IN BRIEF

JTFs: Some Practical Implications

By SUSAN J. FLORES

Last summer the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University held a symposium on "Standing Up a Joint Task Force" which focused on establishing, tailoring, training, and employing a joint task force (JTF). The discussions dealt with the services, CINCs, and Joint Staff as well as the role of U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) as the joint force integrator.

What are the key functional areas to address in standing up a JTF? How does planning and executing tasks in these areas impact on the outcome of a JTF mission? How do the areas interact? The functional areas consist of intelligence, planning, logistics, medical, C⁴, training, personnel, resources, force management, and interfaces. The issues considered by symposium participants to be pivotal in the successful accomplishment of a JTF mission fell under six categories: command and control, doctrine, information management, interfaces, JTF missions, and training/education.

Command and Control

The area of command and control is undoubtedly at the center of mission accomplishment. To develop these capabilities in a JTF, headquarters must use *real* participants in training evolution when possible. Links between billet-holders and their counterparts build teamwork which cannot be developed if stand-ins are used in training. The most cost-effective and performance-oriented scenarios include real staff members and JTF players developing relationships required for mission accomplishment. Virtual

training cannot supplant real training with actual participants.

There are some difficulties in defining a proper chain of command today. When operations involve other nations or agencies unity of command is more difficult. JTF commanders should not only be conscious of mission responsibilities, but also of the duty to translate the risks and options identified in the planning process up the chain so that nonmilitary leaders understand the military implications of their actions. Specifically, if JTF commanders translate risks into potential losses and expenditure of resources, this information should be passed to the leadership.

Doctrine

The subject of doctrine attracted a good deal of attention during the symposium, particularly its role in the training cycle. There was little agreement on those adjustments needed to offer better doctrinal guid-

ance to leaders of JTFs. Some complained that there is too much doctrine and others too little. Between these two extremes were those who indicated that the scope and the specificity of doctrine needs work. There was a sense that significant voids exist in doctrine and that a better framework with common definitions and procedural recommendations is required. Comments also pointed to the need to integrate such information into planning and executing missions.

Participants were reminded that CINCs vote on doctrinal topics so the resulting pubs reflect their input. In the discussion one participant asserted that there was no need for

Lieutenant Colonel Susan J. Flores, USMC, is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

Report Documentation Page

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE **1995**	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED **00-00-1995 to 00-00-1995**

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE **JTFs: Some Practical Implications**	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) **National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,260 Fifth Ave SW Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319**	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT **unclassified**	b. ABSTRACT **unclassified**	c. THIS PAGE **unclassified**	**Same as Report (SAR)**	**3**	

C–130s, F–16s, and C–141s on flight line for JTF–180.

U.S. Air Force (Betty Tsosie)

UH–60 Blackhawk dropping off scouts.

U.S. Air Force (Russ Pollanen)

Joint Pub 4–06, *JTTP for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations,* while another stated that in Desert Storm there was such a need. But since it is a CINC's responsibility to return bodies from the theater, and service logistics channels must be used, this publication deconflicts roles and provides a sound framework to ensure the smooth transportation of deceased Americans back home.

Other publications identified as being in need of improvement are Joint Pub 3–0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, and Joint Pub 5–0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*. Some participants felt that Joint Pub 3–0 was cobbled together and offers little guidance on interfaces and integration. The discussion of the time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) in Joint Pub 5–0 also was cited as needing improvement. This document is normally sponsored and prepared by the J–5 in a joint command; yet it is logisticians who must execute much of it. And it is logisticians who suffer most of the criticism if materiel does not flow to a theater in the proper priorities. Again, interfaces and integration are vital in managing this important planning tool.

Finally, there was a discussion of joint doctrine as a catalyst in generating a joint culture. Many felt that the actual development of such a culture is key to the better planning and execution of JTFs. Although service cultures are important to successful mission execution by components, it is a joint culture that will enhance joint planning and execution and strengthen the interfaces and integration processes in all functional areas.

Information

Proper receipt, tailoring, and use of information affects how well the JTF commander can influence actions in the conduct of his mission. Information impacts on command and control as well as on interfaces. And as handled by the media it also impacts on mission accomplishment. Passing ever larger amounts of information begets command and control-interface burdens. In the information age, there is such a thing as too much data, a glut that overwhelms JTF ability to filter input to determine what is mission essential.

There were differing views expressed on what information should be passed up the chain of command, how much should be provided, and what channels to follow. For example, a JTF surgeon has functional responsibilities to pass medical information that may conflict with certain prerogatives of the commander. Does a surgeon pass this information through his own functional channels? Should he always clear it through the commander first? Should it all go up through the command channels vice functional channels to ensure unity of purpose and reporting in the JTF? Many functional managers find themselves in this dilemma. The issue is compounded if the force is multinational and the event political, since there are several chains—multinational, national level politico-military including the National Command Authorities (NCA), and national theater level. All channels want to exert proprietary control over a commander's information and input. Finally, this situation could tempt a JTF commander to consider not forwarding information up the chain of command. Though blasphemy, there are advantages to not having direct connectivity to the NCA.

The JTF commander does not usually have command and control over all the governmental and nongovernmental organizations in his area of responsibility. He has no tasking authority and little ability to influence these players. One of his strongest tools is the power of information. It is through the coordination process that players are brought together to share useful information and that the commander gains a level of influence and cooperation among many of these entities.

Interfaces

Most participants thought the term *interfaces* meant *all* interfaces—with multinational forces as well as both governmental and nongovernmental agencies, up and down the chain of command, across organizational lines to parallel commands, and among staffs within various commands.

In training JTF headquarters, particular attention must be paid to

staff positions that require an interface, since it is interface points and the management of information through them that often cause problems and inefficiencies in conducting JTF missions. Responsibility for positions should be identified, and individuals involved should be regularly trained and exercised. Where possible, they should be familiar with their counterparts in other staff elements, commands, and agencies. Assignments should be made with continuity and stability in mind, and individuals should not be frequently moved. Personnel turbulence at interface points hurts efficiency and effectiveness.

In terms of logistics, it is not only interfaces that matter; more important is the integration of operational plans and other information into logistic plans that provides the best logistic support. Further, a key interface point for this support is at the theater/strategic level, where joint theater logistic planners must be able to coordinate with service logistic providers. The greatest successes or failures in logistic support are determined here. If the JTF logistics function cannot tap into the theater/strategic logistic interface, it loses what can be mission-essential support. Both service and joint responsibilities are vital to a healthy interface.

Cautionary Notes

The NCA need not stand up a JTF for every contingency. There are occasions when one service or department can handle a crisis, and forming a JTF simply for the sake of jointness violates the principle of simplicity. Forming JTFs with service components as foundations means changing the mindset of component staff members, which normally does not occur easily or rapidly. Once a decision is made to stand up a JTF, the commander needs to rapidly promote a joint focus, and the staff needs to be promptly peopled with multiservice expertise.

The term *ad hoc* can have negative and positive meanings. Some participants thought that it was a pejorative term suggesting a lack of planning and preparation, that various elements of a JTF had been thrown together at the last minute. Others thought it was synonymous with flexibility, the way in which elements of a JTF can be rapidly tailored to fit a specific mission. These individuals said that new concepts such as adaptive joint force packaging were merely the further development of a process of providing flexibility in the tailoring of a force for a mission.

Planners also need to think about JTF mission planning and execution in nontraditional or nonstandard ways. There are many missions that do not fit into the traditional mold and cannot be planned and executed using traditional norms. For example, it may be helpful to think of interagency task forces as a JTF variant in any operation where other governmental agencies have large roles. JTF planning routinely *excludes* other agencies because it is not customary to open the planning process to outsiders, a reluctance that must be overcome if JTFs are to succeed in interagency and multinational environments.

Training and Education

It is through joint training and education that a viable joint culture will be developed. The education community should start at the intermediate college level teaching doctrine in curricula that are systemic versus single service in focus. It is establishing doctrine as the framework for joint operations that will inculcate joint culture in the minds of all personnel. But there is a caution here. Many members of the joint community believe that one cannot be an effective joint officer without first being proficient in the core capabilities of one's own service. In other words, how can service expertise be provided in a joint planning framework without knowledge of service capabilities?

Many JTFs are stood up to respond to international crises that require a quick reaction, the first 16 to 72 hours being critical in planning. The key to quick mission execution is the level of training reached by the JTF staff. Again, interface points are critical in effective mission planning. To *train to plan* well, the staff must actually *plan in training*.

Whatever training system is ultimately designed for JTFs, it must be mission-focused since training responds to operational requirements. If mission requirements are identified then the focus can be put on tasks, conditions, and standards to be established. As the force integrator ACOM will be intimately involved in this process.

Each of these themes impacted on the functional areas raised during the symposium. There was considerable cross-discussion among the panelists on these topics, which would suggest the close relationship and interconnectivity that functional areas have on each other. In addition, there are also several fairly clear messages that can be derived.

The more complexity that is built into a chain of command, the more difficult successful command and control becomes. Training that uses real billetholders in actual planning exercises is most effective in finding successful means of dealing with complex command structures. Further doctrine development and integration is required, along with continued development of a distinctive joint culture to facilitate through informal cultural channels those tasks that must be done through formal working channels. With the advent of the information age, managing voluminous amounts of information available to the JTF commander is vital. Working interfaces are crucial at all levels. While flexibility can be beneficial, training and exercising the functional areas with their interfaces enhances a JTF's ability to perform missions. There are a number of creative approaches in use to accomplish JTF training and exercises. There is no right way. CINCs who have developed useful training procedures for JTFs should employ them. And there is still plenty of room to engage the joint force integrator, ACOM. Every successful training plan increases JTF effectiveness. **JFQ**