Security police patrolling the U.N. facility at Camp Pleso in Zagreb.

Joint Combat Camera Center (James Bowman)

Implications for U.N. PEACEKEEPING

By JOHN O.B. SEWALL

The Clinton administration is currently in the process of determining what role the United Nations will play in achieving U.S. national interests, and how that role relates to multilateralism. A Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on multilateral peace operations has not yet appeared, and the document will undoubtedly be influenced by current U.S. and U.N. operations in Somalia and prospective plans for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This article does not predict, nor depend on, the ultimate PDD. Whether the United States elects to participate exclusively in peacekeeping observer missions, as in the past, or moves more forcefully by putting logistic or combat units under U.N. operational control in peace-enforcement or peace-building operations remains to be seen. The proposals contained herein are designed to better support the United Nations, whatever the mission or degree of participation. The focus will be on organizational support, the enduring definitional problems associated with peace operations, and the importance of doctrinal harmonization.

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Peacekeepers passing through the gates of Camp Pleso, Croatia.

Organizational Support

As long as American participation in U.N. operations was limited to observers—such as those with the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) observers in Egypt, Israel, Syria, and Lebanon—it was appropriate that support of U.N. observers reside in a DOD executive agent. The limited number of observers and preponderance of ground force personnel clearly supported designating the Department of the Army as the agent. In fact, the Army has steadily improved its support role in terms of planning, personnel acquisition, area-specific pre-deployment training, and liaison with U.N. Headquarters in New York.

Nonetheless, while giving credit to the Army, times have changed and a reexamination of how DOD organizes to support U.N. operations is required. We are moving into multiservice or joint operations in support of, or under actual operational control of, the United Nations. Somalia exemplifies the latter and Sharp Guard in the Adriatic, Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, Southern Watch over southern Iraq, and Deny Flight in Bosnia attest to the fact that U.N. operations and American participation in them are now a joint enterprise for the Armed Forces.

U.N. support matters should logically reside with the Joint Staff and with combatant CINCs

This would suggest that U.N. support matters should logically reside with the Joint Staff where coordination is best effected, on the one hand, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Department of State as well as the United Nations and, on the other, with combatant CINCs. While the precise role of regional CINCs will depend on the nature and scale of U.S. involvement, the time has come for a centralized Joint Staff role. In this regard, J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy) on the Joint Staff has an authorized U.N. Division with 7 professionals, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans on the Army Staff—the executive agency—is in the game with 13 professionals in the U.S. Military Observer Group, Washington Branch. My point here is not to propose a precise organization, but rather to promote centralization and rationalization across the Joint Staff and service staffs in order to better plan and execute joint peace operations.

Like U.N. Headquarters itself, which is undergoing reorganization and professionalization, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN) must shake loose from its Cold War moorings and restructure for more *muscular* U.N. operations. The lack of a defense advisor's office which reports to and provides the best possible military advice to the ambassador reflects both the historic tie to the moribund Military Staff Committee and to the traditional U.N. peacekeeping culture, that is, impartial, nonprovocative, minimum force levels operating with restrictive rules of engagement.

USUN does not have an integrated defense advisor's office, but instead has a limited military advisor's office with a colonel and two enlisted members, augmented by two other military professionals. Out of the USUN strength of 75 professional and support personnel, the military advisor's office has only 7 percent of the assets available to the ambassador. In fact, the assigned colonel is a J-5 asset who, among other duties, is designated as U.S. Representative to the Military Staff Committee. As a result there is predictable competition between J-5 taskings emanating from the Joint Staff in the Pentagon and the needs of the ambassador and her deputies in New York.

It is helpful to compare USUN with the U.S. Mission to NATO (USNATO). This is not to suggest replicating the organization of NATO Headquarters in Brussels at U.N. Headquarters in New York. But the relative



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Boarding officer from *USS Normandy* inspecting Bulgarian ship during Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic.

scale of effort and resources suggests that we do not have it quite right on the East River. Excluding administrative staff, half of the 92 professional and support personnel in the U.S. mission in Brussels work in the defense advisor's office. Thus, whereas US-NATO has a defense advisor's office of 30 professional and 17 support staff members, USUN has a military advisor's office with only 3 professional and support staff members. The ability to provide appropriate defense advice is undoubtedly a reflection of this allocation of resources.

not that long ago the United States and NATO used *peacemaking* and *peace-enforcement* almost interchangeably

Again, this is not to suggest a particular organization to solve perceived problems at USUN in New York. Whether or not the PDD in fact endorses what our ambassador, Madeleine Albright, calls *assertive* multilateralism—implying selective participation in more muscular peace operations—remains to be seen. In any event, some broad conclusions seem to be emerging.

First, an integrated defense advisor's office would provide the ambassador better military advice so that New York would have greater weight in developing policy in Foggy Bottom, at the Pentagon, and within the White House. Second, a more robust defense advisor's office would be better suited to deal with deployment, force structure, logistics, and cost estimates for USUN and the U.N. Secretariat. A better in-house capability would obviate a lot of current TDY presence in New York, to include the J-5, who is better situated in Washington to work problems from inside the Pentagon. Finally, and perhaps more symbolically than substantively, a robust defense advisor's office with a general or flag officer would project a more serious image of American interest in the United Nations as a vehicle for meeting our security interests.

The organizational refinements addressed above presuppose a better interagency process to develop and refine American policy. The fact that humanitarian and peace-building operations do not comprise just U.N. civilian and military personnel but nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) as well suggests a complex process of consultation and coordination with a stronger National Security Council Staff focal point. There are indications that point to just such an improved process coming out of the yet to be published PDD. Whether this administration realignment will be matched by Congress remains to be seen.

Definitional Problems

Although both the defense establishment and international security community have moved beyond the generic term peacekeeping to more sophisticated terminology, there are still definitional problems between Pentagon (Joint Pub 3–0) and U.N. (*An Agenda for Peace*) usage—not to mention in the press. For example, the term peacemaking has achieved common understanding in both Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* and Joint Pub 3–0. It is understood to mean a diplomatic

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Pakistanis boarding an Air Force C–130 for Somalia.



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Laying concertina wire in Macedonia during Operation Able Sentry.

process in the main, essentially through such peaceful means as enumerated in chapter VI of the U.N. Charter. But it was not that long ago that the United States and NATO used *peacemaking* and *peace-enforcement* almost interchangeably, a confusion which continues to exist in both the media and public speeches.

Peace-enforcement is another term with multiple interpretations. In *An Agenda for Peace* Boutros-Ghali uses peace-enforcement in a specific sense—that is, in cases where an established cease-fire has been agreed to, but not complied with, and peace-enforcement units are called in to restore and maintain the cease-fire. But peace-enforcement as used in Joint Pub 3–0 describes a chapter VII response to breaches of the peace or acts of aggression such as that authorized by U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Similar military action in *An Agenda for Peace* is described as "military action to maintain or restore international peace and security" under article 42 of chapter VII, using forces preferably provided under article 43, and under the strategic direction of the Military Staff Committee under article 47. Boutros-Ghali's use of peace-enforcement as found above corresponds to *aggravated peacekeeping* in Joint Pub 3–0. Unfortunately the problem is compounded in Joint Pub 3–0 by using *peace operations* to mean, among other things, traditional peacekeeping, aggravated peacekeeping, and low-intensity—but not high-intensity—peace-enforcement; however, *peace-building*, a U.N. term, is not included.

This discussion shows that there is still considerable terminological confusion among the United States, United Nations, and NATO. It is beyond the scope of this article to solve the debate over terminology. Nonetheless, as a rule, it seems logical to take the lead from the United Nations as the *world* organization involved in peace operations. Hence all regional organizations alluded to in chapter VIII—for example, NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Western European Union—and individual nations should adopt similar or at least complementary rather than competitive usage.

Doctrinal Harmonization

As with terminology there is a corresponding debate over the doctrinal underpinning of peace operations. Doctrine is more important and pervasive in its impact on how nations undertake a specific mission than terminology. Cross referencing appropriate dictionaries, although perhaps not the best approach, can solve terminological problems. Doctrine, however, sets the framework for how a coalition will conduct operations to achieve the objectives of a U.N. mandate. Doctrine, in effect, is the capstone from which organization, equipment, training, exercises, and rules of engagement are derived.

The problem, in brief, is that the United Nations has grown comfortable with traditional peacekeeping doctrine, emphasizing low force levels, restrictive rules of engagement, use of force only in self defense, compromise, and impartiality. Peace operations, however, as exemplified in Somalia and Bosnia, have moved far beyond traditional peacekeeping to something short of a chapter VII response and clearly require a doctrinal basis different from that used in Desert Storm (namely, massive firepower and overwhelming force). Traditional peacekeeping is fairly well documented in U.N. publications and the Scandinavian regional training

schools, but the same is not true for the grey area of peace operations which falls between chapters VI and VII.

This is not to say that no one is working the problem. In fact, many bright, energetic staff officers are engulfed in the process. The problem, once again, is central direction and guidance. The military chain of guidance should ideally go from the United Nations to J-7 on the Joint Staff, and then to Atlantic Command (ACOM), the unified command responsible for preparing joint forces for peace operations. What one finds, however, are centers of doctrinal development—or islands of excellence—with little harmonization. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is currently developing a new field manual, FM 100–23, *Peace Support Operations*, with assistance from the Center for Low Intensity Conflict. TRADOC is also providing scenario support for peace operations at the Joint Readiness Training Center. The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center is developing a joint tactics, techniques, and procedures document on humanitarian assistance. Undoubtedly a lot more is being done across the individual services, not to mention the combined doctrine being developed at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and by the peacekeeping workshop at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch. In addition, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council Ad Hoc Group on Peacekeeping has charged combined conferences and workshops, with various individual nations taking the lead, to develop doctrine in this area.

peace operations require a doctrinal basis different from that used in Desert Storm

In sum, there is a lot of activity in the field, but its coherence is questionable, and both J-7 and ACOM have yet to fully assert themselves in the processes. What is worrisome, moreover, is the political imperative to move quickly toward conducting combined training and exercises with North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) members under the Partnership for Peace program, using peace operations as the scenario, before we have the doctrinal foundation fully in place. We risk putting the cart before the horse and possibly learning the wrong lessons by embracing this form of cooperative security activity prematurely. It may well be that recent events in Somalia and the anticipated peace operations in Bosnia are bringing assertive multilateralism into clear focus. If they also better focus the doctrinal debate, we could enjoy an unanticipated but welcome benefit.

The matters of organization and process discussed above—involving DOD, interagency, and USUN activities—also highlight the need for both definitional and doctrinal harmonization. The proposals are relatively modest and low cost, and they will be appropriate regardless of the final version of the PDD on support to the United Nations. There are obviously other initiatives in train or being considered under the general rubric of support to the United Nations including:

- removing legal constraints (the War Powers Act and U.N. Participation Act)
- improving funding responsibilities; eliminating arrearages to the United Nations
- enhancing planning for peace operations (including training, education, and materiel, and also identifying lift, logistics, C^3I, and equipment capabilities)
- supporting U.N. training for peace operations (through political-military simulations and provision of training facilities).

The extent to which the U.S. Government engages in higher cost activities will directly reflect the importance attached to U.N. peace operations as a vehicle for achieving U.S. security interests and the balance between unilateral and multilateral solutions. Irrespective of this balance, however, the United States, as a Permanent Five member of the Security Council, bears a direct responsibility to become actively involved in both U.N. internal reform and the professionalization of U.N. peace operations.

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