup> In total, the U.S. government allocated nearly \$500 million for TSCTP from FY2005 to FY2009, with the OEF-TS component of the partnership funded out of the AFRICOM budget and accounting for nearly half of the yearly expenditure.<sup>24</sup>

## **CJTF-HOA AND TSCTP LESSONS LEARNED**

**Progress Evident at the Program Level.** Though each program is unique in structure and focus, both CJTF-HOA and TSCTP/OEF-TS have consistently demonstrated their utility at the tactical program level. CJTF-HOA provides a U.S. government presence in some of the most challenging and underserved areas of the world, and many of its humanitarian

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<sup>20</sup> Kennedy-Boudali, *The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership* (West Point, NY: The Combating Terrorism Center, USMA, April 2007), 1-3.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Andre Le Sage, ed., *African Counterterrorism Cooperation: Assessing Regional and Subregional Initiatives* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2007), 136-137.

<sup>23</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Actions*, GAO-08-860 (Washington, DC: GAO, July 2008), 12. OEF-TS partner nations include all TSCTP participants except Libya.

<sup>24</sup> Lauren Ploch, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*, CRS report 7-5700 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 13-24. In FY2010, OEF-TS cost an estimated \$46.3 million; AFRICOM's FY2011 request for OEF-TS is \$49.5 million.

assistance efforts contribute – directly or indirectly – to improved livelihoods and prospects among beneficiary communities. Because of its relatively robust staffing vis-à-vis regional embassies, CJTF-HOA also provides support to understaffed civilian colleagues from DOS and USAID. Operationally, Camp Lemonnier’s vital geostrategic position allows it to act as a platform from which to respond to contingencies and support antipiracy operations.

In terms of mil-to-mil engagement, CJTF-HOA-based personnel have facilitated African support to key multinational missions and bolstered the capabilities of regional partners in support of U.S. policy goals, according to State Department officials.<sup>25</sup> They provided military assistance and training to Ugandan peacekeepers deployed to the African Union Mission in Somalia and, in 2009, assisted in Djiboutian military training for the African Union’s Eastern African Standby Brigade. CJTF-HOA assets have also trained other African forces engaged in UN missions and supported peacekeepers stationed in Sudan.<sup>26</sup> Outside of the peacekeeping realm, CJTF-HOA forces participated in multiple iterations of the regional NATURAL FIRES disaster relief exercise and initiatives associated with the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, while also supporting naval training initiatives and antipiracy Task Force 151.

Similarly, TSCTP and the military’s OEF-TS component have fostered closer engagement across northwest Africa and enhanced military capabilities in the region. AFRICOM support to TSCTP takes on a variety of formats, to include Joint Planning Assistance Teams, Joint Combined Exchange Training, and Mobile Training Teams; as well

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<sup>25</sup> Daniel Benjamin, “Testimony,” Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, *Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategies Across Africa’s Sahel Region*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 12.

<sup>26</sup> Ploch, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests*, 19-21.

as military information and civil-military support elements.<sup>27</sup> The TSCTP-supported FLINTLOCK exercise, for instance, is in its tenth iteration, and focuses on regional military interoperability and crisis response.<sup>28</sup> Foreign military sales and military education/training programs are also leveraged to support partner militaries in the region. Senior U.S. government officials have cited the TSCTP/OEF-TS role in training and equipping more professional security forces in Mauritania and Mali,<sup>29</sup> and assert that U.S. support to military and law enforcement has led to stronger border control in the region.<sup>30</sup>

**Strategic Impact Unclear.** While the benefits of CJTF-HOA and TSCTP/OEF-TS may be apparent at the program level, and while these benefits may in and of themselves warrant further engagement, the contribution of these two initiatives to the achievement of strategic counterterrorism objectives is less evident. In both the Horn of Africa and the continent's northwest, the terrorist threat has increased in the past decade, and it is unclear whether the hearts and minds of target populations or specific military counterterrorism capabilities have been substantially improved.

A review of program implementation to date reveals that, despite efforts to further an interagency 3D concept, the emergence of a truly integrated and coordinated approach to CT in eastern and northwestern Africa has yet to fully take hold. Overlap and uncertainty over agency roles impedes unity of effort; a challenge particularly evident in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, interagency program management structures are lacking, resulting in an absence of truly harmonized planning and proper metrics of effectiveness.

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<sup>27</sup> U.S. Africa Command, "Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara," U.S. Africa Command, <http://www.africom.mil/oef-ts.asp> (accessed 11 September 2010).

<sup>28</sup> U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs Office, "Flintlock 10 Exercise Set to Kick Off," U.S. Africa Command, <http://www.africom.mil/getArticleFresh.asp?art=4212&lang=0> (accessed 24 September 2010).

<sup>29</sup> Johnnie Carson, "Testimony," Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, *Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategies Across Africa's Sahel Region*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 7.

<sup>30</sup> Benjamin, "Testimony," *Examining U.S. Counterterrorism*, 8.

*DOD Role within the 3D Construct.* Both doctrine and policy stipulate that the military role in shaping and stability operations – particularly outside of an established war zone – is more often that of a supporting vice supported member of the interagency, with Defense equities serving a secondary role.<sup>31</sup> To this end, DOD Instruction 2205.02 directs that military Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) activities –complement, not duplicate, other forms of social or economic assistance provided to the host nation by other U.S. Departments or Agencies.”<sup>32</sup> An analysis of CJTF-HOA and TSCTP reveals that, despite such guidance, the proper application of DOD resources in whole-of-government CT engagement continues to be unclear. AFRICOM’s emphasis on pre-conflict Phase 0 operations presents coordination challenges and threatens to undermine diplomacy and development efforts; particularly given the imbalance in DOD staffing and funding levels vis-à-vis State and USAID.<sup>33</sup>

The argument that AFRICOM efforts represent a militarization of foreign policy continues to shape perceptions on the continent and, with DOD estimated to control over 20 percent of U.S. humanitarian and development assistance to Africa, both CJTF-HOA and TSCTP have been accused of fostering confusion between military and humanitarian assistance in a region already skeptical of AFRICOM intentions.<sup>34</sup> This confusion risks negative consequences not only for DOD operations but overall U.S. government efforts as well, as engagement is seen to address narrow U.S. policy objectives rather than need, and USAID and non-governmental development agencies are conflated with similar military-led

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<sup>31</sup> Dennis R. Penn, *Africa Command and the Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 10.

<sup>32</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*, DOD Instruction 2205.02 (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 2008), 1.

<sup>33</sup> Ploch, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests*, 5-6.

<sup>34</sup> “More Money for the Military,” *Africa Confidential* 51, no. 3. (5 February 2010): 9-10.

programs.<sup>35</sup> A comprehensive study of AFRICOM HCA initiatives noted that ~~some~~ observers question whether these activities might be more appropriately coordinated by a civilian agency or non-governmental organization.”<sup>36</sup>

Since 2003, a key CJTF-HOA focus has been the provision of assistance to ~~win~~ hearts and minds” among the Horn of Africa’s Muslim communities. In a review of CJTF-HOA press releases from January 2008 to June 2009, over 60 percent were devoted to humanitarian assistance and cultural exchange initiatives, while only one in six dealt with mil-to-mil training.<sup>37</sup> Unlike similar operations undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan, these initiatives occur wholly separate from U.S. military kinetic counterinsurgency operations; they are ~~in~~ essence a military intervention to prevent conflict through the provision of aid and a physical presence.”<sup>38</sup> An estimated 60 percent of CJTF-HOA activities focus on civil affairs, conducted by teams deployed throughout the task force’s operational area and occasionally with the support of host nation forces.<sup>39</sup> Projects include the construction and refurbishment of schools, hospitals and infrastructure; as well as well-digging, medical/veterinary care, and events such as sporting competitions and debates.<sup>40</sup>

As previously stated, CJTF-HOA has met with some success on a programmatic level and improved relations with recipient communities, but there is little definitive evidence to link these ~~hearts and minds~~” investments to the broader aim of reducing the extremist threat.

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<sup>35</sup> Robert G. Berschinski, *AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The “Global War on Terrorism,” “Capacity Building,” Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College/Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 2.

<sup>36</sup> Ploch, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests*, 21.

<sup>37</sup> Jan Bachmann, ~~Kick Down the Door~~, Clean Up the Mess, and Rebuild the House: The Africa Command and Transformation of the U.S. Military,” *Geopolitics* 15, no. 3 (October 2010): 12, cited in Bradbury and Kleinman, *Winning Hearts and Minds*, 42.

<sup>38</sup> Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman, *Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Kenya* (Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, April 2010), 9.

<sup>39</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management: DOD Needs*, 11.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

A Tufts University review of CJTF-HOA projects in Kenya's predominantly Muslim North Eastern and Coast Provinces concludes that the net impact of civil affairs engagement is ~~not~~ enough to make communities significantly alter their worldview," and that recipient communities interact with CJTF-HOA pragmatically to benefit on a case-by-case basis but remain skeptical about its overall mission.<sup>41</sup> In any event, it appears that broader U.S. foreign policy has a greater effect on perceptions of local communities than engagement – as a religious leader in coastal Kenya asserted, the Americans ~~—~~build faith on one side and destroy it on the other. What they are doing in Afghanistan and Israel affects all of us."<sup>42</sup>

State and USAID officials have noted that some CJTF-HOA projects do not directly support their strategic objectives, and may not fully take into account potential negative consequences.<sup>43</sup> In several cases, for example, local politicians manipulated project selection to shore up their support base, and reviews of CJTF-HOA indicate that military involvement in traditional development activities has occasionally put USAID and humanitarian agencies' employees at additional risk.<sup>44</sup> Project sustainment has also been a shortcoming, with long approval timelines and only sporadic follow-up.<sup>45</sup> These challenges are complicated by staffing that has been characterized by the Senate Armed Services Committee as ~~—~~expeditionary in nature, with personnel and officers serving rotations of one year or less"<sup>46</sup> and half of the force comprised of reservists.<sup>47</sup> Additionally, CJTF-HOA's inability to operate in the region's most insecure areas – notably Somalia, but also portions of Kenya and Ethiopia – has impaired its ability to reach the most vulnerable populations.

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<sup>41</sup> Bradbury and Kleinman, *Winning Hearts and Minds*, 4.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>43</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management: DOD Needs*, 14.

<sup>44</sup> Bradbury and Kleinman, *Winning Hearts and Minds*, 6.

<sup>45</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management: DOD Needs*, 16.

<sup>46</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. *National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2010*, 111<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1st sess., 2010, Senate Report 111-35 (p. 218).

<sup>47</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management: DOD Needs*, 9.



With respect to the delineation of agency responsibilities, TSCTP may provide a more appropriate model for future engagement, as it emphasizes closer collaboration and provides clearer demarcation of agency responsibilities. While the predecessor PSI program was DOD-led, the Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs is the TSCTP program lead, with DOD and USAID as additional participants.<sup>48</sup> Under this construct, DOD manages train and equip missions, provides military infrastructure/materiel, and engages in intelligence training; military elements also act in a supporting role to public diplomacy and humanitarian assistance efforts. Program funding is generally split between security and diplomatic/development initiatives, and coordination meetings between relevant agency representatives take place both in Washington and among country teams on the continent.<sup>49</sup>

At the same time, TSCTP's overall planning process at the strategic level remains stovepiped between agencies, with DOD country action plans coordinated at the interagency level but not incorporated into a single comprehensive 3D construct. A review of civil-military assistance by advocacy group Refugees International characterized TSCTP programs as —little more than a collection of initiatives cobbled together from various accounts, with little consideration of their strategic integration, sustainability, and long-term developmental impacts.”<sup>50</sup> The role of OEF-TS assets has also been hampered by tension between State and DOD in the field – in 2007, the Ambassador in Niger forced a suspension of some programs there after limiting the number of DOD personnel in country, and activities in Chad have been slowed due to similar coordination issues. Moreover, disagreements regarding DOS

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<sup>48</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation*, 13.

<sup>49</sup> Le Sage, ed., *African Counterterrorism Cooperation*, 146.

<sup>50</sup> Mark Malan, *U.S. Civil-Military Imbalance for Global Engagement: Lessons from the Operational Level in Africa* (Washington, DC: Refugees International, July 2008), 8.

authority over TSCTP-related DOD personnel in the field remain unresolved.<sup>51</sup>

*Interagency Program Management.* In addition to lingering confusion about DOD roles within an interagency construct, more practical institutional shortcomings in program management also impede progress on a 3D approach to CT. Both AFRICOM's Theater Campaign Plan and the Government Performance and Results Act require assessments of security cooperation efforts; however, current metrics are focused more on quantitative measures of performance rather than more results-based measures of effectiveness.<sup>52</sup> U.S. government reviews of other interagency security programs in Africa have cited the need to systematically assess progress toward the achievement of broad strategic objectives, but both CJTF-HOA and TSCTP/OEF-TS fail to adequately capture such information.<sup>53</sup>

The Government Accountability Office argues that ~~it~~ is uncertain whether [CJTF-HOA's] full range of activities support AFRICOM's mission of sustained security engagement because the task force is generally not conducting long-term follow up on activities,"<sup>54</sup> and AFRICOM officials acknowledge that the command is ~~not~~ setting specific, achievable, and measurable goals for its activities that tie to specific missions or desired effects."<sup>55</sup> While civil affairs teams are required to produce an after-action report within a month after a project, long-term follow-up is generally conducted as a target of opportunity when a team finds itself in an area of past activity and not as a matter of course.<sup>56</sup> Moreover,

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<sup>51</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation*, 22-23.

<sup>52</sup> *Government Performance and Results Act of 1993*, 103<sup>rd</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/mgmt-gpra/gplaw2m> (accessed 25 September 2010). The law requires agencies to move from defining budgets in terms of inputs and program outputs to focus on outcomes and results.

<sup>53</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Systematic Assessment is Needed to Determine Agencies' Progress toward U.S. Policy Objectives*, GAO-08-188 (Washington, DC: GAO, December 2007), 28.

<sup>54</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management: DOD Needs*, 11.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 13

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 16

the connection between these individual projects and strategic effects remains tenuous and generally unmeasured – U.S. government personnel, including civil affairs team members, interviewed for the Tufts University study were “surprisingly unclear” about the ultimate objectives of a “hearts and minds” approach to CT and how their activities related to the achievement of these objectives.<sup>57</sup>

TSCTP has also been cited for its lack of an overarching and comprehensive implementation strategy; as well as clear definition of objectives and performance indicators.<sup>58</sup> At the inception of TSCTP in 2005, USAID commissioned a series of in-depth, peer-reviewed studies to better target their programs to specific vulnerable demographics; however, a comparable depth of analysis has not yet been conducted post-implementation.<sup>59</sup> Sen. Russell Feingold, in a 2009 hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, observed of TSCTP that “nearly \$500 million has been allocated for this program since fiscal year 2005, yet nearly five years later it remains unclear to what extent these efforts have been successful.”<sup>60</sup> While the ability of TSCTP implementers to track and manage individual projects is judged to be adequate, their ability to assess strategic outcomes is limited at best.<sup>61</sup>

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Terrorism in Africa is the quintessential “wicked problem” – efforts to combat it change the nature of the problem itself, there is no immediate or ultimate test of a solution, and

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<sup>57</sup> Bradbury and Kleinman, *Winning Hearts and Minds*, 46.

<sup>58</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation*, 4.

<sup>59</sup> Earl Gast, “Testimony,” Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, *Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategies Across Africa’s Sahel Region*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 14.

<sup>60</sup> Russell Feingold, “Opening Statement,” Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, *Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategies Across Africa’s Sahel Region*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 2.

<sup>61</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation*, 4.

successful initiatives may not bear fruit for years.<sup>62</sup> While the persistence of the terrorist threat across the northern half of the African continent may not specifically indicate that CJTF-HOA and TSCTP programs have failed, it does imply a lack of success and highlights a need to reassess interagency CT engagement on the African continent.

**Programmatic Reform.** The CJTF-HOA and TSCTP case studies above suggest that reform should be undertaken at what may be referred to as the programmatic and structural levels. At the program level, this would entail a reevaluation of interagency program strategy and the DOD role within such a construct, as well as an enhancement of measures of effectiveness to address the achievement of objectives. These programmatic adjustments could be implemented in the near- to medium-term, and would begin to address “the current patchwork of authorities” that, according to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, “incentivizes piecemeal, stovepiped approaches.”<sup>63</sup>

*Develop and Implement Strategic 3D Initiatives through an Interagency Body.* In order to achieve strategic CT effects through a 3D mechanism, all elements of national power must work in synchronicity. CJTF-HOA, however, is virtually an all-DOD operation and TSCTP planning processes are not fully integrated. To ameliorate this, a standing interagency body should be formed for each program to establish desired end states, build an integrated plan, allocate resources, and monitor implementation. This body would draft a joint strategy paper, update it regularly, and ensure distribution to affected country teams and military units – the TSCTP construct, if strengthened at the strategic planning level, already possesses many of the traits of such a structure. The United Kingdom’s Africa Conflict Prevention Pool may also provide an instructive example, as it endeavors to share resources and

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<sup>62</sup> Kenneth Menkhaus, “State Fragility as a Wicked Problem,” *PRISM*, vol. 1, No. 2 (March 2010), 86-87.

<sup>63</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2010, [http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR\\_as\\_of\\_12Feb10\\_1000.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf) (accessed 11 October 2010), 74.

ministerial-level decision-making between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development, and the Ministry of Defence.<sup>64</sup> In the Horn of Africa, a proposed interagency East Africa Regional Security Initiative (EARSi), based upon best practices from TSCTP,<sup>65</sup> should be stood up as soon as possible in order to facilitate diplomacy and development interaction with existing CJTF-HOA structures.

*Emphasize the “D” of Defense.* In order to work toward its strengths and avoid putting humanitarian workers at risk, U.S. military CT engagement in Africa would be most effective if it focused first and foremost on defense and security initiatives. Case studies demonstrate that DOD CT efforts have been most successful – and least contentious – when they concentrate on what Refugees International terms “unashamedly military/political roles” such as security sector reform and military training.<sup>66</sup> A number of international NGOs refuse to work with DOD in Africa because they believe it would compromise their mission and put employees at risk,<sup>67</sup> and a 3D approach that kept “development and defense firmly apart from each other” would also allow these organizations to maintain impartiality.<sup>68</sup> While this would not preclude DOD from engaging in humanitarian disaster relief, limited development initiatives in a supporting role, or stabilization operations in an area of conflict, it would allow AFRICOM assets to focus more exclusively on mil-to-mil engagement as their primary effort. As a Center for Strategic and International Studies report on TSCTP

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<sup>64</sup> Department for International Development (UK), *The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool: An Information Document* (London, UK: DFID, 2004), iii-2, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/acppinfodoc.pdf>, (accessed 25 September 2010).

<sup>65</sup> U.S. Agency for International Development, *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, FY2009*, <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2009/101368.pdf> (accessed 22 September 2010).

<sup>66</sup> Malan, *U.S. Civil-Military Imbalance*, II.

<sup>67</sup> Bradbury and Kleinman, *Winning Hearts and Minds*, 18.

<sup>68</sup> Aaron Kishbaugh and Lisa Schirch, “Leveraging ‘3D’ Security: From Rhetoric to Reality,” *Foreign Policy in Focus blog*, Institute for Security Studies, posted 14 November 2006, [http://www.fpif.org/reports/leveraging\\_3d\\_security\\_from\\_rhetoric\\_to\\_reality](http://www.fpif.org/reports/leveraging_3d_security_from_rhetoric_to_reality), (accessed 12 September 2010).

engagement notes, interagency efforts are most effective when they ~~re~~strict the activities of U.S. military personnel on the ground to train and equip programs and implement all humanitarian and development projects through non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private development firms.”<sup>69</sup>

*Enhance Measures of Effectiveness.* In order to better translate individual programs into strategic CT successes, every effort should be made to improve results-based metrics of effectiveness for Phase 0 shaping operations on the continent and to synchronize them across agencies. Input gained from DOD experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, USAID’s worldwide program implementation, and elsewhere could inform assessment techniques that employ a wide spectrum of qualitative and quantitative data points. The Congressional Research Service recommends an approach that takes into account —~~incidents~~ incidents, attitudes, and trends” and would include – among other metrics – a review of the number and nature of terrorist attacks, surveys of affected populations, and media monitoring.<sup>70</sup> Specifically for DOD, useful data might include interviews with troops that have received training, independent reviews of partner nation CT operations, and assessments of equipment maintenance.<sup>71</sup>

**Structural Reform.** While the above proposals would address known programmatic deficiencies, they will ultimately need to be coupled with long-term structural shifts for a 3D approach to African CT to realize its full potential. Because these recommendations entail a diversion of resources and touch on the personnel element of interagency engagement, they are likely to be more contentious and would take much longer to implement; nevertheless,

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<sup>69</sup> Colin Thomas-Jensen and Maggie Fick, “Foreign Assistance Follies in Niger,” *Online Africa Policy Forum*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, <https://csis.org/blog/foreign-assistance-follies-niger> (accessed 12 September 2010).

<sup>70</sup> Raphael Perl, *Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness*, CRS report RL33160 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 2.

<sup>71</sup> Interview with U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) formally from U.S. Africa Command Intelligence and Knowledge Development, 24 September 2010 (unattributed interview).

the experience of CJTF-HOA and TSCTP demonstrates that greater balance between 3D partners and the cultivation of region-specific DOD expertise could enhance strategic success and avoid potential pitfalls.

*Bolster Civilian Diplomacy and Development Capacity.* At present, the resource imbalance between DOD and other U.S. government agencies encourages – or necessitates – military involvement in a host of non-military activities and negatively impacts the interagency planning process. As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy and scholar Shawn Brimley assert, “we cannot continue to perpetuate the reliance on the military for every mission.”<sup>72</sup> While complete parity between agencies is unlikely, a truly integrated 3D approach to terrorism in Africa requires stronger DOS and USAID ownership of diplomacy and development processes. In a 2007 speech, Secretary of Defense Gates maintained that “when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen was Chief of Naval Operations, he once said he’d hand a part of his budget to the State Department – in a heartbeat, ‘assuming it was spent in the right place.’”<sup>73</sup> His argument has merit – according to counterinsurgency scholar David Kilcullen, the ratio of uniformed U.S. military members to DOS foreign service officers stands at 280:1 and,<sup>74</sup> though State and USAID require over 5,000 additional officers to meet new demands, hiring at both organizations is near attrition.<sup>75</sup> Expanding DOS and USAID capacity would require difficult political decisions and the possible diversion of resources away from traditional Defense functions; however, it would likely lead to more efficient interventions in the diplomatic and development realms while

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<sup>72</sup> Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, “In Search of Harmony: Orchestrating ‘The Interagency’ for the Long War,” *Armed Forces Journal*, July 2006, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/07/1857934> (accessed 26 September 2010).

<sup>73</sup> Robert Gates, “Landon Lecture, 26 November 2007,” Kansas State University Media Relations, <http://www.k-state.edu/media/newsreleases/landonlect/gatetext1107.html> (accessed 18 September 2010).

<sup>74</sup> David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 26.

<sup>75</sup> Ron Capps, “Call in the Civilians,” *Foreign Policy online*, posted 26 October 2009, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/26/call\\_in\\_the\\_civilians](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/26/call_in_the_civilians) (accessed 15 September 2010).

allowing DOD to work to its strengths.

*Build Regional Expertise within DOD.* Ambassador Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, has noted that “first and foremost, we must be sensitive to local political dynamics and avoid precipitous actions which exacerbate long-standing and often bloody conflicts,”<sup>76</sup> however, reviews of AFRICOM program implementation have cited numerous instances in which effectiveness suffered because of a limited understanding of the cultural environment and the inadequacies of the command’s existing training system.<sup>77</sup> As AFRICOM matures as a command, it will undoubtedly build a cadre of experienced soldiers, officers, and civilians on a par with its interagency colleagues. At the same time, this process could be expedited through an increase in the number of Africa Foreign Area Officers, increased opportunity for regional studies training and education, and official encouragement of French, Arabic, Somali, Swahili and other basic language skills. On the ground, AFRICOM leaders should encourage longer tour lengths on the continent and repeat deployments to build skills and relationships; avoiding a dynamic in which, according to an AFRICOM official, —CJTHOA hasn’t been around for seven years. Instead, it’s been around one year seven times.”<sup>78</sup> Flournoy and Brimley observe that “rapid turnover prevents the formation of effective relationships, ensures the continued dearth of institutional and cultural knowledge, and results in ineffectiveness and irrelevance at best, and strategic failure at worst.”<sup>79</sup> To this end, the Tufts University study speculates that individuals on longer tours are favorably received by recipient populations and asserts that, often, —it is the hearts

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<sup>76</sup> Carson, “Testimony,” *Examining U.S. Counterterrorism*, 5.

<sup>77</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *National Security: Interagency Collaboration Practices and Challenges at DOD’s Southern and Africa Commands*, GAO-10-962T (Washington, DC: GAO, July 2010), 15-17.

<sup>78</sup> Bradbury and Kleinman, *Winning Hearts and Minds*, 43.

<sup>79</sup> Flournoy and Brimley, “In Search of Harmony.”



and minds of the civil affairs teams that have been won, rather than the other way around.”<sup>80</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Unity of effort is essential to CT success on the African continent – the 2008 National Defense Strategy observes that —a whole-of-government approach is only possible when every government department and agency understands the core competencies, roles, missions, and capabilities of its partners and works together to achieve common goals.”<sup>81</sup>

The 3D approach adopted by AFRICOM and its partners in the pursuit of CT aims provides a framework to address a complex problem holistically, leveraging the unique skills and capabilities that exist throughout the interagency. As currently implemented, however, these efforts fail to fully capitalize on this potential. An approach that clearly defines agency responsibilities and monitors concrete measures of effectiveness – while at the same time balancing resources between 3D partners and building skills among those charged with implementation – will help to shift CT success in Africa from the tactical to the strategic level and will enhance the security of both the United States and its African partners.

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<sup>80</sup> Bradbury and Kleinman, *Winning Hearts and Minds*, 47-57.

<sup>81</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 2008), 17.

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