



Secretary of Defense William Perry (center) flanked by Polish Minister of Defense Piotr Kolodziejczyk and GEN George Joulwan, SACEUR, at the Pentagon in March 1994.

DOD (Helene C. Stikkel)

Stabilizing the East

by JEFFREY SIMON

NATO has grappled with a Europe in transformation since the revolutions of 1989 and has reached out to countries of the former Warsaw Pact since its July 1990 declaration. The Alliance had to decide how to accommodate the East after the November 1991 Rome summit adopted a new strategy to replace the doctrine of Flexible Response which dated from the late 1960s. The summit also began to deal with the challenges of the post-Cold War era by establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to address Europe's eastern security issues.

While NACC had laudable goals, its limitations were obvious. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in late 1991 and the decision to include former republics as new

members meant that rather than the anticipated five non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states and the Soviet Union, NACC would have twenty-plus new members. The great diversity among NACC partners (for instance, between Poland and Uzbekistan) led to demands for differentiation and membership in the Alliance by many NACC members. Thus, despite well-intended goals, demands placed on NACC by cooperation partners made the organization's lack of preparation evident. NATO's most recent response came in January 1994 when the North Atlantic Council (NAC) adopted the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program.

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The Track Record

NATO responses to developments in the East—first to former Warsaw Pact members and second to new states emerging from the disintegrated Soviet Union—have been extraordinary and insufficient. The institutional response has been extraordinary in that many new initiatives have been taken in a short time. They have been insufficient in that events moved so quickly that NATO's responses have not kept up with regional expectations.

NATO responses to developments in the East have been extraordinary and insufficient

London Declaration. Only months after the revolutions of 1989, NATO extended a “hand of friendship” to the East at the London summit in July 1990. NATO asked the six members of the Warsaw Pact—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Soviet Union—to address the NAC in Brussels and enter into regular diplomatic liaison to share ideas and intensify military contacts in an era of historic change.¹ That summer newly appointed liaison ambassadors from the Warsaw Pact participated in briefings at NATO headquarters.

East German Absorption. The transformation of East Germany from a key Warsaw Pact member to part of a unified Germany in NATO was unexpected and rapid. The Soviet position on the security framework for Germany underwent mercurial changes. While Mikhail Gorbachev refused to accept a Germany-in-NATO framework in a meeting with George Bush in June 1990, his concession to Helmut Kohl the following month indicated that he had little choice in the matter. In reality the Soviets ceded control when the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) failed to stabilize its situation as a reformed communist state in late 1989; *de facto* unification occurred with the economic and monetary union of the two German states. The Soviets also decoupled political unification from security issues in conceding that all-German elections could

occur irrespective of the two-plus-four agreement of September 1990.² With unification in October 1990, Germany's five new eastern *Laender* (the former GDR states) enjoyed protection under article 5 of the NATO treaty: “an armed attack against one . . . shall be considered an attack against . . . all.” This expansion eastward by the Alliance occurred without the need for a new protocol of association as employed on the accession of Greece and Turkey in 1951.

Copenhagen NAC. NATO took another step at the Copenhagen NAC session on June 6 and 7, 1991 when the allies agreed to implement a broad set of further initiatives “to intensify . . . [NATO's] program of military contacts at various levels”³ with Central and East European (CEE) states. CEE contacts would be intensified with NATO headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and major NATO commands; in addition, NATO would invite military officers from CEE to its training facilities for special programs on civilian oversight of defense. Experts would meet to discuss security policy issues, military strategy and doctrine, arms control, and conversion of defense industry to civilian purposes. NATO invited CEE experts to participate in “Third Dimension” scientific and environmental programs and exchange views in areas such as air space management. NATO information programs also were expanded to the CEE region.

NAC Ministerial. NATO treated all former Warsaw Pact countries alike until August 21, 1991. During the attempted coup in Moscow, a NAC ministerial statement differentiated the Soviet Union from other former Warsaw Pact states in suspending liaison “pending a clarification in that country.” The statement also noted:

*We expect the Soviet Union to respect the integrity and security of all states in Europe. As a token of solidarity with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, we will develop ways of further strengthening our contribution toward the political and economic reform process within these countries. Our diplomatic liaison arrangements with the Central and Eastern European democracies now take on added significance.*⁴

Rome Declaration. At a summit in Rome in November 1991, NATO approved broadening its activities with the Soviet Union and CEE to include meetings with NAC at the

Jeffrey Simon is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. He is the author of “Czechoslovakia's ‘Velvet Divorce,’ Visegrad Cohesion, and European Fault Lines,” and the editor of *European Security Policy After the Revolutions of 1989*.

ministerial level in NACC, NAC at ambassadorial level, NATO subordinate committees (including the political and economic committees), and the Military Committee and other NATO military authorities.⁵

*North Atlantic Cooperation Council.*⁶ In December 1991 the foreign ministers of “former adversaries” (including Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) met at the inauguration of NACC to adopt a “Statement on Dialogue, Partnership,

the CEE states believe that more than meetings are needed to secure European peace

and Cooperation” which endorsed annual ministerial level NACC meetings, bi-monthly NAC meetings with liaison am-

bassadors beginning in February 1992, other NACC meetings as circumstances warrant, and regular meetings of the political, economic, and military committees with liaison partners on security and related issues.

Activities snowballed during 1992. At a meeting in February at ambassadorial level NACC adopted a “Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership, and Cooperation.” An extraordinary meeting in March 1992—which extended membership to 35 states (including former Soviet republics except Georgia)—endorsed an approach to planning, conversion, economics, technology, societal challenges, information dissemination, policy planning consultations, and air traffic management.⁷

NACC defense ministers (with Georgia but less France) met for the first time in April and decided to convene a meeting of NACC chiefs of defense staffs (CHODS), a high-level seminar on civilian control of the armed forces, and workshops on restructuring and environmental clean-up of military installations.

Out of Area Peacekeeping

In addition to creating NACC, the Rome summit in 1991 adopted a new strategic concept to replace Flexible Response. This concept moved NATO’s military emphasis away from massive mobilization toward enhanced crisis management and peacekeeping operations.

Oslo NAC. In June 1992 NAC foreign ministers convened in Oslo and agreed “to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with their own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of CSCE

(Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe).”⁸ NATO moved “out of area” immediately after, and with the Western European Union (WEU) dispatched naval units to the Adriatic to enforce a U.N. embargo. Many NACC members saw this as a chance to broaden cooperation with NATO, and their foreign ministers attached “particular importance to enhancing the CSCE’s operational and institutional capacity to contribute to conflict prevention, crisis management, and the peaceful settlement of disputes [and expressed willingness] to contribute.”⁹

A NAC ministerial meeting in December 1992 made a parallel offer to the United Nations, noting its readiness “to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the U.N. Security Council.”¹⁰ NACC indicated that NATO and cooperation partners would share their experiences with one another and with CSCE in the areas of planning and preparing for peacekeeping missions and would consider combined training and exercises. It also approved a work plan with specific provisions on peacekeeping and created a NACC ad hoc group on cooperation in peacekeeping to discuss political and conceptual principles and practical measures for cooperation.

Closer cooperation and confidence among NACC partners was evident in February 1993 when the military committee met for the first time in a cooperation session. When NACC defense ministers met in late March they recognized the importance “of the ability to act in a cooperative framework” in peacekeeping tasks and “ensure(d) that a high priority be given this work.”¹¹ In April, under U.N. resolution 816, NATO began no-fly zone enforcement operations over Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the military committee met with CHODS to discuss possible NATO intervention in Bosnia should a peaceful solution fail.

Athens NAC. A NAC ministerial communique in June 1993 noted the development of a “common understanding on conceptual approaches to peacekeeping [and] enhancing of cooperation in this field”¹² with cooperation partners. The Athens NACC in June adopted the ad hoc group’s detailed Report on Cooperation in Peacekeeping¹³ and agreed to accelerate the program, including sharing experience on peacekeeping planning, training, and logistics.¹⁴ As a result of

Lithuanian *Grisha* class frigate during Exercise Baltops '93.



U.S. Navy (Nathan Jones)

this session, Prague hosted a high-level seminar on the conceptual and doctrinal aspects of peacekeeping.¹⁵

On balance NATO has been responsive in a short time; but is it enough? The CEE states believe that more than meetings are needed to secure European peace. Because NACC expanded to 36 members rapidly, it is in danger of being “neutralized” as a security institution. How should NATO respond? What roles should NATO and NACC play in a crisis? These questions are raised particularly by the four Visegrad states—Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary—which express a desire for a differentiated role in NATO. They want criteria and time-lines on becoming Alliance members and they agree to accept NATO security responsibilities.

The Brussels Summit: A Watershed?

Although it took NATO almost a quarter of a century to adopt a strategic doctrine to replace Flexible Response, one can argue that

NATO needs another *new* strategic concept because of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, efforts by Russia to reassert influence over the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and insecurities in Central Europe. In addition to evolving more flexible force structures, NATO’s strategic tasks aside from NACC should include policies that:

▼ Legitimize democratic leaders in the new states in Europe, and by doing so, help to promote their political, military, economic, and social programs.

▼ Urge sub-regional transparency and cooperation (such as the Visegrad states, Baltics, and Balkans) to discourage ethnic tension and conflict as well as regional arms races. NATO should prevent divergent security perceptions from arising in CEE subregions in order to prevent nascent fault lines in Ukraine from developing into fissures such as in the former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Likewise, it should work to prevent the Czech-Slovak, Hungarian-Ukraine, and Polish-Ukraine/Belarus borders from becoming a new East-West dividing line, which is more likely to occur with need to control emigration.¹⁶

Sub-Regional Cooperation. In January 1990 Czechoslovakia's President Vaclav Havel visited Hungary and Poland and called on both to coordinate their "return to Europe." Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary met in Visegrad, Hungary, in February 1991 and created the so-called Visegrad triangle²⁰ to demonstrate the ability of the three to overcome historical differences and deal with their impending withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, the exit of Soviet forces, and the regional security vacuum as well as to coordinate their eventual "return to Europe." This was to be achieved through institutions like the European Community (EC) and NATO.²¹

In October 1991 a second Visegrad summit in Krakow, Poland, issued a declaration which openly welcomed the Genscher-Baker statement on broadening NATO and stressed their desire to join EC.²² Indeed since then the Visegrad states have signed agreements of association.²³ Hence, EC plays essential economic and political roles in stabilizing the Visegrad group. These countries have also made NATO membership a priority. At a third summit in Prague in May 1992 they

emphasized that NATO and a sustained U.S. presence were of the utmost importance for European security and declared the group's desire to be full members of the Alliance.²⁴ NATO enjoys great prestige and influence with these countries because it commits America and Canada to maintaining the stability of Europe. At the same time NATO is the only organization that has requisite bases, communications, equipment, and forces to defend Europe.

Between February 1991 and May 1992 the Visegrad triangle held a total of three summits, three meetings of defense ministers, two of foreign ministers, and two each at the deputy defense and foreign minister level. These sessions dealt with economic, political, and military matters and involved the triangle's Eastern security policy and efforts to integrate into EC and NATO. This healthy development toward sub-regional cooperation started to unravel following the June 1992 Czechoslovak elections which led to the "velvet divorce" in January 1993. The separation of the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic into the Czech Republic and

Ireland	■		■
Austria	■	3	4
Finland	■	■	4
Sweden	■	3	4
Switzerland	■		
Czech Republic	■	■	5
Hungary	■	■	5
Poland	■	■	5
Slovakia	■	■	5
Bulgaria	■	■	5
Romania	■	■	5
Albania	■	■	
Estonia	■	■	■
Latvia	■	■	■
Lithuania	■	■	■
Russia	■	■	6
Ukraine	■	■	6
Moldova	■	■	6
Azerbaijan	■	■	
Georgia	■	■	
Kazakhstan	■	■	
Turkmenistan	■	■	
Armenia	■	■	
Belarus	■	■	
Kyrgyzstan	■	■	
Tajikistan	■	■	
Uzbekistan	■	■	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	■		
Croatia	■		
F.Y.R. Macedonia	■	■	
Slovenia	■		
Yugoslavia		2	
Others ¹	■		

(7/94)

Slovakia did more than draw a new state boundary at the Moravian-Slovak border. Both the psychological and regional security implications have been much larger: the new borders caused the Czech Republic to turn westward, weakened the Visegrad



Secretary of Defense William Perry and Slovak Minister of Defense Pavol Kanis signing a memorandum of cooperation in May 1994.

group, and created conditions for potentially isolating Slovakia, resulting in renewed tensions with Hungary and reverberations that extend to Ukraine.

The January 1994 NATO summit delayed the decision to admit the Visegrad states. Rather than encouraging forms of sub-regional cooperation and stability, the PFP program adopted by the summit has had the unfortunate effect of transforming former regional partners into competitors. By stressing willingness and ability to cooperate in Alliance military activities, PFP rewards those partners who are prepared to get closer militarily to the Alliance first.

The CEE response to PFP varies and reflects unrealistic expectations, misunderstandings, and cleavage within the region. For example, Romania and Bulgaria initially greeted PFP with enthusiasm and relief because it closed off the immediate entry of the Visegrad states into NATO. Formerly fearing that they would be left behind, PFP established a "level playing field" in what has now become the race to join NATO. In the Visegrad group, PFP legitimizes the Czech Republic's goal to achieve NATO membership first, rewards competition over cooperation, and undermines any further

prospects for the group's development. In the Baltic, similar competition has resulted.

In order to circumvent the negative consequences of bilateral PFP-NATO agreements and sub-regional competition, NATO should encourage partners to cooperate with their neighbors to minimize the disadvantages of competition and to achieve common goals. It must work to ensure that each agreement remains transparent to neighbors.

Though PFP agreements are bilateral, overall NATO-partnership projects should be crafted and developed along sub-regional lines to encourage Visegrad, Balkan, and Baltic common efforts. For issues such as control of air space, PFP projects can be developed on a sub-regional basis; for issues such as environmental emergencies, the projects could be designed for broader cooperation.

Democratic Reformers. PFP initially represented an effort to placate Russia and to support Yeltsin and Russian "reformers," but it has the undesirable consequence of undermining political support for CEE democratic reformers and, correspondingly, American and Western credibility in the region. This has occurred because Russians and Central Europeans perceive security as a zero-sum game, a situation which has evolved not just from the experience of the 1945 Yalta Treaty and forty years of the Cold War, but also from Yeltsin's so-called "secret letter" to American, German, British, and French leaders condemning NATO's expansion. When Yeltsin expressed alarm over admitting East European countries to NATO, proposing instead that "relations between Russia and NATO be several degrees warmer than the relations between the Alliance and Eastern Europe . . . [and that Russia and NATO together] offer [Eastern Europe] security guarantees,"²⁵ he gave the zero-sum formula reality. In effect, Central and East Europeans see Yeltsin's proposal as a "Yalta-2" formula for condominium over Central and Eastern Europe.

As Henry Kissinger noted: "No reasonable observer can imagine that Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Slovakia could ever mount a military threat against Russia, either singly or in combination. The countries of Eastern Europe are terrified, not threatening."²⁶ To the extent that Central

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and East Europeans perceive PFP as an indication of the West succumbing to Russian pressure, the West will lose credibility and influence.

PFP also has significant implications for domestic politics. For as long as the countries of CEE see the West as supporting economic and political platforms to “return to Europe,” electoral support for democratic reformers will continue. One message of the Autumn 1993 Polish elections that returned post-communists to power was that the Suchocka government could not demonstrate successful integration into Western institutions, not just NATO but also EU. The same applies to the May 1994 elections in Hungary.

If PFP is to meet Central Europe’s international and domestic needs, it must muster enough political and financial power to visibly strengthen the platforms of democratic reformers. PFP will otherwise postpone a decision that NATO has avoided—whether to grant membership to Central Europe. As all new democracies in the East are at risk, the NATO summit may have lost valuable time by not bolstering reform-minded leaders. If PFP fails to generate visible programs, NATO’s prestige, influence, and support may be lost on future CEE leaders and their societies. For such projects to succeed, however, financial resources will be necessary.

Civil-Military Relations. Because PFP seeks to develop military cooperation which will ultimately lead to participation in CJTF, political participation is secondary. By stressing military rather than political forms of cooperation, PFP requires the military to develop partnerships with unintended consequences. First, PFP favors states with strong military traditions and institutions (it is easier for Poland to allocate defense resources than Lithuania). Second, civilian control over the military is a new experiment for partners and is tenuous at best. By pushing the military to the fore, PFP jars Central Europe’s civilian efforts to control the military. Thus, rather than stressing common values and developing the political pillar of partner cooperation, PFP has elevated the role of the military in domestic affairs and promoted the military pillar in Alliance cooperation.

To mollify the negative impact of PFP it will be necessary to emphasize its political content. Hence, not only should contact among foreign and defense ministers continue, but partner summits should be convened. PFP member states should participate on Alliance committees, and programs should be developed to encourage sub-regional cooperation.

Security Perception—Ideals and Reality. At best, PFP tends to hedge against the possible contingency of Russia turning sour. At worst, it perpetuates an ideal which Central Europeans perceive as an illusion—a Europe that may no longer exist. In the wake of the 1989 revolutions, budding democratic institutions led to euphoria and an idealized image of a “unified” Europe. By making the criteria and time-lines for NATO admission vague, PFP perpetuates an idealized image of an undivided democratic Europe and ignores the realities facing Central and East Europeans.

Central Europeans already see a divided Europe, believing that democratic reform has failed in most of the former Soviet Union, that various forms of authoritarian rule are likely to remain for the foreseeable future, that Russia is pursuing an imperial foreign policy which threatens security, and that their democratic governments are all at risk. For these reasons and others, PFP could fail if it is not carefully implemented. If PFP fails to enhance sub-regional cooperation and stability, provide visible programs which strengthen democratic reformers, bolster civilian control over the military, and enhance psychological and physical security, then NATO likely will be forced to take a position on membership—probably sooner rather than later.

One drawback of expansion in a crisis scenario is that NATO would lose the potential deterrent effect provided by early expansion (for instance, preventing crises from occurring in the first place). Those who argue against expansion claim that it will precipitate the rise of nationalists in Moscow and thus are blind to the deterrent effect of Russian threats and expansion. The split is between those who see NATO expansion as a catalyst for Russian “lawlessness” and others who see it as a deterrent against Russian expansion.²⁷

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Strategic Implications of Expansion

Any NATO expansion has significant sub-regional and strategic implications. PFP extends NATO's article 4 right of security consultations (but not article 5 security guarantees) to all willing NACC members and non-NACC neutrals who sign "partnership" agreements with NATO. For an unspecified period a partner would channel defense efforts in participation with NATO into a broad range of multilateral missions such as search and rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management. Then when a partner is able to contribute to NATO force goals and has demonstrated adherence to democratic values, it can become a full NATO member and acquire the article 5 guarantee.

By stressing the above factors, the PFP approach tends to ignore specific criteria for NATO admission, the time needed to achieve those standards, and the strategic and stability impact of the sequencing of CEE members. If criteria for admission were clear, they could provide standards for electorates to judge performance and legitimize the programs of regional leaders. Sequencing membership is also likely to significantly impact on continuing cooperation with neighboring states excluded from the initial round of expansion. For this reason, when NATO does decide to expand it should consider admitting blocs of states (for example, the Visegrad group, Bulgaria/Romania in the Balkans, or the three Baltics) to limit destabilization.

Three variables will affect regional and sub-regional stability during expansion: the number of members admitted; timing admissions, either simultaneous or step-by-step; and, if step-by-step, the sequence. In other words, the order of admission may inadvertently undermine CEE stability. Simultaneously admitting the Visegrad members, for example, encourages and rewards multilateral sub-regional cooperation over competition. Multilateral cooperation is better than bilateral because of peer pressure in moderating cleavages. The inclusion of Slovakia (with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) is important because of its central location. Slovakia is the only Visegrad state to border on all others and is therefore crucial in developing the group as a strategically defensible bloc. The timing of admission should be simultaneous. Sequencing acceptance of those countries

over a long period is likely to exacerbate differences and ethnic tension,²⁸ undermine cooperation, and alienate precisely those members who we most want to moderate.

Overall, U.S. bilateral and multilateral PFP policy should consciously encourage Visegrad sub-regional cooperation. It should guard against policies that inadvertently divide the group and turn them into competitors. Also, American policy should ensure that other Western institutions (such as EU and WEU) support these goals.

What if NATO decides to admit only Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic? Without Slovakia, geostrategic problems would emerge. First, this would result in Slovakia's alienation from the West; the Slovak-Czech border fault line would become a fissure, with reverberations to Ukraine. Second, assuming that Austria has not joined NATO, Hungary would not share a border with any NATO member and would become a NATO "island."²⁹ Third, because Hungary has Trianon treaty-related issues with three neighbors—namely, Vojvodina (Serbia), Romania, and Slovakia—ethnic divisiveness would be exacerbated. Since Bucharest and Bratislava would likely fear Budapest's future "blackball," sub-regional competition and tension could result.

And if NATO admits only Poland and the Czech Republic? While some might make a case for accepting them since they are ethnically homogenous and would address Germany's first line of eastern security, it would alienate Hungary and isolate Slovakia. Also, NATO would likely lose leverage in moderating ethnic issues among those states and Romania. Any sub-regional Visegrad cooperation would be destroyed and local competition heightened. And if NATO decides against expansion? The result could be sub-regional cooperation of a new kind. If PFP is unsuccessful in moderating the skepticism of CEE leaders, and their expectations for a "return to Europe" remain unfulfilled, PFP could be perceived as another Western "betrayal" of the region like those of 1938, 1948, 1956, and 1968. Western-oriented leaders would be undermined, thereby setting the stage for a return of post-communist or, even worse, right-wing nationalist leaders.

If EU trade barriers continue to have negative impact on the economies of CEE, and NATO increasingly becomes irrelevant to regional security interests, Western rejection and the fear of both Germany and Russia may lead to a new kind of cooperation. When Central and East Europeans think of a Europe without NATO, three alternatives come to mind: first, cooperating with Germany and France to form a triple alliance which would mean German dominance; second, maintaining Atlantic linkages by cooperating with America and Britain; and third, seeking entente with Russia and, in striking the best possible deal with Moscow, accepting "Finlandization with a human face."

The June 1994 NATO summit which approved PFP may prove to be a watershed. Despite its limitations, if PFP receives adequate resources and is implemented properly, it will reinvigorate the Alliance and foster a new European security architecture. But if PFP is not launched properly, it could well undermine European security and unravel NATO as well.

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NOTES

¹ NATO Information Service, *London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, July 5–6, 1990), articles 7 and 8.

² See Stephen F. Szabo, "Federal Republic of Germany: The *Bundeswehr*," in Jeffrey Simon, editor, *European Security Policy After the Revolutions of 1989* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1991), pp. 189–206.

³ "Statement issued by the North Atlantic Council meeting in Ministerial Session," Copenhagen, June 6–7, 1991, in *NATO Communiques 1991* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992), pp. 22–23.

⁴ North Atlantic Council statement, August 21, 1991, in *NATO Communiques 1991*, pp. 24–25.

⁵ *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, NATO press communique S-1(91) 86, November 8, 1991, article 11, pp. 4–5.

⁶ For a thorough overview, see Stephen J. Flanagan, "NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: From Liaison to Security Partnership," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 15, no. 2 (Spring 1992).

⁷ "Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation," NATO press communique M-NACC-1 (92) 21, March 10, 1992.

⁸ "Final communique issued by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session," NATO press communique M-NAC-1 (92) 51, June 4, 1992, p. 4.

⁹ "Statement issued at the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Oslo, Norway," NATO press communique M-NACC-1 (92) 54, June 5, 1992, p. 2.

¹⁰ "Final communique issued by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session," NATO press communique M-NAC-2 (92) 106, December 17, 1992, p. 2.

¹¹ "Statement issued by the meeting of Defense Ministers," NATO press communique M-DMCP-1 (93) 28, March 29, 1993, p. 3.

¹² "Final communique issued by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session," NATO press communique M-NAC-1 (93) 38, June 10, 1993, pp. 2–3.

¹³ "Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping," NATO press release M-NACC-1 (93) 40, June 11, 1993, pp. 8–11.

¹⁴ "Statement issued by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Ministerial Session," NATO press communique M-NACC-1 (93) 39, June 11, 1993, p. 1.

¹⁵ "NACC High Level Seminar on Peacekeeping," NATO press release (93) 45, June 25, 1993.

¹⁶ Jeffrey Simon, "Czechoslovakia's 'Velvet Divorce,' Visegrad Cohesion, and European Fault Lines," McNair paper 23 (Washington: National Defense University Press, October 1993).

¹⁷ "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government issued by the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, Belgium," NATO press communique M-1 (94) 3, January 11, 1994, pp. 2–3; the declaration stressed development of separable but not separate capabilities.

¹⁸ NATO's January 11, 1994 declaration noted that: "We expect and welcome NATO expansion that would reach democratic states to our east, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe." *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²⁰ The deputy defense ministers and foreign ministers met in October 1990 to coordinate policy. In February 1991 Presidents Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa and Prime Minister Jozsef Antall met in Visegrad, Hungary to determine forms of "triangle" cooperation.

²¹ For a summary, see Joshua Spero, "The Budapest-Prague-Warsaw Triangle: Central European Security After the Visegrad Summit," *European Security*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 58–83.

²² The Krakow declaration stressed association with EC as a priority and called for "the speediest conclusion of discussions about associate status in EC." See *European Security*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 104–08, for the text.

²³ The agreements were signed on December 16, 1991. Warsaw TVP, *FBIS-EEU-91-242* (December 17, 1991), p. 2. After the "velvet divorce" Czechs and Slovaks renegotiated the agreements on June 15, 1993.

²⁴ Communique, Budapest MTI, May 6, 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-089* (May 7, 1992), p. 3.

²⁵ For the full text of Yeltsin's secret letter on NATO expansion, see *Mlada Fronta Dnes* (Prague), December 2, 1993, p. 6.

²⁶ Henry Kissinger, "Be Realistic About Russia," *The Washington Post*, January 25, 1994, p. A19.

²⁷ William Odom notes that PFP (read *non-expansion*) "provides a vehicle for reactionary Russian leaders to cause trouble within NATO"; see *The Boston Globe*, January 11, 1994, p. 15.

²⁸ Ethnic tensions between Hungary and Romania would likely become more intense.

²⁹ This is a consequence of the January 1, 1993 division of the former Czechoslovakia.