

By WILLIAM A. OWENS

Combat Camera Imagery (Mark A. Borosch)

oday's military leadership is charged with three broad and interrelated missions. One is the successful stewardship of a capable military. We must maintain a ready force with superior warfighting capabilities as force structure and budgets get smaller and, because of changes in the world, as operational demands evolve. This latter dynamic is closely linked to a second mission: vigorous engagement. Since America is a world power

Admiral William A. Owens, USN, is Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. He previously served as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments, and has commanded the Sixth Fleet and NATO Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe.

committed to democratic engagement and enlargement, the Armed Forces will continue to contribute to U.S. policies through their presence, and thus must be prepared to conduct a range of operations from peacekeeping and peacemaking to major combat. Finally, the military is charged with assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in building future capabilities, particularly in developing what is known as *leading edge warfare*.

These missions are both challenging and dynamic. Each requires dealing with revolutions. Changes in the international system and the demise of a bipolar world are clearly revolutionary, demanding a constant review of what is meant by vigorous engagement in an uncertain world. But our stewardship of

maintaining the data needed, and c including suggestions for reducing	lection of information is estimated to ompleting and reviewing the collect this burden, to Washington Headqu uld be aware that notwithstanding an DMB control number.	ion of information. Send comments arters Services, Directorate for Info	s regarding this burden estimate ormation Operations and Reports	or any other aspect of the s, 1215 Jefferson Davis	nis collection of information, Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington			
1. REPORT DATE 1994		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVE <b>00-00-199</b> 4	es covered <b>0-1994 to 00-00-1994</b>			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER				
JROC: Harnessing	the Revolution in N	Military Affairs		5b. GRANT NUM	MBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER						
6. AUTHOR(S)			5d. PROJECT NUMBER					
					5e. TASK NUMBER			
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER				
<b>National Defense U</b>	ZATION NAME(S) AND AE Iniversity,Institute f Vashington,DC,203	or National Strateg	cic Studies,Fort	8. PERFORMING REPORT NUMB	G ORGANIZATION ER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITO	RING AGENCY NAME(S) A		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)					
					11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAIL Approved for publ	ABILITY STATEMENT ic release; distributi	on unlimited						
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NO	OTES							
14. ABSTRACT								
15. SUBJECT TERMS								
16. SECURITY CLASSIFIC		17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON				
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>	Same as Report (SAR)	3				

**Report Documentation Page** 

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments										
Participants	Joint Staff	Services	OSD		CINCs		Defense Agencies		Others	
Sponsors							3			
J-8	Strike									
J-8	Ground Maneuver									
J-4	Strategic Mobility and its Protection									
J-7	Air Superiority									
J-5	Deter/Counterproliferation of WMD									
J-6/J-3	Command and Control and Information Warfare									
J-2	In	itelligence	, Surveilla	nce	e, and Re	ecc	nnaissa	nce	9	
J-5	Overseas Presence									
J-3/J-1	Joint Readiness									

the Armed Forces also faces another revolution. We must manage the largest decline in military resources since World War II as we maintain the flexibility to meet the demands of vigorous engagement. And building the force of the future requires harnessing the revolution in military affairs (RMA) brought about by technological leaps in surveillance, command and control, and longer range precision guided munitions.

In some ways this is our most challenging mission. We have a good notion, based upon extensive experience, of what steward-

JROC has emerged as a principal forum in which senior military leaders address requirements from a joint perspective

ship of a capable military means. Having been vigorously engaged in world affairs for decades, we have a sense of what the Armed Forces can and can't do in support of U.S. policy. Building a military for the future—while meeting the demands of two other basic missions—is different. We

have planned for almost half a century to cope with a world that no longer exists and are accustomed to taking our cues from the threat posed by another superpower. Now, planning processes adopted to deal with that threat are not sufficient to shape the joint military power which the future may require. It is here, in extending America's leading edge of military capabilities, that past experience may be the least helpful and the need to alter the old ways of doing things may be the greatest.

Building a joint military capability to harness the RMA will not be easy. History reveals a tendency for the services to diverge rather than coalesce during periods of relative fiscal austerity. That is, each service tends to put planning priority on assuring and protecting core competencies at the expense of those capabilities that support and facilitate operations of the other services. It is easier to be joint in word and deed in times of fiscal largess; parochialism is stronger when budgets draw down. The Nation cannot afford and will not benefit from adhering to this traditional pattern.

Among other duties, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) advocates for a joint military perspective. To accomplish this task the law calls on VCJCS to chair a special council on military requirements—the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)—and CJCS to submit alternative program recommendations and budget proposals to the Secretary of Defense. JROC has emerged as a principal forum in which senior military leaders (VCJCS and the service vice chiefs) address requirements from a joint perspective. These are then taken to CJCS for review and approval. The document in which CJCS alternatives to service POMs are presented is known as the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA).

Until recently JROC and CPA have not been closely associated. JROC, focusing on initial stages of the acquisition process, has not been seen as an integral part of the programming process, and neither JROC nor CPA have been exercised with the full authority vested in CJCS and VCJCS by Goldwater-Nichols. Now when it is critical that the synergism of a joint approach move to the fore in military planning and programming, the legal authority exists. Indeed, the law requires it.

Current changes in the process revolve largely around JROC and CPA. Briefly, we have expanded the scope and significance of JROC discussions and linked them to CPA which, in turn, will fulfill its congressionally mandated destiny to articulate the joint, collective position of the services with respect to joint requirements and readiness. This is an important evolution insofar as the overall process

inside the Pentagon is concerned since it can provide the Secretary of Defense with a single, authoritative military view of key issues, rather than what has often happened in the past: no consolidated joint military view was articulated, or on occasion a cacophony of different and competing views emerged.

Moving JROC into a more central position required major changes in staffing and analytical support. We have created nine assessment areas, charged separate elements of the Joint Staff with coordinating each assessment, and invited participation from a wide range of agencies and research organizations in each assessment. As the accompanying diagram suggests, we see the assessment process in terms of a matrix and have set it up to achieve things that matrix organizations facilitate. Matrices compel interaction across organizations; they engage people who do not normally talk to each other and enhance a horizontal flow of ideas. When this happens new insights, innovation, and intellectual synergy often spark conceptual breakthroughs and leaps in problem-solving.

The assessment process will support the expanded JROC in two ways. It will address the issues that are of particular importance to JROC, responding to its guidance and initiative. But the process will also act as an innovation engine, seeking to discover and propose to JROC the ways in which the capabilities of the various services can be inte-

JROC with the CINCs

of profound military

constitutes a repository

insight and experience

grated to provide more joint,

synergistic solutions to military problems.

One primary result of this interaction between the assessment process and JROC is the formulation of a draft CPA. JROC, largely through the as-

sessment process, helped CJCS formulate recommendations for the Secretary of Defense on obtaining better joint warfighting capabilities for the FY96–FY01 defense program than could be found in the sum of service POMs. The CPA, or "Chairman's Program," represents the corporate advice of the Nation's military leaders (as distinguished from a compilation of programs advanced by each service). It was discussed in detail by JROC members and the CINCs; the JROC boarded an aircraft, flew to unified commands, and there engaged in systematic, in-depth discussions with CINCs and their staffs. While this step was supported by extensive contact between the Joint Staff and the staffs of the CINCs during the assessment process, its essence was face-to-face exchanges at the four-star level.

The results of this process—including any adjustments in the draft CPA—went to CJCS in early September. CJCS then forwarded the CPA to the Secretary of Defense for consideration in program and budget decisions. This sequence will become a normal part of PPBS. (The next step will be completed in February/March 1995 to influence service POMs for the FY 97 defense proposal.) The assessment process and operation of JROC will be a continuous undertaking—not a one-time effort.

The changes implied in expanding JROC are significant. JROC will not be simply another military committee in which the members participate strictly as representatives of their services, making decisions and recommendations that reflect the lowest common denominator or sum of service requirements. The JROC members cannot, of course, be expected to divorce themselves entirely from service positions. Yet collectively, JROC with the CINCs constitutes a repository of profound military insight and experience, and the rank of its members permits JROC to act as a corporate body, capable of developing consensus views that transcend individual service perspectives.

Articulating this joint perspective at the upper levels of military leadership has the potential of bringing about change in a new era. It is a fundamental part of our response to the revolution in military affairs that confronts us today.