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**JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL**

**A STITCH IN TIME SAVES NINE: A COMPREHENSIVE CONFLICT PREVENTION
STRATEGY**

by

Nicole R. Deal

U.S. Department of State



A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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Abstract

This paper will present the logic and defend the value of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy. First, a foundation for a successful prevention strategy will be laid out by examining the benefits, the need for national interest/political will, and the requirement for a successful, multilateral preventive strategy. Then, the current U.S. prevention mechanisms will be examined and will expose the disjointedness and lack of coordination between the various U.S. departments/agencies with conflict prevention missions. In addition, two historical conflict prevention case studies will be analyzed to demonstrate how a proper conflict prevention strategy can be executed and how best practices can be implemented in the future. In conclusion, this paper will recommend a way for the United States to create and implement an effective, comprehensive conflict prevention strategy.

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“We cannot careen from crisis to crisis. We must have a new diplomacy that can anticipate and prevent crises...rather than simply manage them.”¹
-Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher

Chapter 1

Introduction

For the last two decades, the United States as well as many other nations and international organizations have not only been engaged in prolonged wars but also in extensive and costly post-conflict nation building endeavors. There will come a time in the near future where the United States and other nations will not be able to afford financially and socially, these costly and dangerous engagements, and will have to pursue other means to protect its national interests. Isolationism is no longer a viable foreign policy strategy as the world becomes more interconnected and one nation's issues can quickly become a global problem with global implications. This paper will propose that *in effort to shape the future security environment, the United States will need to formulate and apply a strategic, comprehensive, cross-governmental conflict prevention strategy.*

This conflict prevention strategy will entail a United States government smart power philosophy, selecting the appropriate tools of national power for each arising situation. Smart power implies a national whole-of-government approach to foreign policy issues that places emphasis on the capabilities of each department/agency and how they are interrelated while avoiding duplication of effort. Smart power can also be applied by large organizations with different capabilities like the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Integrating these efforts requires

¹ Michael Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts - A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 5.

developing and understanding the capabilities and limitations of each department/agency involved. Therefore, achieving smart power is integral before a multilateral comprehensive approach can be applied. During her confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, “We must use what has been called smart power: the full range of tools at our disposal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural – picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy.”²

Once the ability to combine the various national tools of power is accomplished, U.S. smart power will be applied to a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy. “There is no commonly accepted definition for ‘comprehensive approach,’ there is a broad agreement that it implies pursuing an approach aimed at integrating the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights, and humanitarian dimensions of international missions.”³ In other words, it is the application of multilateral smart power, different nations and organizations working together to resolve an issue.

This paper will present the logic and defend the value of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy. First, a foundation for a successful prevention strategy will be laid out by examining the benefits, the need for national interest/political will, and the requirement for a successful, multilateral preventive strategy. Then, the current U.S. prevention mechanisms will be examined and will expose the disjointedness and lack of coordination between the various U.S. departments/agencies with conflict prevention

² Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Statement of Hilary Rodham Clinton Nominee for Secretary of State*, 2009.

³ Crisis Management Initiative, Kristiina Rintakoski, and Mikko Autti, eds., *Comprehensive Approach - Trends, Challenges and Possibilities for Cooperation in Crisis Prevention and Management* (Helsinki: Ministry of Defence - Finland, 2008), 11.

missions. In addition, two historical conflict prevention case studies will be analyzed to demonstrate how a proper conflict prevention strategy can be executed and how best practices can be implemented in the future. In conclusion, this paper will recommend a way for the United States to create and implement an effective, comprehensive conflict prevention strategy.

Chapter 2

Conflict Prevention Strategy

It is impossible to predict the future but one aspect that is almost certain is that there will always exist some form of conflict. However, the goal of conflict prevention strategy is to manage the conflict so that it does not escalate into a large-scale violent engagement or a crisis of global proportion. “The term conflict [prevention] suggests different things to different people, as yet, it has no agreed upon meaning among practitioners and scholars.”¹ For the purpose of this paper, conflict prevention will be defined as: “Actions taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change.”² In narrowing the definition of conflict prevention, the concept becomes less broad and differentiates prevention actions from routine diplomacy and crisis management.³ Routine diplomatic activities can be characterized as consular relations, exchange programs, and trade. On the contrary, crisis management is when the actual level of violence is high and the primary objective is to stop the violence and enforce a cease-fire.⁴

Although the purpose of conflict prevention varies from routine diplomacy and crisis management, the same tools of national power are utilized to implement preventive

¹ Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts - A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, 31

² *Ibid.*, 37.

³ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 42.

actions. The main difference is that the tools are “...being specifically targeted and oriented to places and times where violence or armed [force is] threatening.”⁵ Conflict prevention measures could include but are not limited to: suppressing violence, removing weapons, addressing an issue in dispute by engaging opposing parties in dialogue or negotiations, creating or strengthening the procedures and institutions through which negotiations can be regularized, and alleviating the flagrant socioeconomic conditions that provide incitement for violence.⁶ A comprehensive conflict prevention strategy provides the means to proactively address these issues. In summary, “...the conceptual core of conflict [prevention] has to do with keeping peaceable disputes from escalating unmanageably into sustained levels of violence and significant armed force...”⁷

Strategy is about making choices and conflict prevention normally rank orders low, compared to other national priorities. But the time has come for a radical change in U.S. strategic priorities. The days of post-conflict nation building should be numbered and not something that the U.S. should deliberately plan for; “...these missions are just too ambitious a goal when the recipient is a large, fragile state...”⁸ The U.S. as well as other nations and international organizations have to strategically adjust their priorities and properly design and apply a global conflict prevention strategy. Early use of various tools of power to shape the international environment and prevent conflict or crisis – that

⁵ Ibid., 44.

⁶ Ibid., 44-45.

⁷ Ibid., 37.

⁸ Stephen J. Flanagan and James A. Schear, *Strategic Challenges - America's Global Security Agenda* (Washington DC: National Defense University and Potomac Books, 2007), 121.

is, acting early to keep small problems from becoming larger and costlier ones – should be a central strategic theme in a grand strategy focused on sustaining the foundations of the global system.⁹ A well executed conflict prevention strategy is cost-effective, in the nation’s best interest; requires a global response, and an early warning system.

A. Cost Effective

The overall costs of intra-state conflicts are much higher than the eye catching material damage and human casualties. There are also the political costs of the demolition of the democratic system and even the disintegration of states, the ecological costs caused by a scorched-earth policy..., the social costs caused by the separation of families and communities, the psychological costs of conflicts, which can easily drive people to new violence, and the spiritual costs of the undermining of values and meaning of life.¹⁰

In an environment where resources are finite, the U.S. deficit is at its all time high and the global economy is in constant turmoil; the U.S. has to implement strategies where it can meet its goals efficiently. Applying a conflict prevention approach is cost-effective and has proven to be successful. It is almost illogical to choose a plan that is not economically beneficial to a nation; “... the costs of prevention efforts are much lower than the costs that actual conflicts impose on outside powers, such as refugee costs, direct economic costs, economic opportunity costs, military costs, and the costs of conflict resolution, reconstruction, and rehabilitation.”¹¹ It is a difficult task to quantify the cost of conflict prevention because it is hard to predict how much a kinetic engagement would

⁹ Shawn Brimley, Michele Flournoy and Vikram Singh, *Making America Grand Again: Toward a New Grand Strategy* (Washington D.C.: Centers for a New American Security, 2008), 21.

¹⁰ Edwin Bakker, "Early Warning by NGOs in Conflict Areas," in *Non-State Actors in International Relations*, ed. Bas Arts, Math Noortmann, and Bob Reinalda (United Kingdom: Ashgate, 2001), 2.

¹¹ Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance, *Cost of Conflict - Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Inc, 1999), 222.

have cost if it never occurs. Similarly, it is hard to quantify the cost of successful prevention if a kinetic engagement has occurred without any type of prevention.¹² In the book *Cost of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena*, Michael E. Brown, Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and Richard N. Rosecrance, Professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, conducted a study to compare the effectiveness of conflict prevention efforts to total costs of the conflicts. In the case studies the researchers used three different methods to quantify the value of conflict prevention efforts on a cost-effective basis. The first methodology used a counterfactual analysis – a proposition which states what would have followed had the actual sequence of events or circumstances been different.¹³ The analysis compared the cost of actual conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti, and the Gulf War to estimates of what it would have cost to prevent that conflict.¹⁴ “In this case [the researchers identified] a moment when international action could have been taken to prevent the dispute from escalating to violence, then ascertain what kinds of international actions would have been needed to prevent violence from breaking out.”¹⁵ The second method applied was also counterfactual analysis. The analysis compared the cost of actual conflict prevention actions in Macedonia and Slovakia to the estimated costs of conflict to regional and international powers that might have intervened.¹⁶ By using this

¹² Ibid., 223.

¹³ Gordon Marshall. "counterfactual." *A Dictionary of Sociology*. 1998. *Encyclopedia.com*. (accessed March 31, 2010). <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O88-counterfactual.html>

¹⁴ Ibid., 223.

¹⁵ Ibid., 223.

¹⁶ Ibid., 224.

method the researchers had to make an assumption about how the conflicts might have escalated and spread. In the third analysis method, they compared the cost of conflicts in Cambodia and El Salvador to costs of the actual conflict resolution. In each of the cases studied, it was revealed that the cost of conflict outweighed the cost of prevention or would have prevention. The summary of study's results can be found in Table 1. The evidence is eye-opening, especially in the cases where the difference is significantly large. With a strictly cost-benefit analysis perspective, conflict prevention is definitely a sound strategy.

Table 1¹⁷
Summary of the Effectiveness of Conflict Prevention Efforts:
Total Costs of Intervention (\$U.S. Billions)

Case	Cost of Conflict To outside Powers	Cost of Conflict Prevention	Difference
Bosnia			
Actual conflict	53.7		
Possible intervention		33.3	20.4
Rwanda			
Actual conflict	4.5		
Possible intervention		1.3	3.2
Somalia			
Actual conflict	7.3		
Possible intervention		1.5	5.8
Haiti			
Actual conflict	5.0		
Possible intervention		2.3	2.7
Gulf War ^a			
Actual conflict	114.0		
Possible intervention			
Small		10.0	104.0
Intermediate		30.0	84.0
Macedonia			
Possible conflict			
Intermediate	15.0		14.7
Large	143.9		143.6
Actual intervention		0.3	
Slovakia			
Possible conflict			
Intermediate	1.3		0.4
Large	15.0		14.1
Actual intervention		0.9	
Cambodia ^b			
Actual conflict	12.0		
Possible intervention		1.7	10.3
El Salvador ^b			
Actual conflict	2.4		
Possible intervention		0.1	2.3

^aCosts to the Western powers only ^bCosts incurred since the end of the Cold War

¹⁷ Brown and Rosecrance, *Cost of Conflict - Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena*, 225.

B. Political Will/ National Interest

In order to implement a viable conflict prevention strategy, it must be in a nation's national interest and supported by political will as well. "Almost every study of preventive [engagements] concludes that when all is said and done, the main obstacle is political will."¹⁸ An effective approach to leveraging the needed political will is to directly associate the need for a conflict prevention strategy to the U.S. national interest and to the survivability of the nation.

States are most likely to act to prevent deadly conflict when they believe that doing so is in their national interests (as they perceive them). Advocates of more vigorous and expansive prevention must therefore begin with states' current perceptions of their interests in attempting to overcome the existing deficit of will. Democracies, in particular, need to be shown the connection between deadly conflicts and their national interests.¹⁹

"One of the main reasons why leaders have been so reluctant to take on preventive [actions] is that they have held to the conventional wisdom critique of its lack of realism, that the costs to be borne and risks to be run are too high and interests at stake too low".²⁰ In other words, it is hard to pass policy that is based on stopping a crisis from occurring that may not be preventable or worth the cost of trying to prevent. In the U. S. hierarchy of national interest, conflict prevention is acknowledged but not allocated the proper resources or strategic attention that it deserves. "However, preventive [strategy] is becoming more widely used and discussed – at least within many policymaking and

¹⁸ Bruce Jentleson, *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 347.

¹⁹ Graham Allison and Hisashi Owada, "The Responsibilities of Democracies in Preventing Deadly Conflict," Carnegie Corporation, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/democ/demfr.htm> (accessed November 27, 2009).

²⁰ Bruce Jentleson, *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 348.

academic circles, though clearly not yet among the public at large – only limited progress has been made in translating this emerging approach into workable operating strategies and ongoing practices.”²¹ A conflict prevention approach would proactively address the basic national interest of U.S. security, survival, and economic growth, which are some of the main themes in the U.S. National Security Strategy 2006. However, conflict prevention is barely addressed in this premier U.S. strategic document. By definition, “strategic interest arise from matters and developments that do not bear immediately on a state’s security, well-being, and domestic tranquility but that have the potential, if left unattended, to directly affect these vital interests or the capacity to advance or defend them.”²² This is exactly what a well executed conflict prevention strategy would address, the festering problems that have potential to become a large crisis with national as well as global implications; “...conflict prevention is a political strategy that can establish a more stable predictable international environment through effective response to emergent, escalating, and ongoing conflicts by means of economic, political, and military techniques...”²³

C. Multilateralism

The problems facing the world in the 21st century are not the same threats that many nations prepared for in the 20th century, like conventional state on state wars. Instead, nations are faced with global problems: terrorism, disease control, and financial

²¹ Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts - A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, 26-27.

²² Chas Freeman, *Arts of Power Statecraft and Diplomacy* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 11.

²³ David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., *Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality*, Vol. 2 (New York: Lexington Books, 2004), 5.

crisis that are too vast and complex for any one nation to manage on its own. As one country's problems can quickly become the world's problems, multilateralism and cooperation is the only option for preventing conflict in the future. Multilateralism is an essential component to a successful comprehensive conflict prevention strategy because it is accompanied with support of other international actors which adds to legitimacy of action and provides a coalition of wisdom and interest.

A multilateral prevention strategy provides consensus, a foundation for long-term cooperation, and legitimacy for conflict prevention actions. A multilateral environment is more inclusive which can lead to a balanced understanding of an issue, therefore providing a comprehensive and clear solution or objectives for action. "The views of the strong and the weak alike can be aired, with the latter often more willing to accede to the needs of the former if they are certain their concerns have been heard. Debates can identify areas of convergence among countries with otherwise different interest."²⁴

Multilateralism also "...creates frameworks for long-term cooperation based on shared principles and precedents that go beyond the bilateral."²⁵ This aspect is instrumental in conflict prevention, if a nation or region in need can see that a multilateral framework is in place, they may be more compelled to cooperate and engage knowing that it is for the long-term. A multilateral framework also reaffirms global commitment to that issue, so the nation or region receiving the assistance knows it is not a short-term commitment.

²⁴ Patrick M. Cronin, ed. *Global Strategic Assessment 2009: America's Security Role in a Changing World* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2009), 441.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 440.

Multilateral support can also be perceived as favorable by other international actors, thus giving the prevention engagement more legitimacy. Having the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, or other international organizations supporting a conflict prevention engagement “...provides a legitimate means of convening nations to address conflict...”²⁶ Multilateral action provides an extra layer of legitimacy and limits the perception of undermining a nation’s sovereignty; furthermore, it demonstrates that it is a global act of conflict prevention with global interests and implications, versus a unilateral action that could be perceived as self-interested actions.

The conflict prevention efforts in Kenya after the post-election violence in 2007, is a recent successful example of multilateral conflict prevention. The UN and African Union (AU) led actions; supported by various NGOs, U.S., France, and Britain; to reach a settlement to the various disputes. Multilateralism was key in these preventive actions because it was comprehensive, created a framework to solve long-term problems, and provided legitimacy of action.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Kingdom, and the United Nations are also promoting and applying comprehensive conflict prevention strategies. For example, experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan have proven to NATO the importance of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy. NATO has recently developed a set of proposals that promote a comprehensive approach to conflict

²⁶ Johanna Forman, *Investing in a New Multilateralism: A Smart Power Approach to the United Nations* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2009), 1.

prevention that focuses on reaping the benefits of a spectrum of civilian and military tools acting in concert.²⁷

“In this age of accelerated globalization, multilateralism offers the most effective means to realize common goals and contain common threats.”²⁸ A comprehensive conflict prevention strategy will need a wide-ranged selection of organizations and nations that will be able to coordinate efforts and provide solutions to a multitude of issues ranging from economic management to social services. “Preventing wars that risk fundamentally destabilizing important regions of the world is a shared imperative. Although balances of power in particular areas change and evolve over time, the United States and other great powers have a shared interest in preventing rising tensions, miscalculation, and the use of force.”²⁹

D. Early Warning System

Another key to an effective conflict prevention strategy is some form of an early warning mechanism with the ability to forecast potential conflicts, alerting to actions that can be taken before violence outbreaks or escalates. The purpose of an early warning system is to help ascertain whether and when violent conflicts can be expected to erupt. Consequently, focus can then be placed on preventive measures and strategies to

²⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "A Comprehensive Approach," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm (accessed February 13, 2010).

²⁸ Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick, eds., *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 440.

²⁹ Brimley, Flournoy, and Singh, *Making America Grand Again: Toward a New Grand Strategy*, 13.

ameliorate the situation.³⁰ The use of an early warning system will provide, “...systematic collection and analysis of information coming from the areas of crises for the purpose of anticipating the escalation of violent conflict, the development of strategic responses to these crises, and the presentation of options to key decision-makers.”³¹ Normally, early warning systems have triggers or potential warning signs that could be a sign of potential crisis. Some of these triggers could be, but are not limited to, rising unemployment rates, demographic changes and population displacement, increased number of protests, and government restrictions.³² For an early warning system to be adequate and the triggers to have relevant significance, they have to be examined with a holistic perspective and understanding of how each trigger is interrelated. Having an early warning system therefore increases the odds of a more cost-effective conflict prevention engagement because it allows for early intervention. Nevertheless, “...the reliability of early warning systems will depend on two fundamentals: (1) the quality, accuracy, relevance, and timeliness of the information sources used; and (2) the way in which this information is analyzed and interpreted.”³³

In short, conflict and the nature of war will always exist. Thus, the eradication of conflict is not the ultimate goal of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy.

Notwithstanding, the objective of a comprehensive prevention strategy is to focus on

³⁰ Netherlands Institute of International Relations, "Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in the Political Practice of International Organizations," http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/1996/19960000_cru_paper.pdf (accessed March 2, 2010).

³¹ Bakker, *Early Warning by NGOs in Conflict Areas*, 3.

³² Eric Brahm, "Early Warning," http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/early_warning/ (accessed March 2, 2010).

³³ John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 6.

managing and or mitigating the causes of conflict before they escalate to large violent engagements. This can only be done effectively if all necessary instruments of national power work together to prevent crisis. A national smart power can then augment a multilateral effort, making it a truly comprehensive approach.

As mentioned earlier, despite its potentially burdensome nature, a comprehensive strategy for conflict prevention provides certain advantages like being more economical than the cost of conflict. Historically, the U.S. intervened in a crisis when it was past the point of prevention. “[The United States] address worrying conditions in the world only when they have erupted into a crisis – that is, at the moment of greatest complexity and intensity along the chain of instabilities, the moment when taking effective action will be most costly and most difficult to resolve.”³⁴ A well executed prevention strategy will save money in the long-term.

In order for a conflict prevention strategy to be successfully implemented, it must be of national interest supported by the political will and include an early warning system. Conventional wisdom can be persuaded in favor of conflict prevention by emphasizing the realism of globalization and how issues like economic crisis and regional instability in other areas of the world can have global consequences and affect the nation’s national interest. Political will is malleable and if the proper linkages and benefits of a comprehensive prevention strategy are illustrated, the people will develop a habit for prevention and make it an integral part of our foreign policy. “We define events by the crisis points. And then we deal with the crisis as though it’s the only reality that counts. We lose sight of or fail to observe the chain of events and conditions that gave

³⁴ Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz, *The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America's Power and Purpose* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 115.

birth to the crisis.”³⁵ A well executed and implemented comprehensive conflict prevention strategy will mitigate that problem so effective actions can be applied before it becomes a large scale tragedy. And in order to apply efforts early on, an early warning system must be in place to provide early indicators of trouble and marshal attention to drive an early response.

³⁵ Ibid., 115.

Chapter 3

Present Day Approach: Ad Hoc Crisis Prevention

The United States Government has been involved in conflict prevention throughout the 20th century. However, its current efforts are an ad hoc approach with no consideration to harness USG's smart power for a multilateral comprehensive approach. According to John Stull, Associate Professor for Transformation & Interagency Initiatives at the Joint Forces Staff College, the U.S. lacks a coherent approach to strategic planning that is multi-agency in nature and extends planning and coordination to multi-lateral partners for implementation. To emphasize this point, the United States has several different departments that have missions in conflict prevention. Among them are the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense. The Department of State is the lead agency for foreign affairs, and within the Department of State, is the Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), which has an office of conflict management. Within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation. The Department of Defense also has a conflict prevention mission, known as Phase Zero, where it "... promotes stability and peace by building capacity in partner nations that enables them to be cooperative, trained, and prepared to help prevent or limit conflicts."¹ The absence of a cross-governmental conflict prevention plan, has led to ad-hoc conflict prevention.

¹ Charles F. Wald, "The Phase Zero Campaign," *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 43 (10, 2006), 73.

A. Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

In an effort to resolve the need to centralize civilian capacity as it relates to conflict engagement, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created in 2004. The mission of S/CRS is to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they may reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”² In December 2005, following the creation of S/CRS, President George Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) which provides S/CRS with its authorities. The purpose of NSPD-44 “...is to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, involved in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.”³ The directive explicitly states, “The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”⁴

The Office of Conflict Prevention within S/CRS is tasked to,

² U.S. Department of State, "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization," , <http://www.state.gov.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/s/crs/index.htm> (accessed January 23, 2010).

³ George W. Bush, *National Security Presidential Directive 44* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2005).

⁴ Ibid.

Coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, develop detailed contingency plans for integrated U.S. Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts, and coordinate preventative strategies with foreign countries, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities.⁵

1. Interagency Management System

In order to carry out these tasks, S/CRS has implemented two interagency frameworks: the Interagency Management System (IMS), a planning framework for a whole of government approach to crisis management, and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework. IMS is designed to provide decision makers with the “flexible tools to ensure unity of effort as laid out through whole-of-government strategic and implementation planning for Reconstruction and Stabilization.”⁶ IMS facilitates and supports “integrated planning process for unified USG strategic and implementations plans, joint interagency field deployments, and a joint civilian operations capability.”⁷ IMS consists of three different levels: the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group, the Integration and Planning Cell, and the Advance Civilian Team. The Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group is the policy formulating arm of the framework. It is an interagency decision-making body that is led by the Regional Assistant Secretary of State, the S/CRS Coordinator, and the National Security Council Senior Director.⁸ “The Integration Planning Cell consists of interagency planners and regional and sectoral experts who deploy to the relevant Geographic Combatant Command or multinational

⁵ U.S. Department of State, "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization," <http://www.state.gov.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/s/crs/index.htm> (accessed January 23, 2010).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

headquarters to assist in harmonizing ongoing planning and operations between civilian and military agencies...”⁹ Then, the Advance Civilian Team deploys to the country or region in question to develop, execute, and monitor plans.¹⁰

S/CRS faces major challenges of funding and staffing. Currently, S/CRS does not have its own funds for conflict prevention. S/CRS depends on Department of Defense 1207 funds, which “...provide targeted reconstruction and stabilization assistance to bolster stability in weak states, failing states, and states facing unanticipated crises.”¹¹

“Section 1207 of the FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act authorized the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to \$100 million per year for two years, to the Department of State for programs that support security, reconstruction or stabilization.”¹²

Another obstacle directly related to funding that the S/CRS faces is lack of staff. In his statement to House Committee on Armed Services, Ambassador John Herbst, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, stated “we have built a modest and promising rapid response capability with the State Department and a growing cadre of civilian planners...”¹³ Inferences could be made by the use of the word “modest” and “growing” to illustrate the need for more staff due to lack of funding. In order to fulfill its mandate of having a civilian response corps that is able to respond to crisis or

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ John Negroponte, *Testimony on Military's Role Toward Foreign Policy*, on July 31, 2008, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

¹² U.S. Department of State, *Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization*.

¹³ Ambassador John Herbst, *Reconstruction and Stabilization*, on February 26, 2008, to the House Armed Services Committee.

mitigation, the Department of State has requested \$323.3 million in fiscal year 2010.¹⁴ A large amount of this money will be used to develop, train, and equip a 4250-person civilian response corps. Currently the civilian corps is comprised of two components, the Civilian Response Corps with seventy-eight full time active members ready to deploy within two days, and a 554 standby members corps who can serve in case of need.¹⁵ In theory, IMS will mitigate the problems of overlapping efforts, missed opportunities, and a lack of coherence in order to successfully implement a smart power philosophy to conflict prevention. As it currently stands, IMS has not been operationalized in any conflict prevention engagement since its inception

A well thought out plan without proper funding and resources is only a vision. If the Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization desires to be the civilian smart power arm of the U.S. Government for conflict prevention, institutional legacies like the relationship between the Department of State and Congress, and the lack of motivation for cross-governmental cooperation will need to be addressed and corrected.

2. Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) is the tool adopted by S/CRS for the interagency to have a shared understanding of the context of a situation, with the goal of crafting a common response. “The purpose of ICAF is to develop a commonly held understanding across relevant U.S. Government Departments and Agencies of the dynamic driving and mitigating violent conflict within a country, that

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization*.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

informs U.S. policy and planning decisions.”¹⁶ ICAF is the first step used by the CRSG in the planning process to inform the establishment of U.S. Government goals, reshaping activities, implementation or revision of programs, and/or allocation or reallocation of resources.¹⁷ ICAF consists of two parts: Conflict Diagnosis and Segue into Planning. The Conflict Diagnosis phase is staged into four parts: evaluating the context of the conflict, understanding core grievances and social/institutional resilience, identifying drivers of conflict and mitigating factors, and describing opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict.¹⁸ Segue into Planning is the second phase of the analysis which initiates pre-planning activities for conflict prevention. Also during this phase, the interagency “...maps existing diplomatic and programmatic activities against the prioritized list of drivers of conflict and mitigating factors to identify gaps in current efforts as they relate to conflict dynamics.”¹⁹ During this phase, multilateral Non-Governmental Organizations and private sector efforts are also taken into consideration. These discoveries are then used as a foundation for recommendations to planners.

As a tool that provides the interagency with a cohesive picture of the conflict environment, ICAF is advantageous yet lacks the ability to forecast countries on the brink of conflict.

¹⁶ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, *Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2008), 2.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

B. U.S. Agency for International Development-USAID

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also has an office with conflict prevention responsibilities, the Conflict Mitigation and Management Office. The Conflict Mitigation and Management Office (CMM) "...leads USAID's efforts to identify and analyze sources of conflict, support early responses to address the causes and consequences of instability and violent conflict; and seek to integrate conflict mitigation and management into USAID's analysis, strategies and programs."²⁰ This office promotes "...activities that seek to reduce the threat of violent conflict by promoting peaceful resolution of differences, reducing violence if it has already broken out, or establish a framework for peace and reconciliation in an ongoing conflict."²¹ In order to do so, CMM has developed a conflict assessment framework. This assessment framework provides a conflict vulnerability assessment for fragile countries with regards to developmental assistance.²² If the country meets the criteria, USAID will create a strategic plan to address the sources of conflict, but the plan only outlines how USAID will address the problem and does not involve any other instruments of national power.

C. Department of Defense

Last but not least, is the Department of Defense (DOD) which is also involved in crisis prevention. In the DOD, crisis prevention is led by the Geographical Combatant Commander (GCC), who is responsible for the development and implementation of DOD

²⁰ U.S. Agency for International Development, "Conflict Management and Mitigation," http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/ (accessed January 23, 2010).

²¹ U.S. Agency for International Development, *Conflict Mitigation and Management Policy* (Washington DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2005), 5.

²² *Ibid.*, 5.

strategies for a geographical region.²³ There are six GCCs that carry out preventive engagements in Phase 0, the prevent and shape phase of the DOD phasing model of operations. According to the DOD Joint Publication 3-0, the definition of Phase 0 is “...activities performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. They are designed to assure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies...”²⁴

As noted earlier, there are six regional Commands: Africa Command, Central Command, European Command, Northern Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command. Each Command has a different mission which is reflected in the way it carries out Phase 0 activities. For example, Phase 0 engagements in the European Command “...range from train-and-equip programs for building capacity in partner nations to regional security initiatives, humanitarian assistance actions, and similar ‘hearts and minds’ engagements.”²⁵ The main purposes of these activities are to protect U.S. interests, promote stability, and overcome the underlying causes of terrorism.²⁶

The organization and composition of each Command also varies, which is an indicator of the degree of interaction they have with the rest of U.S. Government, especially the Department of State, as it relates to coordination for Phase 0 activities. For example, Africa Command (AFRICOM), the newest command, has a mission to “conduct sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and

²³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 2009), I-14.

²⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, 2008), IV 27-28.

²⁵ Wald, *The Phase Zero Campaign*, 73.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 73.

secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy."²⁷ This mission is very different from the more traditional command mandates because it has a heavy focus on Phase 0, which requires more representation of other U.S. Government agencies within the command.²⁸ AFRICOM has eleven designated positions at the deputy director level or above that are reserved for other agencies' Senior Executive Service members. For example, the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities is designated for a Department of State ambassador.

AFRICOM is on the correct course of having a more assorted U.S. Government involvement in DOD preventive engagements, but they are routine steady state activities and not focused conflict prevention efforts. Nevertheless, a comprehensive USG preventive strategy is still missing. There are no clear linkages between GCCs crisis preventive activities and other U.S. Government agencies operating in the same region. This leads to ad hoc and poorly coordinated preventive engagements. "In fact, if not carefully coordinated, even well intended pre-conflict 'shaping' activities designed to improve the training and capabilities of the host military or provide humanitarian relief, may actually complicate [U.S.] foreign policy objectives or worse yet, undermine [U.S.] overall national security interests."²⁹

In order to yield the benefits of crisis prevention, a comprehensive crisis prevention strategy must be implemented. The Office for the Coordinator of

²⁷ GEN William Ward, "AFRICOM Mission Statement," <http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp> (accessed January 23, 2010).

²⁸ Elizabeth Dickinson, "Think Again: Africom." *Foreign Policy*. November 17, 2009. http://www.foreignpolicy.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/articles/2009/11/17/think_again_africom (accessed January 16, 2010).

²⁹ COL Thomas Rhatican, "Redefining Security Cooperation: New Limits on Phase Zero and Shaping" (Master's Thesis U.S. Army War College, 2008), 3.

Reconstruction and Stabilization at the Department of State and Africa Command within the Department of Defense are illustrations of offices headed in the right direction. In each of these departments they are cognizant of the need for cross-governmental planning and have taken steps to take advantage of U.S. smart power and coordinate with multilateral organizations.

Chapter 4

Historical Examples of Conflict Prevention

Comprehensive conflict prevention has been successful in the past. Two historical case studies that illustrate a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy are the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) in the mid 1990's and Macedonia in 2001. First, the examination of each case study will begin by providing background information on each region and what led to the crisis. Then it will identify the early warning signs that caused the international community to become involved. Following, the case studies will look at how the prevention engagement was applied. Finally, it will illustrate the lessons learned. Both of these engagements provide valuable best practices on what is necessary for successful crisis prevention and how it should be executed.

A. Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania)

A well planned and coordinated comprehensive conflict prevention strategy was applied in the Baltic States intervention which resulted in a global compromise that was beneficial to all interested parties. "...Targeted strategies were used to achieve goals; policymakers in the West, the Baltic States, and Russia were creative and flexible in using all available forums at their disposal to achieve a favorable outcome. As a result, ...the united front was a critical part of a positive outcome."¹

¹ Jentleson, *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World*, 94.

1. Background

After World War I, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were all independent states, but in 1940 they were all annexed by the Soviet Union – the U.S. among other countries never recognized the Baltic States as part of the USSR and maintained separate diplomatic relations with each state.² Throughout the 1980's, pro-independence movements took greater fervor throughout the Baltic States, "...setting the stage for high levels of Western concern and involvement..."³ In 1990, Lithuania was the first Baltic State to sever its ties with the USSR and declare its independence. Estonia and Latvia shortly followed and claimed their independence that same year. The USSR responded by moving troops to occupy strategic buildings in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, and Riga, the capital of Latvia. During this show of force, approximately 20 people were killed. Needless to say, the relationship between Russia and the Baltic States was tense but it was further exacerbated by Russian embargoes, ethnic tensions, and citizenship laws. The international community led by the U.S. became engaged early on; this was not just an issue of Baltic State independence but it also became an issue of Russian reform (during this period Russia was going through major reforms dealing with privatization, trade liberalization, and a market-based economy).⁴ In 1994, with constant international engagement and "... targeting of aid to regional flashpoints and marshaling

² "US Support for Baltic Independence," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 2, no. 26 (7, 1991), 471.

³ Jentleson, *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World*, 91.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 93.

the resources of various international organizations to shape Baltic and Russian behavior,” Russian troops withdrew and citizenship issues were resolved.⁵

2. *Early Warning*

The immediate violence that erupted after the Baltic States declared their independence was a forecast of the problems to follow.⁶ “It caught the attention of policy makers, crystallized the issues, and provided a graphic foreshadowing of what a violent conflict would entail...”⁷ The Baltic-American organizations in the U.S. were also very active and created a lot of political pressure to recognize the potential for conflict and intervention in the Baltics. “The immediate result was a continued U.S. focus on the region and a willingness to keep it on the agendas of NATO and the OSCE.”⁸

3. *Engagement*

The Baltic State comprehensive crisis prevention engagement lasted approximately three years from 1991-1994. The international community knew the strategic geopolitical importance of the Baltic States and was committed to seeing this issue resolved. The international community’s goals for this strategy were pretty limited and agreed by all: “to get Russian troops out and to settle the preconditions for ethnic Slavs to gain citizenship or permanent resident status.”⁹ The international community

⁵ Ibid., 92.

⁶ Ibid., 94.

⁷ Ibid., 94.

⁸ Ibid., 95.

⁹ Ibid., 95.

implemented a policy of rewards and punishments to achieve its desired outcome. “Left with a limited arsenal, international organizations and governments worked together to offer several different incentives, which became salient features of the international community’s response.”¹⁰ This situation was unique because the Baltic States and Russia, “...[L]ooked to the West for approval and support.”¹¹ For example, the Baltic States wanted membership in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) therefore they did not want to jeopardize their entry into the organizations. At the same time Russia was reforming, the West wanted to promote and support Russian moderates.¹² Russia was also adamant on having just treatment and citizenship for the ethnic Slavs. And they also wanted a favorable outcome for several military installations in the Baltics.

International engagements were carried out on various levels to see the resolution of this conflict without major kinetic action. The U.S. and the Nordic countries offered a variety of financial incentives to get the Russian troops out and to support the Baltic economy. Heads of States constantly reiterated publicly and privately to the Baltic States, the qualifications of entry into European organizations which “...were conditioned on Baltic adoption of liberal citizenship laws and residence procedures for residents belonging to other ethnic groups...” which reinforced the urgency in resolving its citizenship issues.¹³ The Baltic States remained on the OSCE agenda and in 1993 OSCE established missions in Latvia and Estonia. Finally in 1994, all of the international

¹⁰ Ibid., 93.

¹¹ Ibid., 97.

¹² Ibid., 96.

¹³ Ibid., 93.

engagements succeeded, Russian troops withdrew and the Baltic States enacted just citizenship laws. “The combination of proposals and incentives developed by the embassies and international organization representatives on the ground, with central goals that all actors shared, were what made conflict prevention in the Baltics successful.”¹⁴

4. Lessons Learned

There are several lessons learned from the Baltic States intervention that can be applied to future conflict prevention engagements. One of the key lessons in the Baltic preventive engagement was that the international community did not hesitate to become involved at the first sign of conflict, due in part to the high level of advocacy by the Baltic-American community. “...The Baltic nations’ high visibility and popularity in the United States made early warning relatively unproblematic. A domestic constituency existed and clamored for support for the Baltic States...”¹⁵

Another takeaway from this intervention was the flexibility and coordination of all of the players involved, which made a multilateral intervention key to a successful resolution. Each nation and international organization involved had various incentives that motivated a particular course of action, which concluded in a resolution acceptable to the international community and the other parties involved. “...political and economic capital could be brought to bear on the problem from many different angles. When one entity was distracted or suffering from budget shortfalls, the presence of others helped maintain the initiatives.”¹⁶

¹⁴ Ibid., 107.

¹⁵ Ibid., 104.

¹⁶ Ibid., 106.

This case also reaffirms the importance of having a unified strategic goal. At the onset of the conflict, the international community had a very clear end-state, removal of Russian troops and just citizenship laws. Therefore each international player was able to leverage their power and capabilities to obtain the desired outcome.

B. Macedonia

The crisis in Macedonia demonstrates the importance of comprehensive actions to prevent the escalation of violence and a potential civil war. In Macedonia, concerned nations working through multilateral institutions prevented a potential civil war. Macedonia should be used as an example for adopting a strategy of preventive engagement.

1. Background

The current day Republic of Macedonia was established in 1991 as part of the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Macedonia became one of the six republics of the Yugoslav Federation along with Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro, and Slovenia. "In 1991, the Republic of Macedonia seceded from the Yugoslav federation after a referendum in which two-thirds of the population voted in favor of independence. Although independence was implemented peacefully, some issues concerning recognition of the new state's identity and borders were not completely resolved."¹⁷ Due to the instability and ethnic tensions in the region, the United Nations (UN) deployed a protection force, later renamed UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), to Macedonia. The purpose of UNPREDEP was, "...to monitor and report any developments in its border

¹⁷ Violetta Petroska-Beska and Mirjana Najcevska, *Macedonia: Understanding History, Preventing Future Conflict* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2004), 2.

areas which could undermine confidence and stability in the Republic and threaten its territory.”¹⁸ Later, the mission was expanded to include confidence building between ethnic groups and to support humanitarian assistance efforts. Until its mission was terminated in 1999, UNPREDEP was a key preventive engagement factor that kept Macedonia stable. “... [T]here is no doubt that the presence of substantial numbers of UN soldiers [UNPREDEP] certainly gave a good picture of cross-border activity and helped deter a rise in criminality.”¹⁹

Like most of the countries that seceded from the former Yugoslavia, Macedonia struggled with political conflicts that stemmed from ethnic tensions. Twenty-three percent of Macedonia’s population is ethnic Albanian, the most outspoken minority, and they felt that they have been discriminated against by the Macedonian Slavs, the majority, who make up sixty-five percent of the population.²⁰ The ethnic Albanian community also did not feel like they were fully integrated into the government and were usually assigned to supportive roles in government, which made them feel like “...second class citizens.”²¹ “The new republic’s constitution promised Albanians and other nationalities ‘full equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people,’ but the structural inequalities between the ethnic groups persisted, fueling

¹⁸ Peace and Security Section-United Nations Department of Public Information, "United Nations Preventive Deployment Force," http://www.un.org.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred_p.htm (accessed January 16, 2010).

¹⁹ Mark Laity, *Preventing War in Macedonia: Pre-Emptive Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (United Kingdom: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies by Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 8.

²⁰ Jentleson, *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World*, 180.

²¹ Laity, *Preventing War in Macedonia: Pre-Emptive Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, 9.

Albanian resentment.”²² “On the Macedonian side, many people suspected the Albanian community of rampant criminality and of disloyalty to the new state—disloyalty that ranged from tax evasion to secessionist and irredentist plots.”²³

Ethnic tensions continued to escalate and in February 2001, the National Liberation Army (NLA), an ethnic Albanian militant group, attacked and took control of Tanusevci, a village by the Kosovo/Macedonia border. After this initial incident, tensions escalated and the ethnic strain increased. The government of Macedonia saw the “event as purely criminal or terrorist, rather than symptomatic of the serious strains within their young country,” and thus responded to the attack with a military counter-offensive vice, seeking a military and political solution.²⁴ In April of the same year, the NLA launched another offensive, “... killing Macedonian police and soldiers, occupying villages in northern *Macedonia*, taking hostages, and putting Albanian civilians in grave danger.”²⁵ On June 8, 2001, the NLA escalated its attacks by infiltrating and occupying a largely ethnic Albanian village, Aracinovo, just five miles from the capital and its airport.²⁶ The unknown and newly created NLA, “...became a full-blown insurgency...”²⁷ The international community quickly identified the need for intervention and put the wheels in motion for a comprehensive solution that addressed the security and political needs. The international community was integral in defusing the

²² Petroska-Beska and Najcevska, *Macedonia: Understanding History, Preventing Future Conflict*, 3.

²³ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁴ Laity, *Preventing War in Macedonia: Pre-Emptive Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, 10.

²⁵ Ambassador James Pardew, *Macedonia and Balkan Stability*, on June 13, 2001, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Laity, *Preventing War in Macedonia: Pre-Emptive Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, 9.

Aracinovo situation and providing the NLA with the opportunity to withdraw and avoid a civil war. “If there had been no voluntary NLA withdrawal, the continued fighting would have led inevitably to civil war and partition as Macedonia went the way of Bosnia and Kosovo.”²⁸ In August 2001, the conflict came to a close with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which ended the armed conflict and provided the foundation for improving the rights of ethnic Albanians. The creation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and getting both parties to the negotiating table was a multilateral effort that “...intended to blend of all of the instruments of international power and assistance in solving a crisis.”²⁹

2. *Early Warning*

In this case, the warning signs were recognized by the international community at the time of the first attack in February 2001. The international community had been aware of earlier conflicts and ethnic tensions in the region, which is why the United Nations had sent a monitoring mission, UNPREDEP, to the area. But UNPREDEP was dismantled in 1999, and the international community lost the situational awareness necessary to foresee potential conflicts on the Macedonia/Kosovo/Serb border.³⁰ This is why, the incident in Tanusevci in February caught the international community by surprise.³¹ Afterwards, the international community had a notion that the situation was more than an isolated incident. They knew that the Macedonian military counter-

²⁸ Ibid., 35.

²⁹ Ibid., 91.

³⁰ Ibid., 8.

³¹ Ibid., 9.

offensive was not going to resolve the issue. Subsequently, the United Nations (UN), the EU, NATO, OSCE, and the U.S. became actively involved in preventing an escalation.

As a result of the international community's subsequent recognition of a deeper problem, they were able to engage the conflict while it was still early, resulting in saved lives and money. "It was said that NATO took three years to engage in Bosnia, at least 100,000 people died, and 60,000 troops were needed at the start. In Kosovo, it took a year to engage, 10,000 died and 50,000 troops were needed at the start. In Macedonia, it took two months; less than 100 died, and 5,000 were needed for thirty days."³²

3. *Engagement*

The response in Macedonia was swift and an excellent example of a comprehensive conflict prevention plan. The international community knew that Macedonia's stability was strategically important for the coalition forces in Kosovo because it provided a line of communication. But also, it was symbolically important because, "...it had been the only Yugoslav republic to secure independence without bloodshed and had managed, by and large, to address internal grievances peacefully."³³ The strategic importance of the situation also provided the international community with impetus to bypass all of its bureaucratic frictions on a strategic and operational level.³⁴

The international efforts were concentrated on two fronts, security and political. On the security front, the international community worked with the UN in Kosovo so the insurgents would be denied a safe-haven. They also worked with the Ministry of Defense

³² Ibid., 79.

³³ Alex J. Bellamy, "The Wolves at the Door: Conflict in Macedonia," *Civil Wars* 5, no. 1 (2002), 127.

³⁴ Laity, *Preventing War in Macedonia: Pre-Emptive Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, 76.

in Macedonia. They provided the ministry with guidance and security assistance on how to properly counter the insurgency.³⁵ The OSCE monitored the developments along the border and provided the government with advice regarding confidence-building measures on how to promote stability and interethnic dialogue.³⁶

On the political front, the strategic objective was clear, "...advance reforms that undercut the extremists' false appeal to the ethnic Albanian population..."³⁷ Diplomatic efforts at all levels of the various international players were involved in the promulgation and implementation of this message to the government of Macedonia. But constant high-level engagement from the U.S., NATO, and the EU was *paramount in these successful efforts*. "Much of the art of effective prevention is in being taken seriously, and there is no better way of being taken seriously than seniority."³⁸ Being in Macedonia and working daily with the Macedonian government were representatives/special envoys from the U.S., NATO, and the EU that were able to engage the NLA and work with the Macedonian Government to develop the Ohrid Agreement which ended the conflict and provided a solution to the ethnic tensions.

4. *Lessons Learned*

The Macedonia incident provides several best practices that are still relevant and could be applied to other comprehensive prevention engagements. One of the key lessons in the Macedonia preventive engagement was that the international community did not waste time and engaged at the first sign of conflict. The international community

³⁵ U.S. Congress, *Statement of Ambassador James Pardew on Macedonia and Balkan Stability*.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Laity, *Preventing War in Macedonia: Pre-Emptive Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, 76.

seized the preventive opportunity, something they had not previously done in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo.³⁹

Another essential component to the successful resolution was the application of a comprehensive response. Each nation and international organization involved was able to provide civil and military expertise that were aware of each others' limitations and capabilities. This directly relates to the next lesson. All of the players involved were clear on the strategic goal. Thus, they were able to shape their efforts and mission to compliment each other. "Although there were differing roles and niches, [the NATO led mission with] the EU and OSCE et al could be a team because they wanted the same overall result."⁴⁰

C. Tenets for Conflict Prevention

In an effort to shape the security environment, the U.S. was engaged in a strategic, comprehensive cross-governmental conflict prevention approach in the Baltic States and Macedonia. The two case studies provide a starting framework on what is needed for a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy; early warning, multilateral effort, and clear strategic end states. The take-a-ways from these case studies are timeless and could be applied to any present day conflict prevention strategy. In the case studies, it was strategically important that these countries not erupt into full scale war.

As proven in the two case studies, early warning is key in cost-effective conflict prevention. In the case of the Baltic States, the Baltic community in the U.S. monitored the situation in the region and at the first sign of abnormality, they lobbied for an intervention. This facilitated support for an early response to the rising tensions. In the

³⁹ Ibid., 46.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 77.

case of Macedonia, the UN recognized the volatility of the area and deployed a preventive force before the onset of any violence. However, due to the political bureaucracy in the UN, the force's mission was suspended. The first violent act against the government was the early warning sign that mobilized the international community. Also, being able to recognize that first overt act as more than just a criminal act, was instrumental in a timely response. The objective of early warning is to make possible proactive engagement in the early stages of conflict, to prevent or lessen more destructive expressions.⁴¹ This was accomplished in both historical examples, and without an early response it could have changed the intervention to a crisis management plan.

Another tenet of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy is multilateralism. The case studies reaffirm that a multilateral response provides flexibility in action and the ability to share the burden. "Overseas complex operations are seldom undertaken by the United States alone, and the civilian capacities of other nations should be harnessed at an early stage."⁴² The Baltic State engagement verifies that each international actor was able to persuade the opposing sides with either rewards or punitive measures. If a nation or organization is acting unilaterally, they may not have the availability of more options, which allows for a more all-inclusive solution that crosses all instruments of national power, (i.e., diplomatic, military, and/or economic). If a preventive engagement lasts a significant amount of time, like the three-year Baltic engagement, burden sharing and division of labor becomes more important and critical to the success of the mission. "The OSCE... and Council of Europe officials took on the unpopular role of pressing the

⁴¹ Davies and Gurr, *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning*, 2.

⁴² Richard Lugar, "Stabilization and Reconstruction a Long Beginning," *Prism* 1, no. 1 (2009), 17.

Baltic States to comply with international legal and human rights norms.”⁴³ On the other hand, the U.S., “...and Nordic countries...were left free to urge compromise in more stately terms and to use their ability to provide economic blandishments.”⁴⁴ Burden sharing is also important as it relates to financing a preventive engagement. When one nation or organization is low on funds, another can assist so the preventive cause does not suffer. “When one entity was distracted or suffering from budget shortfall, the presence of others helped maintain the initiatives.”⁴⁵

A clear and attainable objective is another principle that is necessary for a successful conflict prevention strategy. The case studies confirm that a common aim makes a multilateral effort more effective because each nation and organization is able to work toward a common goal. During the Macedonia engagement, “Unity of aim made them [multilateral effort] resistant to divide-and-conquer tactics by the missions’ opponents.”⁴⁶ As a result of having a clear end state, individual preventive actions by each nation and organization are complimentary and work toward achieving the effects necessary to actualize the end state.

The case studies attest that early warning, a multilateral effort, and clear objectives are important and essential to a successful comprehensive conflict prevention strategy. The case studies also demonstrate that conflict prevention is an achievable and successful strategy in the 21st century.

⁴³ Jentleson, *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World*, 106.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 106.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 106.

⁴⁶ Laity, *Preventing War in Macedonia: Pre-Emptive Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, 76.

Chapter 5

The Way Ahead: Recommendations

“In conflict stabilization missions, success hinges upon harmonizing and ultimately, integrating the activities of many different departments and agencies. Changing the way governments operate is never easy, but it is absolutely essential...”¹ An additional bureaucratic venue is not needed for the U.S. Government to have the ability to implement a smart power approach to conflict prevention. However, congressional support for funding, and institutional changes that support cross-governmental efforts, are needed.

Agencies claim to have insufficient resources (funding, people, or equipment) to commit to supporting interagency decisions and actions. In part, this helps them to support priorities in their more traditional core functions. In a broader view, however, resources are clearly not balanced among agencies (i.e., for interagency) or within agencies (i.e., for emerging or non-traditional capabilities). The result is an inability to resource the full range of required capabilities for national priority missions.²

In order to be an effective partner in a comprehensive conflict strategy, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has to develop an early warning system. Further there is a need for a human capital capability that ensures the U.S. has cadre of national security professionals with cross-governmental experience.

A. Early Warning System

For a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy to be successful it must incorporate the following principles: an early warning mechanism, an approach that is all inclusive that lessens the tensions and risk factors, and a long-term commitment to

¹ *Strategic Challenges - America's Global Security Agenda*, 142.

² *Project on National Security Reform: Forging a New Shield* (Washington DC: Project on National Security Reform, 2008), 344.

resolve the cause of conflict. With the development of the two interagency frameworks, Interagency Management System and Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, S/CRS has fulfilled two of the three principles necessary for conflict prevention. An early warning system is crucial for an early effective response; therefore, S/CRS should develop and institutionalize an interagency early warning system. The interagency early warning system should composite the various risk indicators – economic, political, demographical/ societal, and environmental; among others – to produce an index of potential failing states. The various indicators will be compiled by the various organizations that have subject matter expertise in that field, for example demographic/ societal data on school enrollment broken down by gender may be provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development. Then all of the information is compiled into a system that can perform analyses and employ computational modeling, a study of a complex system by computer simulation, to determine the probability of state failure. For this system to produce the most accurate probability of crisis, it is important that non-governmental organizations and research organizations are included. Normally non-governmental organizations and research organizations are usually the ones that are working in the remote areas and more assimilated into a particular society. Once the early warning mechanism is employed it should be the system that triggers the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework to be implemented for a particular crisis. Early Warning is a central part to conflict prevention because it provides a forecast of potential problems and gives the policy makers time to devise a conflict prevention strategy.

B. S/CRS Funding

“Many nations have come to the realization that a cross-government [smart power] approach is indispensable to effective and efficient performance and success in crisis prevention.”³ With this in mind, several countries have offices that are responsible for facilitating whole of government crisis prevention. For example, Canada has the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force, the United Kingdom has the Stabilization Unit, and the U.S. has the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.⁴ In order to make S/CRS a viable office for U.S. Government smart power, it should be provided flexible and easily dispersed funding that supports whole of government stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Department of State should have a crisis management fund that S/CRS should be able to use instead of relying on the Department of Defense for funds for stabilization actions. According to the committee report that accompanied the Senate’s bill for Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act, “...DOD funds are being used for urgent humanitarian and reconstruction assistance because the agencies normally responsible for those functions – the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development – are under funded and lack authorities that allow for sufficient flexibility to respond to urgent, unanticipated requirements.”⁵ The Department of State’s lack of flexibility and funding stem from the antiquated practices of the legislative branch and how they allocate funds. As it currently stands, the Department of State is funded by program and its contingency

³ Crisis Management Initiative, Rintakoski, and Autti, *Comprehensive Approach - Trends, Challenges and Possibilities for Cooperation in Crisis Prevention and Management*, 18.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 18-19.

⁵ Stimson Center, "Budgeting for Foreign Affairs and Defense," Stimson Center, www.stimson.org/budgeting/?SN=SB200806101554 (accessed February/10, 2010).

funding does not allow much latitude in crisis prevention activities. In order to properly resource crisis prevention activities the provisions of the contingency fund should include proactive responses to crisis. In the Stimson's Report, *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future*, they recommend the expansion of contingency funding, "...to include more 'in advance' policy pursuits, geared more toward development of anticipatory local partnerships and oriented more to crisis prevention, rather than crisis response."⁶ They further illustrate by providing examples like the following:

- Organization and conduct of pre-conflict reconciliation conferences in specific situations, or what could be called a localized "Dayton-in-advance" approach;
- Support for multilateral or bilateral deployment of rapid deployment mediation rapid response teams into pre-crisis situations; and,
- Deployment of civilian police advising teams into localized environments of developing, over-the-horizon civil or ethnic strife.⁷

To take it a step further, 1207 funds should no longer reside with the DOD and a separate line within the contingency fund should be created to accommodate those monies. Also the new reconstruction and stabilization funds should encompass all other U.S.

Government funding that is specifically allocated for foreign reconstruction and stabilization efforts. This will allow for better coordinated efforts and provide the Department of State with more authority to lead foreign policy engagements. The funds will be housed with the Department of State, which will allow for the easy dispersal and flexibility that it currently does not have. According to National Security Presidential Directive-44, the Secretary of State has the authority to lead all U.S. Government efforts for reconstruction and stabilization. It further states; "...the United States should work

⁶ Stimson Center, *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness* (Washington DC: Stimson Center, 2008), 18.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law.”⁸ For that mandate to be carried it out it has to come with funding. The United Kingdom and Canadian offices that are equivalent to the S/CRS both have separate stabilization funds to utilize for their missions. If the issue of funding is not resolved S/CRS as the vessel for a coordinated U.S. Government response is disaster-prone and implementing a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy as a main foreign policy goal is damned, “...left unattended, resources will determine policy more than policy determine resources.”⁹

C. Human Capital

Comprehensive conflict prevention as a foreign policy strategy requires a cadre of U.S. professionals that have the ability to function within an interagency environment. This cadre of U.S. personnel should come from the different departments that contribute to the national security of the United States. They should have expertise in their respective subject matter but, through education and training, have a familiarity with other departments’ capabilities as well. The National Security Professional Development Program provides the basic mechanism to achieve a national security cadre, but by modifying the course it could become a realistic national security enabling system. But before this cadre can be developed, the lack of enough personnel at the Department of State has to be addressed.

⁸ *National Security Presidential Directive 44.*

⁹ *Project on National Security Reform: Forging a New Shield*, 325.

1. Department of State Personnel

In order for a comprehensive conflict strategy to succeed as a foreign policy, the main diplomatic capacity of the U.S. Government needs to be restored, so the capability for crisis prevention and engagement is available. The report, *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future*, concludes that, “Existing staffing levels [at the Department of State] are inadequate to meet ongoing requirements as demonstrated by significant vacancy rates and insufficient personnel flexibility to permit needed training and transfers.”¹⁰ “The 2009 budget by the Bush administration began to address the problem with a request for more than 1, 300 new Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development officer positions. It took the first steps to build an active and reserve force of experts who could be called on in a crisis.”¹¹ In the President’s 2010 budget, funds to hire 700 more Foreign Service personnel were requested and approved by congress. This is all part of a broader effort to expand the Foreign Service by twenty-five percent.¹² These efforts are commendable, especially when the domestic economic situation is questionable, but they should not be sporadic efforts. Funds for hiring Foreign Service personnel should be a constant on the Presidential Budget until the Department of State staff levels are adequate to meet the foreign policy demands. The cost, which the report, *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future*, estimates at \$3.5 billion by the end of 2014, is less than half of one percent of what we spend on the defense portion of national security,

¹⁰ Stimson Center, *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness*, 3.

¹¹ Henry Kissinger et al., "U.S . Needs More Foreign Diplomats," Capitol News Company, <http://dyn.politico.com/members/forums/thread.cfm?catid=1&subcatid=4&threadid=2615576> (accessed December 22, 2009).

¹² Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, *FY 2010 Budget for the Department of State*, 1st, 2009.

excluding the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹³ Having the ability to avoid a war or de-escalate crisis would save many times the increase. This will also unburden the military and allow for a more equitable distribution of capacity building.¹⁴

According to Secretary of State Hilary Clinton when she testified before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, "...with the right people in the right numbers, we'll be able to implement the policies that we think are right for our country."¹⁵ This strikes directly at the heart of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy. Without personnel, the Department of State is not able to respond proactively to crises and is always managing them reactively and paying a higher cost, financially and socially.

Indicatively, in the way of "pay now or pay more later," it is worth noting that State significantly constrained staffing in the former Yugoslavia after the end of the Cold War, only to spend somewhere between two and three billion dollars there in peacekeeping, refugee assistance and war crimes tribunal funding in subsequent years. It is obviously unsound to think that expanded, activist, on the ground pre-conflict diplomacy would have alone have changed the course of events in the Balkans. However, it would seem just as hard now to come up with a net policy downside to such an approach. In any event, it is even harder to see how the financial savings produced by understaffing – at most \$25 million in today's dollars – merited even a remote risk of what became reality in Bosnia and Kosovo, or its financial costs.¹⁶

2. National Security Cadre Reforms

The recommendation of having a national security cadre is not novel. There has always been a push to establish a force, "...to encourage a more effective application of

¹³ Kissinger et al., *U.S. Needs More Foreign Diplomats*.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Clinton, *FY 2010 Budget for the Department of State*.

¹⁶ Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future*, 111th Congress, Session 1, 2009.

all elements of national power.”¹⁷ The first initiative to create a national security workforce was done in 2001 as part of the U.S. Commission on National Security 21st Century. The report recommended the establishment of an interagency cadre that, “...could produce integrative solutions to U.S. national security policy problems.”¹⁸ The recommendation took into consideration career development and training, but failed to include the foreign service, military, and intelligence community professionals.¹⁹ In 2007, the U.S. Commission on National Security 21st Century national security cadre program was superseded by the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) Program. The basic mandate of the NSPD program is,

To enhance the national security of the United States, including preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from natural and manmade disasters. The program aims to achieve such enhancement by providing opportunities in three areas, or “pillars” — education, training, and professional experience — and by linking progress through the program with career opportunities.²⁰

In essence this program develops a workforce of professionals across the government that have an understanding of national security objectives beyond their own agency’s mission and the ability to manage cross-governmental national security operations.

The NSPD program consists of four components; (1) the NSPD framework, (2) an Executive Steering Committee, (3) identification and/ or creation of professional

¹⁷ Catherine Dale, *Building an Interagency Cadre of National Security Professionals: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress* (Washington D.C.: CRS Report for Congress, 2008), 1.

¹⁸ United States Commission on National Security/ 21st Century, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report* (Washington D.C.: United States Commission on National Security/ 21st Century, 2001), xvi.

¹⁹ Dale, *Building an Interagency Cadre of National Security Professionals: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress*, 4.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

development programs, and (4) the development of interagency assignments and fellowships.²¹ The fundamental nature of the program is sound; but, by implementing some reforms within the framework of the program it could be a long-term solution for creating a national security cadre. The first modification would change how the program is managed. Currently, oversight of the program is provided by an Executive Steering Committee (ESC) that is led by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Then the ESC reports to the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security/ Counterterrorism and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The ESC also has a small body, the NSPD-Integration Office (NSPD-IO), “that coordinates NSPD-related activities among agencies, on behalf of the ESC.”²² As it currently stands the program has a weak central administration, a largely decentralized execution, and a dual reporting chain.²³ To mitigate these issues, oversight of the NSPD should be moved to the National Security Council - Interagency Working Group. The group will be chaired by the Special Assistant to the President and Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. The interagency working group will then takeover the roles of the ESC and the NSPD-IO. They will then have the responsibility to coordinate and facilitate the guidance and national security programs of each department.

The permanence of the NSPD program is also questionable because it does not have a legislative mandate. “Without the assurance that a program would continue into the future, individuals might be less likely to risk the investment of their time, and

²¹ Ibid., 12-13.

²² Ibid., 13.

²³ Ibid., 12

agencies might be less likely to risk the investment of their resources.”²⁴ Therefore NSPD should be a congressional legislated program that would continue regardless of the presidential administration. This would ensure the various participating departments’ participation and commitment to the program.²⁵

²⁴ Ibid., 20.

²⁵ Ibid., 21.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The challenges that the 21st century brings varies greatly from the challenges of the last century. The principal threat to global order will be posed by weak states like Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Mexico, and others.¹ The inability for these governments to control what happens within their borders has global implications. In order to address these challenges the United States has to implement a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy in foreign policy. Secretary of State Clinton stated,

When I appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee a few weeks ago with Secretary Gates, we both emphasized the need for a comprehensive approach to the challenges we face. We know we are confronting instability..., we have transnational threats like terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change; ..., all of which have a direct impact on our security.²

In order to deal with these challenges the United States will need to formulate and apply a strategic, comprehensive, cross-governmental conflict prevention strategy.

A comprehensive conflict prevention strategy will aim to thwart issues from escalating into large-scale crisis and enable a country or region to maintain a durable peace. This can be achieved by using all the necessary tools of national power with all the necessary tools of international power, a true comprehensive approach. The international tools could be provided by sovereign nations, international organizations, and/ or non-governmental organizations. “[A] comprehensive approach is about developing mechanisms and cultures of understanding, sharing a collaboration, both vertically

¹ Richard N. Haass, "The Weakest Link," *Newsweek* 155, no. 10 (03/08, 2010), 36.

² Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, *FY 2010 Budget for the Department of State*, 1st, 2009.

between nations and international organizations, and horizontally between nations and between organizations.”³

Conflict prevention as a foreign policy strategy is in the nation’s best interest. The national interest of the United States dictates its foreign policies and its actions or inactions around the world. A conflict prevention strategy is in the nation’s best interest because it concentrates on establishing a more predictable and stable global environment. Unless the U.S. is going to become a true isolationist nation a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy is cost effective, in terms of opportunity costs. In the case studies shown in Table 1 conflict prevention cost or would have cost the international community much less than the conflicts themselves.⁴ Not only is the human cost of conflict devastating but its impacts on political, social, economic development are profound.⁵

In order for a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy to be successful it must include the following: a multilateral response, an early warning, and clear attainable objectives. A multilateral response is key to conflict prevention because it brings a diverse set of international actors to resolve an issue. And that in itself (collective action) brings legitimacy of action and a framework for a long-term engagement. Pragmatically, it also allows for burden sharing in regards to cost of the intervention and division of labor. In order for conflict prevention to occur there has to be some kind of early

³ Crisis Management Initiative, Kristina Rintakoski, and Mikko Autti, eds., *Comprehensive Approach - Trends, Challenges and Possibilities for Cooperation in Crisis Prevention and Management* (Helsinki: Ministry of Defence - Finland, 2008), 30.

⁴ Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance, *Cost of Conflict - Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Inc, 1999), 221.

⁵ Organization for Economic and Co-operation Development-Development Assistance Committee, *Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations* (Paris, France: Organization for Economic and Co-operation and Development, 2008), 3.

warning indications to trigger a preventive response. If there is no early warning mechanism, the response will not be proactive and can quickly fall into the realm of crisis management. Since a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy involves multiple actors and can span the different systems of a country/ region it is important that everyone involved has an understanding of the acceptable solution, what they are working towards, and the objectives to obtain that solution. Unity of purpose and action is fundamental and indispensable to the success of any comprehensive conflict prevention strategy because it guides the actions of everyone involved in the engagement. As demonstrated in the analysis of conflict prevention in the Baltic States and Macedonia the elements of multilateralism, early warning, and a clear goal were essential to a successful comprehensive conflict prevention strategy.

The U.S. is not new to conflict prevention, but the lack of cross-governmental planning has led to ad-hoc prevention strategies. S/CRS at the Department of State is the office that has the presidential mandate to lead and coordinate all U.S. Government stabilization and reconstruction efforts but it currently lacks the funding and resources to properly carry out its mandate. The Department of Defense currently provides S/CRS with funds to carry out its conflict prevention mission. In order for S/CRS to be more proactive to responding to crisis it should have its own funds for stabilization and reconstruction activities. S/CRS also needs to institutionalize IMS, to achieve a cross-governmental approach to crisis management planning and actions.

For a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy to be successful there has to be an appetite for collaboration and a workforce that is able to function within an interagency environment. This is why the National Security Professional Development

Program needs to be reformed to be more inclusive, giving employees of the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the intelligence community the opportunity to provide their expertise to it. Also, the program should be legislatively mandated so that the program survives when the administration changes.

“In order for America to be competitive in a multidimensional world order, it must work with a much broader array of partners and employ multidimensional strategies.”⁶ A comprehensive conflict prevention strategy is that exactly. It provides the opportunity for the U.S. to work alongside other global partners to improve the political, social, and economic issues that can destabilize a country and/ or region. Intervening after a weak state has failed is not a policy the U.S. should practice. Applying a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy is the U.S. best foreign policy recourse. As is often the case, a stitch in time saves nine.

⁶ Shawn Brimley, Michele Flournoy and Vikram Singh, *Making America Grand Again: Toward a New Grand Strategy* (Washington D.C.: Centers for a New American Security, 2008), 23.

Glossary of Acronyms

AFRICOM	Africa Command
AU	African Union
CMM	Conflict Mitigation and Management Office
CRSG	Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group
DOD	Department of Defense
ESC	Executive Steering Committee
EU	European Union
GCC	Geographical Combatant Commander
ICAF	Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
IMS	Interagency Management System
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NSPD-IO	National Security Professional Development – Integration Office
NLA	National Liberation Army
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
NSPD	National Security Professional Development Program
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
OSCE	The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization
UN	United Nations
UNPREDEP	UN Preventive Deployment Force

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USG United States Government

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