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Foreword

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) partnered with the Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) Chapter of the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) in sponsoring the annual chapter essay contest. The first-place winner is recognized each year at the NDIA SO/LIC Symposium in mid-February, and the prize is $1,000 cash. The runner-up receives $500.

The competition is open to resident and nonresident students attending Professional Military Education (PME) institutions and has produced outstanding works on special operations issues. These essays provide insights on what our PME students see as priority national security issues today affecting special operations.

Essay contestants can choose any topic related to special operations. Submissions include hard-hitting and relevant recommendations that many Special Operations Forces commanders throughout United States Special Operations Command find very useful. Some entries submitted are a synopsis of the larger research project required for graduation or an advanced degree, while others are written specifically for the essay contest. Regardless of approach, these essays add value to the individuals’ professional development, provide an outlet for expressing new ideas and points of view, and contribute to the special operations community as a whole.

JSOU is pleased to offer this selection of essays from the 2006 contest. The JSOU intent is that this compendium will benefit the reader professionally and encourage future PME students to enter the contest. Feedback is welcome, and your suggestions will be incorporated into future JSOU reports.

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF
Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
Planning Integrated Operations: An Operational Design Framework for the Long War

José M. Madera

Success in the Long War depends upon addressing complex challenges. The operational environment requires effective engagement, coordination, and collaboration with interagency and international partners. To overcome current difficulties, effective integrated operations require the development of a new operational design framework. Developing this framework entails re-envisioning how participants are organized and resourced, how they communicate, and how operations are planned and executed.

The Operational Context

The Long War is 90 percent intellectual, communications, political, economic, diplomacy, and intelligence focused. It is at most 10 percent military. We have not yet developed the doctrine or structure capable of thinking through and implementing a Long War (30 to 70 years if we are lucky) on a societal scale. This challenge is compounded because it is fundamentally different from waging the Cold War against the Soviet Union. — Newt Gingrich

Recent experience shows that, despite achieving a significant measure of success on the battlefield, the Armed Forces of the United States of America face continuing challenges in adapting to the requirements of the long-term global struggle against uncompromising adversaries. Our nation and its leadership expect our forces to be successful in missions as different and distinct from
each other as the locations where they take place—combating Islamic extremists in Iraq and Afghanistan while supporting the establishment of democratic governments, helping Colombia in defeating narcoterrorist illegal armed groups, supporting domestic emergency response and long-term reconstruction in the wake of Katrina, or assisting international partners such as Indonesia and Pakistan in their post-disaster mitigation and rehabilitation efforts. Our forces are expected to accomplish this while at the same time developing and maintaining the capabilities for dealing with potential future conflicts with peer and near peer competitors.

Despite initial successes, our forces continue to be engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq fighting what Gingrich describes as the Long War. Even after eventual success and withdrawal from those countries, an increasing number of other places around the world will see manifestations of this struggle. Furthermore, given international concerns over conditions in places such as Darfur, and the statistical likelihood of major natural disasters, the need for our forces to address complex humanitarian contingencies in the near future is almost inevitable.

In a number of cases, the efficacy of our forces during this conflict has been less than optimal. Critics, such as Brigadier Aylwin-Foster (who served in Iraq as deputy commander of the Office of Security Transition) ascribe problems with the post-liberation performance of the United States in Iraq to a number of factors including historical focus on kinetic operations, a rigid organizational culture, and institutional bias. Others, such as Tom Ricks and Sean Naylor (journalists who have reported on the performance of U.S. Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan), challenge the adequacy of our planning or the increased diversity and complexity of organizations involved in major operations. Many of these criticisms are based upon an incomplete understanding of the complexity of the environment in which our forces operate. Too often, they overlook the significant impact of a complex mixture of factors that go well beyond the military context. As Gingrich points out, the challenges of the Long War demand looking beyond military solutions. Along these lines, most critics only partially acknowledge the fact that many of the problems for which
they hold the military responsible are rooted in the intrinsic inadequacy of our Armed Forces to comprehensively address issues that are political, economic, and diplomatic in nature.

Adding to this difficulty is the fact that the majority of the most critical activities involved in the nonmilitary sphere take place at the operational level. Joint doctrine defines this level as the point at which:

... campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.\(^5\)

This level, which “... links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives,” is seldom, if ever, a sterile military-only domain, uncontaminated by external factors and considerations.\(^6\) For instance, despite inaccurate claims to the contrary, there was a detailed military plan to address Phase IV of Operation Iraqi Freedom; yet no amount of proactive planning can cancel out the impact of what Christopher Schnaubelt (who served as chief of policy in the C-5 directorate of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-7 in 2004) has described as “the lack of effective interagency collaboration at the operational level.”\(^7\)

Our Armed Forces can only be partially successful if they lack a framework that allows for the adequate linkage of strategic objectives to actions at the tactical level while at the same time taking into account the effect of nonmilitary factors upon those actions. Furthermore, the strategic objectives of our government will not be attained without a framework that provides for the linkage of nonmilitary to military actions across these levels. The contemporary and future operational environment will require our forces to address crises that Gene Zajac (a former Foreign Service officer at the United States Joint Forces Command) points out,

... are likely to be more complex calling for a comprehensive response, a multidimensional strategy involving multiple governmental agencies, partnership with other nations and multilateral organizations.\(^8\)
Therefore, it is precisely the operational level that requires urgent attention in order to ensure success in the Long War. Despite the overwhelming technological superiority, strength, and flexibility of our Armed Forces, traditionally they have lacked adequate doctrinal, organizational, and conceptual mechanisms to allow them to address the challenges of operating in an environment defined by a need to synchronize and integrate the actions of diverse multinational elements at the operational and tactical level in order to attain national strategic objectives.

In a recent article, Richard Downie, director of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, promotes the use of the term integrated operations to describe what our current doctrinal terminology covers in several terms such as joint, interagency, intergovernmental, or multinational operations. Adopting that terminology allows us to say that determining the best way to organize, plan, and execute for integrated operations presents the most critical and urgent challenge facing us in the Long War. The problem is greater and more urgent because, as Dr. John T. Fishel (an expert in Latin America, peacekeeping, and civil military operations) pointed out, “DoD is the only organization within the government that has an operational echelon.” The military is often tasked with addressing nonmilitary problem sets at the operational level because its potential partners are unable to respond adequately in terms of resources, presence, authority, or expertise. As Schnaubelt said, “Contemporary threats... require interagency decision making and collaboration at the operational level. Yet there is no effective system in place to cause this teamwork to happen.”

An Operational Framework for Integrated Operations

The contemporary environment in which our Armed Forces operate is best understood as an amalgam of several complex, open systems. The world is, at the same time, a globalized economic sphere, a shifting network of geopolitical alliances, the battleground for competing ideological and cultural visions, and an interconnected web of information exchanges weaving through overlapping social, tribal, and national entities. Our current language, organizations, and approach to operational design hamper the efficacy of the joint
forces in meeting the requirements of integrated operations because they fail to deal with the complexity of these systems.

Recent after-action reports and lessons learned indicate that we need a comprehensive critique and rethinking of the language, organizations, and conceptual constructs currently in place. This critique must recognize that there are a number of problems with our current approach to integrated operations. This approach does not facilitate the exchange of information; it tends to allocate resources along static and hierarchical models and suffers from a lack of imagination and adaptability by applying a linear bias to operational design. The nature of the conflict we are engaged in makes engaging interagency and international partners in coordination and collaboration a requirement, not an option. Therefore, a new approach is required; we must re-envision how interagency and multinational participants communicate, how our resources are organized and linked, and how operations are planned.

Language

One basic problem affecting participants in integrated operations is the lack of a common language. There is a marked absence of shared terminology among military, governmental, and nongovernmental interlocutors. This problem exists not only across nations but also often within the borders of one country, across government agencies, and even within organizations within those government agencies. By virtue of the nature of their profession, members of some communities share a common professional language (for example, engineers and physicians) that transcends social, cultural, and historical differences. This situation is not the case, however, across the very wide spectrum of professions, organizations, and disciplines that may be required to collaborate during post-conflict reconstruction or complex humanitarian contingencies.

One example of this gap, and the impact it has on the effectiveness of operations, occurred last November during post-earthquake assistance efforts in Pakistan. In a number of meetings, U.S. planners engaged in discussions with representatives from the Government of Pakistan (GOP), donor nations, and the United Nations (UN) to address planning for long-term relief and reconstruction. In this situation, the use of terms such as “campaign planning” or “lines of
“operation” by U.S. military planners in the context of humanitarian efforts hampered communication with strategic planners from the UN. Despite the fact that in the U.S. military community the use of those terms is acceptable in stability and reconstruction settings, for the UN participants they conveyed negative connotations that initially hampered collaboration. Once the issue was identified, the U.S. planners “translated” their concepts into terminology used by their UN counterparts for subsequent discussions, ensuring shared understanding and objectives.  

A possible solution to this issue is to assume a pragmatic approach to communication with participants in integrated operations. One key element of operational language is doctrine. Rather than seeking to impose our vision and vocabulary—doctrine—upon interagency and multinational partners, we must be willing to explore the use of neutral terminology or stipulate shared meanings. Following the above model, we must approach the evolution of doctrine by collaborating with interagency and multinational partners instead of attempting to force existing doctrinal constructs or develop emerging terminology in isolation from them.  

A complementary solution may be the creation of virtual shared communities of practice. These groups of people may share common interests, goals, and concerns. Members may come together informally and are willing to establish an ongoing and dynamic relationship based on promoting mutual learning and discovery through the exchange of information and experiences concerning professional activities. Often these relationships will result in improved professional performance and assist in identifying and disseminating best practices. Virtual communities can be established by leveraging technology to support communication and collaboration in order to facilitate the creation and maintenance of the relationships described above. Tapping into these communities would allow for the development of new doctrinal concepts, testing the viability of shared terminology, and encouraging discussion would allow for the development of new doctrinal concepts, testing the viability of shared terminology and encouraging discussion of best practices before, during, and after integrated operations.
Organizations

Analysis of the U.S. government’s post-Katrina response identified a major gap in planning capability and adequate planning structures within agencies responsible for implementing the National Response Plan. In most cases only the Department of Defense has created organizations oriented on the operational level. Whether the task is domestic long-term recovery and reconstruction, or post-conflict stability and reconstruction in Iraq, efficacy is hampered when there are no established organizational structures outside the military. These structures are needed to facilitate communication, coordination, and collaboration across agency, governmental, and national lines. Recent proposals (published in professional publications and academic outlets) begin to address the problem of how to best organize for improving collaboration and coordination in integrated operations. These options include the following:

a. Appointment of a “supra-departmental presidential advisor” to address interagency coordination
b. Creation of the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
c. Subordination of existing combatant commanders and their commands under senior civilian leadership
d. Refinement of current Joint Interagency Task Forces arrangements
e. Increases in the number of standing Joint Interagency Coordinating Groups
f. Creation of Multi-National Interagency Groups
g. Enhancement of Joint Task Forces as the natural organizational focus at the operational level.

While some of these proposals have been adopted, in the aggregate some may be inadequate because they are based on attempts to impose traditional, persistent, and hierarchical command and control schemes upon entities that ought to be nonlinear, ad hoc, short-lived, and mutable. In addition, with few exceptions, they tend to assume that the military should assume an operational level leadership role for those organizations. Finally, the challenge of improving integration within existing organizations of the U.S. government and the historical experiences of international bodies (such as the UN)
point to the equally daunting issues that surround the creation of permanent structures for collaboration and integration among international, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations.

Therefore, we must explore organizational constructs that eschew the hierarchical, linear, and persistent organizational approaches of the past. Rather than identify one single approach as a solution, one more creative alternative is to assume an attitude that encourages experimentation, exploration, and discovery. The development and exploration of possible organizational models could be one of the tasks of the communities of practice (mentioned under Language).

Design

U.S. experiences across the full spectrum of operations point to a lack of adequate interagency operational planning capability, let alone a shared discipline for planning integrated operations. In a discussion of military support for long-term reconstruction planning by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), one of the team members assisting FEMA described one instance of this deficit:

The difficulties we observed during the Katrina response were due to systemic failure. The lack of what we in the military refer to as “unity of effort” stemmed from the absence of operational level planning, thinking, and coordination. In short, there was an omission of the operational art.18

A factor complicating this deficit is that the logic applied by military organizations to problems arising in the contemporary operational environment is usually based upon linear and teleological models.19 This logic tends to a linear and teleological approach—that is, a viewpoint oriented to achieving predetermined results based upon a simple and deterministic view of causality. These models—for example, the Army’s Military Decision-Making Process, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, and even the emerging Effects Based Approach (EBA)—are useful in military contexts. However, these approaches may be grossly inadequate in the face of the complex open systems that comprise the contemporary operational environment and the problems that take place within those systems. Open complex systems are dynamic, nonlinear aggregates of entities whose interactions result in multifaceted interrelationships and which, because they may affect and be affected by other systems,
exhibit behaviors that are difficult to understand, predict, and control.

An emerging alternative to these military modes of thinking is Systemic Operational Design (SOD). SOD presents a radical departure from linear/teleological models and offers the possibility of discovering and creating solution spaces that transcend traditional military options. This approach, which is being studied and evaluated at the School of Advanced Military Studies and other entities across DoD, involves developing a contingent and partial understanding of complex systems and avoids assuming that these systems will respond in a predictable fashion or that a set of actions will necessarily result in the attainment of one determinable or particular end state. It recognizes that actions within a complex system will change initial conditions and that planning and execution must take this indeterminacy into account. As one student of the discipline said, “SOD recognizes that the system will continually change and adapt, not just in response to our actions but also in response to the rest of its environment.”

This mode of operational design is ideally suited to address the chaotic complexities of integrated operations in the contemporary operational environment. It is a mode that may allow us to plan effectively for effective responses in the context of the Long War, and one that should be studied and applied by those seeking to deal effectively with the challenges of integrated operations. One solution to the current lack of a shared operational design discipline would be to establish an institution modeled after the existing advanced operational studies programs where interagency and selected multinational participants would have an opportunity to study a number of disciplines, including Systemic Operational Design.

Conclusion

Linear operational forms are now obsolete, and any attempt to revive them under changed historical circumstances will be a grave mistake. — G.S. Isserson

The challenge of the Long War demands that we change the way the U.S. Armed Forces organize, plan for, and execute integrated operations. A major challenge to our success in the Long War is the lack of a shared language, effective organizations, and design
approaches that satisfy the complex operational-level demands of integrated operations. Without a means for communicating shared visions, adequate organizational structures, and processes that ensure effective and efficient collaboration and integration, our future efforts in the Long War will fall short of achieving national strategic objectives. Failure to implement urgently needed changes in our operational design framework may mean the loss of national resources, international credibility, and most importantly, the lives of our service members. The probable cost is too great to ignore.

Although this will be a protracted conflict and patience will be a key component to our approach in dealing with its challenges, it is urgent to leave behind outmoded conceptual, organizational, and procedural frameworks that impede the effective planning and execution of integrated operations. To be successful against a complex and adaptive adversary working in an equally complex environment, we must heed and implement the following approach:

a. Engage in a constructive dialogue with current and potential partners in integrated operations to construct a shared language that captures the nuances of functioning effectively within the contemporary operational environment. This engagement includes establishment of communities of practitioners that will foster discussion and development of best practices.

b. Develop new nonlinear, adaptive, and dynamic organizational constructs. These constructs must not be bound by traditional approaches and be guided by the imperatives of pushing dialogue, design, and decision making to the lowest possible organizational levels.

c. Adopt an intellectual and conceptual stance that abandons linear and teleological approaches to operational art and looks to a new logic of operational planning. One such logic is Systemic Operational Design.

We must expand and redefine operational art to meet the requirements of integrated operations in the present and future Long War. The complex nature of the adversaries and challenges that we face require the application of innovative approaches. By adopting the operational design framework outlined above, we may gain a critical advantage for our joint forces and their interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners.
Notes


2. Gingrich, 4.


13. Author’s personal experience during support to the Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan (ODRP), (October-November 2005).
14. See Etienne Wenger, *Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning and Identity* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Nancy M. Dixon, *Common Knowledge* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2000); and Etienne Wenger, et al., *Cultivating Communities of Practice* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2002). Arguably these communities already exist because the operational tempo has increased the exposure of members of the military, interagency, and multinational communities to each other. However, a virtual approach that leverages technology widens and enriches the opportunity for contact and is not limited by physical limitations.

15. This approach could mirror the Army’s successful experiences with XO-Net and companycommand.com; see Nancy M. Dixon, et al., *Company Command: Unleashing the Power of the Army Profession* (New York, NY: Center for the Advancement of Leader Development & Organizational Learning, 2005). An excellent example of this type of emerging community is managed by the State Department’s Humanitarian Information Unit. Another example of such a developing community is SAMS Net, part of the Army’s emerging Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS).


19. Dr. Timothy Challans, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth clarified the possible metaphysical, epistemological, and logical pitfalls of the EBA/Effects-Based Operations (EBO).

20. Discussion with MAJ Ketti Davison, U.S. Army, School of Advanced Military Studies.

22. This proposal is in line with the ongoing trend of interagency representation at the Senior Service Schools, which arguably is “too little, too late” to allow for an effective impact upon the maximum number of potential practitioners at the operational level. Until recently, these programs (e.g., Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting and the Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies) have had significant attendance by allied officers but little participation by interagency representatives. Although there are joint interagency initiatives to address the education of integrated operations practitioners (such as the Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Planner’s Course at the Joint Forces Staff College), the length of the educational experience they offer probably falls short of that required to achieve a sufficient level of mastery over concepts such as Systemic Operational Design.

Military Enthusiasm and Political Reality: USSOCOM’s Role in the Joint, Combined, Interagency Global Counterinsurgency

Charles R.V. O’Quinn

Key assumptions are necessary in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) to develop a comprehensive strategy that incorporates all instruments of U.S. national power, as well as those of its allies to defeat an evolving, ubiquitous, yet elusive threat. As lead combatant command in the GWOT, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) should conduct continuous, global, preemptive low-visibility operations in order to disrupt insurgent operations.

“Never confuse enthusiasm with capability.” — GEN Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff Army, Arrival Message 2003

General Schoomaker’s quote refers to the U.S. hostage rescue mission in Iran in 1980, which failed in part due to the ad hoc assemblage of forces and equipment prior to mission planning and execution. Today, USSOCOM finds itself in a similar situation in trying to conduct comprehensive joint, combined, interagency plans and operations in the GWOT. The 2005 Unified Command Plan\(^1\) designated USSOCOM as the lead combatant command for the GWOT, responsible for “planning, synchronizing, and, as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks.” This mission seems logical, given the USSOCOM global responsibility and expertise in special operations and specifically counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. While USSOCOM is shouldering its responsibility by establishing its Center for Special Operations

Major Charles O’Quinn is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer. He submitted this paper while attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), where he is currently assigned. MAJ O’Quinn’s essay won second place in the 2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC SOF Essay Contest.
(CSO) to provide a warfighting capability (to integrate intelligence, current and future operations, and joint interagency coordination), it is meeting with the operational and political reality that it is not fully mandated or resourced for the GWOT.

Although USSOCOM has the largest number of professionally educated, trained, and experienced counterterrorism and counter-insurgency personnel in the U.S. government, the complex aspects of the GWOT battlefield demands the full capacity and capability of all instruments of national power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME). In this environment, USSOCOM must ensure it does not confuse enthusiasm with capability, particularly in regard to nonmilitary instruments of national power. Given this complex situation, how should USSOCOM conduct operations? How should they organize forces to conduct these operations? How should they array resources to conduct these operations?

**Key Assumptions**

Some believe that Al Qaeda and their network affiliates seek to destroy many current governments and replace them with an Islamic caliphate spanning from West Africa to Southeast Asia. Scholars and experienced counterterrorism experts have identified several aspects of the insurgency network and operational environment and

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<td>The insurgency network is comprised of a loose affiliation of small groups with limited independent capabilities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functional resources</td>
<td>The insurgency network is comprised of nine resources: leadership, safe havens, finance, communications, movement, intelligence, weapons, personnel, and ideology.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multiple operational domains</td>
<td>The network operates in multiple domains: geographical, informational (to include Internet, media, and education), and financial.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous operations</td>
<td>The network is continuously planning, preparing, and conducting operations ranging from intelligence collection to direct action.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>This network key enabler influences global and local populations to gain all manner of support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency cooperation</td>
<td>No one U.S. federal agency has the full capability and capacity of all instruments of national power.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
addressed these in national strategic documents such as the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. When distilled, these aspects provide a few “key assumptions” in order to plan the GWOT.

When taken together, the key assumptions demand a dynamic, responsive and cooperative, functional task organization and resource allocation to successfully accomplish objectives in the global counter-insurgency. No one instrument of national power or one organization can accomplish this monumental mission. As lead combatant command in the GWOT, USSOCOM should conduct continuous, global, preemptive low-visibility operations in order to disrupt insurgent operations.

Why continuous, preemptive operations?

Al Qaeda and its associates provide a demonstration of the validity of COL John Boyd’s “observation, orientation, decision, and action (OODA) loop” in their terrorist operations. Al Qaeda and its associates have planned, resourced, conducted, and inspired lethal terrorist operations to include the first attempts to destroy the World Trade Center in 1993, the bombing of the Khobar Towers in 1996, the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the USS Cole bombing in 2000, the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001, the nightclub bombing in Bali in 2002, the train bombings in Madrid in 2004, the Australian embassy bombing in Jarkarta in 2004, and the London subway bombings in 2005. Although some associates have formations of uniformed military forces, Al Qaeda and its associated network currently have no ability to mass forces to wage a global maneuver war and may not want to do so. Therefore, in order to leverage their limited capabilities at the correct time and place for greatest effect, they must conduct continuous planning, preparation, and execution of operations to attack global targets. U.S. counterinsurgency operations must be directed at the enemy’s decision cycle in order to disrupt these operations. This disruption is necessary should the enemy plan, resource, and execute an operation using weapons of mass destruction. This concept of preemptive operations can be found in most, if not all, of our current national strategic security documents.
In order to be truly responsive to intelligence leads in this conflict, capabilities must be positioned and prepared to conduct operations with limited lead time. Intelligence gained on a current planned enemy operation cannot wait for forces to arrive after deployment from the continental United States (CONUS). An inevitable struggle will be the determination of when to conduct an operation against an insurgent cell versus waiting and watching in hopes of gaining further intelligence. Ultimately, the decision to act to prevent or preempt a terrorist act should have priority over the desire for intelligence. In these situations, all is not always lost. Overwatched appropriately, the operation has a chance of creating new intelligence by shaping the environment and forcing an enemy reaction.

Why low-visibility operations?
The U.S. cannot accomplish all missions in the global insurgency alone, if for no other reason than resource constraints. The U.S. must rely upon partner nations and partners (political groups as well as nongovernmental and private organizations that do not hold nation-state status) to develop and employ their own capability and capacity to deal with elements of the global insurgency within their sphere of influence. A critical aspect of both capacity and capability is legitimacy. Partner nations and partners must be seen by their constituents, the insurgents, and the world at large as having capability and capacity independent of U.S. involvement. In fact, overt U.S. involvement (influence or participation in operations) in providing this capacity undermines the very legitimacy the partner nation seeks to develop. This premise is true regardless of the geographic location of the partner nation (e.g., European vs. African countries) as recent press reports discuss possible U.S. involvement in the capture and detention of terror suspects in Italy, 2005. In the eyes of media-influenced masses, overt U.S. unilateral operations limit partner nation legitimacy and provide fuel for Islamic extremist ideology. Indeed the mere presence of U.S. troops on the Arabian Peninsula is a stated reason for terrorist attacks aimed at the removal of U.S. presence in the region. U.S. involvement in partner nation and partner capability, as well as U.S. unilateral operations, must be conducted as low-visibility operations in order to accomplish missions.
while not becoming self-destructive in terms of legitimacy and fueling extremist ideology.

**Low-Visibility Operations**

Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* defines low visibility operations as, “Sensitive operations wherein the political-military restrictions inherent in covert and clandestine operations are either not necessary or not feasible; actions are taken as required to limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities. Execution of these operations is undertaken with the knowledge that the action and/or sponsorship of the operation may preclude plausible denial by the initiating power.”

A more useful definition would describe a range of operations that falls below public awareness levels and include covert and clandestine operations as options within a broader overarching spectrum of low-visibility operations. Most importantly, however, low-visibility operations must be conducted in a way that creates the illusion that a partner nation or partner conducted the operation unilaterally. The partner nation is seen handling its own problems and providing for the safety of its citizens. This conduct solidifies the appearance of legitimacy for the partner nation’s capacity and capability regardless of the true state of affairs. These operations must also take place with little or no media coverage and minimal or no U.S. “on-the-scene” presence. Examples of operations that are normally accomplished in a low-visibility manner are computer network operations (CNO), financial network operations (FNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), and intelligence operations. Other types of operations that should be accomplished in the same low-visibility manner are civil affairs, legal (to include investigation, apprehension, and possibly even trial), information operations (IO), foreign internal defense (FID), and direct action (DA).

Obviously, some of these operations are more easily conducted in a low-visibility manner, and there may be instances where both the partner nation and the U.S. government wish to be seen working
together to solve a problem. However, most if not all of these operations must be conducted at the minimum level of visibility in order to prevent the disclosure of U.S. involvement and reduce the effectiveness of any enemy information campaign against partner nation legitimacy. Additionally, the full range of such operations could be conducted as covert or clandestine, where either U.S. involvement or the operation itself is not discovered. This consideration is especially important in instances and operational environments where the U.S. government has no partner or partner nation capability but must act in order to preempt terrorist or insurgent operations.

Contrary to popular belief, all low-visibility operations are not as unsuccessful as the failed U.S. hostage rescue attempt in Iran. Examples of successful low-visibility operations include those conducted with the Northern Alliance in the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom and ongoing operations conducted by the U.S. forces in the Philippines. At the far end of the low-visibility spectrum, British-trained and employed surrogate teams in the Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya and the clandestine Israeli capture and exfiltration of Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann from unwitting Argentina are two of the most successful covert and clandestine operations.

**Why global operations?**

The very nature of the threat cellular network, its operational domains, and the extent and geographic locations of its functional resources requires that USSOCOM conduct global operations. On 11 October 2005, the U.S. Department of State identified the 42nd globally operating foreign terrorist organization. To address the scope of this widespread threat, USSOCOM’s response must be geographically comprehensive.

**How should USSOCOM organize to conduct global counterinsurgency?**

While it is important to understand the interconnectivity and scale of the threat, regionalizing the network does little to address the local nature of the insurgent elements. Additionally, the political reality of the nation state model of international organization demands that the U.S. interacts bilaterally with partner nations around the world. The Levant, where governments interact differently with the U.S. (as
seen by relations with Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon), typifies the complex nature of U.S. bilateral engagement in a region. Few political programs can blanket such a diverse political region, and thus no one can expect blanket military programs to work either. The U.S. embassy country team must be the first-line interface with any partner nation to ensure legitimacy of any bilateral program. Currently, U.S. embassy country teams, depending on the size of the U.S. mission, have representatives of most if not all of the instruments of national power. However, few if any of these representatives have formal education, training, or experience in counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operations. Function-based organizations located at the U.S. embassy would provide both capability and capacity to address key aspects of the global insurgency (cellular network, operational domains, and functional resources).

How should we address this reality? Models for functional organizations do exist. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is a good organization to examine at the grand strategic level. Created by the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the NCTC conducts intelligence fusion, incident tracking, and integrated interagency strategic and operational planning and information sharing. However, by law the NCTC does not and should not address tactical mission planning and execution.

The designation of USSOCOM as the lead combatant command in the GWOT for the Department of Defense (DoD) is good organization at the strategic level. USSOCOM is synchronizing GWOT planning across the geographic combatant commands, but it must fully integrate planning and operation execution staffs with interagency partners to ensure a seamless, comprehensive functional approach. This integration cannot be fully accomplished through the mere exchange of liaison officers. While there has been a lot of previous work in this arena, without the mandate of DoD, the National Security Council, or a presidential directive, there will remain little consistent integrated interagency operational planning and execution.

Joint interagency task forces (JIATFs), joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs), and joint intelligence operations commands (JIOCs) are all good examples of interagency integration at the operational level. However, these organizations do not address the local or tactical level of operations where the intelligence/operations cycle and the enemy OODA loop demand timely, accurate, and appropriate
response. Furthermore, unless these entities are integrated with partner nation capabilities, they can only achieve limited effectiveness.

An excellent model for organizing U.S. DIME assets in the global insurgency is described as a high performance organization in LTC Chad Clark’s 2003 monograph, “Personnel Targeting Operations.” In this model, all elements of the DIME are utilized at the local level through operators and their enablers. This model is closely linked to the doctrinal civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) delineated in Army field manual (interim) FMI 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations, 2004. However, the doctrinal model fails in that it neither identifies the need for low-visibility operations nor the command relationships within the team. Additionally, it is implied but never stated that the director works directly for the U.S. ambassador.

The best model would be a JIATF or CMOC-like structure consisting of appropriate representatives from the U.S. embassy country teams headed by a USSOCOM special operations forces (SOF) operator as director. (Current U.S. Army Special Forces officers with the education, training, and experience levels lend themselves to this role.) The director would act as a deputy to the ambassador, responsible for all counterterrorism- and counterinsurgency-related planning, resourcing, and execution efforts for that partner nation or partner. This would place a trained and experienced advisor at the critical level working directly for the “tactical” diplomatic decision maker, ensuring complete interagency integration at the lowest level. As in the CMOC, there must be appropriate interface with the partner nation and various local and international nongovernmental organizations. All interaction must be conducted in a low-visibility manner to mitigate possible exposure of U.S. involvement.

How should USSOCOM array resources to accomplish their global counterinsurgency missions?

Doctrine. No standardized interagency counterinsurgency doctrine currently exists. Most federal agencies outside of DoD teach through experience and do not codify their knowledge. This being the case, the military is arguably the best organization for developing and maintaining doctrine to train and educate its personnel.

As the lead combatant command in the GWOT, USSOCOM should spearhead the development and validation of joint interagency doc-
trine for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Within USSOCOM, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School would be best suited to do so. This initiative could be accomplished initially through working groups and symposiums that bring members from the interagency community together to share tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and experiences. From this, a vetted doctrine could be developed to aid interagency understanding among operators as well as their leadership. This doctrine can be accomplished immediately and become institutionalized to enable updates and lessons learned and thereby educate our organizations. Furthermore, it could be integrated at the grand strategic level through interface at the NCTC.

**Personnel.** The most important trait for personnel assigned to these teams must be their understanding of the imperative of interagency interoperability. Personnel with relevant counterinsurgency and counterterrorism expertise must be assigned to key billets as an interface within the joint interagency team. Experience in interagency operations should be a prime consideration in manning these teams. Over time, greater numbers of SOF operators will gain operational experience in this environment and provide a wider base of interagency professionals capable of working at all levels of the national power structure.

**Training and Education.** Currently there is no standardized interagency training or education, and there are few cooperative education or fellowship opportunities within the interagency community. There is only one interagency student at the U.S. Command and General Staff College (CGSC) this academic year, and she comes from a DoD office. This situation is unfortunate, considering the fact that there are 193 sister service, National Guard, and reserve officers from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps as well as 78 officers from 70 nations in that same class. U.S. military officers stand little hope of truly understanding both their roles and those of their interagency brethren unless they sit in the same nonattribution learning environments, such as those at CGSC.

JSOU courses are important for the cross-leveling of information within DoD and specifically within USSOCOM. However, these should be a minimum start point for operators within USSOCOM
and personnel newly assigned to the command. The breadth and depth of experience in the interagency community must come from attendance at interagency schools and symposiums and ultimately from experience through interagency operations and assignments.

USSOCOM must sponsor attendance for SOF officers at other interagency schools. These officers cannot be limited to one specific rank or branch, but should include a broad cross section of skills and expertise. All Special Forces officers should be mandated to attend a joint or interagency school prior to serving at an embassy. Additionally, USSOCOM should increase the number of officers and noncommissioned officers posted to fellowships and operational duty positions within the interagency community. This increase will ensure that professional interagency education will continue when operators are not posted in key interagency billets. At the same time, these interagency billets should count as key and developmental joint or interagency for career management and progression.

**Materiel.** Integrated interagency education, research and development, as well as current and future operations will drive the need for better joint interagency integrated materiel. Standardization of joint equipment within the DoD is improving but is not completely integrated despite being mandated by Congress decades ago. The Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 mandates information sharing on like systems among federal agencies, but this is only the beginning. The need for joint interagency compatible equipment will increase, and USSOCOM should be researching, developing, and procuring this equipment now.

**Additional Recommendations and Conclusions**

The DoD has the most manpower of any of the interagency organizations, and this leverage should be brought to bear immediately. It is where USSOCOM’s military enthusiasm can best serve. The USSOCOM CSO must gain DoD approval for and permanently station elements of their current and future operations staffs with the headquarters of their interagency partners and not merely exchange liaisons or leverage video teleconferences. Additionally, USSOCOM should strongly consider detailing its personnel and even placing complete combat units under the tactical control of other governmental agencies, especially in operations where DoD has neither
the mandate nor operational authority to act alone. These concrete measures would not only provide interagency partners with much needed manpower but also solidify current and future working relationships at all levels.

USSOCOM should also permanently post a greater number of Special Forces personnel at forward locations around the globe. Having Special Forces in CONUS ensures they remain reactive rather than proactive. Even the best rotation plans replace experienced personnel with those who have either less experience or situational awareness. Rotating individual personnel and their families out to team-sized duty locations for 2–3 years ensures area expertise and knowledge as well as strong relationships with country teams and partner nations. It also prevents intensive unit predeployment training and lags in operations tempo due to the arrival and incorporation of inexperienced personnel. The 39th Special Forces Detachment (formerly known as Special Forces Detachment-Korea) is a great example of how continuous forward basing of small Special Forces teams can create and maintain partner nation capacity and capability. Until it can accomplish this, USSCOM should sponsor and provide counterterrorism and counterinsurgency education and training to current and future defense attaché and foreign area officers serving in U.S. embassies.

A dedicated, continuous, cooperative interagency integration from the grand strategic to tactical levels must be fostered and maintained. The U.S. cannot wait for congressional mandates to establish the mechanisms to accomplish these missions because the adaptive enemy continues to plan and operate against U.S. interests without any such political hindrance. USSOCOM must be given the full mandate of the DoD and Joint Staff at a minimum and assume the mantle of responsibility as the lead planner and synchronizer for joint, combined interagency global counterinsurgency operations. In this role, USSOCOM must ensure full integration across all resource domains of doctrine, organization, training [strategy], materiel, leadership [and education], personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) within the interagency community. These recommendations must occur whether or not a federal agency is designated as lead in the GWOT. Relevant experience and expertise must reside at key locations in the U.S. and abroad. Understanding that different organizations will assume the lead or main effort at different times during operations,
qualified personnel must be present to ensure full U.S. capability and capacity is brought to bear in a responsive and timely low-visibility manner against our dynamic asymmetric threat.

Notes
Putting the G in the Global War on Terrorism

Edward J. Mason

The U.S. military in the Philippines struggles with what will likely become the military’s most difficult task in fighting global terrorism: How can the U.S. enter a sovereign country and aid their armed forces in man-hunting operations while neglecting the very conditions that enable terrorists to thrive? Only through counterinsurgency operations concentrated in MILF territories can the U.S. military strike this delicate balance.

The officer in charge of the Philippines Special Warfare Group 6 (a Navy SEAL unit) stood under a thatched roof looking out over the beach toward Basilan Island. In January 2002, 600 U.S. soldiers aided the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in a model counterinsurgency operation on the island to eradicate the Abu Sayyaf kidnap-for-ransom group. Sipping a San Miguel beer and smoking a Marlboro, the SEAL lieutenant said the corruption within the military prohibited him from carrying out his duties of combating smuggling and terrorism. He often witnessed his superiors receiving payoffs for ignoring illegal activity. A natural leader respected by his men, he dreamt of bringing pride back to the Philippines, but unless things were to radically change, the Philippines, specifically the military in the south, would continue to decay. Hours later in Manila, he joined 300 junior officers in an attempted coup; without widespread military support, the coup failed and the leading junior officers faced life imprisonment. The U.S. condemned the coup, and the State Department withdrew funding for the training and equipping of the SEAL units until they proved themselves to be trustworthy. The funding resumed by June 2004.

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) is slowly addressing corruption in the military, but corruption has left the

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AFP too weak to effectively counter the centuries old insurgency on the southern island of Mindanao, where the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is both harboring and training members of multiple terrorist groups. Therefore, the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, invited the U.S. military to aid the AFP. In response to her request, Balikatan Exercise on Basilan began in 2002. Due to sovereignty sensitivities, U.S. personnel were limited to training and advising the AFP and facilitating humanitarian-assistance programs.

In a recent assessment by the U.S. military, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has not been able to reclaim Basilan as a stronghold, the local economy is burgeoning, and all of the reconstruction projects (e.g., wells, roads, and schools) are still in place and functioning. Following the success of Balikatan, the U.S. military attempted to conduct a similar, but more robust, operation on Jolo Island to include combat operations. President Arroyo denied the U.S. permission to move to Jolo; the Philippine constitution forbids foreign militaries from conducting combat operations in the islands.

Instead of returning to successful counterinsurgency operations similar to those conducted on Basilan, the U.S. military for the past 3 years has relied on small teams of U.S. personnel passing intelligence to the AFP, gathered by technical means, to prompt them to hunt down terrorists. The capture/kill operations have had limited success. Instead of using Balikatan as the model of counterinsurgency and conducting similar operations throughout Mindanao, an alternate method is being used to fight terrorism because it requires less U.S. personnel, money, and political investment.

The U.S. military in the Philippines struggles with what will likely become the military’s most difficult task in fighting global terrorism: How can the U.S. enter a sovereign country and aid their armed forces in man-hunting operations while neglecting the very conditions that enable terrorists to thrive? Is it more important to complete the mission, capturing or killing all terrorists in Southeast Asia, or respect a sovereign, democratic country’s constitution that forbids foreign militaries from operating within its borders? Mission success and respecting sovereignty are not mutually exclusive; by using counterinsurgency tactics to address the root of the problem—population support buoyed by dismal living conditions—terrorists can be defeated. Every day that the U.S. ignores the Philippines, more
terrorists are trained and the security of the Philippines and the U.S. is further threatened.

**MILF Training Camps: Training Tomorrow’s Terrorists**

The MILF is believed to have 12,500 members and the support of the local populous in Muslim Mindanao. One intelligence official said, “The MILF is a strong, cohesive, Islamic front. It was bigger, stronger and more battle-tested than Abu Sayyaf.”¹ In the early 1990s the GRP allowed the MILF to set up base camps in support of keeping track of the rebels, but in effect “licensed a jihad movement on their own turf.”² In the GRP-recognized Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the MILF has created an Islamic government to include at least 30 Regional Islamic Committees, an Internal Security Force, a sharia court system, and a military. In 2001, President Arroyo offered a cease-fire, which many in the intelligence community believe has allowed the MILF to rebuild destroyed camps and train recruits.³ The cease-fire has been on and off, but overall has remained intact.

The larger threat to regional security is the multiple terrorist training camps in the ARMM, which over the past 7 years have produced hundreds, if not thousands, of trained terrorists.⁴ Former U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, Francis J. Ricciardone stated, “When you train someone in Mindanao to device [sic] bombs and how to plant them, that becomes a threat and it’s not limited just to the immediate neighborhood where that person was trained.”⁵ MILF leadership continues to deny any links to terrorist groups, but admits that there may be factions it cannot control.

The Jemaah Islamiya (JI) organization, a transnational terrorist group based in Indonesia with the goal of a united Muslim nation in Southeast Asia, is the main beneficiary of the training camps in Mindanao. With the skills the recruits have learned in MILF-sponsored training camps, the JI has committed high-profile bombings—for example, 2002 in Bali, killing 202 people; the suicide type on the Jakarta J.W. Marriot; and of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. “They need these training camps,” said Zachary Abuza, an expert on Southeast Asian terror groups. “JI simply cannot continue to sustain the organization without their members getting such training in Islamic indoctrination, intelligence-gathering, military skills and bomb making.”⁶
Peace process or stall tactic?

When asked in an interview about MILF training camps, U.S. Embassy Chargé d’Affaires Joseph Mussomeli said, “There is training. They are bomb making—there are experts who have come here, JI experts, who have trained others how to make bombs...” In response to allegations that the MILF is sponsoring, harboring, or training terrorists, the organization leadership has renounced terrorism and blames militant factions—and the peace process continues.

As an incentive for peace, President Bush offered $30 million for redevelopment in the ARMM if a strong peace process is agreed to, but because of continued violence, the money has been withheld. The U.S. has attempted to help Mindanao in other ways. The U.S. Agency for International Development has built schools, provided textbooks, trained teachers, and connected more than 100 schools in Mindanao to the Internet. In addition, limited economic measures have been attempted, but until security for aid workers and the local population can be guaranteed, improvement will continue to be slow. Unfortunately, centuries of unrest are not going to be solved in a matter of years.

What is next for the U.S. military in the Philippines?

Continue to aid the GRP in limiting corruption in the AFP. The failed coup attempt forced the GRP to address corruption in the military. Multiple programs have been instituted, including U.S. inventories of weapons and equipment given to the AFP through security assistance. Ridding the military of corruption will be a long process, but if the AFP hopes to one day have the trust of the people they are tasked to protect, they will continue to enforce high standards of behavior.

Utilize the counterinsurgency model against the MILF. When asked in 2003 why they were not interested in joining attacks with the AFP against the MILF, American officials stated, “The Moro rebels are a serious military force with about 12,500 fighters, and they have a large political following. Attacking them would plunge Washington into a fierce civil war.” Because the MILF do command popular support (an estimated 200,000 sympathizers) and are providing protection and training areas for the ASG and JI, the U.S. military must change their focus or risk Mindanao becoming the next Afghanistan.
Charge d’Affaires Joseph Mussomeli (now acting ambassador) stated that since September 11, 2001, “the threat remains and, quite frankly, in some ways, it is growing.”

Following Balikatan, the U.S. military continued to conduct operations and security assistance (a program to provide training and equipment to the AFP), but still there is no comprehensive military strategy to combat not just terrorism as a tactic but also a well entrenched insurgency with popular support and varying levels of organization. The AFP, aided by the U.S. military, has successfully conducted the type of counterinsurgency necessary to win the war on terrorism in the Philippines without igniting a civil war. The model now needs to be implemented in MILF-dominated areas.

**Formulate a regional strategy.** U.S. military policy in Southeast Asia must be reevaluated to address a more complex problem: terrorists move freely between Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines to recruit, train, and conduct operations; they have a sanctuary in the ARMM; and enjoy uninterrupted international funding through the MILF because it is not on the Department of State List of Terrorist Groups.

Starting in the Philippines, the U.S. must support a long-term counterinsurgency effort by the GRP. Doing anything less, particularly concentrating on capturing or killing ASG and JI leadership, will only serve to cause factions within the groups and fail to address the population that supports the terrorists. In the conduct of the counterinsurgency, the U.S. must continue to honor the Philippine constitution by not participating in military operations. Furthermore, vital to the legitimacy and success of the effort, other nations in the region must be convinced of the importance of the mission and agree to support the rebuilding of Mindanao by enforcing borders.

**The population supplies intelligence.** A common complaint in an unsuccessful counterinsurgency is the lack of intelligence: if only the enemy would reveal himself. The U.S. military and AFP share intelligence, but it is lacking. The majority of effort is toward finding “real-time” intelligence (usually from a technical collection asset) that can be passed to the AFP to prompt military operations against specific personnel or groups. Little, if any, intelligence is gathered related to insurgent motivations, methods of movement, recruiting sources, and ideologies. Without this type of intelligence, it is impossible to
know if the insurgents are winning or losing. How can the U.S. military address grievances within the ARMM to gain popular support, or win “the hearts and minds” of the people, if what drives them to support the insurgents is unknown?

**Support a unified effort toward a common goal.** Failed integration of military activities and governmental aid programs into a coherent program prohibits success in the Philippines. To conduct aid programs, intelligence-gathering operations, training events, and exercises all moving towards a common goal, requires a unified chain of command. Currently no organization or individual is overall in charge and responsible for success or failure in the Philippines, creating an environment where every organization has input into decisions, but no one answers for mistakes. Whether civilian or military, someone needs to be in charge of the overall U.S. effort in the Philippines and be held accountable for the results.

Supporting the AFP, the U.S. military still has the ability to prevail. Facing the counterinsurgency in the Philippines, specifically in the ARMM, is the first step in eradicating the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia. As long as there are safe havens, population support, and funding, terrorism will thrive. The U.S. military in the Philippines has been dealt a difficult problem with few resources to solve it, and not surprisingly, has responded remarkably well to the challenge. After 3 years chasing individual terrorists, it is time to return to the difficult, but ultimately successful, counterinsurgency model developed in Basilan. Failure to dedicate the assets and political energy necessary for success in the Philippines may result in the creation of the “next Afghanistan.”

**Notes**

3. Ibid., 138.


Annihilation and Exhaustion: Fighting the Global War on Terrorism

Wayne Keysor

The U.S. is pursuing a strategy of annihilation in its global war against Islamic terrorism, which seeks to destroy the ideological and material support provided by the wider Islamic community. This approach promises large expenditures of men, materiel, and time with little prospect of success. A superior strategy is a strategy of exhaustion, which attempts to attrit the enemy over time, while preserving U.S. power.

The German military historian Hans Delbruck introduced the concepts of *Niederwerfungsstrategie* (strategy of annihilation) and *Ermattungsstrategie* (strategy of exhaustion) to describe the fundamental differences between wars of annihilation and limited wars. While Delbruck was writing from a nineteenth century, Clausewitzian tradition and thus describing a highly operationalized view of strategy, his terminology remains illustrative of two very different modes of strategic thinking. This essay will borrow Delbruck’s terminology to argue that a strategy of exhaustion, rather than the current strategy of annihilation, is the more effective approach to fighting the Global War on Terrorism. It will present the main arguments supporting the superiority of a strategy of exhaustion and address some of the important operational issues that arise from implementing it.

**Strategy of Annihilation**

Classically, a strategy of annihilation is defined as one that targets the enemy’s center of gravity. Center of gravity is a Clausewitzian concept that can be defined as the single element of power without...
which the enemy cannot continue resisting. For nation-states, centers of gravity have historically been their armies, capital cities, or leadership. The most common method of attacking these centers of gravity has been to use large, western-style professional armies. The Islamic terror movement, because of its altogether different origin and structure, does not have these same traditional centers of gravity and therefore has proven to be less susceptible to military instruments designed to attack the common vulnerabilities of the nation-state. Islamic terrorists have neither identifiable armies nor capital cities. Their leadership hides among the inert masses, directing an invisible network of operatives that stretches across multiple nation-states. The disparate groups within the Islamic terror movement are linked in an amorphous web, reducing the ability of the United States (U.S.) to paralyze operations by attacking a single leadership element. U.S. policy makers concluded, quite correctly, that the Islamic terror movement’s center of gravity was the support for terrorism by the wider Islamic community.

As a result of this assessment, U.S. leaders crafted a strategy of annihilation, seeking to strike the Islamic terror movement at its center of gravity. This strategy attempts to undermine the materiel, political, and psychological support for Islamic terrorism within the larger Islamic community. It seeks to eliminate those conditions that create the impetus towards Islamic terrorism. This assault is multi-modal. It includes introducing western-style, democratic governments to Iraq and Afghanistan through military conquest and the diplomatic support of democratic movements and progressive religious interpretations throughout the Islamic world. The foundation of this strategy is the belief that once people of Islamic faith receive the social and economic benefits of western values and institutions, they will seek accommodation with the west, and when given a choice free from violence and coercion will embrace western values and institutions.

The weakness of this approach is its potentially high cost and low probability of success. There is a wider intra-cultural argument within the Islamic world about how to deal with the dominance of
the West, of which the Islamic terror movement is just one competing voice. As Bernard Lewis, respected historian of the Ottoman Empire, outlines in his research on the interaction between Islam and the West, the community of Islam is facing a crisis of confidence as Islamic culture and civilization retreats and western culture, values, and political power advances. This long retreat, which has been ongoing since the sixteenth century, is creating a cognitive dissonance for the adherents of an Islamic worldview that espouses that the correct adherence to God’s law leads to temporal as well as spiritual success for their community.

The Islamic terrorists’ method of squaring this particularly stubborn circle is to ascribe the Islamic world’s loss of primacy to subsequent generations diluting the original faith of the Prophet, thereby losing the favor of God. Only by returning to the old ways can the balance be restored. For these true believers, terrorism is the only weapon currently available to fight western influences and purify the faith. It is important to emphasize that this view is only one of many. However, it will continue to be a valid response in some segments of the Islamic world, until the Islamic community definitively resolves this question in favor of some other solution. Once a broad consensus is reached within the Islamic world that terrorism is not the answer, Islamic terrorism will diminish dramatically, if not disappear altogether.

Islam is facing a crisis, and the military conquest and occupation of Islamic states by the West is not likely to resolve it. The use of force to bring the values and benefits of western civilization has been attempted before. Over the last 400 years, a large number of Islamic territories have come under either the direct rule or the indirect, hegemonic domination of western states. There have been only an extremely select number of historical cases where this has resulted in an accommodation with western values. Spain in the era of the Reconquista and some segments of the Balkan Peninsula and the Aegean after the retreat of the Ottoman Empire are two such examples. However, these efforts took hundreds of years of debilitating war and occupation by western powers and a degree of moral laxity that is currently unacceptable. For the majority of cases, conquest has not resolved questions of Muslim identity and western values. If it had, we would not be in the current situation. Such attempts will only demonstrate the overwhelming dominance of the West over
the Islamic world without resolving the essential conflict within the Islamic cultural sphere.

It is also not the case that conquest eliminates the ability of Islamic terrorists to strike the U.S. This unfortunate fact is simply a function of the nature of the weapon, terrorism, and the nature of the target—the U.S. The basis of U.S. power in the world is the free flow of ideas, people, and goods. It is what gives the U.S. its economic and social vitality, which in turn manifests itself as political power. Yet perversely, it is also the very thing that makes the U.S. most vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

The only preconditions that terrorists require to successfully carry out attacks are access to targets and weapons. Therefore, to successfully stop attacks, one needs to control the movement of people so they cannot reach targets or acquire weapons. Neither of these possibilities is feasible within the U.S. To effectively control the movement of people and goods sufficiently to eliminate terrorist attacks would significantly undermine the freedom that is essential to U.S. success. Thus, to eliminate the risk of terrorism in the U.S. is to undermine the very foundation of U.S. power.

**Strategy of Exhaustion**

The definition of a strategy of exhaustion is one that seeks to engage the enemy in alternate spheres that are more easily accessed rather than attempting to attack the enemy at an elusive center of gravity. The goal of this strategy is to attrit the enemy over time until they are unable to continue the struggle. This strategy seeks to spend the enemy’s strength while preserving one’s own. The strategy of exhaustion, as applied to the Global War on Terrorism, recognizes that the U.S. cannot access the center of gravity of the Islamic terror movement with a reasonable expenditure of lives, money, and time. By applying the strategy of exhaustion, the U.S. would not expend its precious resources on long, open-ended occupations of Islamic nations in an uncertain gamble that it can change their values. Instead, it would return to the strategic defensive, while acting offensively only at the operational and tactical levels.

Remaining on the strategic defensive means forsaking attempts to use military and diplomatic power to change Islamic cultural values. Acting offensively on the operational and tactical level means
using military force to attrit Islamic terrorist groups wherever possible. Successfully employing the strategy of exhaustion requires an alternate way of thinking about the use of force. The fundamental military mindset needs to change from an invasion and occupation model, which seeks decisive victories, to a raiding model that accepts a continuous state of low intensity warfare. Military force would be used to conduct either preventative or punitive raids of limited duration with highly specific goals. These raids could range in size from tens of men to thousands of men, but always with a mind to strike hard and then withdraw. The functions of these raids would be to disrupt terrorist command and control, kill, or capture terrorist leadership, destroy terrorist infrastructure, or disrupt terrorist operations. Ideally, the military forces employed in the strategy would be designed for just this purpose. This plan would involve organizing a small proportion of U.S. military forces into a light, flexible rapid reaction force, reserved only for prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism. These forces would have their own organic combat support, combat planning, and combat operations capabilities. They would operate from defensible bases, either in the U.S. or in friendly states on the periphery of hostile regions, using U.S. technological superiority to move in and out of operational theaters at will.

The critical advantage of this strategy is that it would drastically limit the cost of the Global War on Terrorism. The strategy of exhaustion eliminates the high costs of invasion, occupation, and reconstruction that are being incurred by the strategy of annihilation. The designation of only a very small proportion of U.S. military forces for the Global War on Terrorism would make the majority of its forces available to meet its other global, great power commitments. U.S. interests are many and varied, residing in all regions of the world. The expenditure of so many resources on the global war against terrorism limits what is possible in other spheres and arguably creates an unhealthy strategic myopia that may cause U.S. policy makers to ignore or minimize greater threats to the national interest. This
strategy places the Global War on Terrorism in its proper context, an important interest, but certainly not the only interest of the U.S.

The strategy of exhaustion also has the merit of an achievable goal. Its aim is to minimize, not eliminate, terrorist attacks because it recognizes that eliminating them is not a militarily achievable goal. It accepts that the U.S. is being forced into a peripheral strategy and does not attempt to reach a center of gravity that is prohibitively expensive. Instead, it intelligently fights the peripheral strategy at the lowest possible cost with a military tool that is specifically shaped for just that purpose.

The fundamental premise behind the adoption of a strategy of exhaustion is the argument that in war between the U.S. and non-state terror groups, the disparity in power will eventually wear down the smaller, less resource-rich terror groups at a faster rate than the U.S. For this reason, a war of exhaustion favors the U.S. The most important strategic principle in this type of war for the U.S. is to husband its resources so that it does not compromise its other vital interests in the process of defeating the Islamic terror movement.

This argument is based on the further premise that a state has significant advantages over non-state terror groups in the international system. Such a conclusion is not self-evident. It has become fashionable to argue that the power of the state, in general, is in decline and that the state is less relevant to the modern world than ever before. Such arguments began in the early 1990s, with a body of scholarly literature coming out of U.S. academic and foreign policy communities emphasizing the growing power of non-governmental organizations, global mega-corporations, international criminal syndicates, and stateless terrorist groups. Many scholars believed that the power of these transnational organizations was growing at the expense of the power of states. The trend to see the world in this way became even more pronounced after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

These attacks seemed to confirm what these analysts had long suspected—states were facing new threats that they were ill-equipped to handle, and these threats represented a significant challenge to the power of the state. After all, the most powerful state in the world, a nation of 300 million people, was unable to prevent the mass murder of its own citizens by a stateless terror group numbering only in the
thousands. This event was clear, undeniable proof of what the analysts had been saying over the last decade.

However, such arguments depend on flawed premises. One incorrect premise is that the conflict between state and non-state actors is something unprecedented. One of the earliest and most enduring examples of a non-state threat is piracy. Pirates are the classical case of stateless, bad actors who, like modern, international criminal syndicates, operate across state boundaries. They did violence for profit and frequently operated from weak or ineffective states. Piracy predates the establishment of states and has been a bane for the whole of their history. Yet it is demonstrably not the case that piracy has restricted the growth of the power of states in any real sense. Rather, it has been a symptom of the weakness of individual states at discrete historical periods.

Pirates are not the only non-state actors with which states have had to cope. States have also come into conflict with non-state terror groups. The international anarchist movement of the 1880s and 1890s is one such example. This movement shared many of the same characteristics with modern-day terrorists. They sought a radical overthrow of the current order. They were not a centralized organization, but rather a diffuse mix of small groups and individuals who were more fellow travelers than fellow conspirators. They operated in cells with little knowledge of the plans or operations of other groups because they were not centrally organized. Lastly, they likewise used terror in the form of bombings and assassinations to achieve their political program. These attacks convulsed Europe for 20 years, but these groups eventually dissolved without succeeding. Not a single state was overthrown, nor were the anarchists a significant factor in the distribution of power in Europe in the period.

Given this history, what reason is there to suppose that the U.S. is at a disadvantage in confronting Islamic terror groups when powerful states have dealt so effectively with these kinds of non-state actors in the past? There are excellent grounds to suggest that powerful states, like the U.S., are becoming more effective at dealing with non-state actors. Consider that states command more resources today than at any period in their history, and there is no evidence to suggest that the major states are becoming either absolutely or relatively poorer. It is quite the opposite—the economies of the major states continue to grow each year. These increased resources allow
states to harness extraordinary levels of organized violence. In contrast, non-state actors have never been able to command loyalty, extract resources, and deploy those resources in the production of power to the degree required to challenge states. They fall short of states, not at the margin, but by orders of magnitude. Islamic terror groups do not have the power to create and deploy a modern army for this reason, yet is the reason that the U.S. can defeat these groups in a war of attrition.

**Operational Issues Arising from a Strategy of Exhaustion**

There are several important operational issues that arise from implementing a strategy of exhaustion. The ability to locate and destroy terrorists requires human beings on the ground performing intelligence gathering, target selection, operational planning, and attack execution in hostile and unfamiliar areas. Successful operations will be highly dependent on speed, technology, and shock. These types of operations will call for extraordinary planning and audaciousness. Invariably, in such a high-risk environment, there will be occasional failures and these failures will be catastrophic on the tactical level. The leadership and people of the U.S. must expect these disasters and not be dissuaded by these occasional tactical defeats.

This strategy also requires a serious commitment to continuous human intelligence collection operations. There is little possibility of operational success using this strategy without human intelligence operations delivering tactically relevant information about targets and target environments. Only through persistent human intelligence collection in the local environments where operations are going to occur can hostile environments be transformed from the unknowable to the known. This is vitally important to U.S. forces who will be outnumbered and operating in the terrorists’ home territory without the host governments’ assent.

An excellent example of the nature of intelligence support that is absolutely critical to execute this strategy successfully can be found in Israel’s assault on the Hamas leadership. Israel’s ability to repeatedly find and kill high value terrorist targets is only possible because it made a commitment to operate on the ground in the Gaza and West Bank, not just during the planning and operational phases, but continuously.
Israel has several advantages in this regard:

a. A large segment of its population is ethnically and linguistically identical to its enemy population. Consequently, it can actively recruit from this population to provide human intelligence support that has significant cultural advantages.

b. The Gaza and West Bank are relatively small areas, which allow Israel to concentrate its resources.

c. Israel can operate in these areas without interference from the military forces of other states. They effectively control the external access to the area of operation.

The U.S. has none of these advantages. The area of operations is immense, stretching from the Middle East to South Asia and beyond. This disadvantage impedes any successful concentration of resources, forcing the U.S. to deal with literally dozens of different cultures and nation-states. It also means that the U.S. will never successfully control access to its areas of operation. The sheer breadth of cultural spheres where these operations might take place dramatically increases the difficulty of recruiting individuals possessing the cultural, ethnic, and linguistic characteristics that would enable high quality human intelligence operations in hostile regions. It is an unfortunate truth that regardless of any organizational, tactical, or technological innovations, the U.S. will continue to struggle with these difficult challenges. Military commanders, civilian leadership, and ultimately the American people must tolerate a much greater degree of operational risk than has heretofore been acceptable in order to be successful.

Conclusion

The current strategy of annihilation plays into an American propensity for seeking quick, decisive victories. It is quintessentially American to throw all in, attack the problem at its source, and eliminate the problem as rapidly as possible. As useful as this approach is for some strategic problems, it is potentially disastrous for others. Some strategic problems, like Islamic terrorism, are ill-suited for this type of concentrated effort. The ability of the U.S. to reach Islamic terrorists’ center of gravity at a reasonable cost—which is essential for a quick, decisive victory—is very much in doubt. In the case of Islamic terrorism, it would be much better to allow time to work for
the U.S. By employing a strategy of exhaustion, the U.S. uses its advantages as a powerful, resource-rich state over poor, non-state terrorist groups to apply lesser amounts of indirect pressure over a longer period of time. Such a strategy limits potentially astronomical costs, while allowing the U.S. to pursue its other interests. The strategy of exhaustion is not a panacea, but it does fight the Global War on Terrorism in the way best suited for the current strategic situation of the U.S.
Interagency Approach Vital to Securing GWOT Centers of Gravity

John J. Schaefer III

This paper proposes that insurgencies can best be combated by an interagency effort to remove the connections between insurgents and the population rather than focusing efforts on the insurgents or the population themselves. An interagency approach that matches the strengths of each organization to the appropriate connections can reduce an insurgency’s ability to operate. Replacing or breaking those connections is the key to a counterinsurgency.

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) shares many characteristics with counterinsurgency operations in a complex system. Success in this war requires an interagency approach to address the specific elements of the system that insurgents require to reach their goals. The key to understanding why an interagency approach is necessary lies in examining the societal system that contains an insurgency. Understanding this system gives the counterinsurgency team a focus for their efforts—preventing the insurgency from prevailing. The nature of the connections in an insurgency system dictates that many different agencies participate in the counterinsurgency campaign. No single agency possesses all the attributes and capabilities required to destroy every connection the insurgents need to reach their goals. In fact, even the best interagency team cannot remove all the linkages in the system, but it may be able to affect enough of them to prevent the insurgency from achieving its goals.

The GWOT System

Many current theories of the counterinsurgency conflict view the people’s support as the insurgent’s center of gravity. These theories

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often describe the population as a sea in which the insurgents operate. This view of the system leads to a desire to drain the sea in order to expose the insurgents and destroy their movement. What follows are two major problems with this model:

a. The sea consists of millions of people, and the likelihood of draining enough of it to cripple the enemy is low. Relative to the entire population, very few active supporters are required to sustain an insurgency. Identifying those supporters in a massive population is difficult and does not actually solve the problem. If the conditions that allowed the insurgents to make a connection with a supporter still exist, the insurgents will seek out and gain new supporters to replace their losses.

b. Proponents tend to assign common characteristics to vastly different parts of the population in question. In reality, the population is comprised of very different groups of people and individuals with their own unique motivations. These motivations form the basis for connections with an insurgent group. The counterinsurgency effort should focus on these connections because they are the specific enablers for the insurgents. Some portion of the population will always support the insurgents. Therefore, this support is a characteristic of the system but it is not the insurgent’s center of gravity.

Trying to influence the people’s support applies distinct actions against a nebulous target. The specific connections insurgents use to maneuver to their goals are far better targets. These connections are an insurgency’s centers of gravity because their removal will prevent the insurgency from achieving its goals and may lead to its destruction. Even if parts of the population still sympathize with the insurgent’s ideals, this support does not aid the insurgents unless they have a connection with those people that allows them to make progress toward their objectives. Connections between the population and insurgent groups are shaped by the structure of the society. These connections can be financial in nature. People can be connected to insurgents through tribal allegiance or adherence to a common religious authority. The desire for power or representation can connect people to an insurgency if they see the insurgents as their best chance to have a voice in the future. A connection can
be based on the simple desire to live in a secure environment. In some instances, people may view the insurgency as the best prospect to improve their living conditions through improved community services and infrastructure. Each insurgency system will have different connections. Some connections will be easy to identify and affect while others will remain undiscovered or beyond the reach of the counterinsurgency. Nonetheless, these connections are the true centers of gravity upon which a counterinsurgency should focus its efforts.

The insurgency must use these connections to work across the sea of population. Figure 1 depicts these connections as stepping stones the insurgency requires to reach its goals on the opposite side of the sea of population. No single organization contains the tools required to dissolve all the possible connections between insurgents and a population. This fact dictates an interagency approach to dealing with the problem. The realization that the counterinsurgency’s connections are its centers of gravity should serve to focus agencies with the correct skill sets on the task of either destroying or occupying a stepping stone. Any attempt to have one organization single-handedly solve the problem is ill fated.

Figure 1. All Stepping Stones Available
The Financial Connection
The financial connection between insurgents and a population is one of the most readily apparent and provides an excellent example of why an interagency approach is required. The simple fact that people in nearly all cultures require money to provide for themselves and their families presents insurgents an opportunity to establish a connection with the people. When other sources of financial security are unavailable, the people will be forced to harbor insurgents or commit violent acts in exchange for the money required to provide basic necessities. Different parts of this situation are best addressed by different agencies. If the problem is a lack of employment, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) can step in to provide employment on relief projects. The military can also contribute in the same manner by contracting locally where possible. The military can also shrink the size of this connection by providing a secure environment in which people feel safe conducting commerce. However, if people have jobs and a secure environment but rampant inflation is preventing them from meeting their needs, the military cannot directly affect this connection. In this case, the Department of Treasury or Department of State needs to assume responsibility for this issue and help the local government correct the situation. The agency best suited to alleviate the conditions that allow for a financial connection should actually do the work. Using an agency with experience operating in the local environment can achieve counterinsurgency goals without destroying vital local economic practices. The key issue is that the counterinsurgency side either occupies the stepping stone by making the people look to them as the source of financial security or reduces the size of the stone by working to correct the underlying conditions.

The Security Connection
All people have a basic desire to live in a safe environment. If the insurgency positions itself to appear as the most likely provider of this environment, people will form a connection with their perceived protector. An interagency approach is vital when combating this connection because attempting to solve it solely with military assets can be counterproductive. While the presence of an armed patrol on every street corner may reduce obvious insurgent activity, that
presence does not contribute to a normal social environment. Additionally, any collateral damage or civilian deaths that occur when that military force inevitably engages the enemy will detract from the residents’ perception of a secure environment. While the situation may dictate some military presence, the efforts of other agencies can also contribute to overall security. For example, the Customs Service can help create effective border checkpoints that stop the flow of weapons and materials. Along the same vein, cross-cultural police training can build an indigenous security force capable of contributing to a secure environment. Successful efforts toward creating a safer environment can form the basis of a connection between the people and the counterinsurgency instead of the enemy.

The Religious Authority Connection

Breaking or reducing the religious authority bond between a population and insurgents is a very difficult task. The insurgent side in the GWOT has masterfully exploited this connection. The insurgents use this connection to polarize the population and keep them out of the middle ground of compromise. With this in mind, the best approach to reducing the size of this connection is by working on the margins and the wise use of intermediaries. An example of this approach is for the Department of State to tie foreign aid to the condition that the government in question monitor and curb the most vehement rhetoric coming from extremists within its borders. The military and USAID can prioritize their relief efforts in areas where the religious authorities espouse a more favorable view. Improved conditions in these areas will attract more people and start to reduce the size of the flock listening to the extremists. However, neither of these approaches will be successful unless the intelligence agencies identify and track those who use their religious affiliation to connect the people to their violent cause. The likelihood of outsiders eliminating this connection is low, but an interagency effort can reduce the size of this connection and give the enemy less room to maneuver.

The Tribal Connection

The tribal connections insurgents use to manipulate the population can be difficult to detect and influence. As with connections based on common religious authority, reducing the impact of these connec-
tions requires the efforts of multiple agencies attacking the problem from varied avenues. In this case, the true nature and strength of the tribal associations in question can be difficult to discern using the assets and techniques available to the intelligence community. However, the Department of State may have enough experience dealing with the parties to provide a partial view of the relationships in play. Any agency with experience dealing with the parties can contribute to our understanding of the system. For example, the Department of Commerce can work with businesses to determine who they deal with when they need something done. Examining this information can clarify the true nature of the power hierarchy in a tribal setting. Once that hierarchy is known, counterinsurgency efforts can be directed where they have the best chance of success. Many of the same dynamics present in the religious authority connection also apply when trying to reduce the size of the tribal connection. With a clear view of the situation, the military and other agencies can focus their efforts on influencing the leaders who have formal and informal control over their people.

**The Voice and Desire for Power Connections**

Insurgents also invoke the people’s desire to have a voice or their desire for power to connect with a population. This appeal only works if the insurgents convince the population that they have a common vision of a better future. The enemy’s call for a return to the era of the caliphate when Islam was preeminent is an example of such a common vision. Counterinsurgency forces must show that the insurgent’s goals are not in the people’s best interest. Yet again, an interagency approach is required to reduce the size of this connection. Any agency with an information operations capability must employ it to highlight the disadvantages of the insurgent’s desired endstate. A GWOT specific example of this line of attack is providing targeted populations with the facts about the standard of living before, during, and after Taliban rule in Afghanistan. This message needs to be consistently broadcast by any agency that has contact with the people.

In addition to the efforts to reduce the size of this connection through interagency information operations, counterinsurgency forces should take active steps to occupy this connection. The coun-
terinsurgency must show the people that the road to a brighter future lies in self determination, not in the insurgent’s endstate. Once again multiple agencies can play a role in this effort. Governmental agencies can set up elections. The Census Bureau can help local officials determine local demographics to facilitate voting. The military can provide a secure environment to increase participation in the democratic process. Other agencies can maneuver to increase the likelihood of friendly candidates having the support base required to win the election. All of these efforts can lead to a more inclusive, representative, competent government that reduces the people’s connection to the insurgency. The vital point is that the combined efforts of many agencies will be required to remove this stepping stone on the insurgency’s path to its goals.

The Community Services/Infrastructure Connection

A lack of sufficient community services or infrastructure can also be a source of connection between the population and an insurgency. If people think the insurgency represents the best chance of improving their local situation, they are more likely to provide insurgents passive or active support. The counterinsurgency must employ all its resources to break the mental connection between improved conditions and insurgent victory. This effort should have two prongs:

a. Directly attack existing problems. The military can use construction and civil affairs assets to have an immediate impact. Larger infrastructure improvements should be handled by agencies designed to support them for the long haul. The Department of State can use continued funding of these projects as leverage points to increase the divide between the population and the insurgents.

b. Empower the population so they have the tools required to provide for themselves. This approach requires the expertise of many agencies not normally associated with counterinsurgency operations. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services can teach the local government how to set up and administer social support systems. The Department of Energy can design efficient power distribution systems that meet the people’s needs. Numerous other agencies can address festering issues that allow insurgents to connect with
Interagency Effects on the GWOT System

Interagency efforts to eliminate or occupy the connections with the people used by an insurgency can greatly complicate the insurgent’s problem. When faced with this problem, insurgents have the choice of slowing their operations or taking risks that expose them to direct kinetic and nonkinetic attacks from counterinsurgency forces. The examples of interagency efforts discussed above can change the system enough to defeat an insurgency. Figure 2 depicts the effect these efforts can have on a societal system that contains an insurgency.

The figure shows the effect that efforts, such as those described herein, can have on an insurgency’s chances of successfully achieving its goals. The white connections are no longer available to insurgents because the population now connects with counterinsurgency agencies to fulfill these needs. Gray connections and connections with decreased size represent areas where counterinsurgency efforts do not achieve all their goals. However, even
partial success reduces the number of ways an insurgency can connect to the people. Lastly, black connections represent unsuccessful efforts at breaking connections. Every system will have some connections that are unbreakable. In this new version of the system, an interagency effort has greatly increased the difficulty an insurgent faces while traversing across the sea of population toward his goals. Making some connections unavailable and others harder to exploit complicates the insurgency’s environment and reduces their chance of success.

Victory in the GWOT requires a new orientation and an improved method. The connections between the enemy and the population represent the true centers of gravity in this war. Therefore, our efforts must be oriented against these connections. Successfully occupying or destroying these connections may also lead to swaying the people’s support, but their support is not the central issue. Low levels of support will continue to smolder in the system, but that support alone will not lead to victory for the insurgents without the connections discussed above. An interagency approach is the method best suited to deny the enemy these centers of gravity. This method of attack leverages all our resources against specific targets that can prevent the enemy from achieving his goals. Applying the combined assets of our interagency team against the enemy’s centers of gravity will lead to victory in the GWOT. 

Schaefer: Interagency Approach Vital
After the end of the World War II, Indonesian nationalists fought for independence from Dutch colonial rule. This paper discusses the role and effectiveness of the Dutch Special Forces in the Netherlands East Indies from 1945 until 1950 and thereby broadens our perspective in the light of today’s operations. An important conclusion is that winning battles on the tactical level was no guarantee for winning the battle on the strategic level.

After the collapse of Japan at the end of World War II, Indonesian nationalists recognized the opportunity presenting itself and declared independence from Dutch colonial rule. With the assistance of indigenous army units, their leader Sukarno proclaimed an independent Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945.¹

PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE

WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA, DO HEREBY PROCLAIM THE INDEPENDENCE OF INDONESIA. ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE TRANSFER OF POWER, ETC., WILL BE CARRIED OUT EXPEDIENTLY AND IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME.

JAKARTA, AUGUST 17, 1945 ON BEHALF OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE

SOEKARNO - HATTA

The Netherlands, only recently freed from German occupation itself, initially lacked the means to respond. The republican forces soon controlled parts of the huge archipelago, particularly in Java and Sumatra. On the other, less densely populated islands, no effective control was established by either party, leading at times to

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chaotic conditions. The Netherlands then mounted the biggest military effort in its history to regain what it believed was rightfully its territory. After 4 years of fierce guerrilla warfare and under severe international pressure, the Netherlands were forced back into negotiations, and the Dutch finally assented to Indonesian independence on 27 December 1949.

The Dutch Special Forces played an important role in this conflict. This paper discusses the role and effectiveness of the Dutch Special Forces in the Netherlands East Indies from 1945 until 1950. The hope is that it will lead to a better understanding of this complicated type of warfare and broaden our perspective. Ultimately, the paper elaborates on some significant aspects in light of today’s operations.

**Netherlands East Indies after World War II**

Since the 17th century, what is today’s Indonesia was a very rich Dutch colony. During World War II, the Japanese imprisoned the majority of the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies in concentration camps. Between 1942 and 1945 the conditions were set for a successful national coup. Part of the Indonesian population, espe-
cially the youth, was mobilized and partly militarized with approval and some support of the Japanese. After the capitulation of Japan, Great Britain initially sent troops into the Netherlands East Indies to take over and soon found itself in conflict with the fledgling republic. The British, under command of Admiral Lord Mountbatten, became worried about the increasing boldness and apparent strength of the nationalists. The British were not willing or able to occupy the territory until the return of Dutch military troops. They stressed the importance of negotiating with Sukarno.²

During 1946 the Dutch rapidly built up their military, and the Netherlands negotiated with the republican nationalists. On 15 November 1946 the Dutch and the republican nationalists signed the agreement of Linggadjati and agreed upon the proclamation of the United States of Indonesia on 1 January 1949. From this date the United States of Indonesia would be a semi-autonomous federal state, consisting of several sub-states, keeping as its head the Queen of the Netherlands.³ The rise of the sub-states like Celebes (today’s Sulawesi) was unsuccessful, due to lack of political will. Both sides increasingly accused each other of violating the agreement, and as a consequence the hawkish forces soon won out on both sides. The Netherlands then mounted the biggest military effort in its history to regain what it believed was rightfully its territory. There was also an economic argument: the Netherlands were financially broke after World War II and needed the rich East Indies territory to provide income.

Many Dutch were convinced that a powerful military intervention on Java against Yogyakarta, the power base of the Republic, would lead to the decisive declination of the nationalist movement. They envisioned an endstate similar to the situation before the Japanese intervention. The Dutch Royal Army in the Netherlands East Indies consisted of no less than 125,000 soldiers, mainly conscripts.

On the other side, the Indonesian republican nationalists had built up the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), the Indonesian Land Forces. These troops were quite often led by Japanese officers; they were organized in battalions, brigades, and divisions and mingled with the local population. In great parts of the country the TNI ruled by fear and intimidated the local population. Government officials
and local entrepreneurs, who worked for or cooperated with the Dutch, were assassinated, and their possessions were destroyed. Apart from the TNI, other groups were also trying to increase their influence in some parts of archipelago or to create an independent (sub-) state. Two resistance movements were the Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII) and communism. These several parties fought each other and the Dutch.

By the end of 1946, guerrilla activities against the Dutch authorities and against the population increased, and it appeared that the agreement of Linggadjati was not feasible. At this time, especially at Celebes, the Dutch conventional military troops were unable to maintain order and stability. The Dutch Joint Task Force (JTF) commander, General Spoor, decided to send a newly created unit of the Depot Speciale Troepen (Special Forces) to this region. But where did these troops come from?

**History of Dutch Special Forces**

On 22 March 1942 forty eight Dutchmen began the British-led commando training in Achnacarry (Scotland). Eventually 25 of them obtained the Green Beret. In June 1942 this resulted in No. 2 Dutch Troop, a commando unit that completely consisted of Dutchmen and which was part of No. 10 Interallied Commando. During World War II the number of Green Berets increased, and they fought on the continent. At the same time at Ceylon (today’s Sri Lanka) a similar type of commando training was conducted in cooperation with the British, and the Korps Insulinde was established in cooperation with the British. The mission of this Korps—initially called “Netherlands Special Operations”—was collecting intelligence and organizing guerrilla activities at Sumatra, which was occupied by the Japanese. In May 1945 the Korps Insulinde was reinforced with 154 volunteers, and among those were members of No 2 Dutch Troop. After World War II, the Korps Insulinde was disbanded (November 1945).

In the turmoil of the Netherlands East Indies in the beginning of 1946, two Dutch Special Forces units arose independently: the Depot Speciale Troepen (Green Berets) and the School Opleiding Parachutisten (Red Berets), later called the 1st Parachutist Company. Both units were created due to the efforts of young officers. Captain Scheepens, a former member of the Korps Insulinde, convinced
General Spoor of the usefulness of Special Forces, and he received approval to raise a new commando unit: the Depot Speciale Troepen (DST), later called the Korps Speciale Troepen (KST).

The second Special Forces unit was also created by young officers in Hollandia, New Guinea. The Lieutenants Sisselaar, de Koning and van Beek (also former members of the Korps Insulinde), were approved to raise a parachutist company, and on 1 May 1947 the 1st Parachutist Company became operational. The DST/KST and the 1st Parachutist Company operated separately in different areas during most of the conflict. The total number of operators in DST/KST and the 1st Parachutist Company never exceeded 1,000, which was less than 1 percent of the total Dutch military strength in Indonesia at the time. In 1949 the Army Chief of Staff decided to merge both units, and in July of that year the Regiment Speciale Troepen (RST) was raised. The RST was hardly deployed into combat since the Peace Treaty between the Netherlands and Indonesia was signed in August 1949. But what did the DST/KST and the 1st Parachutist Company do, and were their operations effective?

**Special Forces Operations**

The Dutch military executed two successive large-scale attacks by land, sea, and air forces on the Indonesian Republic, generally known as the First Police Action (21 July to 5 August 1947) and the Second Police Action (19 December 1948 to 5 January 1949). These campaigns resulted in the conquest of the territory of the Republic in Java and Sumatra, though not in the destruction of the Republic and its armed forces. In between the police actions and again after the second one, the Dutch conducted an intensive counterinsurgency “pacification” campaign waged by army and police against the Republican army and independent nationalist, Islamic, and communist fighting organizations.

Although the Army Command created the Special Forces primarily to perform the function of a rapid air-mobile intervention force, the DST/KST and the 1st Parachutist Company were only employed as such on three occasions; during the Second Police Action, both units were used as real Para Commandos and ordered to seize military strategic objectives. In the pacification campaigns the DST/KST and the 1st Parachutist Company were often asked for support when
conventional force commanders were no longer able to control their areas of responsibility. The deputy JTF commander was the tasking authority for Special Forces and gave the Special Forces commanders almost a “carte blanche,” especially in the beginning of the conflict. The missions lasted usually a couple of weeks. After the Special Forces had accomplished their mission, the conventional force commanders took over, and the Special Forces were sent to other problem areas.

The DST/KST and the 1st Parachutist Company acted fast and tough. Their mission was to restore the stability and the security in the area as soon as possible. Key in the execution of these missions was speed, surprise, and violence. The Special Forces usually worked according to the doctrine of the KNIL. This doctrine was developed in the early 1920s and was successful at that time. According to this doctrine, the Special Forces surrounded during nighttime a kampong (small village), sometimes supported by conventional troops. TNI guards were silently killed, and at daylight the Special Forces went into the kampong and searched for the TNI or other fighters. People who resisted were captured or killed, and people who fled were fired upon immediately. During these cordon and search missions, a lot of TNI troops and innocent civilians were killed. Because the guerrilla fighters were often not uniformed, seeing the difference between civilians and combatants was difficult; anyone with a weapon was considered to be the enemy and therefore killed or captured. When the Special Forces found ammunition or weapons in houses, they burned the houses, and the people were taken prisoner or killed instantly. The killing of the inhabitants, suspected of “extremism,” soon became known as “standrecht” (summary justice). After a surge of negative publicity in the beginning of 1947, the Dutch Army Headquarters formally forbade summary justice. The Special Forces built up a reputation, and the Indonesian opponent was frightened and tried to avoid direct confrontation.

A problem for the Special Forces was intelligence—that is, they had to gather it mainly by themselves. Their intelligence capacity was limited, and after arriving in an area, they generated intelligence by conducting patrols. Quite often the civilian population, who were often oppressed by the TNI, informed the Special Forces.
On the tactical level, weapons and ammunition was a center of gravity of the TNI. The Special Forces tried to find and destroy weapon and ammunition storage sites, because the TNI had problems in providing its troops with weapons and ammunition. The Special Forces booked several successes in finding and dismantling storage sites especially on East Java.

The question of whether the Special Forces were effective has a Yes and No answer. The Special Forces did accomplish their missions with minimal losses, and they were able to restore stability in the areas where they conducted pacification missions. In almost every case, conventional troops could take over after a while and maintain stability. Sometimes the opposing forces were destroyed or at least disrupted, but sometimes they just moved out of the area and returned after the Special Forces left. Because the Special Forces had built up a reputation, even the rumor that green or red berets were coming to a specific area caused opposing troops to move out. The general conclusion is that the missions conducted by Special Forces were successful on the tactical level for the short term. On the long term, the effectiveness can be questioned.7

The insertion of Special Forces had other effects:

a. Friction might occur between the Special Forces and conventional forces. The aggressive approach of the Special Forces units and the summary justice was rejected by some conventional force commanders. These commanders sometimes ordered investigations by the Military Police. Friction was also occasionally caused because of the command and control relationship. During a pacification mission, usually the local battalion commander of the conventional troops was overall in charge. The reaction of most Special Forces commanders was that these battalion commanders lacked the specific knowledge, skills, and toughness to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations. Success occurred, however, when disciplined commanders of Special Forces at the platoon and company level communicated and built a relationship with the conventional commanders.

b. Some conventional force commanders wanted to adopt the procedures and the different, more aggressive “rules of engagement.”
c. With the influence of the media, the military performance became the subject of debate in the Netherlands. The left-wing proponents condemned in public the behavior of the troops in the Netherlands East Indies, while the right-wing proponents supported the military. In the end, this debate definitely influenced the righteousness of the cause and the morale of the Dutch troops. The Indonesian nationalists were well aware of this affect, and they understood the importance of information operations and influencing public opinion. While losing the tactical battles, the Indonesian nationalists were successful on the strategic level in influencing the world opinion. They stirred up anti-colonial sentiments in the just-developing United Nations and found the United States and Australia on their side. The Dutch were outmaneuvered on the strategic level and were not able to counter this attack.

By the end of 1948, the Dutch political and military leadership decided to attack directly the opponent’s strategic center of gravity, the nationalist leadership. The Second Police Action was conducted between 19 December 1948 and 5 January 1949. The 1st Parachutist Company and the KST conducted an airborne operation, and following the principles of speed and surprise, they seized the airfield of Yogyakarta. Consequently they arrested in Yogyakarta on 19 December 1948 the civilian republican leadership including Sukarno. The JTF commander, General Spoor, kept the momentum and on 29 December 1948 the entire Dutch Special Forces were inserted again by parachute at Djambi on Sumatra. This time the objective was to seize and hold the important oil fields and refineries, the city of Djambi (including its harbor). This operation was probably even more complicated than the first mission because the element of surprise was less, and the enemy was determined to light the oil fields and create an inferno. After a fierce battle with minimal own losses, this operation was also a success. The third mission in this campaign was executed on 5 January 1949. The Special Forces were inserted for the third time in 3 weeks by parachute at Air Molek and Rengat at the East Coast of Sumatra; again the objective was to seize and hold oil fields. The enemy was less resistant than at Djambi, but the swampy terrain was more challenging; the third mission was also a success and ended the Second Police Action. The conclusion was that the Dutch Special Forces were successful in conducting
military strategic operations under difficult circumstances behind enemy lines.

Although the Dutch managed to defeat the Republican Army in almost all major engagements and even to arrest Sukarno, Indonesian nationalist forces continued to wage guerrilla warfare. Even more important, they booked successes on the diplomatic level, and the active diplomacy finally led to the end of colonial rule. Opinion in the rest of the world, notably in the United States of America, grew more and more against the Dutch. The Netherlands were forced back into negotiations, and after the Round Table conference in The Hague, the Dutch finally assented to Indonesian independence on 27 December 1949.8

**Reflection for Today’s Operations**

Studying this 1945 to 1950 conflict shows the importance of a synchronized grand strategy. The conclusion is that the Dutch did a poor job on the diplomatic and informational operation line, and in general, the economical operation line was of less significance. The Dutch military operations, however, were successful, and the analysis shows that winning battles on the tactical level is no guarantee for success on the strategic level. Furthermore, the grand strategy lacked synchronization and coherence. The most stunning example is the capture of Sukarno and his release after only a few months. Taking the situation in the world after World War II into consideration, the question is whether any grand strategy would have worked for the Dutch, given the world opinion towards colonialism at this time.

Another aspect to highlight is the rules of engagement and the methods used by the Special Forces during the pacification missions. Apparently the Dutch Special Forces were hardly limited by any rules, and one can say they played the game by the rules of the opponent. They ruled by fear, built up a reputation, and conducted summary justice. All this was based on the doctrine that worked in the 19th century and before World War II, except for one aspect. In the colonial doctrine the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the local population is emphasized. During the counterinsurgency the Dutch hardly paid attention to this important issue. Although the methods used seemed to be effective on the tactical level in the short term,
the military and political leadership should have realized that times were changing after World War II. In this period the international community was developing the United Nations and the Conventions of Geneva. On the strategic level the methods used in the field returned like a boomerang. The anti-colonial sentiments increased and the world opinion turned against the Dutch, something that the Dutch military and political leaders should have considered in the early stage of the conflict.

Regarding the role of the media, today the military is well aware of the enormous media impact, but in the days after World War II, the role of the media and its importance was not identified as such. Back in the Netherlands, the pictures and stories of summary justice were in the newspapers and led to a schism in society. This coverage had an impact on the morale of (conscript) troops in the East Indies. And as we see today, legitimacy and righteousness of the cause is still crucial for the morale of military troops conducting operations.

Applicable to all times is the aspect of friction between conventional forces and Special Forces. Some conventional commanders were envious about the methods, behavior, and effectiveness of the Special Forces. Several conventional force commanders wanted to adopt these methods. Other commanders and conventional soldiers strongly disagreed with the harsh Special Forces methods and were not willing to cooperate. The fact that commanders acted differently in different areas sometimes still occurs today. When conventional troops and Special Forces worked together there was sometimes friction because of the command and control relationship. Communication is crucial, and this conflict shows that the Special Forces officers are the key to success at this specific point. In cases where Special Forces officers were in command, able to build rapport, and discuss how to conduct the operations, the operations were successful.

The final aspect of interest is that the total number of Dutch Special Forces was limited regarding the area of operations and the opposing forces. The Special Forces succeeded in creating stability and control, mainly because of their professional skills, mentality, and training. Because of the limited numbers, the Special Forces
troops only could stay in an area for a limited time and had to build an intelligence picture from scratch, a far-from-ideal situation.

Studying military history is not about finding answers for today’s problems. Studying military history broadens our perspective, leads to a better understanding, and will probably help us to avoid making mistakes.

Notes
Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense and Why Words Matter

D. Jones

Major Jones provides a thought-provoking essay on the 50-year-old debate surrounding the definition of unconventional warfare. He also compares unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense and discusses the transition between the two to highlight why words matter. Jones recommends a new definition for unconventional warfare and its applications in the Global War on Terrorism.

One of the greatest contributions Special Operations Forces (SOF) bring to interagency efforts is its ability to work by, through, and with indigenous forces. However, the confusion over the doctrinal definitions for unconventional warfare (UW) and foreign internal defense (FID) continue to cause misunderstanding among SOF and interagency organizations. While this debate has been ongoing for over 50 years, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has muddied the waters even more as the interagency searches for a way to defeat asymmetric threats.

Defining our terms. Ask a group of SOF operators to define UW and you will get numerous answers. At one end of the spectrum are those who say UW is everything SOF does regardless of the type of mission—it’s all unconventional. Somewhere in the middle, they would say that UW is any operation in which SOF is conducting operations by, through, and with indigenous or surrogate forces. While at the other end of the spectrum, some would say UW is SOF’s support to an insurgency. The final group would actually be right, but you would never guess it based solely on the doctrinal UW definition found in

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Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. JP 1-02 defines UW as,

Military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and often more direct offensive, low visibility, covert or clandestine operations as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence gathering, and escape and evasion.

With this broad and vague definition, it is no wonder there is so much confusion.

Interestingly, the epitome of a clear definition is FID. JP 1-02 defines FID as, “Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, further categorizes FID into three types of support: indirect, direct (not involving combat operations), and combat support. As noted in JP 3-07.1, “These categories represent significantly different levels of U.S. diplomatic and military commitment and risk.”

Unlike the FID definition, which is clear in its meaning without any other context, the UW definition requires context for proper understanding. This context comes from the paragraphs that normally follow the UW definition in the joint and Army SOF (ARSOF) doctrinal manuals that describe UW in detail. A second question based on these paragraphs, which ends the debate for the first two SOF answers, is as follows:

Which of the seven phases of U.S. sponsored UW has SOF been conducting between 10 December 2001 and 10 April 2003 in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, to the present—preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, build-up, combat operations, or demobilization?1

For those who try to cram SOF’s current counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts into the “combat phase,” COIN is a component of FID, not UW. Thus, the answer is FID.
It is hard to believe that UW and FID, arguably the key missions of SOF, could be so completely opposite in clarity. As Clinton J. Ancker III, director of the Army’s Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, stated in a 2005 briefing on doctrine imperatives, “if you spend more than 30 seconds debating what it means, it isn’t clear enough for users.” SOF has been debating UW for over 50 years with no more clarity. The same issue haunted the fathers of SOF, Aaron Bank and Russell Volckmann. Bank explains their frustrations,

Neither of us liked the fact that so much terminology was being bandied around concerning behind-the-lines operations. The terms unconventional warfare, clandestine operations, unorthodox warfare, and special operations were being used interchangeably.2

When Bank and Volckmann refined the mission statement for SOF, there was only one mission, originally called Special Forces Operations (SFO), which focused solely on supporting resistance movements.

SFO was defined as “the organization of resistance movements and operation of their component networks, conduct of guerrilla warfare, field intelligence gathering, espionage, sabotage, subversion, and escape and evasion activities.”3 Thus was born SOF’s mission to support indigenous insurgencies behind enemy lines. Field Manual (FM) 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare (published in March 1955) replaced SFO with UW. This single mission would only last through the 1950s. In early 1960, President Kennedy would add FID as SOF’s second core mission. SOF’s success with special reconnaissance (SR) and direct action (DA) in the Vietnam War would add these two missions as well. Thus began the muddying of the waters that would only get worse in the 1980s and 1990s as SOF searched for relevance.

The purpose of this paper is to provide clarity to UW and FID in light of the GWOT. To this end, the writing includes a discussion of current UW and FID trends to provide the context of why words matter, show the transition point between these two core missions during Major Contingency Operations (MCO), and recommend a clear definition of UW.
Unconventional Warfare

The confusion on the meaning of UW is not new, nor is the idea of trying to clarify it. Numerous times throughout the last 50 years, studies have been conducted on UW in an attempt to ensure SOF’s continued relevance. Despite these studies, the UW definition in the 1955 FM 31-21 is nearly indistinguishable from today’s definition. FM 31-21 defined UW as,

... operations ... conducted in time of war behind enemy lines by predominantly indigenous personnel responsible in varying degrees to friendly control or direction in furtherance of military and political objectives. It consists of the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion against hostile states.

The last detailed study of UW was conducted by the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC), called UW 2020. This study ended in the summer of 2001 after nearly 3 years of intense review and debate. At the conclusion of the study it was determined that to remain relevant and ensure SOF’s continued niche, UW should be adopted as an overarching term for all SOF missions. This decision seemed like a prudent measure considering that with the end of the Cold War there was serious doubt whether SOF would ever conduct UW as originally defined.

All of these changes were implemented with good intentions to ensure SOF’s viability long into the future of the still naïve pre-9/11 world. Colonel Michael Kershner highlighted why UW, as an overarching term, ensured SOF’s niche, “By law, only the forces of the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, are authorized to conduct UW.” Unconventional warfare was to become a universal term for working with indigenous or surrogate elements in any type of environment that seemed to be “unconventional.” Although culturally accepted by a majority of SOF for the same reasons mentioned in the introduction, these findings never found their way into the doctrine due to the events of 9/11.

By the summer of 2003, nearly 2 years after the end of the UW 2020 study, SOF had successfully prosecuted two textbook UW missions in Afghanistan and in Northern Iraq. In both of these efforts, SOF partnered with insurgents and was extremely successful,
proving that the concept of UW as support to an insurgency is still valid and viable.

**Foreign Internal Defense**

Some find it hard to equate the current high-intensity environments in Iraq and Afghanistan to their idea of FID. For the most part, FID has been conducted during times of peace. However, high-intensity FID is not new as any Vietnam or El Salvador veteran would confirm. When President Kennedy gave FID to SOF, UW and FID were two separate missions. UW were actions designed to assist indigenous elements to overthrow a government or remove an occupier, and FID aimed at defending a government from those trying to overthrow it.

Where this difference really became evident was in the SOF’s post-conflict performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. Using Iraq as the example, after the fall of Baghdad, the war seemed to be winding down. Since the general consensus was that the coalition would be welcomed as liberators, the main task was hunting down former regime elements. Within 2 months it was evident that the coalition was facing an increasingly effective insurgency that was beginning to cause politically significant casualties. The coalition did not begin to adjust the post-conflict strategy to include COIN until it determined these enemy elements were not just “dead enders or criminals” but organized insurgents.

SOF was again in a doctrinal and operational predicament having to refocus from former regime elements to the more widely supported and complex emerging insurgency. All elements of the coalition failed to realize that a fundamental shift in operations had taken place. For SOF this meant that FID became the mission almost overnight.

**Logical Lines of Operations**

Some may ask why words matter as long as the SOF operators understand what they are supposed to be doing on the ground. This same group will also point out that the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) are much the same in UW and FID. The problem is that UW and FID are completely opposing mission sets. This lesson seems obvious now, but SOF has had to relearn it while conducting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. UW is conducted to overthrow an enemy government and FID to protect a friendly government. At
the tactical level, the SOF skills may seem similar in UW and FID, but that is where the similarities end.

During UW the primary goal is to assist the insurgents to delegitimize the enemy government through subversion, sabotage, and armed conflict. During FID the goal is to protect and increase the legitimacy of the host nation government. FID may include helping the government to relieve grievances, providing sustained services, and advising during security operations. Often security operations are more like police work than combat operations. To clarify these two opposites, an understanding of the logical lines of operation (LLO) for each mission is required.

LLOs are defined by Dr. Jack D. Kem as “a cognitive operational framework/planning construct used to define the concept of multiple, and often disparate, actions arranged in a framework unified by purpose .... All logical lines of operation should lead to the [Center of Gravity or COG]”6 For example, the UW LLOs could be to gain popular support; gain international support; use information operations; organize insurgent underground political, operational, and logistics infrastructure; and conduct armed conflict to delegitimize the government. In this case, the COG is the people. The endstate would be the host nation government overthrown and replaced by the insurgent political wing, opposition defeated or minimized, and rebuilding the country as viable state.

For FID, a good example of the logical lines of operation are information operations, security operations, development of security forces, reestablishing essential service, developing government infrastructure, and promoting economic growth. All of the LLOs are aimed at the COG—the people. Like the insurgents, the government must gain its legitimacy from the people. The FID endstate is a “secure and stable environment ... maintained by indigenous ... forces under the direction of a legitimate national government that is freely elected and accepts economic pluralism.”7

The Transition Point

There is no discussion in doctrine of a transition between UW and FID. In fact, the idea that UW and FID are related has never really been articulated. In a Major Contingency Operation (MCO), involving conflict and post-conflict environments, there is an identifiable
transition period between UW and FID. The transition between UW and FID happens at the point when U.S. or coalition forces have removed the regime and become the occupying power or installed an indigenous governing body, even if only for the interim.

SOF witnessed the transition from UW to FID in both Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this transition was indiscernible until it was too late, especially in Iraq. By the time that SOF and the conventional military identified a transition to FID, the insurgency had already escalated. Had this transition been identified earlier, counterinsurgency operations could have been conducted to disrupt the insurgency before the insurgents could gain the initiative.

This transition point can be modeled using the State versus the Counter-State relationship.8 The State is the enemy government or an occupying power. The Counter-State would be the insurgent elements assisted by or in conjunction with U.S. forces. The goal is to either remain or become the State. For example, the U.S. and its coalition partners, including the supported insurgents, are the Counter-State and use military force to overthrow the regime or the State.

The transition point is the point at which the Counter-State successfully defeats the regime and becomes the new State. An important revelation for the new State happens at the transition point. The new State must immediately switch its mindset and tactics to protect itself in order to now remain the State. The transition from the Counter-State to the State corresponds to the transition between UW and FID, as well as the transition between conflict and post-conflict.

So what happens to the old State? At the time the old State becomes the Counter-State it has two options—accept defeat or not. If it chooses defeat, the post-conflict nation building will occur much faster and with less turmoil, as in the case of Germany and Japan after World War II. If the Counter-state does not accept defeat, it begins using tactics appropriate to its capabilities, either political or military or a combination, to regain its State status. William Flavin explains these options in his article on conflict termination, “When the friendly forces can freely impose their will on the adversary, the opponent may have to accept defeat, terminate active hostilities, or
revert to other types of conflict such as geopolitical actions or guer-
ritta warfare." The former regime elements in Iraq and the Taliban
in Afghanistan are examples of new Counter-States that have not
accepted defeat.

The confusion between UW and FID comes, much like it did in
Iraq and Afghanistan, when the U.S. and the coalition became the
State prior to the end of major combat operations. Flavin explains
that the transition point, or what he calls conflict termination, is
“the formal end of fighting, not the end of conflict.” In Iraq, after
the regime was defeated, combat operations were still ongoing, but
inadequate steps were taken to ensure that the U.S. and coalition
protected the interim government and themselves as the State.

The fact that SOF never positively identified this transition and
continued to conduct what they thought was UW versus attempt-
ing to disrupt the budding insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan is
important. This failure to identify the shift from UW to FID had a de-
trimental effect on U.S. stabilization operations. First, the UW mind-
set focused SOF’s continued efforts to hunt former regime elements
or on other activities that were tangential or irrelevant to securing
the State. The mindset was that the mission was not over until all
of the key members of the former regime were killed or captured. In
Iraq, this focus was provided by the “55-most wanted” deck of cards.
In Afghanistan, the hunt for Usama bin Laden (UBL) and his associ-
ates continued unabated, with all efforts focused on him.

In both cases, our efforts were focused on single individuals
with little regard for other more crucial missions aimed at secur-
ing the environment and the State. This allowed the insurgents and
the foreign fighters to establish underground elements—command,
intelligence, operational, and support networks. The establishment
of underground organizations allowed the insurgency to transition
from a latent or incipient phase to the guerrilla warfare phase.

**UW, FID, and the GWOT**

According to Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman, UW has been
identified as an important concept in the 2005 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR). If UW is going to be used to support insurgencies
against rogue nations, this finding is correct. However if the QDR
determines that UW will be used against non-state actors, such as Al Qaeda (AQ), the debate just became more complicated.

The problem with this theory is that UW was designed for use against the government or occupying power within a state. AQ is neither a state nor an occupier yet. AQ is better classified as a global insurgency. All three of these elements eliminate UW as the correct operation to be used to counter AQ or other non-state actors. The “global” aspect of this insurgency also does not support the use of FID as an overarching term either. This effort will take a global counterinsurgency (GCOIN) effort, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

UW and FID do have a place within the GWOT. UW is appropriate for operations against a rogue state or an occupied state transformed into a caliphate, like the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. If there is an existing radical fundamentalist insurgency or potential for one within a country, FID would be conducted to bolster the host nation’s ability to counter this threat.

The use of other-than-U.S. forces or surrogates to operate against AQ cellular networks would more precisely be called DA, SR, or counterterrorism (CT). All of these operations can doctrinally be conducted with surrogate forces, but are not UW or FID. This subtlety is another important aspect of why words matter.

**Recommendations**

First, UW should be defined as *operations by a state or non-state actor to support an insurgency aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government or occupying power in another country*. Exactly like FID, there would be three types of support: indirect, direct and combat. This would make the definition of UW as clear as the current definition of FID and would finally end the confusion.

Also like the FID definition, the new UW definition would be universal. In other words, external support could be provided by Iran, Syria, China, Cuba, North Korea, and even Al Qaeda, not just the U.S. In fact, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s operations in Iraq are nothing more than AQ advisors conducting UW by providing training, advice, funding, and a form of precision targeting—the suicide bomber—to the Sunni insurgents.

Second, the post-9/11 UW operations also validated the seven-phase concept of U.S. sponsored insurgency. Obviously due to constrained
timelines, many of these phases were much shorter than described in doctrine—days instead of months. However, the final phase, demobilization, would be better served if called *transition*. Thus SOF would begin to shape the environment as combat operations ended to ensure success in the post-conflict phase by identifying potential threats, providing security, and transitioning the insurgents into local militia units that would disrupt any attempts by former regime elements to establish an insurgent infrastructure. The UW-to-FID transition point should also be captured within UW and FID doctrine.

Third, ensure a broader understanding of UW throughout the military and interagency by describing UW in detail in core joint and service doctrinal manuals. Currently, for example, UW is not mentioned in the Army’s FM 3-0, *Operations*. Instead, support to insurgency, with no reference to UW, is described in a single paragraph under *stability operations*. The success of UW in Afghanistan demonstrated that SOF can perform economy-of-force operations by supporting insurgencies, the Northern Alliance in this case, and that these combined forces can conduct decisive offensive operations. SOF’s UW efforts in Northern Iraq advising the Kurds also validated the concept of using insurgents to conduct shaping operations in support of conventional forces.

Finally, if the statement by Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman about UW is prophetic and UW becomes an overarching term for operations supporting insurgencies and operations against non-state actors, the confusion over UW will continue. A possible solution would be to define these two missions separately. The recommended UW definition would instead be used to define a new term, such as *Support to Insurgency* (STI). The second operational term could be called *Operations against Non-state Actors* (OANA). OANA would include all operations against a non-state actor utilizing surrogate forces or former members of the non-state actor that have been turned and now operate for the government. Thus STI and OANA would be clearly defined and retain separate lines of operations and doctrine to ensure clarity and understanding.
Conclusion

After 50 years of confusion, it is time for SOF to clarify the meaning of UW. Using FID as a model of clearness and simplicity, UW should be defined in terms that leave no question about the meaning of UW. Based on SOF’s current experiences around the world, the possibilities of conducting UW and FID—indirectly, directly, or in combat—has never been greater or of more importance with rogue nations and radical fundamentalist insurgencies rearing their ugly heads around the world. The clear understanding of these two missions and the transition between them will be critical for the most effective employment of interagency efforts within the GWOT and in future conflicts.

Notes

3. Ibid., 179.
5. Ibid., 4.
8. The State versus Counter-State theory was originally based on a presentation on the relationship between the counterinsurgent and the insurgent by Dr. Gordon McCormick, U.S. Naval Post Graduate School, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Division, presented at the Unconventional Warfare Conference, August 2003, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; for further discussion of Dr. McCormick’s “Diamond Model,” see Lieutenant Colonel (P) Eric P. Wendt’s article “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” Special Warfare (September 2005), 5.
mil/usawc/parameters/03autumn/flavin.htm [accessed 24 August 2004].

10. Ibid., 96.


Factors to Consider While Countering Insurgencies in the Global War on Terrorism

James Oldenburg

Major Oldenburg identifies three key factors—restraints due to morality, strategic guidance, and resources—that campaign leaders need to consider in applying their operational art. He also analyzes the impacts and interrelationships of these factors and highlights challenges to be overcome in order to facilitate U.S. military success in winning against insurgents.

The 2002 National Security Strategy states “the struggle against global terrorism ... will be fought on many fronts.”

The front in this struggle currently receiving the greatest attention is the counterinsurgency effort in Iraq. Given this war’s importance, and the continued military involvement in it, campaign commanders and planners need to understand how to best practice their operational art in this type of conflict. To aid these military members, this paper gives three key factors to consider in applying their art, analyzes the impacts and interrelationships of these factors, and highlights challenges to be overcome in order to facilitate U.S. military success in winning against insurgents.

Restraints Due to Morality

The first key factor in applying operational art against insurrections is restraints due to morality. In these campaigns it is critical that military activities emphasize the just and fair conduct in war (Jus in Bello) principles of discrimination and proportionality. This emphasis is more important to these wars than traditional symmetric ones due to the nature of the fight. The reason is because an insurgency

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is essentially a battle for the “hearts and minds” (and associated support) of the population. It is in this battle for public opinion that \textit{Jus in Bello} violations can have the greatest effect. Since insurgents’ actions are often less constrained by ethical considerations, U.S. forces may be able to gain public backing by effectively highlighting enemy immorality. U.S. forces, however, must not follow guerrilla tactics, for if they are seen violating morality rules, it will likely enhance the enemies’ popular support.

The 1957 French experience in Algiers provides an example where counterinsurgency forces followed such terrorist tactics, and it led to their failure. During this conflict the French forces (\textit{paras}) violated the restraints of the discrimination principle by imprisoning numerous innocent Arab civilians. In addition, their use of brutal torture to gain information violated the requirements of the proportionality principle. Many at the time felt they were justified because these techniques provided invaluable information and led to the end of the terrorist campaign. Their violations of morality, however, ultimately lost the war. When the French public received word of the atrocities, their support failed. This lack of home-front support eventually led to the terrorists’ success. In all, the inability of the \textit{paras} to stay within the \textit{Jus in Bello} moral restraints was the critical error that prevented them from achieving their goals.

\section*{Strategic Guidance}

The next key factor in applying operational art is strategic guidance. Liddell Hart’s maxim, “the military objective is only the means to a political end,” is as applicable to counterinsurgency operations as it is to large-scale war (if not more so). Although the military is only a means, it must be aligned with the strategic goal to achieve a meaningful endstate, “the better state of peace.” To do this, the operational artist must maintain a continual dialogue with the political leadership. This discussion is also important because insurgent causes are not static. Rebels will continually look for opportunities to rally support for their cause based upon changing political conditions. Counterinsurgents must, therefore, use this discourse to push for political reforms or adaptations to oppose the insurrectionists’ cause and help win the popular support. The importance of this dialogue is best summarized by Lieutenant General Templer, who during the
successful British counterinsurgency in Malaya, noted the political
and military sides fighting insurrections must be “completely and
utterly interrelated.”

For an example of a failure in modifying strategic direction, one
can look at Napoleon’s campaign in Spain. Napoleon’s goal for his
forces was for war to “feed war,” which led the French to “plunder”
civilian property. This action led the population to fight to protect
their land and became one of the Spanish guerrilla forces’ primary
motivating factors. After some setbacks, the French campaign com-
mander was able to attain some success but pushed to change the
strategic guidance in order to obtain complete victory. Unfortunately
Napoleon was not willing to modify his political ends, as he needed
funds in preparation for his planned invasion of Russia. Instead
of changing to match battlefield realities, he instituted additional
taxes. His inability to modify guidance based upon current circum-
stances made the public even more supportive of the insurgency and
was a key contributor to France’s final failure in Spain.

**Resources**

The final factor to consider in implementing operational art are the
resources (and their associated level of technology and transforma-
tion) provided to accomplish the mission. As Clausewitz noted, the
object of war is “to impose our will on the enemy.” Throughout his-
tory, nations have continued to improve their warfighting technology
in hopes of better accomplishing this goal. Pure weapons technology,
however, has not been the key to victory for counterinsurgents. His-
torically they have often been superior in this regard, and when they
lost, it was because they did not know how to apply their technol-
gy to this style of war. Therefore, although it is important for the
operational commander to understand the current status of technol-
gy in order to apply it, it is more important to maintain flexibility in
applying their forces. As summarized by Major General (Ret.) Robert
Scales, the “greatest advantage can be achieved by out-thinking
rather than out-equipment the enemy.”

To illuminate this point, one can look again towards France’s
defeat in Spain. Napoleon’s transformation of the French military
forces led to numerous legendary victories. These transformations
included reorganization and increased emphasis on artillery and
cavalry. Although these forces excelled in the symmetric battles they faced elsewhere, they were one of the commanders’ Achilles heels in fighting guerrillas in Spain. Specifically, the supporting arms could not be used in all battlefields because the artillery was too heavy and slow, and the cavalry could not be deployed in rough terrain. The French commanders’ failure to correctly apply the resources given, to the conditions faced, was a second key to their loss in Spain.

Analysis of Impacts and Interrelationships

After examining the impacts of the various factors on operational art in isolation, this paper will examine the interrelationships of the factors in pairs. This analysis will begin by looking at how strategic guidance and morality work together. As noted previously, when dealing with insurgencies, an ongoing dialogue between military and political leaders is critical. Given the strategic implications any violation of morality restraints may have, any “gray areas” on political intent or “pushing the envelope” on this topic must be included in this discussion. Because politicians are ultimately responsible for the conduct of the war (and for punishing those who violate standards), any changes in the morality of the fighting must be decided at their level. Although there are many issues where the military knows best, the area of morality is one where Clemenceau was spot on when he noted “war is too important to be left to the generals.”

A key example of this point is the debacle in the Abu Ghraib prison. The effects of this breach of morality have been drastic, including leading many insurgents to fight to the death for fear of similar mistreatment. Although ultimate blame has been debated, if one looks at the sentences levied, it points to a misunderstanding of strategic intent at some level within the military. If the actions of the soldiers in the prison had been intended as a deliberate modification to the rules of morality, the political leadership should have clearly directed it. An example of such a process in action was the recent debate over a proposed ban on torture. Without condoning war crimes based on “following orders,” this paper can conclude that a failure in following strategic guidance on morality can greatly hamper achieving the desired endstate.

Morality also has key interrelationships with resources. Focusing attention on information resources, T. E. Lawrence realized this rela-
tionship during his campaign when he noted the printing press was “the greatest weapon in the armory of the modern commander.”

The exponential increase in computers and communications systems since his day has vastly changed the nature of the guerrilla war struggle for “hearts and minds.” Specifically, battles today are almost completely visible to audiences worldwide. Due to this, any violation of morality on the part of warfighters can, and will, have strategic implications in the war. Although often used to aid insurgent causes, this technology is neutral and, like any weapon, can be used by either side.

To provide key instances of the interplay of morality and technology, one need only look towards current operations in Iraq. U.S. forces were late to transition their focus to insurrection and similarly late in realizing the importance of information operations to the overall effort. Many believed it was due to this lateness that the insurgents used the Arab media to gain an initial edge. To counter the insurgents’ operations, military leaders had to rethink their operations and, following the guerrilla’s lead, placed their information campaign first, using traditional military activities to supplement it. For example, “the single most effective tool against the insurgency” is a nightly TV program that shows insurgent interviews. This tool has been crucial in showing the population the lack of morality in war practiced by the insurgents and highlighting that they are “thugs and brutal criminals.”

The final analysis of interrelationships is between strategic guidance and resources. Clausewitz highlights the significance of operational art by noting the political conditions in war include not just “what a war is meant to achieve” but also “what it can achieve.” The important role played by the field commander is identifying the resources required for the desired political end. Once these requirements are established, they should identify any tasks given that they cannot achieve with the resources provided. As Clausewitz summarized, “a prince or general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and resources, doing neither too much nor too little.”

Current U.S. operations in Iraq highlight the importance of obtaining the resources required to achieve strategic goals against an insurgency. The initial forces that invaded Iraq were well equipped for the conventional role they were assigned, but some were ill.
prepared for the counterinsurgency role that ensued. For example, the Humvees were designed for transport behind the lines, but required more protection to deal with the frontless battles they later faced. Due to the change in circumstances, military leaders had to ask politicians for additional resources ($1.3 billion to armor plate the Humvees) to achieve the desired political endstate.

An example of a failure to change resources or intent required by this interrelationship can also be found in the French experience in Spain. By the end of 1810, military commanders had developed some tactics that were more successful against the guerrillas, but needed additional manpower to implement them. By this point, Napoleon needed all the money from Spain, and all his troops, to enable him to attack Russia and was, therefore, neither willing to change his guidance nor provide additional forces. The inability of the commanders to convince the strategic leader to either modify his endstate, or resources provided, was the final key to France’s loss. From these examples, one can see how important it is for the operational commander to match the resources provided to the politicians’ strategic guidance.

**Challenges to Overcome**

There are numerous challenges U.S. forces will continue to face in applying their operational art successfully in counterinsurgencies. First, winning the information battlespace (and the associated population’s support) will remain a struggle. To overcome the struggle, the U.S. military must continue to realize tactical and operational actions have immediate strategic implications and focus all efforts on those strategic ends. Next, operational commanders will need to continue the fight to maintain an effective dialogue with strategic leaders, ensuring strategic guidance adapts and meets changing circumstances, and resources provided are adequate for the desired endstates. Finally, commanders will have to be able to adjust their forces to meet changes on the battlefield.

In conclusion, the U.S. will likely continue to fight against insurgencies, not just in Iraq but in places yet to be identified. It is imperative that the practitioners of operational art in these circumstances consider morality, strategic guidance, and resources (and their inter-relationships) in planning and executing their campaigns. It is through
these considerations, and their operational actions, that U.S. military forces will be able to win the Global War on Terrorism.

Notes
5. Ibid., 289.
8. Ibid., 228.


18. Alexander, 184, 187.

19. Ibid., 189.


25. Tomes, 310.

26. Lowry, 381.
27. Ibid., 383.
29. Ibid., 177.
30. Lowry, 380.
32. Alexander, 189.
Counterinsurgency conflicts have employed informants to gain intelligence on the enemy. When units are organized, equipped, and employed in small groups to mimic enemy units, they are conducting pseudo operations. Their task is to carry out offensive operations, drawing manpower from combined military and intelligence forces and other less obvious channels. These channels are “turned” terrorists. Pseudo operations have been critical to the defeat of insurgent forces in past conflicts.

On 16 October 2003 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sent a memorandum to General Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, and Doug Feith. This memo, now known as “Snowflake,” asked some critical questions of the Department of Defense (DoD) in its conduct of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Of note, “Does DoD need to think through new ways to organize, train, equip, and focus to deal with the global war on terror?” Rumsfeld went on to pose the questions, “Do we need a new organization?” and “What else should be considered?” Currently the United States (U.S.) government, to include its intelligence communities and DoD, has all the assets necessary to fight terrorism on a global scale. Special operations forces, paramilitary capabilities, and intelligence-gathering assets all exist within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the DoD, and other agencies associated with intelligence gathering. To answer Rumsfeld’s questions, very little is necessary in the creation of new organizations. What is required are new methods of employment of existing organizations to accomplish the unconventional warfare aspects of the GWOT.¹

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¹ Spies: Pseudo Operations
The intent of this paper is to provide a new strategy and level of organization, designed using proven counterinsurgency techniques. These techniques have been used by the military and police organizations on multiple occasions over the past 50 years. Counterinsurgency conflicts in Kenya, Rhodesia, and Malaya as well as police operations around the globe have employed informants to gain intelligence on the enemy. When units are organized, equipped, and employed in small groups to mimic enemy units, they are conducting pseudo operations. The task of pseudo operators is to carry out offensive operations in conjunction with other military and intelligence assets wherever and whenever they might be called on to serve, drawing manpower from combined military and intelligence forces and other less obvious channels. These less obvious channels are “turned” terrorists. Pseudo operations have been critical to the defeat of insurgent forces in past conflicts. The criticality of these units has centered around the ability to provide timely intelligence to defeat the enemy.2

The U.S. Congress as well as many other government and non-government entities have identified the necessity of timely intelligence to the defeat of terrorists.3

Counterterrorism is highly dependent upon human intelligence [HUMINT], the use of agents to acquire information (and in some circumstances, to carry out covert actions). HUMINT is one of the least expensive intelligence disciplines, but it can be the most difficult and is undoubtedly the most dangerous for practitioners. Military operations to counterterrorism are dependent on the availability of precise real-time intelligence to support bombing campaigns using precision-guided munitions [or any direct action].4

Congress has identified that meeting this challenge is required to defeat terrorism. Different skills are required in gaining intelligence on terrorist networks than those utilized in keeping informed about the capabilities and intentions of communist governments.

The U.S. government currently maintains extensive capabilities in signal intelligence and imagery, but continual intelligence such
as spies and informers is the most critical in defeating transnational terrorists. The activities of terrorists pose significantly different analytical challenges than those addressed in the past. The focus of intelligence-gathering assets concerning HUMINT will require extensive involvement in third-world nations. Military operations targeting terrorists, both in preemptive and retaliatory events, reinforces the requirement for collecting and analyzing intelligence. “Whatever the organizational relationships, intelligence for counterterrorism will be affected by the need for good HUMINT, analysis, and for capabilities to support military operations with precise locating data.” To maximize and best utilize HUMINT capabilities, current assets need to be organized into pseudo operations.

The strategy for defeating terrorism on the local scale is not new to the U.S. military. The principles of finding the enemy, fixing the enemy to his location, and finally destroying the enemy through the use of kinetic or legal means are the same strategies and principles employed in fighting any insurgency. This strategy at first appears overly simplistic and deceptive in its inference that all three steps are equal. The ability to fix and finish the enemy is well within the capabilities of the U.S. military. Through the use of regionally stationed and employed special operations, conventional elements or U.S. Air Force kinetic strikes, the U.S. possesses the ability to rapidly neutralize any target once it has been identified and its location pinpointed. The hardest task in finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy is the first. Finding the enemy, especially on a global scale, is extremely complex and requires the U.S. government and its intelligence-gathering community to associate with unsavory individuals and groups in order to identify terrorists. These actions are similar to those carried out by police departments across the country when they employ informants. However, informants alone will not produce the desired effects. Pseudo operations provide more aggressive means to preemptively engage terrorists.

Examples of pseudo operations exist in the history of Rhodesia, Kenya, and Malaya. Examining the Kenyan counterinsurgency campaign against the Mau Mau provides an example of a decentralized organizational structure for conducting pseudo operations. The Rhodesian model of pseudo operations is centralized in its command and control. The Malayan example demonstrates the police model of pseudo operations, which operates closer to an informant model.
Example, Kenya

Following World War II, Kenyan soldiers, who were exposed to fighting alongside British white soldiers, began to come home. These young Kenyan soldiers had learned that Europeans were of the same flesh and blood as Africans. From this experience, a generation of Kenyans became disillusioned with British rule; the return of these young soldiers to their homes brought an insurgency. The younger members of the insurgent groups made violence an essential part of all their plans. These groups were tribal-based, and in Kenya the Mau Mau was the most powerful. The Mau Mau established objectives of land reform, self governance, destroying Christianity in Kenya and expelling foreigners.

The insurgency grew without a central Mau Mau authority. Three spheres of influence, each separate from the other, became the heart of the Mau Mau command and control. The organizations, although separate, were very efficient with a committee running each in a decentralized manner. Members of the groups divided themselves into militant wings and passive wings. The militant wings used the forest for cover to live in. These jungle-dwelling militant gangs consisted mostly of young men. The passive wing comprised itself with individuals who provided supplies, money, shelter, recruits, and intelligence for the gangs.

The Kenyan government initially tried to destroy the insurgency using cordon and search techniques. Villages were surrounded in the middle of the night and systematically searched. These operations, such as “Jock Scott,” did result in the arrest of hundreds of key leaders and supporters of the gangs. In response, the insurgents recruited replacement soldiers and continued operations. Operations to blockade forested areas, and therefore prevent militant wings from entering villages, failed due to the size of the area to be covered. Subsequent operations to resettle villages resulted in a backlash from the populace. Recruitment into the militant insurgent gangs increased following the government’s resettling attempts. Using conventional military tactics to patrol, identify insurgents, and destroy the enemy through close air support did assist in keeping the gangs on the move, but could not bring about their destruction.9

In 1955 Frank Kitson developed the concept of using pseudo gangs to gain information about the Mau Mau insurgents. Kitson’s
use of pseudo gangs came about almost accidentally. Kitson identified that traditional intelligence-gathering techniques were not sufficient to gain real time-intelligence. “However energetically we might rush about the district, and however much information we could take up, we could only get what the Mau now gave us accidentally, such as information gained from observation or from interrogating prisoners. Even our interrogation was inefficient as it is very difficult to make any sense of a prisoner’s stories. You must know something to start with.”

From this frustration, Kitson concluded that more timely and accurate intelligence could be gained from the employment of Africans impersonating terrorists, and then infiltrating the terrorist organizations, than continuing with the techniques currently being used. From this concept, Kitson built units of surrogate soldiers or pseudo gangs from converted terrorists and then penetrated insurgent operations across the country. Kitson was always against the use of pseudo gangs in an assault role. He recognized that using them in an overtly offensive manner would ultimately expose the pseudo gangs as government agents. The only time that pseudo gangs operated in a direct action role was if the pseudo gang itself was in jeopardy, the mission was in jeopardy, there was a risk of flight by the terrorists, or a high value target was identified as vulnerable. The ability of the pseudo gangs to rapidly undermine and destroy the enemy was founded in the same strengths as the insurgents. They shared the same strength of information.

**Example, Rhodesia**

While Kitson utilized a decentralized approach to the recruitment and employment of pseudo operatives, the Rhodesian military along with special branch\textsuperscript{11} chose a much more centralized system of employment, recruitment, and overall management. The Rhodesian system used an army regiment with a military hierarchical structure to facilitate administrative purposes. When deployed the pseudo teams operated in a decentralized hub network with limited abilities to expand into an all-channel network. As a result they maintained...
a more traditional force structure in garrison in comparison to the pseudo gangs of Kenya, but maximizing their capabilities in the field. The unit differed in its command relationship with higher headquarters though; the Selous Scouts regimental commander answered to the commander of all counterinsurgent operations.

When the Rhodesian military decided to employ pseudo teams, they found that the teams operated most efficiently with “white European” noncommissioned officers providing the ground leadership. Special Air Service (SAS) type soldiers were not appropriate to handle the intricacies of pseudo operations. What was required were noncommissioned officers who maintained a good knowledge of the language, customs, and people who operate around the villages, combined with tracking and survival skills. Finding individuals with these traits was extremely hard, necessitating the development of a centralized selection process. The selection process that the Rhodesian military used was applied to not only noncommissioned officers but also terrorists and local militia recruits. The concept behind the Rhodesian pseudo teams depended on trust between the turned insurgents and the Rhodesian soldiers who would lead or fight along side them. To foster this trust, the turned insurgents were paid equal to any other member of the unit. The turned terrorists’ families were housed and guarded in a similar fashion to any other member of the unit.

The Selous Scouts were created to train, recruit, and employ pseudo operatives and were fully operational by the end of 1974. Their tactics were slowly modified as the situation in Rhodesia changed. The original techniques employed by the pseudo teams went against the guidance Kitson had used in Kenya. The teams attempted to not only gain intelligence on insurgents but also kill them. One recurring problem, the same problem that Kitson identified, was that pseudo operatives compromised themselves when they attempted to conduct offensive operations.

Rhodesian light infantry, employed as a quick reaction force, was the solution to pseudo team compromise. “Pseudo groups were merely to make contact with terrorist groups through terrorist contact men and arrange meetings. Then instead of the group’s appear-
ing at those meetings and shooting them, helicopter born fire forces would be sent to keep the appointment instead. In this manner, this pseudo group that set them up for the kill could afterwards protest their innocence of involvement and stay on in the area seeking other terrorist groups, with their covers is intact.” During operations where initial contact was made between the pseudo teams and insurgent teams, the white European elements of the group never moved around the African members.

As a general rule the non-African members of the team stayed away from populated areas. The members of the team who did not enter the villages would stay out of sight, maintaining a base camp with observation of the village and communication to the headquarters. By maintaining an element in an isolated base camp, command elements of pseudo teams could keep more sophisticated communication equipment and prevent the obvious compromise of the pseudo team. Camouflage for these non-African members was a continuous problem, however. During the movement phase between isolated base camps, non-African members would use black face paint, along with growing beards, and wear large floppy hats to prevent their compromise at a distance.

The combination of semi-detached but competent leadership, along with long-range communications to headquarters, allowed comprehensive and rapid reaction times by Rhodesian light infantry. By 1979 the Selous Scouts had conducted hundreds of operations. Their success, though, should not be tied to the overall outcome of the war, but to their ability to identify and engage enemy in contrast to conventional counterinsurgency tactics. At the time the Selous Scouts were disbanded at the end of 1979, the information they gained through pseudo operations accounted for 68 percent of the enemy killed.

**Example, Malaya**

Examples of pseudo operations in police employment can be seen in Malaya. In these instances, operations were similar to HUMINT collection by informants than actual pseudo teams making contact with enemy factions. Utilizing informants without centralized vetting, training, or employment limits the scope of the offensive nature of the strategy as a whole. Using pseudo operatives in the Malayan
emergency was limited because the pseudo capability was not yet in
place. Pseudo operations were used late within the emergency, at a
time when the insurgent threat was already on the decline. This late
introduction of pseudo operatives limited the role and final outcome
they could play on a waning insurgency. What this case provides to
the observer is further insight into gauging the timing for introducing
pseudo operatives.

**Interagency Task Force**

If the U.S. were to employ pseudo teams against transnational terror-
ists, an interagency task force of some structure would be required. The
Rhodesian model of pseudo operations, with a centralized com-
mand and control structure, would provide the best ability to manage
operations on a global scale. The requirement for full integration of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), State Department, CIA,
and DoD assets to allow pseudo teams to be fully aware and possess
the best possible information when attempting a new contact with
terrorist networks necessitates a joint interagency effort.

Efforts to “turn” and train captured terrorists on a continuous
basis are necessary to maintain viable pseudo teams. Studies have
shown that the allegiance an individual has to a revolutionary force
is not as strong as previously believed. There are obvious differences
between religiously and politically motivated terrorists. Religious
extremists intent on conducting terrorist acts would be hard to infil-
trate, while individuals who have been indoctrinated into a political
beliefs structure are easier to “turn.” To turn religious terrorists
requires the targeting of individuals on the periphery of the organ-
ization, versus attempting to turn those who have been operating
at its core. Critical to the success of turning a terrorist is the rapid
identification of which individual of the hundreds arrested a year are
vulnerable.

Detailed in the 9/11 commission report are recommendations
that the DoD assume the direction of paramilitary operations. The
use of pseudo teams would require close coordination between
intelligence and DoD assets. Sole ownership of pseudo teams is not
necessary. Similar to the Rhodesian example, joint responsibility is
required for the success of pseudo teams. The CIA, which has a tra-
dition of handling paramilitary forces, should adopt similar responsi-
bilities as those of the special branch in relation to the Selous scouts in Rhodesia. The Rhodesian example of responsibilities breaks down with the intelligence organization controlling physical recruitment and mental preparation of personnel other than army, compilation and dissemination of intelligence, and the welfare and employment of nonmilitary personnel.

Army responsibilities were the housing, training, and discipline of all army personnel, the tactics adopted in the field, and the movement and physical deployment of operational units and their resupply. These tasks, outlined above, provide a very general guide for responsibilities; they do not provide full delegation of responsibilities. Budgetary and authority-based conflicts are an obvious element in reorganization of any governmental agency. These initial tasks provide the start point for further development of task sharing.

Regional fixing and finishing units are currently in place around the globe. The DoD has combat units in the Middle East, Horn of Africa, Far East, Europe, and Latin America. Proper integration of theater special operations commands into an intelligence network providing evolving threats will allow the employment of special operations director action assets in a rapid and timely manner. Pseudo teams with special operations commissioned or noncommissioned officers working alongside turned insurgents can assist in bringing fixing forces into play through the utilization of long-range communications back to theater special operations commands or to the U.S. Special Operations Command. The combination of turned terrorists with long-range communications, coupled to regionally focused direct action assets, will allow the proper employment of finding, fixing, and finishing transnational terrorists in a timely manner.

Ongoing counterinsurgency and counterterrorist efforts in the countries of Iraq and Afghanistan provide the most readily accessible means to identify isolated individuals and recruit terrorists for placement on pseudo teams. Critical to the recruitment is their rapid “turning” upon capture. As found with the Rhodesian elements and the Kenyan pseudo elements, it is necessary to begin turning a terrorist within the first 24 hours of capture. Globally, thousands of terrorist suspects have been arrested since the events of 9/11. Through proper identification and vetting these individuals can benefit pseudo teams.
The magnet for insurgents within Iraq provides a unique opportunity to trace the networks of international terrorists into other countries. Identifying what inroads exist for pseudo teams or the global assessment of initial contact plans with terrorist networks poses a much greater problem. Intelligence assets within the DoD and the CIA would need to identify not only private sponsors of terrorist movements, although not those necessarily limited to Islamic radicalism, but also possible state sponsors. Transnational crime, much of which is narcotrafficking, has emerged as a leading source of violence within both developed and underdeveloped countries. The global reach of narcotrafficking provides unique connectivity to multiple networks of criminal and terrorist groups. Utilizing these transnational crime networks will provide the ability of pseudo teams to identify both state and non-state terrorist networks.

With ongoing combat operations for DoD and CIA, critical to success is identifying what tasks and budgetary requirements are necessary for maintaining the pseudo force while remaining appropriately engaged elsewhere. Of importance is designing a structure capable of handling the amount of information that will be required for analysis. “Low level intelligence is needed to break a decentralized terrorist group. However, what is missing is the need for analysis of this data. The problem with the data collected by pseudo operatives and chatting with locals is not lack of quantity or quality. Quite simply, the security forces were in danger of drowning in the data.”

Network information and efficient distribution of intelligence data is critical to the success of pseudo teams operating as part of a global counterterrorist network.

Using pseudo operations in an international manner provides multiple pitfalls. Using DoD and CIA assets side by side in the conduct of pseudo operations, the legalities of espionage within friendly national borders, and the employment of unsavory individuals are critical issues to be addressed prior to employing counterterrorism through pseudo operatives.

Encompassing every possible outcome from using pseudo operations and policy implications to the GWOT requires more attention. Further development of the concept, especially in reference to what elements within the U.S. government can best conduct pseudo operations, is required. Legal, budgetary, and management of existing
intelligence assets would have to be weighed against the resource drain that pseudo operations may impose.

Current doctrine within the U.S. military does not fully address the use of pseudo operations. Utilizing informants and sources in the conduct of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism has been limited to intelligence gathering alone without emphasis on large-scale infiltration of terrorist networks. The answer to Secretary Rumsfeld’s question is Yes, the military does need to think through new ways to organize, train, equip, and focus to deal with the GWOT. However, No, the government does not need a completely new organization. What is needed is a developed network of pseudo terrorists and direct action forces to find, fix, and finish terrorist networks around the globe.

Notes


8. Waller, 28.


11. The Metropolitan Police Special Irish Branch was formed in March 1883, initially as a small section of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Metropolitan Police. Its purpose was to combat, on a national basis, a ‘Fenian’ (Irish) campaign of terrorism, which was prevalent on the United Kingdom mainland at the time. Subsequently,
the term “Irish” was dropped from the Branch’s title because over time it took on responsibility for countering a wide range of extremist and terrorist activity.

13. Stiff, 73.
15. Interview with Erik Jansen, Professor of Organizational Theory at Naval Postgraduate School, conducted by the author on March 2005.
17. Best, 14.
19. Stiff, 44-83.
20. Ibid., 165.