

## The Letort Papers

# IS THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE OF THE U.S. ARMY CONGRUENT WITH THE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF ITS SENIOR LEVEL OFFICER CORPS?

James G. Pierce

September 2010

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## FOREWORD

Organization theory hypothesizes that an organization's culture enables its members to work through the basic problems of survival in, and adaptation to, the external environment. Organizational culture also guides the organization's development and maintenance of internal processes and procedures that perpetuate adaptability and promote continued existence. Consequently, organizational culture has considerable impact on an organization's behavior at any given time, particularly on organizational effectiveness. However, little literature and even less data discuss the impact of organizational culture within military organizations and, more importantly, the impact that organizational culture may have on the development of an organization's leaders.

In the present study, Dr. Pierce postulates that the ability of a professional organization to develop future leaders in a manner that perpetuates readiness to cope with future environmental and internal uncertainty depends on organizational culture. Specifically, the purpose of his study is to explore the relationship between the Army's organizational culture and professional development. He examines the degree of congruence between the Army's organizational culture and the leadership and managerial skills of its officer corps senior leaders. He uses data from a representative sample of such leaders while they were students at the Army War College, Classes of 2003 and 2004.

At the macro level the results of his research strongly suggest a significant lack of congruence between the U.S. Army's organizational culture and the results of its professional development programs for its future strategic leaders. He bases his conclusion on

empirical data that indicate that the future strategic leaders of the Army believe that they operate on a day-to-day basis in an organization whose culture is characterized by:

- an overarching desire for stability and control,
- formal rules and policies,
- coordination and efficiency,
- goal and results oriented, and
- hard-driving competitiveness.

However, sharply highlighting a pronounced lack of congruence between what they believe the Army's culture to be and what it should be (based on their development as future strategic leaders), the respondents also indicated that the Army's culture should be that of a profession, which emphasizes:

- flexibility and discretion,
- participation,
- human resource development,
- innovation and creativity,
- risk-taking,
- long-term emphasis on professional growth, and
- the acquisition of new professional knowledge and skills.

Clearly, the second set of cultural values and behaviors are much better aligned with the current and future demands of the Army's external strategic environment. Further, almost by definition, these 533 officers represent the future leaders of the Army. That is why their collective perceptions of the Army's professional culture and of their own managerial and leadership skills are of such significance to the Army.

Dr. Pierce's research data provide empirical support to the findings of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (2001), which suggests that the training and leader development programs of the Army profession are not adequately linked and integrated within the Army culture. Dr. Pierce states that the Army's future strategic environment will be ambiguous and uncertain, and organizational culture and professionalism characterized by flexibility, discretion, and innovation offer the greatest opportunity to maximize effectiveness in such an environment. Consequently, his data strongly suggest that the Army's culture is preventing the individual exercise of the excellent professional skills that are being taught via the Army's formal professional development programs. He postulates that if the Army profession expects to maintain its social legitimacy and professional jurisdiction, which are focused on the development and application of the esoteric knowledge and related practical professional skills of land warfare, then the Army profession must take steps to make its professional culture, and particularly the informal development program, congruent with one that is characterized by flexibility, discretion, and innovation.

Dr. Pierce recommends that the leaders of the Army profession initiate an organizational culture change effort. Specifically, he recommends changes to the more informal aspects of the professional development program, such as the less than lifelong commitment to the Army profession, the "up or out" personnel policy, and the officer evaluation system which may be creating an underlying assumption that failure will not be tolerated regardless of the circumstances. Those conditions all are representative of "theories-in-use" that are incongruent with the concept of professionalism.

As a result of the current culture, senior leaders may be exercising an excessive degree of structured supervision which reinforces the culture of stability and control despite, the formal education system which attempts to teach the opposite. Therefore, it is not surprising that junior professionals learn to distrust their senior leaders and to then subsequently perpetuate the cycle of over-control, or depart the profession altogether.

Dr. Pierce recognizes that his study results reflect only a snapshot in time. Since this study was initially conducted, the Army has entered an era of persistent conflict, and is approaching its 9th year of combat. Therefore, Dr. Pierce readily understands that a long-term longitudinal analysis may provide different results, which is exactly why the Strategic Studies Institute is sponsoring a follow-on study by Dr. Pierce and Dr. Don Snider. The new study will create a long-term database and evaluate the results of this 2003-2004 research along with analyzing current data to provide a more robust analysis that may more adequately explain some of the highly subjective ideational aspects of “the way we [the Army] do things around here” (Bower, 1966; Triandis, 1972; Deal and Kennedy, 1982, p. 4).



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## SUMMARY

Why is organizational culture important? The theory of organizational culture maintains that individual behavior within an organization is not solely controlled by the formal regulations and structures of authority as supported by structural theorists. Instead, the theory postulates that cultural norms, values, beliefs, and assumptions provide unconscious guidance and direction, and consequently, the subsequent behavior of organizational members. Accordingly, Martin *et al.* (1997), emphasize that studies of organizational culture share a common objective, which is “to uncover and interpret aspects of organizational life so that we can better understand the perceptions, beliefs, and actions of organizational members” (p. 3). If you want to be able to comprehend the current behavior of an organization as well as to reasonably anticipate its future actions, then you must be able to understand the deep basic underlying assumptions that comprise the abstract concept of organizational culture (Schein, 1999). A strong appreciation of an organization’s culture can help explain why organizational members sometimes exhibit “mysterious, silly, or irrational” behavior (Schein, 1985, p. 21).

Organizational culture can be found at every level of an organization, and since organizational members are multicultural entities understanding an organization’s culture is significant “because the beliefs, values, and behavior of individuals are often understood only in the context of people’s cultural identities” (Schein, 1999, p. 14). Consequently, the long-term strategic decisions made by the senior leaders of an organization are influenced by their multicultural background, but especially by the organization in which they have

spent the bulk of their lives, such as members of professional organizations like doctors, lawyers, and military officers.

Professional organizations exist in a competitive environment where their social jurisdiction and legitimacy can only be supported or perpetuated as long as they maintain their expertise over an area of abstract knowledge that society perceives as important (Freidson, 1970, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Burk, 2002; Snider *et al.*, 2009; Moten, 2010). Since organizational culture is hypothesized to have a considerable impact on organizational behavior and because of the relative scarcity of literature discussing the impact that organizational culture may have on the development of professional leaders, this study attempts to examine the congruence<sup>1</sup> between organizational culture and the professional leadership and managerial skills of professional leaders. Specifically, this study examines the U.S. Army culture and its senior leaders.

This research strongly suggests that there is a lack of congruence between the U.S. Army professional culture and the professional development programs of the Army's senior level leaders. This conclusion is based on empirical data that indicate that the future leaders of the Army profession believe that they operate on a day-to-day basis in a profession whose culture is characterized by an overarching desire for stability and control, formal rules and policies, coordination and efficiency, goal and results oriented, and hard-driving competitiveness. Emphasizing this lack of cultural congruence, the respondents of this study also indicated that the Army's professional culture should be one that is characterized by flexibility, discretion, participation, human resource development, innovation, creativity, risk-taking, and a long-term com-

mitment to professional growth, and the acquisition of new professional knowledge and skills,<sup>2</sup> which is a culture that is more aligned with the Army's strategic external environment.

One of the principal reasons for the popular interest in the study of organizational culture is to determine the linkage between it and organizational performance (Berrio, 2003). This study has reviewed a previously assumed but unverified connection between organizational culture and professional development. It has uncovered a lack of congruence between the dominant type of organizational culture of the U.S. Army and the professional managerial/leadership skills of its senior level leaders. This observed lack of congruence may be inhibiting performance and unconsciously perpetuating a cycle of caution and an over-reliance on stability and control. The data outlined in this study is illustrative of an organization that emphasizes stability, control, formalized structures, and a results oriented – get the job done – culture that attempts to comprehend the ambiguity of the future through an unconscious reliance upon the successful solutions employed in the past, a process also known as the “irony of success” (Paparone and Reed, 2008).





# IS THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE OF THE U.S. ARMY CONGRUENT WITH THE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF ITS SENIOR LEVEL OFFICER CORPS?

## INTRODUCTION

### **Organizational Culture.**

“Studies of organizational culture share a common goal: to uncover and interpret aspects of organizational life so that we can better understand the perceptions, beliefs, and actions of organizational members” (Martin *et al.*, 1997, p. 3). An organization’s culture enables its members to work through the basic problems of survival in and adaptation to the external environment as well as to develop and maintain internal processes that perpetuate adaptability and promote the organization’s continued existence (Parsons, 1951; Merton, 1957; Schein, 1985, Martin, 2002).

Some organizational leaders and researchers might ask why the study of organizational culture and its impact on the professional development of an organization’s leaders is so important. Schein states that it is important because organizational culture is the property of a group and that:

. . . it is a powerful, latent, and often unconscious set of forces that determine both our individual and collective behavior, ways of perceiving, thought patterns, and values. Organizational culture in particular matters because cultural elements determine strategy, goals, and modes of operating. The values and thought patterns of leaders and senior managers are partially determined by their own cultural backgrounds and


their shared experience. If we want to make organizations more efficient and effective, then we must understand the role that culture plays in organizational life (1999, p. 14).

Since organizations are groupings of human beings who have come together to achieve collectively what cannot be accomplished individually, it is understandable that organizational cultures are influenced by a variety of social processes that gradually develop over time and in response to environmental uncertainties and conditions (Barnard, 1938). As these varying human systems attach meaning to their experiences, thereby socially constructing their own interpretation of reality<sup>3</sup> (Berger and Luckmann, 1966), they give rise to cultural differences, which can be viewed as being manifested by an interrelated and differentiated series of levels or layers. Trice and Beyer describe these environmental influences of the cultural evolutionary process by stating that the:

. . . substance of an organization's culture resides in its ideologies, which are emotionalized, shared sets of beliefs, values, and norms that both impel people to action and justify their actions to themselves and others. Cultures have multiple ideologies; the ideas they express sometimes complement and sometimes contradict each other. . . . Some of the ideologies in organizations are imported from at least six levels of their environments: transnational systems, nations, regions and communities, industries, occupations, and other organizations (1993, pp. 75-76).

As indicated by Trice and Beyer, individual behavior is routinely influenced by a number of frequently conflicting cultures and cultural values. Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the layered nature

of culture as well as the interrelationships between these varying levels or layers, which can be complementary or contradictory in nature depending on the communities and organizations to which an individual maintains membership. The outermost ring of Figure 1 depicts “Transnational” cultures, which are those cultures whose members share a set of deep basic underlying assumptions that transcend national boundaries. For example, science and religion are two typical transnational cultures. Regardless of an individual’s nationality or ethnic background, their affiliation with a given religious faith is characteristic of a particular set of beliefs, values, and norms, which readily identify them as, for example, being Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Buddhist, and so on.



Adapted from Mary Jo Hatch, *Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives*, New York: Oxford University, 1997, p. 227.

**Figure 1. A Graphic Portrayal of the Layered and Interrelated Nature of Environmental Influences on Organizational Culture.**

The second layer of culture, as depicted in Figure 1, is identified as “National” culture, which is perceived as representing either national or ethnic association (Trice and Beyer, 1993; Hofstede, 2001). For example, self-reliance, personal achievement, and individualism are characteristic cultural values of American national culture, while Japanese national culture de-emphasizes individualism and personal achievement in favor of selfless cooperation, collective achievement, and consensus (Ouchi, 1981).

The third ring or layer is described by Trice and Beyer (1993) as “Regional” culture. Breton indicates that regional culture is based on identification with a specific geographical area or territory; the people, and the social institutions, whereby this physical locale is transformed into a “social space” (1981, p. 58). For example, within a characteristic national culture such as the United States, there are distinctive regional cultures. Those customs and norms typical to the New England states are in many cases dramatically different than those typically found in Southern states such as South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961). The fourth layer of culture as described by Trice and Beyer (1993) is comprised of cultures of various industries, occupations, and other organizations. In Figure 1, this fourth layer is depicted by three equivalent circles representing “Organizational,” “Professional,” and “Military” cultures, which are particularly pertinent to this study. At this level, the individual is intimately involved with the day-to-day operations, activities, norms, and ideologies of social life that guide behavior in context specific ways (Trice and Beyer, 1993). Perhaps the most common organizational setting that an individual at this level experiences is the work environment, the ac-

tual organization with whom they are employed, such as IBM or the U.S. Army. In general, organizational culture is considered to be very stable and difficult to change because it represents the collective repertoire of thinking, feeling, and perceiving that have enabled the organization to successfully adapt to and react to internal and external environmental stimulus (Schein, 1999). Organizational culture is often defined as the unconscious yet “learned, shared, tacit assumptions on which people base their daily behavior” (Schein, 1999, p. 24). With respect to professional organizations,<sup>4</sup> among the many occupations that are traditionally perceived as being professions such as doctors and lawyers, military officers are also distinguished as being part of a profession as identified by Janowitz, 1971; Mosher, 1982; Schon, 1983; Huntington, 1985; Abbott, 1988; Snider and Watkins, 2002; Snider, 2005; Snider *et al.*, 2009; and Moten, 2010. Mosher states that the significance of professions is that they are “social mechanisms, whereby knowledge, particularly new knowledge is translated into action and service” (1982, p. 112). Of particular importance to this study, as will be discussed in greater detail later in the monograph, is the level of congruence between an organization’s culture and the professional development of its senior leaders. As indicated by Trice and Beyer (1993) and their layered nature of environmental influences as depicted in Figure 1, this study evaluates the possibility that an organization’s culture unconsciously guides the professional development and education of those members who will become the senior leaders, and eventually the professional elite of the profession, in such a manner that these future leaders may be inadequately prepared to lead the profession toward future success. Schein provides an insightful analysis of this

perspective by stating that the “bottom line for leaders is that if they do not become conscious of the cultures in which they are embedded, those cultures will manage them. Cultural understanding is desirable for all of us, but it is essential to leaders if they are to lead” (1992, p. 15).

The fifth and smallest ring depicted in Figure 1 is identified as “Sub-Cultures.” Deal and Kennedy (1982) state that within any organization there may be a variety of behavioral variations based on the extent of the differentiation of tasks performed by the organization. For example, in the Army profession, there are infantry, armor, artillery, medical, nurse, special forces, engineers, and finance officers to name just a few of the occupational branch specialties that comprise the Army officer corps. This diversity of occupational communities and their underlying technologies, training, and processes can create the:

... basic problem of integration and coordination that is often the most difficult part of general management in that one is attempting to bring into alignment organizational members who have genuinely different points of view based on their education and experience in the organization (Schein, 1992, p. 258).

One of the underlying objectives of this study is to determine the level of congruence between the various subcultures of the Army profession, such as officer branch, source of commission, age, sex, etc., and the basic culture and values of the overall Army profession.

*Cultural Manifestation.* The preceding discussion briefly outlines Trice and Beyer’s thesis of how at least six layers or levels of cultural influence can be used

as models to explain and legitimate collective and individual behavior (Trice and Beyer, 1993). These next few paragraphs highlight Schein's three levels of cultural manifestation, which is the underlying model upon which the foundation of the present study is built. Using this approach Schein emphasizes that individual and collective organizational behavior, as described above, is visible or manifested at three levels which vary from extremely overt at the artifactual level to deeply embedded unconscious assumptions, which Schein defines as being the essence of culture (1992). Briefly, Schein states that the manifestation of organizational culture occurs at three levels: "artifacts, values, and basic underlying assumptions" (1985, p. 14).

Schein indicates that **artifacts** are the most visible expression of culture. They represent the physical construct of the organization and its social environment. Organizational artifacts include such visible phenomena as: language, technology and products, rites and rituals, myths, uniforms or other manner of dress, the physical layout or architecture of building space, mission and value statements, organizational stories, symbols, and ceremonies. Artifacts are easily observable; however, they only provide a superficial glimpse of an organization's culture because the true significance or meaning that lies behind their use can be difficult to decipher and interpret.

Schein indicates that the second level of cultural manifestation, **values**, provides organizational members with a sense of what ought to be as opposed to what actually is. Values are a deeper level of culture, which provide guidance in the face of ambiguity. Schein believes that organizational values are not as apparent as organizational artifacts. However, he



states that they do exist at a greater level of awareness than **basic underlying assumptions**, which he identifies as his third level of cultural manifestation. For example, the U.S. Army articulates seven core values assumed to represent the true cultural essence of the Army profession: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless-service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Each officer is expected to uphold these values, especially when they are confronted with ambiguous or ethically demanding situations (FM 6-22, 2006). As is discussed later in this monograph, organizations sometimes espouse values that they believe are appropriate for given situations. Consequently, organizations publicly give allegiance to these values and attempt to communicate them to their members, external stakeholders, and frequently to the general public. **Espoused values** are often evident in organizational strategies, goals, philosophies, training programs, and published organizational value statements. However, espoused values may not be based on prior cultural learning; therefore they may be incongruent with the organization's actual **theories-in-use** (Argyris and Schon, 1974). Theories-in-use are those values that actually govern behavior. It is postulated that a lack of congruence between espoused values and theories-in-use can inhibit individual commitment and consequently impair organizational performance (Argyris and Schon, 1974; Schon, 1983; Schein, 1992).

Finally, the third and deepest level of organizational cultural manifestation, as defined by Schein, can be found in an organization's "basic underlying assumptions." These basic underlying assumptions evolve from the continuous use of a problem solution that has repeatedly been successful in the past and has unconsciously become taken for granted as the only way

to solve similar problems. Therefore, organizational members instinctively perceive these basic underlying assumptions as “nonconfrontable and nondebatable” (Schein, 1985, p. 18). Argyris and Schon indicate that the incontrovertible and unconscious nature of these basic underlying assumptions can inhibit “double-loop learning.” Double-loop learning is a process that encourages organizational members to question all organizational practices, especially successful practices, thereby promoting continuous organizational growth, adaptability, and environmental awareness to include accepting changes in beliefs, values, and assumptions (1974).

### **Importance of Organizational Culture Analysis.**


Schneider (1994) highlights the importance of organizational culture by stating that organizational culture provides consistency for the organization and its members and provides the organization’s leaders with an internally reliable system of leadership that is firmly rooted in previous success. Sathe (1983, p. 5) indicates that culture plays a “subtle but pervasive role in organizational life” and that through a better understanding of organizational culture, organizational leaders can effectively operate within it, deviate from it, and when necessary, change it. Cameron and Quinn concur with these assessments. They state that most “organizational scholars and observers now recognize that organizational culture has a powerful effect on the performance and long-term effectiveness of organizations” (1999, p. 4). Consequently, they define culture as the “taken-for-granted values, underlying assumptions, expectations, collective memories, and definitions present in an organization” (p. 14), which

is very similar to the conceptual model provided by Schein as discussed in greater detail in the next section of this paper. Cameron and Quinn indicate that organizational culture is an ideology that organizational members “carry inside their heads” (p. 14). It provides them with a sense of identity and unwritten, unspoken, unconscious courses of action for how to get along in the organization while maintaining a stable social system within their organizational environment. They assert that generally speaking, each culture is comprised of “unique language, symbols, rules, and ethnocentric feelings” (p. 15), which are reflected by what the organization values, its definitions of success and the dominant leadership styles that pervade the organization. They believe that an organization’s culture is what makes the organization unique, which is a similar assessment to that of Schneider, who states that organizational culture “parallels individual character” (1994, p. 15).

The common theme which intertwines the theses of these authors is that organizational culture is a critical factor in the long-term effectiveness and survivability of organizations. Consequently, those senior leaders who are charged with providing strategic direction and vision for their organizations must not underestimate the importance of culture and must realize that they are responsible for the analysis and management of their own organization’s culture. As such, they must be capable of developing strategies for measuring their cultures, changing them, and for implementing a process to accomplish all of the above (Cameron and Quinn, 1999; Schein, 1999).

*Conceptual Model for the Study.* For the purposes of this research, Schein’s conceptual model of organizational culture, as briefly outlined earlier in this

monograph, is used as the framework upon which this study and its subsequent analysis is constructed. Figure 2 uses the metaphor of an ocean-going iceberg to graphically represent Schein's three levels of the manifestation of organizational culture.



**Figure 2. Iceberg Conceptual Model of Schein's Three Levels of the Manifestation of Organizational Culture.**

Just like the peak of an iceberg, which is the most visible portion of the iceberg even at great distances, organizational artifacts are the most visible manifestation of an organization's culture (Schein, 1992). However, organizational artifacts are often undecipherable and inadequately represent an organization's culture just like the peak of an iceberg inadequately represents the true size of the iceberg, the bulk of which is hidden beneath the surface of the ocean. Organizational values can provide a greater level of awareness of an

organization's culture; however, the researcher must be able to discern the differences between espoused values and theories-in-use. As previously discussed, espoused values are those values that an organization publicly acknowledges and supports, while theories-in-use are those underlying values which are less visible and which actually govern behavior. For example, an organization may publicly state that it supports individual initiative, while concurrently refusing to promote individuals whose initiative resulted in failure. In the iceberg metaphor, organizational values, are closer to the surface and provide a more accurate assessment of the organization's culture. However, the true scope of the culture still remains hidden beneath the surface. Finally, Schein (1992) emphasizes that the essence of an organization's culture is its taken-for-granted basic underlying assumptions. These basic underlying assumptions provide: consistency for its members, order and structure, boundaries and ground rules, membership criteria, communication patterns, conditions for rewards, punishment, and the use of power. They define effective performance, they identify appropriate internal personnel relationships, and they limit organizational strategy (Schneider, 1994). Like the iceberg, the true depth and breadth of an organization's culture lies beneath the surface and is very difficult to recognize through superficial analysis. Schein (1985) underscores the importance of cultural analysis by indicating that it is through an in-depth study of an organization's culture that one can develop a greater appreciation of "the way we do things around here" (Bower, 1966; Deal and Kennedy, 1982, p. 4). Additionally, a robust appreciation of an organization's culture can help to explain why organizational members sometimes exhibit "mysterious, silly, or irrational" behavior (Schein, 1985, p. 21).

## **An Overview of Professional Organizations.**

An analysis of the extant literature concerning professional organizations, those organizations that exhibit mastery of an area of abstract knowledge, control a contested jurisdiction, and that possess social legitimacy (Abbott, 1988; Burk, 2002), indicates that these organizations are generally characterized by adaptive, innovative, flexible, risk-taking, and future-oriented behavior (Argyris and Schon, 1974; Kline, 1981; Freidson, 1970, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Schon, 1983; Senge, 1994; Davis *et al.*, 1997; FM 22-100, 1999; Snider and Watkins, 2002; Paparone, 2003; FM 6-22, 2006). The essential focus of these generic characterizations is that professions and professional organizations must continuously seek to expand their knowledge base as well as their level of expertise in order to remain relevant to society (Freidson, 1970, 1986; Argyris and Schon, 1974; Mosher, 1982; Abbott, 1988, Magee and Somervell, 1998; Burk, 2002; Snider 2005). Argyris and Schon emphasize this point by stating that the “foundation for future professional competence seems to be the capacity to learn how to learn” (1974, p. 157). This “reflexive” thinking process is one of the hallmarks of professional practice and survival (Schon, 1983; Abbott, 1988; Snider and Watkins, 2002; Snider *et al.*, 2009; Moten, 2010).

Since organizational culture can be found at every level of an organization, and since organizational members are multicultural entities, as indicated earlier, understanding an organization’s culture is significant (Schein, 1999). Consequently, the long-term strategic decisions made by the senior leaders of an organization are influenced by their multicultural back-

ground, but especially by the organization in which they have spent the bulk of their lives, such as members of professional organizations like doctors, lawyers, and military officers (Schein, 1999). Professional organizations exist in a competitive environment where their social jurisdiction and legitimacy can only be supported or perpetuated as long as they maintain their expertise over an area of abstract knowledge that society perceives as important (Freidson, 1970, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Burk, 2002). Since organizational culture is hypothesized to have a considerable impact on organizational behavior, this study attempts to examine the congruence between organizational culture and the professional leadership and managerial skills of the U.S. Army and its senior leaders (Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Cameron and Freeman, 1991).

### **Purpose of the Present Study.**

This study postulates that the ability of a professional organization to develop future leaders in a manner that perpetuates an enhanced organizational readiness to cope with future environmental and internal uncertainty depends on organizational culture. Specifically, the purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between organizational culture and professional development by examining the level of congruence between the U.S. Army's organizational culture and the professional leadership and managerial skills of its officer corps senior leaders.

A formalized professional development program is normatively conceptualized by the U.S. Army as a process whereby the leaders of tomorrow are identified, trained, and given progressively more responsible assignments to enable them to be capable of per-

forming duties at the highest levels of the organization later in their careers. Specifically, the U.S. Army states that the:

. . . driving principle behind Army leader development is that leaders must be prepared before assuming leadership positions; they must be competent and confident in their abilities. . . . In turn, leader development rests on a foundation of training and education, expectations and standards, and values and ethics. This foundation supports the three leader development pillars: institutional training (schooling), operational assignments, and self-development (FM 22-100, 1999, p. 5-14).

This study uses the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) and the Managerial Skills Assessment Instrument (MSAI) to provide empirical data indicating the level of congruence between the organizational culture of the U.S. Army and the professional development of its senior level officer corps. The senior level officer corps of the U.S. Army consists of those individuals from whom the future leaders of the Army profession will be selected. For the purposes of this study, the U.S. Army senior level officer corps is defined as those lieutenant colonels and colonels who have been selected to attend the U.S. Army War College through a rigorous evaluation board process. Hence, the primary research question of this study is: **Is the organizational culture of the U.S. Army congruent with the professional development of its senior level officer corps?**

It is anticipated that by answering this primary research question that this study provides empirical support for the premise that the future success of a professional organization is dependent upon the con-



gruence between an organization's culture and the manner in which its senior leaders are prepared to manage uncertainty and ambiguity. This study evaluates the hypothesis, as enumerated in the extant literature, that if the organization's current culture is out of synchronization with future environmental demands, then the leaders who are conditioned by this current culture will have difficulty guiding the organization toward future success.

The pragmatic objective of this study is to assist the U.S. Army in its current attempt to transform its culture to one that truly embraces professional characteristics. The Army seeks to develop leaders whose behavior can be characterized as innovative, risk-taking, boundary spanning, demanding continuous improvement, reflective-in-action, dynamic, and adaptive. The practical importance of the Army's cultural transformation is succinctly indicated by Cameron and Quinn when they state that "[w]ithout culture change, there is little hope of enduring improvement in organizational performance" (1999, p. 13).

*Significance of the Study.* This exploratory study begins to fill a gap in the organizational culture and professional development literature in that no major attempts have been made to relate the professional development of an organization's senior leaders to its organizational culture. The investigation of this relationship has significant analytical potential. For example, if the survival of the Army profession is based upon its ability to readily and continuously adapt to a changing external environment (Mosher, 1982; Freidson, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Senge, 1994; Martin and McCausland, 2002; Snider, 2003, 2003a; Gordon and Sollinger 2004; Snider *et al.*, 2009; Moten, 2010), can the Army's organizational culture inherently prevent

it from successful professional competition because of the way it educates its future leaders? Essentially, does the unconscious pattern of ambiguity reduction, “the way we do things around here” (Bower, 1966; Deal and Kennedy, 1982, p. 4), create a pattern of “homosocial reproduction” (Kanter 1977)? Martin (2002) describes homosocial reproduction as a process whereby those who are selected and prepared to eventually become the future leaders of the Army tend to reflect the patterns of existing leaders and therefore foster a perpetuation of existing values and culture. Consequently, the continuation of a given culture may or may not support innovative, boundary spanning, risk-taking leadership that may be necessary to guarantee the future survival of the organization or profession.

While this study examines the senior level leaders of the U.S. Army and is focused toward the Army as a profession, it is believed that the results of this analysis will have a beneficial impact on organizational literature as a whole, and specifically on that which relates to the professional development of all professions. Schon states that the “technical extension of bureaucracy, which reinforces the confinement of professional work to precisely defined channels of technical expertise, exacerbates the inherent conflict between bureaucracy and professional identity. Within highly specialized, technically administered systems of bureaucratic control, how can professionals think of themselves as autonomous practitioners” (1983, p. 337)? As indicated by Schein at the beginning of this monograph and as indicated throughout the Army’s literature concerning leadership, “the only thing of real importance that leaders do is to create and manage culture and that unique talent of leaders is their ability to understand and work with culture. If one

wishes to distinguish leadership from management or administration, one can argue that leaders create and change cultures, while managers and administrators live within them” (Schein, 1992, p. 5). The implication is that culture is both a metaphor that describes organizations as well as a variable that can be manipulated, although not easily (Smircich, 1983). Therefore, if an organization’s culture prevents it from developing its leaders to be capable of successfully posturing the organization to respond to the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous external environment, then, as Schein (1992) suggests, something must be done about the culture. Specifically, Schein states that “[o]rganizational cultures are created in part by leaders, and one of the most decisive functions of leadership is the creation, management, and sometimes even the destruction of culture” (1992, p. 5). In conclusion, this study attempts to determine if there is a level of congruence between the Army’s organizational culture and its ability to professionally develop its future leaders. In the case of the Army profession, this analysis relates to those senior leaders who will eventually become the stewards of the profession (Snider and Watkins, 2002).

## BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND PROFESSIONALISM

### **Organizational Culture.**

Rockefeller states that organizations possess a logic of their own, which grows over the years and is strengthened by the weight of tradition and inertia (1973, p. 72). Today, organization theory commonly refers to Rockefeller's concept of organizational logic as an organization's culture. Schein defines organizational culture as:

. . . a pattern of basic assumptions, invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (1985, p. 9).

Particularly, Schein believes that the concept of organizational culture can help to explain why organizations grow, change, fail, and "perhaps most importantly of all—do things that don't seem to make any sense" (1985, p. 1).

The concept of organizational culture has been identified as one of the newest, and perhaps one of the most controversial, subtopics of organizational theory (Reichers and Schneider, 1990; Martin, 2002). The predominant reason underlying the spirited nature of the debate surrounding the concept of organizational culture is the absence of a generally agreed upon "precise definition of the concept and its separation from other related concepts" (Cameron and Ettington, 1988, p.

357). At the root of the debate is the fact that the theory of organizational culture is comprised of many intangible concepts such as values, beliefs, assumptions, perceptions, behavioral norms, artifacts, and patterns of behavior (Reichers and Schneider, 1990). To the organizational theorist, culture “is to the organization what personality is to the individual—a hidden, yet unifying theme that provides meaning, direction, and mobilization” (Shafritz, and Ott, 1992, p. 481). Just as a dominant personality controls the actions of an individual, the organizational culture can significantly control the behavior of individuals within an organization (Schneider, 1994). In fact, Schein explains that the shared, tacit, taken-for-granted ways of thinking and reacting that circumscribe the concept of culture are the most powerful and stable forces operating within organizations (1996). Accordingly, Martin *et al.*, emphasize that studies of organizational culture share a common objective, which is “to uncover and interpret aspects of organizational life so that we can better understand the perceptions, beliefs, and actions of organizational members” (1997, p. 3). If you want to be able to comprehend the current behavior of an organization, as well as to reasonably anticipate its future actions, then you must be able to understand these abstract organizational variables (Schein, 1999).

*Organizations “are” Cultures vs. Organizations “have” Cultures.* Perhaps the most significant area of debate concerning the concept of organizational culture centers on the origin of its disciplinary roots. The anthropological tradition emphasizes that organizations **are** cultures, while the sociological tradition proposes that organizations **have** cultures. The anthropological tradition perceives organizational culture as a dependent variable, while the sociological tradition

views organizational culture as an independent variable. Within each of these two primary disciplines, two sub-approaches have evolved; the functionalist perspective and the semiotic perspective (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Smircich, 1983; Schein, 1985; Cameron and Ettington, 1988; Cameron and Quinn, 1999; Martin, 2002). According to the functionalist perspective, organizational culture is a “component of the social system and assumes that it is manifested in organizational behaviors” (Cameron and Ettington, 1988, p. 359), which is evaluated from a researcher’s perspective and at the organization level. The semiotic perspective views culture as residing in the minds of individuals, which is evaluated from the native’s perspective and at the individual level (Cameron and Ettington, 1988; Cameron and Quinn, 1999). Essentially, the functionalist perspective assumes that cultural differences can be identified, measured, and changed (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). The semiotic perspective assumes that culture is an image of an organization (Morgan, 1986), which resides in individual interpretations and perceptions, used to facilitate “understanding and communication about the complex phenomenon of organization” (Smircich, 1983, p. 340).

*The Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI)*. Two key questions arise from the literature concerning quantitative and qualitative analysis. First, do quantitative analysis methods such as questionnaires and survey instruments provide only a superficial level of cultural understanding? Second, do qualitative approaches lack the breadth of analysis to conduct comparative studies among multiple cultures because of the excessive time and energy expended on only one organization’s culture? In reference to their methodological technique, Cameron and Quinn (1999)


state that their OCAI, which is based on the Competing Values Framework (CVF) initially developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981, 1983), adequately addresses both of these methodological questions. Specifically Cameron and Quinn indicate that:

To conduct comparisons among multiple cultures, quantitative approaches must be used. It is crucial, however, that those responding to a survey instrument actually report underlying values and assumptions (culture), not just superficial attitudes or perceptions (climate). This can be accomplished best, we argue, by using a scenario analysis procedure in which respondents report the extent to which written scenarios are indicative of their own organization's culture. These scenarios serve as cues—both emotionally and cognitively—that bring to the surface core cultural attributes. . . . Respondents may be unaware of crucial attributes of culture until they are cued by the scenarios on the questionnaire (1999, p. 135).

The authors of this approach indicate that the OCAI has been used to identify the current and preferred cultural types in thousands of organizations, and that it has been found to predict organizational performance (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). The validity and reliability of this approach are well documented and will not be discussed here (Freeman, 1991; Quinn and Spreitzer, 1991; Yeung *et al.*, 1991; Zammuto and Krakower, 1991; Norusis, 1994; Collett and Mora, 1996; Cameron and Quinn, 1999; Berrio, 2003). The CVF model, as operationalized by the OCAI, is believed to provide a hybrid solution to the functionalist-semiotic debate, discussed earlier in this section. It does so by identifying the “aspects of the organization that reflect key values and assumptions in the organization, and then give[s] individuals an opportunity

to respond using their underlying archetypal framework" [basic underlying assumptions] (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 137). Specifically, OCAI respondents are asked to answer questions representing six content dimensions, which Cameron and Quinn state represent "fundamental cultural values and implicit assumptions about the way the organization functions" (1999, p. 137). These six dimensions are: dominant characteristics, organizational leadership, management of employees, organizational glue, strategic emphases, and criteria for success. When combined with the four cultural types enumerated by the CVF: **clan**, **adhocracy**, **market**, and **hierarchy** (Cameron and Etington, 1988), which are formed by the confluence of two major dimensions of effectiveness: **internal focus and integration** versus **external focus and differentiation**; and **stability and control** versus **flexibility and discretion**, the six cultural content dimensions are able to elicit "the fundamental organizing framework used by people when they obtain, interpret, and draw conclusions about information" (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 136). See Figure 3. Consequently, the OCAI is able to uncover the underlying organizational culture, which is an ambiguous, complex, and non-linear socially constructed shared meaning, difficult to observe and even more so to quantify. The OCAI enables the researcher to identify an organization's predominant cultural type as well as the relative strength of the four basic cultural types briefly identified above. Finally, the OCAI allows the researcher to evaluate the level of cultural congruence in an organization. Cultural congruence refers to the degree to which the "various aspects of the organization's culture are aligned. That is, the same culture types are emphasized in the various parts of the organization" (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 64).





**Figure 3. The Competing Values of Leadership, Effectiveness, and Organizational Theory (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, p. 41).**

Even though the authors of the OCAI approach indicate that this cultural research technique is primarily representative of the functionalist tradition, which treats organizational culture as a variable, they also acknowledge the ambiguous and unmanageable aspects, which are representative of the semiotic perspective. Additionally, the technique combines some of the more positive aspects of both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies. The dimensions graphically portrayed in Figure 3, and the four cultural type quadrants which they produce, “appear to be very robust in explaining the different orientations, as well as the competing values, that characterize human behavior. . . . That is, each quadrant represents ba-

sic assumptions, orientations, and values—the same elements that comprise an organizational culture” (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 33). Consequently, the OCAI and the underlying CVF approach were chosen for this study because the CVF has been empirically developed and has been found to have both face and empirical validity (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). Additionally, the OCAI is a predominantly quantitative instrument that has been developed in such a manner as to elicit subjective qualitative-type responses from respondents. Therefore, the OCAI can be considered to be of a hybrid nature in that it incorporates both quantitative and qualitative aspects of research design, and the instrument has been found to have a high level of documented reliability and validity.

### **Professionalism and Professional Development.**

Despite the significant amount of ambiguity and imprecision that can be found in the extant literature concerning professions and what it means to be professional, there are some common notions of the concept, which appear to have achieved some tacit agreement among researchers and theorists (Golembiewski, 1983). Among these areas of agreement is Abbott’s position that the “tasks of professions are human problems [which are] amenable to expert service” (1988, p. 35). This study accepts the generic proposition that professional status is based on competency whereby individuals in high status occupations translate abstract knowledge into action, and that this action is undertaken to help people confront important societal problems which they are incapable of solving for themselves (Eulau, 1973; Mosher, 1982; Huntington, 1985; Freidson, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Burk, 2002). Gar-

gan emphasizes that a “distinguishing characteristic of the context of professionalism, cited by essentially all observers, is autonomy, the notion that if professionals are to be held accountable for their decisions they must be allowed discretion, the right to make choices which concern both means and ends” (1998, p. 1091). Consequently, Freidson (1986) indicates that professional autonomy and special privilege are conferred upon professions by society because of the profession’s mastery or expertise in an area of formal abstract knowledge which is traditionally considered to be in the interest of society as a whole, examples include: law, medicine, engineering, teaching, the ministry, and defense.

In his book discussing “the system of professions,” Andrew Abbott provides a succinct description of the historical definitions of professions by stating that professions “were organized bodies of experts who applied esoteric knowledge to particular cases. They had elaborate systems of instruction and training, together with entry by examination and other formal prerequisites . . . [and] . . . They normally possessed and enforced a code of ethics or behavior” (1988, p. 4). Abbott also emphasizes that in relation to the professional development of individual professionals, “the academic knowledge system of a profession generally accomplishes three tasks – legitimation, research, and instruction – and, in each, it shapes the vulnerability of professional jurisdiction to outside interference” (1988, p. 57). Here, Abbott is implying that the future survival of the profession is shaped by the organizational culture of that profession; in this case, its unconscious willingness to expand the boundaries of its professional abstract knowledge. He indicates that if the profession is incapable of keeping pace with a rapidly

changing external environment, then the profession will face serious competition from other professions and lose its legitimacy and socially granted professional jurisdiction. Relevant to this study, Snider and Watkins (2002) warn that the U.S. Army's culture is preventing its senior leaders from developing the managerial and leadership skills that will enable them to guide the Army profession into the future and to ensure that it keeps pace with its rapidly changing external national security environment. For example, they state that "[m]icromanagement has become part of the Army culture, producing a growing perception that lack of trust stems from the leader's desire to be invulnerable to criticism and blocks the opportunity for subordinates to learn through leadership experiences" (2002, p. 10), and contributing to the subsequent "flight of talented young officers" (Wardynski *et al.*, 2010a, p. iii).

In reference to military professions, Huntington, in his work discussing the theory and politics of civil-military relations, identifies those technical, personal, ethical, and doctrinal skills that must be mastered to successfully wage war in support of national values and national security strategy as the abstract knowledge intrinsic to the "management of violence" (1985, p. 11). Specifically, Huntington (1985) outlines three characteristics of professionalism; expertise, responsibility, and corporateness, which he believes distinguish the professional from the amateur. He indicates that expertise refers to "specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor" (p. 8). He states that responsibility implies that a professional is a "practicing expert, working in a social context, and performing a service, such as the promotion of health, education, or justice, which is essential to the

functioning of society" (p. 9). Finally, Huntington describes professional corporateness as the shared "sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from layman" (p. 10) that the members of a profession possess.

Abbott (1988) believes that the key aspect of professions is their ability to acquire and control various types of knowledge, and as will be discussed shortly, their ability to compete for and maintain a dominance over their specialized knowledge. Professional dominance over a given area of abstract knowledge is important because as Freidson states, "knowledge is power" (1986, p. 1), consequently, the ability of a profession to sustain its societally granted "jurisdiction" depends upon its ability to expand this knowledge base while concurrently maintaining the profession's mastery of it (Abbott, 1988). Gargan concurs and indicates that when "a profession's extant core knowledge and associated substantive, methodological, and theoretical issues are undergoing attack or rapid change, the profession as a whole must be concerned with the emergent knowledge and the mechanisms available for transmitting the new knowledge to students and to practitioners in the field" (1998, p. 1090). These foregoing statements highlight three key aspects of professionalism: expertise, legitimacy, and jurisdiction, which Abbott (1988) states represent the environment within which professions exist.

*Expertise.* By traditional definition, professional practice is considered to be essential to the functioning of society and usually exceeds the capabilities of the average citizen because of the extensive amount of education, which frequently takes years to complete and is normally representative of a lifelong vocation (Abbott, 1988; Mosher, 1982; Freidson, 1986; Burrage and

Torstendahl, 1990, Snider, 2003a). Due to the inherent requirement for individual professionals to maintain a high level of expertise, professions dedicate significant resources to the initial and recurring training of their members, especially new members (Huntington, 1985; Snider, 2003a). The continuous education which occurs over the lifetime of individual professionals is commonly referred to by the U.S. Army as professional development (FM 22-100, 1999; FM 6-22, 2006). Professional development includes the moral obligation to generate a professional ethic and to promulgate standards of practice that are in keeping with the public trust. If professions uphold their social responsibility and sustain the public's trust, then "[W]estern societies generally grant a large degree of autonomy to set standards, to police their ranks, and to develop their future members" (Snider, 2003a, p. 4).

Additionally, the ability of a profession to maintain the legitimacy and autonomy to exercise its esoteric knowledge for the benefit of society depends upon the profession's continuous capacity to expand the boundaries of its current knowledge base and to acquire new and more specialized skills (Mosher, 1982; Beckman, 1990). Mosher (1982) emphasizes this point by stating that professions display several common characteristics, one of which is the necessity for the professions to enhance their stature within society and to strengthen their public image as seen by society. Additionally, Mosher states that:

A prominent device for furthering this goal is the establishment of the clear and (where possible) expanding boundaries of work within which members of the profession have exclusive prerogatives to operate. Other means include: the assurance and protection of career opportunities for professionals; the establish-

ment and continuous elevation of standards of education and entrance into the profession; the upgrading of rewards (pay) for professionals; and the improvement of their prestige before their associates and before the public in general (1982, p. 117).

There is also an expectation to pass these new skills and knowledge on to a new generation of professionals through a variety of formalized educational programs, institutions, and professional schools. Cook highlights the importance of professional formal education by stating that entry “into any profession is a kind of initiation into a body of knowledge primarily, if not exclusively, generated, transmitted, and built upon by fellow members of the profession” (2002, p. 345).

The significance of the necessity for professions to continuously expand the boundaries of their esoteric knowledge and specialized skills lies in the concept of legitimacy, which provides justification for “what professions do and how they do it” (Abbott, 1988, p. 184). Underlying this monopoly of specialized esoteric knowledge are the interrelated concepts of trust and social responsibility. Together, legitimacy, trust, and social responsibility are the focus of the next section of this chapter.

*Legitimacy.* When society grants to a profession the privilege of exercising nearly monopolistic authority and autonomy in an area of expert knowledge such as law, medicine, and national defense, the profession is seen to be operating as a legitimate agent of society (Freidson, 1986). Trust forms the foundation upon which this symbiotic relationship is built. Consequently, the professions are afforded a high degree of autonomy, to include self-regulation, licensing, regulation of the conduct of individual members, and the



development of professional skills and a professional ethic. In return, they pledge to society that the members of the profession will act in an altruistic manner for the benefit of society (Brien, 1998). Snider (2003a) indicates that professions dedicate significant portions of their professional development programs to training of professional ethics and standards of practice for the explicit purpose of maintaining a high level of trust between the profession and society.

*Jurisdiction.* Abbott states that “diagnosis, treatment, inference, and academic work provide the cultural machinery of jurisdiction” (1988, p. 59). What sets this professional process apart from occupations is the fact that social problems such as medical health, legal interpretation, and national defense do not have routine solutions. For example, when senior military officers are preparing a combat plan to provide to the President, they are relying on an esoteric body of knowledge that has been developed and refined for thousands of years on how to fight wars. However, each situation requires an in-depth analysis, a “diagnosis” of all current and potentially relevant factors such as the readiness of military units, geography, logistical support, international support, local nation support, to name only a few. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is an excellent case-in-point. Using this diagnostic process, which includes the vast experience of thousands of military professionals, senior military leaders develop a campaign plan, which in the professional vernacular is a “treatment” as described by Abbott above. Once the treatment is implemented, another analysis of the effectiveness of that treatment is initiated, and Abbott calls this analysis process “inference.” The U.S. Army refers to these analyses as “after-action-reviews,” which is a process it uses to



provide lessons learned to the Army profession (FM 22-100, 1999; FM 6-22, 2006). Finally, the entire “diagnosis, treatment, and inference” process becomes the basis of the formalized professional development programs of the various professions. These experiences frequently become articles in professional journals or become the content of professional training courses, thereby expanding the professional body of knowledge for future professionals to learn as they progress through their initial or recurrent training programs (Schon, 1983; Abbott, 1988).

The greater the success that professions achieve in solving complex social problems, the greater the probability that they have of achieving professional legitimacy as described in the preceding section (Freidson, 1986; Abbott, 1988). Professional legitimacy enables professions to claim control of a particular kind of work such as medicine, law, or national defense. Abbott states that:

In claiming jurisdiction, a profession asks society to recognize its cognitive structure through exclusive rights; jurisdiction has not only a culture, but also a social structure. These claimed rights may include absolute monopoly of practice and of public payments, rights of self-discipline and of unconstrained employment, control of professional training, of recruitment, and of licensing, to mention only a few. . . . This control means first and foremost a right to perform the work as professionals see fit. Along with the right to perform the work as it wishes, a profession normally also claims rights to exclude other workers as deemed necessary, to dominate public definitions of the tasks concerned, and indeed to impose professional definitions of the tasks on competing professions. Public jurisdiction, in short, is a claim of both social and cultural authority (1988, pp. 59 and 60).

Professions compete for jurisdictional control with other professions and with newly developing technologies, organizations, and occupations (Abbott, 1988; Collins, 1990; Broadbent *et al.*, 1997). Those professions that fail to successfully compete or that become overly bureaucratized “may very well die, losing their status as a profession” (Martin and McCausland, 2002, p. 429). Abbott (1988) states that abstract knowledge, the continuous expansion of that knowledge base, and the practical professional skills that grow from this system enable a profession to successfully defend its jurisdiction from encroachment by others. Senge (1994) emphasizes that the successful organizations of the future will be those that can be characterized as learning organizations. Senge defines a learning organization as:

. . . an organization that is continually expanding its capacity to create its future. For such an organization, it is not enough to merely survive. ‘Survival Learning’ or what is more often termed “adaptive learning” is important—indeed, it is necessary. But for a learning organization, “adaptive learning” must be joined by “generative learning,” learning that enhances our capacity to create (1994, p. 14).

As such, LeBoeuf (2002) emphasizes that professions and professional organizations must be characterized as learning organizations whose primary focus is directed toward the constant growth of their expertise, practical professional skills, and the knowledge base that underlies their expertise. Martin and McCausland (2002) agree with LaBoeuf. They emphasize that the task of ensuring that professional organizations stay focused on a strategy of “learning” (Senge, 1994) and “reflection-in-action” (Schon, 1983)

falls unequivocally to the senior and strategic leaders of the organization. Specifically, Martin and McCausland state that:

Clearly one of the most vital tasks of those leading a profession at the strategic level is to tend to the dynamic nature of change that affects the particular tasks it is called upon to perform, as well as the associated knowledge base. . . . In other words, unless the strategic leaders of the profession tend to the profession's body of expert knowledge and its effective application to new situations and tasks by the members of the profession, they run the risk of competing poorly and declining in standing, or legitimacy, with their client [society] (2002, p. 428).

Additionally, Martin and McCausland emphasize that the strategic leaders of professional organizations "must provide purpose, direction, energy, motivation, inspiration, and a clear professional identity" (2002, p. 429) to the members of the profession. They must do this by shaping the professional culture, and by providing a strategic vision for the profession which underscores the necessity for expanding the profession's expert knowledge base and practical professional skills. Martin and McCausland (2002) state that organizational strategic leaders must remain acutely aware that the status of the profession's legitimacy and jurisdictional competitions will ultimately determine the future survival of the profession as it navigates through the ambiguity of its strategic external environment.

*The Army Profession.* "To call an occupation a 'profession' is usually to make a positive normative judgment about the work being done, and since we think that professional work is a social good, whatever we

call professional work also reveals something about what we believe is required for the well-being of society" (Burk, 2002, p. 19). When Huntington states that "[t]he modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man" (1985, p. 7), he too is making this distinction, and he is ascribing to the military profession those seven criteria of professionalism as identified by Gargan (1998) earlier in the previous sections of this monograph. In addition to Huntington's (1985) analysis, a great deal of the extent literature indicates that the officer corps of the U.S. military constitutes a profession (Huntington, 1985; Janowitz, 1971; Freidson, 1973; Mosher, 1982; Schon, 1983; Freidson, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Abbott, 2002; Segal and Bourg, 2002; Snider and Watkins, 2002; Snider, 2003a). Finally, the Army acknowledges its professional status by stating that the Army's professional purpose is "to serve the American people, protect our enduring national interests, and fulfill our national military responsibilities. The Army, with the other Services, deters conflict, reassures allies, defeats enemies, and supports civil authorities" (FM 1, 2001, p. 25). Consequently, this study accepts the premise that there is an Army profession, which this author believes has been satisfactorily argued by many theorists as identified in this monograph and as history has proven as well.

The Army as a profession is focused on the development and application of the esoteric knowledge and related practical professional skills of land warfare (Snider, 2003a). The U.S. Army has a social responsibility to the people of the United States of America to fight and win the nation's wars and to preserve and protect the American way of life. In addition, the Army profession maintains a professional ethic of

selfless service that is committed to the prevention of abuse of its authority and power (FM 22-100, 1999; FM 6-22, 2006). While it may not be obvious to the casual observer, the Army professional jurisdiction is in constant competition with other professions to include" (Brinsfield, 2002) the naval (to include the Marine Corps) and air professions, foreign military services, "other government agencies, private contractors, and nongovernmental organizations, both American and international" (Snider and Watkins, 2002, p. 7).

Cook (2002) emphasizes that the main challenge confronting Army professionalism today is the necessity for the profession to emphatically embrace the rapidly evolving nature of the external strategic environment. Accordingly, the Army profession must encourage intellectual professional development and the transformation of its practical professional skills in such a manner as to become adaptable, innovative, and flexible in the face of this constantly changing external environment. Cook (2002) indicates that there are benefits to analyzing the Army profession through the "expertise, legitimacy, and jurisdiction" model as explicated by Abbott. Specifically, Cook states that:

The benefit of viewing professions through Abbott's lens is that it avoids viewing the professions statically and ahistorically. Rather, it sees the profession as evolving through time in interaction with its environment and with other claimants to the profession's jurisdiction. At the root of the challenge to Army professionalism is the necessity to create and sustain the intellectual creativity to get ahead of environmental changes, to embrace them, and to demonstrate the intellectual flexibility to inspire the nation's confidence that it can meet the demands of the changing security environment with enthusiasm. Such a profession transmits and extends its corporate culture and

its developing intellectual engagement with a body of expert knowledge into the future (2002, p. 353).

The significance of the preceding comments lies in their admonition for the furtherance of professional intellectual skills and the necessity to pass this knowledge on to succeeding generations of professionals as well as to pass on a culture of innovation. Wong emphasizes the necessity for professional innovation by stating that the Army profession “will require a change in the way the Army approaches problems and issues. It will require changing the Army’s culture to one where subordinates are free to innovate” (2002, p. 30). The ability to fully understand the strengths and weaknesses of the Army’s culture and to inculcate into that culture a level of readiness and willingness to adapt to the rapidly changing external environment is one of the most significant challenges facing the Army’s professional strategic leaders today (LeBoeuf, 2002). “The strategic leadership of the Army must reinforce and sustain a military that promotes the evolution of professional expertise” (LeBoeuf, 2002, p. 495), particularly that which emphasizes professional development for its senior leaders and the attendant practical professional skills that translate esoteric knowledge into application. However, there is reason to believe that the strategic leaders of the Army profession either do not fully understand the significance of the professional development process or they simply do not support it (ATLDP, 2001; LeBoeuf, 2002; Wardynski *et al.*, 2010b, 2010c; Moten, 2010). For example, LeBoeuf (2002) states that personnel assignments that give little consideration for the professional development of junior professionals by “simply injecting warm bodies into required slots” is an all too frequent example

of the lack of senior leader support for professional development (2002, p. 493). Consequently, the implication of the organizational culture and professional literature discussed so far indicates that the:

Army cannot train its way out of these problems, but must include a substantial educational and developmental component for all of the profession's members. Actions must be top-down, with strategic leaders creating conditions for change, and bottom-up, with junior officers educated, trained, and developed in a manner more consistent with the demands of the profession and Army transformation (LeBoeuf, 2002, p. 499).

Since strategic leaders are tasked with understanding the tenets of professionalism and with fully understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the Army's culture (Martin and McCausland, 2002), they must be aware of the "powerful, latent, and often unconscious set of forces . . . [that] . . . determine strategy, goals, and modes of operating" (Schein, 1999, p. 14), such as the content, implementation, and results of professional development programs.

*Army Organizational Culture and Professional Development.* This study conducts an analysis of the level of congruence between the organizational culture of the U.S. Army and the professional development of its senior leaders. The purpose is to determine if the organizational culture of the U.S. Army is supportive of the professional development of its officer corps in general, but more specifically, its senior level officer corps, the future leaders and protectors of the Army profession. As implied by Snider and Watkins (2002), Builder (1989), and by the acerbic remarks from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (Galloway, 2003),

there is a great deal of concern that the U.S. Army officer corps is at risk of transitioning from a professional organization to that of an obedient bureaucracy (LeBoeuf, 2002). If such a transition were to occur, it is postulated that the bureaucratic form of organization will stifle the development of professional military knowledge, and practical professional skills, particularly the abstract knowledge of the management and conduct of land warfare (Janowitz, 1971; Schon, 1983; Huntington, 1985; Snider and Watkins, 2002; Wong, 2002). Additionally, Wong (2002) indicates that there is a concern that the ability of the Army profession to develop innovative strategies to cope with the changing national security environment will be at risk if a cultural shift was allowed to occur from that of a profession to that of a bureaucratic organization emphasizing standard operating procedures, and the “application of knowledge embedded in organizational routine and process” (Snider and Watkins, 2002, p. 8). The hierarchical nature of the bureaucratic form of organization and its focus on efficiency and a “do more with less” philosophy creates a psychological distance between organizational members and their work. Unlike bureaucracies, the key to professional organizations is their emphasis on the continuous development and expansion of their esoteric knowledge and on their commitment to social responsibility as manifested through a professional ethic and through the promulgation of professional standards of conduct (Cook, 2002; Mattox, 2002; Snider and Watkins, 2002; Toner, 2002, Snider *et al.*, 2009; Moten, 2010). Unlike professions, organizational members of a bureaucracy strive for machine-like efficiency and survival. Consequently, these members view themselves as employees of the organization instead of actually being



the organization. As a result, individual commitment, accountability, and organizational identity are minimized (Peters, 1989). Snider and Watkins emphasize that “[w]ith regard to social control, by nurturing the profession’s ethic within its members, a profession offers a better means of shaping human behavior in situations of chaotic violence, stress, and ambiguity than bureaucratic management can ever hope to achieve” (2002, p. 11).

In an effort to close the gap between an apparent imbalance between what the Army profession says that it is and what it appears to be in actual practice, the U.S. Army has commissioned several studies that have attempted to investigate the organizational culture of the Army. However, these studies have tended to be more focused on the concept of “organizational climate” than on organizational culture (CSIS, 2000; ATLDP, 2001; Snider and Watkins, 2002). Unlike organizational culture, organizational climate is an assessment of how individuals feel about the organization to include such things as “the physical layout and the way in which members of the organization interact with each other” (Schein, 1992, p. 9). Schneider (1990) indicates that the concepts of culture and climate have a substantial degree of overlap, which is one of the reasons many authors use the terms interchangeably. However, being aware of and understanding these differences and similarities is necessary for a greater appreciation of the more complex construct of organizational culture.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) study commissioned by the Department of Defense (DoD) has determined that the existing culture of the military is out of step with its professed values. For example, the CSIS found that “[s]ome officers and NCOs in the field and fleet have views on

the condition of the force that are at odds with those expressed by senior military leaders in Washington . . . [the survey] data in this [study] do not contradict the theme of mistrust between top military leaders and some officers and NCOs" (2000, p. 71). Additionally, it concluded that the psychological environment in which individual behavior occurs (organizational climate), if not modified, will result in a degradation of the U.S. Army's professional culture over time (CSIS, 2000; Snider and Watkins, 2002). The study strongly indicates that a professional military culture does exist. However the fundamental values that underscore the professional nature of the military are coming under increasing levels of stress, particularly because of excessive deployments, for example, Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, which may result in undesirable cultural changes, as pointed out above (CSIS, 2000).

In their book discussing culture, careers, and climate in the Australian Army, Jans and Schmidtchen stress that a professional military career development program "is the major conduit by which Army cultural values are translated into professional behavior" (2002, p. 103). Their evaluation underscores the significance of the present study by indicating that professional development is the process whereby current organizational culture is converted into future professional behavior. Jans and Schmidtchen emphasize that a formalized program of professional development produces both desirable and undesirable outcomes. For example, professional development programs reinforce the Army's culture of professionalism and community, both of which are desirable. However, the programs also strengthen the aspects of the organization's culture that encourage hierarchy, conserva-

tism, and an emphasis on rules and structure, which are inimical to professionalism. Figure 4 provides a graphic representation of the relationship among organizational culture, professional development programs, and the resulting leadership/managerial skills that underscore professional behavior. It can be seen that organizational values and ethics rest upon the foundation provided by organizational culture. In the case of the U.S. Army, the Army espouses seven institutional values and ethics: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage through the use of the acronym “LDRSHIP” (FM 22-100, 1999; FM 6-22, 2006). As mentioned previously, values guide organizational members to strive toward what ought to be as opposed to what is (Schein, 1992). Upon these key values, the Army has built its professional development program, which consists of two pillars: formal training and informal training.



Adapted from FM 22-100, *Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do*, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1999, p. 5-14).

**Figure 4. A Model Depicting the Influences on Professional Behavior.**

Formal training is comprised of institutional training such as officer basic courses, advanced leadership courses such as those provided by the U.S. Army War College, and additional skill-qualification courses. Informal training is achieved by providing officers with a career of worldwide operational assignments with ever-increasing levels of authority and responsibility, and the associated personnel policies that directly impact development such as the annual Officer Evaluation Reports, retirement incentives, and a “promote or out” policy. Informal training also includes individual self-development such as an officer earning an advanced degree on his or her own time, and mentoring programs where senior officers give career guidance and counseling to junior officers. Professional development training programs are designed to impart the necessary managerial and leadership skills to the officer corps so that these Army professionals will routinely exhibit professional behavior and ultimately providing strategic guidance and leadership for the U.S. Army as a profession well into the future (FM 22-100, 1999). Consequently, the adequate and appropriate development of Army professionals is a necessity if the Army profession expects to obtain societal approbation for its legitimacy as the premier instrument of American land warfare and to maintain its jurisdiction as such (Cook, 2002). Since organizational culture pervades all that organizations do, it is logical that the Army professional managerial/leadership skills that were nurtured through the professional development program have been influenced by the Army culture (LeBoeuf, 2002). Therefore the next section outlines the methodological procedures employed by this study to identify the level of congruence between the Army culture and the professional managerial/leadership skills of the Army’s senior leaders.

## METHODOLOGY


### **An Overview of the Competing Values Framework (CVF) Model.**

The CVF evolved from the work of Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981, 1983) as they attempted to circumscribe the elusive definition for a generally agreed upon theoretical framework of the concept of organizational effectiveness. This framework was chosen for this study because it was experimentally derived and found to have a high degree of face and empirical validity. Additionally, the CVF was identified as having a high level of reliability matching or exceeding that of other instruments commonly used in the social and organizational sciences (Cameron and Ettington, 1988; Cameron and Quinn, 1999; Berrio, 2003). The four quadrants of the framework, representing the four major cultural types: clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy, provide a robust explanation of the differing orientations and competing values that characterize human behavior. The richness provided by the CVF is based on its ability to identify the basic assumptions, orientations, and values of each of the four cultural types. These three elements comprise the core of organizational culture. "The OCAI, therefore, is an instrument that allows you to diagnose the dominant orientation of your own organization based on these core culture types. It also assists you in diagnosing your organization's cultural strength, cultural type, and cultural congruence" (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 33). Through the use of the OCAI and its associated MSAI, this study identifies the cultural type of the U.S. Army, as defined by the study population, and

the managerial/leadership skills of its senior leaders, thereby establishing the level of congruence between culture and professional development as depicted by the building block model graphically portrayed in Figure 4 above.

In their research concerning organizational effectiveness, Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981, 1983) statistically analyzed 39 indicators of organizational effectiveness as identified by Campbell *et al.*, (1974). Quinn and Rohrbaugh's analysis resulted in the bifurcation of the 39 effectiveness criteria between two major dimensions. The first dimension, which is labeled the "Structure" dimension, differentiates the organizational effectiveness criteria between those that emphasize flexibility, discretion, and dynamism and those that emphasize stability, order, and control. The second dimension, which is labeled the "Focus" dimension, differentiates the organizational effectiveness criteria between those that emphasize internal orientation, integration, and unity and those effectiveness criteria that emphasize an external orientation, differentiation, and rivalry (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1981 and 1983; Cameron and Quinn, 1999). Within each of these two dimensions there is also a third set of values, which produces an emphasis ranging from organizational processes, such as planning and goal setting at one end of the spectrum, to an emphasis on results, such as resource acquisition at the other end. Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981) labeled this third set of values as the organizational "Means-Ends" continuum. The two primary dimensions differentiating between organizational values emphasizing "Structure" and "Focus" produce four clusters of effectiveness criteria as depicted in Figure 5. The "Structure" axis is represented by the "Flexibility-Control" continuum,

while the “Focus” axis in Figure 5 is represented by the “People-Organization” continuum. Within each of these four quadrants the relevant “Means-Ends” values are enumerated.



**Figure 5. A Summary of the Competing Value Sets and Effectiveness Models (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981, p. 136).**

Cameron and Quinn state that the significance of these clusters of organizational effectiveness criteria is that they “represent what people value about an organization’s performance. They define what is seen as good right and appropriate . . . [and they] . . . define the core values on which judgments about organizations are made” (1999, p. 31). Additionally, these quadrants represent opposite or competing values or assumptions. As you move, from left to right along the “Focus” (People-Organization) continuum or axis of the



chart the emphasis shifts from an internal focus within the organization to that of an external focus outside the organization. As you move from the bottom of the chart along the "Structure" (Flexibility-Control) continuum or axis the emphasis shifts from control and stability within the organization and the environment to that of flexibility and discretion within the organization and the environment. The diagonal dimensions also produce conflicting or competing values. For example, the values in the upper right quadrant emphasize an external focus concerned with flexibility and growth, while the values in the lower left quadrant accentuate an internal focus with control and stability (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). Hence, the competing or contradictory values in each quadrant form the basis for the "Competing Values Framework" name of the conceptual model upon which the present study is based.

In their initial study, Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981) also provided a brief review of four competing theoretical models of organizational effectiveness (Literature discussing these four models can be found elsewhere: Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum 1957; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Thompson, 1967; Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967; Mott, 1972; Price, 1972; Steers, 1975; Campbell, 1977; Katz and Kahn 1978; Cameron and Whetten, 1983; Pasmore, 1988; Anspach, 1991; Scott, 1992): the rational goal model, the open system model, the human relations model, and the internal process model, and they demonstrated how each of these four models was related to the four quadrants of their CVF model, see Figure 5. In their analyses, Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981, 1983) illustrate the importance that the human relations model places on internal flexibility, cohesion, morale, and human resource develop-



ment and correlate it to the upper left-hand quadrant of their CVF model. The upper right-hand quadrant of the CVF model is correlated with the open systems model, which highlights the significance of external flexibility, readiness, growth, and resource acquisition. The lower left-hand quadrant of the CVF model is correlated with the internal process model, which underscores the significance of internal control, stability, information management, and communication. Finally, Quinn and Rohrbaugh state that the lower right-hand quadrant of their CVF model is correlated with the rational goal model, which underscores the importance of external control, planning, goal setting, productivity, and efficiency. Figure 5 provides a summary of the competing values sets and the four organizational effectiveness models. The significance of these four quadrants is that they represent how “over time, different organizational values have become associated with different forms of organization . . . [and that] . . . each quadrant represents basic assumptions, orientations, and values – the same elements that comprise an organizational culture” (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, pp. 32-33).

### **Origins of the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI).**

In 1985, Quinn and McGrath used the CVF model of organizational effectiveness, outlined above, to develop their theory concerning the transformation of organizational cultures. They stated that their study was “interested in the contradiction, tension, and paradox that leads to transformation” (1985, p. 315). Specifically, they were attempting to develop an analytical scheme based on Janusian<sup>5</sup> thinking (Rothen-

berg, 1979), which “is a complex process in which two apparently contradictory ideas or concepts are conceived to be equally operative, therefore, paradoxical. It involves the generation of a simultaneous antithesis, the integration of opposites” (Quinn and McGrath, 1985, p. 316). This concept is analogous to “double-loop learning” as described by Argyris and Schon, who indicate that “[d]ouble-loop learning changes the governing variables (the settings) of one’s programs and causes ripples of change to fan out over one’s whole system of theories-in-use” (1974, p. 19). In other words, double-loop learning challenges an organization’s past success and the basic norms, values, and assumptions that underlie that success by continuously evaluating alternatives. As theorized by Quinn and McGrath, such a continuous evaluation of organizational processes and behaviors will eventually generate a shift (a transformation) of organizational culture. Consequently, their cultural transformation theory implies the simultaneous existence of competing values within any organization; hence, their preoccupation with contradiction and paradox (Quinn and Cameron, 1988). This perspective helps to explain why, as will be seen later, the OCAI identifies the relative preference and strength of competing cultural types within organizations. In other words, organizations have predominant cultural types, but they also exhibit at the same time characteristics of the other cultural types but to a lesser degree. Also, organizations may exhibit differing predominant cultural types depending on a given situation in which the organization finds itself.

Using the existing scholarly literature explicating different forms of organization, Quinn and McGrath identified four main organizational forms, which


they believe correlate with key management theories concerning organizational success, leadership roles, quality, and management skills (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). Consequently, they labeled these forms based on the key characteristics of organizational values that have over time become associated with these organizational forms, and they are: clan, adhocracy, hierarchy, and market (see Table 2, Four Types of Organizational Forms). Table 1, Transactional Expectations or Governing Rules, identifies the characteristics or profiles of four transactional systems or cultural biases: **Rational Culture, Ideological Culture, Consensual Culture, and Hierarchical Culture**, which are deeply held organizational values that determine identity, power, and satisfaction within an organizational setting. For example, in a rational culture, the organizational purpose is the pursuit of objectives. In a hierarchical culture, the organizational purpose is based on the execution of regulations. Quinn and McGrath (1985) found that these four transactional expectations were related to the four types of organizational forms highlighted in Table 2. By reading down the columns, you can see, for example, that the “Market” organizational form is representative of a rational culture, and that the “Adhocracy” organizational form is representative of an ideological culture, and so on. Cameron and Quinn indicate that the four quadrants developed by the CVF model matched “precisely the main organizational forms that have developed in organizational science” (1999, p. 32), as identified by Quinn and McGrath in Tables 1 and 2. The resulting hybrid model has become the foundation of Cameron and Quinn’s (1999) OCAI see Figure 6.

<b>Transactional Expectations or Governing Rules</b>				
	<b>Rational Culture</b>	<b>Ideological Culture</b>	<b>Consensual Culture</b>	<b>Hierarchical Culture</b>
<b>Organizational Purpose</b>	pursuit of objectives	broad purposes	group maintenance	execution of regulations
<b>Criteria of Performance</b>	productivity, efficiency	external support, growth, resource acquisition	cohesion, morale	stability, control
<b>Location of Authority</b>	the boss	charisma	membership	rules
<b>Base of Power</b>	competence	values	informal status	technical knowledge
<b>Decisionmaking</b>	decisive pronouncements	intuitive insights	participation	factual analysis
<b>Leadership Style</b>	directive, goal oriented	inventive, risk oriented	concerned, supportive	conservative, cautious
<b>Compliance</b>	contractual agreement	commitment to values	commitment from process	surveillance and control
<b>Evaluation of Members</b>	tangible output	intensity of effort	quality of relationship	formal criteria
<b>Appropriate Motives</b>	achievement	growth	affiliation	security

**Table 1. Transactional Expectations or Governing Rules from Quinn and McGrath, 1985, p. 327.**

<b>Four Types of Organizational Forms</b>				
	<b>Market</b>	<b>Adhocracy</b>	<b>Clan</b>	<b>Hierarchy</b>
<b>Technology (Perrow, 1967)</b>	Engineering	Non-routine	Craft	Routine
<b>Effectiveness Model (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983)</b>	Rational Goal	Open Systems	Human Relations	Internal Process
<b>Strategic Orientation (Miles and Snow, 1978)</b>	Analyzer	Prospector	Implementor	Defender
<b>Type (Oliver, 1982)</b>	Task	Professional	Group	Hierarchic
<b>Illustration</b>	Theory A	Stage II	Theory Z	Bureaucracy

**Table 2. Four Types of Organizational Forms from Quinn and McGrath, 1985, p. 327.**



**Figure 6. The Competing Values of Leadership, Effectiveness, and Organizational Theory (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, p. 41).**

Cameron and Quinn (1999) emphasize that each of the four quadrants of the OCAI represents basic assumptions, orientations, and values, which as the literature review of this study has identified, represent the same elements that define organizational culture. Figure 7 provides a detailed organizational culture profile for each of the four dominant cultural types as identified in Figure 6. Therefore, Cameron and Quinn state that the OCAI “is an instrument that allows you to diagnose the dominant orientation of your own organization based on these core culture types. It also assists you in diagnosing your organi-

zation’s cultural strength, cultural type, and cultural congruence” (1999, p. 33). Using the OCAI and its associated graph as depicted in Figure 9 (discussed in the next section), cultural strength is determined by the resulting score awarded to the four cultural types. “The higher the score, the stronger or more dominant is that particular culture” (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 63). Cultural type is determined by an OCAI profile plot in the quadrant with the highest resulting score. Finally, cultural congruence is determined by an analysis of the various components of an organization.

<p><b>The Clan Culture.</b></p> <p>A very friendly place to work where people share a lot of themselves. It is like an extended family. The leaders, or the heads of the organization, are considered to be mentors and perhaps even parent figures. The organization is held together by loyalty or tradition. Commitment is high. The organization emphasizes the long-term benefit of human resources development and attaches great importance to cohesion and morale. Success is defined in terms of sensitivity to customers and concern for people. The organization places a premium on teamwork, participation, and consensus.</p>	<p><b>The Adhocracy Culture.</b></p> <p>A dynamic, entrepreneurial, and creative place to work. People stick their necks out and take risks. The leaders are considered innovators and risk takers. The glue that holds the organizations together is commitment to experimentation and innovation. The emphasis is on being on the leading edge. The organization’s long-term emphasis is on growth and acquiring new resources. Success means gaining unique and new products or services. Being a product or service leader is important. The organization encourages individual initiative and freedom.</p>
<p><b>The Hierarchy Culture.</b></p> <p>A very formalized and structured place to work. Procedures govern what people do. The leaders pride themselves on being good coordinators and organizaers who are efficiency-minded. Maintaining a smooth-running organization is most critical. Formal rules and policies hold the organization together. The long-term concern is on stability and performance with efficient, smooth operations. Success is defined in terms of dependable delivery, smooth scheduling, and low cost. The management of employees is concerned with secure employment and predictability.</p>	<p><b>The Market Culture.</b></p> <p>A results-oriented organization whose major concern is with getting the job done. People are competitive and goal-oriented. The leaders are hard drivers, producers, and competitors. They are tough and demanding. The glue that holds the organization together is an emphasis on winning. Reputation and success are common concerns. The long-term focus is on competitive actions and achievement of measurable goals and targets. Success is defined in terms of market share and penetration. Competitive pricing and market leadership are important. The organization style is hard-driving competitiveness.</p>

**Figure 7. The Organizational Culture Profile (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, p. 58).**

For example, if the marketing and sales divisions of an organization both produce similar OCAI profile plots then those two organizational sub-units are considered to have cultural congruence. In the case of the Army profession, this study conducts a demographic analysis to see if the various professional sub-components, i.e., branch, sex, source of commission, type of student, etc., reflect organizational congruence or not. The significance of organizational congruence is that “[h]aving all aspects of the organization clear about and focused on the same values and sharing the same assumptions simply eliminates many of the complications, disconnects, and obstacles that can get in the way of effective performance” (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 64).

The OCAI uses an **ipsative** rating scale that requires the respondent to “identify the trade-offs that actually exist in the organization” (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 144). In other words, the ipsative scale allows the respondent to identify the simultaneous existence of the preference for different cultural types. This implies, as indicated in the literature, that a variety of cultural types (competing values) may exist in each organization, but to different degrees or strength. In short, each organization will have a unique cultural profile. The ipsative scale allows the respondent to differentiate between four different alternative responses to a given question by assigning a relative percentage to each of the alternatives. The percentages given to all four alternative responses must total 100, thereby allowing the respondent to indicate the cultural type and strength that exists within their organization. See Appendix A for copy of the OCAI used in the present study.



## **An Overview of the Management Skills Assessment Instrument (MSAI).**

Cameron and Quinn developed the MSAI using the same framework as that of the OCAI in order to help managers and leaders identify the necessary skills and competencies that they must either develop or improve to facilitate an organizational culture change effort. The MSAI can also be used to enhance leadership abilities to improve organizational performance within the context of a current culture if a cultural change is not necessary. Based on an analysis of 15 studies, which researched the managerial leadership skills characteristic of a number of highly effective managers and organizations worldwide, Whetten and Cameron (1998) interviewed over 400 top executives to identify which skills were most important for individual leadership success (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). Cameron and Quinn consolidated the resulting list of successful leadership skills into a set of 12 competency categories which are mainly applicable to mid-level and upper-level managers (1999). See Figure 8 for the 12 competency categories and their associated primary OCAI category. Table 3 provides a detailed list of the 12 critical managerial competency categories and a brief description of the individual characteristics, which comprise these categories.



**Figure 8. A Model of the 12 Critical Managerial Competencies and their Related CVF Cultural Types (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 108).**

<b>The 12 Competency Categories</b>	
<b>CLAN QUADRANT</b>	<b>CHARACTERISTICS</b>
<b>Managing Teams (MT)</b>	Facilitating effective, cohesive, smooth functioning, high performance teamwork
<b>Managing Interpersonal Relationships (MIR)</b>	Facilitating effective interpersonal relationships including supportive feedback, listening, and resolution of interpersonal problems
<b>Managing the Development of Others (MD)</b>	Helping individuals improve their performance, expand their competencies, and obtain personal development opportunities
<b>ADHOCRACY QUADRANT</b>	
<b>Managing Innovation (MI)</b>	Encouraging individuals to innovate, expand alternatives, become more creative, and facilitate new idea generation
<b>Managing the Future (MF)</b>	Communicating a clear vision of the future and facilitating its accomplishment
<b>Managing Continuous Improvement (MCI)</b>	Fostering an orientation toward continuous improvement, flexibility, and productive change among individuals in their work life
<b>MARKET QUADRANT</b>	
<b>Managing Competitiveness (MC)</b>	Fostering competitive capabilities and an aggressive orientation toward exceeding competitors' performance
<b>Energizing Employees (EE)</b>	Motivating and inspiring individuals to be proactive, to put forth extra effort, and to work vigorously
<b>Managing Customer Service (MCS)</b>	Fostering an orientation toward serving customers, involving them, and exceeding their expectations
<b>HIERARCHY QUADRANT</b>	
<b>Managing Acculturation (MA)</b>	Helping individuals become clear about what is expected of them, what the culture and standards of the organization are, and how they can best fit into the work setting
<b>Managing the Control System (MCS)</b>	Ensuring that procedures, measurements, and monitoring systems are in place to keep processes and performance under control
<b>Managing Coordination (MCo)</b>	Fostering coordination within the organization as well as with external units and managers, and sharing information across boundaries

**Table 3. The 12 Critical Managerial Competency Categories and Their Associated Characteristics (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, pp. 108 – 109).**

<b>The 12 Competency Categories</b>	
<b>CLAN QUADRANT</b>	<b>MSAI Question Numbers</b>
<b>Managing Teams</b>	12, 18, 21, 22, 49, 61, 76
<b>Managing Interpersonal Relationships</b>	1, 13, 23, 48, 50, 62, 77
<b>Managing the Development of Others</b>	5, 20, 24, 25, 47, 63, 78
<b>ADHOCRACY QUADRANT</b>	
<b>Managing Innovation</b>	2, 8, 9, 26, 51, 64, 79
<b>Managing the Future</b>	14, 27, 28, 45, 46, 65, 80
<b>Managing Continuous Improvement</b>	29, 44, 52, 53, 59, 66, 81
<b>MARKET QUADRANT</b>	
<b>Managing Competitiveness</b>	15, 30, 35, 43, 60, 67, 82
<b>Energizing Employees</b>	3, 6, 7, 31, 42, 68, 83
<b>Managing Customer Service</b>	32, 33, 41, 54, 55, 69, 84
<b>HIERARCHY QUADRANT</b>	
<b>Managing Acculturation</b>	10, 11, 34, 40, 56, 70, 85
<b>Managing the Control System</b>	4, 16, 19, 36, 39, 71, 86
<b>Managing Coordination</b>	17, 37, 38, 57, 58, 72, 87

**Table 4. The 12 Critical Managerial Competency Categories and Their Associated MSAI Questions (Cameron and Quinn, 1999).**

## Methodology of the Study.

As stated at the beginning of this monograph, the primary research question of this study is: **Is the organizational culture of the U.S. Army congruent with the professional development of its senior level officer corps?**


The present study is based upon a quantitative evaluation of the current and preferred culture of the U.S. Army as identified by its senior level leaders. For the purpose of this study, the study population is defined as all U.S. Army lieutenant colonels and colonels who were actively enrolled as students of the U.S. Army War College Master of Strategic Studies program, Classes of 2003 and 2004 as of May 1, 2003. These individuals were chosen as the study population because they were previously identified by competitive U.S. Army evaluation boards as having highly successful command and leadership careers and as having the greatest potential for advancement. Collectively, senior service college graduates, such as these cohorts from the U.S. Army War College represent the pool of officers from which the future strategic leaders of the U.S. Army will be selected. Once selected for promotion to general officer, these officers will be charged with shaping the future culture of the U.S. Army and with adequately posturing the Army as an organization and as a profession for successful performance in a highly turbulent national security environment (Magee and Somervell, 1998).

The purpose of the present study is to explore the relationship between organizational culture and professional development and to extend current theory and empirical knowledge concerning this relationship.

These objectives will be accomplished by answering the primary research question through an analysis of four related hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 1: The current organizational culture of the U.S. Army is not consistent with an organizational culture supportive of professional development.**

To address the first hypothesis, a quantitative survey instrument, the OCAI, was administered to 952 U.S. Army War College students as described above. For the purposes of this study and in accordance with Schein's (1992) model, the concept of organizational culture is conceptualized as having three levels: artifacts, values, and deep basic underlying assumptions, see Figure 2. Additionally, this study supports the Competing Values Framework (CVF) as identified and described by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981, 1983) earlier in this monograph. The CVF approach has been identified as being highly successful as an "underlying framework, a theoretical foundation that can narrow and focus the search for key cultural dimensions" (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 29). The Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI), as established by Cameron and Quinn (1999) and as outlined earlier in this study, is used to operationalize the concept of organizational culture as defined by the CVF. The type of culture as identified by the respondents for both the "Now" and "Preferred" cultures will be plotted on the CVF graph as developed by Cameron and Quinn (1999) and as portrayed in the following sample plot in Figure 9.



**Figure 9. Overall Culture of Sample Organization.**

Note: Figure 9 is a graphic representation of the overall culture of "Sample Organization" based on "Now" (solid line) and "Preferred" (dotted line) Respondent Ratings on the OCAI. This plot indicates this organization's cultural archetype is relatively balanced, with the exception of a lower rating in the adhocracy cultural type. Note the preferred ratings clearly indicate that "clan" is the desired culture type (Sample is adapted from Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 97).

Professional development is normatively conceptualized by the U.S. Army as the process whereby the leaders of tomorrow are identified, trained, developed, and assigned to increasingly responsible duty positions for the purpose of being prepared to perform duties at the highest levels of the organization. Additionally, the concept of professional development includes the advancement of those skills that support innovative, flexible, risk-taking, visionary, and entre-

preneurial behavior (Argyris and Schon, 1974; Schon, 1983; Mosher, 1982; Huntington, 1985; Freidson, 1986; Senge, 1994; Martin and McCausland, 2002; Wong, 2002; Snider, 2003, 2003a).

For the purposes of this study, a culture that is supportive of professional development is operationalized as being reflective of the “adhocracy” cultural type as indicated by the results of the OCAI on either the “Now” or “Preferred” ratings. As indicated in Hypothesis 1 it is anticipated that the “Now” plot for the study population of this study will not reflect an adhocracy cultural type for the U.S. Army. Additionally, the operationalization of the concept of professional development will be accomplished through the use of Cameron and Quinn’s MSAI, which is specifically pertinent to Hypothesis 4.

**Hypothesis 2: The current organizational culture of the U.S. Army is consistent with that of a hierarchical/bureaucratic organization.**

The U.S. Army’s Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP, 2001) concluded that the gap between the Army’s professed ideals and its actual practices in the areas of training and leader development has spread outside the officer corps’ “band of tolerance.” What this means is that the difference between the Army profession’s “espoused values,” those that they publicly promulgate as organizational principles, and the Army profession’s “theories-in-use,” those values that actually guide behavior, (Argyris, 1976; Argyris and Schon, 1974) are no longer in agreement with each other. Snider and Watkins emphasize the significance of this discrepancy by stating that “[f]rom the members of the Army officer corps, as the commissioned agents of the American people responsible for



the continued stewardship of the profession and for the development of the sons and daughters of America who serve in it, more is expected, legally and morally" (2002, p. 16). The principal thesis of their work is that since "the continual development of military expertise and effective control of an Army operationally engaged on behalf of American society are both essential to the nation's future security, a nonprofessional Army is certainly not in America's best interest" (2002, p. 12). Schon reiterates the need for professional organizations to renew their essence as a profession by being reflective-in-action and by avoiding the pitfalls of embedded organizational knowledge. In other words, successful practices from the past must be continuously challenged, evaluated, and if necessary changed, to ensure success in the future. Consequently, Hypothesis 2 suggests that the current culture of the U.S. Army as indicated by the "Now" plot on the OCAI chart will reflect the hierarchy cultural type. If this is found to be the case, the CVF model indicates that a plot in the Hierarchy quadrant is the antithesis of the adhocracy cultural type, which is the theoretically preferred dominant cultural type for professional organizations as the literature review of this study has demonstrated. See Figure 9 for an example of a "Now" plot on the OCAI chart.

**Hypothesis 3: The preferred culture of the U.S. Army is consistent with organizational cultures supportive of innovative, risk-taking, boundary spanning, demanding continuous improvement, reflective-in-action, dynamic, and adaptive behavior.**

A review of several significant U.S. Army leadership publications indicates that the Army is acutely aware of the type of values, practical professional

skills, and behavior that are necessary for its senior and strategic level leaders to exhibit for the Army as a profession to be successful well into the future (AR 600-100, 1993; FM 22-100, 1999; Magee and Somervell, 1998; FM 6-22, 2006). Argyris and Schon (1974) state that “espoused values” are those values that individuals and organizations give allegiance to and communicate to others. Therefore, it is expected that the first two hypotheses will indicate that the U.S. Army’s culture is not consistent with that of professional organizations as operationalized by the adhocracy cultural type of the OCAI. Assuming that Hypotheses 1 and 2 are not rejected, therefore providing empirical support indicating that the study population of Army senior leaders perceives the Army’s current culture as being indicative of a hierarchical organization, Hypothesis 3 postulates that the study population of Army senior leaders also realizes how the culture must be transformed to achieve greater organizational performance, success, and survival (Brown and Dodd, 1998; Berrio, 2003). Hypothesis 3 is validated through the “Preferred” plot of the OCAI, which is intended to be an instrument that enables organizational leaders to determine the direction in which cultural change efforts should be directed (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). Cameron and Quinn state that:

A common mistake in organizations desiring to improve is that they do not take the time to create a common viewpoint among employees about where the organization is starting [the “Now” cultural plot of the OCAI] and where it needs to go [the “Preferred” cultural plot of the OCAI]. Unsuccessful organizations often launch right into a new change program without considering the need to develop a consensual view

of the current culture, the need to reach consensus of what change means and doesn't mean, and the specific changes that will be started, stopped, and continued (1999, p. 92).

Consequently, it is postulated that the preferred culture of the U.S. Army, as perceived by the study population and as indicated by the "Preferred" plot on the OCAI chart, will be representative of the adhocracy cultural type, which is the antithesis of the hierarchical cultural type, and is the direction in which the Army senior leaders believe that the Army profession must be moved to guarantee future success. See Figure 9 for an example of a "Preferred" plot on the OCAI chart. As discussed previously, adhocracy cultures are characterized by dynamic, entrepreneurial, creative, risk-taking, and innovative behavior that is dedicated to the long-term emphasis of acquiring new knowledge and practical skills (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). Hierarchical cultures are characterized as being formalized organizational structures, with an emphasis on formal rules and policies, and a long-term commitment to stability, and efficient smooth performance (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). It is anticipated that a "Preferred" plot in the adhocracy quadrant is significant for several reasons. First, it indicates that what the Army's senior leaders say they will do in a given situation is different than what they will actually do in practice (Argyris and Schon, 1974; Schein, 1985; CSIS, 2000; Watkins and Cohen, 2002). Second, a "Preferred" plot in the adhocracy quadrant would indicate that the study population of U.S. Army senior leaders perceives that the current culture of the U.S. Army is not consistent with the type of culture that is supportive of innovative, adaptive, dynamic, flex-


ible, or forward-looking behavior. This would indicate that the Army's culture is out of congruence with the national security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, which is characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (Magee and Somervell, 1998). Finally, if this hypothesis is not rejected, it implies that the potential for a successful cultural intervention is good because the espoused values of the study population of U.S. Army senior leaders are at least consistent with the cultural type most representative of a professional organization and that there is a level of consensus among those who will be responsible in the near future to facilitate that change. Consequently, a "Preferred" plot in the adhocracy quadrant demonstrates an appreciation for innovative behavior and a willingness on the part of the Army's future leaders to embark upon a cultural change effort that would be meaningless without senior leader commitment.

**Hypothesis 4: The individual professional skills of the U.S. Army senior level officer corps are not characterized by innovative, risk-taking, boundary spanning, demanding continuous improvement, reflective-in-action, dynamic, and adaptive behavior.**

Leader development is an essential component of organizational performance and organizational survival, especially for that of a professional organization (Argyris and Schon, 1974, Schon, 1983; Huntington, 1985; Abbott, 1988; CSIS, 2000; Snider and Watkins, 2002; Martin and McCausland, 2002; Snider, 2003a; Gordon and Sollinger, 2004). As indicated above, and for the purposes of this study, professional development is a process whereby the leaders of tomorrow are identified and prepared to be capable of perform-

ing duties at the highest levels of the organization as their career progresses.

The operationalization of the concept of professional development will be accomplished through the use of Cameron and Quinn’s MSAI as outlined in detail earlier in this study. The 12 critical managerial competencies for the study population of Army senior leaders, as identified by the MSAI, will be plotted on a chart similar to the OCAI, see Figure 10.



**Figure 10. Management Skills Profile Plotting Chart (Adapted from Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 207).**

Hypothesis 4 suggests that the resulting data as depicted by an MSAI plot will not reflect scores that are consistent with the three critical managerial competencies associated with the Adhocracy quadrant of the OCAI: Managing Innovation, Managing the Fu-

ture, and Managing Continuous Improvement (see Figure 10). If this hypothesis is not rejected, then this analysis provides empirical data suggesting that there is a positive correlation between the Army's existing culture and the type of professional skills that are produced by its professional development training program. It is expected that the respondent scores will be reflective of the three critical managerial competencies associated with the hierarchical cultural type: Managing Coordination, Managing the Control System, and Managing Acculturation, because it is also hypothesized that the hierarchical cultural type will be reflected by the OCAI as the dominant cultural type as identified by the study population.

*Additional Analysis.* Analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedures will be used to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the survey instrument response data. Specifically, an evaluation will be conducted to determine if there are any statistically significant differences between the branches of the Army profession (infantry, armor, artillery, etc.), between the three components of the Army profession (active duty, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve), and between key demographic information (sex, rank, age, source of commission, resident student, or distance education student, etc.). See the "Demographic Information" portion of the MSAI at Appendix B. This analysis will help to determine if there is a homogeneous professional Army culture.

An analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the demographic data provided by the respondents will provide some indication of the impact that sub-cultural influence may have on a homogeneous Army culture. For example, do infantry officers perceive the cultural type to be different than do medical corps officers? Do

women officers perceive the cultural type to be different than do male officers? From a practical perspective it is theorized that if a homogeneous culture does exist within the senior level officer corps, even if those values are not congruent with that of a professional organization, then the potential for a successful cultural intervention is favorable. If it is determined that the Army officer corps is comprised of numerous subcultures whose values and basic underlying assumptions are dramatically different from one another, a cultural intervention would be far more difficult. This difficulty would arise because of the necessity to diagnose the specifics of the underlying differences and to develop a change strategy that addresses each of these differences, as opposed to changing one relatively homogeneous culture. It is interesting to note that Gailbreath *et al.*, in their study using the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), concluded that "in the Army, as in some other organizations, forces toward homogeneity have created limited diversity in top management" (1997, p. 229). The negative aspect of behavioral homogeneity is that the behavioral flexibility of a profession's senior leaders is restricted and as a result organizational effectiveness suffers (Gailbreath *et al.*, 1997; Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1991). Consequently, if a homogeneous culture is desired, it is important to emphasize the development of a culture that has reflexive thinking as a core value and a basic underlying assumption. For the purposes of this study, it is hypothesized that the adhocracy cultural type, as identified by the OCAI, is a culture type that is supportive of continuous improvement and reflexive thinking and is most representative of professional organizations, to include the officer corps of the U.S. Army who represent the Army profession.

## FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

As indicated in the introduction and methodology sections of this monograph, four classes of U.S. Army War College<sup>6</sup>, Master of Strategic Studies degree program students were given an anonymous opportunity to complete the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) and the Management (Leadership) Skills Assessment Instrument (MSAI). The study population of U.S. Army officers in these four classes consisted of 952 students (N=952). From this study population, a total of 533 (n=533) survey instruments were returned for a response rate of 56 percent. There were no unusable survey responses returned. The demographics of the respondent population (n=533) are virtually identical to the study population (N=952). This finding is not surprising due to the relatively high response rate of 56 percent. For example, males comprise 93 percent of the study population and 87.8 percent of the respondent population. Infantry officers comprise 13.2 percent of the study population and 13.1 percent of the respondent population, and as a final example, Caucasian officers comprise 84.6 percent of the study population and 87.6 percent of the respondent population. Table 5 provides a detailed demographic summary of the parameters of the 952 students in the study population and the statistics of the 533 survey respondents. A close inspection of this data reveals that in all categories the respondent population is nearly identical to that of the study population.



<b>Demographics</b>	<b>Study Population</b>	<b>Percent of Study Population</b>	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Percent of Respondents</b>
<b>Sex</b>				
Male	885	93.0	468	87.8
Female	67	7.0	65	12.2
<b>Age</b>				
30 & Under	0	0.0	0	0.0
31-35	1	0.1	1	0.2
36-38	1	0.1	0	0.0
39-41	38	4.0	47	8.8
42-44	277	29.1	185	34.7
45-47	345	36.2	170	31.9
48-50	146	15.3	66	12.4
Over 50	143	15.0	64	12.0
<b>Rank</b>				
COL	403	42.3	196	36.8
LTC	549	57.7	337	63.2
<b>Branch</b>				
Air Defense	19	2.0	8	1.5
Adjutant General	31	3.3	17	3.2
Army Nurse	12	1.3	10	1.9
Armor	71	7.5	49	9.2
Aviation	70	7.4	32	6.0
Civil Affairs	35	3.7	18	3.4
Chaplain	28	2.9	15	2.8
Chemical	18	1.9	11	2.1
Dental	7	0.7	4	0.8
Engineers	84	8.8	53	9.9

**Table 5. Demographics of the Study and Respondent Populations.**

<b>Demographics Continued</b>	<b>Study Population</b>	<b>Percent of Study Population</b>	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Percent of Respondents</b>
<b>Branch Continued</b>				
Field Artillery	85	8.9	51	9.6
Finance	9	0.9	8	1.5
Infantry	126	13.2	70	13.1
Judge Advocate	28	2.9	10	1.9
Medical Corps	17	1.8	14	2.6
Military Intelligence	47	4.9	25	4.7
Military Police	25	2.6	13	2.4
Medical Services	17	1.8	12	2.3
Ordnance	35	3.7	20	3.8
Quartermaster	48	5.0	32	6.0
Signal	52	5.5	24	4.5
Special Forces	21	2.2	13	2.4
Transportation	44	4.6	21	3.9
Veterinary	8	0.8	3	0.6
Other	15	1.6	0	0.0
<b>Source of Commission</b>				
Military Academy	121	12.7	71	13.3
ROTC	536	56.3	310	58.2
OCS	136	14.3	97	18.2
Direct Commission	82	8.6	49	9.2
Other	77	8.1	6	1.1
<b>Ethnicity</b>				
Caucasian	805	84.6	467	87.6
African American	64	6.7	35	6.6
Latino	25	2.6	11	2.1
South Pacific Islander	No Data	No Data	3	0.6
Asian	10	1.5	7	1.3
Other	48	5.0	10	1.9

**Table 5. Continued.**

<b>Demographics Continued</b>	<b>Study Population</b>	<b>Percent of Study Population</b>	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Percent of Respondents</b>
<b>Component</b>				
Active Army	447	47.0	227	42.6
USAR	266	28.0	126	23.6
USAR Title 10	No Data	No Data	39	7.3
ARNG	239	25.1	105	19.7
ARNG Title 10 & 32	No Data	No Data	36	6.8
<b>USAWC Class</b>				
2003	474	49.8	235	44.1
2004	478	50.2	298	55.9
<b>Type of USAWC Student</b>				
Resident	428	45.0	204	38.3
Distance Education	524	55.0	329	61.7
<b>Level of Education</b>				
Bachelors	252	26.5	119	22.3
Masters	572	60.1	351	65.9
Doctorate	128	13.4	63	11.8

**Table 5. Continued.**

Since it is the intention of this monograph to generalize its findings to that of the larger study population, the representativeness of the respondents, as reflected by the demographic data provided above, is noteworthy. However, it is important to state at this time that the findings of this monograph are not intended to be representative of all U.S. Army lieutenant colonels and colonels. As indicated in the introduction and methodology sections, these lieutenant colonels and colonels were chosen as the study population because they were previously identified by competitive U.S. Army evaluation boards as having highly successful

command and leadership careers and as having the greatest potential for advancement. Consequently, they have already been distinguished as not being representative of all U.S. Army lieutenant colonels and colonels. Collectively, senior service college graduates, such as these cohorts from the U.S. Army War College represent the pool of officers from which the future strategic leaders, general officers, of the U.S. Army will be selected. By definition then, these 533 respondents can be considered representative of the future leaders of the U.S. Army. That is why their collective perceptions of the Army's professional culture and of their own managerial/leadership skills are of such significance to this study.

### **Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI): Findings and Analysis.**

*OCAI/MSAI Reliability Tests.* Data supporting the validity and reliability of the OCAI and MSAI survey instruments are well-established (Berrio, 2003). However, this study also conducted reliability tests using Cronbach's alpha, which is a satisfactory statistic to determine if the respondents of the study population of the Army's senior leaders rated the Army profession's culture consistently across all of the different questions used by the two survey instruments. The results of these tests demonstrate strong internal reliability and are very consistent with previous results. The reliability coefficients for the OCAI are summarized in Table 6 and in Table 7 for the MSAI.

Culture Type	Reliability Coefficients "Now"	Reliability Coefficients "Preferred"	Comparison Reliability Coefficients				
			*1	*2	*3	*4	*5
Clan	.77	.76	.74	.79	.82	.80	.77
Adhocracy	.68	.76	.79	.80	.83	.75	.72
Market	.74	.74	.71	.77	.78	.90	.84
Hierarchy	.69	.66	.73	.76	.67	.62	.79

\*1–Quinn and Spreitzer, 1991; \*2–Yeung *et al.*, 1991; \*3–Zammuto and Krakower, 1991; \*4–Berrio, 2003; \*5–Berrio, 2003.

**Table 6. OCAI Reliability Coefficients Using Cronbach’s Alpha Methodology.**

Culture Type	MSAI Reliability Coefficients for the 12 Competency Categories (See Table 3)											
	MT	MIR	MD	MI	MF	MCI	MC	EE	MCS	MA	MCS	MCo
Clan	.73	.72	.78									
Adhocracy				.79	.83	.79						
Market							.82	.73	.81			
Hierarchy										.73	.78	.76

**Table 7. MSAI Reliability Coefficients Using Cronbach’s Alpha Methodology.**

As indicated in Table 6, Cronbach's alpha was used to determine the reliability coefficients for both the OCAI "Now" and "Preferred" series of questions, and these reliability scores are listed for each cultural type in their respective column. Additionally, Table 6 also provides comparative reliability coefficients from five previous studies. The results of this study are very consistent with the previous data and provide strong support for Cameron and Quinn's (1999) assertion that the OCAI is a reliable instrument that measures culture types consistently.

Table 7 provides Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients for the 12 MSAI competency categories as reported in the Methodology section of this monograph. As a review, the three competency categories for the **Clan** culture type are: Managing Teams (MT), Managing Interpersonal Relationships (MIR), and Managing the Development of Others (MD). The three competency categories for the **Adhocracy** culture type are: Managing Innovation (MI), Managing the Future (MF), and Managing Continuous Improvement (MCI). The three competency categories for the **Market** culture type are: Managing Competitiveness (MC), Energizing Employees (EE), and Managing Customer Service (MCS). Finally, the three competency categories for the **Hierarchy** culture type are: Managing Acculturation (MA), Managing the Control System (MCS), and Managing Coordination (MCo). Just like the results for the OCAI, the MSAI reliability coefficients strongly support Cameron and Quinn's (1999) contention that the MSAI is a reliable instrument that measures the strength and weakness of managerial/leadership skills within the four predominant culture types consistently. In conclusion, we can reasonably assume

that the questions that comprise the OCAI and the MSAI are, to at least some strong degree, measuring what each purports to measure, that is, culture type and managerial and leadership skills respectively.

*Analysis of the Research Hypotheses.* The principal purpose for this study was to answer the following primary research question: **Is the organizational culture of the U.S. Army congruent with the professional development of its senior level officer corps?** In order to answer this question, four research hypotheses were empirically tested to determine the degree of congruence between the U.S. Army culture and the professional development of its senior leaders.


**Testing of Hypothesis 1:** Hypothesis 1 postulates that the current culture of the U.S. Army is not consistent with organizational cultures supportive of professional development. As discussed earlier, the existing literature strongly suggests that the “adhocracy” culture type is the culture type, as identified by the Competing Values Framework (CVF) (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983), that is representative of organizational cultures supportive of professional behavior, and that such professional behavior can be characterized as adaptive, innovative, flexible, dynamic, and entrepreneurial. Consequently, Hypothesis 1 assumes that when the OCAI data values for the current culture of the U.S. Army are plotted on an OCAI profile chart that the predominant culture type will not be plotted in the **Adhocracy** quadrant.

Figure 11 depicts the U.S. Army’s current (“Now”) organizational culture archetype, as identified by the 533 (n=533) respondents to this study, as clearly falling into the **Market** quadrant; the solid lines forming a diamond shape in the graph. The mean scores for each quadrant are: 37.95 for the **Market** quadrant, 28.84 for

the **Hierarchy** quadrant, 21.17 for the **Clan** quadrant, and 11.77 for the **Adhocracy** quadrant. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is not rejected because the current U.S. Army culture profile did not fall into the **Adhocracy** quadrant. This is a significant finding because organization's whose organizational culture can be characterized as "market" cultures are defined as being results-oriented, competitive, goal-oriented, tough and demanding, with an emphasis on winning. "The organizational style is hard-driving competitiveness (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 122)." During the initial analysis this finding was somewhat of a surprise. Based on the present researcher's 30 year career as an Army officer and as an Army civilian and extensive research with this subject matter the expectation was that the current U.S. Army culture would fall into the **Hierarchy** quadrant, which is the assumption of Hypothesis 2. Hierarchical cultures are characterized as being formalized and structured, with an emphasis on formal rules and policies that hold the organization together (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). Hierarchical leaders are proud of being efficient coordinators and organizers. It is no surprise to most organizational theorists that the military has been described as being the model of a rigid hierarchical organization (White, 1997). It is interesting to note that the second highest score given by the U.S. Army respondents for the U.S. Army's current culture was plotted in the **Hierarchy** quadrant, with the third highest score being plotted in the **Clan** quadrant and the lowest score in the **Adhocracy** quadrant. The magnitude of the ratings in the **Hierarchy** and **Market** quadrants is quite large and indicates the relative cultural strength. The "market" rating is nearly four times greater than the "adhocracy" rating and the "hierarchy" rating is nearly three



times greater than the “adhocracy” rating. What the data tell us is that the future senior leaders of the U.S. Army profession clearly perceive that the deep-seated underlying assumptions that comprise the Army culture are focused on organizational stability and control as opposed to innovation, flexibility, and long-term growth.



**Figure 11. OCAI Profile Chart for the "Now" U.S. Army Culture.**

An ANOVA procedure was conducted across all demographic categories to determine if there were any statistically significant differences in the mean scores of these various demographics. There were no

statistically significant differences ( $p \leq .05$ ) between respondent's rank, branch, source of commission, ethnicity, War College class, and type of War College student. There was a statistically significant finding ( $p \leq .05$ ) that females rated the current culture as lower in the **Clan** and **Adhocracy** quadrants and higher in the **Market** quadrant than did male officers. There was also a statistically significant finding ( $p \leq .05$ ) that officers over 50 years of age found the current culture as being less competitive than did younger officers. Additionally, there was a statistically significant finding ( $p \leq .05$ ) that active duty Army officers perceived the Army culture as being more competitive than did reserve component officers. Finally, there was a statistically significant finding ( $p \leq .05$ ) that Army officers with a doctoral degree perceived the Army culture as being more hierarchical than did other officers.

It is not surprising that those female U.S. Army officers who participated in this study do not find the current U.S. Army culture as friendly and as entrepreneurial as do their male counterparts. Females still experience some degree of gender discrimination in the U.S. Army, and in the military in general, as they do throughout society. Additionally, the U.S. military still prohibits women from entering into a number of military occupational specialties which involve direct ground combat, and which are perceived as being the technical core of the Army profession. Consequently, women perceive a greater level of competition with their male counterparts and they also believe that they must work harder than do their male counterparts to earn the same level of respect. These perceptions are consistent with the findings of the CSIS report on *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century* (2000).

The finding that officers over 50 years of age perceive the current culture as being less competitive than do younger officers is also not particularly surprising. Most of these officers are in the twilight of their military careers and are nearing the 30-year mandatory retirement limitation for active duty officers, and the mandatory retirement date for reserve officers. Consequently, it is assumed that they realize that there are few promotion opportunities ahead of them and that they have probably attained the highest rank that they will achieve.

It is postulated that the active duty officers perceive the Army culture as being more competitive because of the demanding “up or out” policy employed by all of the military services since 1947 (Crawley, 2004). Active duty Army officers are constantly competing with their peers for career enhancing schools, duty assignments such as being a unit commander, and secondary career specialties, all of which are normally required to be accomplished by specified time periods during which various cohorts of officers are considered for promotion. While the standards for promotion are essentially the same for reserve officers the time period constraint as exemplified by active duty promotion boards is not the same or as critical for reserve officers and therefore a reserve officer can be retained in their current rank for much longer periods of time between promotions. Additionally, reserve officers tend to be assigned to a specific unit, usually in the community for which they are a native, for many years as opposed to the months or year or two that active duty officers are assigned. Consequently, the underlying culture of competitiveness, as indicated by this study, is not as prevalent for reserve officers as it is for their active duty counterparts. It is interesting to note

that in 2004 the Department of Defense discussed a limited test for a new officer personnel management policy that would eliminate the “up or out” strategy and change it to a “perform or out” policy (Crawley, 2004). This proposal addressed the promotion time period issue and would allow military professionals to focus on their own individual performance instead of constantly jockeying and competing for the right duty assignment or school “that serve as promotion and command qualification gates rather than opportunities to complete significant developmental experiences based on articulated standards” (LeBoeuf, 2002, p. 495).

The final statistically significant difference indicated by the ANOVA procedures for Hypothesis 1, which indicated that Ph.D.s perceive the Army culture as being more hierarchical than did the remaining officers, is not surprising. Berrio (2003) reported that the prevailing culture of the Ohio State University Extension was a **Clan** type culture, and Paparone (2003) reported that the dominant culture of the research institute of military senior service college was an **Adhocracy** type culture. Both of these institutions are predominantly populated by Ph.D.s who value an emphasis on flexibility and discretion and who direct their energies toward the expansion of their esoteric professional knowledge base. Due to their extensive level of education and autonomous research capabilities and preferences, the formalized competitive structure of the U.S. Army is considered to be overly restrictive by the Army professionals with Ph.D.s. It is not surprising that they are more opposed to the bureaucratic desire for stability and control of hierarchical cultures than are the remainder of their officer peers (Paparone, 2003).

In summary, this study found that the dominant organizational culture type and strength, as indicated by the direction and magnitude of the various quadrant scores, of the U.S. Army profession is strongly supportive of stability and control. The Army professional culture can be characterized by an emphasis on hard-driving competitiveness situated in a very formalized and structured place of work.

**Testing of Hypothesis 2:** Hypothesis 2 is essentially an extension of Hypothesis 1. To some extent, the results have already been discussed in the review of the findings for Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 takes Hypothesis 1 one step further by postulating that the current dominant culture of the Army profession, as perceived by the 533 respondents (n=533) will fall into the **Hierarchy** quadrant. As indicated above, this hypothesis should be rejected, at least on a superficial level, since the score obtained for the **Hierarchy** quadrant was the second highest score and not the highest score. However, as indicated in the Competing Values Framework (CVF) (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983) organizations can possess competing cultural values at various times or in various sub-units of the organization. The ANOVA procedures outlined in the previous section indicate that there is a clear belief among all ten demographic categories of the Army senior leaders in this study that the dominant Army cultural type falls in the **Market** quadrant with the **Hierarchy** culture type coming in a strong second. The reason that this hypothesis should not be categorically dismissed even though the data do not directly support its premise is that both the “market” and the “hierarchy” cultural types fall below the “internal–external focus” axis which indicates that the Army profession is strongly supportive of stability and control and

can be characterized by an emphasis on hard-driving competitiveness and as a very formalized and structured place to work. The combined ipsative score for the **Market** and **Hierarchy** quadrants is 66.79, which is double the combined score of 32.94 for the **Clan** and **Adhocracy** quadrants. Consequently, the total OCAI results are highly informative in that they provide a strong indication that the characteristics of the Army professional culture are not supportive of professional behavior or long-term environmental adaptability, flexibility, and innovation (Freidson, 1970, 1986; Mosher, 1982; Burk, 2002; Martin and McCausland, 2002; Snider 2003, 2003a).

In summary, the results of the data provided in Hypothesis 2 support previous research (ATLDP, 2001; Snider and Watkins, 2002; Wong, 2002) which indicates that the current culture of the U.S. Army profession is out of balance with the future requirements of the Army profession. Additionally, the Army profession's cultural focus on stability and control are resulting in "[t]op-down training directives and strategies combined with brief leader development experiences for junior officers [which] leads to a perception that micromanagement is pervasive [and that] [p]ersonnel management requirements drive operational [duty] assignments at the expense of quality developmental experiences" (ATLDP, 2001, p. 193). This is unfortunate. A review of Figure 4 provides a graphic illustration that professional behavior rests upon two pillars: formal training and informal training. The latter is accomplished by providing officers with a career of worldwide operational assignments with ever-increasing levels of authority and responsibility. Informal training also includes individual self-development such as an officer earning an advanced de-

gree on his or her own time, and mentoring programs where senior officers give career guidance and counseling to junior officers. The cultural focus on stability and control fosters micromanagement because senior leaders believe that their career is directly dependent upon the success of their subordinates; therefore, these senior leaders take direct action that will not allow their subordinates to fail; they micromanage, which destroys, the “diagnosis-treatment-inference” cycle of professional behavior, which is a critical component of professional development of these junior professionals (Freidson, 1970, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Snider and Watkins, 2002).

Even though the OCAI plot for the current culture of the U.S. Army profession did not fall into the **Hierarchy** quadrant as predicted by Hypothesis 2, the resulting plot is highly informative and equally disappointing for the Army profession.

**Testing Hypothesis 3:** Hypothesis 3 tests the assumption that even if the current (“Now”) culture of the U.S. Army profession cannot be characterized as a culture type that is supportive of professional behavior, that the “Preferred” culture type of the U.S. Army profession, as identified by the survey respondents, can be identified as a type of culture that is supportive of professional behavior. As operationalized in this study, cultures that are supportive of professional behavior can be characterized as adaptive, flexible, innovative, and boundary-spanning, which the **Adhocracy** quadrant represents.

Figure 12 depicts the U.S. Army’s “Preferred” organizational culture archetype, as identified by the 533 (n=533) respondents to this study, as falling into the **Clan** quadrant; the dashed lines forming a diamond shape on the graph. The mean scores for each quadrant are: 28.97 for the **Clan** quadrant, 27.08 for



the **Market** quadrant, 24.55 for the **Adhocracy** quadrant, and 19.34 for the **Hierarchy** quadrant. Therefore, like Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3 should, on the surface, be rejected since the resulting OCAI plot did not fall dominantly into the **Adhocracy** quadrant. However, the results of this plot are as suggestive as are the results of Hypothesis 2. A close analysis of these results indicates a significant shift from the respondents' perception of the current ("Now") dominant culture of the U.S. Army profession and the culture that they would prefer ("Preferred") to see as the dominant culture.





Figure 12. OCAI Profile Chart for the "Preferred" U.S. Army Culture.



Figure 13 provides a graphic representation of both the “Now” and the “Preferred” plots (Figures 11 and 12) superimposed on one chart for ease of comparison.



**Figure 13. OCAI Profile Chart for the “Now” and “Preferred” U.S. Army Culture.**

Using a Paired Samples T-Test, the differences between each quadrant’s “Now” and “Preferred” scores were determined to be statistically significant ( $p \leq .01$ ). Perhaps more important than the statistically significant difference in the paired scores is the change in magnitude from a combined score that fell below the “internal-external focus” axis, as was identified in the

discussion of Hypothesis 2, to a composite score that falls above the “internal-external focus” axis. A review of the discussion of Hypothesis 2 reveals that the combined score for the **Hierarchy** and **Market** quadrants for the current “Now” Army culture was 66.79. However, the data for Hypothesis 3 demonstrates that the combined score for these **Hierarchy** and **Market** quadrants using the “Preferred” scores is 46.42, which is a 30 percent reduction in the respondents’ preferences for stability and control. By contrast, the combined scores for the **Clan** and **Adhocracy** quadrants increased from 32.94 for the “Now” plot to 53.52, a 62 percent increase, which suggests the respondents’ desire to be part of an organizational culture that can be characterized by flexibility and discretion—the hallmarks of professionalism. Additionally, the greatest change in individual quadrant scores occurred in the **Adhocracy** quadrant which saw a dramatic increase of 109 percent, followed by a 37 percent increase in the **Clan** quadrant score, a 33 percent decrease for the **Hierarchy** quadrant, and a 29 percent decrease for the **Market** quadrant. Therefore, to some extent, it would be difficult to outright reject Hypothesis 3 in light of these findings.

As outlined earlier in this study, these findings are significant for two reasons. First, the data provide empirical validation that the Army’s current culture is incongruent with its preferred culture; and, second, that there appear to be underlying cultural factors that are inhibiting the Army from either providing appropriate professional development programs or that these cultural factors are preventing the exercise of the professional skills being taught in current professional development programs. In either case, the resulting professional behavior of the Army profession’s future

leaders does not appear to be congruent with the type of professional development that should enable them to successfully lead the Army and to confront the ambiguities of its future external environment.

As was accomplished for Hypothesis 1, an ANOVA procedure was conducted across all demographic categories to determine if there were any statistically significant differences in the mean scores of these various demographic categories. There were no statistically significant differences ( $p \leq .05$ ) between respondent's sex, age, rank, source of commission, component, type of U.S. Army War College student, and level of education. There was a very interesting and statistically significant finding ( $p \leq .05$ ) that certain Army branch officers preferred the "adhocracy" culture type more so than did other officers. These branches included: Special Forces (Green Beret), Military Intelligence, Dental Corps, and Veterinary Corps. This finding is not surprising since each of these specialties traditionally operate with a significant degree of autonomy and flexibility. Consequently, it is understandable that these officers, who already operate in, and are comfortable with flexibility and discretion, would prefer that the entire organizational culture reflect these deep-seated basic underlying assumptions. There was also a statistically significant finding ( $p \leq .05$ ) that African-American officers had a higher preference for a "clan" culture than did all other officers. Once again, this finding is not particularly surprising. African-Americans still experience a significant amount of racial discrimination in the United States, although not as much in the Armed Forces (Segal and Bourg, 2002). Consequently, it is understandable that any minority group would prefer

to belong to an organization whose culture could be characterized as a “very friendly place to work where people share a lot of themselves. . . . The organization is held together by loyalty and tradition . . . [and] . . . The organization emphasizes the long-term benefit of human resources development and attaches great importance to cohesion and morale” (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 96). Finally, officers in the Class of 2003 reported a statistically significant finding ( $p \leq .05$ ) that they preferred an “adhocracy” culture more so than did the officers in the Class of 2004. However, the actual mean difference was only 1.38 points, and this research was unable to uncover any practical significance or cause for this difference. In either case, both classes preferred a statistically significant reduction in the “hierarchy” and “market” cultures and a statistically significant increase in the “clan” and “adhocracy” cultures. All of these preferences have practical significance as well, which are discussed in greater detail later in this monograph.


In summary, this monograph discovered that the “Preferred” dominant organizational culture type and strength of the U.S. Army profession is strongly supportive of flexibility and discretion and can be characterized by a concern for people and teamwork, as well as a strong interest in innovation, initiative, creativity, and a long-term emphasis on growth and the acquisition of new resources.

**Testing Hypothesis 4:** The final hypothesis of this study suggests that the individual professional skills of the U.S. Army senior level officer corps are not characterized by innovative, risk-taking, boundary spanning, demanding continuous improvement, reflective-in-action, dynamic, or adaptive behavior. Essentially, this implies that an MSAI plot of the 12

competency categories will not result in a dominant plot in the **Adhocracy** quadrant of the MSAI profile. The underlying assumption is that the current organizational culture of the U.S. Army profession inhibits formal and informal professional development programs and professional experiences from providing the educational opportunities that will foster professional growth, as well as innovative, flexible, and adaptive behaviors that will enhance future survival of the Army profession (ATLDP, 2001, Snider and Watkins, 2002). Instead of constantly challenging the current professional knowledge base and esoteric professional skills, Hypothesis 4 assumes that the current professional development program of the U.S. Army profession results in “homosocial reproduction” (Martin, 2002). Kanter (1977) indicates that homosocial reproduction is a process whereby those who are selected and prepared to become the future leaders of an organization tend to reflect the patterns of existing leaders, thereby fostering a perpetuation of existing values and culture as opposed to encouraging a culture that challenges the status quo.

Figure 14 depicts the U.S. Army senior level officer corps’ self evaluation of their management/leadership skills assessment, as identified by the 533 (n=533) respondents to this study, as predominantly falling into the **Clan** quadrant. Unlike the OCAI which had only one score for each quadrant, the MSAI is comprised of 12 competency categories with three categories in each quadrant. See Table 3 for a detailed review of the 12 MSAI competency categories. The mean scores for each quadrant are as follows. The three competency categories for the **Clan** culture type are: Managing Teams (MT) - 4.16, Managing Interpersonal Relationships (MIR) - 4.16, and Managing the Development

of Others (MD) - 4.16 for a composite quadrant score of 4.16. The three competency categories for the **Adhocracy** culture type are: Managing Innovation (MI) - 3.99; Managing the Future (MF) - 3.86; and Managing Continuous Improvement (MCI) - 4.01, for a composite quadrant score of 3.95. The three competency categories for the **Market** culture type are: Managing Competitiveness (MC) - 3.50, Energizing Employees (EE) - 3.94, and Managing Customer Service (MCS) - 3.78 for a composite quadrant score of 3.74. Finally, the three competency categories for the **Hierarchy** culture type are: Managing Acculturation (MA) - 3.98, Managing the Control System (MCS) - 3.69, and Managing Coordination (MCo) 3.83, for a composite quadrant score of 3.83. Therefore, like Hypotheses 2 and 3, Hypothesis 4 should, on the surface, be rejected since the resulting MSAI plot did not fall primarily into the **Adhocracy** quadrant. However, the results of this plot are as equally informative as the results of Hypotheses 2 and 3. A close analysis of these results indicates that the respondents perceive that their strongest skills are supportive of the "clan" type culture, with the second highest composite score being supportive of the "adhocracy" type culture, the third highest MSAI composite score being supportive of the "hierarchy" culture type and the lowest composite MSAI score being supportive of the "market" culture type. These scores, similar to the OCAI scores for Hypothesis 3, indicate that these officers perceive that their strongest skills fall above the "internal-external focus" axis which indicates their perceived skills can be characterized by flexibility and discretion which are the hallmarks of professionalism.



**Figure 14. MSAI Profile Chart for the U.S. Army Senior Level Officer Corps.**

Like Hypotheses 1 and 3, an analysis of variance procedure (ANOVA) was conducted across all demographic categories to determine if there were any statistically significant differences in the mean scores of these various demographic categories. There were no statistically significant differences ( $p \leq .05$ ) between respondents' rank, branch, component, and War College class. There was a statistically significant finding ( $p \leq .05$ ) that female officers rated themselves higher in all 12 MSAI competency categories than did the male officers. Since women are generally perceived as



having greater interpersonal skills than do men, this finding is not surprising for the six MSAI categories that are related to interpersonal skills. However, the higher scores in the remaining six MSAI categories could be a result of the greater level of competition that women experience as indicated earlier in the analysis of Hypothesis 1. Consequently, since women believe that they must work harder to gain the same level of respect, these scores may be a reflection of that perception. However, for the purposes of this study, this finding does not have much practical significance, since the overall trend for both men and women is consistent with the results indicated in Figure 14. There was also a statistically significant finding ( $p \leq .05$ ) that officers over the age of 50 rated themselves as having higher "adhocracy" skills than did younger officers. Since officers of this age tend to be near the end of their military careers and at the rank of colonel, it is very possible that they do exercise a greater degree of autonomy and a willingness to take risks. There was a statistically significant finding ( $p \leq .05$ ) that officers who received their commissions through "Officer Candidate School (OCS)" perceived themselves as having greater "clan" competencies than did other officers. This finding may be a result of the fact that these officers normally were enlisted soldiers prior to entering OCS and consequently they had prior leadership and interpersonal skills experience. Because of their prior enlisted experience, these officers tend to feel a well-deserved kinship with enlisted soldiers and a higher than average ability to relate to them on a personal and professional level. Therefore, this finding is not particularly surprising. There was also a statistically significant finding ( $p \leq .05$ ) that African-American officers rated themselves higher in the "clan" MSAI



competencies than did the other officers. Considering that the African-American officers demonstrated a statistically significant higher preference for the **Clan** quadrant than did other officers, it is not surprising that they perceive their own “clan” competencies as higher than average. Also, like the finding for women, this finding does not have much practical significance, since all officers rated their own personal managerial/ leadership skills higher in this quadrant than the other three quadrants. There was also an interesting and statistically significant finding ( $p \leq .05$ ) that officers in the Distance Education program rated their “clan” and “adhocracy” MSAI competencies higher than did the officers in the resident program. Since the majority of these officers are reserve component officers it could naturally be assumed that their civilian careers and training have a significant and concurrent effect on their managerial/leadership competencies. However, the data indicate that there were no statistically significant differences between reserve component and active duty officers. Consequently, it is possible that the officers selected for the resident program, which traditionally has more prestige, have been selected because their skills are more congruent with the current Army culture, which can be seen as a manifestation of the concept of homosocial reproduction (Martin, 2002). Finally, there was a statistically significant finding ( $p \leq .05$ ) that officers with a Ph.D. scored themselves lower in the “market” competencies than did the other officers. This finding is consistent with the previous findings that indicated that Ph.D.s had a higher preference for the **Adhocracy** quadrant. It is not surprising that officers with Ph.D.s perceive themselves as being more innovative, adaptive, and entrepreneurial and consequently less competitive, goal-oriented, and de-

manding as is typified by the “market” MSAI competencies.

It is interesting to note that the basic shape of the MSAI plot and the OCAI “Preferred” plot are very similar, especially with the “clan” culture type receiving the highest score in both survey instruments. It is highly probable that in their responses to Hypothesis 3 that the 533 Army respondents identified a “Preferred” organizational culture type that is more congruent with the type of managerial/leadership skills which they believe that they currently possess. It is also interesting to note that in both cases the “Preferred” culture and the MSAI managerial/leadership skills are diametrically opposite to the “market” culture type, which as you may recall was identified in Hypothesis 2 as the dominant Army professional culture type. The Competing Values Framework (CVF) indicates that the diagonal relationships between the four quadrants are negative (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983; Cameron and Quinn, 1999). This data provides strong support for the contention that the Army professional culture is “out of balance,” as indicated by the ATLDP (2001) and is not congruent with the professional skills necessary to support professional growth and survival (Freidson, 1970, 1986; Mosher, 1982; Abbott, 1988; Snider and Watkins, 2002).

### **Final Analysis.**

The principal purpose for this study was to answer the following primary research question: **Is the organizational culture of the U.S. Army congruent with the professional development of its senior level officer corps?** This monograph outlined four research hypotheses which were employed to provide empirical

data to help answer the primary research question. In light of the resulting data which has been enumerated and analyzed in this chapter there is strong support indicating that the U.S. Army professional culture is not congruent with the professional development of its senior level officer corps. Hypotheses 1 and 2 provided strong empirical data, a combined OCAI score of 66.79 for the **Market** and **Hierarchy** quadrants, indicating that the dominant organizational culture type and strength of the U.S. Army profession is highly reflective of stability and control and can be characterized by an emphasis on hard-driving competitiveness within a very formalized and structured place to work, as opposed to being distinguished by innovation, flexibility, and long-term growth, which are the characteristics that most clearly represent the hallmarks of professional cultures (Freidson, 1970, 1986; Argyris and Schon, 1974; Mosher, 1982; Schon, 1983; Abbott, 1988; Senge 1994, Middlehurst and Kennie, 1997; Magee and Somervell, 1998; FM 22-100, 1999, Martin and McCausland, 2002; Snider, 2003a).

Hypothesis 3 demonstrated that the future leaders of the Army profession strongly preferred an organizational culture which is dramatically different from the one that they believe currently exists in the Army profession. The OCAI data plot found that the "Preferred" dominant organizational culture type and strength of the U.S. Army profession is strongly supportive of flexibility and discretion and can be characterized by a concern for people and teamwork, as well as a strong interest in innovation, initiative, creativity, and a long-term emphasis on growth and the acquisition of new resources, as indicated by a dominant plot in the **Clan** quadrant. Additionally, it is important to note that the greatest change in individual quadrant

scores occurred in the **Adhocracy** quadrant which saw a dramatic increase of 109 percent, followed by a 37 percent increase in the **Clan** quadrant score, a 33 percent decrease for the **Hierarchy** quadrant, and a 29 percent decrease for the **Market** quadrant. Consequently, this study data indicates that the Army's current professional culture is incongruent with its preferred culture. The data indicate that there appears to be underlying cultural factors that are inhibiting the Army from either providing appropriate professional development programs, or that these cultural factors are preventing the exercise of the professional skills that are being taught in current professional development programs.

Hypothesis 4 provided empirical data that indicates that the respondents perceive that their strongest skills are supportive of the "clan" type culture, with the second highest composite score being supportive of the "adhocracy" type culture, the third highest MSAI composite score being supportive of the "hierarchy" culture type and the lowest composite MSAI score being supportive of the "market" culture type. These data provide strong support for the contention that the Army professional culture is "out of balance," as indicated by the ATLDP (2001) and is not congruent with the professional skills necessary to support professional growth and survival (Freidson, 1970, 1986; Mosher, 1982; Abbott, 1988; Snider and Watkins, 2002).

Finally, the study provided empirical data strongly suggesting that a homogeneous culture exists within the senior level officer corps of the U.S. Army. The various ANOVA procedures indicated that there were virtually no statistically significant differences between the 10 demographic categories employed by

this study that would change or modify the overall results obtained by this study. The few small differences that were observed supported the overall finding of the hypothesis but usually to a stronger degree. This finding has important considerations for the overall study because it indicates that the U.S. Army's professional development program, as conceptualized by this study, generates consistent values throughout the senior level officer corps. This finding is also important because it indicates that there is little if any sub-cultural influence on the larger homogeneous U.S. Army culture. As indicated earlier in this monograph, it was theorized that if a homogeneous culture does exist within the senior level officer corps, even if those values are not congruent with that of a professional organization, then the potential for a successful cultural intervention is favorable. This implies, as suggested from the functionalist perspective, that the U.S. Army's culture is an attribute of the organization and can be modified, although not easily (Sathe, 1983). Consequently, the data suggest that to some extent the professional development program is instilling moderately professional values and skills as indicated by the "Preferred" OCAI organizational culture plot in the **Clan** quadrant and the MSAI managerial/leadership skills plot also in the **Clan** quadrant. The question that should be raised at this point and will be discussed in the final section of this monograph is why do these senior level Army professionals perceive the current Army professional culture to be primarily in the **Market** quadrant and secondarily in the **Hierarchy** quadrant, which are essentially the antitheses of the **Clan** and **Adhocracy** quadrants?

## IMPLICATIONS

### Overview.

This research strongly suggests that there is a lack of congruence between the U.S. Army professional culture and the professional development programs of the Army's senior level leaders. This conclusion is based on the empirical data provided in the **Findings and Analysis** section that indicate that the future leaders of the Army profession believe that they operate on a day-to-day basis in a profession whose culture is characterized by an overarching desire for stability, control, formal rules and policies, coordination and efficiency, goal and results oriented, and hard-driving competitiveness. However, the respondents of this study also indicated that the Army's professional culture should be one that emphasizes flexibility, discretion, participation, human resource development, innovation, creativity, risk-taking, and a long-term emphasis on professional growth and the acquisition of new professional knowledge and skills. These characteristics have been identified in the **Brief Discussion of the Concepts of Organizational Culture and Professionalism** section of this monograph as being representative of professional cultures (Argyris and Schon, 1974; Kline, 1981; Freidson, 1970, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Schon, 1983; Senge, 1994; Davis *et al.*, 1997; FM 22-100, 1999; Snider and Watkins, 2002; Papparone, 2003). The purpose of this section is to discuss the implications of these research findings.

## **Implications for the Army Profession.**

As discussed in the **Introduction** section of this monograph, it is theorized that organizational culture, those taken-for-granted, deep basic underlying assumptions within an organization (Schein, 1992), unconsciously influences the formulation of the training and professional development that future organizational leaders are given to enable them to promote organizational interests well into the future. You may recall that it was proposed that the investigation of this relationship would have significant analytical potential. For example, if the survival of a profession is based upon its ability to readily and continuously adapt to a changing external environment (Mosher, 1982; Freidson, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Senge, 1994; Martin and McCausland, 2002; Snider, 2003, 2003a; Gordon and Sollinger 2004), can an organization's culture inherently prevent it from successful professional survival because of the way it educates its future leaders? Does the unconscious pattern of ambiguity reduction, "the way we do things around here" (Bower, 1966; Deal and Kennedy, 1982, p. 4), create a pattern of homosocial reproduction (Kanter, 1977)? The data provided by this study strongly support the assertion that organizational culture can inhibit the professional development of the profession's future leaders by influencing the professional development program, particularly the formal and informal training aspects of professional development program.

The study data powerfully indicate that there is a lack of congruence between the current culture (as indicated by the "Now" OCAI plot) of the Army profession and the type of culture which the future senior Army leaders would prefer to see in place (as indicat-

ed by the "Preferred" OCAI plot). In addition, there is a lack of congruence between the current Army professional culture and the individual professional skills of those future Army leaders (as indicated by the MSAI plots). What the lack of congruence suggests is that there may be a paradoxical relationship between the managerial/leadership skills that are taught in the formal training programs<sup>7</sup> (such as senior service war colleges) and those informal professional development aspects of the program such as personnel policies and the Officer Evaluation System, retirement programs, and the "up or out" policy. In other words, the managerial/leadership theory taught in the formal professional education process can be considered to be analogous to the "espoused values" of the Army profession, while the informal professional development program, which includes operational assignments and personnel policies, reflects the operant or "theories-in-use" of the Army profession (Argyris and Schon, 1974). A review of the definition of "espoused values" indicates that organizations publicly give allegiance to these values and attempt to communicate them to their members, external stakeholders, and frequently to the general public. Espoused values are often evident in organizational strategies, goals, philosophies, training programs, and published organizational value statements. However, espoused values may not be based on prior cultural learning. Therefore, they may be incongruent with the organization's actual "theories-in-use" (Argyris and Schon, 1974). Theories-in-use is defined as those values that actually govern behavior. It is theorized that a lack of congruence between espoused values and theories-in-use can inhibit individual commitment and subsequently impair organizational performance (Argyris



and Schon, 1974; Schon, 1983; Schein, 1992). What these findings imply is that those in the Army profession are reasonably aware of the type of professional managerial/leadership skills that should be imparted to new generations of senior leaders of the professional officer corps as reflected by the "Preferred" OCAI organizational culture plot, and the MSAI plots in the **Clan** and **Adhocracy** quadrants. However, the current Army professional culture, "the way we do things around here" (Bower, 1966; Deal and Kennedy, 1982, p. 4), demonstrates that deep underlying assumptions result in behavior that is diametrically opposite to that which is espoused in the Army profession's formal professional development process. Other research supports this finding by indicating that the Army profession more reflexively rewards stability and control and encourages excessively structured supervision by severely punishing innovation and risk-taking that results in failure (ATLDP, 2001; LeBoeuf, 2002; Wong, 2002). Wong supports this assessment by stating that the "current situation of over-control reflects the [Army's] culture. . . . The Army now has a culture where the obsession with minimizing risk and uncertainty has pervaded not just the leadership, but also the way the entire institution thinks and works" (2002, p. 28). LeBoeuf concurs by stating that

the ATLDP [2001] assessed Army culture as "out of balance" and failing to provide the conditions necessary to preserve the Army's professional standing. . . . In other words, the professed principles of officers do not always coincide with their actual practices. Army culture must reflect a set of conditions that embody a mutually supportive and trustworthy relationship between individual professionals within the organization and the Army as a profession (2002, p. 491).

Numerous other studies have also indicated that the Army profession's emphasis on stability and control is contrary to the long-term survival of the Army profession (Builder, 1989; Scroggs, 1996; ATLDP, 2001; Snider and Watkins, 2002; Wong, 2002; Snider, 2009; Wardynski *et al.*, 2010a; Moten, 2010). Schein states that organizational leaders must learn "how to enhance elements of the culture that are congruent with new environmental realities while changing dysfunctional elements of the culture" (1999, p. 144). The empirical data provided by this study indicate that the leadership of the Army profession should seriously consider embarking upon an organizational culture change effort as described by Bolman and Deal (1991); Cameron and Quinn (1999); Schein (1999); and Watkins and Snider (2002).

The data also demonstrate that there is a relatively homogeneous Army culture. Despite the diversity of the respondents, the data suggest that these Army senior level professionals have been acculturated in such a manner as to view the Army profession in a fairly consistent way. To reiterate this point, Jans and Schmidtchen (2002) emphasize that a formalized program of professional development produces both desirable and undesirable outcomes. For example, the research data from the "Preferred" OCAI and MSAI plots suggests that the Army's professional development program reinforces the Army's culture of professionalism and community, both of which are desirable. However, portions of the professional development program also strengthen the aspects of the organization's culture that encourage hierarchy, conservatism, and an emphasis on rules and structure, which are inimical to professionalism. Consequently, the current lack of congruence between the Army professional

culture and the professional development program indicates that this obvious example of homosocial reproduction (Kanter, 1977) is detrimental to the long-term survival of the Army profession. There is, however, a silver lining to this apparent cloud. Since the current professional development process is capable of producing such strong uniformity in the behavior and values of the Army profession's future leaders, it is postulated that changes to the professional development process, such as the experimental "produce or out" career system discussed earlier (Crawley, 2004), or a personnel realignment toward a true lifelong profession, have the potential to produce a beneficial uniformity among future Army professionals. For example, the "produce or out" system may very well encourage initiative and innovation by rewarding risk-taking instead of punishing it.

In conclusion, the research data provide empirical support to the findings of the ATLDP (2001), which suggests that the training and leader development programs of the Army profession are not adequately linked and integrated within the Army culture (LeBoeuf, 2002). The future strategic environment which confronts the Army profession can be characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty. The brief discussion of the concepts of organizational culture and professionalism have demonstrated that professional organizations whose organizational culture can be characterized as emphasizing flexibility, discretion, and innovation have the greatest potential to operate within ambiguous and uncertain environments. The research data strongly suggest that the Army's culture is preventing the individual exercise of the excellent professional skills that are being taught in the Army's formalized professional development program. Con-

sequently, as suggested by Schein, “[o]rganizational cultures are created in part by leaders, and one of the most decisive functions of leadership is the creation, management, and sometimes even the destruction of culture” (1992, p. 5). If the Army profession expects to maintain its social legitimacy and professional jurisdiction, which are focused on the development and application of the esoteric knowledge and related practical professional skills of land warfare (Snider, 2003a), then the Army profession must take steps to bring its professional culture and particularly the informal professional development program into congruency and pointed in the direction that favors flexibility, discretion, and innovation.

Until now, the relationship between organizational culture and professional development has been more assumed and theorized than validated. The data provided by this study begin to fill that empirical gap and provide strong evidence that a lack of congruence between the two can create long-term detrimental impacts on organizational performance, resulting in a lack of commitment from organizational members (Schein, 1999).

These methods strongly support the belief that organizational culture can be perceived as an attribute of the organization, which can be empirically identified, measured, evaluated, and changed, and is manifested in organizational behaviors (Ouchi, 1981; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Schein, 1985; Cameron and Ettington, 1988; Trice and Beyer, 1993; Schneider, 1994; Cameron and Quinn, 1999; Martin, 2002). To emphasize this point, it was recommended above that the leaders of the Army profession initiate an organizational culture change effort to eliminate the lack of perceived congruence between the Army’s professional culture

and its professional development program. However, within this perspective, the data appear to support the contention that organizational culture may actually be a much more complex construct, one that is more reflective of the concept of interdependence than that of simply a dependent or an independent variable. For example, Weick (1979) states that in an “interdependent relationship,” the designation of one event as a “cause” and another event as an “effect” is the result of an arbitrary and incomplete analysis. Instead, Weick (1979) indicates that in an interdependent relationship, events routinely cycle back and forth, being a cause at one time and an effect at another. In other words, one event may influence others, but is then in turn influenced by the resultant action of those other events. In the case of the Army profession’s culture, the more informal aspects of the professional development program, such as the less than lifelong commitment to the Army profession, the “up or out” personnel policy, and the officer evaluation system which may be creating an underlying value and deep assumption that failure will not be tolerated regardless of the circumstances are representative of theories-in-use that are incongruent with the concept of professionalism. Consequently, senior leaders may be exercising an excessive degree of structured supervision which reinforces the culture of stability and control despite the formal education system which attempts to teach the opposite. Therefore, it is not surprising that junior professionals learn to distrust their senior leaders and to then subsequently perpetuate the cycle of over-control (Wong, 2002), or depart the profession altogether (Wardynski *et al.*, 2010a).

The use of the OCAI and MSAI analytical instruments in combination with an informed organizational insider<sup>8</sup> appear to provide an adequate comprise

between a long-term qualitative ethnographic study and a short-term quantitative analysis. Cameron and Quinn summarize the importance of conducting organizational culture analysis by stating that:

The need to diagnose and manage organizational culture is growing in importance partly because of an increasing need to merge and mold different organizations' cultures as structural changes have occurred (for instance, when units are consolidated, when downsizing and outsourcing eliminate parts of the organization, or when entire organizations merge). The escalating importance of culture is also partly a result of the increasing turbulence, complexity, and unpredictability faced by organizations in their external environments (1999, p. 131).

Echoing the remarks of Cameron and Quinn above, this study has demonstrated the practical significance of an organizational culture analysis for the Army profession. Not only is the Army profession's survival as a profession of particular importance, but its ability to maintain its superiority over the esoteric knowledge of land warfare is an absolutely crucial social responsibility for the preservation of the American way of life.

In summary, this study supports the premise that organizational culture is a complex construct that is more than just a variable and more than just a "thick description" of organizational behavior. Additionally, the study also supports the assertion that a strong cultural analysis can be accomplished through the use of a highly valid and reliable assessment instrument such as the OCAI and MSAI survey instruments. However, an even richer and deeper analysis can be achieved through the use of qualitative methods such as an informed insider.

It is important to note that this research project has not taken a longitudinal perspective. That is, repeatedly administering the survey instruments over a number of years to develop trend data and to determine if the deep-seated underlying assumptions that comprise culture are enduring. However, several related studies that were completed previously have been reviewed, and they do provide some support for the contention that there is a homogeneous Army culture. Additionally, these other studies also provide a slight degree of “triangulation” of the resulting research data and were highlighted in the Findings and Analysis section. Therefore, a future research opportunity may be directed toward a more traditional long-term ethnographic analysis supported by the quantitative tools used by this study. It is postulated that such an analysis may be able to provide more than just a snapshot of where the organization currently is and where it may want to go. Instead, such an analysis may be able to more adequately explain some of the highly subjective ideational aspects of “the way we do things around here” (Bower, 1966; Triandis, 1972; Deal and Kennedy, 1982, p. 4). Such an analysis may be able to support the symbolic constructs of the semiotic perspective which encourages different ways of thinking and subsequently influencing different aspects of organizational phenomena (Tsoukas, 1991). Srivastva and Barrett support this perspective by stating that:

The process of giving language to experience is more than just sense-making. Naming also directs actions toward the object you have named because it promotes activity consistent with the related attribution it carries. To change the name of an object connotes changing your relationship to the object and how one will behave in relationship to it because when we name

something, we direct anticipations, expectations, and evaluations towards it (1988, pp. 34-35).

Additionally, it would be beneficial for such a long-term analysis to track the actual organizational culture change efforts, for example, if the Army profession was able to transition its culture from predominantly a **Market** culture to an **Adhocracy** culture, would there be a resulting increase in organizational performance and effectiveness?

In conclusion, “[s]tudies of organizational culture share a common goal: to uncover and interpret aspects of organizational life so that we can better understand the perceptions, beliefs, and actions of organizational members” (Martin *et al.*, 1997, p. 3). An organization’s culture enables its members to work through the basic problems of survival in and adaptation to the external environment as well as to develop and maintain internal processes that perpetuate adaptability and promote the organization’s continued existence (Parsons, 1951; Merton, 1957; Schein, 1985, Martin, 2002). Schein emphasizes that the study of organizational culture is important because organizational culture is the property of a group and that:

. . . it is a powerful, latent, and often unconscious set of forces that determine both our individual and collective behavior, ways of perceiving, thought patterns, and values. Organizational culture in particular matters because cultural elements determine strategy, goals, and modes of operating. The values and thought patterns of leaders and senior managers are partially determined by their own cultural backgrounds and their shared experience. If we want to make organizations more efficient and effective, then we must understand the role that culture plays in organizational life (1999, p. 14).



Consequently, one of the principal reasons for the popular interest in the study of organizational culture is to determine the linkage between it and organizational performance (Berrio, 2003). This study has reviewed a previously assumed but unverified connection between organizational culture and professional development. It has uncovered a lack of congruence between the dominant type of organizational culture of the U.S. Army and the professional managerial/leadership skills of its senior level leaders. This observed lack of congruence may be inhibiting performance and unconsciously perpetuating a cycle of caution and an over reliance on stability and control. The data indicates that the U.S. Army is illustrative of an organization that emphasizes stability and control and that attempts to comprehend the ambiguity of the future through an unconscious reliance upon the successful solutions employed in the past.

## ENDNOTES

1. Cameron and Quinn (1999) state that "cultural congruence means that various aspects of an organization's culture are aligned. That is, the same culture types are emphasized in various parts of the organization. For example, in a congruent culture the strategy, leadership style, reward system, approach to managing employees, and dominant characteristics, all tend to emphasize the same set of cultural values (1999, p. 64)." This study employs the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) to diagnose the U.S. Army's culture as identified by selected U.S. Army senior leaders. Then, the study evaluates the level of congruence between the identified U.S. Army cultural types to the managerial/leadership competencies of these selected senior leaders as identified through the use of the Managerial Skills Assessment Instrument (MSAI). The ostensible objective is to determine if professional development programs support or inhibit the promotion of senior leadership skills which will sustain future

professional growth, and survival. This is important because as Cameron and Quinn emphasize, cultural incongruence leads to differences in perspectives, goals, and strategies which drain organizational energy and prevent the organization from operating at the highest level of effectiveness (1999, pp. 64-65).

2. Senior leader skills which are characteristic of professional organizations include the following types of behavior: innovative, risk-taking, boundary spanning, adaptive, and reflective-in-action. What these concepts mean is that individual professionals must be trained to challenge the status quo. They must question previous success and the procedures that fostered that success. Professionals must be willing to constantly strive to find new answers to old questions and new questions that have yet to be asked. They must seek constant improvement and the expansion of their professional knowledge base. They must be willing to stick their necks out and take risks for the betterment of society and their profession. They must be willing to experiment and they must be willing to accept failure and to learn from failure. Finally, professionals must be willing to span boundaries, that is, they must be willing to go beyond their own organizational and professional boundaries in the search of new knowledge, techniques and procedures, that can be imported into their professional knowledge base, and used in their own practical professional skills, as well as to potentially identify new areas for professional growth (Argyris and Schon, 1974; Aldrich and Herker, 1977; Weick, 1979; Mosher, 1982; Schon, 1983; Freidman, 1986; Senge, 1994; Cameron and Quinn, 1999; Wong, 2002; Snider, 2003a; Gordon and Sollinger, 2004).

3. "Social Construction of Reality" theory implies that "there is no reality apart from social meanings, but that we can know reality only by categorizing it, naming it, and giving it meaning. . . . Categories are human mental constructs in a world that has only continua" (Stone, 1988, p. 307). In other words, the intellectual boundaries that we employ to circumscribe experiences and social knowledge help us to comprehend the meaning of these experiences and to provide order to what would otherwise be a chaotic existence. Therefore, reality is a socially constructed phenomena that is the product of human activity (Berger and Luckmann, 1966).

4. Mosher states that “the professions are social mechanisms, whereby knowledge, particularly new knowledge, is translated into action and service. They provide the means whereby intellectual achievement becomes operational (1982, p. 112).” In describing professional work, Abbott states that the “tasks of professions are human problems amenable to expert service. They may be problems for individuals, like sickness and salvation, or for groups, like fundraising and auditing. They may be disturbing problems to be cured, like vandalism or neurosis, or they may be creative problems to be solved, like a building design or a legislative program. The degree of resort to experts varies from problem to problem, from society to society, and from time to time (1988, p. 35).” Schon indicates that professional knowledge, and therefore individual professionals and professional organizations, must continuously expand their knowledge and practitioner base because of the “changing character of the situations of practice—the complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflicts which are increasingly perceived as central to the world of professional practice (1983, p. 14).” Consequently, professional organizations must be characterized by reflective, innovative, flexible, and risk-taking thinking and behavior.” In contrast to normal bureaucratic emphasis on uniform procedures, objective measures of performance, and center/periphery systems of control, a reflective institution must place a high priority on flexible procedures, differentiated response, qualitative appreciation of complex processes, and decentralized responsibility for judgment and action (Schon, 1983, p. 338). Argyris and Schon indicate that “professional practice requires practitioners to have the special competences related to diagnosis, to the generation and testing of solutions, and to the experience of personal causality in implementing solutions (1974, p. 172).” In summary, these authors indicate that professional organizations are characterized by dynamic, innovative, entrepreneurial, creative, and risk-taking behavior. This perspective of professional organizations is incorporated throughout this study.

5. Janusian thinking derives its name from the Roman god Janus who was described as being able to look in opposite directions at the same time. In his study on creativity, Rothenberg (1979) found that the ability to embrace paradox, which is the simultaneous existence of contradictory but interrelated concepts, is what leads to the significant advances in art and science. Fur-

ther emphasizing the importance of this concept for organizational transformation, Quinn and McGrath state that

“Einstein’s observation that a falling object could be simultaneously moving and at rest is a Janusian idea. In sum, Janusian thinking offers the resolution of psychological contradiction in such a way that the resolution generates great productive energy. In the mind, new theories and insights emerge. In organizations, a new culture evolves in which leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality” (1985, pp. 316-317).

6. The mission of the U.S. Army War College is to “prepare selected military, civilian, and international leaders for the responsibilities of strategic leadership; educate current and future leaders on the development and employment of landpower in a joint, multinational and interagency environment; conduct research and publish on national security and military strategy; and engage in activities in support of the Army’s strategic communication efforts” (U.S. Army War College Home Page, 2004, available from *www.carlisle.army.mil*).

7. It is interesting to note that during the research for this study, the author conducted a content review of the professional leadership literature promulgated by the U.S. Army in a wide variety of Army Regulations, Field Manuals, textbooks, supplemental readings, and monographs, and found this literature to be comprised of some of the finest leadership and organizational theory available today.

8. The “insider” vs “outsider” cultural research distinction is based on the perspective in which the researcher obtains the relevant data upon which to base his research findings. For example, Martin states that outsider

“cultural research includes any study, quantitative or qualitative, in which the conceptual categories are imposed by the researcher rather than initiated by the cultural member who is being studied. The key, for an etic [outsider] study, is to explain cogently why these particular concepts and operationalizations were chosen, usually with reference to both reliability and validity. . . . Usually, in etic [outsider]

research, categories are deduced from prior theory and research, not from material gathered from a study (2002, p. 36)."

The present study primarily uses the outsider approach, that is, the research questions have been developed prior to the beginning of the study. However, the development of the research questions was based on the author's "insider" experience as a career U.S. Army professional.

The "insider" perspective is adopted from social anthropologists who argued that cultural researchers must endeavor to observe and understand cultural behavior as if the researcher was a member of the culture being observed. In other words, the cultural researcher must attempt "to grasp the native's point of view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of the world (Malinowski, 1961, p. 25)." Schein states that the "most efficient and possibly valid way to decipher cultural assumptions is for an outsider to work directly with a group of motivated insiders on a model of artifacts, values, and assumptions. This works best when the group has some purpose for conducting the cultural analysis and when there are no special communication barriers in the group that would prevent a free flow of communication. . . . *The main purpose of the resulting cultural description is to provide insight to the organization so that it can figure out how different cultural assumptions aid or hinder what members are trying to do* (1992, p. 168, emphasis added)."

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## APPENDIX A

### ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT (OCAI)\*

In this survey, “the organization” means “**THE U.S. ARMY,**” not subordinate organizations or branches in the U.S. Army such as a battalion, brigade, division, or infantry or armor branch, etc. Rate each of the statements by dividing 100 points between A, B, C, and D depending on how similar the description is to “**THE U.S. ARMY**” (100 is very similar and 0 is not at all similar to “**THE U.S. ARMY**”). **The total points for each question must equal 100.** Repeat this for how you feel “**THE ARMY**” is now (**NOW**) and how you think it should be (**PREFERRED**).

For example, in question 1, assume that you gave 75 points to A, 10 points to B, 15 points to C, and 0 points to D. Your responses would be written as indicated in the following sample response. This would indicate that the organization is predominantly a personal place and not at all a controlled and structured place. If you gave 25 points to each one, it would mean that each of the characteristics are exactly equal. Once you have completed the “**NOW**” column indicating how things are done in “**THE U.S. ARMY**” now, complete the “**PREFERRED**” column for how you believe things should be done in “**THE U.S. ARMY.**” You may use only four numbers that total to 100. **Please note: Fill in a number in each column even if that number is 0.** Thank you!

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# SAMPLE RESPONSE

## 1. DOMINANT CHARACTERISTICS

	NOW	PREFERRED
A. The organization is a very personal place. It is like an extended family. People seem to share a lot of themselves.	A <u>75</u>	A <u>25</u>
B. The organization is a very dynamic and entrepreneurial place. People are willing to stick their necks out and take risks.	B <u>10</u>	B <u>45</u>
C. The organization is very results oriented. A major concern is with getting the job done. People are very competitive and achievement oriented.	C <u>15</u>	C <u>25</u>
D. The organization is a very controlled and structured place. Formal procedures generally govern what people do.	D <u>0</u>	D <u>5</u>
Total	100	100

## 1. DOMINANT CHARACTERISTICS

	NOW	PREFERRED
A. The organization is a very <b>personal place</b> . It is like an extended family. People seem to share a lot of themselves.	A ____	A ____
B. The organization is a very <b>dynamic and entrepreneurial</b> place. People are willing to stick their necks out and take risks.	B ____	B ____
C. The organization is very <b>results oriented</b> . A major concern is with getting the job done. People are very competitive and achievement oriented.	C ____	C ____
D. The organization is a very <b>controlled and structured</b> place. Formal procedures generally govern what people do.	D ____	D ____
Total	100	100

## 2. ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP

	NOW	PREFERRED
A. The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify <b>mentoring, facilitating, or nurturing.</b>	A ____	A ____
B. The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify <b>entrepreneurship, innovating, or risk taking.</b>	B ____	B ____
C. The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify a <b>no-nonsense, aggressive, results-oriented focus.</b>	C ____	C ____
D. The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify <b>coordinating, organizing, or smooth-running efficiency.</b>	D ____	D ____
Total	100	100

## 3. MANAGEMENT OF EMPLOYEES

	NOW	PREFERRED
A. The management style in the organization is characterized by <b>teamwork, consensus, and participation.</b>	A ____	A ____
B. The management style in the organization is characterized by <b>individual risk-taking, innovation, freedom, and uniqueness.</b>	B ____	B ____
C. The management style in the organization is characterized by <b>hard-driving competitiveness, high demands, and achievement.</b>	C ____	C ____
D. The management style in the organization is characterized by <b>security of employment, conformity, predictability, and stability in relationships.</b>	D ____	D ____
Total	100	100

**4. ORGANIZATIONAL GLUE**

	<b>NOW</b>	<b>PREFERRED</b>
A. The glue that holds the organization together is <b>loyalty</b> and <b>mutual trust</b> . Commitment to this organization runs high.	A ____	A ____
B. The glue that holds the organization together is commitment to <b>innovation</b> and <b>development</b> . There is an emphasis on being on the cutting edge.	B ____	B ____
C. The glue that holds the organization together is the emphasis on <b>achievement</b> and <b>goal accomplishment</b> . Aggressiveness and winning are common themes.	C ____	C ____
D. The glue that holds the organization together is formal <b>rules</b> and <b>policies</b> . Maintaining a smooth-running organization is important.	D ____	D ____
Total	100	100

**5. STRATEGIC EMPHASES**

	<b>NOW</b>	<b>PREFERRED</b>
A. The organization emphasizes <b>human development</b> . High trust, openness, and participation persist.	A ____	A ____
B. The organization emphasizes <b>acquiring new resources</b> and <b>creating new challenges</b> . Trying new things and prospecting for opportunities are valued.	B ____	B ____
C. The organization emphasizes <b>competitive actions</b> and <b>achievement</b> . Hitting stretch targets and winning in the marketplace are dominant.	C ____	C ____
D. The organization emphasizes <b>permanence</b> and <b>stability</b> . Efficiency, control and smooth operations are important.	D ____	D ____
Total	100	100

**6. CRITERIA OF SUCCESS**

	<b>NOW</b>	<b>PREFERRED</b>
A. The organization defines success on the basis of the <b>development of human resources, teamwork, employee employee commitment, and concern for people.</b>	A ____	A ____
B. The organization defines success on the basis of having the most unique or the <b>newest products.</b> It is a <b>product leader</b> and <b>innovator.</b>	B ____	B ____
C. The organization defines success on the basis of <b>winning in the marketplace</b> and <b>outpacing the competition.</b> <b>Competitive market leadership</b> is key.	C ____	C ____
D. The organization defines success on the basis of efficiency. <b>Dependable delivery, smooth scheduling, and low cost production</b> are critical.	D ____	D ____
Total	100	100

**You have completed the OCAI, please continue with  
the Management Skills Assessment  
Instrument (MSAI)**

## APPENDIX B

### MANAGEMENT (LEADERSHIP) SKILLS ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT (MSAI) SELF-RATING FORM\*

Describe **your** behavior as a **manager/leader**. Respond to the items as you actually behave most of the time, **not as you would like to behave**. If you are unsure of an answer, make your best guess. Please circle your response in the following columns as appropriate. The following scale is used for your ratings:

- 5 - Strongly Agree
- 4 - Moderately Agree
- 3 - Slightly Agree **and/or** Slightly Disagree
- 2 - Moderately Disagree
- 1 - Strongly Disagree

For Example:

1. I communicate in a supportive way when people in my unit share their problems with me.      5    4    **3**    2    1

	Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree/Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. I communicate in a supportive way when people in my unit share their problems with me.	5	4	3	2	1
2. I encourage others in my unit to generate new ideas and methods.	5	4	3	2	1
3. I motivate and energize others to do a better job.	5	4	3	2	1
4. I keep close track of how my unit is performing.	5	4	3	2	1
5. I regularly coach subordinates to improve their management skills so they can achieve higher levels of performance.	5	4	3	2	1
6. I insist on intense hard work and high productivity from my subordinates.	5	4	3	2	1

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	Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree/Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
7. I establish ambitious goals that challenge subordinates to achieve performance levels above the standard.	5	4	3	2	1
8. I generate, or help others obtain, the resources necessary to implement their innovative ideas.	5	4	3	2	1
9. When someone comes up with a new idea, I help sponsor them to follow through on it.	5	4	3	2	1
10. I make certain that all employees are clear about our policies, values, and objectives.	5	4	3	2	1
11. I make certain that others have a clear picture of how their job fits with others in the organization.	5	4	3	2	1
12. I build cohesive, committed teams of people.	5	4	3	2	1
13. I give my subordinates regular feedback about how I think they're doing.	5	4	3	2	1
14. I articulate a clear vision of what can be accomplished in the future.	5	4	3	2	1
15. I foster a sense of competitiveness that helps members of my work group perform at higher levels than members of other units.	5	4	3	2	1
16. I assure that regular reports and assessments occur in my unit.	5	4	3	2	1
17. I interpret and simplify complex information so that it makes sense to others and can be shared throughout the organization.	5	4	3	2	1
18. I facilitate effective information sharing and problem solving in my group.	5	4	3	2	1
19. I foster rational, systematic decision analysis in my unit (e.g., logically analyzing component parts of problems) to reduce the complexity of important issues.	5	4	3	2	1
21. I create an environment where involvement and participation in decisions are encouraged and rewarded.	5	4	3	2	1
22. In groups I lead, I make sure that sufficient attention is given to both task accomplishment and to interpersonal relationships.	5	4	3	2	1
23. When giving negative feedback to others, I foster their self-improvement rather than defensiveness or anger.	5	4	3	2	1
24. I give others assignments and responsibilities that provide opportunities for their personal growth and development.	5	4	3	2	1
25. I actively help prepare others to move up in the organization.	5	4	3	2	1
26. I regularly come up with new, creative ideas regarding processes, products or procedures for my organization.	5	4	3	2	1



	Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree/Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
27. I constantly restate and reinforce my vision of the future to members of my unit.	5	4	3	2	1
28. I help others visualize a new kind of future that includes possibilities as well as probabilities.	5	4	3	2	1
29. I am always working to improve the processes we use to achieve our desired output.	5	4	3	2	1
30. I push my unit to achieve world-class competitive performance in service and/or products.	5	4	3	2	1
31. By empowering others in my unit, I foster a motivational climate that energizes everyone involved.	5	4	3	2	1
32. I have consistent and frequent personal contact with my internal and my external customers.	5	4	3	2	1
33. I make sure that we assess how well we are meeting our customers' expectations.	5	4	3	2	1
34. I provide experiences for employees that help them become socialized and integrated into the culture of our organization.	5	4	3	2	1
35. I increase the competitiveness of my unit by encouraging others to provide services and/or products that surprise and delight customers by exceeding their expectations.	5	4	3	2	1
36. I have established a control system that assures consistency in quality, service, cost, and productivity in my unit.	5	4	3	2	1
37. I coordinate regularly with managers in other units in my organization.	5	4	3	2	1
38. I routinely share information across functional boundaries in my organization to facilitate coordination.	5	4	3	2	1
39. I use a measurement system that consistently monitors both work processes and outcomes.	5	4	3	2	1
40. I clarify for members of my unit exactly what is expected of them.	5	4	3	2	1
41. I assure that everything we do is focused on better serving our customers.	5	4	3	2	1
42. I facilitate a climate of aggressiveness and intensity in my unit.	5	4	3	2	1
43. I constantly monitor the strengths and weaknesses of our best competition and provide my unit with information on how we measure up.	5	4	3	2	1
44. I facilitate a climate of continuous improvement in my unit.	5	4	3	2	1
45. I have developed a clear strategy for helping my unit successfully accomplish my vision of the future.	5	4	3	2	1

	Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree/Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
46. I capture the imagination and emotional commitment of others when I talk about my vision of the future.	5	4	3	2	1
47. I facilitate a work environment where peers as well as subordinates learn from and help develop one another.	5	4	3	2	1
48. I listen openly and attentively to others who give me their ideas, even when I disagree.	5	4	3	2	1
49. When leading a group, I ensure collaboration and positive conflict resolution among group members.	5	4	3	2	1
50. I foster trust and openness by showing understanding for the point of view of individuals who come to me with problems or concerns.	5	4	3	2	1
51. I create an environment where experimentation and creativity are rewarded and recognized.	5	4	3	2	1
52. I encourage everyone in my unit to constantly improve and update everything they do.	5	4	3	2	1
53. I encourage all employees to make small improvements continuously in the way they do their jobs.	5	4	3	2	1
54. I make sure that my unit continually gathers information on our customers' needs and preferences.	5	4	3	2	1
55. I involve customers in my unit's planning and evaluations.	5	4	3	2	1
56. I establish ceremonies and rewards in my unit that reinforce the values and culture of our organization.	5	4	3	2	1
57. I maintain a formal system for gathering and responding to information that originates in other units outside my own.	5	4	3	2	1
58. I initiate cross-functional teams or task forces that focus on important organizational issues.	5	4	3	2	1
59. I help my employees strive for improvement in all aspects of their lives, not just in job related activities.	5	4	3	2	1
60. I create a climate where individuals in my unit want to achieve higher levels of performance than the competition.	5	4	3	2	1

## MANAGERIAL (LEADERSHIP) EFFECTIVENESS SELF-RATING FORM

For questions 61-73, please rate your effectiveness in performing these skills. Use the following scale in your rating:

- 5 - Outstanding
- 4 - Very Good
- 3 - Average
- 2 - Marginal
- 1 - Poor

	Outstanding	Very Good	Average	Marginal	Poor
61. <b>Managing teams</b> (building effective, cohesive, smooth functioning teams)	5	4	3	2	1
62. <b>Managing interpersonal relationships</b> (listening to and providing supportive feedback to others)	5	4	3	2	1
63. <b>Managing the development of others</b> (helping others improve their performance and obtain personal development opportunities)	5	4	3	2	1
64. <b>Fostering innovation</b> (encourage others to innovate and generate new ideas)	5	4	3	2	1
65. <b>Managing the future</b> (communicating a clear vision of the future and facilitating its accomplishment)	5	4	3	2	1
66. <b>Managing continuous improvement</b> (fostering an orientation toward continuous improvement among employees in everything they do)	5	4	3	2	1
67. <b>Managing competitiveness</b> (fostering an aggressive orientation toward exceeding competitors' performance)	5	4	3	2	1
68. <b>Energizing employees</b> (motivating others to put forth extra effort and to work aggressively)	5	4	3	2	1
69. <b>Managing customer service</b> (fostering a focus on service and involvement with customers)	5	4	3	2	1
70. <b>Managing acculturation</b> (helping others become clear about what is expected of them and about organizational culture and standards)	5	4	3	2	1

	Outstanding	Very Good	Average	Marginal	Poor
71. <b>Managing the control system</b> (having measurement and monitoring systems in place to keep close track of processes and performance)	5	4	3	2	1
72. <b>Managing coordination</b> (sharing information across functional boundaries and fostering coordination with other units)	5	4	3	2	1
73. <b>Overall management competency</b> (general level of managerial ability)	5	4	3	2	1

74. On the basis of your level of management competency, how high in the organization do you expect to go in your career? (CHECK ONLY ONE ALTERNATIVE)

5 \_\_\_\_\_ To the very top of the organization.

4 \_\_\_\_\_ Near the top — just below the CEO.

3 \_\_\_\_\_ To a senior position — e.g., a member of the executive committee.

2 \_\_\_\_\_ One level above where you are now.

1 \_\_\_\_\_ No higher than the current position.

75. Compared to all other managers/leaders you've known, how would you rate your own competency as a manager/leader of managers/leaders?

5 \_\_\_\_\_ Top 5%

4 \_\_\_\_\_ Top 10%

3 \_\_\_\_\_ Top 25%

2 \_\_\_\_\_ Top 50 %

1 \_\_\_\_\_ In the bottom half

## IMPORTANCE INFORMATION

**NOTE: The scale changes for question 76-87. Please read carefully.**

In order to succeed in your current position, how important is each of the following skills? Use the following scale in your rating:

- 5 - Critically Important
- 4 - Very Important
- 3 - Moderately Important
- 2 - Of Some Importance
- 1 - Little Importance

	Critically Important	Very Important	Moderately Important	Of Some Importance	Little Importance
76. <b>Managing teams</b> (building effective, cohesive, smooth functioning teams)	5	4	3	2	1
77. <b>Managing interpersonal relationships</b> (listening to and providing supportive feedback to others)	5	4	3	2	1
78. <b>Managing the development of others</b> (helping others improve their performance and obtain personal development opportunities)	5	4	3	2	1
79. <b>Fostering innovation</b> (encourage others to innovate and generate new ideas)	5	4	3	2	1
80. <b>Managing the future</b> (communicating a clear vision of the future and facilitating its accomplishment)	5	4	3	2	1
81. <b>Managing continuous improvement</b> (fostering an orientation toward continuous improvement among employees in everything they do)	5	4	3	2	1
82. <b>Managing competitiveness</b> (fostering an aggressive orientation toward exceeding competitors' performance)	5	4	3	2	1
83. <b>Energizing employees</b> (motivating others to put forth extra effort and to work aggressively)	5	4	3	2	1

	Critically Important	Very Important	Moderately Important	Of Some Importance	Little Importance
84. <b>Managing customer service</b> (fostering a focus on service and involvement with customers)	5	4	3	2	1
85. <b>Managing acculturation</b> (helping others become clear about what is expected of them and about organizational culture and standards)	5	4	3	2	1
86. <b>Managing the control system</b> (having measurement and monitoring systems in place to keep close track of processes and performance)	5	4	3	2	1
87. <b>Managing coordination</b> (sharing information across functional boundaries and fostering coordination with other units)	5	4	3	2	1

## DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Please write the appropriate response in the space provided next to the item number.

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1. \_\_\_\_\_ **Sex**

- (1) Female
- (2) Male

2. \_\_\_\_\_ **Age (At Last Birthday)**

- (1) 30 & under
- (2) 31-35
- (3) 36-38
- (4) 39-41
- (5) 42-44
- (6) 45-47
- (7) 48-50
- (8) over 50

3. \_\_\_\_\_ **Rank (Current—Not Promotable to Rank)**

- (1) Colonel
- (2) Lieutenant Colonel

4. \_\_\_\_\_ **Branch (Not Functional Area) of the Army (Write in the 2 Letter Identifier, for example, "Infantry—IN")**

5. \_\_\_\_\_ **Source of Commission**

- (1) Military Academy
- (2) ROTC
- (3) OCS
- (4) Direct Commission
- (5) Other

6. \_\_\_\_\_ **Ethnicity**

- (1) Caucasian
- (2) African American
- (3) Latino
- (4) South Pacific Islander
- (5) Asian
- (6) Other

7. \_\_\_\_\_ **Component**

- (1) Active Army
- (2) USAR
- (3) USAR Title 10 and Title 32
- (4) ARNG
- (5) ARNG Title 10 and Title 32

8. \_\_\_\_\_ **USAWC Class of**

- (1) 2003
- (2) 2004

9. \_\_\_\_\_ **Type of USAWC Student**

- (1) Resident
- (2) Department of Distance Education

10. \_\_\_\_\_ **Level of Education**

- (1) Bachelor's Degree
- (2) Master's Degree
- (3) Doctoral Degree

You have completed the MSAI, please return the survey by placing the completed survey in a box labeled: "Completed OCAI/MSAI Surveys—COL Jim Pierce." This box will be located near the book return cart next to the student mailboxes on the 3rd floor of Root Hall.