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**JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE  
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL**

**NAVY RESERVE: NOT READY FOR OLC**

by

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.**

**This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.**

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**11 June 2010**

**Thesis Adviser: Vardell Nesmith, PhD**



## **ABSTRACT**

The lack of integrated Navy force planning, education/training requirements for Reserve Officers, and Navy Reserve organizational rules limit the effectiveness of Navy Reserve support to the joint operational level of command (OLC). The Navy Reserve is waiting on force planning guidance from Navy leadership that history has shown is unlikely to be given. The quantity and type of Navy Reserve support provided to the OLC is not recognizable by existing manpower accounting. Current manpower billet structure will be determined and analyzed to provide needed information for recommendations and future study. Tracking of Navy Reserve Officers' operational employment since September 2001 has not been done with any fidelity or level of detail. Analysis of the awarded joint experience qualifications will provide insight on the employment of the Navy RC Officer corps and if additional training and education is required.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Active Component (of a military service)
AQD	Additional Qualification Designation
BSO	Budget Submitting Office
CCJO	Capstone Concept of Joint Operations
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CNOG	Chief of Naval Operations Guidance (issued annually)
FTS	Full-Time Support, USN RC personnel
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
JFMCC	Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JTF	Joint Task Force
MOC	Maritime Operations Center
NCC	Navy Component Command
NOBC	Navy Officer Billet Classification
NOOCS	Navy Officer Occupation Classification System
OLC	Operational Level of Command
OLW	Operational Level of War
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RC	Reserve Component (of a military service)
RCR	Reserve Capability Review
SELRES	Selected Reserve
SSP	Subspecialty
URL	Unrestricted Line Officers
ZBR	Zero-Based Review

## INTRODUCTION

*Navy Reserve. Ready Now. Anytime, Anywhere.*

-United States Navy Reserve motto

*“Ready for what?”*

-Unidentified U. S. Navy Reserve Officer

Military leadership has called for better officer preparation for the Joint Operational Level of Command. Academia and national think-tanks have called for the revitalization of the Officer Corps. Congress has called for the transformation of the Guard and Reserve. The Navy continues to reorganize itself and the Navy Reserve. Navy Reserve officers are struggling to prepare themselves and their sailors for an ill-defined future, waiting on guidance that is unlikely to be given. Discouragingly, none of these efforts have yet intersected. This thesis contends that the lack of integrated Navy force planning, education/training requirements for Reserve Officers, and Navy Reserve organizational rules limit the effectiveness of Navy Reserve support to the joint operational level of command. The joint operational level of command (OLC) exercises the authority and direction of assigned forces to accomplish the operational level of war<sup>1</sup> by planning, conducting and sustaining campaigns / major operations linking tactics and strategy through operational design to meet national strategic objectives.

The Navy Reserve Component (RC) is required to provide strategic depth and deliver operational capabilities to the Navy and Marine Corps team and joint forces

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<sup>1</sup> Operational Level of War, the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. (Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, 2008)



during both peace and war.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the organizational design of the Navy RC should be based upon a clear understanding of the operational capability requirement—the demand—that would serve as the ends within an organizational strategy. Moreover, the Navy RC ought to be designed and organized to provide the ways and means of achieving those ends connected to the demand.

Unfortunately, consistent with the history of the Navy Reserve, as will be shown, there is no coherent strategic guidance articulating the capabilities that the RC is to provide. Equally, there does not appear to be any intent to articulate this in the near future, though the limited discussion of the Reserves within the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) calls for a comprehensive review over the next year.<sup>3</sup> Unclear objectives and goals for the Navy Reserve provide insufficient force planning guidance; therefore, the RC focuses on improving existing capabilities.

Incremental improvements of RC capabilities are ongoing, but the primary core capabilities that the Navy Reserve provides have changed significantly over the past decade. The focus has moved from conventional core Navy skills such as operating warships, submarines and aircraft, to irregular warfare and combat support. The RC provides a significant percentage (and in some competencies the majority) of the Navy's irregular warfare capability; for riverine operations, maritime security, maritime civilian affairs, explosive ordnance disposal and special warfare. Combat support provided by the RC focuses on skills such as construction, logistics, medical, intelligence, and operational level headquarters staff. It is anticipated that additional changes to RC core

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<sup>2</sup> Navy Reserve Mission, Focus, Vision. (accessed 9 September 2009); available from <https://www.navyreserve.navy.mil/Ready Now/Shared Documents/Mission, Vision, Focus.aspx>

<sup>3</sup> Department of Defense, *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review*, 54.

capabilities are pending, but the easy redirection of resources previously dedicated to obsolete capabilities are complete. The future RC core capabilities will require thorough review of missions and allocation of resources.

Studies of missions and tasks recently performed by the RC have been undertaken, but were limited in focus and depth, not addressing support to OLC or RC officer development requirements. The studies did clearly identify the inability to accurately track usage of the RC in some missions, capabilities and competencies. For that reason, the current allocation of RC resources, measured by the apportionment of personnel billets, will form a framework for analysis, determining the “depth” or quantity, and the nature of RC operational capability.

However, using the Navy Reserve Billet database<sup>4</sup> as a basis for the analysis of RC capabilities is problematic. Historically, Reserve capabilities were functionally or mission orientation organized into Reserve Programs to facilitate oversight by the Navy Reserve Forces Command. Unfortunately, when oversight of the RC was transferred to the Active Component (AC) as part of the Total Force initiative, the Reserve Program manager billets were disestablished. The resultant lack of dedicated oversight has led to an inability to accurately track resourcing via Reserve Program codes, because resources were redirected without a corresponding update to the database. Further complicating the data collection effort, multiple Navy Major Claimants and Budget Submitting Offices

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<sup>4</sup> The Global Reserve Headquarters System, RHS, provides the authorized billet descriptions for the entire Navy Reserve and personnel data on each member assigned. RHS provides the Reserve Component data for the Navy Training Management and Planning System. (<https://www.ntmps.navy.mil/info/datsourc.htm>)

(BSOs)<sup>5</sup> control RC resource allocation and are very protective, limiting the ability to assess (and reprioritize) billets. The opacity of RC allocation represents a major challenge to accurately capturing the current RC resources allocation that supports OLC. The barriers to determining the allocation of resources needs to be rectified and administrative recommendations to improve the accuracy of what capabilities are resourced will be given.

RC leaders have attempted to meet the perceived demand—capabilities needed to support the joint operational level of command, by reallocating billets. However, RC force planning has been fragmented due to the limits of command authority and without an integrated global view. Additionally, the current force planning approach does not fully account for training requirements, particularly for OLC. A force planning approach focused on current capabilities alone will not create an integrated view including future requirements, so the RC force planning approach must be modified.

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserve final report to Congress, January 2008, concluded that there is “no reasonable alternative to the nation’s continued increased reliance on reserve components as part of its operational force for missions at home and abroad.”<sup>6</sup> The Commission further stated that the Reserve Components must be reformed for their continued viability and without the RC the future of all-volunteer force is in jeopardy. As the RC and Guard have evolved from a strategic reserve into operational reserve, providing on-going augmentation of the active force, the

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<sup>5</sup> Major Claimants / Budget Submitting Offices are Navy Major Commands and activities that conduct Planning, Programming and Budgeting, such as Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet, Chief Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Director of Naval Intelligence, or Navy Field Support Activity.

<sup>6</sup> Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense (Jan 2008).

Commission stated that debate on the future is overdue, particularly regarding the missions the Reserve should perform.

Parallel to Congressional efforts, academia and research organizations have called for the revival of officer education. The most recent example is the Center for New American Security report, *Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America's Military Officer Corps*. The report should further broaden the discussion of what skills are needed in the officer corps. The report calls for the rebalancing the officer corps between specialists and generalists to handle the range of required skills and education. Unfortunately, missing from the report was discussion of the unique skills Reserve officers could or should bring to the joint fight. The report does identify a basic truth that additional education and training cannot be added to overwhelmed officer development schedules which should be added to the debate of the Reserve reform.

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations version 3.0 (CCJO) provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff vision of the future of the joint force and details significant implications for the way the Services organize, man, train, and equip the units that compose the joint force. Guidance from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNOG) refines the implications of the CCJO and has prioritized the goal of developing “preeminent expertise and proficiency in planning, organizing and commanding at the Operational level.”<sup>7</sup> The Navy determined that a baseline military education for OLC staff was needed and the Navy Personnel system has been updated to include officer qualifications pertaining to the joint duty/joint specialty field, to track and utilize OLC education and skills more effectively.

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<sup>7</sup> Chief of Naval Operations, *2010 Chief of Naval Operations Guidance* (Sep 2009), 11.

The Navy has been struggling to develop meaningful OLC readiness reporting criteria metrics for headquarters tasked to become a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ), the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) or the Navy Component Command (NCC). The requirement for RC augmentation of these staffs to accomplish their OLC missions is recognized, but the staffs have yet to determine if separate and unique RC readiness metrics are appropriate, and if so, what metrics? The Goldwater Nichols Act does not require RC or Guard personnel to become joint qualified officers for selection to Flag or General rank, therefore there is no requirement to complete Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), the foundation for OLC competency. The Active Component (AC) hesitancy to require the RC to have OLC training and education is that it would require resourcing at the unit level, diverting man-hours and funding. OLC education will not be sufficiently resourced, without a defined RC OLC education requirement, but since there are limited resources being applied there is reluctance to set the requirement.

The parallel efforts introduced cannot be coordinated until a clear understanding of what the Navy Reserve is providing to the joint OLC is obtained. The quantity and type of Navy Reserve support provided to the OLC is not recognizable by existing manpower accounting. Determining the current RC support to OLC is the primary effort of this thesis. Current manpower billet structure and personnel OLC qualifications will be determined and analyzed to provide needed information for recommendations and future study. The next section is a short description of the structure of the Navy Reserve.


## COMPOSITION OF THE NAVY RESERVE

*"We must train and classify the whole of our male citizens, and make military instruction a regular part of collegiate education. We can never be safe till this is done." -Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 1813.*

The Navy Reserve is by statute comprised of the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The Retired Reserve is composed of all reserve members who receive retirement pay and those eligible for retirement pay but are not members of the Ready or Standby Reserve. The Standby Reserve is a pool of trained individuals who could be mobilized to fill manpower needs in a specific skill, but do not perform training and are not part of units. Standby Reserves without a military service obligation may volunteer to retain their Reserve affiliation on the Inactive Standby List without training or promotion opportunities. Reserve Personnel with a temporary hardship precluding participation in the Ready Reserve, a remaining military service obligation or members of Congress and other "Key Personnel" removed from the Ready Reserve because of importance of their civilian employment to national security are part of the Active Status List with the Standby Reserve. The Ready Reserve is composed of personnel organized in units or as individuals liable for recall to active duty service to augment the active components.

The Ready Reserve is composed of the Selected Reserves (SELRES) and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). IRR members are not assigned to a unit and do not participate in regular drills. The IRR is made up of personnel separating from active or reserve duty with a service obligation, personnel awaiting or participating in training programs and eligible personnel who request to be in the Ready Reserve. The second group, Selected Reserves, is made up of three subcategories: drilling reservists in a unit,

Individual Mobilization Augmentees and Active Guard / Reserve. Navy Active Reserve personnel are referred to as Full-Time Support (FTS)<sup>1</sup> and by Title 10 U.S.C. have the primary purpose to train and administer the Navy Reserve. There are over 11,000 Full-



**Figure 1. Navy Reserve Composition**

Source: OASD for Reserve Affairs, *Reserve Components of the Armed Forces* (September 2005)

Time Support personnel, of which 30% provide Headquarters and staff support for all the Ready Reserve.<sup>2</sup> The remaining SELRES, members of units and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA's), are normally considered the 'traditional' Reservists, paid for the performance of assigned duties, nominally annually 24 days of drills and at least 12 days of training. These 'part-time' Selected Reserves are the focus of this thesis and the term 'Navy Reserve' will henceforth refer only to this category of personnel unless otherwise stated and are highlighted in figure 1.

<sup>1</sup> Previously called TAR, Training and Administration of Reservists.

<sup>2</sup> There are 11,079 Full-Time Support personnel; 8,066 provide direct Operational Support and 3,013 perform Reserve Component Headquarters and Staff Support functions for the 37, 926 IRR and 55,970 'part-time' SELRES as of 22 February 2010. U.S. Navy Reserve, *RC Communicator, March 2010* (Norfolk, VA: CNRF Public Affairs, 2010). As of 19 February 2010 the Navy had 330,298 on active duty per www.navy.mil status of the Navy.

## US NAVY RESERVE HISTORY AND ROLE

*“each Colony at their own expense, make such Provision by armed vessels or otherwise... for the protection of their Harbours and Navigation on the Sea-Coasts, against all unlawful Invasions, Attacks and Depredations...”*-Grand Congress of America, 1775.

The formal establishment of the United States Navy Reserve component was accomplished by the March 1915 legislation. However, the US Naval Militia began on June 12 1775; Machias Maine citizens battled and captured the HMS Margareta, motivated by the battles of Lexington and Concord. The victory embodied the concept of American citizen-sailors in combat as an organized force in times of crisis, creating the precedent for the Navy Reserve. Throughout the Revolutionary War, citizen-sailors fought as privateers and in support of the small Continental Navy. But skilled seaman were difficult to recruit to the Navy, as they were serving in the Continental Army or preferred to serve aboard privateers, with better pay and laxer discipline. Despite this difficulty, the United States continued to assume that the American merchant and fishing fleet could provide the requisite skilled manpower in time of war.

The Naval Militia disappeared following the end of the Revolutionary War, ending the initial era of the Navy Reserve. Subsequently, several plans for creating an organized Naval militia were proposed, but none were enacted. The Barbary pirate attacks against American merchant vessels in the Mediterranean prompted the re-birth of the US Navy in 1794. This small Navy was fully engaged in its mission of protecting commerce, chasing slavers or performing scientific/ diplomatic missions and did not consider the requirements of a large planned wartime mobilization requiring a reserve force.



Though the nineteenth century the demands of maritime threats and enthusiasm of volunteers guided the Navy Reserve vice national defense policies. The limited nature of the wars with Great Britain in 1812 and Mexico in 1848 did not create a serious manpower challenge requiring the organization of a Navy Reserve. Volunteer sailors did again raid British commerce in 1812, and also unsuccessfully attempted to challenge the British invasion on a fleet of barges in the Chesapeake Bay. At the beginning of the Civil War, the Navy register included 1,000 officers and 7,500 enlisted men without an organized reserve. Through the war, the Navy grew to 6,000 officers and 45,000 enlisted men to man 626 purchased vessels<sup>1</sup>, but the growth was slow and difficult.

The Civil War Navy believed it could enlist trained personnel from the merchant marine, but was unable. Since the 1850s America merchant fleet shrank as industrial nations' steam powered merchant ships began to dominate commercial shipping, reducing the skilled American sailor pool. Further at the beginning of the war, the threat of Confederate commerce raiders forced most owners to shift flags<sup>2</sup> or keep their ships in port, providing even less opportunity for Americans to become skilled mariners. The officers and sailors unemployed by the threat were unwilling to join the Navy because of the better wages from the remaining merchantmen and the high bounties<sup>3</sup> for joining the Army. Later, the draft took large numbers of Navy and merchant sailors into the Army. By 1863, the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, had to request the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, to release not only merchant seaman, but drafted active naval

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<sup>1</sup> Kevin R. Hart, "Toward a Citizen Sailor: The History of the Naval Militia Movement, 1888-1898." *The American Neptune, a Quarterly Journal of Maritime History* Volume XXXIII, No. 4, (October 1973): 260.

<sup>2</sup> Shifting flag refers to transferring the country of registry of the vessel. Occasionally done during time of conflict to allow the vessel to claim neutrality and not be subject to seizure.

<sup>3</sup> Signing bonus given for enlisting in the army, ranging from \$100 to \$1,000 during the Civil War.

personnel from the Army in order to meet the Navy's skilled manning requirement. Only after the 26 March 1864 intervention by President Lincoln did Secretary Stanton release the men to the Navy.<sup>4</sup> By the end of the war, 101,207 men from twenty-one states had enlisted in the Navy. The Navy reverted to its pre Civil War status and capability without organizing a reserve due to the desire to return to normalcy and the lack of any significant threat.

During the 1870s, two movements generated the impetus for the creation of a Navy reserve force: reform of the U.S. Military, specifically the National Guard and Navy, and the growth of social and functional groups organized to societal trend creating specialized organizations. The debate on the National Guard became contentious because of its use in policing labor troubles potentially conflicting with training for its military reserve role. Throughout the debate on the future of the Guard, the majority of Army and Guard officers recognized the American military tradition of a limited standing military supported by citizen-soldiers and worked to improve the Guard in performing all of its duties. This desire to improve the efficiency of the Guard led to the creation of the National Guard Association by Guard officers in 1877 and the doubling of the Federal National Guard appropriations to \$400,000 by Secretary of War William C. Endicott on 12 February 1887.

Defense reform efforts were also ongoing within the Navy. The U.S. Naval Institute, USNI, was founded in 1873 by 15 Naval Officers at the U.S. Naval Academy as

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<sup>4</sup> The 3 March 1863 Draft Law, made no provision for serving Navy sailors or skilled experts required by the Navy (gunsmiths, ordnance design, ...) to be exempt from being drafted into the Army. The problem continued until 26 March 1864 with President Lincoln's direction to Secretary of War Stanton to release the skilled personnel as the Navy was unable to man available ships. During the final year of the war the Navy had too many potential recruits as men sought to avoid service in the Army. Gideon Welles, *The Diary of Gideon Welles, Vol. I.* (Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911), 498, 546.

a forum “to discuss the serious implications of a smaller, post-Civil War Navy and other matters of professional interest”<sup>5</sup>; and, subsequently, the Naval War College, NWC, was created in 1884 in recognition of the need for a center for professional naval education and research. The NWC provided a forum for its first instructor, Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, to develop his book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* (1890). Mahan’s theory is that national greatness required the control of the seas and the requirement a robust navy to protect commerce and keep the global sea commons open. His theory supported the growing American concept of manifest destiny and America’s desire to join the leading nations of the world and supported the creation of a larger navy.

Attempting to expand American manifest destiny during this period, President James A. Garfield’s Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, aggressively pursued access to foreign markets and western hemispheric intervention in support of the Monroe Doctrine with almost complete failure as America did not have a fleet to support its desires. The inability of the U.S. Navy to support Peru in its war with Chile, (whose British built Navy was stronger than the American), or to credibly protect a possible Pan-Isthmus canal in Nicaragua from European influence demonstrated the requirement for a Navy<sup>6</sup>. Following President Chester A. Arthur’s succession of assassinated President Garfield, the new Secretary of State, Frederick T Frelinghuysen, attempted a less aggressive course because of the lack of capability to do more. President Arthur began to urge for a

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<sup>5</sup> U.S. Naval Institute, “History of U.S. Naval Institute,” U.S. Naval Institute, <http://www.usni.org/about/history.asp>

<sup>6</sup> Henry F. Graff, “Presidents a Reference History, James A. Garfield and Chester A. Arthur,” Columbia University, <http://www.presidentprofiles.com/Grant-Eisenhower/James-A-Garfield-and-Chester-A-Arthur-Tragedy-succession-and-surprise.html> (accessed March 29, 2010).

stronger navy and supported the Secretary of the Navy, William E. Chandler, efforts to create an expeditionary navy.

In line with federal budget surpluses<sup>7</sup>, a new navy was planned and authorized by Congress, starting with the 'ABCD' ships in 1883. The new navy was a significant departure from the 1881 navy of 50 fighting ships, comprised of 33 were wooden sailing vessels and 13 coastal defense monitors. The armor-plated Cruisers, USS Atlanta, USS Boston and USS Chicago and a dispatch boat USS Dolphin were designed to operate far from America on a equal basis with other 'advanced' nations navies. Still the Navy was resistant to depart from its established and comfortable strategy. Instead Naval Officers recommended subsidies for a larger merchant marine keeping with the traditional peacetime mission of protecting American commerce not acknowledging the assignment of force projection as a primary mission for the Navy. The Officers believed a larger fleet "would require a larger peacetime navy of modern cruisers to protect it, and in case of a major war, would provide a larger reserve (of skilled sailors) for the Navy."<sup>8</sup> The idea that the American merchant fleet would provide a skilled reserve force remained the basis of Navy reserve force planning until World War I, when the vital role of merchant marine in modern war became obvious, removing it as a source of men and ships.

The second movement of period, the growth of social and civic organizations, was the primary inspiration to recreate the Naval Militia, not a break with the traditional Navy reliance on the merchant marine for manpower or a wartime crisis. The increasing wealth and industrialization of this period allowed the upper and middle classes more

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<sup>7</sup> Federal budget surpluses 1866 to 1893 had paid down the Civil War debt and provided means to fund a navy. Federal surplus in 1881 was \$100 million. <http://www.usgovernmentspending.com> (accessed March 29, 2010).

<sup>8</sup> Hart, 262.

time to form organizations of specialized interests as seen by the interest in the National Guard and several groups interested in promoting maritime skills and the Navy were created for social and patriotic reasons.<sup>9</sup> Yacht clubs becoming the center of this organizational trend in promoting a Naval Militia believing “the struggle with wind and wave braces men’s nerves, hardens the sinews, broadens the character and begets in the citizen a wider national sentiment.”<sup>10</sup>

The shipbuilding industry attempted to promote governmental subsidies for the shipbuilding and the creation of a large merchant fleet similar to the steamship subsidies of the 1830s and 40s. The steamship subsidies were discontinued prior to the Civil War due to poor planning and administration and Congress did not want to restart them even as American merchant fleet further declined face with subsidized foreign vessels. The initial bills, (1887 and 1888), to formally create the Naval Reserve failed due to the inclusion of shipbuilding subsidies.<sup>11</sup> Subsidies for shipbuilding were enacted by the Fry-Farquar bounty bill of 1890 and the Merchant Marine Act of 1891 without a connection to the creation of a Navy Reserve.

So, three groups supported the idea of a Navy reserve or militia—Naval leadership, the ship building industry and yachtsman, but did not agree on the strategy or method. Naval leaders acknowledged that a surge capacity to fight a war did not exist, and that an organized national pool of individuals was required. The ship building industry argued that the need was for ships alone, as a larger merchant fleet would also

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 260.

<sup>10</sup> Jacob W. Miller, “A Naval Militia and a Naval Reserve,” *The Forum*, XII (October 1891):282, quoted in Hart, 265.

<sup>11</sup> *Naval Reserve of auxiliary cruisers, officers and men from the Mercantile Marine of the United States*, 49<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., 1887. S. Rep. 1987, quoted in Hart, 266.

provide the manpower. The Yacht clubs just wanted to revitalize American sea power. The actions of the Navy and shipbuilding advocates to create a Naval Reserve were not successful though Congress mainly due to the belief that maritime industries would receive the benefit. Their efforts did prompt a great deal of activity at the state and local level. On 17 March 1888, the Massachusetts Naval Battalion of Volunteers was created by formal bill through the efforts of the Dorchester Yacht Club. New York followed, passing its Naval Militia act in the summer of 1889 due to the influence of the wealthy shipping industry supporting the yachtsmen's efforts. Captain Augustus P. Cooke's, the Vice-President of the New York Branch of the Naval Institute, observation summarized the attitude of the time, "in the early days of smoothbores and sails before steam and the telegraph were known, it might have been safe enough to defer the moment of preparation to the season of actual hostilities: but our national armaments should now be kept ready and manned."<sup>12</sup>

The Naval Militias were not immediately formed for several reasons, some of which still challenge the current Reserve and Guard. Beyond the slow funding process, the ability of Militia personnel to remain current on evolving naval technology was questioned. Additionally, jealousies of privileges to be given to reserves during wartime, and concerns that the Naval Militia would divert attention and resources from higher priority slowed the establishment of units. The first militia units were organized similar to National Guard units, primarily because the Naval Militia was organizationally part of the Guard. However, as the Naval Militia could not perform a major role in maintaining

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<sup>12</sup> Augustus P. Cooke, "Our Naval Reserve and the Necessity for its Organization," Proceedings, XIV (1888), 175, quoted Hart, 263.

domestic order during civil unrest,<sup>13</sup> the discussion as to its role was energized. Three positions developed regarding the training of the Naval Militia to reflect its role: trained as infantrymen to support the National Guard, trained to fight with the Fleet in time of war, or trained for coast and harbor defense.

Until the Spanish-American War, coast and harbor defense duty was the accepted likely role of the Naval Militia, although the Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin F. Tracy, proposed that the Militia consist of technical specialists that could augment the sea-going Navy in times of national emergency. Several units actively recruited in-demand technicians such as mechanics and electricians; for example the Rhode Island Naval militia specialized in torpedo handling and maintenance. The Navy department came to accept the Naval Militia as a fleet reserve because of these in-demand specialists, and began to lend old ships for service as armories and headquarters to the Militias. Secretary Tracy acquired some control over the activities of the Militias with the first federal appropriation of \$25,000 for “arming and equipping the Naval Militia” on 2 March 1891. This direct control of the federal appropriation affirmed the intention of many of the Militia founders that the primary function of the Naval Militia was to serve the needs of the Navy.

The Naval Militia expanded from 1,149 men in 1891 to 4,157 in 1897, the beginning of the Spanish conflict. The Spanish- American War was the first test of the Naval Militia. The Navy required additional personnel for the conflict but recognized

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<sup>13</sup> The Naval Militia did supplement the National Guard when called out for riots or natural disasters, with the exception of 1905 ‘war’ between Mississippi and Louisiana over Mississippi yellow fever quarantine. The Governor of Louisiana called out the Naval Militia to recapture Louisiana fishing boats were seized in Louisianan waters by Mississippian patrol boats. The Louisiana Naval Militia drove off or captured the offending Mississippi boats. Hart, 269.

that only trained volunteers were useful and the only trained personnel were in the state Naval Militias. But as the Naval Militias report to their state Governors, the Navy found that it could not call the Militia to national service without the Governors authorization to the Navy to use the Militia. The Governors granted the militiamen leave to join the Navy and the mobilizations proceeded relatively smoothly due to the established personal relationships of senior Militia officers with Navy leadership. The Naval War College proposal that the Naval Militia would man coastal defense and patrol vessels was enacted. After the USS Maine explosion,<sup>14</sup> the Navy expanded the fleet and found that it did not have sufficient skilled manpower. Militiamen completed the complement of many ships and fully manned four auxiliary cruisers, the USS Prairie, USS Yankee, USS Yosemite and USS Dixie, except for the Captain, Executive Officer and Navigator. Overall, 263 officers and 3,832 enlisted men from the 18 Naval Militias served during the war<sup>15</sup>.

Following the war, the Navy returned the Naval Militia to the coastal defense mission. The Navy believed the Naval Militia would never be used for more than auxiliary functions, regardless of the performance of its members during the war, due to the technical training requirements of the Navy. The Naval Militia's primary value became moral, consistent with the American ideal of citizen-soldier with decentralized local control.<sup>16</sup> CAPT Jacob W. Miller, Commander New York Naval Militia, believed that, "Outside of any special fitness that the Naval Militia may have had to man ships, I

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<sup>14</sup> The USS Maine exploded at 9:40 PM 15 February 1898 while at anchor in Havana harbor. The explosion cause was determined to be from a mine detonated under the ship. The public outrage at the loss of 260 men rallied support for armed intervention against Spain. (US Naval Historical Center)

<sup>15</sup> Michael D. Doubler, *The National Guard and Reserve* (Westpoint CO: Praeger Security International, 2008), 84.

<sup>16</sup> Hart, 278.



think it has done a great work in creating between the navy and the people that reciprocal feeling which did not exist in the old navy.”<sup>17</sup> The Navy support continued and the Naval Militias would strengthen to over 8,000 citizen-sailors by 1915.<sup>18</sup>

The preparation for American involvement in World War I, the Navy began the push to create an organized federal Navy Reserve due to determination that sea power would be required in the probable war effort, for at least transportation to the battlefields of Europe. On 3 March 1915, Congress passed legislation creating the Navy Reserve, the beginning of the end for the Naval Militias as the incentive to provide funding for the Militia was reduced. The Reserve was to be manned with sailors leaving active duty enticed by reserve duty pay. The initial Navy Reservists served in conjunction with the Naval Militias.

World War I is the only time Naval Militia and the Navy Reserve served as separate reserve components in wartime. The Militia again primarily performed coastal defense and augmented Navy vessels. Navy Reservists filled technical positions such as aircraft crew and antisubmarine special equipment operators. By the end of World War I nearly 60 percent of the Navy was Reservists and in technical fields such as aviation, 82 percent were Reservists.<sup>19</sup>

The return to “normalcy” following World War I sharply reduced the Navy Reserve and by 1922 the Navy Reserve received no money for training, only the interest of World War I aviators sustained the Reserve. Recognizing the requirement for a skilled

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<sup>17</sup> Naval Militia Association 1904, 58<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., 1904, S. Doc. 265, quoted in Hart, 279.

<sup>18</sup> Doubler, 85.

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Navy, *U.S. Naval Air Reserve*, by Commander Peter Mersky USNR-R, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) and the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (Washington, D.C. 1986).

Reserve force following local efforts to revive the Naval Aviation Reserve, the Chief of Naval Operations formalized Reserve policy and set performance and capability standards for units (at least 10 new qualified pilots a year). The Navy Reserve mission at the time was “to procure, organize and train the officers and men necessary in the event of war.” The Reserve was to be manned to supplement the regular Navy for the first 120 days of any possible war, after which it was assumed the training system could provide required personnel.

During this time the Naval Aviation Cadet and Navy Reserve Officer Training Corp (NROTC) programs were created. These programs focused on creation of capabilities of prioritized skills that require significant training and education. The NROTC program was established in 1926 at six universities “to provide a broad base of citizens knowledgeable in the arts and sciences of Naval warfare.”<sup>20</sup> The Naval Aviation Cadet act of 1935 was designed to augment both the Active and Reserve aviation capacity, but in reality the program became a primary source of Active Naval Aviators and a drain on the Reserve force. The Cadet Act required almost half of the Reserve Naval Aviators to support the Aviation Cadet Program as instructors leaving Reserve units undermanned and unable to meet unit training requirements.

The Great Depression placed severe financial challenges on the interwar Navy Reserve, reducing training hours and cancelling several years of support for the Volunteer Naval Reserve (similar to the Individual Ready Reserve). The Volunteer Naval Reserve consisted of skilled and desired personnel, but due to lack of vacancies in units or distance from training locations were unable to be members of the Fleet Naval

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<sup>20</sup> U.S. Navy, “Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps – History,” U.S. Navy, <https://www.nrotc.navy.mil/history.aspx> (accessed 29 December, 2009).

Reserve, the traditional drilling Reservist. Funding for the Fleet Naval Reserve members was occasionally limited but personnel were expected to perform at least 15 days of training a year with pay and remain ready and qualified for combat duty. The Naval Reserve Act of 1938 brought the Navy Reserve under the direct command of the Navy Department for management and training from an independent office. Training given at that time emphasized individual technical skills focused on his billet or his potential battle station assignment as this expertise was the sailor's value to the fleet. The 1938 Act cut the funding for Naval Militia members who were not qualified Reservists, effectively ending the Naval Militias.

Following the German invasion of Poland, President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the voluntary recall of Naval Reservists on 8 September 1939 and by November 1940 over 24,000 Reserves were on active duty. The Navy grew to over 3.4 million during the war, and approximately 271,000 of the 300,000 officers and 2,600,000 of the 3,000,000 sailors were Reservists,<sup>21</sup> fully integrated into all positions of the Navy. Additionally, the need for qualified personnel inspired the Navy to create a new reserve program, the Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES), which peaked at 86,000 women serving in stateside assignments.

The Korean War required the mobilization of over 182,000 Navy reservists who reactivated four mothballed<sup>22</sup> aircraft carriers and were the vast majority of aircrews in combat. The Reservists primarily served as individuals assign to regular Navy units, but did provide almost the entire compliment for several ships and 22 fighter squadrons. It is

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<sup>21</sup> US Navy News. "Navy Reserve Birthday, 19 August 2004 speech." US Navy. <http://www.news.navy.mil/navco/speeches/2004/r-bday.txt> (accessed February 10, 2010).

<sup>22</sup> Ship placed in storage with the potential for reactivation.

likely the extensive usage of the Navy Reserve for Korean combat operations motivated a change in Navy force planning. The resulting limited usage of the Reserve for the Cold War and the decision to not mobilize the Guard and Reserve for Vietnam fed the “Navy’s distinct bias against citizen-sailors, reduc(ing) its dependency and confidence in the Navy Reserve.”<sup>23</sup> The Reserve had been primarily used to provide individuals vice units for national emergencies following Korea, but Reservists did serve tours in Vietnam and often participated in combat operations during their annual training period.

The bias against the use of the Reserves was based on the historical challenges: full-time operators and maintainers were required due to increasing complexity of systems, the mandated training system focused on individual qualification, the need for a large sustained expeditionary presence required a larger percentage of the force to be on active duty and lastly the culture of the Navy favored active duty over Reservists. This reluctance to engage the Reserve continued through the enactment of the Total Force Policy and did not change until Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. enacted reforms to expand and improve the Navy Reserve. The separation between the Active and Reserve began to change due to significant participation of the Navy Reserve in Operation Desert Storm, (over 21,000 personnel). Significant usage of the Navy Reserve continues, on average 30 percent of the Reserve has been on active duty every day since the attacks of 11 September.<sup>24</sup>

The Navy Reserve has transitioned from a strategic reserve to an operational one, but challenges and questions remain. History has shown that Navy Reserve force

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<sup>23</sup> Doubler, 87.


<sup>24</sup> U.S. Navy, “Chief of Navy Reserve Testifies Before Senate Subcommittee,” Chief of Navy Reserve Public Affairs, [http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story\\_id=52199](http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=52199) (accessed 29 March 2010).

planning to be limited and reactive, but consistent the American tradition of citizen-sailor/ soldier. The capabilities the Navy Reserve develop and provide to the nation have been historically determined primarily by itself within broad guidelines provided by the Navy and the nation. History has shown that detailed guidance for what capabilities and competencies the Reserve is to develop and maintain will not be forthcoming and the Reserve itself must provide the focus.

## FORCE PLANNING THEORY AND PRACTICE

**force planning** — 1. Planning associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments, Services, and US Special Operations Command and is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments and Services. -Joint Publication 1-02<sup>1</sup>

It has been said force planning, like strategy, is an art, not a science.<sup>2</sup> The Joint Publication 1-02 definition assumes the consideration of national security needs and resource constraints in the planning for the development of the military forces. The military forces should be built to meet military requirements as determined by the national security desires within the strategic environment, which must include resource availability. The relative abundance of resources available to the U.S. military has created a force planning process in which resource constraints only affect the tools, not the strategy or goals as described by the Bartlett model, figure 2.<sup>3</sup>



**Figure 2. Bartlett Model of Strategy and Force Planning**

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<sup>1</sup> US Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (12 April 2001, As amended through 17 March 2009).

<sup>2</sup> Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, Jr., and Timothy E. Some, “The Art of Strategy and Force Planning” in *Strategy and Force Planning*, Fourth Edition, (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2004), 17.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

The Bartlett model provides strategists and force planners a framework to accomplish their task. The model describes a continuous, iterative process, where goals are met by the use of strategy and tools in the existing security environment. Resource constraints limit available resources and require the prioritization of resource allocation, affecting the entire model. 'Risk' describes uncertainty and potential negative outcomes when the goals, strategy and tools are not balanced. The strategist normally focuses on balancing goals and strategy, the force planner focuses on balancing strategy and tools, while the commander balances all the key variables as depicted in figure 2. To maintain stability in the model each of the key variables could be modified, though it may be argued that changing capability resourcing has become the primary method of U.S. military to reestablishing balance.<sup>4</sup>

Since a change to one key variable affects the others, force planning therefore affects goal, strategy and risk. A review of several approaches to force planning as proposed by Bartlett, Holman and Some, offers alternatives on how to reestablish the connection of resources to achievement of goals and the impact of the approach on other variables. Each of the force planning approaches has strengths and weaknesses, but effective force planning should use a combination of approaches. The key of strategic force planning is the discussion and investigative process rather than spreadsheets. The engagement of senior leadership in force planning must include understanding the goals with its implications for execution, both in strategy and tools. As the RC is legislated by Congress, leadership must begin there.

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 22.

## **CONGRESSIONAL CALL TO REFORM THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE, JOINT DUTY, EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 charted a Commission to assess the military reserve component and recommend changes. The Commission's final report made several conclusions and recommendations. The first conclusion is that the nation requires an operational reserve force and that reform is required for the reserve components to fully serve the nation.<sup>1</sup> The Commission determined that the Reserves and Guard "provide our military's most intimate and extensive links to the American people"<sup>2</sup> and the key to preserving the all-volunteer force. One of the areas of focus in the report was the design of the DOD personnel management system. The system was designed in response to the Cold War and the demographics of 1950's. Recommendations to the system strategy were made to meet today's threats and demographics. The recommendations included changes to policies and laws regarding joint duty, education and experience of reserve component leadership.

The Commission recognized the desirability of reserve component officers, whose skills from military and civilian experience cannot be duplicated in the full-time force, to be ready to assume senior leadership positions. But the reserve component's lack of joint military education and experience limit the opportunity to use their considerable talent. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 did not include the reserve components, though it did mandate policies for RC joint education

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<sup>1</sup> Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense (Jan 2008), 11.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 9.



and experience to be “similar” to the active component. No requirement for reserve component officers to be joint qualified has been enacted and the Commission found that,

Until reserve officers are held to the same standards as their active component peers and are required to obtain joint experience, education and qualification to achieve promotion to senior ranks, the armed forces will not be able to take full advantage of the unique skills and experiences that these professionals possess and will not achieve the integration essential for the most effective employment of an operational reserve.<sup>3</sup>

The Commission made seven recommendations to meet this goal, several of which have been acted upon. The first recommendation is that within 10 years, qualification as a joint officer be required for reserve component promotion to flag and general rank. The next three recommendations encourage additional Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) at all ranks for the reserve component and additional reserve component content added to JPME. The fifth recommendation is to expand the statutory definition of joint duty<sup>4</sup> to include service in support of civilian authorities, including state and local agencies, and review how joint duty experience credit is determined. The sixth recommendation is to require better integration of reserve component officers into the Joint Staff, service headquarters and joint organizations, including the combatant commands. The final recommendation provides a suggestion on how to increase the number of available billets to reserve component flag and general officers by waiving up to 10 percent of the statutory limitation of such billets if filled by a reserve component officer.

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>4</sup> Title 10 defined joint matters as “matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters relating to national military strategy; strategic planning and contingency planning; and command and control of combat operations under unified command.” Section 668(a), Chapter 38, Title 10, United States Code (as amended through December 31, 1992), April 1993, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.

The Commission report concluded that the nation requires an operational reserve force,<sup>5</sup> though it provided only limited specifics of what capabilities the reserve components should provide. The Commission found that the Reserve provides unique skills to the joint force unobtainable by the Active component and that increased opportunities and requirements for Reserve joint skills development is needed. Each service is to determine the competencies and capabilities its reserve component provides in accordance with national security, defense and military guidance. Military guidance begins with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's vision for the future force.

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<sup>5</sup> Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense (Jan 2008), 11. Conclusion One: The nation requires an operational reserve force. However, DOD and Congress have had no serious public discussion or debate on the matter, and have not formally adopted the operational reserve. Steps taken by DOD and Congress have been more reactive than proactive, more timid than bold, and more incremental than systemic. They thus far have not focused on an overarching set of alterations necessary to make the reserve components a ready, rotational force. Congress and DOD have not reformed the laws and policies governing the reserve components in ways that will sustain an operational force.

## **MILITARY LEADERSHIP OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF COMMAND REQUIREMENTS FOR THE USN**

“We must remember that the Reserves, which represent twenty percent of our warfighting force, are absolutely vital to our Navy’s ability to fight and win wars now and in the future.” -Admiral William J. Fallon

The *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* and the *2008 National Defense Strategy’s (NDS)* unstated foundational assumption is that U.S. Armed Forces will fight jointly. The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations version 3.0 (CCJO)* provides the vision of how this joint force will operate in the future. The CCJO provides implications and risks of how the future joint force will operate and these implications are to directly guide the services capabilities development process. Two specific implications for the development of personnel for the Operational Level of Command (OLC) were provided.<sup>1</sup>

Development of senior leaders to be experts in commanding at the operational level was directed as joint operations take place at the operational level. The CCJO noted that future OLC will be more challenging due to the growing complexity of the operating environment and that skills to meet this challenge must be developed over a career. The development of joint leader skills separate from the Service particular command and leadership skills is directed and must occur over a career.

Development of senior leaders who are experts not only in the operational art, but also in the development and execution of national strategy was directed as the joint force commander must contribute to the development of strategic objects. Strategic objects must be based on all elements of national power, not just military, and senior military leaders must understand the interaction these elements with military force. This broader

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations version 3.0*, Department of Defense (Pentagon, 2009), 34.

strategic understanding is directed by the CCJO to “begin early in the military education process and continue throughout every military’s officer’s professional development.”<sup>2</sup>

The CCJO stipulates that the proper ratio of the Active and Reserve forces must be included in the building of the future balanced and versatile joint force, implicitly including forces supporting the OLC. Absent from the CCJO is any Reserve specific direction such as the Congressional report finding that unique Reserve skills gained through civilian employment should be considered in building the force. Providing the conceptual foundation for subordinate joint and Service concepts is part of the CCJO’s primary purpose. Navy leadership has developed its strategy and guidance based on the QDR, NDS, and CCJO.

The National Maritime Strategy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, broadly continues the progression of the CCJO implications for OLC calling for “At all echelons of command, we must enhance our ability to conduct integrated planning, execution and assessment.”<sup>3</sup> The Chief of Naval Operations Guidance for 2009 and 2010 further detailed OLC requirements for the Navy, listing as one of his 18 focus areas: “Develop preeminent expertise and proficiency in planning, organizing and commanding at the operational level.”<sup>4</sup> Of note, in the 2010 QDR Main Elements of US Force Structure, Navy Fleet headquarters (which would execute the OLC) are not listed

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>3</sup> Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, Department of the Navy (Pentagon, 2007).

<sup>4</sup> Roughhead, Admiral G. "CNO Guidance for 2010." Executing the Maritime Strategy. [www.navy.mil/features/CNOG%202010.pdf](http://www.navy.mil/features/CNOG%202010.pdf) (accessed September 8, 2009).

with sister service equivalents headquarters,<sup>5</sup> as clear indication that the Navy has not accepted command at the operational level a distinct capability, despite the creation of a project team dedicated to improving Navy OLC capability.

The Navy created the Maritime Operations Center (MOC) Project Team to focus on manning, training and equipping the Navy's OLC capability. The MOC is an organization within most Fleet headquarters that will provide the core skilled personnel and equipment to establish a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters, a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) staff or a Naval Forces (NAVFOR) staff. The equipping of the MOCs is focused on C4I<sup>6</sup> standardization to improve system support and reduce unique training requirements. The training efforts are twofold, headquarter-wide training and specific billet training. The headquarter-wide efforts have established a two year cyclic training program culminating in an exercise event allowing the Commander to fully evaluate his command's readiness. The requirements for billet training are being coordinated with the ongoing manning studies. The Navy's OLC headquarters concept of operations, in line with the joint concept, requires personnel augmentation to function at the joint operational level. The manning studies are just beginning to address the augmentation requirements that would be supported by the Navy Reserve, joint personnel and mission specific personnel,<sup>7</sup> but details of the Augmentees capabilities (skills, training, education) required will not be addressed fully.

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<sup>5</sup> Operational Level of Command headquarters listed in the QDR: the Army's 4 Corps and 18 Divisions, 3 Marine expeditionary forces and the Air Force's 5 fully operational air and space operations centers.

<sup>6</sup> C4I, Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence.

<sup>7</sup> Other U.S. government agency personnel (State Department, Treasury, Homeland Security,...), Non-Governmental Organization personnel (Operation Smile, Carter Foundation, shipping companies...), International Organization personnel (International Red Cross, UN,...).

## CURRENT NAVY RESERVE FORCE PLANNING

The primary method of determining the priorities for an organization is by how resources of that organization are applied. The primary resource of the Navy Reserve is manpower. The Navy Reserve allocates manpower via billets structured into units.<sup>1</sup> The ability to determine mission, priorities and level of effort that the Navy Reserve provides to the nation should therefore be able to be determined by the billet structure of the Navy Reserve. The billet structure also should be easily discernible for Navy Leadership to make resourcing decisions and for Navy Reserve personnel to be able to make career decisions. The billet structure of the reserve is difficult to assess holistically due to the lack of clarity and consistency in the structure.

The limited guidance for force planning provided to the Navy Reserve has created a fundamentally incremental improvement approach to force planning. Significant changes to the Navy Reserve may be pending though in reaction to perceived national vulnerabilities, requirement for new Navy capabilities, and fiscal constraints. The Navy Reserve must be ready for the upcoming discussion. The current review process is insufficient to address the challenge.

Responding to a Secretary of Defense July 2003 memorandum,<sup>2</sup> the Chief of Naval Operations began an effort to renew the Navy Reserve, better integrating the Reserve into the total force. The Reserve was to be directly linked to Active units in

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<sup>1</sup> As noted in earlier in the composition of the Navy Reserve chapter, some funded selected reserves are Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) and are not part of units but are included in this analysis unless otherwise stated.

<sup>2</sup> Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Rebalancing Forces (July 9, 2003)

support of Sea Power 21<sup>3</sup> mission requirements. A review was conducted to determine the requirement for selected reservists beginning in August 2004. The review was conducted not considering funding, availability of personnel or organizational limitations as a zero-based review (ZBR). The ZBR was led by US Fleet Forces Command and followed a structured process using mission requirements and goals. It did not analyze the cost-effectiveness of the total manpower mix (active, reserve, civilian or contractor) per the Department of Defense directive on manpower management,<sup>4</sup> but did realign the reserve to emerging requirements.

Continuing realignment of reserve resources following the ZBR has developed into a standard process. A Reserve Capabilities Review (RCR) process was created in 2008, which recommends adjustments to the application of Reserve resources via a priority system, grouped by capability sets on a 2-year cycle. The RCR attempts to fulfill both halves of the Navy Reserve mission: providing strategic depth and deliver operational capabilities. The RCR accepts and incorporates the conclusion of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves “that there is no reasonable alternative to the nation’s continued increased reliance on reserve component as part of its operational force for missions at home and abroad.”<sup>5</sup> The RCR does not address cost effectiveness of the manpower mix and seeks only to adjust reserve force allocation

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<sup>3</sup> Sea Power 21 was the vision how the Navy will organize, integrate and transform, replaced by the *Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, October 2007.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Department of Defense. Directive 1100.4, Guidance for Manpower Management. Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2005.

<sup>5</sup> United States Congress. Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. *Final report to Congress and Secretary of Defense*, Commission of the National Guard and Reserves (Washington, D.C., 2008), letter to Congress.

under the Navy's primary mission execution organizations, US Fleet Forces (USFF) and US Pacific Fleet (PACFLT).

The RCR is coordinated effort between USFF and PACFLT, which have budgeting authority for almost 70 percent of the Reserve force.<sup>6</sup> Units outside of their authority are to be reviewed by the Office of Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV). The RCR reallocates personnel per capability and units by days of work performed supporting that capability or unit and the percentage of 'strategic' capability that is in the RC. 'Strategic' capability percentage is the number of RC billets divided by total RC, AC and civilian billets assigned to that capability, such as 100 % of the Navy's medium and heavy airlift is in the Reserves. Special cases for RC priority were also determined based on the requirement for unique civilian skills, special interest by Navy leadership or demonstrated good business case for RC part-time capability. The RCR is a very good process for making personnel resourcing adjustments, but assumes that the training and education required for the new billets has been accomplished or will be addressed at the unit level. Additionally, the process focuses at the 'tactical' level, avoiding implications that may affect the total force, such as the growth of RC support to the OLC.

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<sup>6</sup> Accurate accounting of funding of the reserves via Budget Submitting Offices (BSOs) is not available. This estimate is based upon Reserve Program Codes. Significant BSOs with percentage (%) of Reserve force, not included in RCR: Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 10.0%, Naval Installations 7.5%, Office of Naval Intelligence 6.3%, Marine Corps 3.3%, Naval Sea Systems Command 3.0%, Naval Supply Systems Command 2.0%.



## NAVY RESERVE SUPPORT TO OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF COMMAND

To determine what the Navy Reserve should provide at the Operational Level of Command (OLC) it is necessary to determine the current state of the provided support. The current force planning process only looks at the changes to resources allocated, not the overall resource allocation. Therefore, determining the level of support to the OLC the RC provides requires significant analysis. The Navy definition of the OLC—Unified Commands, Joint Commands and Fleet Headquarters— provides a basis for the analysis. But, as noted, the loss of Reserve Program<sup>1</sup> managers over the past decade has introduced discrepancies into the database. Review of all 2,628 RC units by unit title and evaluated usage is therefore required.

Analysis of the units via data provided by the Reserve Headquarters System (RHS)<sup>2</sup>, results in at least 10.7 percent of the RC dedicated to supporting the Operational Level of Command and likely that over 12 percent of the RC is allocated as shown in table 1. At least 160 RC units were assessed to dedicated support to the OLC and an additional 30 units were assessed to have a significant focus on supporting the OLC. The Reserve Programs that provide significant support to the OLC are the Office of Naval

	UNITS	BILLETS	% Billets	SAILORS	% Sailors
Supports OLC	160	5739	10.77	5208	8.66
Highly likely supports OLC	30	751	1.41	639	1.06
TOTAL SUPPORT OLC		6490	12.17	5847	9.73
Total RC	2638	53311		60109	

**Table 1. US Navy Reserve Billets and Sailors to OLC**

*Source:* Reserve Headquarter System query with analysis by author.

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<sup>1</sup> Reserve programs are functional or mission orientated groupings for administrative and funding support.

<sup>2</sup> RHS provides reserve personnel and pay interfaces, manpower requirements data and reserve billet data and provides headquarters level support for force billet and mobilization management.

Intelligence, Numbered Fleets, Major HQ Staffs, Unified & Joint Commands, and Allied-NATO Commands. Analysis of OLC focused units also points out the average of 10 percent vacancy in assigned billets across the competency set. This gap is consistent through all Reserve Programs supporting the OLC and is considered standard due to personnel transition and the request for high demand skill sets. A detailed summary table is attached as Appendix A.

The Navy has created an OLC capability sub-category, Maritime Operations Center (MOC), the primary Operational Level of Command headquarters for the Navy. The MOC concept focuses on accreditation of organizations that could function as the staff for a Joint Task Force, a Joint Force Maritime Component or the Naval Force provider. The concept assumes that networking of the MOCs to other MOCs and support agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, will reduce some of the augmentation required to fulfill a Joint role, but expects the RC to provide trained personnel. The RC has dedicated 76 reserve units with over 5% of the RC personnel to provide support to the MOCs as shown in table 2. The MOC support is a subset RC OLC support statistics. Currently only geographic Fleet headquarters<sup>3</sup> have Maritime Operations Centers.

	UNITS	BILLETS	% RC Billets	SAILORS	% RC Sailors
Direct report to MOC	66	2427	4.55	2132	3.55
Provides support to MOC	10	305	0.57	249	0.41
Total to MOC	76	2732	5.12	2381	3.96

**Table 2. Navy Reserve Billet and Sailor support to MOCs**

*Source:* Reserve Headquarter System query with analysis by author.

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<sup>3</sup> 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, Fleet Forces and Pacific Fleets have MOCs. 10<sup>th</sup> Fleet was established 29 January 2010 in support of US Cyber command and currently is not expected to have a MOC.

### **Details of RC Support to the Operational Level of Command by Rank**

The RC support to the OLC can be further broken down by Officer and Enlisted positions for force planning. The US Navy Active Component currently has a 1:5 officer to enlisted ratio<sup>4</sup> and the Navy Reserve has approximately a 1:3 officer to enlisted ratio. The support by the RC to OLC is 1.2:1 officer to enlisted ratio, and if intelligence units are not counted the ratio becomes 1.6:1.<sup>5</sup> RC support to the Operational Level is therefore confirmed as predominately officer based with a third of enlisted support being intelligence specialists. The RC Officer specialties providing support to the OLC cannot be accurately determined by analysis of the billet database due to the lack of detail available and scope of this thesis, but the level of support by rank can be determined.

The operational level of command requires experienced officers. Analysis shows that almost all RC officer billets for the OLC are Lieutenant Commanders (O-4), Commanders (O-5) and Captains (O-6) and approximately one-third of all mid-grade officer RC billets are dedicated to supporting the operational level of command as detailed in table 3. Appendix B provides a full summary of RC Officer support to the OLC by Reserve Program and grade, providing a basis for estimating the percentage officer specialties dedicated.<sup>6</sup>

	LCDR, O-4	CDR, O-5	CAPT, O-6
Provide Operational Level Support	846	807	316
Total Navy Reserve Billets	2987	2345	957
Percentage of Total	28.32%	34.41%	33.02%

**Table 3. US Navy Reserve Officer OLC Billets by Grade**

*Source:* Reserve Headquarter System query with analysis by author.

<sup>4</sup> As of 19 February 2010 the Navy had 330,298 on active duty. 51,723 officers, 274,103 enlisted and 4,472 midshipmen (<https://www.navy.mil>).

<sup>5</sup> Based on 30 December 2009 Reserve Headquarter System database analysis officer and enlisted manpower.

<sup>6</sup> For example, the Office of Naval Intelligence Reserve Program, manned almost completely by Intelligence Officers, has 40.39% dedicated to OLC providing 9.84% of the total support.

## **Navy Officer Skills Tracking System**

The Navy tracks specific officer qualifications through the Navy Officer Occupation Classification System (NOOCS). The system is used to identify skills, education, training, experience and capabilities both obtained by officers and to describe manpower requirements. The system provides the code structures for officer manpower needs: manpower management, procurement, training, promotion, distribution, career development and mobilization.<sup>1</sup> The four subsystems of NOOCS are: Designator/Grade, Subspecialty (SSP), Navy Officer Billet Classifications (NOBC) and Additional Qualification Designation (AQD).

The Designator/Grade structure is the primary administrative means the Navy uses to determine officer manpower resources and requirements. The Designator “identifies primary specialty qualifications, associated legal and specialty categories and competitive categories for promotion.”<sup>2</sup> The Grade refers to the scale of officer pay grade and rank. Officer Designator codes are grouped into five primary categories: Unrestricted Line, Restricted Line, Staff Corps, Limited Duty and Chief Warrant. Unrestricted Line officers are not restricted in the performance of duty and are the ‘warfighters.’ Restricted Line officers are designated for special or specific duty and therefore are restricted in the performance of duty. The eight Staff Corps of the Navy are: Medical, Dental, Medical Service, Judge Advocate General’s, Nurse, Supply, Chaplain and Civil Engineer. Limited Duty officers are appointed for the performance of duty in occupational fields based on their former warrant or enlisted specialty and are

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Navy, Manual of NAVY OFFICER MANPOWER AND CLASSIFICATION VOLUME 1, Major Code Structures, NAVPERS 158391, Chief of Naval Operations (Washington, D.C., 2010), 3.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid*, 3.

'limited' from holding a warfighting command. Chief Warrants are appointed for the performance of duty in technical fields.

The Subspecialty structure is to establish "criteria and procedures for identifying officer requirements for advanced education, functional training and significant experience in various fields and disciplines"<sup>3</sup>, to identify those who acquire the desired qualifications. The SSP is used to generate the Navy's advanced education requirements and is focused on 6 concentration areas:

- National Security Studies, focusing on Intelligence skills and regional expertise.
- Resource Management and Training, focusing on Financial Management, Logistics Management, Manpower Management, Education & Training and Operations Research Analysis.
- Applied disciplines, focusing on instructing.
- Engineering and Technology, in support of research & development and acquisition.
- Operations, for specialized fields of information systems, C4I, Space, Undersea warfare, Oceanography and Meteorology.
- Unique Staff Corp, specialized education for each of the 8 staff corps.

There are no subspecialty codes are for joint or military planner education.

The Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) system identifies "officer billet requirements and officer occupational experience or through a combination of education and experience."<sup>4</sup> NOBCs are used to assist in the selection of naval officers to fill mobilization or augmentation billets. NOBC codes can be translated into common Department of Defense occupation groupings and numerical coding system for comparison. The NOBC system is for tracking Navy specific capabilities, except for

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., B-2.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., C-3.

qualifications to support a Joint Air Operations Center, the USAF weapon system<sup>5</sup> that plans and executes the Joint Force Air Component mission .

The Additional Qualification Designation (AQD) “identifies additional qualifications and skill sets not included in the other code structures.”<sup>6</sup> AQDs are used to support detailed personnel planning and can be acquired by an officer through training and/or experience. The AQD system is how the Navy tracks the majority of the joint skills to include Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) phase I & II, Joint Qualified Officers, and Joint Staff experience.

### **Joint skills attained by the USN RC**

The Navy Reserve uses IMAPMIS, Inactive Manpower and Personnel Management Information System, to maintain officer qualifications. Records can be sorted by primary specialty (Designator), grade/rank and joint qualifications. Analysis of an 11 February 2010 IMAPMIS query resulted in the AQDs for 22,295 Ready reservists. The Ready Reserve is composed of personnel liable for active duty service and consists of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Selected Reserves (SELRES). SELRES are drilling reservists are those assigned to a unit, represented by the 10,109 billets counted by the RHS query. Greater than a third of the difference is Reserve Merchant Marine officers (2,356) and Staff Corp students (1,479) who are not assigned to Reserve units, which means a sixth of the analyzed records will not support the OLC and detailed analysis will be required to ascertain the significant facts. Joint skills are obtained through education and experience; unique qualifications are awarded for both.

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<sup>5</sup> The AN/USQ-163 Falconer weapon system requires personnel to be qualified to operate it, similar to any other weapon system and therefore requires awarding and tracking of those qualifications.


<sup>6</sup> Manual of Navy Officer Classification, 3.

## Joint education attained by the USN RC

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) provides the basis of capability to support the operational level of command. Data regarding joint education was sorted using spreadsheet formulas to count the number of Ready Reserve officers who have been awarded a joint education AQD. The majority of the AQDs must be requested by the officer to be awarded and therefore the inventory of officers with the skill may be underrepresented.

Figure 3

summarizes Navy Professional Military Education qualifications continuum. Education to support the operational



**Figure 3. The Navy's PME Continuum 2009**

*Source: Statement of Rear Admiral J. P. Wisecup, U.S. Navy, President of the U.S. Naval War College to Congress, 25 June 2009.*

with the Maritime Staff Operators Course (MSOC).<sup>7</sup> MSOC was created to prepare officers and senior enlisted personnel who do not have the experience or education to effectively serve in operational staff assignments in Maritime Operations Centers (MOC) or other staffs billets in recognition that the Navy was not preparing personnel adequately for operational staff positions. The five-week course is a familiarization course covering the Navy planning process, joint & service doctrine, organizations, functions, roles and responsibilities of joint and MOC staffs and does not replace Joint Professional Military Education Phase I (JPME I). The Naval War College holds 148 Navy Reserve graduates

<sup>7</sup> House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee, *Statement of Rear Admiral J. P. Wisecup, U.S. Navy, President of the U.S. Naval War College 25 June 2009*, 111<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 2009, 11.

of MSOC as of 1 March 2010<sup>8</sup>, but several graduates were senior enlisted and recent classes qualification may not yet posted to the database, see table 4.

JPME I qualification is offered to Navy Reserve officers through funded orders or independently, for which the officer may request credit of days service (points) towards retirement pay. Several announcements and predictions that JPME I would be required for Navy Reserve officers to be selected for command or promoted over the past several years have not yet come true. Currently there is no requirement for Navy Reserve Officers to complete JPME I or JPME II/AJPME for any promotion, though specific billets in reserve units recommend placement of officers with JPME I and infrequently JPME II/ AJPME. The Secretary of the Navy’s guidance to the Reserve Active Status-List Promotion board for FY-11 does direct “favorable consideration” for Professional Military Education (PME) to include Joint PME and prioritizes first Joint experience for most competitive promotion categories.<sup>9</sup> The Secretary’s guidance is the only formal incentive for RC officers to pursue JPME completion.

The AQD system used the JS1 code until 1989 for JPME I completion and now uses JS1 to indicate JPME I and II completion,

<b>Qualification</b>	<b>Officers</b>	<b>AQD</b>
Maritime Staff Operators Course	109	JOM
JPME I -pre 1989*	26	JS1
JPME I	1037	JS7
JPME I total	1063	
JCWS- JPME II	32	JS8
AJPME	105	JSA
Plans school	2	JP1
Plans Experience	1	JP2
Qualified Planner	0	JP3
Navy Plans	4	JPN

**Table 4. Awarded Navy Ready Reserve Officer Joint Education Qualifications**

*Source:* IMAPMIS query with analysis by author.

<sup>8</sup> Interview with John Mangold, Naval War College MSOC program, by author, March 1, 2010.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, *Guidance for the FY-11 promotion selection boards considering officers in the line on the Reserve Active Status-List of the Navy for promotion to the permanent grade of Captain*, signed by Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy (Washington, D.C., 2010).



creating a challenge to accurately count the number of awarded qualifications. Analysis of the AQD query found 59 JS1 codes. 33 of the 59 personnel awarded the JS1 code also had the new code for JPME I, JS7. Resulting in 26 personnel with JS1 and 1037 JS7 for a total of 1,063 or 4.9 percent of all Ready Reserve officers (SELRES and IRR) awarded the qualification of JPME I completion as shown in table 4.

Table 5 details the analysis of JPME I by rank for all Ready Reserve officers. This summation includes junior and chief warrant officers and officer specialties which do not traditionally support the operational level of command, such as Merchant Marine, Dental, or Medical. Further analysis reveals 8.1 percent of all Ready Reserve mid-grade officers have completed JPME I and 11 percent of mid-grade officers in traditional OLC supporting communities.<sup>10</sup> Commanders in the primary communities filling OLC billets, warfare qualified unrestricted line (URL) officers and Intelligence officers, have completed JPME I at 13.8 and 12.6 percent respectively, while, 19.2 percent of Warfare qualified URL Captains and 16.1 percent of Intelligence duty Captains have completed JPME I.

The Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) at the National Defense University Joint Force Staff College is the primary location for JPME Phase II

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>JPME I</b>	<b>JPME I %</b>
RADM	17	0	0.0
RDML	29	7	24.1
CAPT	2438	291	12.4
CDR	5034	471	9.6
LCDR	5047	255	5.1
LT	6093	37	0.7
LTJG	977	2	0.2
ENS	2521	0	0.0
CWO4	41	0	0.0
CWO3	57	0	0.0
CWO2	41	0	0.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>22295</b>	<b>1063</b>	<b>4.9</b>

**Table 5. Awarded Navy Ready Reserve Officer JPME Phase I Qualification by Rank**

*Source:* IMAPMIS query with analysis by author.

<sup>10</sup> Traditional OLC supporting communities, Unrestricted Line, Intel, IW, IP, PAO, Oceano, and Supply.

instruction. JPME Phase II completes the joint education requirement for officers to become joint qualified officers (JQOs) and eligible for selection to Flag/ General officer per Section 619a of Title 10. The Navy database holds 32 Reserve officer graduates of the course while JCWS holds 21 graduates per Table 6 over the last five years. The discrepancy can be accounted for since November 2007 all four service colleges<sup>11</sup> were accredited to award JPME II and it is likely some Navy Reserve officers were counted as Active Component while attending JCWS. The small percentage of Reserve and Guard officers, 3.2 percent over the last five years, completing JCWS was assessed to be two-fold: the lack of requirement for JPME II completion and the lack of opportunity to attend, due either to civilian occupation conflict or prioritization of AC to attend. Congress mandated better opportunities for RC officer to complete JPME II be created.

<b>Service</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>Total</b>
Army	189	252	249	263	335	1288
Army Reserves	3	8	7	7	4	29
Navy	148	211	220	224	264	1067
Navy Reserves		2	1	1	17	21
Air Force	229	319	332	323	403	1606
Air Force Reserves		3	3	2	1	9
Marines	50	71	96	83	103	403
Marine Corps Reserves		1	5	4	1	11
Army National Guard	15	13	20	12	15	75
Air National Guard	3	3	7	3		16
Coast Guard	2	2		3		7
Interagency	10	7	14	13	17	61
International	46	63	56	70	103	338
<b>Total</b>	<b>695</b>	<b>955</b>	<b>1010</b>	<b>1008</b>	<b>1263</b>	<b>4931</b>

**Table 6. JCWS/ JPME II Graduates 2005-2009 by Service, Component and Group**  
Source: Data from Joint Force Staff College Institutional Research, Assessment and Accreditation Division.

<sup>11</sup> The four U.S. military service colleges are the Naval War College, Army War College, Air War College and Marine Corps War College.

The Advanced JPME (AJPME) program was created to meet the mandate for “JPME for reserve officers similar to active duty education”<sup>12</sup> and the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1300.19, DOD Joint Officer Management Program recognizes RCJPME (AJPME) as equivalent to JPME Phase II for RC officers. The Navy database holds 105 graduates of the course (table 4), while the Joint Force Staff College holds 224 Navy Reserve graduates, per table 7. It is highly unlikely that over half of the graduates have retired or resigned from the Navy reserve. It can be reasonably assumed that the large discrepancy between the numbers is caused by the requirement for each officer to individually request the qualification. Coordinated awarding of the qualification should be considered or accurate tracking of skills will not be possible.

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Army Reserves	18	32	59	48	66	63	286
Navy Reserve	22	38	32	42	50	40	224
Air Force Reserves	13	27	19	24	24	24	131
Marine Corps Reserves	3	4	6	19	21	15	68
Army National Guard	3	8	16	29	31	36	123
Air National Guard	1	5	29	10	16	15	76
Coast Guard Reserve	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
Interagency	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Total	60	114	161	174	209	194	912

**Table 7. AJPME Graduates by Year and Component**

Source: Data from Joint Force Staff College Institutional Research, Assessment and Accreditation Division.

The final education Joint education category is for military planning. The year-long education pipeline to complete military planner course such as JAWS or SAMS<sup>13</sup> is

<sup>12</sup>House Committee on National Security, Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, 105<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., May 12 1998, H. Rep. 105-532, pp. 294,295.

<sup>13</sup> JAWS, National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College Joint Advanced Warfighting School, SAMS, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, SAWS, U.S. Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, SAASS, U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, and the new Navy equivalent, MAWS, U.S. Naval War College Maritime Advanced Warfighting School are the specialized military planning courses.

a challenge for part-time Reserve officers to complete. The availability of funding and conflict with civilian occupations will limit the number of RC officers able to attend and complete the programs. Unless designated and prioritized a RC specialty area it is unlikely the RC will ever be able to provide significant numbers of qualified military planners. The Joint Planner Navy qualification, JPN, may be awarded to graduates of the resident Naval War College of Naval Command and Staff program, but it is not the equivalent of any of the advanced military planning courses. Maritime Advanced Warfighting School (MAWS) is the Naval War College 13 month advanced planning program. RC officers do attend the 9 ½- month Naval Command and Staff program, but have not participated in the parallel MAWS program to date.

#### **Joint experience attained by the USN RC**

Tracking of Navy Reserve Officers operational employment since September 2001 has not been done with any fidelity or level of detail. The analysis of the awarded experience qualifications should provide insight on the Navy RC Officer corps utilization. This knowledge should guide the training and education of RC officers. The AQD system has coding for Joint experience, J\*\* codes, and for Intra-service specialty experience, U\*\* codes. The difference between the two is not well defined and causes confusion in the awarding of the qualification, therefore both will be considered. The AQD system awards qualifications by level of command and specialty fields. Levels of command range from strategic level at Office of Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff to tactical level staffs such as counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) task force. Four levels of command within the AQD system function at the operational level: Multi-National HQ, COCOM, Fleet/ Division and Joint Task Force. In determining the number of Navy Reserve Officers awarded joint experience qualification at each level of

command, only the first qualification per officer was counted on table 8. Eight hundred and ninety officers have been awarded joint experience at more than one command level and are included in all awarded levels but subtracted from the OLC total to result in 5,676 RC Officers with OLC awarded experience. It is likely that more RC officers have significant OLC experience than the shown due to administrative requirements, but table 8's

<b>Level of Command</b>	<b>Joint</b>	<b>Intra-service</b>	<b>Total AOD</b>
OSD Joint Billet	2	0	2
Joint Staff	8	6	14
Multi National HQ Staff	6	0	6
COCOM Level Staff	588	134	722
Fleet/ Division Staff	1056	1579	2,635
Joint Task Force Staff	3,273	7	3,280
Other Staff	540	311	851
<b>OLC Total</b>	<b>4,923</b>	<b>1,720</b>	<b>6,643</b>
<b>RC Officers with OLC AOD</b>			<b>5,676</b>

**Table 8. Navy Ready Reserve Officers Awarded Joint Experience Qualifications by Level of Command**

Source: IMAPMIS query with analysis by author.

value is quantifying the significant usage of the RC at the operational level. This information can be sorted to determine the rank and specialties of these officers.

The database does not provide when the experience occurred in an officer's career, but table 9 confirms that by the rank Commander, nearly half of all Ready Reserve officers have supported the OLC. Table 9 numbers dramatically under-represent the true level of operational level experience held

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>COCOM Staff</b>	<b>Fleet Staff</b>	<b>JTF Staff</b>	<b>Total OLC</b>	<b>% OLC Exp</b>
RADM	17	0	0	6	6	35.29%
RDML	29	1	3	7	11	37.93%
CAPT	2438	96	371	691	1158	47.50%
CDR	5034	247	839	1302	2388	47.44%
LCDR	5047	213	729	731	1673	33.15%
LT	6093	157	622	453	1232	20.22%
LTJG	977	2	38	43	83	8.50%
ENS	2521	1	5	4	10	0.40%
CWO4	41	2	13	19	34	82.93%
CWO3	57	3	15	20	38	66.67%
CWO2	41	0	2	2	4	9.76%

**Table 9. Navy Ready Reserve Awarded OLC Experience by Rank**

Source: IMAPMIS query with analysis by author.

by the those most likely to support the OLC, the Selected Reserves. The Selected Reserve Officers are approximately half of the total Ready Reserve Officer Corps and

roughly segregated by officer community in appendix C and

D. Comparisons of OLC

experience to OLC education, JPME I, on table 10 shows that Navy Ready Reserve Officers are not being prepared for the mission they are performing.

Rank	Total	Total OLC	% OLC Exp	JPME I	% JPME I
RADM	17	6	35.29%	0	0.00%
RDML	29	11	37.93%	7	24.14%
CAPT	2438	1158	47.50%	291	11.94%
CDR	5034	2388	47.44%	471	9.36%
LCDR	5047	1673	33.15%	255	5.05%
LT	6093	1232	20.22%	37	0.61%
LTJG	977	83	8.50%	2	0.20%
ENS	2521	10	0.40%	0	0.00%
CWO4	41	34	82.93%	0	0.00%
CWO3	57	38	66.67%	0	0.00%
CWO2	41	4	9.76%	0	0.00%

**Table 10. Ready Reserve OLC Experience vs. OLC Education**

Source: IMAPMIS query with analysis by author.

**Type of Joint experience attained by the USN RC**

The same database query allows for an estimation of what RC officers have been doing while supporting the OLC as summarized in table 11. While most support is grouped under ‘Operations’, staff Corps specialties, such as logistics and civil affairs qualification are proportionally well represented to the size of their RC officer pool. Appendix C details OLC education and experience by officer community.

Qualification (AQD)	#
Acquisition (J*A)	105
Civil Affairs (J*C)	358
Detainee Ops (J*D)	39
Finance (J*F)	122
Human Resources (J*H)	470
Intelligence (J*I)	550
Logistics (J*L)	372
Medical (J*M)	1089
Operations (J*O)	4485
Planning (J*P)	222
Training (J*T)	115
Counter IED (J*X)	70

**Table 11. Summary of Awarded Navy Reserve Officer Joint Experience by Specialty**

Source: IMAPMIS query with analysis by author.

That half the intelligence community has worked at the OLC is not surprising as about half of its billets are in support of the OLC. But several communities, which are

not significantly dedicated to the OLC<sup>14</sup> have significantly supported the OLC based on qualifications awarded. The Special Warfare, Special Operations and Supply communities not unexpectedly have supported the OLC with minimal dedicated OLC units, but the amount of the Civil Engineering Corps and Information Professional communities' support should prompt an organizational review and re-allocation of personnel. Appendix C shows the lack of preparation for OLC support by officer community allowing for the comparison of OLC experience to OLC education. Appendix D provides a further level of detail of RC preparedness to support the OLC by both officer communities and rank.

### **Navy Reserve Joint Qualified Officers**

As stated previously, there is no requirement and only limited incentive for RC Officers to become a Joint Qualified Officer (JQO). Awarding of JQO designation requires an officer to complete JPME I and JPME II (or AJPME for RC), and have significant joint experience. Credit for joint experience must be requested via the Joint Qualification System (JQS), unless the officer filled a designated qualifying joint billet. . The very small number of RC JQOs in table 12 clearly shows the lack of incentive to become a JQO. The small number of officers who have both the required education and experience make meaningful analysis

challenging, but does present the question if the correct personnel are being sent to JPME II/AJPME and to joint positions.

<b>Qualification (AQD)</b>	<b>Officers</b>
JPME II or AJPME (JS7, JSA)	137
JQS II Experience (JS2)	136
JQS II Experience & JPME I (JS4)	20
Joint Qualified (JS5)	17

**Table 12. Navy Reserve Joint Qualified Officers**

*Source: IMAPMIS query with analysis by author.*

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<sup>14</sup> Appendix A provides the breakdown of Reserve Programs support to the OLC.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Sweeping change to cultural and legal restrictions to better use of the Reserves in support of the joint operational level of command will be difficult, but several administrative changes can be made. The reform of how the Navy reserve measures allocation of resources should be first. As stated, the primary resource of the Navy Reserve is personnel. The *Navy's Total Force Vision for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* states that manpower should be defined in terms of competencies to allow the Navy to link knowledge skills and abilities to meet current and emerging needs. It is therefore recommended that the primary categorization of Navy Reserve units, Reserve Programs, be transitioned to competency based categories vice current legacy categories. Navy Reserve unit categorization by competency will allow for better analysis of how the primary resource, personnel, is being allocated.

The number of categories should be limited and not “platform” based, though some competencies are inherently platform centric. The creation of the categories will provide an opportunity to prioritize what competencies the Navy Reserve should provide. The categories should help capture education and training requirements for assigned personnel, such as Joint Operational Staff, Navy Operational Staff, Navy Support Staff, Bureau of Medicine, Judge Advocate General, Systems Commands, or Marine Corp Forces.

The next recommendation comes from interviews and statements of Operational Level Commanders who had Navy Reserve officers assigned. Navy Reserve Officers should be assigned to specific headquarters due to unique characteristics of each command and the assignment should be greater than the current three years for the officer



to be fully trained and known to the Commander and active component staff. Specifically, Lieutenant Commanders assigned to joint and Navy operational level staffs via JO APPLY<sup>1</sup> should be for five years. To develop the knowledge, skills and trust of the supported staff to be takes about three years for the part-time Reserve Officer, the equivalent of the first six months in a position. The additional years provide a payback to the supported command for the training investment and would provide needed continuity for the staffs.

Basic operational level staff skills should be required for RC OLC Commander and Captain billets by instruction. Leadership positions in ‘warfighting’ units such as Harbor Security or an aircraft squadron, require an officer be qualified to operate the system by instruction, why not our primary warfighting staffs? The mythology that anyone can be on a staff without specific knowledge, skills or experience ignores the risk to mission accomplishment. The knowledge, skills or experience could be obtained by education, previous military assignments or civilian work.

The final administrative recommendation is to progressively require JPME I for selection to command and promotion. Starting the next command selection board, FY 11 APPLY,<sup>2</sup> require JPME I completion for all Captain Command billets of Joint and Navy Operational Level staff units. As shown, the JPME I completion is nearing 20 percent for Captains in the primary OLC supporting communities and there will be sufficient eligible officers. The next step would be within two years, starting with the August 2012 FY-13 APPLY board, that all Captain billets at Operational Level support

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<sup>1</sup> JO APPLY, the reserve system which details junior officers, Lieutenant Commanders and below, to non-command billets on a cyclic basis throughout the year.

<sup>2</sup> APPLY, the reserve system which annually selects unit Commanding Officers at all ranks and non-command billets for all Commanders and Captains.

units require JPME Phase I, as shown approximately one-third of all RC Captain billets. Then, beginning with the January 2013 FY-14 Captain Selection board require JPME I for most officer communities. The requirement for JPME should then be placed on Commander OLC leadership positions for the August 2014 FY-14 APPLY board. Of note, the Marine Corps Reserve requires JPME I/ USMC Command and Staff college (or equivalent) completion for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel.

Joint Professional Military Education has been identified as the foundation for the Joint Operational Level of Command, yet less than half of Active Component Navy Commanders and Captains have completed JPME Phase I and only 21 percent were Phase II qualified.<sup>3</sup> As shown, only 10.5 percent of Reserve Commanders and Captains have completed JPME Phase I and less than 3 percent JPME Phase II, yet one-third of all mid-grade officer billets support units tasked to execute the OLC. The Navy Reserve determined that it would lead the Navy's joint air command and control efforts recognizing the challenge of qualifying AC officers in joint air operations. This model of support should be considered by the Reserve in supporting the entire operational level of command.

The non-administrative recommendation is that the composition of the RC OLC support be adjusted to include more officers of the staff corps communities, such as Supply and Civil Engineering. The disproportional number of joint OLC experience qualifications awarded to RC staff corps officers compared to the amount dedicated to the OLC indicates that insufficient focus on the this area. The lack of focus implies that the officers are likely not being adequately prepared and not ready for their jobs when

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<sup>3</sup> Christopher D. Hayes, CDR USN, "Developing the Navy's Operational Leaders," *Naval War College Review* 61, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 92.

mobilized. This adjustment will require Navy leadership to conduct across all funding sources and claimants a reprioritization of where personnel are needed. The Chief of Naval Operations staff has been reluctant to address this issue due to higher staff priorities. Therefore the delegation of authority to the Reserve Capabilities Review (RCR) board to address is recommended.

The RCR has successfully completed its first two-year cycle, restructuring RC billets and manning within the US Fleet Forces and Pacific Fleet authorization. This process can be the basis for a RC wide review if additional resources and leadership are provided. Dedicated Flag officer involvement to the RCR will be needed for the process to progress due to the sensitivity of resource reallocation.

## CONCLUSION

Significant cultural, administrative and legal challenges limit the effectiveness and efficiency of Navy Reserve support to the Operational Level of Command. The Navy Reserve comprises 17 percent of the Navy manpower, but is only considered in unique cases for force planning. Navy Reserve leadership is standing by to respond to Navy guidance for force planning, but history has shown that guidance is rarely given and unlikely to be forthcoming. The Navy platform focus places Navy operational level commands as a supporting or enabling element of the US force structure not a main element, as reflected in the 2010 QDR. Though the Chairman's vision and CNO's guidance calls for improvement in operational art, the Navy Reserve role at the operational level of command is not being discussed.

The Navy reserve can improve its capability to support the operational level of command, but it will take Reserve leadership decision and action. The Navy Reserve is currently dedicating 12 percent of the force and one-third of its mid-grade officers to supporting the operational level of command and there are not significant unfilled OLC support requirements pending. So, to help the Navy meet the call for improvement in the operational art, the dedication of significant additional resources is not needed. The adjustment and improvement of the dedicated resources is the requirement.

Analysis shows that a high percentage of Navy staff corps officers have earned OLC experience qualifications, yet very few are part of OLC supporting units. This disconnect implies resources are not being directed to where needed and that it is likely personnel are not ready for the positions they are filling when mobilized. Improving the resources dedicated to the OLC must begin with Joint Professional Military Education.

As shown by the amount of joint experience qualifications earned by the RC officer corps overall, a primary use of the RC has been supporting the operational level of command. Yet, there is no requirement or incentive for Navy Reserve Officers to complete the JPME, the foundation for working at the OLC. As only 8.1 percent of mid-grade Ready Reserve officers have completed JPME I, the requirement must be instituted with clear incentives and timeline. While the Navy Reserve can be proud of its motto, “*Ready Now. Anytime. Anywhere.*”, it is clearly not ready to effectively support the operational level of command, a primary role it has been asked to fill.

## APPENDIX A

### Summary of Operational Level support by Reserve Program Code

Reserve Program Codes	Billets	Sailors	OLC Billets	% OLC of RP	% of OLC
Allied - NATO Commands	220	210	220	100.00	3.39
Bureau of Medicine	5339	4892	71	1.33	1.09
Chief of Naval Personnel	330	308	0	0.00	0.00
Civil Defense	98	99	98	100.00	1.51
General Operational Support	0	5033	0	0.00	0.00
Judge Advocate General	465	440	22	4.73	0.34
Major HQ Staffs	1794	1532	1243	69.29	19.15
Marine Corps Forces	1759	1994	0	0.00	0.00
Military Sealift	936	3360	279	29.81	4.30
Mine Forces	190	117	0	0.00	0.00
Naval Air Forces	5337	4033	0	0.00	0.00
Naval Air Systems Command	222	277	0	0.00	0.00
Naval Amphibious Forces	1542	1538	0	0.00	0.00
Naval Construction Forces	8800	9348	0	0.00	0.00
Naval Education and Training	262	226	0	0.00	0.00
Naval Installations	4016	4091	0	0.00	0.00
Naval Meteorology and Oceanography	187	144	0	0.00	0.00
Naval Reserve Support Element	0	140	0	0.00	0.00
Naval Sea Systems Command	1609	1700	0	0.00	0.00
Naval Submarine Forces	1571	1553	114	7.26	1.76
Naval Supply Systems Command	1065	1079	0	0.00	0.00
Naval Surface Forces	548	389	0	0.00	0.00
NAVELSG	3241	2797	0	0.00	0.00
Navy Info Ops Directorate	1628	1404	64	3.93	0.99
Navy Office of Information	366	313	146	39.89	2.25
NCAGS	182	189	182	100.00	2.80
NEC Other	4094	2881	0	0.00	0.00
NRPC ADMIN Units	0	1	0	0.00	0.00
Numbered Fleets	1749	1514	1589	90.85	24.48
Office of Naval Intelligence	3348	3427	1590	47.49	24.50
ONR - NRL	211	231	0	0.00	0.00
Selective Service	42	29	0	0.00	0.00
Space & Warfare Systems Command	207	188	0	0.00	0.00
Special Warfare Forces	874	674	0	0.00	0.00
Transient Personnel Unit	0	173	0	0.00	0.00
Unified - Joint Commands	1079	942	872	80.82	13.44
VTU	0	2843	0	0.00	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>53311</b>	<b>60109</b>	<b>6490</b>	<b>12.17</b>	

## APPENDIX B

### Summary of Operational Level support by Mid-Grade Officer per Reserve Program Code

Reserve Program Codes	O4	O5	O6	O4 OLC	O5 OLC	O6 OLC	% to OLC	% of all RC
Allied - NATO Commands	22	43	20	22	43	20	100.00	1.35
Bureau of Medicine	427	294	163	2	3	6	1.24	14.06
Chief of Naval Personnel	34	40	9	0	0	0	0.00	1.32
Civil Defense	0	5	73	0	5	73	100.00	1.24
General Operational Support	63	5	2	0	0	0	0.00	1.11
Judge Advocate General	75	95	82	3	10	4	6.75	4.01
Major HQ Staffs	181	193	66	138	127	41	69.55	7.00
Marine Corps Forces	77	57	13	0	0	0	0.00	2.34
Military Sealift	62	52	26	31	30	9	50.00	2.23
Mine Forces	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
Naval Air Forces	121	86	6	0	0	0	0.00	3.39
Naval Air Systems Command	45	78	30	0	0	0	0.00	2.43
Naval Amphibious Forces	20	13	2	0	0	0	0.00	0.56
Naval Construction Forces	125	64	21	5	2	2	4.29	3.34
Naval Education and Training	19	22	7	0	0	0	0.00	0.76
Naval Installations	80	20	12	0	0	0	0.00	1.78
Naval Meteorology and Oceanography	17	7	4	0	0	0	0.00	0.45
Naval Reserve Support Element	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
Naval Sea Systems Command	111	76	46	0	0	0	0.00	3.70
Naval Submarine Forces	116	90	22	9	8	3	8.77	3.63
Naval Supply Systems Command	79	56	19	0	0	0	0.00	2.45
Naval Surface Forces	36	24	8	0	0	0	0.00	1.08
NAVELSG	62	27	10	7	15	8	30.30	1.57
Navy Info Ops Directorate	95	59	22	10	4	2	9.09	2.80
Navy Office of Information	26	16	8	14	11	3	56.00	0.80
NCAGS	16	23	4	16	23	4	100.00	0.68
NEC Other	106	35	16	0	0	0	0.00	2.50
NRPC ADMIN Units	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
Numbered Fleets	283	349	90	255	293	83	87.40	11.48
Office of Naval Intelligence	378	174	67	174	59	17	40.39	9.84
ONR - NRL	59	67	26	0	0	0	0.00	2.42
Selective Service	8	12	0	0	0	0	0.00	0.32
Space & Warfare Systems Command	25	24	9	0	0	0	0.00	0.92
Special Warfare Forces	51	20	6	0	0	0	0.00	1.22
Transient Personnel Unit	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
Unified - Joint Commands	168	219	68	160	174	41	82.42	7.23
VTU	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Total Officers by Grade	2987	2345	957					100.00
Officers by Grade supporting OLC				846	807	316	31.31	

## APPENDIX C

### Summary of OLC Qualifications of Navy Selected Reserve Officers by Designator

Designator	Officer Community	Total	COCOM Staff	Fleet Staff	JTF Staff	% OLC AQDs	JPME I	% JPME I
1115	Surface	2334	99	300	450	36.38%	217	9.30%
1125	Submarine	930	27	103	88	23.44%	92	9.89%
1135	Spec War	129	9	31	37	59.69%	8	6.20%
1145	Spec Ops	76	4	11	28	56.58%	16	21.05%
1315	Pilot	2413	67	182	311	23.21%	202	8.37%
1325	NFO	787	27	59	102	23.89%	81	10.29%
1105	URL No W	454	16	52	69	30.18%	18	3.96%
1305	URL Av No	449	13	35	16	14.25%	3	0.67%
1205	HR	341	13	51	46	32.26%	25	7.33%
1215	Nuc Spec	9	0	0	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
14**	EDO	508	15	32	38	16.73%	25	4.92%
15**	AEDO	309	6	45	13	20.71%	23	7.44%
1605	IP	141	12	33	25	49.65%	12	8.51%
1615/1645	IW	317	10	25	53	27.76%	14	4.42%
1625 +++	Merch Mar	2356	9	61	56	5.35%	29	1.23%
1635	Intel	1996	132	250	629	50.65%	114	5.71%
1655	PAO	241	19	43	33	39.42%	8	3.32%
1805	Oceano	104	3	2	8	12.50%	8	7.69%
19**	Students	1479	1	2	3	0.41%	0	0.00%
21**	Medical	1106	13	130	115	23.33%	12	1.08%
2205	Dental	421	0	20	19	9.26%	1	0.24%
2305	Med Serv	558	17	108	91	38.71%	11	1.97%
2505	JAG	558	11	43	67	21.68%	27	4.84%
2705	Med Flag	5	0	0	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
2905	Nurse	1527	2	367	264	41.45%	11	0.72%
3105	Supply	1159	73	289	267	54.27%	70	6.04%
4105	Chaplain	272	13	41	57	40.81%	10	3.68%
5105	CEC	737	87	216	188	66.62%	19	2.58%



## APPENDIX D

### Summary of OLC Qualifications of Navy Selected Reserve Officers by Designator and Grade

Designator Community	Grade	TOTAL	JPME I	JPME II AJPME	COCOM Staff	Fleet/ Division Staff	JTF Staff	Other Joint Staff
1105	RADM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
URL Not Warfare Qualified	RDML	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CAPT	43	9	1	0	9	19	1
	CDR	102	6	0	8	16	27	5
	LCDR	97	2	0	3	12	14	1
	LT	197	1	0	5	15	8	2
	LTJG	10	0	0	0	0	1	0
	ENS	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	454	18	1	16	52	69	9
1115	RADM	4	0	0	0	0	2	0
Surface Warfare	RDML	4	3	1	1	0	1	0
	CAPT	344	75	21	13	52	122	4
	CDR	666	110	23	50	117	228	30
	LCDR	508	27	0	21	78	74	26
	LT	801	2	0	14	53	23	19
	LTJG	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	2334	217	45	99	300	450	79
1125	RADM	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Submarine Warfare	RDML	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
	CAPT	179	28	6	9	20	32	0
	CDR	237	40	6	5	23	33	5
	LCDR	210	21	1	10	38	16	4
	LT	302	2	0	3	22	7	3
	LTJG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	930	92	13	27	103	88	12

Designator Community	Grade	TOTAL	JPME I	JPME II AJPME	COCOM Staff	Fleet/ Division Staff	JTF Staff	Other Joint Staff
1135	RADM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Warfare (SEAL)	RDML	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CAPT	19	4	2	2	2	9	5
	CDR	41	3	1	5	12	16	8
	LCDR	24	1	0	2	10	5	4
	LT	38	0	0	0	7	7	8
	LTJG	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	129	8	3	9	31	37	25
1145	RADM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Ops (EOD, Dive, Salvage, EOM)	RDML	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CAPT	18	5	3	1	2	7	1
	CDR	32	7	1	1	7	18	0
	LCDR	14	3	0	0	2	1	0
	LT	12	1	0	2	0	2	0
	LTJG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	76	16	4	4	11	28	1
1205	RADM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Human Resource (HR)	RDML	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
	CAPT	42	7	2	3	4	12	2
	CDR	101	13	3	8	18	23	3
	LCDR	56	3	0	2	19	9	2
	LT	85	1	0	0	7	2	0
	LTJG	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	54	0	0	0	2	0	0
	Total	341	25	5	13	51	46	7
1215/25	CAPT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nuclear Instructor Reactor Engineer	CDR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	LCDR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	LT	8	0	0	0	0	0	0
	LTJG	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	9	0	0	0	0	0	0

Designator Community	Grade	TOTAL	JPME I	JPME II AJPME	COCOM Staff	Fleet/ Division Staff	JTF Staff	Other Joint Staff
1305	CAPT	7	0	0	0	2	2	0
Aviation URL Not Warfare Qualified	CDR	20	2	0	2	3	5	1
	LCDR	37	1	0	1	5	1	2
	LT	370	0	0	10	25	8	7
	LTJG	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	449	3	0	13	35	16	10
1315	RADM	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aviation Pilot	RDML	5	0	0	0	0	2	0
	CAPT	282	48	7	10	30	66	1
	CDR	984	107	12	26	91	194	14
	LCDR	957	44	4	26	49	46	7
	LT	180	3	0	5	12	3	3
	LTJG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	2413	202	23	67	182	311	25
1325	RADM	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
Aviation Naval Flight Officer (NFO)	RDML	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CAPT	126	17	1	7	13	34	0
	CDR	336	43	2	11	16	54	11
	LCDR	257	20	0	7	25	10	7
	LT	67	1	0	2	5	3	1
	LTJG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	787	81	3	27	59	102	19
1445/65	RADM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Engineering Duty Officer (EDO)	RDML	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
	CAPT	74	5	0	3	4	7	0
	CDR	145	9	3	9	13	18	1
	LCDR	111	9	0	2	8	8	2
	LT	111	1	0	1	7	4	2
	LTJG	31	0	0	0	0	1	0
	ENS	35	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	508	25	3	15	32	38	5

Designator Community	Grade	TOTAL	JPME I	JPME II AJPME	COCOM Staff	Fleet/ Division Staff	JTF Staff	Other Joint Staff
1505/15/25	RADM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aviation Engineering Duty Officer (AEDO)	RDML	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CAPT	60	7	0	0	6	1	0
	CDR	101	11	2	0	21	10	0
	LCDR	52	3	0	2	8	1	2
	LT	72	2	0	4	7	1	1
	LTJG	12	0	0	0	3	0	0
	ENS	11	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	309	23	2	6	45	13	3
1605	RADM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Duty Information Professional (IP)	RDML	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CAPT	10	3	1	0	3	6	0
	CDR	25	1	0	7	7	7	0
	LCDR	34	7	1	4	8	9	1
	LT	26	1	0	1	10	2	2
	LTJG	19	0	0	0	5	1	0
	ENS	27	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	141	12	2	12	33	25	3
1615/45	RADM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Duty Information Warfare (IW)	RDML	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CAPT	24	3	3	1	1	4	0
	CDR	74	2	0	2	5	20	1
	LCDR	70	8	0	3	4	15	2
	LT	117	1	0	4	15	13	0
	LTJG	12	0	0	0	0	1	0
	ENS	19	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	317	14	3	10	25	53	3

Designator Community	Grade	TOTAL	JPME I	JPME II AJPME	COCOM Staff	Fleet/ Division Staff	JTF Staff	Other Joint Staff
1625/65	RADM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1675/95	RDML	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Duty Merchant Marine	CAPT	70	3	0	0	3	4	0
	CDR	222	10	1	6	20	27	2
	LCDR	257	13	1	2	16	20	9
	LT	1009	3	0	1	20	5	0
	LTJG	418	0	0	0	2	0	0
	ENS	380	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	2356	29	2	9	61	56	11
1635	RADM	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
Special Duty Intelligence	RDML	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
	CAPT	193	29	4	6	11	91	1
	CDR	349	40	2	30	38	199	4
	LCDR	393	32	2	37	63	173	7
	LT	756	11	0	59	131	159	16
	LTJG	95	2	0	0	6	4	0
	ENS	208	0	0	0	0	1	0
Total	1996	114	8	132	250	629	28	
1655	RADM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Duty Public Affairs Officer (PAO)	RDML	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CAPT	18	0	0	5	5	5	1
	CDR	42	2	1	3	12	14	0
	LCDR	57	5	0	7	11	8	0
	LT	85	1	0	4	13	6	1
	LTJG	10	0	0	0	2	0	0
	ENS	28	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	241	8	1	19	43	33	2	

Designator Community	Grade	TOTAL	JPME I	JPME II AJPME	COCOM Staff	Fleet/ Division Staff	JTF Staff	Other Joint Staff
1805	RADM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Duty Ocean- ographer	RDML	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CAPT	12	2	0	0	2	5	0
	CDR	18	3	1	0	0	1	0
	LCDR	33	2	0	2	0	1	0
	LT	29	1	0	1	0	1	1
	LTJG	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	8	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	104	8	1	3	2	8	1
19**	CAPT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Students for Nurse, Medical, Dental, JAG, Med Service and Chaplain	CDR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	LCDR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	LT	54	0	0	0	0	0	0
	LTJG	44	0	0	0	0	1	0
	ENS	1381	0	0	1	2	2	0
	Total	1479	0	0	1	2	3	0
210*	RADM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Medical Corps	RDML	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CAPT	206	9	1	10	61	75	33
	CDR	257	3	0	3	56	38	32
	LCDR	348	0	0	0	13	2	15
	LT	290	0	0	0	0	0	1
	LTJG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	1106	12	1	13	130	115	81
2205	RADM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dental Corps	RDML	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CAPT	85	1	0	0	3	12	2
	CDR	91	0	0	0	10	5	3
	LCDR	126	0	0	0	7	2	1
	LT	118	0	0	0	0	0	1
	LTJG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	421	1	0	0	20	19	7

Designator Community	Grade	TOTAL	JPME I	JPME II AJPME	COCOM Staff	Fleet/ Division Staff	JTF Staff	Other Joint Staff
2305	CAPT	66	3	0	2	13	16	5
Medical Service Corps	CDR	152	2	0	7	44	40	19
	LCDR	203	6	0	6	39	28	15
	LT	132	0	0	2	12	7	6
	LTJG	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	558	11	0	17	108	91	45
2505	RADM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps	RDML	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CAPT	138	8	0	0	9	21	5
	CDR	191	10	0	4	21	27	10
	LCDR	179	9	0	5	13	14	2
	LT	49	0	0	2	0	5	1
	LTJG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	558	27	0	11	43	67	18
2705	RADM	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Flag Dental Med, Nurse	RDML	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
2905	CAPT	193	0	0	0	46	45	8
Nurse Corps	CDR	310	4	0	0	105	89	41
	LCDR	462	6	0	2	120	94	73
	LT	476	1	0	0	94	32	47
	LTJG	53	0	0	0	2	4	2
	ENS	33	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	1527	11	0	2	367	264	171

Designator Community	Grade	TOTAL	JPME I	JPME II AJPME	COCOM Staff	Fleet/ Division Staff	JTF Staff	Other Joint Staff
3105/65	RADM	2	0	0	0	0	1	0
Supply Corps	RDML	4	1	1	0	1	2	0
	CAPT	109	13	6	9	29	42	9
	CDR	271	34	3	26	103	111	14
	LCDR	237	21	1	31	91	76	14
	LT	254	1	0	6	55	25	12
	LTJG	149	0	0	1	10	9	4
	ENS	133	0	0	0	0	1	0
	Total	1159	70	11	73	289	267	53
4105	RADM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chaplain	RDML	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CAPT	33	1	0	2	5	14	3
	CDR	76	4	0	2	10	24	16
	LCDR	88	4	1	8	22	16	20
	LT	65	1	0	1	4	3	7
	LTJG	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	272	10	1	13	41	57	46
5105	RADM	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
Civil Engineering Corps (CEC)	RDML	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
	CAPT	76	10	3	13	33	32	16
	CDR	143	3	0	31	62	53	20
	LCDR	166	6	0	24	53	54	37
	LT	229	0	0	19	67	43	44
	LTJG	51	0	0	0	1	4	22
	ENS	70	0	0	0	0	0	7
	Total	737	19	3	87	216	188	146



Designator Community	Grade	TOTAL	JPME I	JPME II AJPME	COCOM Staff	Fleet/ Division Staff	JTF Staff	Other Joint Staff
61**	CAPT	4	1	0	0	1	2	0
Limited Duty Officer (LDO) Surface	CDR	15	1	0	0	3	7	0
	LCDR	16	0	0	2	7	8	1
	LT	19	0	0	3	5	8	2
	LTJG	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
	ENS	5	0	0	0	1	0	1
	Total	60	2	0	5	18	25	4
62**	CAPT	2	0	0	0	0	2	0
Limited Duty Officer (LDO) Submarine	CDR	4	0	0	0	0	1	1
	LCDR	2	0	0	0	0	2	0
	LT	5	0	0	0	1	2	0
	LTJG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	13	0	0	0	1	7	1
63**	CAPT	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
Limited Duty Officer (LDO) Aviation	CDR	11	1	1	0	3	3	0
	LCDR	11	0	0	0	0	0	3
	LT	12	0	0	0	2	3	0
	LTJG	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	36	1	1	0	6	7	3
64**	CAPT	3	0	0	0	0	2	0
Limited Duty Officer (LDO) Special Duty	CDR	13	0	0	1	0	7	1
	LCDR	37	1	0	3	6	21	1
	LT	124	2	0	8	33	71	5
	LTJG	36	0	0	1	6	17	2
	ENS	103	0	0	0	0	0	2
	Total	316	3	0	13	45	118	11
65**	CAPT	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
Limited Duty Officer (LDO) Staff Corp	CDR	5	0	0	0	3	3	1
	LCDR	5	1	1	1	2	3	0
	LT	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	LTJG	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ENS	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	15	1	1	1	6	7	1

Designator Community	Grade	TOTAL	JPME I	JPME II AJPME	COCOM Staff	Fleet/ Division Staff	JTF Staff	Other Joint Staff
71**	CWO4	19	0	0	1	7	6	3
CWO Surface	CWO3	13	0	0	1	6	3	3
	CWO2	12	0	0	0	0	1	0
	Total	44	0	0	2	13	10	6
72**	CWO4	1	0	0	0	2	0	0
CWO Submarine	CWO3	3	0	0	0	0	2	1
	CWO2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	4	0	0	0	2	2	1
73**	CWO4	2	0	0	0	0	1	0
CWO Aviation	CWO3	11	0	0	0	1	1	0
	CWO2	8	0	0	0	0	0	2
	Total	21	0	0	0	1	2	2
74**	CWO4	11	0	0	0	3	6	2
CWO Special Duty	CWO3	22	0	0	2	4	10	2
	CWO2	13	0	0	0	2	1	0
	Total	46	0	0	2	9	17	4
75**	CWO4	8	0	0	1	1	6	3
CWO Staff Corp	CWO3	8	0	0	0	4	4	2
	CWO2	8	0	0	0	0	0	2
	Total	24	0	0	1	5	10	7
	CWO total		139	0	0	5	30	41

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Most recently was a member of USN Maritime Operations Center project team, refining manning, training and equipping of USN Operational Level staffs, US Fleet Forces, Norfolk, Virginia. His concurrent reserve assignment is to OPNAV N81G staff, supporting of SEA SHAPING assessments, Pentagon.

Commissioned June 1988 through NROTC program and qualified as a SH-2F pilot deploying on Pearl Harbor based ships. He then served as Operational and Technical analyst at Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington DC. Transitioned to the Navy Reserve in 1998 and has served as C2F JFACC Staff Officer (GAT/MAAP/TST), XO of a Reserve Carrier Augment unit, OIC of an Embarked Security Detachment and NATO Staff Officer. He was recalled to active duty November 2001 joining CCG-8 as Helicopter Coordinator/ Assist Air Operations officer, embarked USS Theodore Roosevelt. He was recalled again in 2006 augmenting CJTF-HOA J-5, Joint Planning Group, Djibouti.

Holds a BSE in Systems Control Engineering from the University of Pennsylvania and a MS in Management from Troy University. Graduate of USMC Command and Staff non-resident seminar program. Currently on Military Leave of Absence from Northrop Grumman where he works as an Operations Analyst.