

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments



June 29, 2010

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OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

June 29, 2010

The Honorable Robert Gates
Secretary of Defense

Commander, U.S. Central Command

Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and
Commander, International Security Assistance Force

Lieutenant General David M. Rodriguez
Commander, International Security Assistance Force
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Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV
Commander, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, and
Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

This report discusses the results of a performance audit of the assessment system used to evaluate the capabilities of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). It includes ten recommendations for ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and three for NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) intended to improve the reliability of future ANSF assessments and to support U.S. and international efforts to develop ANSF capabilities.

A summary of this report is on page ii. This performance audit was conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181 and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. When preparing the final report, we considered comments from IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Copies of these comments are included in appendices II, III, IV, and V of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "John Brummet". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

John Brummet
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SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

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June 2010

Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments

What SIGAR Reviewed

The development of self-sufficient Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) capable of independently providing internal and external security for Afghanistan is a key goal of the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan. For the last 5 years, the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system has been the primary metric for measuring the development of ANSF capabilities against end-state goals. In late 2009, responsibility for the management of ANSF capability assessments moved from NTM-A/CSTC-A to IJC. This review—the first independent evaluation of the CM rating system since its creation in 2005—assesses (1) the reliability of the Capability Milestone rating system; (2) summary reports provided to decision-makers; (3) challenges to U.S. and Coalition assessment efforts; and (4) systemic ANSF deficiencies that have undermined efforts to develop unit-level capabilities. To accomplish these objectives, we conducted interviews with responsible U.S., Coalition, and Afghan officials; reviewed ANSF assessment documents from IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A; and visited 18 Afghan army and police units. We conducted our work in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan from October 2009 to May 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

What SIGAR Found

As the United States and international community aim to transfer security responsibility to Afghan security forces, having a reliable system for monitoring progress toward that objective is critical. The CM rating system has not provided reliable or consistent assessments of ANSF capabilities. For example:

- Measurements used in the assessment system have overstated operational capabilities.
- Top-rated ANSF units have not indicated a capability to sustain independent operations.
- The CM rating system has inadvertently created disincentives for ANSF development.
- ANSF capability reports have included outdated assessment data.

In addition to these weaknesses, serious challenges affect U.S. and Coalition assessment efforts, including security conditions, mentor shortages, and inadequate training. Further, systemic ANSF deficiencies have undermined efforts to develop unit capabilities. These include logistics problems, personnel attrition, inadequate personnel authorizations, infrastructure deficiencies, corruption, drug abuse, and illiteracy. In late April 2010, IJC replaced the CM rating system with a new unit-level assessment called the Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT). SIGAR has not yet assessed the CUAT system; however, the principles and recommendations in this report remain relevant to whatever system is in place for evaluating the operational effectiveness of fielded ANSF units.

What SIGAR Recommends

To improve the reliability of ANSF capability assessments, SIGAR is making ten recommendations to IJC to improve the measurement, validation, and reporting of assessment results; to increase visibility into Afghan police capabilities; and to counteract perverse incentives that have accompanied the use of ANSF assessment systems. SIGAR is also making three recommendations to NTM-A/CSTC-A to improve compliance with ministerial logistics systems, help offset the effects of personnel attrition, and improve operational effectiveness by extending driver training.

IJC concurred or partially concurred with all ten recommendations. NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred with all three recommendations.

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ACRONYMS

ADAB	ANSF Development Assistance Bureau
ANA	Afghanistan National Army
ANCOP	Afghanistan National Civil Order Police
ANP	Afghanistan National Police
ANSF	Afghanistan National Security Forces
AUP	Afghanistan Uniform Police
AWOL	Absent Without Leave
CE	Capability Endorsement
CUAT	Commander's Unit Assessment Tool
DOD	Department of Defense
FPDD	Focused Police District Development
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
IDR	In-District Reform
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOI	Ministry of Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTM-A/CSTC-A	NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
RC	Regional Command
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
INL	International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
TRAT	Training Readiness Assessment Tool
VTT	Validation Transition Team



Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments

The development of self-sufficient Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) capable of independently providing internal and external security for Afghanistan is a key goal of the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan. In the long term, a reliable system for monitoring progress toward that objective is critical, as the United States and international community aim to transfer security responsibility to Afghan security forces. In the short term, the development of ANSF capabilities is essential to the U.S. and Coalition counterinsurgency strategy, which calls for securing key population areas and relies on bolstering the Afghan people's confidence in their government. For 5 years, the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system has been the primary system for measuring the development of ANSF capabilities against end-state goals. In late 2009, responsibility for the management of ANSF capability assessments moved from NTM-A/CSTC-A to IJC. The Department of Defense (DOD) has regularly reported CM rating summaries for the Afghan army and police to the President of the United States and Congress.

This report assesses (1) the reliability of the CM rating system, (2) summary reports provided to decision-makers, (3) challenges to U.S. and Coalition ANSF assessment efforts, and (4) systemic ANSF deficiencies that have undermined efforts to develop unit-level capabilities.

To accomplish these objectives, we conducted interviews with responsible U.S., Coalition, and Afghan officials; reviewed ANSF assessment documents from ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A); and visited 18 Afghan army and police units located in Regional Commands Capital, North, and East, where we interviewed mentors, partners, and Afghan officials. We conducted our work in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan from October 2009 to May 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A discussion of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.

BACKGROUND

The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan depends on building that country's capacity to provide for its own security by training and equipping the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), collectively referred to as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Since 2002, the United States has provided over \$27 billion—over half of all reconstruction dollars—for ANSF training, equipping, and sustainment. Current ANSF force-generation goals, which were agreed to by the Afghan Government and the international community, call for 171,600 ANA and 134,000 ANP by October 2011.

Starting in 2005, the United States used the CM rating system to monitor and report on progress in developing fielded Afghan security forces, which consist of the Afghanistan National Army and Afghanistan National Police. The CM assessment system grades Afghan army and police unit capabilities on a 4-point scale in which a score of 1 is awarded to the most capable units and 4 to the least.¹ CM rating definitions generally designate CM1 units as capable of conducting their primary mission with limited Coalition support. That definition aligns with U.S. and international strategic goals; and in official statements, DOD and ISAF have said that, at the CM1 level, an Afghan army or police unit is expected to be capable of "independent operations."

As of March 29, 2010, IJC reported CM ratings for 150 Afghan army and 130 Afghan police units. As shown in Table 1 and 2, approximately 23 percent of those army units and 12 percent of police units received the highest rating, CM1.

Table 1: IJC's Afghan Army CM Ratings as of March 29, 2010

	CM1	CM 2	CM 3	CM 4	Total
ANA Units	34	53	48	15	150
Percentage of Total	23%	35%	32%	10%	100%

Source: SIGAR analysis of IJC data.

Table 2: IJC's Afghan Police CM Ratings as of March 29, 2010

	CM1	CM 2	CM 3	CM 4	Total
ANP Units	15	38	52	25	130
Percentage of Total	12%	29%	40%	19%	

Source: SIGAR analysis of IJC data.

Assessment methods for evaluating army and police units have differed. U.S. and Coalition military mentors and partners working with ANSF units have had responsibility for performing monthly CM rating assessments at the army *kandak* (battalion) level and the police district or precinct level.² Mentors guide and advise ANSF units. Partners do the same, but also share an area of responsibility

¹ The CM system has also been used by NTM-A/CSTC-A to rate the capacity of the Ministries of Defense and Interior; however, this report focuses exclusively on the assessment of fielded forces.

²As of April 2010, IJC moved to a 6-week assessment cycle.

with their assigned ANSF units, frequently co-locating and jointly training, planning, and executing operations.³

Under the CM rating system, police mentors and partners use a structured evaluation form called the Capability Endorsement (CE) checklist. CM ratings for Afghan police units depended on assessment of the following factors:

- personnel (including payroll and personnel systems),
- equipping (including maintenance, supply and property accountability systems),
- facilities,
- training, and
- proficiencies in security sector functions (including command and control, intelligence, and force protection).

By contrast, army mentors and partners conducted CM assessments using a less structured, more subjective approach submitted in various formats. CM ratings for Afghan army units were based on assessments of the following factors:

- personnel,
- command and control,
- training,
- sustainment,
- equipment on-hand,
- equipment readiness, and
- an overall assessment measure.


For both police and army units, after monthly assessment reports were completed at the unit level, they were gathered at the regional command level; results were then passed up to the ISAF Joint Command (IJC).⁴ At IJC, the ANSF Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB) had responsibility for performing quality control checks and for aggregating assessment data into a comprehensive briefing called the Transition Readiness Assessment Tool (TRAT). The TRAT included a final summary of CM results for each assessment cycle. (See figure 1 for CM assessment procedures.)

During the course of our review, changes were made to reshape the ANSF development program, including a realignment of ISAF's command and control structure. To achieve greater unity of command and improve operational effectiveness, General McChrystal, Commander of ISAF, established IJC in October 2009 and NTM-A in November 2009. IJC achieved full operational capability in November 2009, while NTM-A did the same in February 2010. As of April 2010, DOD reported that IJC Headquarters was manned at 82.5 percent and NTM-A/CSTC-A at 52 percent.

³ Mentoring and partnering typically occurs after training, once Afghan army and police units have been fielded.

⁴ The CM rating system was designed to be used at the army *kandak* (battalion) or police district/precinct level. For example, CM assessments of the abilities of army brigades or corps to operate effectively as a whole were not performed.

Figure 1: CM Assessment Procedures, as of March 2010



Source: SIGAR analysis of IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A information.

In late March 2010, IJC told us that plans were underway to replace the CM rating system completely. Since its creation in late 2009, IJC has had responsibility for the management of U.S. and Coalition mentors and partners for fielded ANSF forces, including the assessment of ANSF capabilities. As part of that responsibility, IJC introduced a new process by which Regional Commands report on governance, development, and security for priority areas of Afghanistan. As of February 2010, the new process still used CM rating results for measurements of unit-level ANSF capabilities. In late April 2010, IJC ordered the use of a new unit-level assessment system intended to replace the CM rating system called the Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT).

CAPABILITY MILESTONE RATINGS HAVE NOT PROVIDED RELIABLE ASSESSMENTS OF ANSF EFFECTIVENESS

CM ratings have not provided consistent and reliable measures of progress toward the goal of developing self-sustaining security forces for Afghanistan. Methods of measurement and validation used to generate ANSF capability ratings contributed to a lack of equivalence in CM rating results, in some cases obscuring accurate measures of operational effectiveness.

The CM Rating System Has Yielded Inconsistent Measures of ANSF Capabilities and Has Created Disincentives for ANSF Improvement

The inability of top-rated units to sustain their capabilities over time calls into question the effectiveness of the CM rating system as a reliable measure of ANSF development progress. Furthermore, the CM rating system created unintended disincentives for ANSF units to attain top-rated capabilities. Finally, similarly rated ANSF units have not always manifested similar capabilities.

Top CM Ratings May Not Indicate the Capability to Maintain Self-Sustaining Operations

Although the United States and ISAF have stated that the attainment of “self-sustaining operations” is a goal for ANSF development, units obtaining the top rating in the CM system, CM1, may not have the capacity to sustain the gains they have made. Our analysis of CM-rating histories showed significant levels of regression, or backsliding, in the capability levels of fielded army and police units. We evaluated monthly ANSF CM ratings for a 12 month period (February 2009 through January 2010) and found that 38 percent of army units (52 of 137 units) and 66 percent of police districts (67 of 101 districts) had regressed at least one level during that period. When we considered only those units that had received the top rating, CM1, we found that 39 percent of top-rated army units (20 of 51 *kandaks*) and 71 percent of top-rated police districts (22 of 31) had regressed at least one CM rating level. Of those units that lost their CM1 status, 11 army units (55 percent) and 4 police units (18 percent) had regained their CM1 status by the January 2010 rating cycle.

Police units, in particular, have had difficulty sustaining top-level capabilities. Officials from IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A, State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and DynCorp expressed concern about this trend, stating that CM1-rated police units require significant post-CM1 mentoring to sustain training results and stave off regression. Mentors and partners at police districts we visited reported similar concerns. For example, in February 2010, a Regional Command (RC) North mentor team, responding to written questions we provided, stated, “The ANP will simply stop doing what we asked them to do as soon as we leave the area. This is especially troublesome in areas of security and patrolling.” Police mentor and partner team assessment reports corroborated these concerns. For example, an October 2009 assessment report describing a CM1-rated police unit in Orgun, Paktika Province, stated that “The District has well trained ANP soldiers but this training needs constant reinforcement.”

Police districts have experienced regressions in their assessed capabilities, due to several factors, including attrition of personnel, reassignments, and a lack of sustained mentoring and partnering.

- *Attrition:* Heavy personnel losses have been a primary cause of capability regression in police units. Mentors, partners, and IJC officials stated that training has not been systematically

provided to new recruits brought in to replenish units, causing a gradual loss of trained personnel.

- *Reassignments:* Police mentors, partners, and Afghan commanders stated and assessment reports confirmed that reassignments of police personnel—often to provincial police headquarters—were commonplace and a significant factor in reducing police units’ effectiveness.
- *Lack of sustained mentoring/partnering:* A lack of sustained mentoring/partnering—a critical element in supporting the development of police units—has contributed to the regression of some units. IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A officials we spoke to cited NATO restrictions on mentors, mentor shortages, and conflicting battle space priorities as having contributed to this pattern.

The CM rating system itself has created disincentives for ANSF units to make progress toward a CM1 rating and, thereafter, to become independent of Coalition support. Mentor/partner support for ANA units at the top rating level has been minimized to re-prioritize support for lower-rated units; in the case of ANP units, it is withdrawn entirely. Not surprisingly, ANSF units dislike the prospect of losing U.S. and Coalition mentors and partners who bring with them force protection, expertise, supplies, funding, and prestige. According to ANSF mentors and partners and IJC officials, the potential loss of U.S. and Coalition support has been a direct disincentive to improvement on the part of Afghan units. In addition, IJC’s Validation Transition Team (VTT), which provides independent validation of CM1 capabilities for the Afghan army, warned against decreasing the size of mentor teams immediately following validation. The team reported that CM1 units generally had residual deficiencies that a reduced mentor team was not equipped to address, and that Afghan army units feared that attaining a CM1 rating would mean “you’re on your own.” For police units, full withdrawal of all mentors/partners has been programmatically intended, once a unit has held a CM1 rating through a period of monitoring. As of March 2010, only one police district—Baghlan-e Jadid in Baghlan Province—had graduated to that stage, with unfortunate results (see “Overstated Police Capabilities: The Case of Baghlan-e Jadid,” page 13). In February 2010, IJC Assessments officials stated that they recognized the CM system had inadvertently provided disincentives to development.

ANSF Units with the Same CM Ratings May Not Have Equivalent Capabilities

CM ratings for ANSF units have provided relative, not absolute, measures of unit-level capabilities. Based on interviews, observations, and reviews of assessment reports, we found that *relative* differences in units receiving different CM ratings were readily apparent. Specifically, units rated CM1 were generally more capable than those rated CM2, and so forth. However, we also found that similarly-rated units in different regions were not always comparable so that one could not assume that units with similar ratings would have similar capabilities. In particular, Afghan army units receiving similar ratings in different parts of the country exhibited disparities in actual capability. Variations were pronounced between army units being partnered compared with those mentored. We observed that the more intensive nature of partnering resulted in increased developmental benefits to Afghan units. Additionally, planning and executing joint operations through partnering allowed U.S. and Coalition forces to assess firsthand the effectiveness of Afghan army units during operations. Mentoring, by contrast, resulted in a different type of exposure, and NATO mentors were often restricted in their

development and assessment activities due to national caveats and guidelines that limited the scope of their activities.⁵

The Measurement and Validation of ANSF Capabilities May Have Resulted in Overstatement and Variability in Assessment Results

Measures used to determine CM ratings resulted in overstated operational capabilities and a lack of consistency in assessment results. Inconsistencies resulted from an emphasis on quantitative measures, biases in personnel inputs, variable rating definitions, weaknesses in assessment tools, and a lack of independent validation of police capabilities.

Emphasis on Quantitative Measures Has Sometimes Obscured the Assessment of Operational Effectiveness

CM assessments were biased by a dependence on quantitative inputs that in some cases obscured reliable assessments of operational effectiveness. Quantitative measures of readiness—such as levels of manning and equipping—can provide important gauges of progress toward force generation goals. However, CM ratings depended more heavily on the measurement of supplies and personnel available to a unit than on subjective evaluations of the unit’s ability to perform its mission effectively.⁶ As a result, CM ratings did not consistently provide reliable assessments of ANSF readiness. For example, our discussions with army and police mentors and partners revealed that in some fully supplied units poor leadership, corruption, and other factors had significantly diminished operational effectiveness. Conversely, some units lacking all authorized supplies demonstrated successful operational abilities.

Police CM ratings were based on results from a structured questionnaire, called the Capability Endorsement (CE) checklist system. According to police mentors and partners we interviewed, CM ratings for some units had been inflated by the CE form’s overdependence on raw numbers of personnel and equipment on hand. As a result, CM ratings resulting from use of the CE Checklist were not always reliable in indicating a unit’s capability level.⁷ In February 2010, a police mentor team leader in Kunduz Province, RC-North, responding to our questions, wrote, “The CM report spits out a rating that to me indicates a much higher level of competence than I am trying to report... The CM Rating does not provide an accurate assessment of the district. If your numbers are good, the form will spit out a high CM rating.”

⁵National caveats are limits imposed on the operations of international partners’ troops, to ensure those troops are used in a manner consistent with their national laws and policies. DOD has noted that the resulting limits on the operations of international partner forces may limit the ISAF Commander’s ability to utilize his forces (see DOD’s April 28, 2010 *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, p.17).

⁶Seventy percent of the measures listed on the CE Checklist, which until the end of 2009 was exclusively used for ANP assessments, are quantitative measures of manning, training, and equipping. The balance is an aggregate measure of answers to 156 YES/NO/NOT OBSERVED questions. Assessments of ANA units also have relied heavily on quantitative measures, which constituted 50 percent of the factors used in determining a CM rating.

⁷Commanders had the authority to upgrade or downgrade a unit after the generation of a CM rating using the CE Checklist.

Most CM assessments for Afghan army units were not created using the CE Checklist; instead, they were conducted using a variety of methods that had the potential to include more subjectivity. As a result, ANA ratings may not have been subject to the same reliance on quantitative measures. Nevertheless, our analysis of ANA TRAT data for March 2010 showed that of 35 CM1-rated units, 6 (over 17 percent) had the lowest possible “Equipment on Hand” rating, CM4, corresponding to a level of under 50 percent of equipment authorized. Furthermore, a NATO mentor who had worked with Afghan army units in RC-South stated that “the CM rating system as it was used in RC South in 2008-2009 was not a reliable predictor of Afghan army unit effectiveness. It had no relation to an Afghan unit’s ability to operate independently.”

One example of the effect of the CM system’s reliance on quantitative measures emerged during our field observations of Afghan army and police units. We found that army and police units, including those rated at the highest capability level, CM1, were fully supplied with vehicles but lacked a sufficient number of trained drivers.⁸ For example, Bati Kot, a top-rated police district in Nangarhar Province, had 10 vehicles on hand, but only 3 capable drivers, at the time of our visit in March 2010. CM assessments had taken into account only the number of vehicles on hand, but not the number of drivers available to operate the vehicles.

Officials at IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A agreed that the CM system’s reliance on quantitative measures had sometimes created misleading results. IJC officials stated that they expected upcoming changes to the ANSF assessment system and TRAT process to help remedy the problem by emphasizing qualitative aspects of assessment.

Personnel Measurements Have Overstated Operational Capabilities

Measurements of personnel numbers have been key quantitative inputs used to generate CM ratings for ANSF units. Although personnel levels have been measured differently for Afghan army and police ratings, both methods have resulted in overstatements of unit capabilities. For the army, personnel measurements constituted one of six input categories used to rate the capabilities of Afghan army units. However, personnel inputs used in ANA unit capability assessments did not reflect operational realities, as they were based on measurements of the number of personnel *assigned* to each unit, without also considering the actual number of soldiers *present for duty*. Due to substantial absences without leave (AWOL) and approved absence rates, this method of evaluation has falsely inflated measures of personnel readiness, contributing to an overstatement of ANA capabilities.⁹

The effect of substantial AWOL rates and approved absences has been significant. According to an IJC report, as of March 2010, only 74 percent of assigned personnel were present for duty in ANA-fielded combat units. The ANA’s manning shortage was confirmed in statements by VTT officials who reported

⁸ German mentors for the Afghan army’s 2nd Brigade, 209th Corps in Kunduz Province stated that a lack of capable drivers was one of the most significant impediments to the development of operational effectiveness.

⁹ MOD’s definition of AWOL includes those personnel absent from regular duty after 24 hours. MOD does not consider personnel late back from leave to be AWOL. Additionally, according to officials at NTM-A/CSTC-A, an MOD AWOL amnesty was in place for ANA personnel through the end of the last solar year, 1388. That amnesty allowed troops to return to the rolls without punishment.

that “foxhole strength” is often low, potentially reducing *kandak* (battalions) to company size.¹⁰ Our analysis of CM rating records showed that, as of March 2010, 99 of 150 ANA units (66 percent) received a top rating for personnel. However, even with a top rating for personnel, a unit may have a low number of personnel present for duty. For example, as of March 2010, the 1st *kandak* of the 3rd Brigade, 205th Corps, was granted a CM1 rating for personnel, based on a fill rate of 99 percent. Specifically, this *kandak* had 796 personnel authorized and 795 assigned. However, the same unit had only 469 personnel present for duty, giving it a present-for-duty rate of 59 percent, which would have corresponded to a CM3 personnel rating.¹¹

Police unit capabilities also have been overstated by personnel measurements, which are one of several quantitative inputs used to generate CM ratings. Personnel inputs for police unit assessments have incorporated measures of authorized, assigned, and available personnel levels. However, the number of “available” personnel does not correspond with those present for duty because it includes personnel detailed to other locations. According to statements by police mentor and partner teams and our review of police unit assessment records, reassignment has been a significant problem at the district level, leaving numerous police units without sufficient personnel to operate effectively. This challenge has been exacerbated by heavy requirements for manning static checkpoints and outposts, leaving very few police available for patrols and other mobile operations.

Data on police personnel, which have not been validated, may not be reliable, according to police mentors and partners. They reported that there was “no accountability” for Afghan personnel, including no way to verify personnel reports. Within each police district, personnel are often posted at widespread locations, making personnel monitoring particularly challenging in non-permissive security conditions. Officials from NTM-A/CSTC-A, IJC, Dyncorp, State/INL, as well as police mentors in RC-Capital, RC-North and RC-East, stated that ongoing monthly reporting of police personnel levels were not reliable. However, NTM-A/CSTC-A also reported that Ministry of Interior (MOI), with U.S. and Coalition support, had made progress in developing a snapshot inventory of police through an ongoing personnel inventory.

CM Rating Level Definitions Lacked Consistency

CM rating definitions have varied, inhibiting a common understanding of rating levels among ANSF mentors and partners conducting unit assessments. Rating definitions have changed as the assessment system evolved; however, we also identified contemporaneous differences in CM rating definitions. For instance, an IJC FRAGO (fragmentary order) dated November 30, 2009, regarding TRAT reporting contained full CM rating definitions for ANA ratings and references to CE form version 5.15, which contained a different set of definitions.¹² Furthermore, an ANA unit assessment report, completed shortly after the IJC FRAGO was issued, contained another definition of CM1 (see Table 3). ANSF mentors and partners reported that they noticed a lack of consistency in CM level definitions and were concerned that this would result in a lack of equivalence between assessments.

¹⁰ The ANA is transitioning from three to four line companies per *kandak*.

¹¹ Present-for-duty as a rate constitutes the ratio of present-for-duty personnel to assigned personnel.

¹² ISAF Joint Command, *Transition Readiness Assessment Tool Reporting*, HQ ISAF//FRAGO/42-2009, November 30, 2009.

Table 3: Varying Definitions for CM1

Source	Date	Document	CM1 Definition
IJC	Nov. 30, 2009	FRAGO 042-2009	“CM 1 unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at Battalion Level with coalition support required in Close Air Support (CAS) / Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) / Indirect (ID) Fires only.”
NTM-A/CSTC-A	Nov. 30, 2009	Capability Endorsement checklist form version 5.15	“CM 1. (Full Operational Capability - FOC) The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). Capability, in terms of DOTMLPF, is defined at >85%.” ¹³
Regional Command West	Jan. 10, 2010	ANA <i>kandak</i> assessment submission	“Level 1 unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations. Battalion Level.”

Source: SIGAR analysis of data provided by IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A.

Weaknesses in ANSF Evaluation Tools Yielded Inconsistent Assessment Results

According to ANSF mentors/partners, the CE checklist has weaknesses that have resulted in uncertainty among assessors and inconsistent assessment results. Mentors and partners stated that they often did not have a clear understanding of what was intended by each CE assessment question and were concerned that this may have affected assessment results. They also noted that high levels of non-response within the assessment tool did not prevent the generation of a CM rating level and were not noted in summary reports.

On November 30, 2009, IJC ordered all army and police mentors and partners to use the same assessment evaluation form: CE checklist version 5.15. Before that date, ANA mentors/partners used a less structured system of reporting, including more subjective narrative assessments. Even though the CE checklist, which was originally designed for use by police mentors/partners, was revised for use in ANA assessments, a number of questions inappropriate for ANA evaluation remained. For example, the form still stated “Is the unit aligned with the most current MoI approved payroll system and processes?” and “Does the ANP follow Afghan criminal law and crime procedure requirements for processing crime?” As of February 2010, according to IJC officials, very few ANA mentors/partners had adopted the CE checklist for use in assessing army units.

Other sources of variation in measurement methods have contributed to concerns about equivalence between ANSF evaluations. Due to the less-structured requirements associated with the original ANA assessment process (prior to December 2009), army mentors and partners provided a considerable

¹³U.S. military doctrine divides force development into domains: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF).

range of assessment submissions.¹⁴ Mentors and partners conducting ANP evaluations were using, at some points in time, entirely different versions of the CE checklist that assessed capabilities differently.¹⁵ In addition, some ANP assessment submissions included valuable, subjective narrative evaluations written by mentors and partners; however those were not required elements of an evaluation and were not consistently completed. Further, in our review of CE checklist submissions for ANP assessments, we noticed a wide range in the number of unobserved items on each CE assessment form. Officials at NTM-A/CSTC-A stated that, since the CE checklist's introduction in 2005, no attempt had been made to evaluate its internal consistency or other aspects of its effectiveness.

Police Units Have Not Been Independently Validated

VTTs independently validate ANA units before their designation as a CM1-rated unit. Applying uniform capability standards through an independent validation was intended to help standardize the assessment process and to capture lessons learned regarding ANA units and their development. ANP units, by contrast, have not been subject to independent validations. As of February 2010, 4 of 7 ANA-dedicated VTT teams had been reassigned to support the ANSF training mission. Thus, it was unclear whether sufficient resources would be available to extend the program to the ANP.

¹⁴ ANA assessment submissions we reviewed from mentors and partners included various formats, such as narratives in Word documents, Mission Essential Task List evaluations in Excel spreadsheets, and PowerPoint slide compilations.

¹⁵ For example, unlike version 5.x of the CE checklist, version 4.x did not assess ANP facilities.

SUMMARY REPORTS INCLUDED OUTDATED DATA AND OVERSTATED ANSF CAPABILITIES

Decision makers hoping to gauge progress in U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop capable Afghan security forces depend on summary reports of CM rating results. However, these reports have included outdated assessment data without indicating them as such. A lack of quality control measures and resources at IJC also contributed to weaknesses in the analysis and reporting of ANSF assessment results.

ANSF Capability Rating Reports Included Outdated Assessment Data

TRAT reports of ANSF capability ratings regularly included outdated assessment data due to missing submissions from ANSF mentors and partners, according to officials at IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and State/INL. Officials at IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A stated that monthly CM assessment submissions were typically missing due to: (1) a lack of mentors/partners to provide reporting; (2) turnover from one mentor/partner team to another; (3) technical problems in submitting reports from certain areas of the country; and (4) the reluctance of NATO police mentor teams to perform mentoring tasks, due to security concerns and national caveats.

In our analysis of IJC records for the ANP, we found that, from September 2009 through February 2010, as many as 44 percent of police district reports had been missing in a single month (see Table 4). In some cases, we found ratings that had been carried over for as long as 4 months. We were unable to perform a parallel analysis for ANA assessment submissions during this time period, as IJC was not able to provide a full set of ANA assessment records.

Table 4: Missing Police Assessments, September 2009 to February 2010

	Missing Police Assessments
SEP 09	12 of 63 (19%)
OCT 09	33 of 108 (30%)
NOV 09	23 of 108 (21%)
DEC 09	32 of 72 (44%)
JAN 10	7 of 89 (8%)
FEB 10	23 of 126 (18%)


IJC Performed Limited Quality Control over Assessment Data before Submitting Summary Reports

Although IJC/ADAB had copies of all submitted ANP assessment files, they did not have ANA assessments on file. This lack of access to the underlying assessment reports used to create TRAT summaries meant that IJC could perform only limited quality control and analysis of the assessment data. When we requested copies of all ANA unit assessments for October 2009 and January 2010, IJC/ADAB attempted to retrieve copies from the Regional Commands, but was unable to obtain a full set of files.

IJC performed limited quality control or analysis of ANP assessment results. According to officials at IJC/ADAB responsible for aggregating ANP assessment files, the complex data included in the assessments had raised concerns because it appeared to be unduly consistent from 1 month to the next. However, IJC/ADAB did not conduct any analysis of or quality control over the data within assessment files, due to a lack of resources.

Overstated Police Capabilities: The Case of Baghlan-e Jadid

IJC's March 2010 TRAT report included a CM1 rating for the Baghlan-e Jadid police district in the northern Afghan province of Baghlan. The district first reached a CM1 rating in August 2008 and, according to IJC, maintained that rating for 9 months until it graduated from the Focused Police District Development (FPDD) program in June 2009. However, the Baghlan-e Jadid police received no direct capability assessments after that period. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, full graduation signified that a police unit had reached a level of capability at which it was "able to function on its own" and would no longer be rated and monitored by U.S. or Coalition forces. At graduation, all U.S. and Coalition mentors/partners were removed. As of March 2010, direct assessments of the police in that district had still not been conducted.



Officials at IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A and State Department civilian police advisers and contractors all stated that, in the absence of any direct assessment, they had grave concerns about assuming that Baghlan-e Jadid had sustained its top-level capabilities. Explaining their doubts, officials cited increasingly challenging security conditions and the widespread tendency for other police districts to regress due to the lack of continuous mentoring/partnering and heavy attrition. An NTM-A/CSTC-A official stated that two other ANP districts had progressed to the stage just before graduation, but regressed after their original police mentor teams were withdrawn. IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A officials agreed that reporting on districts not receiving monitoring in parallel with actively evaluated districts was misleading.

In February 2010, our team requested support for a visit to the Baghlan-e Jadid police district. U.S. police mentors working in Regional Command North stated that they could not support our request because the police district was "not secure." We also consulted IJC officials who said that the district was "overrun with insurgents." One IJC official commented, "Unfortunately, [FPDD] graduation has become synonymous with CM1 (a super CM1 if you will) that doesn't exist at all in reality." He added that in his opinion the Baghlan-e Jadid police force had "withered away to the point that it barely functions." Another U.S. military official, operating from within RC-North said, "I doubt CM1. Most of their police officers do not even have uniforms, nor has the majority received basic training, either."

In February 2010, IJC officials told us that Baghlan-e Jadid would be part of a new focus of intensive work to improve certain priority districts around the country.

DOD Reported Capability Ratings for Afghan Police Units That Had Not Been Assessed by Mentors or Partners

Afghan police TRAT summary reports we reviewed only included CM ratings for police units that had been assessed by mentors or partners. However, in some reports to Congress, DOD reported capability ratings for more police units than had actually been assessed. Units that had not been assessed were reported by DOD at the CM-4 level. In biannual reports to Congress, prior to April 2010, Defense reported capability ratings for as many as 559 ANP units.¹⁶ However, as of March 2010, only 229 police units were being directly mentored or partnered and assessed using the CM system, according to IJC reports. IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A officials agreed that the charts included in DOD's June 2009 and October 2009 reports to Congress on *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan* included CM ratings for units that had not been assessed. Regarding this matter, OSD told us that the DOD reports had relied on data from CSTC-A which included CM-4 ratings for units that had been provided equipment or training, but had not been assessed by mentors or partners. According to IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, a continued shortage of mentors had limited police development efforts to the subset of police districts identified as most important to achieve campaign plan goals and in which FPDD or In-District Reform (IDR) training had been provided and police mentors/partners were present. Because the system for ANSF assessment was under review, DOD did not include an ANP ratings chart in its April 28, 2010, report to Congress.¹⁷

During our field work, we found that a number of police units were being mentored but not assessed. Mentors were assigned to these districts but no assessment reports had been filed because the ANP unit had not received FPDD or IDR training. IJC was unable to state how many police units were being mentored but not assessed, but officials at Regional Commands South and West identified at least 14 police districts in which this was the case.

The CM assessment system relies solely on the reports of military mentors/partners. However, civilian contractors have provided training and mentoring of police units in districts where military personnel are not assigned. According to an IJC official, in these districts, IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A did not track the development of police units. For instance, contractors have provided training and mentoring for specialized police units, including Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Afghan Border Police, and Counter-Narcotics Police, none of which had been routinely assessed.

¹⁶ The ANP includes the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), as well as specialized units such as counterterrorism and counternarcotics police.

¹⁷ DOD is required to report to Congress every 180 days, in accordance with sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended.

U.S. AND COALITION ASSESSMENT EFFORTS HAVE FACED CHALLENGES

A variety of factors affect U.S. and Coalition efforts to assess ANSF capabilities and the consistency and quality of assessments. Key challenges have included poor security conditions, shortages of police mentors, and inadequate training of mentors and partners in assessment methods.

Security Conditions Have Affected Mentor and Partner Assessment Efforts

According to IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and State/INL officials and Dyncorp civilian police advisers, Afghanistan's non-permissive security environment has been a significant challenge for ANP mentoring and assessment. Increased security demands in many areas of the country have required a heavy troop presence to provide effective mentoring or partnering after basic police training. Mentoring or partnering has been more risky for ANP than for ANA units, given IED (improvised explosive device) threats to ground movements and the greater dispersion of police units, which has required mentor teams to "commute" to work. Furthermore, since ANP units tend to be relatively small compared with ANA units, ANP mentor/partner teams have lacked the backup protection afforded to ANA mentors/partners by their co-location with large units of ANA personnel.

ANP mentoring and assessment has been significantly limited and sometimes ineffective in areas where enemy activity is intense. In some cases, force protection resources were insufficient to allow for movement; in others, mentoring and assessment duties were challenged by the conflicting priorities of commanders. According to a July 2009 report by civilian police advisers in Wazi Zadran police district of Paktia Province, the mentor team's movements were restricted due to diminished manning and challenging security conditions. The report stated that mentors had not been able to visit the police unit for months, observing, "Mentoring ultimately turned into a few comments or statements put over the radio to the District Center." Narratives within U.S. and Coalition police assessment reports also noted security concerns, citing security-related operational constraints as a challenge to mentoring and assessment. The October TRAT participants noted that mentors had experienced difficulties in gaining access to police posts, with some locations accessible only by air.

IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A officials said that mentor/partner performance had a significant effect on development and assessment practices. Anecdotal evidence pointed to variation in mentor/partner efforts, but IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A did not attempt to assess performance systematically, according to these officials. TRAT reports and officials at IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A raised specific concerns about variations in the quality and extent of the mentoring performed by NATO mentor/partner teams, citing national caveats and guidelines as constraining factors that had limited the efforts of some NATO teams.

Mentor and Partner Shortages Have Reduced the Effectiveness of Mentoring and Assessment

The ANSF training mission has been challenged by longstanding mentor/partner shortfalls, which are likely to remain an issue as ANSF growth continues. Shortfalls have been particularly severe with regard to the ANP development effort, constraining the expansion of police training programs as well as the effectiveness of police mentoring/partnering after basic training. As of March 29, 2010, IJC reported that, while all U.S. commitments for mentor/partner teams had been fulfilled, NATO had failed to deploy the 38 army mentor/partner teams and 163 police mentor/partner teams required to meet the demands of current force development goals. IJC officials told us they could not provide an estimate of these shortfalls in terms of actual numbers of personnel required, since no mandatory personnel size

requirement had been defined for NATO mentor and partner teams. Nevertheless, according to an April 2010 Department of Defense report, a typical NATO mentor/partner team consists of 40 personnel.¹⁸ That report also noted, “Without sufficient mentors and trainers, our ability to effectively grow and develop the ANSF is at risk.”

According to IJC officials, ANSF assessments had been submitted each month without any evaluation of the level of access mentors and partners had to their assigned units. Although they lacked systematic measurements, officials at IJC/ADAB and State/INL said they knew that CM ratings for some ANP units had been submitted without sufficient mentor or partner contact to support the assessment results. Mentor and partner teams we interviewed agreed, saying they were typically overstretched, responsible for mentoring/partnering with numerous ANSF units, and that they sometimes had to neglect certain ANSF units over others. An October 2009 police mentor report from Moqur, in Ghazni Province, acknowledged that low mentor coverage at that district made the rating suspect and their ability to advise and assist problematic. In another example, one Kabul police mentor team that received an additional assignment to train a problematic ANA *kandak*, resorted to occasionally calling its police districts rather than observing them directly. The team had continued to submit CM assessments under these conditions but said that its ability to mentor and assess effectively had been seriously impaired.

Mentors and Partners Lack Adequate Training

Military personnel serving as ANSF mentors and partners lack adequate training to support their mission, according to mentor and partner teams and IJC/VTT officials. ANP mentors stated that they found that they were unprepared for their duties and unfamiliar with MOI regulations concerning ANP operations. Mentors/partners reported that insufficient guidance and training made it difficult to assess police districts’ compliance with MOI decrees and guidance, as required in numerous questions on the CE checklist. In response to our written questions, mentors in RC-North reported, “The fundamental lack of training of [police mentor teams] in essential MOI decrees, procedures, and common problems hampers the [police mentor team’s] ability to provide meaningful information and the lack of a comparable standard creates a large degree of subjectivity from one team to the next.” According to IJC/VTT, army mentors have faced similar challenges, including the lack of training on ANA systems and Ministry of Defense (MOD) decrees and guidance.

To support ANSF assessors’ use of the CE checklist, NTM-A/CSTC-A produced a video training program and an instruction manual. However, the mentors/partners we interviewed criticized the video and other materials, stating that they were focused on technical aspects of completing the form, rather than on assessment practices. The assessors said that to improve the quality and consistency of their evaluations they needed additional guidelines to enhance their understanding of assessment criteria and best practices.

¹⁸ DOD, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, April 2010, p. 17.

SYSTEMIC ANSF DEFICIENCIES HAVE UNDERMINED EFFORTS TO DEVELOP UNIT CAPABILITIES

Systemic ANSF deficiencies have undermined progress toward developing independent Afghan security forces. These deficiencies include logistics problems, personnel attrition, inadequate personnel authorizations, infrastructure challenges, corruption, and drug abuse and illiteracy. In commenting on a draft of this report, NTM-A/CSTC-A stated it is aware of these deficiencies and is working to address them (see appendix III).

Severe Logistics Problems Challenge the Development of Self-Sustaining Operations

Deficiencies in ANSF logistics have challenged U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop independent army and police forces for Afghanistan. The CM assessment system has included measures designed to evaluate an army or police unit's ability to carry out logistics functions crucial to self-sustainment. However, officials of IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A, State/INL, ANSF partners and mentors, VTT teams, employees of DynCorp, and Afghan army and police commanders uniformly described above-unit-level problems with logistics support functions as significant impediments to the development of self-sufficient ANSF units. At every ANSF unit we visited, army and police alike—including top-rated CM1 units—we found logistics supply problems directly interfering with unit operations. Army and police mentors and partners for all 18 units we visited reported that logistics support was a severe problem and supply-request systems non-functional. Assessment reports we reviewed for other units echoed this concern. Mentors and partners reported vanishing supply requests, hoarding at provincial and Corps levels, and an inability to track supply-request forms through the ministerial supply chain systems.

Police mentors and partners told us that logistics failures were not only affecting operational effectiveness and life support, but also challenging efforts to develop ANSF confidence in ministerial leadership and draining ANSF morale. Police mentors in Kunduz Province wrote in a February 2010 statement, "The logistics system does not function to any acceptable level... [We] would hesitate to state that a logistics system even exists." In another example, an ANP mentor in RC-North noted, "I would think [the ANP] would be much more eager to be independent of coalition support if they thought their own system was functional at all. If their own chain of command is broken, what motivation is there to have us leave? Right now we are the source of all repairs and most other logistics support."

ANA mentors and partners also reported severe deficiencies associated with the MOD supply system. NATO mentors in Kunduz Province described the system as a "fill or kill" process in which requests are submitted, and then disappear. In other cases, they said supplies were pushed down from MOD, and thus were not responsive to the units' needs. A November 2009 assessment report on a CM1-rated army unit, the 1st *kandak* 2nd Brigade of the 203rd Corps, reported that the supply process was a failure. The *kandak* received no feedback on the status of its supply requests and was primarily dependent on U.S. soldiers to remedy supply issues.

NTM-A/CSTC-A agreed that logistics challenges are of great concern and stated it has taken a variety of steps to address known shortcomings, including making plans to field and develop additional ANSF logistics enablers beginning in FY 2011.

Heavy Personnel Attrition Diminishes Training Gains and Operational Effectiveness

Heavy attrition in the Afghan military and police forces has undermined developmental gains in many units, by reducing the number of trained personnel available for operations. As of March 2010, the ANA's AWOL rate was 12 percent and, as of May 2010, the ANP had an overall attrition rate of over 17 percent. Those losses, coupled with high levels of approved absence and frequent reassignments, have left many units with insufficient personnel to permit effective operations. For example, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A, as of February 2010, solar-year-to-date attrition in ANCOP—"the premier force in the ANP," according to DOD—was about 73 percent. One ANCOP battalion in RC-West had an attrition rate of 140 percent over that period.¹⁹ The attrition rate for Afghan Border Police over the same period was 27.4 percent, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A.

In many Afghan Uniformed Police units, attrition has drained a large proportion of those originally trained in the FPDD program. We found numerous examples of this within ANP assessment reports. In one instance, in July 2009, mentors reported that at Waza Zadran police district in Paktia Province there were only 6 ANP personnel in place, compared with the *tashkil* authorization of 53 officers. That district completed FPDD training in April 2008, when 23 students were trained, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A's records. Mentors said this severe attrition was largely due to actions taken by powerful anti-coalition forces and disappointment over pay levels. NTM-A/CSTC-A documents we reviewed showed that Waza Zadran had attained a top-level capability rating and had even been slated for graduation from the FPDD program, as late as April 2009. However, by February 2010, the district had dropped to the lowest rating level, CM4.

Inadequate Personnel Authorizations Have Inhibited Effectiveness

The goals against which ANSF manning levels have been assessed may not represent end states adequate to permit independence. Under the CM rating system, an ANSF unit could earn a top CM1 rating for personnel, if it had a full complement of personnel assigned, as compared with the ministerial *tashkil* authorization. However, according to mentors/partners and Afghan officials we interviewed, and assessment reports, some ministerial personnel authorizations have been inadequate to support effective operations.²⁰ For both army and police forces, the ability of units to support mobile operations, including patrols and quick reaction force operations has been limited by the number of personnel lost through attrition and reassignment and the number needed to man checkpoints and outposts.

Infrastructure Challenges Affect ANSF Morale, Security, and Operational Effectiveness

We identified widespread deficiencies in ANSF infrastructure, including problems directly affecting army and police operations. Facilities were often unable to support the basic needs of assigned personnel, lacking running water, electricity, and proper billeting and dining facilities. In many cases, police chiefs were choosing to use fuel to run generators, rather than conduct patrols. Facilities problems were directly affecting the morale and operational readiness of fielded units. We observed serious infrastructure issues at many units we visited, including those rated CM1. In addition to basic life

¹⁹ DOD reported in April 2010 that NTM-A/CSTC-A, Mol, and EUPOL have established an ANCOP Working Group to examine how to reduce attrition and improve the ANCOP program.

²⁰ Similar observations regarding insufficient police authorizations were recorded in the September 2009 DOD Inspector General report, SPO-2009-007, *Report on the Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces*, p. 112.

support issues, infrastructure problems have raised security concerns. At police units we visited, including those rated CM1, we observed examples of inadequate security perimeters and unsecured weapons storage areas. Mentor and partner reports frequently noted that facilities issues were holding back development and raised concern about units' ability to operate independently, without long-term solutions to facilities maintenance issues. An October 2009 assessment report from Dand Patan police district in Paktia Province noted, "Facility maintenance is critical... MOI must create a long term solution for this issue however if ANP are ever to become truly autonomous."

Mentors and partners acknowledged that widespread efforts have been under way by the United States and Coalition partners to help improve ANSF facilities. Nevertheless, they also reported pervasive delays in construction projects. Construction delays of over a year at the 2/209th brigade garrison project we visited in Kunduz Province had left four *kandaks* housed in temporary facilities, dramatically restricting training and operations.²¹ During our February 2010 visit, we observed Afghan army personnel coping with deep mud, freezing conditions, unsanitary shower and bathroom facilities, inadequate dining facilities, medically unsafe food storage, and sewage being openly discharged on the surface of the compound.

Corruption Has Undermined the Development of ANSF Independence

In addition to its corroding effect on public confidence in ANSF and thereby the Afghan government, corruption was cited by army and police mentors and partners as a key factor undermining developmental progress and morale at the unit level. ANP mentors and State/INL officials we interviewed expressed doubts about the validity of top ratings in certain police districts, due to the effects of corruption problems. Mentors and partners we interviewed and assessment reports we reviewed observed that ANSF corruption has affected the leadership of many units, disrupted supply chain operations, and diminished willingness to cooperate with mentoring/partnering efforts in some cases. For example, in a February 2010 TRAT report on ANP capabilities, RC-East commanders commented, "Corruption of Senior ANP Leaders continues to thwart all of our developmental efforts." RC-West commanders also weighed in, reporting, "Corruption is continuing to plague the Western ANP, and this includes an increase of influence by the [insurgents'] shadow government."

Corruption has had direct negative effects on daily ANSF operations in the following areas:

- *Supply chain*: Police assessments prepared in October 2009 and January 2010 cited multiple instances of Afghan police officials selling ANP materials, taking money from transport trucks at checkpoints, skimming fuel, and pilfering supplies, including weapons.
- *Fuel*: Corruption has affected fuel availability and distribution within the ANSF, and thus the operational effectiveness of army and police units. Problems with fuel accountability, including siphoning and selling fuel, were widely reported in police unit assessments and detailed for us on our visits to army and police units around the country. An October 2009 report on a top-rated police unit in Chaparhar, Nangarhar Province, stated that the lack of accountability for fuel

²¹SIGAR conducted a separate audit of contract performance and oversight for the construction of the ANA garrison at Kunduz. See SIGAR, *ANA Garrison at Kunduz Does Not Meet All Quality and Oversight Requirements; Serious Soil Issues Need to Be Addressed*, 10-09, April 20, 2010.

was the greatest issue in sending out patrols. A January 2010 report from Bala Boluk, Farah Province, described fuel-related corruption as a “perpetual problem.”

- *Illegal checkpoints:* Mentor/partner reports noted that in some places it was typical for Afghan police to “shake down” travelers for money in order to pass through districts.
- *Personnel:* Misuse and diversion of police personnel were cited in numerous police assessments as challenges to effective operations, weakening the present-for-duty strength of many police units.
- *Pay and rank:* Pay fraud and rank abuse were widely reported, although electronic fund transfer programs were credited with reducing payroll abuse in some police units. Reports of ghost police were common and RC-North police mentors stated that paying for promotion was commonly accepted among the ANP. Mentors in Ghowrmach police district, Baghdis Province, reported in October 2009 that, even though electronic fund transfer was not available for the unit due to its remote location, pay continued for absent police, those whose loyalties were suspect, and officers who had never worked in the district.

Corruption also has directly affected the ability of U.S. and Coalition forces to mentor and partner effectively with ANSF units. Mentors and partners we interviewed said corruption at the police chief or *kandak* commander level had undermined their efforts to develop ANSF units. NTM-A/CSTC-A stated that it has taken actions to combat corruption, including steps such as assisting MOI in conducting a Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI) and implementing Electronic Funds Transfer for ANSF pay delivery.

Drug Abuse and Illiteracy Continue to Challenge Operational Effectiveness

Drug abuse continues to be a problem for the Afghan army and police. As of February 2010, results from drug tests during a personnel asset inventory of the Afghan police force overall showed positive results for drug use in 17 percent of police tested. NTM-A/CSTC-A officials who assisted MOI with the inventory said that this rate was likely understated, and the March TRAT report noted that the inventory results for Ghazni and Paktika Provinces were returning an average usage rate for controlled substances of at least 50 percent, with the highest rates in more remote areas. In addition, assessment reports and mentors and partners at many of the army and police units we visited cited instances of drug and alcohol abuse. According to several officials with responsibility for ANSF development, an extreme case of drug abuse had occurred at an ANCOP unit of about 100 personnel based at Nimla Gardens, Nangarhar Province. There, according to eye witness accounts from U.S. military personnel, ANCOP personnel were openly using marijuana and were unwilling to conduct operations or even leave their compound.

Although steps have been taken to introduce literacy training for the Afghan army and police, high levels of illiteracy in both forces continue to hamper development. Army and police mentors/partners stated, and assessment reports corroborated, that illiteracy has constrained the development of support systems such as personnel management and logistics, including accountability for equipment and fuel. Widespread illiteracy was also cited as an impediment to the development of intelligence and navigation capabilities. In response to the problem of ANSF illiteracy, NTM-A/CSTC-A has made literacy training mandatory for all ANSF soldiers and police and continues to increase the number of literacy instructors.

CONCLUSIONS

Weaknesses in design and implementation of the CM rating system have led to variable results and have impeded a clear understanding of the operational effectiveness of ANSF units. The Department of Defense and ISAF have expressed concerns about the risk of using an assessment system that provides an ineffective measure of performance. Acknowledging the risk such a system poses, DOD reported in late April 2010 that General McChrystal was considering alternatives to CM ratings. According to IJC officials, the CM rating is being replaced with a new unit-level assessment system. Moving forward, it is critical that whatever assessment system is used to evaluate ANSF units should provide consistent and reliable reporting of operational effectiveness. Without such measures, decision makers will not have a clear understanding of the extent to which progress is being made in developing Afghan security forces capable of independently conducting operations, and ultimately securing Afghanistan.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We are including ten recommendations for ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and three for NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) intended to improve the reliability of future ANSF assessments and to support U.S. and international efforts to develop ANSF capabilities.

Recommendations for IJC:

To improve measurement and validation techniques in order to obtain more reliable assessments of ANSF operational effectiveness, we recommend that IJC:

1. Place greater emphasis on subjective assessment of overall operational capability provided by mentor and partner team evaluators, including a requirement to complete narrative observations.
2. Support the completion of meaningful and consistent evaluations, by developing a manual for mentor and partner team assessors that incorporates real-world examples and best practices.
3. Work with NTM-A/CTSC-A to provide additional training and guidance to mentor and partner teams regarding the nature of MOI and MOD decrees and procedures.
4. Encourage an equivalent understanding among raters of different ANSF units by ensuring rating-level definitions are consistent.
5. Incorporate present-for-duty figures as a percentage of assigned personnel into assessments for both police and army units. Note: Until reliable present-for-duty numbers are available for police units, we recommend that IJC incorporate a separate measurement for tracking "available" personnel who have been detailed to other locations (i.e., available, but not present).
6. Conduct independent validations of top-level Afghan police unit capabilities.

To improve the transparency and accuracy of ANSF assessment reporting, we recommend that IJC:

7. Begin to systematically track the number of unit-level evaluations not submitted each month and the number of elements not observed within those assessments.
8. Add an additional overall rating level to represent units “not assessed” where no mentor/partners are assigned.

To maximize visibility into Afghan police capabilities, we recommend that IJC:

9. Require all U.S. and Coalition military mentor and partner teams to submit unit assessments and that IJC begin requesting unit assessments from civilian advisers in those districts where military mentors/partners are not assigned.

To counteract perverse incentives resulting from the application of the ANSF assessment system, we recommend that IJC

10. Evaluate, in conjunction with NTM-A/CSTC-A, MOI, and MOD, the creation of an incentive system to reward Afghan units for the development of validated, top-level operational capabilities.

Recommendations for NTM-A/CSTC-A:

To help develop compliance with ministerial logistics systems and increase the transparency of ANSF logistics operations, we recommend that NTM-A/CSTC-A:

1. Work with MOI and MOD to implement functional tracking systems for monitoring supply requests.

To counterbalance the effects of attrition in FPDD units, we recommend that NTM-A/CSTC-A:

2. Develop a program to systematically provide backfill training for new recruits assigned to previously-trained FPDD districts.

To facilitate the training of as many drivers as possible and improve operational effectiveness at the unit level, we recommend that NTM-A/CSTC-A:

3. Implement a train-the-trainer driving program to allow each ANSF unit (district or *kandak*) to extend driver training using its own personnel.

COMMENTS

IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A, OSD Policy, and OSD Personnel and Readiness provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments are provided in appendix II, III, IV, and V, respectively, along with our response to the comments.

In its response, IJC concurred or partially concurred with ten recommendations. As noted in our report, in April 2010, IJC adopted a new ANSF assessment system. IJC stated in its response to our report that it intended to address our recommendations as part of its implementation of that new system, the Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT). IJC disagreed with two recommendations, which we have removed from the final report because IJC's responses fulfilled the spirit of our recommendations. In commenting on a draft of our report, IJC said our report should have great utility and described our work as accurate, well-informed, and comprehensive.

In its response, NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred with our recommendations, but suggested that our report included information that was out of date. Our audit work was conducted from October 2009 through May 2010 and relied on interviews and information collected over that entire period, including field observations of 18 ANSF units made during February and March 2010 and detailed reviews of ANSF assessment documents dated through March 29, 2010. NTM-A/CSTC-A provided additional information regarding progress in ANSF development, including its *180 Day Internal Review and Way Forward*, dated May 29, 2010. Lieutenant General Caldwell, Commander of NTM-A and CSTC-A, stated that the additional materials contain important information regarding NTM-A/CSTC-A's efforts and challenges ahead.

In its response, OSD Policy provided additional information, including clarification about the nature of DOD reports to Congress and comments regarding DOD's concerns about the CM system. We included some of this information in our report.

OSD Personnel and Readiness also commented on our report, and provided additional information regarding the history of efforts to improve ANSF assessments, including details on OSD's involvement in attempting to address reliability and integrity problems with the CM rating system. We have included the additional information provided in appendix V of our report.

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction's review of the assessment system used to rate ANSF capabilities.

To evaluate the reliability of the CM rating system, we reviewed documentation from and conducted interviews with responsible officials from IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A, State/INL, OSD/Policy, Embassy Kabul, CENTCOM, DynCorp, MPRI, Border Management Taskforce, Provincial Reconstruction Team Kunduz, Task Force Mountain Warrior, RC-East ANSF Development Section, Afghan army and police commanders. Additionally, to obtain firsthand evidence regarding the capabilities of fielded Afghan army and police units and the evaluation of those capabilities at the *kandak* and district/precinct level, we performed direct observations at 18 Afghan army and police units in the following locations: Afghan Uniformed Police Kabul Districts 1, 3, 7 and 11; Aliabad Police District, Kunduz Province; Kunduz City Precincts 2, 3, and 4 plus associated checkpoints and outposts; Kameh Police District, Nangarhar Province; Bati Kot Police District, Nangarhar Province; Provincial Police Headquarters Nangarhar Province; ANCOF 3rd *Kandak* Headquarters, Nangarhar Province; OCC-P Nangarhar Province; ANA 2nd BDE, 209th Corps, including 3 infantry *kandaks* and one CSS *kandak*; and ANA 3rd BDE, 201st. At all locations, to understand challenges facing assessment efforts and concerns regarding the assessment system we interviewed mentors and partners—including U.S. and Coalition forces—assigned to work with the Afghan units. Our interviews with NATO mentors and partners included military personnel from Germany, Belgium, and Canada. At every army and police unit we visited, we also interviewed Afghan officials. To understand the role of civilian police advisers in ANP mentoring/partnering and evaluation, we met with officials of State/INL in Washington, D.C. and Kabul, as well as officials of DynCorp in Afghanistan. We also met with MPRI, to obtain information about that company's role in supporting ANSF development, including systems.

To examine ANSF assessment procedures, including methods of analysis and reporting, we held several meetings each with officials from NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ5 and IJC Assessments. We also met on several occasions with IJC's ANSF Development Assistance Bureau to understand the system by which assessment reporting has been processed at IJC. We also met with the ANSF Development Section for RC-East, and the ANSF Coordinator for Taskforce Mountain Warrior in Nangarhar Province. To examine ANSF development efforts as they related to assessment practices, in Kabul, we met with NTM-A/CSTC-A's Command Training Advisory Group—Army and Command Training Advisory Group—Police, NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ7 (Force Integration and Training), NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ5, NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ1, and the Border Management Task Force. We met with NTM-A/CSTC-A's Office of Security Cooperation regarding efforts to improve weapons accountability. We also attended TRAT meetings at Camp Phoenix and IJC HQ, in October 2009 and February 2010 and conducted 2 meetings with members of IJC's Validation Transition Team, in October 2009 and February 2010.

We performed documentary reviews of TRAT reports for both the Afghan army and police for each month from October 2009 through March 2010. We also reviewed, for qualitative and quantitative information, 87 CE Checklist file submissions for Afghan police districts or precincts as submitted in October 2009, and 113 such files as submitted in January 2010. We were unable to obtain a comparable set of Afghan army assessment submission files, but reviewed an incomplete sample of assessment submissions representing examples from October 2009, November 2009, and January 2010. Our review also included 96 narrative district reports regarding Afghan Uniformed Police units, prepared by

DynCorp civilian advisors. To determine the extent of regression amongst ANSF units, we reviewed all available CM ratings for ANA and ANP units from February 2009 through January 2010. We counted the occurrence of rating-level regressions during this period, looking at declines from any level and also counting declines from the CM1 rating level. Since our analysis required at least two data points for comparison, we included only those ANA and ANP units that had at least two CM ratings during this period.

To examine the effects of challenges on U.S. and Coalition assessment efforts and to examine systemic , ANSF deficiencies that have undermined efforts to develop unit-level capabilities, we reviewed documentation from and conducted interviews with responsible officials from IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A, State/INL, DynCorp, Task Force Mountain Warrior, RC-East ANSF Development Section, U.S. and Coalition army and police mentors and partners, and Afghan army and police commanders. We also made observations while visiting the ANSF units listed above. We also performed detailed reviews of assessment records for both Afghan army and police units, as detailed above.

We conducted work in Afghanistan and Washington, D.C., from October 2009 through May 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The audit was conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

APPENDIX II: COMMENTS FROM ISAF JOINT COMMAND



Headquarters
International Security Assistance Force Joint Command
Kabul, Afghanistan
APO AE 09354

IN REPLY REFER TO
IJC CMD GRP

15 June 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN
RECONSTRUCTION

SUBJECT: ISAF Joint Command Comments on SIGAR Draft Report on Afghan National
Security Forces Assessments

Enclosed are the ISAF Joint Command's comments on the subject report. We appreciate the effort your team put in to produce their well-informed and comprehensive audit of this critical process. Thank you for providing this opportunity to review and comment on their work.

As a point of clarification concerning the NTM-A response to SIGAR, IJC is not considering phasing out Focused Police District Delivery (FPDD) training. The FPDD program is critical to training the thousands of police officers who are in the field without formal training.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "David M. Rodriguez".

DAVID M. RODRIGUEZ
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commander,
International Security Assistance Force
Joint Command

Enclosure:
1 – IJC Comments

SIGAR DRAFT REPORT – DATED June 2010
SIGAR Audit 10-11
"Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Forces
Assessments"

IJC COMMENTS
TO THE DRAFT REPORT

To improve measurement and validation techniques in order to obtain more reliable assessments of ANSF operational effectiveness, we recommend that IJC:

RECOMMENDATION 1. (page 19, SIGAR Draft)

Place greater emphasis on subjective assessment of overall operational capability provided by mentor and partner team evaluators, including a requirement to complete narrative observations.

IJC RESPONSE: *IJC concurs with and has implemented this recommendation. The new Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) was specifically designed to allow the partners and the commanders to provide subjective assessments in a narrative format.*

RECOMMENDATION 2. (page 19, SIGAR Draft)

Support the completion of meaningful and consistent evaluations, by developing a manual for mentor and partner team assessors that incorporates real-world examples and best practices.

IJC RESPONSE: *IJC concurs with and will implement this recommendation. IJC-ADAB has prepared a manual on how partners, mentor and commanders will use the CUAT and we will incorporate real-world examples and best practices in the revised version we are currently preparing.*

RECOMMENDATION 3. (page 19, SIGAR Draft)

Work with NTM-A/CTSC-A to provide additional training and guidance to mentor and partner teams regarding the nature of MOI and MOD decrees and procedures.

IJC RESPONSE: *IJC concurs with and will implement this recommendation. IJC will ensure that information concerning the nature, importance and location of MOI and MOD decrees is part of our RIP/TOA checklist and that OMLT/POMLT teams are provided this information when they receive initial training in theater.*

RECOMMENDATION 4. (page 19, SIGAR Draft)

Encourage an equivalent understanding among raters of different ANSF units by ensuring rating-level definitions are consistent.

IJC RESPONSE: *IJC concurs in part with this recommendation. IJC has established standard Rating Definition Levels (RDLs) for fielded force organizations. All partners, mentors and commanders are being trained on these RDLs. IJC assessments personnel have coordinated with and are in routine contact with NTM-A assessments personnel to ensure full understanding of our respective systems. IJC RDLs and the standards associated with them may not be appropriate for Ministerial Level assessments conducted by NTM-A/CSTC-A.*

RECOMMENDATION 5. (page 19, SIGAR Draft)

Incorporate present-for-duty figures as a percentage of assigned personnel into assessments for both police and army units. Note: Until reliable present-for-duty numbers are available for police units, we recommend that IJC incorporate a separate measurement for tracking "available" personnel who have been detailed to other locations (i.e., available, but not present).

IJC RESPONSE: IJC concurs with and has implemented this recommendation. The new CUAT collects present for duty information for both police and army formations. Note: Because not all police entities are partnered, IJC plans to take those units that are reported and determine an average present for duty percentage. This average present for duty will be reported until all police units are partnered and reporting present for duty figures.

RECOMMENDATION 6. (page 19, SIGAR Draft)

Measure the ratios of trained and certified drivers to vehicles on hand.

IJC RESPONSE: IJC does not concur with this recommendation. Although this specific issue is of concern at the tactical level, it is one of many such issues. Highlighting each of them by separate reporting fields would offer little value in understanding combat effectiveness across the force. Issues such as shortage of drivers can be (and are being) addressed in the appropriate RDLs for manning, logistics, etc., and can be brought to the attention of the appropriate-level commander through this means.

RECOMMENDATION 7. (page 19, SIGAR Draft)

Conduct independent validations of top-level Afghan police unit capabilities.

IJC RESPONSE: IJC concurs with and is exploring options to implement this recommendation. IJC is reviewing the mission, manning, and training of the existing Validation Training Team organization to determine their suitability for conducting independent assessments of top-level Afghan Police and Army organizations.

To improve the transparency and accuracy of ANSF assessment reporting, we recommend that IJC:

RECOMMENDATION 8. (page 19, SIGAR Draft)

Indicate the number of months since the last direct assessment when carrying over ratings.

IJC RESPONSE: IJC does not concur with this recommendation. The IJC does not intend to carry over assessments from one period to the next. The unit either has a current assessment or will be reported as not assessed. Carrying over ratings could have a misleading effect on the overall assessment process and could result in units feeling they do not have to maintain current assessments. In cases where a "not assessed" rating is assigned, the time elapsed since the last valid assessment will be readily apparent in that unit's data record over time.

See SIGAR comment 1.

See SIGAR comment 2.

RECOMMENDATION 9. (page 19, SIGAR Draft)

Begin to systematically track the number of unit-level evaluations not submitted each month and the number of elements not observed within those assessments.

IJC RESPONSE: *IJC concurs with and will implement this recommendation. The CUAT systematically tracks the number of unit-level evaluations not submitted each month and the number of elements not assessed during each reporting period.*

RECOMMENDATION 10. (page 20, SIGAR Draft)

Add an additional overall rating level to represent units "not assessed" where no mentor/partners are assigned.

IJC RESPONSE: *IJC partially concurs with this recommendation. The CUAT identifies units that were not evaluated and should have been, regardless of partnering status. The CUAT also identifies units that are part of the ANSF organizational structure but were not evaluated because they have not yet been fielded. We will examine the possibility and benefit of adding a mechanism for showing a unit was not evaluated because there was no mentor/partner.*

To maximize visibility into Afghan police capabilities, we recommend that IJC:

RECOMMENDATION 11. (page 20, SIGAR Draft)

Require all U.S. and Coalition military mentor and partner teams to submit unit assessments and that IJC begin requesting unit assessments from civilian advisers in those districts where military mentors/partners are not assigned.

IJC RESPONSE: *IJC partially concurs with this recommendation. IJC-ADAB does not have the authority to require all US and Coalition mentors and partner teams to submit unit assessments to the IJC. Some teams are under contract from the US State Department and some are partnered based on bi-lateral arrangements between the mentor nation and the Afghan government. IJC-ADAB does request assessments from these mentors and some have provided valuable insight, but there is no standardized format. IJC-ADAB will attempt to explain the CUAT process to all mentor and partner organizations and encourage their use of this standardized process but we currently lack authority to ensure compliance in all cases.*

To counteract perverse incentives resulting from the application of the ANSF assessment system, we recommend that IJC:

RECOMMENDATION 12. (page 20, SIGAR Draft)

Evaluate, in conjunction with NTM-A/CSTC-A, MOI, and MOD, the creation of an incentive system to reward Afghan units for the development of validated, top-level operational capabilities.

IJC RESPONSE: *IJC concurs with this recommendation. IJC will in coordination with GIRoA partners and ISAF HQ the feasibility of implementing a positive*

incentive program which rewards ANSF organizations that achieve top level operational effectiveness and transition to self-sufficient operations.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE REPORT

Broadly speaking, the recommendations in this report reflect actions that were already in progress when the SIGAR audit team visited IJC HQ, and upon which the team was briefed during their visit. It is reassuring that the SIGAR audit team has indicated positive support to such a wide range of IJC initiatives. The report should have great utility in bringing these actions to the attention of a broader audience.

The general picture painted in the report regarding the challenges to assessment of operational effectiveness of ANSF organizations, and the majority of the specific comments regarding the now-superseded TRAT/CE system, are accurate from the IJC's perspective.

APPROVED BY:
D. M. Rodriguez
LTG, U.S. Army
Commander, IJC

PREPARED BY:
M. L. Jones
LtCol, U.S. Marine Corps
HQ IJC DSN (318) 449-9032

The following are SIGAR's comments on IJC's letter dated June 15, 2010:

1. We removed this recommendation from our final report, as the actions IJC described in its response fulfilled the spirit of our recommendation.
2. We removed this recommendation from our final report, as IJC's description of its intentions fulfilled the spirit of our recommendation.

APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM NATO TRAINING MISSION-AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

HEADQUARTERS
NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

NTM-A/CSTC-A-CG

10 June 2010

MEMORANDUM THRU

Commander, United States Forces - Afghanistan, APO AE 09356
Commander, United States Central Command, MacDill AFB, FL 33621

FOR Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 400 Army-Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202

SUBJECT: NTM-A Response to Draft SIGAR Audit Report dated June 2010

See SIGAR
comment 1.

1. The purpose of this memo is to highlight the fact that the information in the Draft SIGAR Audit Report, dated June 2010, is based on data that is six months old. The findings in this report do not accurately represent the current state of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) training, or recognize the progress the Afghan national security leadership have made in reversing the adverse trends in the growth and professionalization of the ANSF that existed just six months ago. In light of the tremendous progress made, while still recognizing the significant challenges remaining, this report is not only inaccurate, it is potentially damaging.

See SIGAR
comment 2.

2. When NTM-A activated six months ago, the command faced several critical challenges: some training facilities were on the verge of shutting down due to severe Coalition manning shortages; the training focus was on quantity over quality; most Afghan National Police (ANP) were recruited and assigned, but seldom received any formal training; and ANSF recruiting and retention was lagging partially due to the inequality of pay in comparison to similar occupations. In the past six months, several substantial changes in the approach to training not only turned around the training effort but also created a sense of urgency to build a foundation this year for an enduring, professional ANSF. Changes in systems, procedures, and culture began immediately, but these take time for demonstrable progress to be realized. While the SIGAR audit was done over this period, the report does not capture the significant radically new processes which have led to the currently demonstrated progress. Discussing this new approach and the recently emerging trends will provide a more accurate context for those reading the report. It is imperative that the SIGAR report portray information in an accurate and timely manner, which unfortunately has not been done. A more accurate portrayal of the current situation and challenges ahead can be found in the attached 'NTM-A 180 Day Internal Assessment and Way Forward.' (supporting data slides are available upon request).

See SIGAR
comment 3.

3. Additionally, the report is critical of the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system. The command understands the SIGAR position that the CM rating system is not perfect in measuring the development of ANSF capabilities against end-state goals – no one claimed this as their

**NTM-A/CSTC-A
Response
Draft SIGAR Audit Report No. 10-11
Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments
May 2010**

desired outcome. In fact, the October 2009 DoD Report to Congress on the Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan clearly states that:

“It is important to understand fully what CM ratings measure and indicate. CM ratings simply depict the manning, training, and equipment of a unit. The correlation between CM ratings and operational capability to complete assigned missions is tenuous, and thus attempting to draw the conclusion that a CM rating is an indicator of the capacity for success in operations can be misleading.”

See SIGAR
comment 3.

In recognition of the failure of CM ratings to assess operational capability, NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC began in the fall of 2009 to reform the system to provide a better assessment of ANSF progress.

4. Attached are our comments on the draft SIGAR Report and our 180 Day Internal Review and Way Forward which together (1) provides some historical context regarding the challenges we have collectively faced as we build the ANSF in a counterinsurgency environment; (2) provides a sense of balance to the anecdotal and dated observations contained within the draft SIGAR report; (3) highlights initiatives that have been instituted and clearly illustrate the significant progress that has been achieved since the research was conducted for this audit, as well as our projections for future growth and the significant challenges ahead; (4) responds to specific observations, findings, and comments within the draft report; and (5) responds to the three recommendations at the end of this draft report.

5. Point of contact for this action is COL Jeffrey L. Kent, Senior ANSF IG Advisor/Command IG at DSN (318) 237-1076, email: jeffrey.l.kent@@afghan.swa.army.mil.



WILLIAM B. CALDWELL, IV
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

2 Encls:

1. NTM-A/CSTC-A Responses, 10 Jun 10
2. 180 Day Internal Review and Way Forward, 29 May 10

**NTM-A/CSTC-A Response to the Draft SIGAR Audit Report No. 10-11
Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments
May 2010**

Page 14, para 2: "JIC and NTM-A/CSTC-A officials said that mentor/partner performance had a significant effect on development and assessment practices. Anecdotal evidence pointed to variation in mentor/partner efforts, but JIC and NTM-A/CSTC-A did not attempt to assess performance systematically, according to these officials."

NTM-A/CSTC-A Response: NTM-A/CSTC-A believes that "mentor/partner performance had a significant effect on development and assessment practices."

Page 17, para 1: "Mentors and partners acknowledged that widespread efforts have been under way by the United States and Coalition partners to help improve ANSF facilities. Nevertheless, they also reported pervasive delays in construction projects".

NTM-A/CSTC-A Response: This draft report also references the SIGAR audit on the ANA Garrison at Kunduz, which they mention "persistent delays". It is important to note that the Kunduz project was a "fixed-firm priced" contract, and this section infers that there were construction cost over-runs, which was not the case. We exercised contract options due to accelerated growth of the ANA. The exercise of contract options routinely impacts a contract's completion schedule and the contract's price. Consequently, quite frequently construction contracts are not completed within the original schedule, since the original schedule is superseded due to exercising an option(s).

Page 17, para 3: Corruption has undermined the development of independent ANSF.

NTM-A/CSTC-A Response: ISAF and NTM-A/CSTC-A is well aware of corruption within the Afghan government and ANSF. Corruption is a difficult and inherent problem in this environment. However, both ISAF and NTM-A/CSTC-A are taking actions to combat corruption. MOI's conduct of the Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI) was their first major step in reducing corruption in the police force. Establishing a database of all ANPs allows MOI and NTM-A to eliminate double enrolled police and accompanying corruption, and allow for a more transparent organization. The PAI will provide a baseline for the police force to maintain accountability and eliminate corruption within the ranks. The process includes registration, drug-testing, re-vetting, weapons verification and obtaining biometrics information for 100% of the ANP.

Measures such as pay parity between police and the army, pay delivery, and pay accountability are a strong anti-corruption measure that has been implemented across the ANSF. The implementation of Electronic Funds Transfer, which pays personnel by direct deposit into bank accounts rather than cash payments, continues. Since one of the obstacles to across the board implementation of an EFT system is the lack of banks or ATMs in rural areas of Afghanistan, the testing of an alternative new technology has begun in select ANP districts. This cell phone technology "Roshan m-Paisa" will provide a method for ANA and ANP soldiers to receive a secure PIN code on their cell phone that allows them to draw their pay. These two methods streamline direct pay and account for 78% of all pay accounts, increasing monthly.

See SIGAR
comment 4.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A Response to the Draft SIGAR Audit Report No. 10-11
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Page 18, para 3: “Drug abuse continues to be a problem for the Afghan army and police. As of February 2010, results from drug test during a personnel asset inventory of the Afghan police force overall showed positive results for drug use in 17 percent of police tested.”

NTM-A/CSTC-A Response: NTM-A/CSTC-A is aware that drug abuse is a problem. However, they are working with the MOI to correct this problem. The MOI has developed a 4 pillar program of awareness, identification/testing, enforcement, and referral for treatment. During the recent PAI, MOI conducted testing of 97,000 personnel and continue testing in training centers with a goal of 100% tested by 2nd Qtr FY10. Mandatory drug awareness modules are being incorporated into courses at regional training centers (RTCs). MOI is assigning Islamic religious leaders to provinces to address the religious implications of drug use. Finally, we are soliciting contributions from the International Community for ANP Rehabilitation Facility under Ministry of Public Health.

Page 18, para 4: “Although steps have been taken to introduce literacy training for the Afghan army and police, high levels of illiteracy in both forces continue to hamper development.”

NTM-A/CSTC-A Response: Afghanistan’s illiteracy problem did not occur overnight, nor will it be solved overnight. This is a well known problem and likely will be for quite some time, but NTM-A/CSTC-A has initiatives to combat illiteracy. In past programs, literacy training had been voluntary, now we have made it mandatory for all ANSF soldiers and police. In addition, the number of literacy instructors has increased from 251 in November 2009 to 351 in May 2010, and is projected to have 1,011 instructors by November 2010. The number of students has also increased from 6,345 in November 2009 to 9,191 in May 2010. NTM-A/CST-A projects there will be 28,359 enrollments by November 2010. As the number of students is increasing, the number graduates is also increasing. The six months beginning in November 2009 to May 2010 was extremely successful, going from 0 graduates at the beginning of the period to 1,789 by periods end. The next six months are projected to be even better, with a projected 10,167 graduates by November 2010.

SIGAR specific recommendations for NTM-A/CSTC-A:

1. Work with MOI and MOD to implement functional tracking systems for monitoring supply requests.

NTM-A/CSTC-A Response: Concur and has taken steps to address this recommendation. This issue is of great concern to NTM-A/CSTC-A and rectifying the missing components in the ANSF logistics system will lead to greater trust, less confusion, and enhanced operational readiness throughout the ANSF. These issues, with others, were previously identified and are programmed into the next ANSF logistics decree review, update, and rewrite.

Although the establishment of the FSDs and RLCs has greatly increased the capability of the ANSF’s logistics operations, the existing ANSF logistics configuration has

**NTM-A/CSTC-A Response to the Draft SIGAR Audit Report No. 10-11
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multiple layers of bureaucracy hamper efficiency and effectiveness. For example a supply request require a minimum of seven signatures; due-ins and due-outs are only kept manually at stock record points; and the priority for materiel is new units which are issued to a level of 70% to 80%, due to attrition, before declaring them mission capable. Incomplete information in an undermanned bureaucratic system of scarce resources has resulted in turmoil, workarounds, consternation, and readiness issues.

NTM-A/CSTC-A has had to implement or accelerate policies and procedures to ease the grief. One of the policies is the "fill-or-kill policy" for supply requests for new units. If the materiel is not available the request is canceled for the shortage. This is expected to eliminate multiple requests for the same item when status is unavailable.

NTM-A/CSTC-A has started to field the Authorized Stockage Listing (ASL) for regional supply points that have been completed so as to provide materiel management capability at the local level rather than at the national level in Kabul. Another component in rectifying the problems is that NTM-A/CSTC will be fielding and developing additional ANSF logistics enablers beginning FY11. Finally, the accelerated growth and disparity of logistics maturity between ANA and ANP has put a burden on the supply system, where item lead times can be in the "years", causing new ANSF units and fielded units to compete for the same scarce resources. Even though it is a conscience US policy decision to develop an Afghan fighting force before a logistics force, NTM-A/CSTC-A is working with the ANSF to develop a reliable logistics system that the ANSF trusts.

2. Develop a program to systematically provide backfill training for new recruits assigned to previously-trained FPDD districts.

NTM-A/CSTC-A Response: Concur and has taken steps to address this recommendation. Prior to November 2009 most ANP were recruited and assigned, but seldom received any formal training. This model – *Recruit-Assign-Intend to Train* – was replaced with a new model that makes training mandatory for all police recruits. We anticipate that this new model, described as *Recruit-Train-Assign*, will improve quality. We have also instituted in the training base increasing numbers of specialized courses to develop quality skill sets necessary to support the fielded force. *Recruit-Train-Assign* will mitigate the decline in capability of FPDD districts as they lose police to attrition, since all incoming recruits will have received formal training prior to their arrival at their units. This model will eliminate the requirement for reform and IJC is considering phasing out FPDD after FPDD 12. Also, MOI has developed the new ANP Training Command designed to institutionalize training and bring unity of effort to the ANP training mission.

3. Implement a train-the-trainer driving program to allow each ANSF unit to extend driver training using its own personnel.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A Response to the Draft SIGAR Audit Report No. 10-11
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NTM-A/CSTC-A Response: Concurs and has taken steps to address this recommendation. Both the ANA and the ANP have implemented driver's training programs in their training centers. The ANA conducts driver's familiarization at the Consolidated Fielding Center in order to familiarize ANA soldiers with the vehicles assigned to their Kandak. Additionally, a five week driver's training course is taught at the logistics school. The ANA Logistics school also conducts a driving instructors course and driving basic course which they have graduated 113 and 231 personnel respectively. The ANP are taught to drive both the light pick-ups they are issued, as well as a smaller number are trained to drive the UAH's that are now being fielded to ANP units. To date, the ANP has trained 986 drivers through the UAH driver's training course. A consistent trend seen across the board is the very small number of recruits that join the army or police with the existing knowledge of how to drive.

APPROVED BY:
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PREPARED BY:
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NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

29 May 2010

SUBJECT: 180 Day Internal Review and Way Forward

1. Allow me to convey on behalf of the Afghan People and the International Community our sincerest thanks. You have done a truly incredible job in a very short period of time. Your tireless efforts over the last six months in working closely with our Afghan partners forged a comprehensive approach, underpinning what we collectively achieved. Each of you should be extremely proud of what you and our Afghan partners have accomplished—laying the foundation for an enduring legacy of security. Am proud to be serving with each of you and look forward to what we will accomplish as we work with our Afghan partners as one team.

2. Overview. In the first six months of NTM-A, we changed our approach to training and created a sense of urgency as we build a foundation for an enduring, professional ANSF. NATO and the Afghan security leadership made significant progress in reversing adverse trends in the growth and professionalization of the ANSF. However, we still have much to do. Building an enduring and self-sustaining force remains a distinct challenge and attainment of the growth objectives is not assured. While aggregate growth objectives appear on track, higher tempo operations combined with the onset of the traditional summer lull (Jul-Oct) in recruiting will significantly challenge our programs, both in regard to quantity and quality. The development of effective leaders and the persistent high attrition in specific components of the ANSF also pose major challenges. In looking forward, the probability of successful growth and development of the ANSF can be improved if our programs receive full Coalition and Afghan instructor manning, and if requirements of longer term ANSF growth and professionalization are carefully balanced against current operational demands in the field. To provide perspective, the review that follows will describe conditions at activation of NTM-A, detail the conditions at the time of writing this document, and explain in more detail our challenges and concerns as we move forward.

3. Conditions at Establishment of NTM-A. When NTM-A activated we faced several urgent challenges. First, some training facilities were on the verge of shutting down due to severe Coalition manning shortages. In November 2009, NTM-A/CSTC-A was manned at little more than 25%, and the trainer-to-trainee ratio for the Afghan National Army (ANA) was approximately 1:79, although the ratio was far worse (as low as 1:466) at some training locations. Second, the training focus was on quantity over quality; there were in fact few, if any, quality standards such that all trainees present on graduation day typically graduated, and the marksmanship pass rate hovered at 35%. Third, most Afghan National Police (ANP) were recruited and assigned, but seldom received any formal training. Fourth, ANSF pay lacked parity with comparable occupations, exerting a negative impact on recruiting and retention, and increased attrition. Finally, overall recruiting in the Fall of 2009 had dipped to near record lows.

4. Six Month Review. In the last six months and as International Security Assistance Force's strategic main effort, we have accomplished much to stabilize the Afghan training mission.

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Recently consolidated metrics capture the change in performance of NTM-A/CSTC-A programs between November 2009, now, and where we project them to be in November 2010. Most of our indicators are focused on inputs; however, we will work with the fielded force to better capture and measure outputs and outcomes.

a. **NTM-A/CSTC-A Manning.** Our Coalition manning improved to 70% overall and the instructor-to-trainee ratio to 1:29, but both remain significant concerns. In order to increase the probability of success and increase the quality of training, additional personnel are required. The U.S. provided bridging solutions, but NATO partners must begin to follow through on their pledges by late summer to have an impact this year. Manning shortages have an overall negative impact on training operations, with institutional trainer shortages at police training centers and ANA branch schools being the most serious.

b. **ANSF Quantity.** Training facilities have been expanded and throughput increased such that ANSF is currently on path to meet the end strength objectives of 109K for ANP and 134K for ANA by 31 Oct 2010. However, component elements of the ANA and ANP are at risk to meet their end strength goals, such as ANCOP (Afghan National Civil Order Police), and ANA units that have a high operational tempo may experience rising attrition. The traditional summer lull for ANSF recruiting exacerbates quantity concerns.

(1) **Recruiting Mitigation.** Faced with low recruiting in late 2009, it was apparent we would not make growth objectives. We worked together with Afghan leadership to implement several initiatives to mitigate low recruiting, to include pay raises, tripling the number of recruiters, and standup of a Recruiting Command. In addition, we contracted for a major Afghan media recruiting campaign, authorized a further increase in recruiters, and set up sixteen mobile sub-recruiting stations to coincide with the start of the challenging summer months.

(2) **Attrition Mitigation.** Aggregate attrition has been decreasing for the ANA and ANP over the last six months, but there is no assurance that this trend will continue, especially in those ANA and ANCOP units engaged in high tempo operations. Despite its small size, ANCOP is of particular concern given its key role in counterinsurgency operations and its proportionately large share of the overall ANP growth program. While down from highs of November 2009, the ANCOP level of attrition remains unacceptable and unsustainable at an approximate annualized rate of 70% (as determined by most recent measures taken in April of this year). To mitigate the effects of high ANCOP attrition, recruiting has been ramped up. Additionally, we are working closely with the fielded force to reduce attrition through several initiatives.

c. **ANSF Quality.** Several NTM-A programs have been reoriented to place a greater emphasis on quality, and progress has been noted in some areas.

(1) **Training Programs.** We focused early on marksmanship, raising qualification rates in ANA from 35% to 65% by May, and expanded driver training. Up until March of this year, most AUP were recruited and assigned without formal training. This model—*Recruit-Assign-Intend to Train*—was replaced with a new model that makes training mandatory for all police recruits. We anticipate that this new model, described as *Recruit-Train-Assign*, will

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improve quality. We have also instituted in the training base increasing numbers of specialized courses to develop quality skill sets necessary to support the fielded force.

(2) Literacy. At the stand-up of NTM-A, there existed minimal mitigation programs to improve the quality of the force, and these were voluntary. In the past six months we have significantly expanded and made mandatory across ANSF basic literacy programs. We see literacy programs as a major quality enhancement tool but also an incentive for recruiting and possibly retention.

(3) Leadership. ANA and ANP leader development courses have been developed, reorganized, and improved to support increased through-put requirements of the fielded force. Steps have also been taken to ensure higher quality and highly literate officers are distributed based on operational need, not cronyism or favoritism. To that end, the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA) instituted a transparent assignment lottery system that distributed graduates of the class of 2010 to all the fielded force, rather than predominantly in Kabul, which had been the case in the 2009 graduating class.

(4) Intelligence. While the initial cadre is relatively small, we have established the Personnel Security (PERSEC) vetting program for the Ministry of Defense (MoD) that will eventually expand to be ANSF-wide, to include the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in June of this year. With regard to improving the quality and capacity of ANSF intelligence programs, we assisted in the establishment of a network targeting and exploitation center, which will help the ANP combat insurgent and criminal networks, and thus complement recent new intelligence training programs that are already paying dividends.

(5) Sustainment. We have taken additional steps to improve the logistical and medical sustainment capacity of ANSF, examples of which include the standup of Regional Logistic Centers (RLC), a Medical Training Advisory Group (MTAG), and the establishment of educational and clinical standards for doctors. However, ANSF sustainment capacity remains a challenge due to the shortage of trained Afghan logistic personnel.

(6) Air Corps. Another early sign of increasing quality efforts was demonstrated in the expansion of the Air Corps, a highly technical community that must maintain high quality standards in both training and maintenance in order to safely operate. To that end, Afghan air capability was successfully expanded with the introduction of the first five of twenty planned C-27s, the first modern airframe in the Air Corps' inventory. The Air Corps established an Air School for education and training, in addition to increased capabilities in battlefield mobility, casualty evacuation, forward observer training, humanitarian support, and mission planning.

d. Ministerial Development. Ministerial development shows slow but steady incremental progress, an improvement when compared to the low level of systems maturity in early 2009. The MoD and MoI are moving towards Afghan-led ministerial operational capacity, but neither will be fully capable before 2012. A lack of quality leaders, middle-level staff, and efficient bureaucracy, however, pose challenges which we will mitigate through training and education programs, and experience gained by close partnering with CSTC-A advisors.

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c. **Anti-Corruption Efforts.** Our anti-corruption philosophy is not limited to prosecution only, but also seeks to promote policies and cultures that engender transparent and accountable practices. Important components of this strategy include “Pay by Phone”, Electronic Funds Transfer, and MoI mobile anti-corruption teams which have successfully conducted several investigations. Additionally, the establishment of an ANSF biometrics program, the development of merit-based promotion policies, and the NMAA lottery are all contributing to an environment of transparency.

5. Looking Forward: Challenges and Concerns.

a. **Leader Development.** Leader Development remains our #1 priority and is essential to developing a professional ANSF. Leadership deficiencies within the ANSF—across the spectrum from insufficient numbers of junior officers and NCOs, gaps in the midgrade ranks, to corrupt senior officers—pose the greatest threat to our Afghan allies. Significant efforts have been made to improve leader development programs, to include adding new and overhauling existing ANA and ANP leader courses. However, critical shortages in officers and noncommissioned officers, as well as qualified logisticians, persist. There is a need to continue to invest energy and creativity into ANSF leader development, and we will continue to focus on junior officers and noncommissioned officer programs. With regard to midgrade officers, to the degree we can, we will continue to assist our Afghan allies in the field to encourage the selection of officers based on merit and not cronyism. To help address senior officer leadership deficiencies, our ministerial advisors and flag officers will work with our Afghan senior partners to develop policies, practices, and law that will encourage upward mobility and the selection of senior officers based on merit. Along these lines, we will support the passage of legislation or policy such as the pending Inherent Law and related retirement programs.

b. **Attrition Impacts on Quality and Quantity.** As we executed our accelerated growth plans, it became apparent that a complex interaction exists amongst recruiting, retention, and attrition. This interaction affects our efforts to meet quantitative goals while maintaining adequate quality. Even if the attainment of recruiting goals and expanded training capacity allow us to meet accelerated growth objectives, attrition must be brought down or quality will suffer. Therefore, one of our major challenges is to balance these various demands. A natural tension also exists between today’s operational requirements at one end of the spectrum, and alternative long-term programs focused on growth, quality, and supporting institutions at the other end. An excessively long training and education program deprives the field of required personnel. We are mindful of that concern and modified programs accordingly. For example, we expanded recruit ‘throughput’ by modifying the daily program for police basic training (e.g., lengthening the training day which allowed us to reduce the length of the program from eight to six weeks, and thereby increase throughput). The number of professional development courses for army NCOs has also been condensed, and the three year police academy is being converted, for the next few years, to a six month OCS-type program. On the other end of the spectrum, the deployment of a large percentage of the existing ANSF in near continuous operations, and the challenge of rotating combat veterans to staff training institutions or manning ETTs in a timely fashion, risk retarding long-term professionalization efforts. Implementation of an effective and consistent operational deployment cycle (rotation between train, employ, reset), applied to both

NTM-A/CSTC-A-CG

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the ANA and ANP, could help reconcile the competing demands. Such a cycle, if consistently observed by Afghan rank and file, and augmented by a robust partnering program with Coalition forces, should contribute to increased retention, reduced attrition, and as secondary order effects, raise the quality of the force while meeting growth goals. Lastly, as will be discussed below, in order to maximize the probability of meeting both quantitative and qualitative objectives, training and instructor shortfalls must be filled when required.

c. Structure, size, and nature of the ANA/ANP. To build an appropriate security framework, and to produce the right balance and type of security forces, to include sustainment capabilities, NTM must remain adaptable. We must also closely monitor ethnic balance as we grow the ANSF. And, we will continue to assess the ultimate size of the ANSF and the ratio between army and police that best supports security requirements and the ability to transition the ANSF to a lead security responsibility.

d. Shortfalls in NTM-A/CSTC-A Manning. While NTM-A/CSTC-A has received a significant influx of U.S. personnel since November 2009, there remain unfilled requirements. We continue to actively engage with the Joint Staff, the Services, and SHAPE to bring in personnel with the appropriate skill sets to meet our quantitative goals in a timely manner while raising quality. If we should receive all confirmed NATO pledges, we will have approximately 750 additional personnel, bringing us to just over 80% fill for the first time.

e. Rule of Law. Internal security depends on the three pillars of judiciary, corrections, and policing. While we are directly responsible for supporting policing, other organizations are responsible for the development of corrections and the judiciary. The lagging progress of the judiciary is a serious concern, and if corrective measures are not taken soon to accelerate the development of the justice system, the professionalization of the Afghan police will be put at risk.

6. Conclusion. In our first six months we made significant gains as we changed our overall approach to training and created a sense of urgency in building the foundation for an enduring and professional ANSF. While aggregate growth objectives appear on track, the traditional summer recruiting lull will be a challenge. In addition, the greatest threats to building an Afghan quality force with adequate quantity are the lack of effective leaders and the persistent high attrition in specific components of the ANSF. Though not assured, we can increase our probability of success by fully resourcing NTM-A/CSTC-A and carefully balancing current operational needs against those of longer term growth and professionalization programs.



WILLIAM B. CALDWELL, IV
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

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The following are SIGAR's comments on NTM-A/CSTC-A's letter dated June 10, 2010:

1. NTM-A/CSTC-A said our report relied on information that was out of date. Our audit work was conducted from October 2009 through May 2010 and relied on interviews and information collected over that entire period, including field observations of 18 ANSF units made during February and March 2010 and detailed reviews of ANSF assessment documents dated through March 29, 2010.
2. NTM-A/CSTC-A acknowledges it faced numerous problems in training ANSF units as recently as six months ago. However, NTM-A/CSTC-A said it has made much progress since May 2010, when our audit ended and believes our report does not reflect that progress. NTM-A/CSTC-A provided its May 29, 2010 report entitled *NTM-A 180 Day Internal Assessment and Way Forward*, as part of its official comments, indicating that its report provides more current information than the observations and information we developed during our work. Our audit work was conducted from October 2009 through May 2010, and our draft report was circulated for agency comment on May 27, 2010, two days prior to the issuance of the NTM-A/CSTC-A report. NTM-A/CSTC-A's report recounts challenges faced in training and fielding ANSF forces, accomplishments achieved during NTM-A/CSTC-A's first six months, and potential concerns for future operations; the report does not address ANSF capability assessments. We have included NTM-A/CSTC-A's report on pages 37 through 41.
3. In its comments, NTM-A/CSTC-A observes that it, along with DOD and IJC, had harbored concerns regarding the efficacy of the CM rating system since the fall of 2009. As such, NTM-A/CSTC-A cited an October 2009 DOD report to Congress entitled *Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*. That report, which expressed concern about the CM rating system was dated October 2009, but was not issued until the first week of April 2010, just weeks after we shared our preliminary observations regarding the CM assessment at an out-brief for the Commanders of ISAF, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and IJC. The DOD report passage quoted by NTM-A/CSTC-A contains an inaccurate characterization of the CM rating system, stating "CM ratings simply depict the manning, training, and equipment of a unit." In fact, as our audit report describes, CM rating assessments evaluated a variety of other factors, such as facilities, sustainment, and command and control. NTM-A/CSTC-A also said that it and IJC began reforming the CM system in the fall of 2009. While we appreciate that concerns existed regarding shortcomings of the CM system during that timeframe, IJC and NTM-A were only established in October and November 2009, and were not fully operational until November 2009 and February 2010 respectively, according to DOD's April 28, 2010 report to Congress.
4. In our report, we discussed construction delays and resulting conditions at the Kunduz Garrison, but not cost issues. NTM-A/CSTC-A's comments appear to address a prior SIGAR report, *ANA Garrison at Kunduz Does Not Meet All Quality and Oversight Requirements; Serious Soil Issues Need to Be Addressed*, 10-09, April 20, 2010.

APPENDIX IV: COMMENTS FROM THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)



ASIAN & PACIFIC
SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2700 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2700

Mr. John Brummet
Assistant Inspector General for Audits
Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction
400 Army-Navy Drive
Arlington VA 22202

Dear Mr. Brummet:

The following is the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) comment on the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) draft report, "Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments," dated June 2010 (SIGAR Audit-10-11).

Page 13, para 1: "DOD Reported Capability Ratings for Afghan Police Units That Had Not Been Assessed by Mentors or Partners" (revised from "Reports to Congress on Afghan Police Capabilities Have Been Misleading" in report draft).

OSD response: OSD appreciates SIGAR's revisions to the draft report. We remain concerned, however, that the language still does not provide sufficient clarity regarding the Afghan National Police assessments and does not recognize that in the October 2009 *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, DOD pointed out the weakness of the Capability Milestone (CM) system as an important risk factor and DOD's April 2010 *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan* states, "It is also important to note that the current CM ratings look only at the manning, training, and equipping of a unit, so a combat unit can be operationally effective without necessarily being rated at CM1." By not including this language in the SIGAR audit, the audit leaves the impression that DOD had not recognized this risk problem and was not taking steps to address it. Therefore to report accurately on DOD's actions on CM ratings, we recommend that the section title and first paragraph on page 13 of the draft SIGAR Audit-10-11 be changed to read as follows:


DOD Reported CM4 Capability Ratings for Afghan Police Units That Had Not Been Assessed by Mentors or Partners

Afghan police TRAT summary reports we reviewed only included CM ratings for police units that had been assessed by mentors or partners. However, in some reports to Congress, DOD reported CM4 capability ratings for police units that CSTC-A assessed for adequate manning, equipment and basic training, but that

had not actually been assessed by police mentors or partners for operational effectiveness. In biannual reports to Congress, prior to April 2010, Defense reported capability ratings for as many as 559 ANP units. However, as of March 2010, only 229 police units were being directly mentored or partnered and assessed using the CM system, according to IJC reports. IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A officials agreed that the data used to create the charts included in DOD's June 2009 and October 2009 reports to Congress on *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan* included CM4 ratings for units that had not been assessed by police mentors or partners. Regarding this matter, OSD told us that the DOD reports had relied on data from CSTC-A which included CM4 ratings for units that had been provided equipment or training, but had not been assessed by mentors or partners. CSTC-A had provided equipment or training to these units but, due to force level constraints, partner units or mentors had not been assigned. According to IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, a continued shortage of mentors had limited police development efforts to the subset of police districts identified as most important to achieve campaign plan goals and in which FPDD or In-District Reform (IDR) training had been provided and police mentors/partners were present. DOD's October 2009 *Report to Congress on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan* stated that "the utility of the CM rating system is limited to measuring the number of troops trained, equipped, and present for duty. The CM system does not effectively measure the quality of performance of the ANP. This is a significant risk and will be revisited over the coming year." [Add footnote: DoD's October 2009 *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, p. 30.] Because the system for ANSF assessment was under review, DOD did not include an ANP ratings chart in its April 28, 2010 report to Congress. DOD had recognized the shortfalls of the CM rating system to reflect ANP operational capabilities adequately by stating in the report, "It is also important to note that the current CM ratings look only at the manning, training, and equipping of a unit, so a combat unit can be operationally effective without necessarily being rated at CMI." [Add footnote: DoD's April 2010 *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, p. 111.]

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this report. My points of contact are Cara Negrette, 703-695-8268, Cara.Negrette@osd.mil and Mark Morehouse, 703-695-8258, Mark.Morehouse@osd.mil.

Sincerely,



David S. Sedney
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Afghanistan, Pakistan & Central Asia

APPENDIX V: COMMENTS FROM THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-4000

June 23, 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION (SIGAR)
(ATTN: Ms. Emily Rachman, Senior Auditor)

SUBJECT: Draft SIGAR Report - Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan
Security Force Assessments

In response to draft SIGAR Report, *Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments*, Readiness Programming & Assessment identifies several comments of significance. Specific comments are provided in the attached comment matrix, SD Form 818. OUSD (P&R), RP&A appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the report. The point of contact for this action is Mr. Michael Delacruz, Senior Readiness Analyst, who can be reached at (703) 693-3864 and michael.delacruz@osd.mil.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "B. Barrow".

Brent Barrow
Deputy Director,
Readiness Programming & Assessment

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMENTS MATRIX: SECDEF MEMO – Draft SIGAR Report: Actions Needed to Improve ANSF Assessments

(Please read instructions on back before completing form.)

#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE #	PARA #	COMMENT TYPE (C/S)	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
1	U	P&R RPA Joseph Angello 693 -5584 joseph.angelo@osd.mil Jim Tolle 703-604-0482 james.tolle.ctr@osd.mil	2	4	S	<p>Coordinator Comment: Add the following background information , where appropriate, before the last paragraph on page 2:</p> <p>“From the end of 2007 to the beginning of 2009, OSD worked with CENTCOM and CSTC-A to improve ANSF assessment methodology and reporting. CSTC-A developed an enterprise reporting capability for ETTs to report monthly assessments, including capability-based assessments and CM ratings. A web-based version of TRAT reporting, called WebTRAT was deployed throughout the theater which supported internet reporting of ETT and OMLT assessments on all Corps and below units. CSTC-A worked with the Afghan Ministry of Defense to establish training doctrine which defined Mission Essential Tasks (METs) for ANA units and these tasks were used by the ETTs to report monthly assessments in accordance with U. S. Army assessment doctrine. CSTC-A OORDER dated 08 May 2008 directed the reporting of monthly MET assessments and CM ratings into the Department in the Defense Readiness Reporting System in order to support more streamlined reporting and sharing of assessments leadership in theater and throughout the Department for national analysis. A similar reporting capability was attempted for ANP with PMT mentors reporting in an enterprise system from August to December 2008 but many problems similar to those covered in the remainder of the report prevented reliable ANP assessment reporting.”</p> <p>Rationale: Document previous substantive efforts by CSTC-A, CENTCOM and OSD to address reliability and integrity problems with the CM rating system and to perform ETT assessments of ANA forces using a MET-based methodology similar to how the US assesses its own fighting units.</p>	

SD FORM 818, JAN 09

PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE

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COMMENTS MATRIX: SECDEF MEMO – Draft SIGAR Report: Actions Needed to Improve ANSF Assessments (Please read instructions on back before completing form.)							
#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE #	PARA #	COMMENT TYPE (C/S)	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
2	U	P&R RPA Joseph Angello 693 -5584 joseph.angelo@osd.mil Jim Tolle 703-604-0482 james.tolle.ctr@osd.mil	6	2	S	<p>Recommendation: Add the following paragraph as appropriate to the section on “The Measurement and Validation of ANSF Capabilities May Have Resulted in Overstatement and Variability in Assessment Results”:</p> <p>“OSD and CSTC-A efforts from 2007 to 2009 to improve the ETT assessments using an enterprise MET-based reporting system were not sustained by forces in theater despite efforts to establish theater-wide policy, training and support. Inconsistent implementation of task force policy and rotation of personnel led to enterprise and MET-based reporting through WebTRAT being replaced by the Excel-based Capability Endorsement system in 2009. Inconsistencies in implementing assessment methodology improvements and sustaining consistent reporting systems over time may have contributed substantially to loss of data and variability of the assessment data in 2009.”</p> <p>Rationale: To document previous substantive efforts by CSTC-A, CENTCOM and OSD to address reliability and integrity problems with the CM rating system and how problems in sustaining task force reporting policy and systems contributed to variability in reporting and assessments.</p>	
3	U	P&R RPA Joseph Angello 693 -5584 joseph.angelo@osd.mil Jim Tolle 703-604-0482 james.tolle.ctr@osd.mil	9	2	S	<p>Recommendation: Add at the beginning of the section “<i>Weaknesses in ANSF Evaluation Tools Yielded Inconsistent Assessment Results</i>”:</p> <p>“Efforts in 2007 to 2009 to establish an standardized, enterprise reporting tool through WebTRAT and DRRS for the MET-based assessment of ANA forces by ETTs and OMLTs were not sustained over time, inconsistency in assessment procedures and methodologies have affected ANA assessments since then.</p> <p>Rationale: Document how efforts by CSTC-A, CENTCOM and OSD to address reliability and integrity problems with the CM rating system were</p>	

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COMMENTS MATRIX: SECDEF MEMO – Draft SIGAR Report: Actions Needed to Improve ANSF Assessments

(Please read instructions on back before completing form.)

#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE #	PARA #	COMMENT TYPE (C/S)	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
						not sustained and how problems in sustaining task force reporting policy and systems contributed to problems in consistency and reliability of assessments following this period.	
4	U	P&R RPA Joseph Angello 693 -5584 joseph.angelo@osd.mil Jim Tolle 703-604-0482 james.tolle.ctr@osd.mil	19	1	S	Recommendation: Change first recommendation to IIC to read – “Place greater emphasis on subjective assessment of overall operational capability, based on Mission Essential Tasks (METs) where appropriate, provided by mentor and partner team evaluators, including a requirement to complete narrative observations.” Rationale: To improve the credibility and reliability of the ANSF assessments, ISAF assessments should reflect the same MET-based methodology and approach as used by U. S. forces in accordance with DODD 7700.65 and AR 220-1.	

(This report was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-012A.)

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The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction is to enhance oversight of programs for the reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to:

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- improve management and accountability over funds administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their contractors;
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