

ISSUES FOR ENGAGEMENT:

Asian Perspectives
on Transnational
Security Challenges



ASIA-PACIFIC CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 2010	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2010 to 00-00-2010			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Issues for Engagement: Asian Perspectives on Transnational Security Challenges		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S)		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2058 Maluhia Rd, Honolulu, HI, 96815		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified	Same as Report (SAR)	91	

Table of Contents

Foreward.....	5
Editor’s Introduction.....	6
Russia’s Transnational Security: Challenges, Policies, and International Cooperation <i>by Rouben Azizian</i>	21
The Perfect Storm? Thailand’s Security Predicament <i>by Miemie Winn Byrd</i>	35
Transnational Security Threats to Indonesia <i>by James R. Campbell</i>	48
Cambodia’s Transnational Security Challenges <i>by Jessica H. S. Ear</i>	63
US-Oceania Security Cooperation in the Post 9/11 World: Whose Agendas and Priorities? <i>by Gerard A. Finin</i>	77
Japan’s Transnational Security Agenda <i>by David Fouse</i>	90
Republic of Korea: Meeting the Challenge of Transnational Threats in the Twenty-first Century <i>by Steven Kim</i>	104
Afghanistan at a Crossroads: Transnational Challenges and the New Afghan State <i>by Kerry Lynn Nankivell</i>	117
Transnational Security Challenges in India <i>by Rollie Lal</i>	128
Perceptions of Transnational Security Threat in Malaysia and Singapore: Windows of Cooperative Opportunities for the United States <i>by Yoichiro Sato</i>	140
Sri Lanka: Transnational Security and Postinsurgency Issues <i>by Shyam Tekwani</i>	154
Vietnamese Perspectives on Transnational Security Challenges <i>by Alexander Vuving</i>	167

Published 2010 by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

Cover photo by Soumik Kar

For reprint permissions, contact the editors at the
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies,
2058 Maluhia Road, Honolulu, Hawaii 96815.

All views expressed in the chapters of this book are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies or those of any governmental agency.

ISBN 978-0-9719416-2-5

Foreward

Ed Smith
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Retired
Director, Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies

At the end of the first decade of the Twenty-first Century, various transnational security challenges appear in much of the world. The continuing challenge for security officials and others assessing what is happening is to understand comprehensively not only the facts related to situations at hand and anticipated ahead, but also various perspectives on what is occurring as well as opportunities for useful collaboration and cooperation.

To help in that regard, faculty members at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) have endeavored to gather in this volume a series of perspectives from the Asia-Pacific region. The resulting product of their efforts, in the form of this collection of essays, entitled *Issues for Engagement: Asian Perspectives on Transnational Security Challenges*, is intended to offer perspectives APCSS faculty have gathered from recent travels and other intersections with diverse groups dealing with these challenges regularly.

As you would expect the common thread is the diversity of perspectives, leading to various strategies, policies and actions to accomplish national objectives related to prioritized security challenges. If cooperation is to be realized with results beneficial to all or most, a continuing exchange and careful study of these evolving perspectives is necessary.

In support of the Center's continuing attempt to contribute to enhanced cooperation for the common good of all, I am pleased to offer this publication to help advance our continuing discussion of select complex security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region.

Editor's Introduction

David Fouse

This introductory chapter has five specific objectives. First, it summarizes an ongoing debate within the global security community over what constitutes security in the world today. The aim of this discussion is not to settle this debate, but rather to contextualize the views of security professionals from all over the globe with regard to the emergence and/or intensification of a wide variety of transnational security challenges. Secondly, this chapter addresses US policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. The emphasis is that regardless of where one places transnational security issues in terms of US national security priorities, US policy currently promotes active engagement with the Asia-Pacific region, and that to engage in a manner seen as beneficial to all parties will require careful scrutiny of the needs and perspectives of those who live in the region. The third objective is to discuss the unique position of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) as a conduit for regional security dialogue and a filter through which Asia-Pacific security priorities can be channeled. The goal of this volume, to provide insights from our assessment of the importance of transnational security challenges in the national security priorities of a wide range of Asia-Pacific nations, is explained in section three. In the fourth section of this chapter, the results of an electronic poll of APCSS alumni on the importance of a wide variety of transnational security challenges are presented, highlighting the significant differences that can be observed among the priorities of the various subregions of the Asia-Pacific. Finally the chapter concludes with a summary discussion of some of the crosscutting themes that emerged from the individual country level analyses.

I. The (not so) New Security Debate

The global security community is currently involved in a wide-ranging debate about the significance of emerging transnational security challenges. This debate has been ongoing for more than twenty years, receiving enhanced impetus with the end of the Cold War and more recently with the rise of international terrorism. The debate within security circles has pitted those who continue to view traditional state-to-state rivalry and conflict as the preeminent concern of national policymakers against a growing chorus of voices emphasizing the need to expand the

concept of national security to address a wide variety of transnational security challenges that require multilateral cooperation and coordination to resolve. Concerns about global climate change, environmental degradation, pandemics, resource scarcity, demographic shifts, terrorism and organized crime predate the end of the Cold War but have received increasing attention as the probability of a great power nuclear conflict has receded.

Another factor contributing to the rising importance of transnational security challenges is the increasing pace of globalization. In addition to bringing opportunities and benefits to many of the world's people, globalization also has brought new risks and associated costs. For example, modern advances in communications, transportation and commerce that have fostered economic growth, social exchange and political integration can also be conduits for transnational security threats.ⁱ Sometimes referred to as the "dark side" of globalization, advances in global integration have made it easier for those involved in illicit trafficking, money laundering and terrorism to evade the reach of national governments.ⁱⁱ Further, the global impacts of infectious disease, environmental degradation, resource scarcity and economic distress all have been magnified as the barriers between countries have been lowered.ⁱⁱⁱ

For those advocating an expanded view of security, the key is not to focus on any one particular transnational threat but rather to understand the overlapping and interactive effects that various challenges can pose at the individual, national and global levels. Jessica Matthews, in her much-debated 1989 *Foreign Affairs* article "Redefining Security," argued that unresolved issues of resource scarcity and population growth that result in economic decline could spark domestic unrest or "make countries ripe for authoritarian government or external subversion."^{iv} Five years later Robert Kaplan's controversial article, "The Coming Anarchy," invoked West Africa as a symbol of "worldwide demographic, environmental and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real strategic danger."^v Kaplan's message, while certainly not universally accepted, did help to garner additional attention for the UN Development Program's attempt to introduce the concept of "human security" in its 1994 Human Development Report. The notion that security should be conceived globally, with the focus on individual human beings, meant "both a horizontal extension of the parameters of security policy to include an even larger set of problems, such as poverty, epidemics, political injustice,

natural disasters, crime, social discrimination, and unemployment, as well as a vertical extension of the traditional referent object of security policy to above and below the nation-state.”^{vi} As Amitav Acharya has argued, the development of the human security concept has strong roots in the Asia-Pacific, though the emphasis in the East has tended toward “freedom from want” whereas the West has promoted “freedom from fear”.^{vii}

As more researchers took an interest in a wider view of security, assessments across the globe were carried out. Alan Dupont’s *East Asia Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to Security*, while clearly less apocalyptic in tone than Kaplan, argued that a failure to reverse the decline in energy, food and water sufficiency, as well as increases in HIV transmission, drug addiction and people-smuggling, “will have overwhelmingly negative outcomes for peace and stability in the region.”^{vii}

Dupont is among those who have criticized the dominant realist school in international relations theory for focusing too narrowly on issues related to interstate warfare. Critics such as Dupont argue that because realism puts too much emphasis on territory and national boundaries, new threats caused by the cross-border flow of money, information, infectious diseases and environmental degradation do not receive enough attention. Critics argue that both classical realists and contemporary neorealists view economic vulnerabilities and strengths primarily in terms of strategic control and war-fighting potential rather than as fundamental security issues. Dupont, and others like him, see the need for an “extended realism” that gives sufficient weight to the combined threat of these challenges, not only because of the cost to individuals, but also in terms of weakening states and increasing the tensions of interstate relations.^{ix}

Realists and others who have a skeptical view of broadening the concept of security often have pointed to the problems of making security in this sense operational, emphasizing the need for governments to prioritize among a diverse array of possible threats.^x Some would argue that the end of the Cold War has been overrated; great power confrontations are not obsolete but rather in the “down phase” of a cyclical pattern that will eventually return. Such viewpoints posit that emerging powers and rogue states continue to challenge the international order, and that policymakers turn attention away from these threats at their own peril.^{xi}

The debate between realists and “the transnational challenges school” is a significant aspect of current US strategic thinking and US policy

toward the Asia-Pacific region, with most American strategists differing in terms of degree of emphasis, rather than the outright denial of the importance of issues on either side.^{xii}

This volume does not attempt to settle this debate but rather to identify areas of particular concern for the Asia-Pacific region and, where possible, to offer suggestions on how the United States might engage these countries to our mutual benefit.

II. Transnational Security Challenges and US Asia Policy

The US government’s interest in transnational security challenges was evident well before the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Soon after taking office in 1992, the Clinton administration signaled its interest in “new” security issues by creating several new offices in traditional areas of the government. These included a national intelligence officer for global and multilateral issues, a deputy undersecretary of defense for environmental issues and an undersecretary for global affairs at the State Department. The National Security Council also added a new Directorate for Global and Environmental Issues, which attempted to integrate environmental considerations throughout the NSC’s decision-making process.^{xiii}

The Clinton administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) of 1997 moved the issue of transnational challenges closer to the forefront of US policy. The 1997 NSS named transnational threats, including terrorism, the illegal drug trade, illegal arms trafficking, international organized crime, uncontrolled refugee migrations and environmental damage as “threats to US interests” on par with regional or state-centered threats and threats from weapons of mass destruction.^{xiv} However, there was often disparity between these policy pronouncements and comparable levels of funding and policy initiatives during a period of declining public and congressional support for foreign engagement.^{xv}

Clearly, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001 helped to galvanize US strategic thought and resources to combat transnational security challenges. These events moved the threat of terrorism—and the danger of weak states that can become vulnerable to terrorist networks—to the highest level of priority in US security policy.^{xvi} The corollaries of this shift in US security priorities for US Asia policy during the Bush administration led to mixed reviews. The new emphasis on nonstate actors as primary security concerns provided the United States

and major powers such as China and Russia (both having their own reasons to be concerned with the terrorist threat) with a stabilizing framework from which to engage each other despite deep differences over many other strategic concerns.^{xvii} At the same time, some US allies in the region grew concerned that US preoccupation with counterterrorism was resulting in inadequate attention to regional security dynamics, including the pace of Chinese military modernization.^{xviii}

The designation of Southeast Asia as a “second front” in what was then described as the “war on terror,” in conjunction with a new awareness of China’s growing influence in the region, led to what Catherine Dalpino has described as “a modest renaissance in US bilateral relations with Southeast Asia.”^{xix} The focus on increased intelligence cooperation, new economic and military assistance, and expanded military-to-military ties between the United States and certain Southeast Asian countries, while significant, was not enough to overcome the view in some quarters that Southeast Asian concerns and regional developments were being overshadowed by US preoccupation with the Middle East.^{xx} Additionally, major initiatives developed by the Bush administration to enhance economic and trade relations with Southeast Asia, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Cooperation Plan, the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative, the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership, and the US-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, were sometimes viewed as reactions to improvements in China-ASEAN relations.^{xxi} The sense of marginalization felt by some in Southeast Asia was fostered when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice decided not to attend the 2005 and 2007 annual meetings of the ASEAN Regional Forum and when a US-ASEAN summit was canceled in 2007.^{xxii}

In her recent “Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities,” Secretary of State Clinton indicated that the failure of the United States to participate in these annual meetings demonstrated “a lack of respect and a willingness to engage.”^{xxiii} The Obama administration has indicated that it intends to actively engage the region over a wider variety of issues, dealing both with traditional interstate rivalries and a “range of diverse, unconventional threats that transcend national borders.”^{xxiv} Secretary of Defense Robert Gates articulated the US position at the May 2009 Shangri-la Dialogue, stating: “It has become clear in just the last two decades that “security” encompasses more than just military considerations. An economic crisis can become a security crisis. A lack of good governance can undermine order and stability. Under pressure from

criminals or disease, weak states can become failed states.”^{xxv}

Secretary Gates’s characterization of the United States as a “resident power” in the Asia-Pacific region during his May 2008 remarks to the Shangri-la Dialogue has been adopted by the Obama administration in symbolizing a reinvigorated US engagement strategy for the region. US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell, articulated this theme in his recent statement, “Principles of US Engagement in the Asia-Pacific” during testimony before the US Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs:

The Asia-Pacific region is of vital and permanent importance to the United States and it is clear that countries in the region want the United States to maintain a strong and active presence. We need to ensure that the United States is a resident power and not just a visitor, because what happens in the region has a direct effect on our security and well-being. Over the course of the next few decades climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and widespread poverty will pose the most significant challenges to the United States and the rest of the region. These challenges are and will continue to be the most acute in East Asia. This situation not only suggests a need for the United States to play a leading role in addressing these challenges, but it also indicates a need to strengthen and broaden alliances, build new partnerships, and enhance capacity of multilateral organizations in the region. Fundamental to this approach will be continued encouragement of China’s peaceful rise and integration into the international system. A forward-looking strategy that builds on these relationships and US strengths as a democracy and a Pacific power is essential to manage both regional and increasingly global challenges.^{xxvi}

The Obama administration’s first year has seen a number of high-level diplomatic visits to the region, including President Obama’s visit to Singapore in November 2009 to convene the first US-ASEAN Summit meeting. Secretary of State Clinton’s first diplomatic trip was to Asia, and she attended the 14th ASEAN summit in Thailand from 28 February to 1 March 2009. Very early in his administration President Obama appointed a special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, emphasizing the need for diplomatic solutions to the complex problems plaguing this region. The administration’s decision to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in July 2009 has been well received in Southeast Asia and should allow

the United States to attend meetings of the East Asia Summit.

As for concrete initiatives for engaging the region, the Obama administration hosted the first US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July 2009 with follow-up discussions planned for 2010. Also in July 2009 the United States launched an initiative that creates a formal partnership between the Mississippi River Commission and the Mekong River Commission, a cooperative management organization involving Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.^{xxvii}

One of the central aims of this volume is to point in the direction of further possibilities “for America to enhance, deepen, and sustain our engagement to seize opportunities and minimize risk.”^{xxviii}

III. Goals and Methods

The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies maintains a constant and continuing dialogue with government officials, security practitioners and subject matter experts of the Asia-Pacific region over a wide range of security issues through its in-house educational programs, outreach activities and research. Through our research and publications program we seek to ensure that the insights derived from this dialogue are conveyed to policymakers in the United States and in the Asia-Pacific region.

This volume attempts to bolster our efforts in this regard by identifying the major transnational security challenges facing ten Asia-Pacific countries, Oceania and Afghanistan, a country that has had a large effect on the region. Authors in this volume were asked to answer a number of questions, including: What are the most significant transnational security challenges facing this country? How do transnational security challenges stack up against traditional security threats for the country’s security planners? What steps has the country taken unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally to cope with these challenges? What are the most important “next steps” for this country to take? Are the transnational security challenges this country faces of any consequence for the United States? Is the country in question interested in engaging with the United States to deal with these issues?

Each author was asked to discuss the governmental priorities in the country under study with respect to transnational security challenges and to assess whether these priorities and the resources applied sufficiently address the threats posed by these issues today. In this context APCSS faculty authors explored how emerging transnational security challenges

may influence the changing security environment of the region and US relationships (including alliances and strategic partnerships) in the Asia-Pacific region during coming years, providing US policymakers with up-to-date insights for engaging countries on issues of significant concern across the region.

The first step in the research for this project was carried out in June–July of 2009. During this period APCSS conducted an online survey of its alumni regarding their views on the most pressing transnational challenges in their own countries as well as the best means for addressing these issues. The results of this survey (discussed below) were then distributed to APCSS faculty authors as background for writing the individual country analyses. Over the summer of 2009 most of the faculty authors then traveled to the region to conduct face-to-face interviews with government officials and subject matter experts in countries covered in this volume, supplementing the information they have gained through their day-to-day contact with Asia-Pacific security practitioners and analysts here at the Center. The chapters that follow represent the culmination of this process.

IV. Alumni Survey Results

The APCSS electronic survey of its alumni base on “Transnational Security Challenges” was carried out from June–July 2009. Some two hundred of our alumni, composed primarily of mid-level government officials, law enforcement and military officers from forty-six nations in the Asia-Pacific region, responded to the survey.^{xxix} The tables below provide a look at the survey results across the various subregions, highlighting the differences and commonalities in the perceived security priorities of the Asia-Pacific.

Table 1 Framing Questions

As Table 1 indicates, Northeast Asia is the only subregion where interstate security is the top concern. As discussed in chapters by Azizian on Russia, Fouse on Japan and Kim on South Korea, Northeast Asian security priorities still lie in the area of traditional state rivalries, although transnational challenges have been integrated into security strategy at varying levels. Table one also indicates that internal security is the highest priority in both South and Southeast Asia, followed by concerns over transnational security challenges. Chapters by Vuving on Vietnam and

Table 1: Framing Questions

		Southeast Asia (%)	South Asia (%)	Northeast Asia (%)	Oceania (%)
Country's most important security challenge?	State to State	5.1	6.2	55.6	15.0
	Internal Security	57.7	63.1	11.1	40.0
	Transnational Security	37.2	30.8	33.3	45.0
Most effective approach to dealing w/ Transnational Challenges?	Global	27.3	28.1	15.4	20.0
	Regional (Asia-Pacific)	36.4	29.7	57.7	50.0
	Subregional	36.4	42.2	26.9	30.0
Country interested in working w/ U.S.?	no interest			3.8	
	a little interest	5.3	4.6	7.7	
	fairly interested	34.2	44.6	19.2	10.0
	very interested	60.5	50.8	69.2	90.0

Byrd on Thailand discuss this tendency among Southeast Asian countries to focus on the maintenance of domestic stability, which can sometimes undermine the ability of these governments to confront other emerging challenges. Our alumni in Oceania rated transnational security challenges as their number one security priority, followed closely by internal security.

Table one also indicates that our alumni have diverse views regarding how to most effectively deal with transnational security challenges, whether global, regional or subregional. Northeast Asian alumni do appear to favor a regional (Asia-Pacific) approach, while there is slightly more emphasis on finding a subregional approach among the South Asian alumni respondents. Each of the subregions indicates a strong interest in working with the United States to deal with transnational security challenges. Oceania, the subregion with the fewest resources of its own, demonstrates the greatest interest.

Table 2 High-Profile Transnational Issues

Alumni rankings of three transnational security challenges that have received significant media attention in recent years are listed in table two. This table indicates that there is a great deal of variation across the subregions in terms of the gravity of concern regarding terrorism, climate change, and infectious diseases. While strong majorities of our alumni respondents in South Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania view terrorism as “very important,” only 17 percent of our Northeast Asia alumni felt the same about this issue. Tekwani’s chapter on Sri Lanka demonstrates that despite the government’s recent victory over the Tamil Tigers, the threat of

Table 2: High Profile Transnational Challenges

		Southeast Asia (%)	South Asia (%)	Northeast Asia (%)	Oceania (%)
Terrorism	not important	1.3		13.0	
	of little importance	10.4	6.2	39.1	5.0
	fairly important	18.2	24.6	30.4	35.0
	very important	70.1	69.2	17.4	60.0
Climate Change	not important	2.7	1.6		5.0
	of little importance	13.3	12.7	21.7	10.0
	fairly important	44.0	42.9	34.8	25.0
	very important	40.0	42.9	43.5	60.0
Infectious Disease	not important	2.6	1.6	4.5	5.0
	of little importance	9.2	38.7	27.3	10.0
	fairly important	34.2	46.8	40.9	35.0
	very important	53.9	12.9	27.3	50.0

terrorism remains a significant concern in southern Asia.

Oceania, not surprisingly, was the subregion most concerned with the issue of climate change, given that the very existence of some island states has been called into question by the rise of ocean levels. Nevertheless, strong majorities of the alumni respondents in each subregion view climate change as at least fairly important.

Sharp differences in opinion can be found with regard to the threat posed by infectious diseases such as acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the avian flu and malaria. Although majorities in each subregion view this issue as fairly important, we see that the intensity of this concern is much stronger in both Southeast Asia and Oceania, where 53.9 and 50 percent, respectively, saw the issue as very important.

Table 3 Transnational Crime

Table 3 demonstrates that the illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings raises the highest level of concern in Southeast Asia. Ear’s chapter on Cambodia illustrates the continuing need for international support for initiatives that foster local empowerment in these areas. Northeast Asian alumni ranked their concerns on these issues significantly lower, especially with regard to weapons trafficking. The high level of concern of our Oceania alumni with regard to money laundering may come as a welcome surprise to those involved in countering the financing

Table 3 Transnational Crime

		Southeast Asia (%)	South Asia (%)	Northeast Asia (%)	Oceania (%)
Drug Trafficking	not important		3.3	8.7	
	of little importance		23.3	34.8	5.0
	fairly important	11.8	48.3	39.1	20.0
	very important	88.2	25.0	17.4	75.0
Human Trafficking	not important		3.1	12.5	5.0
	of little importance	2.6	23.4	33.3	10.0
	fairly important	50.0	43.8	33.3	45.0
	very important	47.4	29.7	20.8	40.0
Weapons Trafficking	not important		9.2	26.1	10.0
	of little importance	14.5	23.1	39.1	10.0
	fairly important	48.7	41.5	34.8	45.0
	very important	36.8	26.2		35.0
Money Laundering	not important	1.3	6.3	4.3	5.0
	of little importance	13.3	23.8	34.8	10.0
	fairly important	57.3	50.8	56.5	25.0
	very important	28.0	19.0	4.3	60.0
Cybercrime	not important	2.7	14.8	4.3	10.0
	of little importance	12.0	41.0	30.4	15.0
	fairly important	57.3	32.8	34.8	35.0
	very important	28.0	11.5	30.4	40.0
Piracy	not important	5.3	36.1	37.5	20.0
	of little importance	26.3	36.1	25.0	45.0
	fairly important	47.4	24.6	29.2	15.0
	very important	21.1	3.3	8.3	20.0
Illegal fishing	not important	5.3	30.2	47.8	5.0
	of little importance	17.1	31.7	34.8	5.0
	fairly important	43.4	30.2	8.7	15.0
	very important	34.2	7.9	8.7	75.0

of terrorism. As Finin points out in his chapter, the leadership in these countries has faced difficult tradeoffs between meeting the concerns of the international community and providing economic sustenance for their people. Oceania alumni also register very high levels of concern on the issue of illegal fishing, with substantial concern registered from our alumni in Southeast Asia as well. Campbell's chapter on Indonesia discusses how environmental crimes like illegal fishing, illegal logging and illegal wildlife trade outrank concerns over terrorism.

The only Asia-Pacific subregion to identify piracy as at least fairly important is Southeast Asia, where concerns over the Malacca Straits have been prominent. Sato's chapter on Singapore and Malaysia illustrates that even within Southeast Asia, concerns about piracy and other transnational challenges can vary widely. Table three also indicates that a majority of our alumni view cybercrime as at least fairly important, although South Asian alumni are yet to be completely convinced on this issue.

Table 4 Resource Scarcity

Table 4 displays the results with regard to resource scarcity issues (food, water and energy). Here South Asian alumni consistently demonstrate the strongest concerns, although alumni from Southeast Asia also place high importance on these issues. Energy scarcity is the one issue majorities in all of the subregions, including Northeast Asia, see as at least fairly important, although even here South Asians show the strongest concerns. Lal's chapter on India highlights the manner in which South Asia's lack of environmental resources is currently fueling tensions between states in this subregion.

Table 4 Resource Scarcity

		Southeast Asia (%)	South Asia (%)	Northeast Asia (%)	Oceania (%)
Food scarcity	not important	10.5		8.7	5.0
	of little importance	25.0	19.4	43.5	45.0
	fairly important	39.5	50.0	39.1	40.0
	very important	25.0	30.6	8.7	10.0
Water scarcity	not important	9.2	1.6	8.3	10.0
	of little importance	27.6	17.5	20.8	50.0
	fairly important	42.1	33.3	54.2	20.0
	very important	21.1	47.6	16.7	20.0
Energy scarcity	not important	2.6		4.3	5.0
	of little importance	18.4	6.5	13.0	15.0
	fairly important	38.2	30.6	52.2	45.0
	very important	40.8	62.9	30.4	35.0

V. Summary Thoughts on Crosscutting Themes

The chapters in this volume analyze security priorities at the individual country level and gauge each country's attempts at bilateral and multilateral security cooperation on transnational security challenges. Our intention is to provide policymakers and other government officials with a useful and convenient reference tool to draw upon to engage specific countries in the Asia-Pacific region. As shown in the survey results discussed above, security priorities across the various subregions can vary widely, making it hard to pinpoint crosscutting themes that fit the region as a whole.^{xxx}

Despite the difficulty in categorizing all of the Asia-Pacific under a single framework, several themes that emerge from these analyses are noteworthy. Northeast Asia, as stated above, is an outlier among the other subregions where internal and transnational security issues receive paramount importance. Nevertheless, in Russia, Japan and South Korea, where traditional interstate security issues predominate, each country has adopted policies that allow it to play an international role in helping to resolve transnational security challenges. Furthermore, the bilateral relationships between these economically powerful countries and the United States influence their willingness to confront cross-border challenges. More broadly, we see that US security priorities can differ significantly with those of many Asia-Pacific countries (see especially chapters covering Oceania, Indonesia and Malaysia), and that the willingness of the United States to engage these concerns will impact the response on US concerns.

The research for this book was conducted during a period of deep financial crisis. Many of the chapters depict the additional burden that economic turmoil has placed upon already beleaguered states to provide basic services to their people, no less carry out the tasks of securing porous borders and initiating governmental reforms necessary to bringing whole-of-government approaches to complex security challenges. Several states covered in this volume, including Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam, have prioritized domestic or regime stability to such an extent that transnational challenges are not receiving sufficient attention. US policymakers are urged to find ways to work with these governments to prevent negative outcomes that would threaten long-term stability in the region.

ⁱSee Paul Stares, "Introduction," in Paul Stares ed., *The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey* (Tokyo and New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998):12.

ⁱⁱSee Moisés Naim, *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy* (New York: Doubleday, 2005).

ⁱⁱⁱSee, for example, Thomas Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," *International Security* vol. 16, no. 2, 1991.

^{iv}Jessica Matthews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 2, 1989: 162–177.

^vRobert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 273, no. 2, 1994: 44–76.

^{vi}Stares, "Introduction," p. 15.

^{vii}Amitav Acharya, "Human Security: East Versus West", *International Journal*, Vol. LVI, No. 3 (Summer 2001): 442-460.

^{viii}Alan Dupont, *East Asia Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 243.

^{ix}*Ibid.*, pp. 3–11.

^xStephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* vol. 35, no. 2, 1991: 211–39.

^{xi}John Mearshimer, "Disorder Restored," in Graham Ellison and Gregory T. Treverton, eds., *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order*, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992).

^{xii}See Kurt Campbell, Nirav Patel, and Vikram Singh, "The Power of Balance in iAsia," Center for a New American Century, 11 June 2008: 60. Available online at: www.cnas.org/files/documents/.../CampbellPatelSingh_iAsia_June08.pdf.

^{xiii}Ann M. Florini and P. J. Simmons, "North America," in Paul Stares, ed., *The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey* (Tokyo and New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998):62.

^{xiv}*Ibid.*, p. 61.

^{xv}*Ibid.*, p. 63.

^{xvi}See the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy of 2002, available online at: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>.

^{xvii}See Shirley Kan, "US-China Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Issues for US Policy," *CRS Report for Congress*, May 12, 2005. Available online at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21995.pdf.

^{xviii}This issue was raised on numerous occasions during author interviews with Japanese security analysts.

^{xix}Catherine Dalpino, “Group Think: The Challenge of US-ASEAN Relations,” in *America’s Role in Asia: Asian and American Views* (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2008): 231.

^{xx}Alice Ba, “Systemic Neglect: A Reconsideration of US Southeast Asia Policy.” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* (December 2009): 376.

^{xxi}*Ibid.*, p. 379.

^{xxii}*Ibid.*, p. 378.

^{xxiii}Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities,” East-West Center, Honolulu, January 12, 2010.

^{xxiv}Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates’s remarks for the 8th IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-la Dialogue), 30 May 2009.

^{xxv}*Ibid.*

^{xxvi}Kurt Campbell, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Principles of US Engagement in the Asia-Pacific,” testimony before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, 21 January 2010.

^{xxvii}Ivan Boekelheide, “Engaging ASEAN: US Policy in Southeast Asia,” Stimson Publications available online at: <http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=%20908>.

^{xxviii}Kurt Campbell, “Principles of US Engagement in the Asia-Pacific.”

^{xxix}For details on survey methodology please contact David Fouse at foused@apcss.org.

^{xxx}Barry Buzan first documented this disparity among what he termed the “security complexes” of the region in his seminal work *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1983).

Russia’s Transnational Security: Challenges, Policies, and International Cooperation

Rouben Azizian

Key Findings

- The major innovation of Russia’s new security strategy, adopted in May 2009, is its departure from a narrow interpretation of national security as a military or geopolitical concept. A wide variety of factors, including the broad gap between the country’s rich and poor, the level of unemployment and the state of the country’s health and education, have now been framed as fundamental components of Russia’s national security.
- Russia’s security strategy does not prioritize the country’s transnational security challenges. It does, however, emphasize the vital importance of protecting the country and its people against terrorism, ethnic and religious extremism, and international crime, especially drug trafficking.
- Demographic decline and international migration are perceived as high priorities, although these topics are discussed less openly in view of their diplomatic sensitivity affecting the high-priority relations with former Soviet republics and China.
- Russia has shown interest and willingness to advance cooperation with other countries—first of all its neighbors—on transnational challenges. However, the level of such cooperation remains limited. Limitations derive from the high levels of corruption within Russia’s security sector, legislative deficiencies in Russia, the weak legal basis for Russia’s bilateral cooperation on transnational issues, as well as a lack of trust and confidence in her relations with neighboring countries.
- US-Russia cooperation on transnational challenges has been uneven and reflective of disruptive bilateral relations in the past few years. After a brief period of intensive dialogue and collaboration on counterterrorism measures following 9-11, the bilateral cooperation has been sporadic.

- Since President Obama took office, the United States and Russia have tried a fresh start. At the July 2009 summit in Moscow, the United States and Russia made concrete commitments to deepen security cooperation, pledging to work together to defeat violent extremists and to counter transnational threats, including those of piracy and narcotics trafficking. One concrete result of the summit was Russia's agreement to allow the United States to transport its military personnel and equipment across Russia in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International Security Assistance Force and the Coalition Forces in Afghanistan.

Introduction: Russia's Security Perceptions

On 12 May 2009, Russia adopted a new national security strategy projected until 2020. The key innovation of the third post-Soviet iteration of Russia's security strategy is its departure from a narrow interpretation of national security as a military or geopolitical concept. Russia has traditionally relied on a "hard-power" vocabulary when constructing its doctrines and strategies, which led to a much greater emphasis on the needs of the military-industrial complex than that of civil society.

But in an era of global interdependence, national security is no longer simply a question of military strength or economic indicators, but also many other factors such as demographic strength, the quality of human resources and the quality of life. All of these factors find a prominent spot in Russia's new national security strategy. The new document acknowledges that a state's social, economic and humanitarian conditions are no less important for providing security than the size of its army. Factors such as the wide gap between the country's rich and poor, the level of unemployment and the condition of health and education are included as fundamental components of Russia's national security.¹

The new Russian security strategy, however, continues to distinguish between external and internal threats and does not specifically use the term "transnational security." Transnational security threats are considered within the concepts of state and public security (as opposed to national defense). They are also often referred to as nontraditional threats. Finally, the Russian concept of transboundary threats is quite broad and covers many transnational security challenges.

Major Transnational Security Challenges

Russia's security strategy does not prioritize the country's transnational security challenges. It does, however, emphasize the vital importance of protecting the country and its people against terrorism, ethnic and religious extremism, and international crime, especially drug trafficking.

The public relations center of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) states in its 2008 annual report that "the possibility of infiltration of the territory of the Russian Federation by international terrorists remains the main destabilizing factor, which creates a direct threat to the national security and interests of the Russian Federation in the border area." There is, however, little evidence that such infiltration is happening at a significant scale: the majority of extremist and terrorist acts in Russia are organized and executed by homegrown groups.

At the same time, some well-known and highly disturbing challenges like demographic decline and international migration did not receive due prominence in the new security strategy. Reticence on these issues has in part to do with their foreign policy sensitivity, especially relations with the former Soviet republics and China. In closed meetings and private conversations, however, the demographic situation is portrayed as one of Russia's greatest challenges.

Demographic Security

According to a recent United Nations report (released in April 2008), Russia's population could drop from about 142 million today to 131 million by 2025, due to alcohol, smoking and poor diet. This demographic decline has serious economic consequences: there will be as many as eight million fewer people in the work force by 2015 and possibly nineteen million fewer by 2025. Sergei Mironov, speaker of Russia's Federation Council (Senate), believes that the most serious social problem in Russia today is the demographic crisis, and that if Russia does not solve it, Russia will cease to exist as a nation. It is clear from statements by political leaders that the government is aware of the problem and the serious threat that it poses to future economic growth and security as the country's workforce shrinks. What also is clear, according to demographers and public health experts, is that the government has not made enough effort to identify the root of the problem or to measure whether extant policies to address the demographic crisis are really helping. Although some financial

incentives have been created to help couples have more children, a much more comprehensive approach is necessary. The UN report cautioned that the government's demographic policy would fall far short of its goal of stabilizing a rapid decrease in the country's population. The situation in the Russian Far East is particularly disturbing, with the already tiny population of seven to eight million people living on this vast landmass shrinking by approximately one hundred thousand people every year.

Health Security

Russia is one of the few countries in the world where life expectancy has declined since the 1960s. In 2006, the life expectancy for Russian men was 60.6 years, about fifteen years lower than that of most developed countries. The number for women is higher, at 73.1, but still almost ten years below that of most developed countries.ⁱⁱ

Experts agree that a large share of early deaths in Russia, particularly among men, is preventable. Cardiovascular diseases account for 55 percent of all deaths, four times the rate in Western Europe.

Reducing the death rate among the working-age population by 38 percent by 2025 is one of the government's targets, with the ultimate goal of raising average life expectancy to seventy-five years—the current figure for Mexico.

Over the past two decades, state spending on healthcare has, however, remained meager, and the population has failed to develop healthier lifestyles.

Most demographers agree that the Russian government needs to find ways to lower alcohol consumption, particularly the abuse of cheap, low-quality alcohol that kills thousands every year. Annual alcohol-related deaths averaged about 426,000 over the past twenty years, representing almost 30 percent of deaths among men and 17 percent for women. Studies show that mortality rates have risen or fallen in tandem with alcohol consumption rates in the country, and both rose in the 1990s.

HIV in Russia

Russia has the fastest growing human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) rate in the world, with new cases doubling every twelve months. Russia represents two-thirds of all HIV cases in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. While the number of “registered” cases is three hundred thousand, experts

believe the number to be closer to three million when unregistered cases are considered. Eighty percent of infected people in Russia are under the age of thirty. A combination of young people being infected and an aging population is resulting in a decreasing workforce and population; if left unchecked, this trend will have a significant economic impact by the year 2020.ⁱⁱⁱ

After the breakup of the Soviet Union and the formation of the independent Soviet states, HIV was a low-priority issue. With the emphasis on the newly independent Russian Federation, HIV agencies commanded little importance and even less funding. Poor networking among the few HIV organizations that existed resulted in an inadequate flow of information between the agencies. Russian medical professionals received very little training on how to recognize and treat HIV and related illnesses.

Today in Russia, things have not improved much. HIV is a growing problem for many of the same reasons as when it began twenty years ago. The Russian Government has vowed to commit more resources and attention to the HIV problem. Yet, little progress is being made. HIV education is inadequate, and the societal perception—despite strong evidence to the contrary—remains that the problem affects only drug addicts and homosexuals.

Illegal Migration

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced a major immigration boom. Millions of ethnic Russians found life in newly independent post-Soviet states politically uncomfortable, while millions of non-Russians experienced major ethnic and economic upheavals prompting them to move to Russia for a better life.

Because of the difficulties of tracking illegal migrants and the complex registration system for those entering the country legally, it is statistically not very clear how many people move to Russia annually. However, according to Konstantin Romodanovsky, who heads Russia's Federal Migration Service, more than twenty million migrants enter Russia each year as part of a post-Soviet “migration boom.” Of these, half are in the country illegally.

There is only one state program aimed at attracting Russian-speaking people from former Soviet republics into the country, but to be eligible for Russian citizenship and financial benefits, potential immigrants have to

settle in remote and sparsely populated areas, like the Far East. The program, which focuses on these “fellow countrymen” was established by then-President Vladimir Putin in June 2006 and was scheduled to kick into action in 2007. Viktor Ivanov, the Putin aide appointed to oversee the program, promised in an interview with German newspaper *Die Welt* in 2006 that the country was ready to welcome the twenty-five million ethnic Russians living in other former Soviet republics.

So far, however, the results have been very modest. According to a source in the Federal Migration Service, in 2007 only 2,100 immigrants were resettled in Russia as part of this program. The challenges are even more severe for potential immigrants who are not ethnic Russians. Isolation, the lack of social infrastructure, xenophobia and salary discrimination all make life for immigrants difficult.

The Chinese are Coming ...

If the Russian press is to be believed, a massive influx of Chinese into Siberia and the Russian Far East is turning the area “yellow,” and Russia is about to lose its easternmost provinces. Russia’s Far Eastern Federal District—a huge area covering 6,215,900 square kilometers—has only seven million inhabitants, and that is down from nine million in 1991. The population is declining rapidly as factories are closing down and military installations have been withdrawn.

Across the border, China’s three northeastern provinces—Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning—are home to one hundred million people, and the area has an unusually high unemployment rate. Many Chinese cross the border with Russia legally and illegally for work opportunities. Officially, forty thousand Chinese live more or less permanently in the Russian Far East, but the actual figure is believed to be much higher. Russians call it a “creeping occupation” by the Chinese.^{iv}

Moscow has tightened border control. However, due to corruption among immigration and customs authorities, it has not been very effective. More importantly, Russia does not have a clear immigration policy that could encourage legal migration to its under populated Far East. Ideally, however, the local Russians should be offered enough incentives not to move to European Russia.

Human Trafficking

Russia is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children trafficked for various forms of exploitation.

Men and women from the Russian Far East are trafficked to China, Japan, the Middle East, and South Korea for purposes of sexual exploitation, debt bondage, and forced labor, including in the agricultural and fishing industries. Moscow and St. Petersburg are destination centers for children trafficked within Russia and from Ukraine and Moldova for purposes of sexual exploitation and forced begging. The International Labor Organization of the United Nations reports that an estimated one million illegal migrant workers may be victims of labor trafficking in Russia. The Government of the Russian Federation does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so.^v

Russian legislation on human trafficking is ill-equipped to tangle with highly adaptable operators who use the country as a major source, transit and destination country for the trade in human beings. Human trafficking is seen by Russian legislators as primarily transnational and being about the sexual exploitation of women and children, when in fact trafficking for both internal and international labor exploitation is the most common form in Russia, according to a report funded by the Canadian government and supported by six United Nations agencies and the International Organization of Migration (IOM). Laborers are moved or migrate to cities from poorer regions within Russia and from former Soviet republics now comprising the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).^{vi} Russia needs to develop a comprehensive national strategy that acknowledges the gravity of Russia’s multifaceted human trafficking problem and allocates adequate resources to address deficiencies in victim assistance.

Transnational Terrorism

Along with drug trafficking, smuggling, and mass migration, the threat of transnational extremist penetration into Russia is one of the strongest arguments for the securitization of Russian border policy. In some cases militants and extremists have been discovered among those trying to enter Russia (both legally and illegally) from neighboring countries. Some of these extremists have cooperated with Chechen separatists and even made preparations for terrorist activities. Such activity was registered mostly across Russia’s border with Azerbaijan and Georgia, where illegal centers

supporting Chechen militants worked, and sometimes in territories near the Russia-Kazakhstan border.

Some observers perceive the mere presence of Chechen communities in some Kazakh and Russian borderland districts, in conjunction with Russia's overall illegal migration from traditionally Muslim non-CIS countries—as a phenomenon connected a priori with transborder extremism.

Violent Extremism in the North Caucasus

The Russian government has been caught off guard by a spike in violence in the North Caucasus over the past few months. After canceling antiterrorist operations in Chechnya, the authorities were convinced that the situation there had stabilized.

It is clear, however, that the picture is far less rosy. It has become obvious that the number of insurgents in the North Caucasus—primarily in Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan—is greater than official figures have stated and that they have deep reserves and the ability to operate at a fairly professional level.

What started as the Kremlin's attempt to "Chechenize" the conflict in the republic—that is, to convert it into a domestic struggle rather than one between Russian troops and local forces—has now turned into a "Kadyrovization" of the problem, with all of its numerous drawbacks. As a result, Moscow is becoming increasingly annoyed with Chechen President Kadyrov's absolutism and the way his strong loyalty to the Kremlin is coupled with attempts to transform Chechnya into something bordering on an independent state. The Russian government is facing a dilemma about what to do next. On one hand, the direct application of force is no longer effective.

Sending federal forces to the region evokes hostility among local people and only escalates tensions. On the other hand, it is unrealistic and even dangerous to give full authority to local officials to solve their own problems, given the widespread lack of trust they have among the people.

In the meantime, the population of the North Caucasus continues to live according to its own laws. Blood feuds are on the rise again, and Islam is playing an increasingly central role in regulating social relations. Religion has become politicized from two sides. First, jihad remains a standard rallying cry for the Muslim opposition. Second, secular authorities frequently appeal to Islamic leaders, viewing them as

convenient tools for maintaining their own authority. Even traditional Islam has become politicized in the Caucasus, and in Chechnya the mosque serves as the center of political indoctrination for the republic's youth.^{vii}

The republics across the North Caucasus are experiencing an acute demodernization. The region is extremely weak. It has few elements of a modern economy, and the system of middle school and secondary education has practically collapsed. Emigration is growing, which in turn is causing tensions in neighboring regions of Russia. The problems in the region have definitely become one of Moscow's biggest challenges.

Drug Trafficking

Activities related to illegal movement of narcotic substances across the border and organizing channels of illegal migration by cross-border criminal groups continue to pose a serious threat to Russia's security. The Russian-Kazakh section of the border presently remains the main barrier along the drug trafficking route from Afghanistan and the Central Asian region to Russia. During the past two years alone, about 40 percent of the total volume of narcotic substances seized by border guards was seized on the border with Kazakhstan in close cooperation with Kazakh border guards.^{viii}

Currently, law enforcement structures are able to intercept only a paltry share of the drugs coming into Russia. Between 1,000 and 1,500 kilograms of heroin is arrested at Russia's borders annually. Based on conservative expert assessments that Russia's estimated one million heroin addicts consume on average 0.5 grams daily, the effectiveness of Russia's border protection system against heroin trafficking may be estimated at no more than 0.7 percent.^{ix}

President Dmitry Medvedev called a special meeting of the Security Council on 8 September 2009 where he declared drug abuse among young people a threat to national security and ordered the government to craft a program against illegal drugs that introduced tougher penalties for drug-related crimes. Medvedev said the number of drug users has shot up by nearly 60 percent over the past decade to an estimated two to two and a half million, or 2 percent of the population. Two-thirds are under the age of thirty. He said longer prison sentences should be handed down to people who deal drugs to minors, as well as for organized drug traffickers and corruption related to trafficking. Victor Ivanov, chief of the Federal

Drug Control Service, posited several ideas on how to fight the drug problem, such as compulsory testing of school and university students, a ban on drug abusers from occupying certain jobs and driving cars, and the compulsory treatment of drug users convicted of minor crimes.^x

Transnational Security Cooperation

Russia has shown interest and willingness to advance cooperation with other countries—first of all its neighbors—on transnational challenges. However, the level of such cooperation remains limited. Barriers to this cooperation include the high level of corruption within Russia's security sector, legislative deficiencies, the weak legal basis for Russia's bilateral cooperation on transnational issues, as well as a lack of trust and confidence in her relations with neighboring countries. The CIS has adopted numerous decisions on transnational security cooperation between its members, but very few measures are working. For example, since 2004, when Russia approached the CIS countries to conclude bilateral agreements on countering illegal migration, only Ukraine has agreed to the proposal.^{xi}

In Russia's relations with China, despite a proclaimed strategic partnership, the level of trust on demographic issues remains problematic. Russia's cooperation on transnational security with other Northeast Asian countries also is lagging. For example, according to numerous publications in the Russian media, the criminal groups of Russia and Japan have been collaborating much more effectively on illegal fishing than have law-enforcement agencies from their respective countries.

At the multilateral level, Russia has been most active in pursuing a common agenda on counterterrorism and drug trafficking.

Countering Terrorism

Russia's international strategy on fighting terrorism was most comprehensively articulated by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in his article "In the Face of a Common Threat," *Diplomatic Yearbook—2004*, Russian Diplomatic Academy.

This article calls upon members of the international community to assume collective responsibility for fighting terrorism and act multilaterally to advance the relevant international norms. Russia's willingness to genuinely engage in anti-terrorist multilateral cooperation

depends, however, to a considerable degree on the factor of reciprocity. For example, Russia has been urging the United States to give up double standards when dealing with terrorist movements, implying especially the lack of Western support for Russia's campaign in Chechnya. In the absence of such support, Moscow has demonstrably maintained close contacts with Hamas, which is identified by the United States as terrorist organization. As a long-term solution to religious extremism and terrorism, Russia emphasizes the need to protect religion and national cultures from the destructive impact of extremism and forge a "respectful dialogue" among religions and civilizations.

In regional terms, Russia would like the UN's Counter-Terrorism Committee to build up practical cooperation with regional organizations, including the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the SCO.

Combating Drug Trafficking

The Russian Federation has been contributing to international antidrug cooperation. It has signed bilateral agreements with various countries ranging from South America to Thailand. Multilaterally, Russia has been particularly active in the CIS and the SCO. On 17 June 2004, during the organization's summit in Tashkent, SCO member states signed the Agreement on Cooperation in the Fight against Illicit Drug Trafficking.

The struggle against the threat of drugs occupies one of the central places in the agenda of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, of which Russia became a full-fledged member on 18 October 2004.

Given that Moscow considers Afghanistan the main source of the narco-threat for Russia, it has suggested the need for an international strategy—including economic, social and law enforcement measures in Afghanistan and beyond—to fight Afghan drug trafficking. In particular, Moscow advocates the creation and strengthening of "antidrug security belts" round the periphery of Afghanistan's borders and those of the next-door states. The chief goal of this initiative is to put a stop to the outward flow of Afghan drugs and the inward stream of chemical substances that are precursors for the production of heroin. This is perceived not as a sanitary cordon but rather a collaborative scheme that will operate only with cooperation between the Afghan government, the international military forces in Afghanistan and the neighboring states.^{xii}

The Russian Federation has offered assistance to Afghan antidrug

agencies, including staff training at Russia's specialized education centers.

In 2004 the problem of Afghan drug trafficking was examined in the Russia-NATO Council. The Russia-led CSTO invited NATO to consider the possibility of joining efforts in the fight against drug trafficking in Afghanistan. Moscow has urged the coalition forces deployed on Afghan territory to strengthen the Afghan section of the border with Tajikistan.

US-Russia Transnational Cooperation

US-Russia cooperation on transnational challenges has been uneven and reflective of disruptive bilateral relations in the past few years. After a brief period of intensive dialogue and collaboration on counterterrorist measures following 9-11, the bilateral cooperation has been sporadic. The activity of the bilateral working group on antiterrorism has declined and is uneventful. Russia has been suspicious of the US military presence in Central Asia and its rationale of supporting counterterrorist activity in Afghanistan. Moscow fears an increased Western political and ideological presence in what it considers to be Russia's sphere of influence.

The main reason for the lack of US-Russia transnational security cooperation has been the preeminence of geopolitical and ideological agendas in bilateral relations in contrast with both countries' pronounced priority to deal with transnational challenges. Washington has been suspicious of Russia's resurgence and potential neoimperialism, while Moscow has accused the United States of promoting the "color revolutions" in former Soviet states neighboring Russia as well as unilateralism in international affairs.

After President Obama took office, the United States and Russia made some progress in defining common areas of concern and cooperation. At the Moscow Summit on 6–8 July 2009, the United States and Russia made concrete commitments to deepen security cooperation. For example, the countries are to work together to defeat violent extremists and to counter transnational threats, including those of piracy and narcotics trafficking. At the summit, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen and Russian Chief of the General Staff General Makarov agreed to a work plan for resuming military-to-military cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism, search and rescue, and counterpiracy.

Another tangible result of the summit was Russia's agreement to allow the United States to transport its military personnel and equipment across Russia in support of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force

as well as the Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. This agreement adds flexibility and further diversifies crucial supply routes, resulting in a potential savings of up to US\$133 million in fuel, maintenance, and other transportation costs. The significance of this contribution to US efforts to bring about peace and stability to Afghanistan, which also is of strategic benefit to Russia, should not be understated.^{xiii}

Washington and Moscow also agreed to strengthen cooperation in nonstrategic areas. For example, the United States and Russia took steps to build cooperation in public health, which may include strengthening work between US and Russian scientific research institutions on HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis and prevention and treatment of cardiovascular disease.

Finally, President Obama and President Medvedev recognized the need for a more structured foundation for advancing cooperation in key areas across respective interagencies. The newly formed Bilateral Presidential Commission—to be chaired by the two presidents and led by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov—will provide a mechanism for sustaining and expanding on the progress achieved in Moscow, while also providing a forum in which the United States and Russia can work together effectively to narrow differences.

ⁱFyodor Lukyanov, "A Positive but Confusing Security Strategy," *Moscow Times*, 20 May 2009.

ⁱⁱ*Interfax News Agency*, 17 March 2008.

ⁱⁱⁱMark Cichocki, "The Cold War Is Over, but the War Against HIV Has Yet to Begin, HIV Around the World—The Russian Federation," *About.com Health Disease and Condition*, 3 April 2007.

^{iv}Bertil Lintner, "The Chinese are coming ... to Russia," *Asia Times Online Ltd*, 27 May 2006.

^vTrafficking in Persons Report – 2008, Tier 2 Watch List, Released June 04, 2008, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Country Report: Russia

^{vi}"Inventory and Analysis of the Current Situation and Responses to Trafficking in the Russian Federation," *Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)*, 24 June 2009.

^{vii}Alexei Malashenko, "The Kremlin's Violent Underbelly," *Moscow Times*, 29 July 2009.

^{viii}*ITAR-TASS* news agency, 12 February 2009.

^{ix}Sergey Golunov, "Ethnic Migration: A Challenge to Russian Border Security?" *PONARS Policy Memo No. 432*, March 2007.

^xNatalya Krainova, "Young Drug Users Called Major Threat," *Moscow Times*, 9 September 2009.

^{xi}Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Yakovenko's presentation at the conference on Labor Migration in Russia and CIS: trends, problems and avenues of cooperation, Russian Foreign Ministry website, 11 May 2007.

^{xii}Interview of Anatoly Safonov, the Russian President's Special Representative for International Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime, *Interfax News Agency*, 20 January 2005.

^{xiii}"Obama, Medvedev Announce New Afghan Cooperation," CBS News, 6 July 2009.

The Perfect Storm? Thailand's Security Predicament

Miemie Winn Byrd

Key Findings

- Political turmoil in Thailand has serious implications for security and stability in the region. Thailand is a major hub for commerce and transport and a prominent player in the region's multilateral forums.
- At present, the Abhisit administration's first order of priority is regime security. Other pressing security challenges, such as the insurgency in the South, are receiving insufficient attention.
- The global economic downturn is the most significant transnational threat Thailand is currently confronting. The downturn has exacerbated problems associated with illegal immigration, human trafficking and substandard healthcare. Effective government is needed to deal with these competing and complex security challenges within Thailand's own borders and across the region.
- It is imperative that US policymakers continue steady engagement and open dialog with the Thai government, emphasizing the fundamentals of democracy and effective governance. The United States should aim to leverage regional forums and to increase engagement through Track II unofficial channels.
- While US-Thailand military engagement remains vigorous, the United States needs to consider extending economic assistance in rural development, health, family planning, education, science and technology. Expansion of current assistance programs related to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/AIDS prevention and treatment, refugee assistance and the prevention of human trafficking should be considered.

Introduction

Thailand's position as a major hub for commerce and transport signifies its strategic importance for the Southeast Asian region as a whole. Surprisingly, however, many observers of Southeast Asia have tended to understate the significance of Thailand's current political turmoil and the myriad of security challenges confronting Thailand today. Although Thailand was once considered Southeast Asia's economic tiger and beacon of democracy, its current political turmoil and economic woes could, if allowed to fester, significantly weaken the foundation for the region's future stability and growth.

Thailand faces numerous domestic and transnational security challenges that have been exacerbated by ongoing political and economic turmoil, creating what might be called a "perfect storm" for the Thai government. Among the most pressing security challenges Thailand faces today are the escalating insurgency in the South, the eruption of a border dispute with neighboring Cambodia, increased trafficking of people and drugs across the country's borders and problems associated with illegal migration and refugees fleeing Myanmar. Effective government is needed to deal with these competing and complex security challenges within Thailand's own borders and across the region.

Thailand's efforts to effectively respond to these security challenges have been hampered by the Abhisit administration's preoccupation with regime security. Although Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva recently survived the most serious challenge to his rule so far, the risk of an outbreak of violence remains high. While some have argued that the strong self-identity and historical unity of the Thai people will help them weather this political storm, recent sociopolitical turmoil has caused unprecedented fragmentation of Thai society by polarizing urban versus rural, poor against rich, and the north and northeast regions against Bangkok and the South.

Historically, Thailand has played a prominent role in supporting the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and contributing to cooperation and the prosperity of Southeast Asia. However, during Thailand's tenure as the ASEAN chair, Thai leaders have faced difficulties in fulfilling the responsibility of hosting ASEAN summits due to eruptions of civil protests in the country. The annual summit was postponed four times before it eventually took place in Phuket during July 2009. The struggle to host the ASEAN summit tarnished Thailand's reputation on the world stage and triggered doubts about the region's stability.

Current Political Turmoil

The divisiveness that now exists among the Thai is unprecedented. Thailand has cycled through six prime ministers in the three years following the September 2006 coup d'état, and there seems to be no end in sight for the continued civil unrest. The current Prime Minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, came into power following the occupation of Bangkok's international airport in 2008 by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD, also known as the "yellow-shirts"). Abhisit called for opposition participation in efforts to end the civil unrest in May 2009. However, the opponents (formerly Thai Rak Thai Party and popularly known as the "red-shirts") felt cheated and undermined. Until the government is willing to address the underlying reasons for conflict between the different classes, sectors, and regions within Thailand, there is little hope of ending the civil unrest.

On the surface, this political upheaval appears as a fight between the traditional urban elite (represented by the urban middle class, the military, and the bureaucracy) and the poor (represented by Thaksin Shinawatra and his supporters). Under the surface, it is a clash of two elite classes: the "old-money" of the traditional plutocracy and the "new money" accumulated as the result of the country's economic growth since the 1960s.ⁱ However, the "new-money" elite group, led by Thaksin, was able to gain the support of the poor by exploiting the conditions of economic inequality through populist policies, which have been dubbed "Thaksinomics". Although Thailand has experienced spectacular economic growth over the past few decades, not all regions have shared the growth equally. The country's Gini coefficient (measure of inequality of income distribution) is considered one of the most unfavorable in Asia.ⁱⁱ This inequality has provided Thaksin and his new-money elites the ability to leverage the rising social discontent against the old-money elites. Thaksin and his party have been able to portray themselves as champions of the poor, primarily in the north and northeast region of the country, thereby creating additional rifts between the regions.

The situation is at a deadlock. As the global economic crisis deepens and the Thai economy slows down, the socioeconomic gaps amongst various factions will become more prominent and discontent will deepen, which will further fuel political controversy and the power struggle. Until now, the Thai people's unity has been held together primarily by the citizens' sincere love and reverence for King Bhumibol. The King is now in his eighty-second year, and there is no obvious political leader who

matches Bhumibol's charisma and who commands genuine respect from the populace. The King has been the one who was able to bring back Thailand's citizens from the escalating violence in the past. Most Thais today still believe that the King will stop the current political turmoil from reaching the tipping point. Overdependence on the King for the country's unity and an inability to strengthen the democratic institutions in the post-1976 era has left the Thai very few alternatives to resolve internal sociopolitical conflicts. Weakened institutions are perpetually vulnerable to elite exploitation and military interference. Many of them have clearly shown a willingness to use extraconstitutional means to gain and maintain power. Michael Connors' characterization of the Thai government as an "ambivalent state" seems fitting, a state in which "competing modes of legitimation, forms of leadership and the exercise of power have not settled into any enduring pattern of dominance."ⁱⁱⁱ

Thailand's status as an ambivalent state is unlikely to change in the near future. The opponents of Abhisit feel strongly that PAD has undermined participatory democracy. They believe that Abhisit's predecessors were removed through unconstitutional means and therefore, the Abhisit administration constantly faces difficulty in garnering legitimacy, authority, and support from the general populace. To maintain control over the government bureaucracy, the Abhisit administration has replaced many key government officials with those whom they trust, regardless of whether they have the necessary qualifications for the positions. Additionally, the ministries and departments are centralizing authority to tighten control. Many of the midlevel career bureaucrats complain that their operating budgets have been severely slashed and that they can't get any work done because they have to seek approval for every action. At a time when Thailand needs efficient and effective governance to address a myriad of security issues plaguing the country and the region, the Thai government has become paralyzed while the current global economic crisis continues to worsen.

Impact of Current Global Economic Crisis

The global economic downturn could be considered the most significant transnational threat Thailand currently confronts. Besides diminishing the government's ability to respond to other challenges Thailand faces, the downturn magnified the effects of three years of political instability that had already significantly damaged the Thai

economy. High taxes and cumbersome regulations have stifled entrepreneurship. Implementation of draconian capital control rules immediately after the 2006 coup has driven away many foreign investors. Since then, Bangkok has been faced with the difficult task of convincing foreign investors that Thailand is still an excellent destination for investment. Additionally, the "red-shirts" occupation of the Thai International Airport severely interrupted the country's vital tourist industry, reflected by the 15.7 percent decline in tourist arrivals during the first quarter of 2009.^{iv} Extensive media exposure of the airport occupation bred doubts among international investors regarding the future stability of the country. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth went from an impressive 7.1 percent in 2003 to 4.8 percent in 2007 and 2.6 percent in 2008.^{vi} Foreign investment plunged from an annual average of 12 percent from 2003–05 to 3.8 percent in 2006 and 1.4 percent in 2007. For 2009, the Thai economy is expected to contract by 4.4 percent,^{vii} the worst decline since the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis.

Although the Thai government in the first quarter of 2009 pledged to inject a Bt1.4 trillion (US\$40 billion)^{viii} stimulus package into the domestic economy, such action is unlikely to have an immediate impact on preventing further economic deterioration. The Bt1.4 trillion is primarily targeted for building expensive infrastructure over the next three years. Historically, such large infrastructure projects have become caught up in multiyear political infighting. Bangkok's new international airport, which took more than ten years to build, is an example of this problem. Furthermore, the current political instability likely will affect the government's ability to secure sufficient financing. The government is planning to borrow a total of Bt70 billion from a combination of lenders including the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency to finance the stimulus package. This will raise public debt to approximately 45 percent of GDP, which nearly reaches the 50 percent cap set by the existing legislation's fiscal-sustainability framework. The Abhisit administration may seek to amend the existing legislation to remove the cap in the midst of the political turmoil.

In a shrinking economic environment, financial inequality within Thailand will be exacerbated because those who have large political influence will be able to subvert institutions, policy, and resource allocation to maintain and protect their private economic interest at the expense of the poor.^x Meanwhile, unemployment is rising sharply as

factories shed jobs in response to a collapse in export orders. Thailand's crucial export sector—merchandise exports—had experienced a year-on-year decrease of 23.1 percent as of March 2009.^x Both General Motors and Toyota cut production and laid off workers at their plants in Thailand to cope with falling demand.^{xi} In March 2009 the National Statistic Office reported that five hundred forty thousand workers had lost jobs at the end of 2008, and the number could rise to at least one million in 2009.^{xii} As GDP declines and unemployment rises, resentment in Thai society will become more pronounced, and opposition groups are likely to further exploit increased economic hardship in efforts to discredit the fragile Abhisit government and its policies. The downturn will be acutely felt in the Deep South, where economic and political inequalities are already contributing factors in the political insurgency. Bangkok has continuously failed to address the key substantive grievances dealing with economic, social, and political inequities in the South. The Deep South is the poorest region of Thailand, with a population of 1.7 million and a poverty rate of 17 percent.^{xiii}

Increased Instability in Southern Thailand

While Bangkok is preoccupied with economic and political turmoil, the violent insurgency in the South continues to escalate. The violence in the South has sharply increased since January 2009. More than three thousand seven hundred people have been killed since 2004 in the southern provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani.^{xiv} Eighty percent of the population in the southern border region are Muslim, who identify themselves as Malay rather than Thai. Separatists in the South are fostering the development of a Muslim identity and the rise of Islamic consciousness in an attempt to manipulate the young and lure them into the separatist movement. The conflict, which originally was based on ethnonationalism, is now laced with religious rhetoric with a jihadi flavor as more Islamists join the movement.^{xv} The allegation of increased human rights abuses by Thailand's government security forces in recent years has reinforced a collective sense of injustice that draws young Muslim men toward recruiters. Schools have been a fertile ground for recruiting young members, ensuring multigenerational support for the struggle to separate from dominantly Buddhist Thailand. Although precise data are not available, an estimated 70 to 80 percent of Muslim children in the area are attending *panoh*, traditional private secondary schools teaching Islam.^{xiv}

This Islamic school system enrolls more than one hundred thousand students and yields an average of one thousand eight hundred to three thousand fighters at any given moment.^{xvii} It is significant to note that schools—and the education system in general—have been the epicenter for the clash of cultures, ideologies, and conflict. Muslims in the South view the state schools and education system as the government's primary tool of oppression, subjugation, and discrimination. Such views also assert that the instilling of Thai nationalism, rituals, and culture in the students undermines Malay-Muslim ethno-religious identity. These perspectives lead to government schools and teachers being made a central focus of attacks.

The lack of a stable administration since the 2006 coup d'état has further hindered the Thai government's promise to devise and implement consistent policies to address inequitable socioeconomic conditions in the southern provinces. Despite Abhisit's pledge to empower the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), Bangkok continues to maintain centralized power and control of policy, which erodes the development of a regionalized political solution.^{xviii} The Thai government's concentration of control has been a consistent theme of complaint expressed by people in the South. As the decentralization process continues to stall, the Thai central government is losing its legitimacy and credibility to effectively deal with the issue, which further feeds mistrust among Malay-Muslims. As the Abhisit government employs the military to squelch violent mass protests by opposition parties in the North to cement its power, the resolve to pursue peaceful policies in the South is diminished.

However, intensifying the military campaign in the South is unlikely to reduce violence. The government's continued failure in substantially addressing a long-standing list of grievances escalates political frustrations and justifies—in the minds of the southern Muslims—the hostilities. The longer the government fails to settle the conflict, the greater the risk of involvement of foreign Muslim extremists. Jihadi groups in Malaysia and Indonesia, for example, are showing increased interest in southern Thailand's conflict.^{xix} The Malaysian foreign minister has expressed concerns about the possible spillover effects impacting his country as well as the possibility that regional terrorist groups, such as Jemaah Islamiya (JI), may make themselves central to the conflict.^{xx}

Increased Migration and Trafficking

According to the Asian Development Outlook 2009, more than sixty million people in the region will remain mired in poverty due to the current economic decline.^{xxi} A corollary of this is that Asia will experience significant increases in migration as more people search for better economic opportunities across the region. Increased migration flows will usher in greater challenges for regional governments as they attempt to maintain security and stability.

As a country with excellent infrastructure located at the heart of Southeast Asia and situated between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean littoral, Thailand is a hub for regional commerce and transport. Thailand's economic prosperity—relative to other countries in the region—has made it an attractive destination for irregular cross-border migration—which has created opportunities for traffickers to coerce, deceive, abduct, threaten, and exploit victims for sex and forced labor. Thailand is considered a source, destination and transit point for human trafficking globally.

Although the Thai government has launched several legislative initiatives and has recently passed laws in efforts to address the human trafficking problem, the implementation and enforcement of these laws have been weak. According to the US State Department's 2004 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, only 108 new victims of trafficking were identified for the entire year.^{xxii} The 2008 TIP Report noted that the Government of Thailand does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. The Royal Thai Police reported to have prosecuted only 144 sex trafficking cases for the two-year period ending in June 2007.^{xxiii} Some observers see considerable evidence of official complicity in the trafficking, both among lower levels of law enforcement and senior public officials who have been identified as having commercial interests in the brothels and factories into which many victims are trafficked.^{xxiv}

The combination of pervasive corruption within the government and the paralysis induced by the current political instability may position Thailand to become a safe haven for traffickers moving illicit goods and people throughout the region. The resource constraints created by the economic slump will further hinder the government's ability to address the issue.

Thailand is already overburdened by refugees and illegal migrants from the neighboring countries of Burma, Cambodia, and Laos. While

Thai official figures estimate there are five hundred thousand to seven hundred thousand Burmese illegal migrants, some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) believe the real number may be closer to two million.^{xxv} Many of the migrants work jobs that are considered dirty, dangerous, and demeaning. The migrants are forced to reside in crowded refugee camps, labor camps, and densely populated slums. The plight of migrant workers in Thailand is worsened by their unregistered and illegal status, making them vulnerable to unscrupulous employers' exploitation and enslavement and in some cases the target of crooked police extortion and brutality. While it is heart wrenching to note the peril of the migrant workers, their exploiters are also eroding Thailand's stability by undermining basic human rights and the rule of law. These negative conditions can breed criminal elements within the Thai society and weaken its social fabric.

Increasing migration and slum living conditions bring added risks of health insecurity for Thailand and the region—spreading infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and Avian Influenza. HIV/AIDS outbreaks are known to occur along the migration and trafficking routes. Available health data on Shan ethnic migrants from Burma in Thailand indicate that the migrant population is disproportionately plagued by infectious diseases, including HIV/AIDS. Tuberculosis, lymphatic filariasis, and some vaccine-preventable illnesses are also prevalent.^{xxvi} These dismal conditions in labor and refugee camps are straining the capacity of local health programs. Furthermore, Thai public hospitals increasingly bear the costs of providing charity care for migrants and refugees, who are unable to pay for their treatment. The additional costs strain healthcare budgets, which are already stretched thin as a result of insufficient government funding.

Thailand's inability to tackle healthcare issues of the migrant and refugee populations could have wider health implications both for Thailand and for the region. Many of today's global pandemics have originated and spread from impoverished slums where dense numbers of human live in close proximity with animals and food sources. Pandemics are thus closely linked to the emergence of "hot zones" in slums and refugees camps.^{xxvii}

Clashes at the Thai-Cambodian Border

In July 2008 an armed conflict erupted over a long-running border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia. The ongoing tension between the two countries centers on a 1.8 square mile strip of land near the nine-hundred-year-old Preah Vihear Temple, which the United Nations declared a World Heritage Site in June 2008. The temple sits on top of a cliff and is accessible only from Thailand because most of the surrounding area on the Cambodian side is littered with mines from the earlier Cambodia-Khmer Rouge conflict. The International Court of Justice awarded the temple to Cambodia in 1962. After long and bitter dispute throughout the 1950s, Cambodia became the owner of the temple building while the surrounding land and the pathway to the temple are inside Thailand's territory—creating an untenable situation and fueling a historic rivalry between these two countries. When the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) listed the temple as a World Heritage Site, the simmering tension boiled over into an armed conflict.

The conflict was localized along a small border area, but the larger threat lies with unscrupulous politicians willing to manipulate nationalist sentiment on both sides. The temple issue is symbolic of a long-standing historical rivalry between the two countries and thus ripe for political manipulation. In Thailand, PAD exploited rising nationalist sentiment around the Preah Vihear case to mobilize mass demonstrations that contributed to bringing down the Thaksin government in 2008.^{xxviii}

The increased tension along the Thai-Cambodia border could also have a wider global impact. In February 2009 the World Health Organization (WHO) reported the emergence of a drug-resistant strain of malaria along the Thai-Cambodia border and has been working in the area to contain the spread of this new strain.^{xxix} However, the rising tension and armed conflict could impede scientists' ability to continue working in the area. The disruption of work to contain this deadly disease in a "hot zone" could undermine the global effort to control infectious diseases.

Malaria kills more than a million people every year. The United States and Thailand, through programs developed under the US Agency for International Development (USAID), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences (AFRIMS), cooperate closely on efforts to fight malaria and a range of other public health initiatives, including tuberculosis, dengue, HIV/AIDS, and avian/pandemic influenza.^{xxx}

Recommendations for US Engagement

The United States and Thailand share a 175-year history as allies, with especially close relations since the end of World War II. In December 2003 the United States designated Thailand a "major non-NATO ally," further solidifying this relationship. Viewed in this historical perspective, recent political events in Thailand should not be allowed to undermine what continues to be an important political, economic and military relationship for the United States. The United States should actively seek out ways of improving engagement and dialog with the Thai government, emphasizing the fundamentals of democracy and effective governance.

The United States could leverage regional forums to facilitate confidence building measures to address cross-border issues between Thailand and its neighbors and to address Thailand's southern insurgency. To further complement formal multilateral efforts, the United States should facilitate and encourage increased engagement and sharing of best practices through Track II unofficial channels.

As part of mutual defense cooperation over the last three decades, Thailand and the United States have developed a vigorous joint military exercise program, which has engaged all the services of each nation (with an average of forty joint exercises per year). Current levels of military engagement with Thailand seem appropriate and do not require any major adjustment.

At the same time, this strong military relationship needs to be buttressed by stronger assistance to address some of the issues discussed above. The formal USAID bilateral program for economic assistance to Thailand ended in 1995, and the United States should reconsider extending economic assistance in the areas of rural development, education, science and technology. The United States also should consider expanding current assistance programs in the areas of health and HIV/AIDS programming, refugee assistance, and trafficking in persons. The United States and Thailand also should reinvigorate Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations (championed by Thaksin) that have been dormant since 2006. A peaceful and prosperous Southeast Asia is in the strategic interests of the United States, and Thailand lies at the heart of Southeast Asia.

¹Litner, Bertil, "The Real Thai Crisis: A Conflict between Old Money and New Money," *The Wall Street Journal Asia*, April 15, 2009.

ⁱⁱLitner, Bertil, “The Battle for Thailand: Can Democracy Survive,” *Foreign Affairs*, 88:4, p. 114.

ⁱⁱⁱConnors, Michael K., Liberalism, Authoritarianism and the Politics of Decisionism in Thailand, *The Pacific Review*, 22: 3, July 2009, p. 369-370.

^{iv}Economist.Com, May 28, 2009, “Thailand in Recession”

^vCountry Profile Thailand 2008, Economist Intelligence Unit, June 3, 2008.

^{vi}The Wall Street Journal Asia, “Rally calls for Thai Government’s Resignation,” Associated Press, March 26, 2009

^{vii}Country Report Thailand April 2009, Economist Intelligence Unit

^{viii}The Wall Street Journal Asia, May 13, 2009, “Bangkok Building Boom.”

^{ix}Hicken, Allen, “The Politics of Economic Reform in Thailand: Crisis and Compromise”, William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 638, January 2004, University of Michigan Business School.

^xCountry Forecast, The Economist Intelligence Unit, May 26, 2009

^{xi}Jantraprap, Viparat, “GM and Toyota to Cut Jobs at Their Plants in Thailand,” *New York Times*, November 20, 2008.

^{xii}The Wall Street Journal Asia, March 23, 2009, “Thailand unveils measures to address economic woes.”

^{xiii}Royal Thai Consulate-General, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, June 2006

^{xiv}AFP, July 8, 2009, “Three killed in fresh Thai south unrest: police”

^{xv}International Crisis Group, Asia Report No 170, 22 June 2009, “Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand.”

^{xvi}Ibid. p.20-21.

^{xvii}International Crisis Group, Asia Report No 170, 22 June 2009, “Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand.”

^{xviii}International Crisis Group, Asia Report No 170, 22 June 2009, “Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand.”

^{xix}International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No 80, 28 August 2008, “Thailand: Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency,” p.5.

^{xx}Storey, Ian, “Malaysia’s Role in Thailand’s Southern Insurgency,” *Terrorism Monitor*, 5:5, March 15, 2007.

^{xxi}Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Report 2009.

^{xxii}Ibid, p. 146.

^{xxiii}Trafficking in Persons Report 2008, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2008/>, p. 28.

^{xxiv}Gallagher, Anne, Human rights and Human Trafficking in Thailand: A Shadow TIP Report, *Trafficking and the global Sex Industry*, ed. Karen Beeks & Delila Amir, Lexington Books, Lanham, 2006, p. 143.

^{xxv}Dupont, Alan, *East Asia Imperiled: Transnational Challenges to Security*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 143.

^{xxvi}Suwanvanichkij, Voravit, Displacement and disease: The Shan Exodus and Infectious Disease Implications for Thailand, Center for Public Health and Human Rights, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, March 14, 2008 <http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2324075>

^{xxvii}Davis, Mike. Pandemic and the Planet of Slums, *News Perspective Quarterly*, 26:3, Summer 2009, http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2009_summer/16_davis.html

^{xxviii}Prasirtsuk, Kitti. Thailand in 2008: Crisis Continued, *Asian Survey*, XLIX: 1, January/February 2009, p. 178. Head, Jonathan, A Long-Running Border Dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, *Khmer Voice*, October 15, 2008. <http://www.khmervoice.org/?p=1345>

^{xxix}Hirshler, Bill, Super Malaria Threat on Thai-Cambodia Border, *Reuters*, February 25, 2009. <http://www.reuters.com/article/healthNews/idUSTRE51O6FJ20090225>

^{xxx}<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2814.htm>, 3 September 2009.

Transnational Security Threats to Indonesia

James R. Campbell

Key Findings

- Senior Indonesian military agree that their country has no imminent conventional external threat; internal and transnational security threats receive top priority in Indonesian security planning.
- According to high-level Indonesian authorities, corruption is the number one domestic security problem for Indonesia. President Yudhoyono's anticorruption agency has been effective in fighting corruption.
- Along with corruption, other domestic security threats such as economic issues are prioritized over transnational security threats. Nontraditional threats like illegal fishing and other environmental crimes are weighted more heavily than terrorism, narcotics or human trafficking. Terrorism, especially international terrorism, is not viewed as an existential threat to the country.
- As nontraditional threats such as environmental crime often involve the same networks, actors and elements of corruption as other transnational security threats, assisting Indonesia in investigating its priority nontraditional security threats may represent a less contentious way for the United States to address its own terrorism concerns in the region. Programs for fighting terrorism and other security threats need to be seen not as foreign initiatives but as Indonesian solutions that empower the government.
- In programs designed to fight terrorism and other transnational crimes, the military, the police and the National Intelligence Service compete for resources and status, and thus resist cooperation and intelligence sharing.
- The United States can make its most immediate contribution to Indonesian security by helping to increase the professionalism of the National Police.

- It is often expressed by Indonesian security personnel that the United States should revise its vetting process as it relates to International Military Education and Training and historical human rights violations, and focus more on creating a security environment in which such violations will not occur.
- Indonesia's rating in combating human trafficking fluctuates between Tier 2 and Tier 3, with shifting government interest in this transnational security threat.

Indonesia has no conventional external threat to its security. National security priorities therefore tend to focus on the many internal and transnational security challenges that Indonesia faces today. This paper characterizes the current vulnerability of Indonesia with respect to such threats from an Indonesian perspective and analyzes the conditions and forces within this vast archipelago that predispose the country to domestic challenges of external origin. Mechanisms are discussed through which Indonesia counters transnational security threats by engaging with regional neighbors and the United States. This paper further argues that while many of Indonesia's transnational security threats are consistent with US priorities, other threats are ranked differently by the two countries. Thus, this discussion focuses on Indonesian perceptions of key threats, and how the United States and Indonesia can better coordinate their efforts against these transnational threats.

High-profile transnational security threats like terrorism and narcotics trafficking appropriately receive international attention, and these crimes are repudiated by most countries. Other types of transnational crime such as human trafficking, and environmental crimes like illegal fishing, illegal logging and illegal wildlife trade are less frequently viewed from a security standpoint. Nonetheless, such environmental crimes outrank terrorism in terms of transnational challenges in Indonesia. Greater US attention to environmental issues is not necessarily a quid pro quo for improved cooperation in other areas such as counterterrorism. However, recognition by the United States that Indonesia considers these issues to be national priorities would be an influential component of an integrated strategy for engaging Indonesia in security cooperation.

Terrorism

Probably the most significant terrorist threat to Indonesia is the domestic, Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Other lesser actors include Laskar Jihad, Hizbullah Front, Laskar Mujahidan, and Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the latter being more in the category of “violent moralists” rather than terrorists. In the past, there have been international connections with the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, which included training and funding. “Afghan Veterans,” reported by one senior Indonesian diplomat to number perhaps as many as six thousand, consist of Indonesians who trained or participated in military jihad operations in Afghanistan in opposition to the Russian occupation of that country. However, more conservative estimates hold these numbers to be only in the hundreds.ⁱ Regardless of the actual total, many of these Afghan mujahideen returned to Indonesia, bringing destructive elements into the region, where some perpetrated violence in Christian-Muslim religious conflicts in Ambon, Maluku and Poso, Central Sulawesi, particularly from 1998 to 2001.ⁱⁱ

Several expert bombmakers remain at large, and access to explosives and/or small arms is not particularly difficult. These extremists include Taufik Bulaga and Tedi, both apprentices of the late Malaysian bomb specialist, Dr. Azhari Husein. Noordin Top, a Malaysian national and leader of a violent JI splinter group responsible for several major bombings in Indonesia, was recently killed by police during an antiterror investigation, following the July 21, 2009 bombings of the J. W. Marriott Hotel and Ritz Carlton Hotel in Jakarta. JI’s leaders are opposed to Al-Qaeda-style bombings on Indonesian soil, not because they are considered illegitimate, but because they are counterproductive—attacks on Western targets have killed more Indonesians than infidels, provoked community outrage, and led to mass arrests.ⁱⁱⁱ Also, international funding for jihadi operations has largely dried up, with no significant external funding for JI since 2003. Nonetheless, small but persistent domestic terrorist cells continue to attract global attention to Indonesia, and the potential for renewal of international terrorist support cannot be dismissed.

The vast majority of Indonesians reject terrorism, but many are troubled by a possible perception that the US War on Terror is also focused on Muslims. Indonesians are aware of “homegrown” terrorist organizations like JI but do not generally consider them a significant problem. This is in large part because Indonesia had not suffered a significant terror attack since 2004. It remains to be seen whether or not

the recent bombing attacks on hotels in the capitol city of Jakarta will change this perception. Indonesia also feels that as a nation it now has credibility in global finances, and it does not want terrorism to blemish its standing in world banking and financial markets.

For most Indonesians, the most pressing security threats involve the economy: putting food on the table, the rising price of gasoline, and paying for children’s schooling.^{iv} Externally, JI does not appear to be formally linked to regional extremist groups in the Pattani province of southern Thailand, the Rohingyas in Burma, or the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, although there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the exact nature of the relations. The Indonesian government is developing a database of international terrorist-related websites that may be used for recruitment within the country by different groups, and one area for US cooperation may be to provide technological assistance for this effort. While JI takes inspiration from organizations like Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, senior Indonesian security analysts suggest that transnational terrorist organizations do not appear to have an actual “footprint” in Indonesia.^v Al-Qaeda’s intransigence, indiscriminate brutality, and dismissal of politics as a perversion of religion banish it to the fringes of Muslim society. Its global brand has suffered a damaging ideological backlash from repentant violent extremists, prominent religious leaders and an overwhelming number of Muslims who feel horrified by the movement’s wanton killings.^{vi}

Currently JI is focusing on publishing and appears less interested in mounting operations, likely reflecting a decision from the top to focus on religious outreach and recruitment as a way of rebuilding the organization. JI has developed a profitable consortium in and around the country’s religious schools (pesantren). The Indonesian government should monitor these enterprises more closely, but they may be useful in channeling JI energies into political struggle through the printed page rather than through acts of violence. The best way to ensure adequate scrutiny would be for the Indonesian government to enforce its own laws with respect to publishing, labor, corporate registration and taxation. Such enforcement would not only offer a means of monitoring these enterprises, but it could also yield valuable information about the size and status of the JI organization. Every publisher is also required by law to provide copies of every title to the National Library.^{vii}

Nonetheless radicalization—the process by which law-abiding individuals become willing to use violence to achieve their goals—

remains a risk in Indonesia, as in the case of the “Palembang Group.” This group demonstrated how easy the transformation can be if the right ingredients are present: a core group of individuals, a charismatic leader, motivation and opportunity for targeted killing. Access to funding and weapons may also spur jihadi groups to violence.^{viii} While very few religious schools (pesantren) in Indonesia today promote violent extremist ideologies, the schools serve as a social network where such ideologies can be discussed. Approximately fifty JI-affiliated schools remain active, mostly on Java. The challenge is to identify individual problem schools without stigmatizing the entire system.^{ix}

Police have embarked on a prisoner-focused “deradicalization” program aimed at persuading jihadists to reject the use of terrorist tactics. A key element is the provision of economic aid—usually to prisoners’ families and often involving school fees for children—on the assumption that acceptance of aid from the police entails a rejection of the jihadi premise that all officials are “thoghut” (anti-Islam).^x While police clearly hope that deradicalized prisoners will return to their communities and help discourage recruitment into terrorist cells, there has been little strategic thinking about how this might actually be accomplished. Muhammadiyah, the nation’s second-largest Islamic organization, had been working with the government on deradicalization; however, the funding support ran out, and cooperation has ceased. Discussions with staff at an influential Jakarta think tank suggest that Muhammadiyah is no longer participating in the government deradicalization, although the organization remains willing to accept post-radicals (“Alumni Bui”) into their own existing programs. The United States should support prison reform in Indonesia but lacks credibility in offering assistance, as Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo have become the “poster children” of prison abuse.

Indonesia’s strategy for dealing with terrorism is based on “soft power,” because more than 90 percent of the population is Muslim, and thus a hard-power approach to Islamists is deemed unacceptable, although aggressive interventions by security forces are not “off the table.”^{xi} Sensitivities with regard to battling Islamic extremism mean that even following the recent terrorist bombings of two Jakarta hotels, President Yudhoyono carefully avoided naming the perpetrators as Jemaah Islamiyah, as this name literally means “Islamic community,” and using it would have opened him to criticism by Islamist politicians of defaming Islam.

Conservative Indonesian Salafi Muslims oppose organizations like JI.

The strictest Salafis in Indonesia are religious—not political—activists. Ironically, this means that the most “radical” of the Salafis are the most immune to jihadist teachings; Salafism in Indonesia is not the security threat sometimes portrayed. It may come across to outsiders as intolerant or reactionary, but for the most part it is not prone to terrorism, in part because it is so inwardly focused on faith.^{xii}

US counterterrorism assistance in Indonesia, which is focused on increasing the competence of police and courts to investigate and prosecute terrorism, has been effective and should be continued. US assistance to Detachment 88, the elite antiterrorism force of the Indonesian National Police, should be increased, and the force should be better integrated with the parent organization. The United States should not just bring funding and a proposal for Indonesia to implement. US negotiators should first meet with the National Intelligence Service (BIN) and discuss what the problem is, including the unresolved definition of terrorism, and a way forward. The reason for the United States to include BIN in these discussions is because the military (TNI) and the National Police (POLRI) are often focused too tactically, rather than strategically. One way to optimize security assistance would be through supporting education to enhance Indonesian police capacity in surveillance and evidence gathering, as all antiterrorist actions must be done on Indonesia’s terms, and not at the insistence of US or other foreign authorities. A challenge for the United States is that US funding is stovepiped for the different components of the Indonesian security sector. Such an arrangement inherently reinforces the existing stovepiped structure of the Indonesian security forces and may exacerbate the lack of interagency communication and intelligence-sharing.

Corruption and the Security Sector

From the perspective of Indonesian policymakers, the foremost internal threat to Indonesian national security is corruption. Ten years after the fall of the kleptocratic Suharto regime, corruption remains a significant challenge for Indonesia, which is ranked 126 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Index.^{xiii} Transnational crime organizations are drawn to operate in Indonesia because of the perception that the police are corrupt and inept. Transnational crime is more a symptom of weak governmental institutions and corruption, rather than an externally imposed threat. The Indonesian term *oknum* refers to

members of the police or military who abuse their position by engaging in a range of extralegal economic activities with various degrees of backing from the state.^{xiv} President Yudhoyono has taken an aggressive approach to fighting corruption through the creation of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). This organization has relentlessly pursued corrupt politicians and businessmen, bringing to justice more than one hundred high-profile public and corporate officials. Ironically, in May 2009 the head of KPK, Antasari Zahra, was arrested on suspicion of conspiracy to murder. While his arrest marred the pristine reputation of the KPK, it apparently did not seriously damage the political platform of good governance that carried Yudhoyono into a second five-year term as president in July of this same year. Despite the President's unequivocal backing of the KPK, International Anti-Corruption Day on December 9, 2009 saw large rallies in several major Indonesian cities. Rally participants demanded zero tolerance for corruption, and alleged a systematic government attempt to weaken the KPK and the Anti-Corruption Court.

Part of the basis for the corruption problem in the security sector lies in poorly articulated regulations and inadequate funding levels for the police and military. After President Suharto left office in 1998, the police (POLRI) were assigned responsibility as lead agency for internal security, while the military (TNI) was limited to an external security role, including Territorial Capacity Building (TCB). Law 34 was written to define security responsibilities of the police and the military; however as of May 2009 the law had not been ratified by the People's Representative Council (DPR) and thus has not been implemented. Since Indonesia currently has no real external adversary, the military basically has no formal mission. As a result, TNI has not been successful in justifying the budget it deems necessary for modernization.^{xv} The police, public prosecutor's office and the courts are still weak, yet they have been given the security responsibilities formerly ascribed to the military. For the next ten to fifteen years, the military may still have to remain engaged, in the background, to aid development of the internal security role of the police. Currently, only the military enjoys a modicum of respect as a security force. However, the successful police operation that resulted in the death of Noordin Top, Indonesia's most dangerous terrorist following the Jakarta hotel bombings of 2009, resulted in a great deal of positive media coverage regarding the developing capabilities of the police in counterterrorism.

Formerly, the regional military commands (KODAM) were reported to

be funded by a mix of funds estimated to be 30 percent from the government budget and 70 percent from off-budget private businesses managed by officers in the KODAMs (although the exact proportion from each source remains unclear). When approval to manage these private businesses was officially revoked, TNI found itself faced with the prospect of operating with less than one-third of previous revenues. It is difficult to assess with certainty whether the extrabudgetary funding stream has actually stopped or just transformed into a "shadow" budget. As the "official" operational funds support salaries, training, equipment purchases and maintenance, TNI's equipment maintenance strategy has basically become one of cannibalization. The priority for the Government of Indonesia is the economy and education, not modernization of the military. Economic development and social development programs garner 70 percent of the budget, while defense and security receive 30 percent of the budget. While TNI is now ostensibly under civilian control, senior military officers confided that should democracy fail in Indonesia, they believe the military remains competent to run the country.

The police currently operate under an analogous split-funding arrangement, although its off-budget private businesses are operated under private contracts, ostensibly with no oversight by senior police officials. However, if approval is revoked for the regional police commands (POLDA) to benefit from private businesses as it was for the military, the police will be forced to scale back operations significantly. The national police organization is only ten years old and, while it has made great progress, there is much work to do in terms of developing professionalism among its leadership and strengthening basic police investigative skills. The United States should increase training assistance in investigative skills to POLRI. Better police work might have detected and arrested the Palembang Group before it was able to carry out its terrorist acts in 2006–07.^{xvi}

In cooperating with TNI, the US military needs to engage in operations and activities that make a difference and stay engaged long enough to gain credibility. The US military participates in nearly 150 joint exercises each year with TNI, two-thirds of which are US-sponsored. However, a limitation on US military hardware transfer to Indonesia is the requirement for a commitment by the government to maintain the equipment in the future with Indonesian funds. Another mechanism is the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which historically has been an important mechanism for security cooperation. For example,

reform-minded President Yudhoyono is a graduate of US IMET training. Indonesian, regional and US security would be enhanced by an expansion of this program. Alongside such an expansion, it has also been suggested by some that the opportunity could be taken to reassess the human rights vetting process associated with the program, as this is perceived to be in need of improvement in order to more effectively pursue US goals.

Environmental Crime, Narcotics Trafficking and Piracy

While terrorism remains an ongoing challenge for Indonesia, environmental crime ranks higher among the government's set of transnational security threats. It is estimated that illegal fishing costs Indonesia US\$5 billion per year in lost revenues, with prime offenders being Thailand, Malaysia and Taiwan.^{xvii} Of all timber produced in Indonesia, 70 percent is logged illegally^{xviii}, and much illegal timber moves between Indonesia and Malaysia on its way to overseas markets. The Indonesian government estimates that illegal logging results in an annual loss in revenue of about US\$3 billion.^{xix} Corruption and collusion by local elites with illegal logging operations have been exacerbated by the political decentralization that followed the fall of Soeharto's regime, and this has created an environment where domestic and transnational environmental criminals operate with impunity. Some local governments have emphasized development over conservation and in some cases have urged people to settle and open businesses in protected areas, simply ignoring national laws.

The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)^{xx} functions to improve intelligence-sharing, review weak laws, and coordinate enforcement actions. One hundred and sixty-seven countries are party to the CITES treaty, and it is one of the few multilateral environmental agreements to which all ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, including Indonesia, are party.^{xxi} Transnational crime organizations involved in arms, narcotics and human trafficking also are likely to be involved in the illegal wildlife trade, and these criminal activities can supply funds to terrorist organizations.^{xxii} The illegal wildlife trade is attractive to organized criminal groups because of their synergistic links with trafficking of other contrabands, particularly narcotics.^{xxiii}

One way to address these criminal activities is to strengthen marine and border surveillance. The Office of Defense Cooperation at the US Embassy

in Jakarta has used Department of Defense 1207 counterterrorism funding^{xxiv} to enable the Department of State to purchase and install fifteen new radar stations on northeast Sulawesi, near Manado and at various locations along the strategic Straits of Malacca in support of the "Eye in the Sky" program,^{xxv} jointly operated by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. This program enhances regional maritime surveillance capabilities to combat illicit activities such as smuggling and narcotics trafficking in the waters bordering these countries. Indonesia previously had to deal with narcotics primarily as a transshipment point for these drugs. Today narcotics are increasingly becoming an internal threat, with both the domestic production and use of methamphetamines and ecstasy. It is estimated that there are approximately one million drug addicts today in Indonesia.^{xxvi}

Indonesia has been remarkably successful in reducing piracy in its waters. However, joint efforts are delicate because of sovereignty issues and extant territorial disputes involving Malaysia and Singapore. US support for effective regional responses is critical to reduce pressure on external maritime powers and to intervene to protect commercial shipping. Previously, much of the piracy in the northern Malacca Straits was carried out by Indonesians from the Aceh region of north Sumatra. When Aceh's economic situation improved, piracy in the northern Malacca Straits declined. However, Indonesian Bugis sailors still conduct piracy in the southern Malacca Straits. For Bugis, capturing a vessel through piracy is considered a "rite of passage" and earns them the title "Lord of the Sea." The Indonesian government is seeking to replace this act of piracy with just a ceremonial event.

Indonesia contributes little to the airborne surveillance effort because most of its helicopters are not operational, and it possesses few C130 and no P3 aircraft. An additional hindrance is that Indonesia prefers not to appear "too cooperative" with the United States for domestic political reasons. Pirates and smugglers understand these "fault lines" in security cooperation and continue to exploit them for criminal purposes.

The United States is working to set up a Joint Operations Center for Maritime Security in Jakarta to enable increased maritime presence, and support should be extended to include the Joint Maritime Patrols of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. In 2008 the US Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) helped to establish Indonesia's first Marine Police Special Boat Unit to provide criminal investigative assistance with maritime transnational crime (TNC).

Human Trafficking and Threat of Pandemic Disease

Indonesia is a major source and transit point for women trafficked to Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan and Japan, as well as to the Middle East. A major transit route is through the island of Batam, off of South Sumatra, to Malaysia.^{xxvii} In addition, women from the Central Asian states, notably Kazakhstan, are brought into Indonesia for prostitution. Building international cooperation to control human trafficking has been difficult for Indonesia because Malaysia denies complicity. The Malaysian government sponsors RELA, a public security auxiliary force consisting of five hundred thousand “volunteer civilians” who have been given the authority to arrest illegals. Halfway houses have been set up just across the border in Indonesia to repatriate these women. However, once detained inside Malaysia, the women are often just re-trafficked for profit by the volunteers.^{xxviii}

The regional realpolitik of lack of women’s rights is a root cause of trafficking of women in Indonesia. Exacerbating this, the laws and legal processes in Indonesia related to human trafficking are not easily understood by people who lack legal training. Rescued human trafficking victims may fear possible criminal charges, retaliation by traffickers if they provide information to police, or attacks against family members. Indonesia was elevated to a Tier 2 country rating in the US State department’s most recent Trafficking in Persons report, in part because of strong efforts to assist victims of trafficking through the funding of basic services and referral of victims to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations. However, there are few reported efforts to prosecute, convict or punish Indonesian law enforcement and military officials complicit in human trafficking.^{xxix} With little fear of prosecution by corrupt Indonesian law enforcement authorities, traffickers continue community recruitment of vulnerable women and children, particularly in rural areas of central Java. A complicating political factor is that if Indonesia pressures countries like Malaysia or Saudi Arabia to regulate trafficking, these countries may retaliate by sending home legal Indonesian guest workers in their countries, leading to significant losses in remittances sent to Indonesia.

In central Java, there are regions where institutionalized human trafficking represents a significant part of the local economy. This is a sensitive problem for the Indonesian government that was confirmed by US officials working on these issues in central Java. In these areas, local citizens cooperate with police in investigating human trafficking networks,

while at the same time engaging in community-level recruiting of young women for these networks.^{xxx} Wherever there is wealth, such as at the Freeport Mining Corporation, Timika, Papua, or at other mining, logging or energy production camps, there is trafficking. The US Embassy has held discussions with Freeport on this issue, but little concrete action has been taken to resolve the problem. The apparent lack of will by both governments in addressing this problem inevitably sends a signal to traffickers and to international businesses that trafficking in humans is considered less than a priority threat.

To help Indonesia grapple with this problem, the United States should send more trainers to the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC). In 2008, the United States sent nine trainers (the Netherlands sent thirty, the United Kingdom sent thirty-two, and Australia sent one hundred and twenty). In 2007 Australia initiated a five-year, A\$21 million partnership with Indonesia to fight the human trade. Historically, the United States has provided a total of US\$20 million to assist Indonesia in the fight against human trafficking, and it needs to continue this support.

To deal effectively with TNC, Indonesia needs to clarify its policies with respect to international cooperation on surveillance, apprehension and particularly extradition of transnational criminals. Indonesia is open and flexible on these issues; however, traditional ASEAN perceptions of national sovereignty hamper regional progress in this area.^{xxxi} For countries with which Indonesia lacks a formal extradition treaty, regional national chiefs of police have developed an unofficial system of cooperation through which wanted individuals in one country have on occasion been “handed over” to the country of origin of the suspect.^{xxxii}

A more insidious aspect of human smuggling and trafficking involves the international spread of disease. Illegally trafficked individuals as well as official foreign guest workers often carry infectious diseases between Indonesia and other countries where screening for tuberculosis, hepatitis, and sexually transmitted diseases is inconsistent. Indonesians are more concerned about domestic health issues (malaria, dengue, tuberculosis) than transnational health threats such as avian influenza (bird flu), H1N1 (swine flu), severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and to a large extent the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/AIDS, which is still viewed as an “external” problem. Pandemic preparedness is led only by the Public Health sector, within the Ministry of Health. Citing valid concerns over potential exploitation by the international pharmaceutical industry, the Indonesian Ministry of Health has failed to cooperate fully

with the World Health Organization in H5N1 avian influenza vaccine development.^{xxxiii} This situation does not bode well for the current H1N1 pandemic.

An effective Continuity of Operations (COOP) plan for pandemics requires an interagency approach involving other service sectors such as telecommunications, food and water, sanitation, banking and education. The United States should encourage ASEAN, via its new Ambassador to the Secretariat in Jakarta, to establish regional standards in disaster preparedness to deal with transnational health threats such as pandemic influenza preparedness. Minimum preparedness standards should apply: (1) within countries for interagency communication and cooperation; (2) for information sharing with neighbors; and (3) for communication with NGOs and donors.

Implications for the United States

The biggest challenge to security sector development in Indonesia is the lack of professionalism among the police and, to a lesser degree, the military. Improvement in leadership skills, strategic thinking and technical training of security personnel should be a primary goal of any US engagement strategy for Indonesia. Increased professionalism among the national police will help reduce corruption and increase public confidence in the police as a credible security force. Furthermore, a more stable and secure society in Indonesia supports the strategic goals of both the United States and Indonesia. The United States recently acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. This important confidence-building measure was a *sine qua non*, and provided the United States both credibility and gravitas to engage effectively in negotiations with Indonesia in a regional context. In this way, programs for fighting terrorism and nontraditional security threats can be crafted as Indonesian solutions, not foreign mandates, thereby empowering the Indonesian government.

For the United States to demonstrate global leadership it must build partnerships with other nations to share the burden of addressing transnational security threats.^{xxxiv} Both countries should look forward and concentrate on creating a security environment beneficial to the region. This is best accomplished by continued security sector development and professionalization of Indonesian security forces at all levels. A comprehensive partnership between the United States and Indonesia,

which supports long-term capacity-building in a culturally sensitive manner, is the best strategy for creating a sustainable security environment in Indonesia and advancing US national interests.

ⁱAbuza, A. 2002. Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network. *Contemporary SE Asia* 24(3): 427-465.

ⁱⁱInternational Crisis Group. 22 Jan 2008. Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso. *Asia Briefing* No. 75: 1-11.

ⁱⁱⁱJones, S. July 2008. Briefing for the New President: The Terrorist Threat in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. *Annals Amer. Acad. Political and Social Sciences* 618: 69-78.

^{iv}Public Affairs official. 2009. US Embassy, Jakarta. Interview by author. Jakarta, Indonesia, 14 June.

^vSukma, R. 2009. Executive Director. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Interview by author. Jakarta, Indonesia, June, 2009.

^{vi}Boukhars, A. 2009. There are Many Ways to Exploit Al-Qaeda's Vulnerabilities. Brookings Institution, 22 June. Available online at: http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0622_al_qaeda_boukhars.aspx.

^{vii}International Crisis Group. 28 Feb 2008. Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry. *Asia Report* No. 147, p. 1.

^{viii}International Crisis Group. 20 May 2009. Indonesia: Radicalization of the "Palembang Group." *Asia Briefing* 92: 1-19.

^{ix}Della-Giacoma, J. 2009. Radicalisation: Look at the Network, not the School. *The Interpreter*. 29 June. Available online at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6195&l=1>.

^xInternational Crisis Group. 19 Nov 2007. Deradicalization and Indonesian Prisons. *Asia Briefing* No. 142: 1-31.

^{xi}LTG Bambang Darmono. 2009. Secretary General of National Resiliency Council. Presentation to Seminar on East Asian Security. 7 July. Jakarta, Indonesia.

^{xii}International Crisis Group. 13 Sept 2004. Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix. *Asia Report* 83: 1-59.

^{xiii}Transparency International. 2008 Global Corruption Report 2008, p. 191. Available online at: http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2008.

^{xiv}Scott, J. 1977. Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia. In *Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in clientelism*. Edited by S. Schmidt. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997. Pp. 123-146.

^{xv}Bakri, C., *Defending Indonesia*. Gramedia Pustaka Utama Pubs. Jakarta, Indonesia. 2009. p. 128.

^{xvi}Senior official, Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Interview by author, Jakarta, Indonesia, June, 2009.

^{xvii}Sianipar, M. (2006). Deputy Chairman, Commission IV, Indonesian House of Representatives. Quoted in Media Indonesia, Jakarta. 6 April.

^{xviii}Larsen, J. 2002. Illegal logging threatens ecological and economic stability. Available online at: <http://www.westbynorthwest.org/summer02/larsen.vow.summer02/shtml>.

^{xix}Down in the Woods. 2006. The Economist. 25 March, p. 74.

^{xx}CITES, 3 March 1973, 993 United Nations Treaty Service 243.

^{xxi}Lin, J. 2005. Tackling Southeast Asia's Illegal Wildlife Trade. Singapore Yearbook of Intl Law 9: 191-208.

^{xxii}Vince, G. .17 June 2002. Organized Gangs Target Wildlife Trade. New Scientist. Available online at: <http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn2413>.

^{xxiii}Cook, D., M. Roberts, and J. Lowther. The international wildlife trade and organized crime. WWF Traffic Report, WWF UK. Godalming, UK. 2002.

^{xxiv}Serafino, N. 2008. DOD Section 1207 Security and Stabilization Assistance. CRS Report for Congress, pp 1-4.

^{xxv}Yusof, M. 2005. Eye in the Sky Over Malacca Straits. Bernama. Available online at: http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/news_lite.php?id=154485.

^{xxvi}Senior official. 2009. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Interview by author. Jakarta, Indonesia 14 June.

^{xxvii}Political officer. 2009. US Embassy. Interview by author. 12 June.

^{xxviii}Senior Protection Officer. 2009. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Refugee Lecture to Seminar on East Asia Security. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 9 July.

^{xxix}US DOS Trafficking in Persons Report 2009 – Indonesia 16 June 2009. Available online at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a4214a6c.html>.

^{xxx}Political officer. 2009. US Embassy. Interview by author. 12 June.

^{xxxi}Jemadu, A., 2009. Associate Dean. National Sovereignty Lecture to Seminar on East Asian Security. Universitas Pelita Harapan. Jakarta, 10 July.

^{xxxii}Senior faculty, Indonesian National Police Headquarters, College of Police Science. 2009. Interview by author. Corroborated by law enforcement officials at US Embassy, 10 June.

^{xxxiii}Sedyaningsih, E., S. Isfandari, T. Soendoro, and S. Supari. 2008. Towards mutual trust, transparency and equity in virus sharing mechanisms: The avian influenza case of Indonesia, Ann. Acad. Med. Singapore 37: 482-488.

^{xxxiv}Pascual, C. 2009. American Leadership in a Global Century. Brookings Institution. 12 June 2009. Available online at: http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2009/0612_american_leadership_pascual.aspx

Cambodia's Transnational Security Challenges

Jessica H. S. Ear

Key Findings

- Cambodia's current political stability provides opportunities for the government to focus on nontraditional security challenges that continue to plague economic development and effective governance.
- Existing transnational security threats that include trafficking, terrorism and pandemics highlight a need for government skills and capacity-building to effectively handle these problems.
- Although coordination among multinational organizations, civil society groups and the government is becoming more effective in combating Cambodia's transnational security threats, more can still be done.
- International assistance to Cambodia should focus on empowerment initiatives that promote Cambodian self-sufficiency, sustainability and national confidence in its ability to combat transnational threats domestically, regionally and globally.

Cambodia shares borders with Thailand, Laos and Vietnam and has limited resources to adequately monitor its overland crossings, maritime security and coastlines. Therefore, it is not surprising that Cambodia's most significant transnational security challenges can be observed along its porous border towns and waterways. Potential pandemics, terrorist threats, and illicit activities such as trafficking of drugs, small arms and people, are real concerns for the Cambodian government as people and goods continue to move easily across mainland Southeast Asia.

Transnational challenges along the nation's borders have long been recognized by Cambodia and foreign governments, but recent border flare-ups between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear Temple have refocused Cambodia's attention and intensified the need to protect its national borders against intrusion and illegal activities. Although Preah Vihear is a bilateral dispute between Thailand and Cambodia and does not directly relate to regional threats, the issue has heightened attention on border issues and the capacity of Cambodia's military and police to handle

potential transnational risks. This point was emphasized in the country's National Defense White Paper 2006, as the Cambodia recognized a changed security outlook due to an evolved regional and global situation. From this new perspective the government acknowledges that major nontraditional security challenges such as international terrorism and transnational crimes currently pose serious threats to its national defense, security and development.

In the early 1990s Cambodia's violent history receded into the past under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and national focus turned to political stabilization and institutional reconstruction. After more than a decade of party struggles that included a 1997 coupe ousting the rival National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), headed by Prime Minister Hun Sen, concluded its claim to strong national support in a 58 percent win, constitution 90 out of 123 seats in the National Assembly Election of July 2008. Cambodia's relatively stable political climate over the past ten years has allowed its leaders to shift focus from national reconstruction to economic development, bringing about a new era of big business, personal profit, transnational dealings and potential international investments.

Currently, Cambodia is undergoing remarkable growth and changes in national image. While transnational security challenges of trafficking, terrorism and pandemic threats are not new to Cambodia, the ability for the country to handle these problems has greatly improved. Better coordination among civil society groups and multinational efforts combining nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the government and other regional and international players are helping Cambodia become more effective in combating transnational security concerns. Global initiatives such as Cambodia's contributions to United Nations peacekeeping and demining efforts—as well as strides to reform its security sector—are increasing government confidence, reshaping concepts of self-sufficiency and redefining Cambodia's roles in the region.

Despite these positive steps, however, Cambodia remains burdened by endemic corruption and an entrenched system of client patronage that leaves many of its population impoverished and subject to exploitation by the country's rich and powerful. International assistance to Cambodia should strive to support initiatives that empower the country to become self-sufficient and confident in its ability to contribute to combating transnational concerns globally and in the region.

Smuggling of Small Arms

The end of more than three decades of fighting in Cambodia left large surpluses of arms and weapons that quickly find their way into the world's illegal arms market. During the 1980s and 1990s, small arms sales originating in Cambodia became one of the country's most lucrative activities. The variety of weapons intercepted during that period included assault rifles, general-purpose machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, antitank weapons, pistols and ammunition. At that time, weapons, ammunition and war supplies in Cambodia could be bought and sold in local markets alongside other basic commodities. Small handguns carried freely in the streets further fueled lawlessness and personal insecurity among the people.

Since then, a joint effort with international partners and organizations has brought nearly half of Cambodia's supply of surplus weapons under government control. Active weapons collection and destruction programs have substantially reduced the country's supply of unused arms and its potential for proliferation. A small arms survey supported by the Swiss government in 2006 concluded that a considerable reduction in arms had taken place since the 1990s and estimated that twenty-two thousand to eighty-five thousand weapons continue to circulate illegally in Cambodia today.

Although the reduction in surplus arms since the end of the country's civil war is very encouraging, imported arms from China and the Middle East are still finding their way to insurgents and terrorists groups throughout Southeast Asia. Small arms smuggling remains a transnational security challenge for Cambodia because the country remains a key transit location among the many covert routes of arms movements in the region. With insurgencies and terrorist threats in the region, Cambodia must continue to eliminate war remnant weapons to reduce the risk of supplying these groups with arms and to prevent transnational small arms trafficking along its borders.

Trafficking of Drugs

Cambodia is part of a geographical region that has long been recognized as one of the world's major locations for drug production. Located between Thailand, Laos and Vietnam, Cambodia's centralized location and an under-developed law enforcement structure hindered by corrupt practices make it an ideal originating and transit point for

trafficking and other illegal activities. Clandestine laboratories backed by organized crime syndicates manufacture illicit drugs in Cambodia's sparsely populated areas or new urban settings for trafficking to other countries. Cambodia's porous borders are conducive to trafficking because the borders span unpopulated areas of jungle that are often poorly monitored and controlled. As modernization gives rise to more highways crisscrossing national boundaries, higher volumes of pedestrian, private and commercial traffic will pass through border checkpoints. Without law enforcement units trained and equipped to respond to and interdict illegal substance movements, arresting transnational criminal elements will remain extremely difficult.

It is known that drugs enter Cambodia's northern entry points from the Golden Triangle area along the Thailand, Laos and Burma borders. Many of the narcotics then transit through Cambodia via road or river networks and move on to Thailand and Vietnam. The flow of drugs in and out of Cambodia, combined with a large and idle young population susceptible to drug use, is resulting in a trend of increased drug abuse and crime in Cambodia.

Recent discoveries of covert factories extracting sassafras oil from rare trees in the southwestern provinces link Cambodia to the drug network and syndicates at play in the region. Sassafras oil is a key ingredient often used to manufacture the drug commonly known as "ecstasy." At the height of the illegal operations in 2006, it was estimated that there were at least seventy-five processing factories run by crime syndicates in the Cardamom protected forest. In 2008, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, in a joint operation with the Australian Federal Police and the environmental nonprofit organization Fauna and Flora International (FFI), destroyed factories, made arrests and confiscated about thirty-three tons of sassafras oil. Authorities claimed that amount of oil could have produced 245 million ecstasy tablets with a street value of US\$7 billion.

Since then the Joint Enforcement Task Force has continued to confiscate tons of sassafras oil in Cambodia and at the Thailand border. As long as there is an international demand and high profitability for drugs, the emergence of new ecstasy manufacturing facilities and the destruction of rare trees and forest will continue in Cambodia.

Trafficking in People

As seen in drug trafficking, Cambodia is also a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking. The trafficking is reportedly organized and managed by crime syndicates. Making the problem even more sinister and harder to deter, however, is the fact that traffickers are often family and friends profiting from the sale of young men, women and children.

According to the United Nations Inter-Agency Project (UNIAP), Cambodian men, women and children are trafficked for sexual and labor exploitation in Thailand, Malaysia, Macau, and Taiwan. Men are trafficked for forced labor in the agriculture, fishing, and construction industries while women are trafficked for sexual exploitation and forced labor in factories or as domestic servants. A global network of organizations and individuals working together for the elimination of these crimes, called End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes (ECPAT International), reports that as many as one-third of the victims are children trafficked for sexual exploitation and forced labor in organized begging rings, soliciting, street vending, and flower selling.

There are many causes of human trafficking in Cambodia. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Youth Rehabilitations found that 76 percent of trafficked persons returned from Thailand had come from families who owned their own land and house. Perplexingly, about 47 percent of those interviewed stated that their mother was the facilitator of their trafficking. According to the UNIAP, poverty is considered the most significant cause of trafficking. Human trafficking in Cambodia has increased because of a number of other factors, including socioeconomic imbalance between rural and urban areas, increased tourism, lack of unemployment, education, and safe migration. NGOs working to stop human trafficking in Cambodia attribute the common phenomenon of family-member trafficking to a lack of education and livelihood skills. Parents or victims can easily be led to believe that they or their child will be working as domestic servants only later to find themselves coerced by criminal elements into sexual exploitation.

Other factors, such as client-patron relationship exploitation and displacement from government land concessions in rural areas, have fueled a return of Cambodian people to the urban areas seeking jobs and means of livelihood. With well over half the population below the age of twenty, Cambodia faces a growing problem of providing decent work for

its young population. Cambodia's present shortfall in job stability further increases the drive toward cross-border migration for employment, which perpetuates the cycle of vulnerability to human trafficking.

Infectious Disease and Pandemics

The ease with which people and goods move across Cambodia's national borders also poses the threat of infectious disease becoming a serious security issue. This threat is exacerbated when taking into account the fact that Cambodia is a country already plagued by a weak health system that lacks surveillance capability and suffers from widespread poverty and ill nutrition.

According to the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is becoming less prevalent in the Cambodia population. In June 2007, HIV prevalence among adults ages fifteen to forty-nine was 0.9 percent, down from 1.2 percent in 2003. An estimated sixty-seven thousand adults and three thousand eight hundred children live with HIV in Cambodia. While the decrease in prevalence rate is a positive indication that public campaigns promoting condom use have had some effect, methods of HIV infection are changing due to altered sexual networking practices. Men in Cambodia are increasingly turning to non-brothel-based sex workers, with whom they are less likely to use a condom. This has led to circumstances where almost half of new infections are among married women, and one-third of new infections occur from mothers transmitting HIV to their newborn infants. This change in the method of infection is raising new challenges in the campaign against HIV/AIDS in Cambodia.

In addition to new sexual behavioral trends, the lack of adequate disease detection, treatment and healthcare poses other significant challenges to transnational disease transmission. At least one-fifth of the population has no access to health and medical treatments. Under sourced public health services are one of the major contributing causes of indebtedness and poverty in the country. While the government spent only US\$1 per capita on public health services in 1998, private out-of-pocket spending was on average about US\$30 per person for healthcare needs. Results from an Oxford Committee for Famine Relief study on landlessness indicate that 44 percent of people who had recently lost their land did so because they had to pay for medical expenses. Corruption plays a role in unofficial charges, and demands for fees to individuals in

public health facilities are also widespread. It is commonplace for Cambodians who cannot afford healthcare to purchase medicines from illegitimate sources and turn to unreliable home treatments of diseases. For wealthier Cambodians, travel to Thailand or Vietnam for serious medical attention is often preferred to receiving in-country care.

Cambodia's poor healthcare system lacks surveillance and detection capability to contain potential pandemics such as SARS or Avian Human Influenza (AHI). As one of the first countries in Southeast Asia to experience AHI infection in December 2003, Cambodia had its first wave of alarm from January to May 2004. The outbreak had a severe impact on small-scale commercial poultry farms and on village farms that raise the majority of the country's poultry under subsistence conditions. AHI cases emerged again in late 2004 and early 2005, with four fatal human cases reported and about two thousand five hundred birds killed by disease or culling. Additional human deaths were confirmed in 2006 and 2007.

Although the outbreaks in Cambodia have not been of the scale experienced in other countries, Cambodia remains vulnerable to pandemics. The repeated outbreaks and associated loss of human life and livelihoods highlight the country's inadequate disease surveillance system, its limited capacity to control disease and the persistence of infection in the region. Because Cambodia is situated between Thailand and Vietnam—two major poultry-producing countries that have experienced far greater AHI human infection—Cambodia remains a potential flashpoint for an expansion of avian influenza and possible emergence of a human pandemic strain of influenza.

The first case of the new influenza strand A/H1N1 was confirmed on June 23, 2009. A month later a Cambodian health official confirmed twenty-one new cases. Cambodia has consequently tightened its monitoring and tracking system at two main airports through the use of thermal detection scanners. The Cambodian government is working with the international community to build capacity for disease surveillance, investigation and control to integrate preparedness and response planning. These measures, though helpful, do not fully address the threat that transnational infectious disease and pandemics present to the majority of people still unable to afford medical treatment under the poorly sourced and maintained national health system.

Terrorism

Although Cambodia is not threatened by significant organized domestic terrorist groups currently operating in country, the government is nevertheless cautious about the regional threat and has classified terrorism as one of its top transnational security concerns. The government references Cambodia's vulnerability for terrorism and its potential to be used as a "safe haven" to its geographic proximity to recent attacks and its closeness to areas of terrorist operation networks by groups such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).

The arrest of Hambali, former military leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (with links to Al-Qaeda, in Bangkok, Thailand in August 2003) highlighted Cambodia's susceptibility to terrorists seeking safe haven from capture. Hambali's whereabouts leading up to his arrest included hiding out at a guesthouse in the Phnom Penh Lake district. A Cambodian official reported further evidence suggesting that Hambali also had tried and failed in attempts to attack the British Embassy in Phnom Penh in 2002.

These terrorist activities inside Cambodia's territory spurred the government to consider the threat stemming from increased radicalization within the Cambodian Muslim or Cham community. Shortly following the Hambali arrest, various religious schools—which were focused on teaching radical Islam in Cambodia and funded by foreign sources—came under Cambodian government scrutiny. In the period leading up to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum meeting in 2003, Cambodian authorities, acting on tips from US government sources (citing links to Al-Qaeda and JI), arrested and expelled the director, associated teachers and their families from a Muslim organization that assisted the Cham community through its religious schools and programs.

Although the government relied on credible sources that led to these arrests, advocates of human rights continue to condemn what they consider to be drastic government measures that may not be based on legitimate evidence. These critics view such government actions as potentially damaging to the Cambodian Muslim community in a way that may serve to isolate and give rise to grievances and potential retaliation. Researchers of Muslim communities in Cambodia suggest that in large part, the communities are pacifist and unsympathetic to radical Islamic fundamentalist beliefs. Therefore, in cases where the Cambodian government takes proactive measures to deal with terrorism threats, it also should be cautious of generating ill-treatment and discriminatory attitudes

toward its Muslim minorities through intensified policy campaigns. Despite the Cambodian government's increasing concern regarding terrorist infiltration and domestic risk, its capability to investigate and respond to transnational terrorist threats remains unsophisticated and limited. Cambodia needs to develop a comprehensive anti-terrorism approach that incorporates aspects of Cham cultural understanding to the much needed capacities and coordination training among its law enforcement and intelligence units.

Capacity and Cooperation

Cambodia has ratified many international conventions and protocols addressing transnational security threats, including terrorism suppression in areas of financing, aviation and hostage taking. However, the complexity of implementing and enforcing international agreements through Cambodia's national legislation—under the framework of a weak Cambodian judiciary—leads some observers to question the effectiveness of the laws.

For example, critics of the Law on the Suppression of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation argue that the law's non-differentiation of sex workers from true victims of the sex industry diverts attention from the crime of trafficking, which could result in greater health risks. From the time the law was passed in January 2008, health campaigns to promote condom use became less effective because police raided and drove sex workers out of brothels and into other unconventional establishments. Deficiencies in Cambodian laws—either in drafting or intent—continue to reflect the current limited capacity of legislators, judiciaries and law enforcement to establish conditions for effective rule of law.

Under the umbrella of international and domestic laws, the government of Cambodia also has established various governmental bodies to have oversight of specific transnational security concerns. To address the drug threat, the government established the National Authority for Combating Drugs (NACD) to centralize decisions on drug control policy and to supervise and coordinate the government's antinarcotics efforts. The NACD set out and implemented Cambodia's 2005–2010 national plan for narcotics control, focusing on demand reduction, supply reduction, drug law enforcement, and expansion of international cooperation.

Other government initiatives to address transnational threats include the creation of the National AIDS Authority to provide overall policy direction and to undertake health sector development to strengthen the capabilities of the Ministry of Health, the development of the National Counterterrorism Committee in late 2004 and its Secretariat in mid-2005, and the creation of the National Task Force, which is overseen by the “High-Level Working Group” to combat human trafficking. Chaired by the deputy prime minister and minister of interior, the High-Level Working Group oversees a task force that includes eleven ministries, three government agencies and more than two hundred international and local NGOs.

This high-level involvement from government officials in antihuman trafficking initiatives has strong political backing by the prime minister, a fact many aid workers attribute to organizational and international pressures. External pressures for proactive government oversight are also reflected in the annual US government’s “Trafficking in Persons” report. In 2007, Cambodia was listed among countries on the Tier 2 Watch list, a special category for countries that require special scrutiny due to its trafficking trends. A year later, Cambodia was fully upgraded to Tier 2, with “significant efforts to comply with the Trafficking and Violence Protection Act” due to enhanced government efforts and improved statistics related to victims of human trafficking. The combination of integrated collaboration among government agencies, international pressures and NGOs has helped Cambodia reduce human trafficking.

Comprehensive cooperation models, such as that found in dealing with human trafficking, coordinate NGO activities with government officials and agencies. Both civil society and government collaborate in the prevention and enforcement phases of the public anti-trafficking campaign. In the context of the large NGO community, this form of collaboration is considered to be most effective in handling transnational threats in Cambodia. Groups such as the Cambodia Women’s Crisis Center (CWCC) work with government authorities to provide counseling and training to repatriated victims of human trafficking, assist reintegration into society and further reduce vulnerabilities of re-trafficking. This model will not be effective without the efforts of many NGOs such as the Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights, (LICAHDO), the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC), and Action Pour Les Enfants (APLE) working with authorities to protect the rights of victims and to prosecute traffickers

and sex offenders.

Another example of this NGO and government enforcement model is that of Fauna and Flora International (FFI), an international NGO working to protect the Cardamom Mountains in Cambodia. FFI has been cooperating with the Ministry of Environment (MOE) since 2000 to protect and monitor sections of the vast forest from illegal activities such as poaching and illicit extraction of sassafras oil from rare trees. FFI supplements the income of about fifty MOE rangers and provides extensive training for the rangers while liaising with Australian and US drug enforcement agencies to utilize satellite technology in detecting new and illegal oil extraction activities in the forest.

Much like other NGOs assisting the Cambodian government, FFI has to be proactive and involved to bring about success. Cambodian government authorities, as in the case of the MOE park rangers, lack resources, salary incentive and capacity to effectively do their job. The most common problem in government is the lack of funds and resources. To help address this shortcoming, NGOs and civil society groups have stepped in to provide services that are traditionally expected of government. This culture of assistance, however, is not sustainable because it creates reliance on NGOs and dependence on foreign aid.

At the national level, Cambodia is utilizing NGOs to establish a comprehensive approach to handling transnational concerns. Cambodia also is partnering with multiple countries on various security concerns, including Australia and the United States, to combat drugs and terrorism. Japan helps to manage the Sihanoukville port, and Thailand and Vietnam assist in the training of police and military. Cambodia is also a willing participant in regionally cooperating with other countries, ASEAN and the United Nations.

Among the many regional initiatives in which Cambodia participates to address transnational interests, the UNIAP on Human Trafficking in the Greater Mekong Sub-region is a notable and effective collaboration between Cambodia and five neighboring countries to report annually on antihuman trafficking initiatives and statistics. UNIAP has deemed the project successful because it harnesses the political will of individual countries and invites competitive peer pressure to motivate the establishment of anti-trafficking objectives and greater accountability among the countries. Through such multiparty initiatives, Cambodia is becoming more adept at working with various entities to maximize organizational strengths and resources to benefit

from a whole of government approach in combating transnational security threats.

Challenges

The gradual shift in the attitude of Cambodian leadership toward cooperation is welcome, and there have been noted improvements in the realm of transnational security. However, Cambodia still faces many challenges that continue to fuel security threats. Many aid and foreign government officials describe corruption as endemic in Cambodia. Transparency International, a global coalition against corruption, places Cambodia 166th out of 180 on its corruption perception index in 2008. In Southeast Asia, only Myanmar, which tied with Iraq in the second-to-last ranking at 178, ranks lower on this index.

Corruption can be found almost everywhere in Cambodia. Government wages are roughly US\$25 a month. To better retain rangers, compensate for the dangerous work conditions and deter corrupt behavior, FFI supplements the MOE park ranger's US\$25 monthly salary by raising it to US\$150. Where most low-level Cambodian officials turn to corrupt practices to supplement their income, higher-level government authorities and politicians have been linked to large national businesses and lucrative transactions for self-profit. Corruption is so widespread in Cambodian society that incidences of kickbacks to public school administrators or teachers are expected for children to attend schools. Driving in the country is met by occasional police shakedowns in traffic. Even the prolific Khmer Rouge Tribunal was subjected to corruption; staff members have confessed to having paid their superiors to obtain and keep their jobs.

Cambodia's judicial system also is perceived as being corrupt as judges and police often can be bribed. Corruption in law enforcement and in the court is so prevalent that impunity for extrajudicial killings has become commonplace. Whistle-blowers and those who get in the way of powerful figures can become victims of convenient accidents or unexplained disappearances. Despite receiving a petition—with more than a million Cambodian signatures and thumbprints—supporting a proposed anticorruption law in May 2009, the National Assembly has yet to pass the law. An ineffective legal system with a weak civilian police force that lacks capacity poses serious challenges in Cambodia's efforts to counter transnational crimes and threats.

Another major obstacle to countering transnational threats is

government land concession to big businesses. Since the early 1990s, the Cambodian government, with its personal ties to wealthy businesses, has conceded large tracts of land to private companies for investment in plantations and large-scale agriculture. Instead of promoting rural development, however, these concessions have compromised the rights and livelihoods of villagers, displacing the poor and creating more destitute communities susceptible to human trafficking and other vices. For Cambodia to adequately face threats of drug, human and small-arms trafficking, the risk of pandemic and infectious disease outbreaks, and vulnerabilities to terrorism networks, it must rein in corruption, cease land concession practices and take steps to improve poverty levels in Cambodia.

Opportunities for Engagement

The Cambodian military with executive oversight is in the process of conducting a security sector reform to redefine the roles of the armed forces and gendarmerie police. This reform process is an opportune time for the country to better address the law enforcement and protection needs of the state and its people against a wide variety of transnational threats.

Strong political will is needed to carry out security sector reform and reduce transnational threats. In Cambodia this political authority lies in the centralized power of Prime Minister Hun Sen. Very little is likely to change without the prime minister or his deputies' support and approval. The concentration of political decision-making power in only a few leaders in Cambodia creates slow and often ineffective governance, as very little progress can be made without high-level endorsements. To better meet pressing transnational challenges security sector reform in Cambodia should include wider delegation of power to other government institutions. In a similar vein, military and police responsibilities should be more clearly delineated.

It is also in the United States' interest to support Cambodia's effective handling of transnational issues. The US government should continue to fund initiatives and programs that seek to build Cambodia's capacity for better governance and security, such as training for the counterterrorism task force, military and law enforcement, supporting educational initiatives and women's programs, and strengthening health and governmental institutions. Donor fatigue, along with large cuts in funding, exerts positive pressure on the government and NGOs to build

partnerships and sustainability in their work. The key to enhancing security cooperation in Cambodia—and more broadly in Southeast Asia—lies in unifying program efforts and collectively pushing for better government responses to transnational issues at the national and regional levels, as is being done to counter terrorism, pandemics, and human and drug trafficking. Other donor initiatives, such as program matching by the Cambodian government, will bolster political will and national ownership of assistance needs. Rigorous monitoring and evaluation requirements in aid programming will help to reduce the potential for corruption while promoting stronger governance practices.

US engagement with Cambodia on these transnational issues must continue to incorporate capacity-building, training and education and confidence-building measures aimed at empowering Cambodia to become more self-sufficient. This was effectively demonstrated through US support for Cambodia to join UN peacekeeping missions and demining operations. Cambodia is fast gaining expertise and confidence in its ability to contribute on a global level by sending peacekeeping troops to Sudan and Chad. The sense of empowerment from these missions is helping Cambodia to develop specialized skills in demining and the capacity to respond to national and regional challenges. Ideal opportunities to build capacity and channel future US assistance include support for Cambodian peacekeeping missions, regional disaster response development and multinational cooperation to combat transnational security threats.

US-Oceania Security Cooperation in the Post 9/11 World: Whose Agendas and Priorities?

Gerard A. Finin
APCSS Adjunct Professor
Deputy Director, East-West Center Pacific Islands Program

Key Findings

- In countering terrorism, even the smallest and most remote countries can produce large and potentially serious security problems. This suggests that the US must continue its efforts to fully engage with Pacific island nations to advance mutual interests and address security issues.
- Unlike other regions of the globe where the US initiated major new forms of cooperative engagement and coalition building, 9/11 has not been a redefining or transformative moment in US-Pacific island relations. Although the US has embraced Pacific island nations as partners in its strategies to address the threats posed by terrorism, it has not given sufficient attention to the security priorities of Oceania, which frequently differ from those of western nations.
- September 11 magnified US attentiveness to the security threats that can emanate from fragile or failed states. The doctrine of “preemptive action” subsequently changed the calculus of how the US and its regional allies think about Pacific island nations, with a new emphasis on military and non-military interventions intended to prevent fragile states from becoming failed states. Pacific island governments had little alternative but to cautiously accept this change, but today appear to be more supportive of the new collaborative multilateral architecture being advanced by the Obama administration.
- The role of US allies in Pacific islands regional affairs is shifting. Australia and Japan are assuming increasing influence and responsibility for regional stability in the South Pacific that is in

keeping with their national interests. At the same time, the United States is increasing its own diplomatic engagement in Oceania, especially with regard to public diplomacy initiatives. China's and Taiwan's increasing presence has been welcomed by island governments as it provides an alternative to the existing regional architecture, with the potential for both governments to play constructive roles in the region.

- Promoting US engagement in Oceania through the use of *soft power* is one of the most effective ways to facilitate robust collaboration and ensure that there are no “weak links” in our Asia-Pacific security community.

Introduction

In the early morning hours of 12 September 2001, Tuvalu's Secretary to Government was awakened at home by a police officer who via radio had learned of an attack on New York City. What concerned the Secretary most immediately was the welfare of Tuvalu's permanent representative to the United Nations and his family. Unable to make telephone contact with anyone at the U.S. Embassy or to gather more information on the crowded internet lines, he contacted Tuvalu's High Commissioner in Fiji who was able to watch CNN television and relay the latest developments via phone.

The personal connection that made the attacks especially real for Tuvalu was mirrored in other Pacific island nations, each of which have personnel working at the 12 Pacific island UN missions. Unlike unfolding world events of previous eras, most Pacific island government officials had direct access to the vivid images conveyed around the globe by television. Within the next several days, island governments issued statements of condolence offering to assist the US in the fight against terrorism.

Cook Islands Prime Minister Dr. Terepai Maoate described the strikes in New York and Washington as “vicious” and “unthinkable.”ⁱ Like most Pacific island nations, the Cook Islands' bilateral relationship with the United States was not exceptionally vibrant in economic or political terms. However, based on the reservoir of good will from World War II and constructive American diplomatic activity during the cold war years, the relationship was still seen as quite positive. Dr. Maoate's expression of his nation's condolences to the people of the United States was echoed by

island leaders throughout Oceania. At this juncture, however, Pacific governments were still uncertain about how they could assist the US in responding to the new security environment.

Overview

This essay explores the changes that have taken place in the US-Pacific island security environment during the nine years since the attacks of 9/11 and identifies some of the opportunities and challenges for security cooperation. Few would assert that 9/11 did not significantly alter the way in which the US viewed the issue of homeland security, or the way in which foreign policy is conducted. Similarly, it is difficult to argue that the policy environment in which US interests are being defined has not changed. However, it is important to underscore that many longstanding US interests have not been transformed, and significant continuities in US foreign policy must also be taken into account.

Initial US Responses in Asia and the Pacific

If September 11 revealed the vulnerabilities of US homeland security, the weeks and months that followed highlighted the breadth and depth of Al Qaeda's organizational reach, including numerous groups in South and Southeast Asia that were sympathetic to their objectives. Soon countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Pakistan were receiving priority attention from US policymakers and others in government. For example, on September 19, 2001, President George W. Bush and President Megawati Soekarnoputri issued a joint statement at the White House vowing “to open a new era of bilateral cooperation based on shared democratic values and a common interest in promoting regional stability and prosperity” and “pledged to cooperate with the international community in combating terrorism.”ⁱⁱ The US also reached out to Malaysia and, during a well-publicized meeting at the APEC summit in Shanghai, sought the advice of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad on fighting terrorism. Promises of liberal increases in economic aid and trade concessions were clearly part of the new post 9/11 agenda in Asia.ⁱⁱⁱ In the case of the Philippines and Pakistan, the proposals for small numbers of specialized US ground troops proved extremely sensitive in domestic political terms, but also allowed both countries to negotiate attractive aid packages that were beneficial to their national interests. The United States

decided that it must not only go after terrorists but take the offensive by denying terrorists places where they can “hide, plan and conduct their attacks.”^{iv}

In contrast to the host of anti-terrorism related initiatives launched in Asia, concerted new attention to the Pacific region beyond Hawaii and Guam was initially difficult to discern. US Embassy staff in Fiji, Port Moresby, Majuro and other locales made earnest efforts to dialogue with host country officials about improving security, but were not able to avail of any significant additional resources or programs. Some steps were made to enhance airport security, and at one point, suspicious activity in Samoa resulted in the temporary closure of US diplomatic offices there. Still, the sense of great urgency and indeed imminent danger that prevailed during the months immediately after 9/11 gradually appeared to give way to a sense of tacit complacency. For example, in 2003 US diplomats in Fiji revealed an awareness of certain security weaknesses and expressed concern about the lack of activity by Pacific island governments to bolster defenses, but offered little in the way of an action plan toward that end.

Pacific Islands’ Growing Economic and Political Vulnerabilities

It was not long after 9/11 that newspapers and other media outlets in the US took notice of the weak security procedures across the Pacific islands region. Op-ed articles and editorials pointed to the need for the United States to ensure that the Pacific’s ostensible “backwaters” would not become an open “back door” from which attacks could be launched.^v From the perspective of Pacific governments it was clear that the US during the 1990s had quietly disengaged from the region. In the wake of its successful policy of strategic denial during the cold war years and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US had closed consular offices, cut development aid and discontinued educational exchange programs.

Over time, however, policymakers in Washington gradually realized that there was a need to reengage. Although considerable good will existed on almost all levels, finding common ground for collective action was challenging in light of differing national security priorities. The security concerns of Pacific islands governments are influenced in part by ongoing economic and political vulnerabilities that predate 9/11. Ongoing pressures from bilateral donors and multilateral lending institutions for economic restructuring induced Pacific island nations to find means by which to

offset declining revenues from external donor sources. While there are, to be sure, differences among countries, the following suggests some of Oceania’s major security concerns and compares them with international security priorities frequently emphasized by metropolitan powers:

Oceania’s Security Concerns

- Climate Change/Sea Level Rise
- Disaster Preparedness/Management
- EEZ Intrusions and Poaching
- HIV-AIDS, Malaria, Dengue
- Energy Security (fossil fuels)
- Human Resource Capacities

International Security Concerns

- Human Smuggling/Trafficking
- Money Laundering/Offshore Banking
- Passport Sales/Flags of Convenience
- Transnational Drug Operations
- Transportation Security (sea & air)
- Weak State Institutions (e.g., RAMSI)
- Inadequate Information Sharing

Most Pacific nations’ economies are structured by large subsistence sectors and considerably smaller formal monetized activity. As a consequence, options for raising revenues directly from citizens are quite limited. However one avenue governments have for raising revenue is through opportunities afforded by sovereignty. Pacific islands nation states have in numerous instances turned to such options because they do not impose hardships on citizens lacking taxable resources. A well known example is Tuvalu’s commercialization of its domain name: .TV, which brings in considerable revenue from media firms which “rent” this form of Internet identification. But in the new security environment, a number of these activities now posed a potentially significant threat to the “war on terrorism.” Some of the practices that could hinder efforts to provide greater security included:

- Sale of passports on demand, which in certain cases allowed entry into countries such as Canada without requiring a visa.^{vi}

- Offshore banking operations with the potential to hide huge sums from scrutiny by financial oversight institutions.
- Weak institutions for preventing human smuggling to locations from which entry to the US is made easier (e.g., Guam and American Samoa)

With remote island nations having porous national maritime borders extending thousands of miles, maintaining strict enforcement of immigration procedures also provides major challenges. Even in countries that have good airport screening equipment or port procedures, scrutiny of arriving and departing visitors and cargo is at best only as reliable as the motivation and diligence of customs and security personnel.

In light of these vulnerabilities there were calls after 9/11 for the US to recognize these problems, see the opportunity to renew and reinvigorate US-Pacific friendships, and work side by side with island governments to advance collective security. This included proposals for strengthening relations by reestablishing exchange programs and increasing diplomatic contacts at multiple levels. Rather than attempt to find high cost, high tech solutions, it envisioned strengthening personal relationships between public servants in key US agencies and island ministries such as finance, immigration and customs through more frequent face to face contacts and a wider sharing of information.

However, as the early US military successes in Afghanistan were witnessed throughout Oceania, island governments, having early-on offered to join the war on terrorism, often felt they were being left on the sidelines as passive observers. Commenting at the East-West Center's Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders in early 2002, Fiji's Prime Minister at the time, Laisenia Qarase, spoke for many Pacific island leaders in attendance when he observed, "Just because our region is relatively peaceful does not mean nothing is happening. I don't think we should be complacent. The Pacific island countries will be used to stage activity elsewhere." In responding to these and other similar comments Admiral Dennis Blair, then Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Command, offered no false hope to the assembled Pacific heads of state. "Cooperation with Pacific islands will come in time but it's lower on the priority list than Southeast Asia...Our hands are full now with the terrorism we know about."^{vii} Indeed, of the nine countries Admiral Blair visited after 9/11 to forge a united front against terrorism, none were in the Pacific.

Increased US-Pacific Island Engagement

By mid-decade it was apparent that a number of US government agencies had started to think more about ways to enhance security in the Pacific. Some of this thinking predated the terrorist attacks, but the post 9/11 atmosphere seemingly gave security-related initiatives greater impetus. For example, in an effort to assist Fiji, the State Department in August 2002 provided modest funding to the East-West Center's Pacific Islands Development Program to support the "talanoa" dialogue and reconciliation process. Following the May 2000 coup wherein government leaders were held hostage at gunpoint for 56 days, a series of East-West Center sponsored *talanoa* convened for the purpose of bringing together political opponents, religious leaders, former hostages and coup sympathizers. The *talanoa* represented an effort to rebuild national unity as well as address contentious issues related to land tenure and constitutional reform in what Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and the Pacific Affairs James Kelly described as a country that "may have the most complicated politics in the whole Asia-Pacific region."^{viii}

Other small signs of emerging US government interest could be found as well. A Pacific islands specialist from Hawaii was invited to provide a briefing at CIA headquarters. Yet, according to the briefer, a World War II veteran, those present for the session seemed to have little knowledge of the Pacific region and displayed remarkably mild interest in pursuing the issues that were raised as points of concern for enhancing security. The Honolulu-based Joint Terrorism Task Force, established to coordinate efforts among various law enforcement agencies in Hawaii and beyond, also made genuine efforts to better understand the nature of the weak links in the defense against terrorism in the Pacific. But again, the extent of the follow-up appears to have been rather limited since these agencies had little experience or funding to work with peer agencies in the South Pacific.

In the North Pacific, where direct US involvement has for over 50 years been far more pervasive, 9/11 appears to have reinforced the US desire to exert a firmer hand on economic and immigration matters. The compact of free association agreements between the US and the north Pacific nations of Palau, Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) provide for exclusive US control over external security matters in exchange for, among other benefits, liberal no-visa access to the US.

In keeping with the original agreements stipulating reexamination of

certain aspects of the compacts after the first fifteen years, amendment negotiations were already underway well before 9/11. However, the war on terrorism underscored ongoing US concerns about restricting naturalization and passport sales to individuals who were not born in these countries. Moreover, spurred by a desire to see better financial management of US tax dollars being allocated to FSM and RMI, and certainly aware of the major problems facing a number of Pacific island states to the South, the US proposed a new financial management structure. As was the case during the pre-independence era, the proposed amendments, negotiated in the post 9/11 environment, once again gave the US a high degree of control over these two nations' budget expenditures. And for the first time citizens of countries in free association were required to have an updated passport when entering the US.

Offshore Banking

One area where the US did in time make a concerted effort in the Pacific islands region involved offshore banking operations. US authorities asserted that tax haven operations in the Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Nauru and Niue were fronts for Russian underworld and South American drug money laundering.^{ix} Banking operations in Vanuatu and Palau were also the subject of investigation. The Financial Action Task force of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) had been urging a number of countries around the world to severely tighten their tax haven operations or face sanctions.

Nauru was of special concern because of Russian reports claiming that US\$70 billion had been laundered through Nauru by Russian tax dodgers.^x More ominously, of approximately 450 shell banking companies reported to be operating from a single post office box in Nauru, one-third were said to be of Middle Eastern origin. In the face of dire economic conditions bordering on insolvency, Nauru resisted shutting down its revenue producing banking operations. Intense international pressure including possible repossession of Nauru's only aircraft, and a letter of concern from Secretary of State Colin Powell, finally convinced Nauru's leadership to meet with officials in Washington, D.C. After years of delay, Nauru, in March 2003, bowed to direct White House pressure and effectively abolished its offshore banking sector.^{xi} Subsequent claims by Nauru that the US would provide financial relief were denied, the State Department saying, "The U.S. did not, either directly or indirectly, offer Nauru an aid

package in exchange for action on U.S. concerns."^{xii} While sympathy for Nauru regarding its economic plight was not widespread in the region, the way in which US pressure was applied did not go unnoticed.

If US pressure for policy changes in the Pacific caused some quiet resentment, the US gradually found ways to indicate its desire for positive long-term engagement based on common interests. In 2004 President George W. Bush along with his senior staff and national security team attended a meeting of the Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders in Honolulu that emphasized a sharing of perspectives about security matters, at times going into considerable detail about the burdens some island nations face when international security requirements are imposed unilaterally. In 2007 the same group of Pacific Island leaders convened for the first time in Washington, D.C., where they met with the Department of State's most senior officials, as well as the Congressional Leadership. More recently, regional US diplomatic positions have been created to promote action on environmental issues and increase educational exchanges, including a return of the Fulbright Program. In another significant development USAID has announced it is back in the Pacific, focusing on a broad range of development-related activities region-wide.

Shifting Roles for US Allies in the Region

A key lesson learned from the Asia-Pacific region by US officials in the post 9/11 era is that in the war on terrorism, even the smallest most remote countries can produce large and potentially serious security problems. Over time, the US came to more fully appreciate that a number of South Pacific island nations were facing major political, economic and social challenges. However, in view of pressing challenges in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, and the proximity of two countries with which the US maintains strong alliances, the US has to some extent been reliant on notions of "burden sharing" to address security related matters in the South Pacific.

More than any nation in the southern hemisphere, Australia in recent years has reaffirmed its close partnership with the US. Australia's vision of itself as an integral part of the Asia-Pacific with close security links to the US had gained currency in the late 1980s. Moreover, Australia's colonial role in the Pacific islands region and significant economic ties, especially in Melanesia, converge to make prominent its national interests in the region. This is well reflected in Australia's Pacific aid budget that that is

second only to Japan's overseas development expenditures.

A turning point in US recognition of Australia's role in Asia Pacific security was the successful peace keeping operation launched in East Timor. Coming in response to US urging and proceeding with the UN's endorsement, Australia's status was further elevated by its willingness to take the lead in this multinational endeavor. Indicative of the importance the US–Australia security relationship in the months prior to 9/11 was the presence of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld at the annual joint meeting on defense and diplomacy in July 2001. Subsequently, US reliance on Australia has grown significantly as evinced by Australia's conspicuous support for the war in Iraq. Most recently, Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton both committed to attending the 2010 annual meeting ministerial consultations in Australia.

Embracing the Bush doctrine that like America, national security may require pre-emptive military action, Australia's 2003 deployment of troops and police officers (including personnel from New Zealand and other Pacific island nations) to restore peace and order in the Solomon Islands suggested that Washington and Canberra shared the same outlook. The announcement to send in Australian troops was justified on the grounds that the Solomon Islands was in danger of becoming a “failed state” and, if Canberra did not act, this could in the future lead to use of the Solomon Islands as a location that could be exploited by international terrorists or criminal syndicates sympathetic to terrorist organizations.^{xiii} To the extent that Australia is successful over the long term in its efforts at what former Prime Minister John Howard called “cooperative intervention” for the purpose of nation building in the Solomon Islands, and more recently Nauru, its standing in the international community, and particularly with the US, will likely be enhanced.

The other major US ally in the region is Japan. Japan's more assertive posture in recent years is increasingly significant. As a former colonial power in Micronesia, and following more than a quarter century of slowly growing activity in the region, Japan has substantial national interests centered around access to fisheries, seabed minerals and land-based natural resources.^{xiv} Greatly concerned with regional stability but hesitant to be involved in the domestic affairs of island nations, Japan's position as the largest de facto aid provider in the Pacific has long been appreciated by Pacific island governments.^{xv}

At a time when Japan's overseas development assistance budget is

declining globally, then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's announcement at the May 2003 Pacific Leaders Meeting (PALM) in Okinawa that Pacific aid levels would be maintained sent a clear signal of commitment. This stepping to the fore, supported by subsequent governments, represents a welcome aspect of Japan's willingness to assist with regional security across the Asia Pacific. In addressing the war on terrorism, Japan has funded specialized training for law enforcement officers and supported the collection of illegal small arms. Interestingly, Japan has increasingly worked collectively on development assistance with Australia and New Zealand, a position it had for some years assiduously avoided in the past given Australia's efforts to push politically difficult economic reform programs throughout the region.^{xvi} Based on these recent developments, Japan may be poised to play a larger role in Pacific island security matters involving political stability and terrorism.

Within Oceania six governments recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) and six governments recognize Taiwan. While some have raised alarm over this state of affairs, there is an emerging consensus that the increasing interest in Oceania being expressed by the PRC and Taiwan has in general been beneficial for island governments as it provides alternatives to the existing regional architecture. The PRC's emphasis on infrastructure projects such as airport terminals, government buildings and sports facilities contrasts with Taiwan's emphasis on scholarships and a range of development projects such as increasing agricultural production. While the international community has bemoaned the lack of transparency, there is scope for both governments to play a positive role in the region, with little evidence that this competition over the past decade, sometimes characterized as checkbook diplomacy, has actually been destabilizing.

Conclusion

The post-Cold War process of US disengagement from the Pacific region facilitated new and larger roles for other regional powers, most notably Australia and Japan. In the wake of 9/11, the US gained greater appreciation for the security weaknesses found in the region and, together with its allies, has incrementally sought new forms of security cooperation with Pacific island nations. Although it has implicitly welcomed the increasing influence and range of responsibilities for regional security and stability being assumed by US allies, it has at the same time attempted to clearly project that message that the US is “back” in the South Pacific.^{xvii}

Pacific island nations have consistently articulated the willingness and even a desire to join with Washington in a multinational effort to increase regional security and combat terrorism. For instance, when symbolic political backing was urgently needed for the “Coalition of the Willing” assembled by President Bush to support the war in Iraq, US officials turned to island states. The inclusion of Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau and the Solomon Islands in the 46 nation partnership was noted internationally.^{xviii}

Palau’s assistance in joining the “coalition of the willing” was later rewarded in the form of an invitation for then President Thomas E. Remengesau Jr. to speak at the May 2003 US Coast Guard Academy graduation in Connecticut. Remengesau and the first Palauan cadet to complete his studies at the academy shared the stage with President Bush and Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge. Speaking about the ramifications of 9/11, Ridge told all those in attendance, “Suddenly the oceans got smaller,” he said, “and the challenges to protect them grew larger.”^{xix} Palau’s recent acceptance of a small number of former Guantanamo detainees as residents has underscored the ways in which even the smallest island states can at times contribute to global security concerns.

The years since September 11, 2001 have underscored the fact that terrorists seek to exploit any available vulnerability to achieve their objectives. Comprehensive global security must include Oceania, strengthening historic ties to advance collective safety and welfare. Recent initiatives to promote renewed engagement through the use of soft power is one of the most effective ways to facilitate robust collaboration and ensure that there are no “weak links” in our Asia-Pacific security community. Such an approach will be warmly welcomed across Oceania.

ⁱ*Cook Islands News*, September 12, 2001

ⁱⁱWhite House Press Release, September 19, 2001
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010919-5.html>

ⁱⁱⁱIndonesia, for example, received \$400 million to promote trade and investment, especially in the Indonesian oil and gas sector.

^{iv}Pacific Islands Report (PIR), July 25, 2002,
<http://166.122.164.43/archive/2002/july/07%2D25%2D10.htm>

^vGerard A. Finin, “Renew ties with Pacific islands to bolster ‘Weak Link.’” *The Honolulu Advertiser*, October 28, 2001.

^{vi}For evidence of passport sales see, Ronald G. Crocombe, *The South Pacific*, Suva:

Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 2001...

^{vii}East-West Wire, March 19, 2002, https://www.ewc.hawaii.edu/events-en-detail.asp?news_ID=58.

^{viii}*Pacific Magazine*, June 2003.

^{ix}PIR May 22, 2001 <http://166.122.164.43/archive/2001/may/05%2D23%2D1.htm>

^xPIR <http://166.122.164.43/archive/2000/february/02%2D29%2D01.htm>

^{xi}Radio Australia, Mar. 27, 2003. The Australian newspaper reported from Washington on April 16, 2003 that investigators in the United States have released details of six alleged terrorists, including two alleged Al Qaeda operatives, had been arrested in Southeast Asia in recent months carrying Nauruan passports. Nauru has agreed to abolish its investor passport scheme.

^{xii}*The Australian*, April 9, 2003, PIR
<http://166.122.164.43/archive/2003/april/04%2D10%2D11.htm>

^{xiii}Particularly revealing of the different perspectives held by Australia and New Zealand was a press conference held on 29 June at Adelaide Airport. See, http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/transcripts/2003/030629_philgoff.html

^{xiv}Gerard A. Finin and Terence Westley-Smith, “A New Era for Japan in the Pacific Islands: The Tokyo Summit.” East-West Center Asia Pacific Issues Paper No. 32, September, 1997.

^{xv}See Tanaka Yoshiaki, “Pacific Island States and Japan in the Global Context,” in Eric Shibuya and Jim Rolfe (eds.). *Security in Oceania in the 21st Century*. Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2003.

^{xvi}“Joint Statement on Cooperation among Australia, Japan and New Zealand on Development Assistance in the Pacific Region,” May 17, 2003.

^{xvii}See Steven McGann, “A Strategic Vision for the Pacific.” *Ambassadors Review* Fall 2009. Available on-line at
><http://www.americanambassadors.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Publications.The%5FAmbassadors%5FREVIEW><

^{xviii}*The Washington Post*, March 25, 2003. See also,
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030320-11.html>.

^{xix}*The Hartford Courant*, May 22, 2003.
<http://www.house.gov/simmons/print/inthenews83.html>

Japan's Transnational Security Agenda

David Fouse

Key Findings

- Japan's top national security priorities lie in the area of traditional security concerns related to North Korea and China. Transnational challenges are visible in Japan's overall security thinking but are clearly secondary concerns. Japan views cooperation with the United States on global or transnational issues in relation to US support for its top priorities of North Korea and China.
- Japan's top transnational security priorities have been nonproliferation and maritime security, because they are so closely intertwined with concerns related to North Korea and China. Disaster relief and peace cooperation activities are also deemed significant government priorities, although Japan's participation in peace cooperation activities has actually declined in recent years. Disaster relief was emphasized as an area for greater US-Japan cooperation at the recent Defense Ministers Joint Defense Conference by Japan's new defense minister, Toshimi Kitazawa.
- Japan has offered support to US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, cooperated with efforts aimed at undermining financial support for terrorism, and contributed to capacity-building in South Asia and Southeast Asia. However, the Japanese public does not feel that international terrorism strongly affects them, and many in the Japanese security community do not seem to make a firm connection between issues such as transnational organized crime and the illicit networks that can aid terrorists and undermine states.
- Given its available resources, Japan could do more to confront transnational organized crime both domestically and internationally. Japan could strengthen these efforts by passing anti-conspiracy legislation that would allow it to ratify the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC), fully implement Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations on money laundering, and take more proactive steps toward dealing with human trafficking.

- Japanese security policy is currently undergoing review following the victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the August 2009 elections. The new Hatoyama administration has already indicated its desire to see Japan regain leadership in dealing with climate change. Increased US-Japan cooperation in this and other nontraditional, transnational security areas is most likely to be successful, as the DPJ will be unlikely to stretch the limits of the legal restrictions placed on the Japan's Self-Defense Forces.

Policy Background

During the early 1980s Japan adopted a "comprehensive security policy" that ostensibly placed less emphasis on military than on economic and diplomatic means for ensuring the country's security. The comprehensive security concept developed as a natural outgrowth of Japan's successful postwar experience, in which Japan devoted itself to economic development while relying on its alliance with the United States to provide external deterrence and limit its military expenditures.ⁱ Within the alliance structure, Japan's actual military planning in the postwar period focused primarily on defense of the homeland through the end of the Cold War.

In the early 1990s Japan confronted a number of challenges that led to a reconsideration of its overall security strategy. Japan faced strident international criticism of its so-called "checkbook diplomacy" in the first Gulf War of 1991. Shortly thereafter Japan was unprepared to offer assistance to the United States in contingency planning for the first North Korean nuclear crisis, causing what some have called a "minicrisis" in the alliance. As Japan began to grapple with the issue of how to make an international contribution to security proportionate to its economic clout, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) released a report introducing the new concept of human security and the need to expand security strategies beyond traditional territorial-based thinking to confront a plethora of growing transnational security challenges.ⁱⁱ

The first serious review of Japan's Cold War security strategy was carried out in 1994 by Japan's Advisory Group on Defense Issues (commonly referred to as the Higuchi commission). The report issued by the Higuchi commission indicated that military dangers now differed considerably from when the first National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) had been issued in 1976, pointing toward nontraditional threats

arising from an “opaque and uncertain situation.” The Higuchi report emphasized that new multilateral approaches to dealing with security threats would be necessary, and that Japan would need to create capabilities to aid in preventing unstable situations from developing into large-scale conflicts. The gist of this report was then incorporated into a new NDPO that was released in 1995, which included “areas surrounding Japan” and contributions to international peacekeeping as valid concerns of Japanese security policy.ⁱⁱⁱ Throughout the latter half of the 1990s, support for the idea of human security grew within Japan, culminating in 1999 when Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi indicated that the concept of human security would be embodied concretely in Japan’s foreign policy.^{iv} A 2003 amendment of Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter included a stipulation that the concept of human security would underlie the implementation of Japanese aid programs in the future.

The 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) augmented Japan’s incorporation of transnational and nontraditional security challenges into its overall security planning. Citing “new threats and diverse situations” in the evolving security environment—such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism—the 2004 NDPG placed international peacekeeping operations on par with the defense of Japan for the first time. Another first in the 2004 NDPG, however, was the direct listing of North Korea and China as growing security concerns. Thus, while Japan aimed to broaden the scope of its security policy in the early part of the new century, it also became increasingly committed to traditional security concerns and whether or not it could afford to spread its limited resources across a wider array of international threats while keeping pace with threats perceived closer to home. Interviews carried out with Japanese government officials and subject matter experts during July 2009 indicate that present concerns about China and North Korea far outweigh a desire to confront so-called “global issues.” Likewise, many Japanese security analysts do not see these issues as priorities in terms of national security.

The rise of the DPJ to power in August 2009 has put renewed emphasis on some parts of Japan’s transnational security agenda, such as reviving its leadership on climate change. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent Japanese priorities will shift under the new administration.

Nonproliferation and Maritime Security

Not all transnational security challenges can be easily classified as traditional or nontraditional threats. Some of these issues are deeply intertwined with traditional security concerns, such as nuclear weapons proliferation, which crosses over these boundaries and garners greater attention from Japanese security planners focused on North Korea and China. Japan has for some time been a leader in the area of nonproliferation, and North Korean nuclear weapons development programs have brought even greater attention to this issue. Japan has been an active participant in discussions aimed at promoting better implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), early enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

The emphasis that Japan places on nonproliferation was highlighted by former Minister of Defense Yasukazu Hamada at the Asian Security Summit (Shangri-la Dialogue) in May 2009. In his summit speech Hamada identified complex and stratified global security threats such as piracy, natural disasters, infectious diseases and climate change as one of three major trends affecting the region (the two other trends were rapid military modernization and North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests). Hamada’s emphasis in dealing with global challenges focused specifically on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, and he suggested Japan was ready to play a more significant role in this area, including promoting greater understanding of the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Maritime security is another priority often mentioned by government officials during interviews and discussed in Japan’s 2009 defense white paper. Here, one can see close linkages with Japanese concerns about Chinese naval expansion as a driving force in policymaking. Incursions into Japanese territorial waters by Chinese survey ships have been an ongoing source of tension between the two countries for some time. Both countries share aspirations to play a greater role in the protection of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) as well as a territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands that will make cooperation in this area very difficult to achieve. Not surprisingly, the Chinese government’s December 2008 announcement that it would be sending naval vessels to support the antipiracy coalition in the Gulf of Aden was quickly followed by a similar decision by the Japanese government to support that operation. Tokyo first sent the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) ships that were limited to the protection of maritime vessels under the Japanese flag and

could only use their weapons in self-defense. After the Diet passed a new antipiracy law in June 2009, the JMSDF was allowed to escort foreign commercial ships and fire upon pirate ships if they do not respond to warnings. This meant that, at least in theory, the JMSDF could be involved in escorting Chinese merchant ships while the Chinese navy similarly protected Japanese commercial vessels. The type of loose multilateral naval cooperation evident in the Gulf of Aden antipiracy operations will be much harder to achieve, however, as the focus moves closer to home in terms of disputed territories, territorial waters and claims regarding exclusive economic zones. Some Japanese analysts have expressed a desire to see the Sino-US Maritime Military Consultative Agreement (MMCA) expand to include Japan in a trilateral format to facilitate greater cooperation and incident prevention in this area.

Peacekeeping, Disaster Relief and Pandemic Disease

In recognition of a new and changing security paradigm, the 2004 NDPG signaled that Japan would look beyond its borders and make efforts to ensure a stable international environment to prevent security threats from reaching Japan. The 2004 document stated, “Japan will, on its own initiative, actively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts.” Under the 2004 NDPG Japan has created a new Central Readiness Force Regiment intended for quick dispatch to international peace cooperation activities.^v Japan also plans to establish a new International Peace Cooperation Center under the Joint Staff College to train Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) personnel, officials, and other related staff and to conduct publicity on the behalf of JSDF international peace cooperation activities.

Despite these positive steps and the new emphasis on proactive international peace cooperation, Japan’s contributions in this area have actually been on the decline in recent years. Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies annual publication, *East Asian Strategic Review 2009*, acknowledges this point and attributes this decline to several factors, including a recent shift to more UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) being carried out as “Chapter VII” operations, in which the use of force is authorized. While Japan’s constitution allows for SDF participation in Chapter VII operations in the areas of humanitarian assistance, airlift support, and similar duties in noncombat zones, the Japanese government has had to walk a fine line in adhering to the limitations imposed by the

constitution and the 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law. The report also indicates that the 2004 NDPG’s emphasis on Japan utilizing its PKO involvement to serve Japan’s national interests has, paradoxically, become something of an impediment to further participation in UN PKO activities. For example, situations in neighboring areas, such as the North Korean nuclear issue and the rise of China, are clearly recognized as being directly relevant to national security, while the growing number of UN PKOs in distant places, such as Africa, is not.^{vi}

Meanwhile, Japan has continued to offer support in the area of international disaster relief. Because disaster relief and humanitarian assistance efforts are for the most part noncontroversial topics in Japan, this is an area where Japan is looking to expand its cooperation. The limitations on Japan’s military derived from its unique postwar constitution have led it to develop capabilities that can be of great value in responding to natural disasters internationally. SDF capabilities in international disaster relief operations encompass (1) medical services such as first aid and epidemic prevention, (2) transport of goods, patients, and disaster relief personnel by helicopter, and (3) ensuring water supplies using water-purifying devices. In addition Japan is a major contributor to financial assistance packages for disaster relief in countries all over the world. Japan also supplies twenty-seven member states with disaster-related information at the Asian Disaster Reduction Center in Kobe city, Hyogo prefecture. Disaster relief was emphasized as an area for greater US-Japan cooperation at the recent Defense Ministers Joint Defense Conference by Japan’s new defense minister Toshimi Kitazawa.

In the area of pandemic disease, Japan has been a major contributor to the Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria as part of its focus on human security. Japan also has contributed to the fight against avian flu in Asia, contributing funds to assist Asian countries with the stockpiling of five hundred thousand courses of antiviral drugs and training personnel from Asian countries to respond to outbreaks of this disease. In 2005 Japan developed its own domestic “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Action Plan” in compliance with the global plan of the World Health Organization (WHO) to facilitate countermeasures in the event of an outbreak. In September 2009 Japan contributed approximately US\$10.8 million of emergency grant aid through the WHO to help extend vaccinations in developing countries in light of the worldwide H1N1 influenza pandemic.

Terrorism

Japan has been one of the United States' most vocal supporters in fighting the battle against terrorism since the September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington. In addition to diplomatic support, Japan has made precedent-setting contributions through its dispatch of the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) and Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) to Iraq for humanitarian aid and reconstruction as well as its deployment of the JMSDF to the Indian Ocean for refueling operations in assistance of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Japan also has played an important role in fundraising activities for reconstruction in Afghanistan and contributed substantial financial resources of its own to this cause. Less publicized contributions include Japan's support for capacity-building in Southeast Asian countries. Japan's focus in this area has been to enhance Southeast Asian countries' basic governance capacities in areas such as law enforcement, export control, money laundering, antipiracy, air and sea port security, immigration control, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.^{vii} Japan has ratified the thirteen UN counterterrorism conventions and protocols and has held training seminars for other Asian countries aimed at facilitating their adoption and implementation of the UN conventions and protocols.

Japan has taken on significant risk in supporting US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In November of 2003 Al-Qaeda issued a warning to Japan not to send troops to Iraq or it would face terrorist attacks. During the same week, an Al-Qaeda operative identified as Abu Mohamed al-Ablaj sent an email to the Arab language weekly *Al-Majallah*, in which he claimed that Tokyo would be "the easiest place to destroy."^{viii} The next event that brought the issue of terrorism closer to home for Japan was the discovery that Lionel Dumont, a Frenchman believed to have ties to Al-Qaeda, had made numerous deposits and withdrawals from a postal savings account after entering Japan on a fake passport several times in 2002 and 2003^{ix} and was suspected of attempting to create a terrorist cell inside Japan. This revelation contributed to Japan's adopting the Action Plan for Prevention of Terrorism in late 2004. The action plan covers sixteen items related to border control, prevention of domestic activities (through identification of foreign guests at hotels and inns), bomb material control, the suppression of terrorist financing, infrastructure prevention and intelligence gathering.^x

However, Naofumi Miyasaka, a counterterrorism expert at Japan's National Defense Academy, notes that while most of these measures have

been at least partially implemented, Japan still lacks a coherent national strategy for combating terrorism both domestically and internationally.^{xi} In a similar vein, a policy recommendation by a group of Japan's top security analysts affiliated with the Tokyo Foundation recently indicated that Japan lacks the necessary legal arrangements and crisis management systems to deal with a terrorist attack on Japanese soil.^{xii} The policy recommendation suggests there is a need for Japan to send a clear message demonstrating that it has the national will to fight against terrorism by all means. These analysts argue that, "Despite the actual acts of terror in Southeast Asia and Europe and the conspicuous drug transactions that can be financial sources for terrorists, citizens of Japan do not regard the deteriorating situation of Afghanistan as a security issue that affects them."^{xiii}

Interviews conducted in July 2009 with officials from the Japanese Ministry of Defense and foreign affairs indicate that the above statement also could be applied to the policymaking level. Ministry of Defense officials clearly do not see transnational issues such as drug and human trafficking within the parameters of their national security strategy, despite the often-reported links between these types of transnational crimes and terrorist financing and support networks. One candid government official intimated that while the battle against international terrorism is given rhetorical support, the reality is that the issue does not get high priority within the Japanese government, and that most Japanese initiatives in this area are seen internally in terms of alliance management.

Transnational Organized Crime

While contributing to the UNDP's Afghan Counter Narcotics Trust Fund and sharing US concerns over North Korea's reported drug trafficking, Japan could do significantly more when it comes to dealing with transnational organized crime, both internationally and domestically. The Japanese Diet has failed to agree on an anticonspiracy bill for the fifth consecutive year. As a result, Japan remains unable to ratify the UNCTOC, although it has signed the UNCTOC and its three protocols. Japan is also not yet a party to the UN Convention against Corruption.

In the area of drug trafficking, where Japanese organized crime groups (known collectively as the Yakuza) play a significant role in Asia, Japanese law enforcement is faced with legal constraints that both prevent the passing of timely and useful information to foreign nations in

international drug investigations and make it very difficult for Japanese police authorities to proactively investigate members of international drug cartels that operate inside Japan. Most investigations conducted in Japan only disrupt drug operations at the lower levels of couriers and street dealers. In 1992 Japan passed the Anti-Drug Special Law to deal with drug-related money laundering; however, its narrow scope—and the burden of requiring law enforcement to prove a direct link between money and assets to specific drug activity—has limited the law’s effectiveness. In 2008 Japan underwent its third comprehensive mutual evaluation by the FATF on its implementation of the 40 + 9 Recommendations for countering money laundering. The FATF review concluded that Japan was fully compliant with only four recommendations, with notable deficiencies in areas specific to financial institutions.^{xiv}

Proactive measures by Japanese law enforcement also are needed to address human trafficking, which is another reported source of income for the Japanese Yakuza. While Japan has contributed funds to antitrafficking projects around the world, it has not yet ratified the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol. Japan is a destination and transit point for men, women and children trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation. Women and children from East Asia, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, Russia, and South America are trafficked to Japan for commercial sex exploitation. Men and women from China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and other Asian countries are sometimes subject to forced labor.^{xv} Japanese authorities’ attitudes toward human trafficking, considering the resources at their disposal, have often been described as lax. In 2004 the US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report listed Japan on the “Tier 2 Watch List” along with countries such as Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines known to have serious human trafficking problems.^{xvi} Japan has since taken efforts to demonstrate its seriousness in dealing with human trafficking, including the adoption in December 2004 of a Comprehensive National Action Plan of measures to combat trafficking of persons. The new action plan amended the penal code to directly criminalize the conduct of buying and selling persons and designated human trafficking as a predicate offence for money laundering. It also increased scrutiny of immigration practices related to Japan’s “amusement businesses” (otherwise known as the sex industry).

In recognition of these efforts, Japan has been removed from the Tier 2 Watch List, but the 2009 TIP Report indicates that the government of Japan still does not fully comply with minimum standards for the

elimination of trafficking, noting that while there was an increase in the number of sex trafficking prosecutions in 2008, most convicted offenders were given suspended sentences. The report also noted that the Japanese government had not yet effectively addressed the problem of trafficking for labor exploitation. One of the report’s key recommendations was for the Japanese government to expand collaboration with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as “one the most effective tools the government has available to its efforts to combat trafficking.”^{xvii}

Climate Change

Japan’s stewardship of the development of the Kyoto Protocols in the 1990s was symbolic of its efforts to stake out a leadership position on newly emerging transnational threats during this period. Japan first developed its own Action Plan to Prevent Global Warming in October 1990 and brought these proposals to the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, where the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in May 1992. Japan’s action plan accepted separate roles for developed and developing countries, stating that major developed countries should take common efforts to limit emissions. In the summer of 1997, Japan domestically formed the Joint Conference on Relevant Advisory Councils to establish its approach toward climate change. In December 1997 Japan hosted the UNFCCC’s Third Conference of the Parties (COP), playing a key role in attempting to moderate and facilitate negotiations between the European Union and the United States, which led to the Kyoto Protocol.^{xviii}

In the years following the development of the Kyoto Protocol, Japan has continued to attempt to influence the international debate on climate change, though its own position within that debate has slowly shifted away from its earlier emphasis on the role of developed nations. Japan’s “Cool Earth 50” proposal at the UNFCCC’s COP-13 meeting held in Bali in December 2007, which calls for a halving of global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, was accompanied by a speech by then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who argued that global warming must be addressed by the whole world, given the reality that some of the developing countries are emitting substantial amounts of greenhouse gases.^{xix} Abe’s proposal was followed by Prime Minister Fukuda’s “Cool Earth Promotion Program,” which emphasized once again that fair and equitable emissions targets were essential, while adding that Japan could play a greater role in the

transfer of high-quality environmental technology in an attempt to raise global energy efficiency by 30 percent by the year 2020. The shift in Japan's policy on climate change can be attributed at least in part to domestic industry's concerns about Japan taking on an unfair burden vis-à-vis China and India as economic competition in the region heats up.

Japan has made very little progress in meeting its own Kyoto Protocol obligation to achieve a 6 percent emissions reduction from a 1990 baseline, with emissions being reported as 14 percent higher in 2009 than in 1990 by the Japanese Ministry of Environment.^{xx} Japan's commitment to combating climate change became an issue in the August 2009 election, where one poll indicated that 62 percent of the Japanese public felt that the Aso government was not doing enough in this effort, and a solid 63 percent majority favored the DPJ's call for a 25 percent emissions reduction by 2020 (versus the 15 percent reduction from 2005 levels proposed by Aso's Liberal Democratic Party).^{xxi} The DPJ's platform called for implementing a purchase system that would require power companies to buy the entire power output of renewable energy and not simply the surplus power. The DPJ also proposed increasing renewable energy to 10 percent of Japan's total primary supply by 2020. It also has called for a cap-and-trade system that would bind polluters to mandatory emission limits.

With the support of popular opinion, Japan's newly elected Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama made the announcement of Japan's commitment to a 25 percent reduction in emissions at the UN Summit on Climate Change in September 2009. Hatoyama also has pledged that Japan will provide both technology and funding to developing countries attempting to fight global warming. Following his announcement of Japan's 25 percent cut in September, Prime Minister Hatoyama took his message to the second trilateral summit between the leaders of China, Japan and South Korea held in Beijing in October 2009. The three leaders pledged to work closely together to find a successful approach to climate change once the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2013. Climate change was also a major agenda item when US President Barack Obama visited Tokyo in November 2009. Hatoyama and Obama pledged to make the Copenhagen summit on climate change (the UNFCCC's COP-15) in December 2009 a success and to have their two countries work together through expanding their research and development cooperation to provide solutions to the challenges of global energy security and climate change.

Implications for the US-Japan Alliance

Increasing efforts to deal with transnational security challenges worldwide holds both the potential for greater US-Japan security cooperation as well as for increasing frustration regarding differences in country priorities. If Japan can truly develop a leadership position in dealing with disaster relief, climate change and other transnational issues, it will help to offset the limitations placed on Japan's contributions in traditional security areas by its postwar constitution. On the other hand, if Tokyo sees the United States as overly preoccupied with the Middle East and international terrorism, Japan is likely to focus its energy and resources on security concerns dealing with China and North Korea at the risk of drawing criticism from Washington. In this sense, the broadening security paradigm only heightens the ever-present need for closer consultation and coordination between the two governments.

US concern with defeating international terrorism and its enabling illicit activities is not likely to abate any time soon. Just as the United States will need to reassure its ally on external deterrence, Japan will need to more proactively deal with transnational organized crime flowing across its own borders. While Japan will naturally reserve its greatest resources for its highest-threat priorities, increasing cooperation in peacekeeping and disaster relief activities—in line with Japan's own previously stated policy—will also enhance its diplomatic capital in Washington.

Japan's new leadership is in the process of reviewing security policy and, based on the DPJ's established platform, will most likely focus the international efforts of its Self-Defense Forces on noncombat, UN-sanctioned activities that do not stretch the limitations of the postwar constitution. This does not mean, however, that Japan's international contribution to security will necessarily decline if it applies its wealth of technological and diplomatic resources toward resolving the many nontraditional, transnational security challenges the world faces today.

ⁱSee Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy: A New East Asian Environment," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 31, No. 4 April, 1991, pp. 324-340.

ⁱⁱUnited Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report 1994*, available online at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/>.

ⁱⁱⁱThe emphasis on multilateralism was toned down significantly in the 1995 NDPO due to US concerns that the bilateral alliance was being overshadowed.

^{iv}Bert Edstrom, “Japan and the Challenge of Human Security: Founding of a New Policy 1995-2003,” Institute for Security and Development Policy. Available online at: <http://www.isdp.eu/biblio/japanandchallengehumansecurity.foundingnewpolicy1995-2003>.

^vThe Central Readiness Force Regiment was established in March 2008.

^{vi}The National Institute for Defense Studies, *East Asian Strategic Review 2009 (The Japan Times*, May 2009) pp. 264-265.

^{vii}David Fouse and Yoichiro Sato, “Enhancing Basic Governance: Japan’s Comprehensive Counterterrorism Assistance to Southeast Asia”, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Asia-Pacific Papers, Feb., 2006. Online at: <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/JapanCTCooperation.pdf>.

^{viii}Joseph Ferguson, “Al Qaeda’s Threat to Japan: Tokyo’s Wake-Up Call to the War on Terrorism,” The Jamestown Foundation, *Terrorism Monitor*, vol. 2, no. 2, Jan. 2004.

^{ix}Dumont was arrested in Germany in December 2003 and extradited to France for crimes he was convicted of committing there in the 1990s while a member of a radical Islamist group known as the Roubaix gang.

^xNaofumi Miyasaka, “Japan’s Counterterrorism Policy,” SIS publication available online at: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090201_bsa_miyasaka.pdf.

^{xi}*Ibid.*, p.15. Miyasaka confirmed these reservations during a personal interview with the author in July 2009.

^{xii}Shinichi Kitaoka, Akihiko Tanaka, Chikaku Ueki, Mataka Kamiya, Ken Jimbo and Tsuneo Watanabe, “New Security Strategy for Japan: Multilayered and Cooperative Security Strategy,” The Tokyo Foundation, Policy Recommendations, October 8, 2008.

^{xiii}*Ibid.*, p. 16.

^{xiv}US State Department, *2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* available online at: <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2009/index.htm>. For excellent background on these issues see H. R. Friman, “Obstructing Markets: Organized Crime Networks and Drug Control in Japan” in H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas, eds., *Illicit Global Economy and State Power* Rowman & Littlefield Publishers (February 28, 1999).

^{xv}US State Department, *2009 Trafficking in Persons Report* available online at: <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2009/>.

^{xvi}See Rollie Lal, “Japanese Trafficking and Smuggling” in Kim Thatchuk ed., *Transnational Threats, Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs and Human Life* Prager (May 30, 2007).

^{xvii}US State Department, *2009 Trafficking in Persons Report*.

^{xviii}See Takashi Hattori, “Japan’s Way Forward: Mainstreaming the Climate Change Policies in World Politics.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA’s 49th Annual Convention, Bridging Multiple Divides, Hilton San Francisco, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008.

^{xix}Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s speech to “The Future of Asia” conference held in Tokyo, 24 May 2007 is cited in Takashi Hattori “Japan’s Way Forward,” pp. 9-10.

^{xx}The Wall Street Journal, “Japan Pledges to Cut Emissions by 15%,” 11 June 2009, available online at: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124462901241601729.html>.

^{xxi}“New Japanese Poll: Aso Government Failing on Climate Change,” available online at: http://www.panda.org/what_we_do/footprint/climate_carbon_energy/climate_deal/news/climate_press_page/?uNewsID=166021.

Republic of Korea: Meeting the Challenge of Transnational Threats in the Twenty-first Century

Steven Kim

Key Findings

- Due to the changing nature of security threats in the post–Cold War period, the Korean government has developed a more expansive concept of security to take into account the confluence of traditional and nontraditional threat elements characterizing Korea’s security environment.
- The Korean government’s desire not to passively follow but to actively lead efforts in promoting international security reflects its growing aspiration to become a global player—Global Korea—commensurate with its national power and international status.
- Given the high threat perception of terrorism, the Korean government has recognized the need for comprehensive and systematic counterterrorism efforts not only at the domestic but also at the global level.
- Korea’s participation in multilateral naval operations to suppress piracy is a manifestation of its desire to assume greater responsibility for maintaining international peace and safety.
- The Korean government has taken aggressive steps to prevent transshipment of drugs through its borders and domestic export of precursor chemicals.
- President Lee has taken a visible and proactive stance in addressing the problem of climate change through major, new initiatives in the domestic and international arena.
- By agreeing to elevate the ROK-US alliance to a strategic partnership based on common values, the Lee Myung-bak administration has broadened the scope of bilateral cooperation with the United States to include countering transnational threats at the regional and global levels.

- By playing a global role in addressing transnational threats commensurate with its national power, Korea believes that what it is doing is good for the international community and, ultimately, good for Korea in enhancing its capacity to deal with future challenges.

With the end of the Cold War, the security challenges facing South Korea have not abated but have, in fact, increased in complexity and scope. While many countries have reaped the peace dividend from the end of the East-West conflict, the Korean Peninsula remains a security flash point, with North and South Korea still bitterly divided and locked in a military standoff along the most heavily fortified border in the world—the Demilitarized Zone. With the Korean War still unresolved in the Korean Peninsula, the dangerous stalemate has been exacerbated by the ongoing development of nuclear arms program by North Korea. The controversy over the program first emerged in the early 1990s (first nuclear crisis) only to subside temporarily with the signing of the Agreed Framework in 1994 before reemerging in 2002 (second nuclear crisis) as the most pressing regional security problem in the post–Cold War period.

While North Korea has defended its nuclear program on the basis of protecting its national sovereignty and security, South Korea and regional powers such as the United States, China, Russia, and Japan have been united in their opposition to the program as destabilizing and undermining regional peace and security. Despite ongoing efforts to find a lasting solution to the North Korean nuclear problem, it remains an intractable issue. With North Korea carrying out further nuclear and missile tests in the first half of 2009, tensions continue to remain high on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, even with the end of the Cold War, the Korean government has continued to focus on the traditional military threat from North Korea.

However, due to fundamental changes in the international security environment in the post–Cold War period, Korean policymakers have gradually expanded their threat perception to include security challenges that do not conform to conventional criteria of a military threat—namely nontraditional or transnational threats. In fact, the government has come to recognize that Korea now faces new security challenges to the safety and welfare of its citizens such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), natural disasters, piracy, international organized crime, and cyber-crime. Because these new threats are not only growing

but also are diversifying rapidly due to globalization and advances in information technology, they have accentuated the already high level of uncertainty surrounding Korea's security environment. The changing nature of security threats in the post-Cold War period, therefore, has prompted the Korean government to develop a more expansive concept of security to take into account the confluence of traditional and non-traditional threat elements characterizing Korea's security environment.

The expanded threat perception of the government also is reflected in the Korean public at large. In a public opinion poll conducted in South Korea, the Korean public identified not only traditional but also non-traditional security challenges as "critical threats" to their country's vital interests. Among the nontraditional threats, the public cited international terrorism (61 percent), potential epidemics (51 percent), and global warming (48 percent). As for traditional threats, the public identified "North Korea becoming a nuclear power" (59 percent), "the rise of Japanese military power" (47 percent), and "development of China as a world power" (46 percent) as critical threats.¹ Therefore, the Korean public's perception of the top two threats—one traditional and the other nontraditional—reflects a broad societal consensus on the importance of both types of threats to ROK security.

The government has begun to develop a comprehensive security posture to effectively respond to an increasingly wider spectrum of threats to Korean security. First, the government seeks to enhance the capabilities of its armed forces by creating a more technology-intensive and information-centric military. The advanced capabilities will enable the military not only to defend Korea from a military threat on the Korean Peninsula, but also to respond with greater flexibility and efficiency to diverse threats as they evolve from the rapidly changing international security environment. To further ensure the effectiveness of the military in responding to varied threats, the government has begun to reorganize the force structure by establishing specific military units with the requisite staff and equipment to deal with transnational and non-traditional threats during peacetime.

Second, the government has developed a "whole of government" approach to responding to national contingencies such as terrorism and large-scale natural disasters by integrating the crisis-response capabilities of its civilian and military sectors through interagency coordination. The coordinated response by the whole of government is necessary, since not all threats can be addressed solely by military means. The government,

moreover, has passed or revised legislation to provide the legal basis for interagency coordination such as the Terrorism Prevention Law and the integrated Civil Defense Law.

Lastly, since transnational threats by their nature cannot be effectively addressed by the efforts of any one nation, the Korean government has committed itself to working bilaterally and multilaterally with other countries. As its most important bilateral partner, the Korean government has agreed with the United States to transform their alliance relationship—which traditionally focused on deterring North Korea—into a future-oriented, strategic relationship equipped to deal with global threats such as terrorism, WMD proliferation, piracy, organized crime and narcotics, climate change, and epidemic diseases. The Korean government also intends to take a leadership role in multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus Three (ASEAN+3), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asia Summit (EAS) to promote greater dialogue and cooperation in addressing the new security challenges of the twenty-first century. The Korean government's desire not to passively follow but to actively lead efforts in promoting international security reflects its growing aspiration to become a global player—Global Korea—commensurate with its national power and international status.

Terrorism

Terrorism is perceived not only by the public but also by the ROK government to be the most important transnational threat facing Korea. South Korea has been no stranger to terrorism and since 1958 has suffered from many terrorism-related events involving bombings, shootings, hijacking, and kidnappings of its citizens. Prior to 1990, almost all of the terrorist-related events occurred inside the country and were carried out by the North Korean regime. Since 1990, however, most of the terrorist attacks against South Korean citizens—including diplomats, businessmen, and tourists—have occurred abroad such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen and have been carried out by international terrorist organizations.

Since 9/11, there have been four high-profile incidents that have heightened public awareness and concern over terrorism as a security threat. In May 2004, a Korean contractor was kidnapped and later gruesomely executed by an Islamist group who claimed that the killing

was in response to South Korea's plans to send three thousand troops to participate in the US-led military operation in Iraq. In February 2007, a Korean soldier was killed in a suicide bomb attack at the US Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Then, five months later in July 2007, twenty-three Korean Christian volunteers in Afghanistan were kidnapped by the Taliban, who demanded the withdrawal of South Korean military personnel from Afghanistan. After the killing of two male Korean hostages, the Korean government was able to secure the release of the rest of the hostages by promising to withdraw the Korean military personnel from Afghanistan once their mandate expired in 2007. The latest terrorist incident occurred in March 2009 when, for the first time, four Korean tourists were killed by a suicide bomber linked to an Al-Qaeda terrorist group in Yemen. A few days later, the Korean government officials who went to Yemen to investigate the incident were attacked by another suicide bomber but escaped without casualties. With thirteen million Koreans traveling overseas annually, South Korean businesses expanding their operations abroad, and Korean troops being dispatched to foreign countries, terrorist attacks against Koreans are likely to increase in the future.

While there has been no domestic terrorist attack by international terrorist organizations, the possibility of such an attack occurring cannot be ruled out when considering Korea's alliance relationship with the United States and its involvement in US-led overseas military operations, the presence of US military installations and personnel in the country, and Korea's hosting of major international events. The vulnerability to an international terrorist attack in Korea is highlighted by the fact that from 2004–08, the ROK government arrested seventy-four foreigners, mostly Muslims from South Asia or Southeast Asia, as terrorism suspects. Many of the suspects were found to have been involved in collecting information on US military forces in South Korea or planning terror attacks on non-Koreans. Some Arabs who have been caught were involved in criminal activities to provide funding for terrorist activity. The suspects arrested by the Korean government were expelled and sent back to their home countries to face legal prosecution.

Given the high threat perception of terrorism, the Korean government has recognized the need for comprehensive and systematic counterterrorism efforts not only at the domestic but also at the global level. First, it has sought to strengthen its domestic counterterrorism capacity by consolidating its domestic legal arrangements and the national

emergency response system. The South Korean government first established guidelines for countering terrorism in response to the terrorist attack during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games and North Korean terrorist attacks in the 1980s. But it was only after South Korea was chosen to host the 1988 Olympic Games that the government created a national system of emergency management for terrorism-related events with the passage of the Presidential Order for Counterterrorism of 1982. The original law was amended in its entirety in 2005 to better respond to large-scale, unconventional terrorist events in the wake of the 9/11 World Trade Center and the US anthrax letter attacks in 2001. The law was further revised in 2008.

The efficiency of the national emergency response system in conducting anti-terrorism operations has been improved through the creation of a unified system of command and inter-agency cooperation. The Korean government also has begun issuing e-passports to protect the identity of lawful travelers and prevent the use of fake passports by terrorists. The government, moreover, has passed the Anti-Terrorist Financing legislation to curb money laundering by terrorist organizations, either in or through the country. But, it has yet to pass a comprehensive anti-terrorism bill, which has been pending in the National Assembly for years. Although the bill would provide a solid legal basis for government-led efforts to curb terrorism, human rights activists have raised concerns about the possibility of granting excessive power to the state intelligence agency, which may lead to violation of the right to privacy and other civil liberties.

Fully aware that comprehensive and systematic counterterrorism efforts are indispensable at the global level, the Korean government also has been active both bilaterally and multilaterally in promoting counterterrorism efforts. With increasing numbers of Koreans working, traveling, and living abroad, the government is strengthening cooperation with antiterrorism authorities in various countries where Korean nationals are vulnerable to terrorism. In addition, the ROK has held consultative meetings with twenty countries and international organizations from various regions to exchange information and expertise, to discuss measures for counterterrorism capacity-building and technical support, and for cooperation in case of a terrorist incident. The Korean government also has signed twenty-four extradition treaties and nineteen mutual legal assistance treaties with various foreign governments to expedite and support cross border counterterrorist investigations and prosecution. As

part of its efforts to join the Visa Waiver program, South Korea also has agreed on a mechanism to exchange terrorist screening information with Washington.

The Korean government also has vigorously supported the efforts of the United Nations and regional organizations, including APEC and ARF, to strengthen international cooperation in combating terrorism. Korea is now a party to the twelve International Antiterrorism Conventions and Protocols and has signed the “International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” It is also actively involved in implementing the travel restrictions and financial sanctions on the individuals and entities linked to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban imposed by the UN Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee. From 2007–09, Korea chaired the APEC Counterterrorism Task Force and played a leading role in launching various counterterrorism projects to ensure that regional trade and investment not be disrupted by terrorism. The Korean government also signed the ROK-ASEAN “Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism” in July 2005 to assist ASEAN member countries in strengthening their counter-terrorism capacity through education, training, and consultations. Lastly, the Korean government has been very active in the annual Intersessional Meeting, seminars, and workshops sponsored by ARF to address counterterrorism and transnational criminal issues. In the early half of 2009, the ROK co-chaired the seventh ARF Intersessional Meeting on Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime. Thus, the Korean government has been increasingly proactive in trying to contain the threat of terrorism both at the domestic and international level.

Piracy

Along with terrorism, piracy is viewed as an important transnational threat by the Korean public and the government. Piracy has garnered public attention because of increasing incidents of Somali pirates seizing Korean merchant vessels—as well as foreign vessels with Korean sailors onboard—and holding their crews for ransom in the Gulf of Aden. Approximately five hundred Korean vessels transit through the Gulf of Aden each year, and about one hundred and fifty of them are vulnerable to pirate attacks because of their low speed.

Since 2006, six vessels that were either Korean-flagged or carrying Korean crew members have been hijacked off the waters of Somalia. The

latest incident involved the September 10, 2008 hijacking of a merchant vessel, Bright Ruby, with eight Koreans onboard. Prompted by increasing public pressure to protect Korean vessels after the French government in April 2008 rescued a hijacked French vessel by military means and the passage of a series of UN Security Council Resolutions sanctioning foreign military intervention to suppress piracy in Somali territorial waters in 2008, the Korean government approved the deployment of the naval unit, Cheonghae-jin, to Somali waters in March of 2009. The unit consisted of a destroyer, Munmu the Great (on a rotating six-month tour), with three hundred crew-members, a Lynx anti-submarine helicopter, and three rigid inflatable boats. The name of the unit refers to a maritime base in the Yellow Sea (on what is now Wando Island) that was established by the renowned Korean general Jang Bogo (787–846 AD) of the Unified Silla Kingdom to protect his vast commercial empire from pirate attacks.

The Korean destroyer’s primary mission is to ensure the safety of Korean and other foreign commercial ships by escorting them through pirate-infested waters. Its mandate also includes conducting operations to monitor, inspect, stop and seize pirate vessels by using force, if necessary, and to prevent arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and terrorism in cooperation with US-led multinational Combined Task Force 151 of the Combined Forces Maritime Component Command based in Bahrain. The South Korean navy also is to coordinate closely with the US and Japanese navies, on which they will rely for material support in conducting operations in Somali waters. Since its deployment, Munmu the Great has escorted a total of three hundred ships and has rescued seven commercial vessels (including a North Korean ship) from pirate attacks.

The deployment of a Korean naval unit is significant beyond the suppression of piracy. Sending its military for the first time to protect the lives and the property of its citizens abroad is the clearest affirmation by the Korean government of the importance of protecting vital sea lanes critical to Korea’s foreign trade and energy supply and of developing its naval power to protect its national interests. Second, instead of operating independently or waiting for the creation of a UN-led force, the decision by Korea to join the US-led Combined Task Force 151 to carry out antipiracy operations is a sign of its commitment to cooperate with the United States in mitigating transnational threats and, more broadly, to strengthen the ROK-US strategic alliance on the basis of common interests and values. Third, the ROK’s participation in multilateral military operations to suppress piracy is a manifestation of Korea’s desire to

assume greater responsibility for maintaining international peace and safety in its pursuit of becoming a “Global Korea.”

International Crime: Drug Trafficking

Because narcotics production and drug abuse are not significant problems in South Korea, the ROK regards the transshipment of drugs and the export of precursor chemicals used in manufacturing illegal drugs as its most serious drug trafficking concerns. As a result, the Korean government has taken proactive steps to prevent transshipment of drugs through its borders and domestic companies from exporting precursor chemicals. Transshipment of drugs is a growing concern because South Korean ports are increasingly being used as a transit point for the shipment of large quantities of narcotics by international drug traffickers. Korea has become an attractive transshipment location because, paradoxically, Korea does not have a serious drug problem and the Korean port of Pusan is one of the largest in East Asia. By transiting the drugs through Korea, the illegal shipments are not as likely to draw the attention of contraband inspectors upon arrival as are shipments from countries with a stronger link to illegal drug usage or production.

The countries of origin for transshipped drugs include Thailand, China, North Korea and Canada for heroin; the United States and Spain for ecstasy; Iran and South Africa for marijuana and hashish; and China, Thailand, the Philippines and North Korea for methamphetamine. The precursor chemicals used for manufacturing narcotics, such as ephedrine and ascetic anhydride originate mostly from China for transshipment to South America and to the Middle East region. At present, drug abuse is not a serious problem; however, Korean authorities are concerned that the popularity of Korea as a transit point for shipping drugs may lead to an increased supply of drugs in the Korean market. They fear that increased accessibility and lower prices could lead to greater illicit drug use.

To combat the transshipment of drugs and precursor chemicals, the Korean government has taken aggressive, proactive steps domestically as well as internationally. In 2004, the government amended legislation to enhance its control and enforcement procedures of certain precursor chemicals and to impose criminal sanctions against companies that transship precursor chemicals through Korea. Previously the government could bring only administrative charges of mislabeling against these companies. The Korean government also has created a program with

greater power to punish domestic companies for exporting precursor chemicals. But the lead agency responsible for the program—the Korean Food and Drug Administration—does not have sufficient resources and manpower to monitor the program effectively. To curb the flow of drugs through airports, the government has increased the presence of security personnel and instituted tighter screening processes for persons, luggage, express mail and cargo.

In addition, Korea has strengthened international cooperation to mitigate drug trafficking. Korea is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and has signed the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. Korean authorities also exchange information with international counter-narcotics organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). Korea, moreover, has signed extradition treaties with twenty-three countries and mutual legal assistance treaties with seventeen countries including the United States. These treaties are essential in facilitating cross-border drug trafficking investigations and prosecution. Furthermore, ROK narcotic law enforcement authorities work closely with the US Embassy’s Drug Enforcement Administration Seoul Country Office and the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials in co-sponsoring training programs, sharing intelligence on the importation of precursor chemicals into Korea, and monitoring airport and drug transshipment methods and trends. In 2007 the Korean government also established a Liaison Office for International Cooperation in the Golden Triangle region to provide Laotian law enforcement officials with training in drug investigation techniques and equipment, as well as assisting with their anti-drug abuse public campaign. This capacity-building program was extended to Cambodia and Vietnam in 2008, and the government is now in discussions with ASEAN to expand this program to other member countries including Indonesia.

Climate Change and Environmental Degradation

Although climate change and environmental degradation do not merit the same degree of security concern as terrorism or piracy, the current Lee Myung-bak administration has recognized climate change and environmental disasters as potential new threats to the security and welfare of the Korean people. According to one recent study, global warming on

the Korean Peninsula is accelerating at twice the pace of the world average and, in the case of Seoul, at three times faster than the global average over the past century. The effects of climate change are now being felt by increasing occurrences of typhoons and torrential rainfall.

Against this backdrop, President Lee has taken a visible and proactive stance in addressing the problem of climate change through major, new initiatives in the domestic and international arena. The government has announced that it will support the global vision of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 50 percent by 2050 and plans to announce by the end of 2009 a voluntary mid-term goal of mitigating emissions for the year 2020. It is currently considering a 4 percent cut in greenhouse emissions by 2020 from 2005 levels, even though Korea is not required to declare a target for reducing emissions because it is not currently included in Annex 1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change under the Kyoto Protocol. Although the business community is expected to oppose the government initiative, the 4 percent target is quite modest when compared with other advanced industrialized countries like Japan and even some developing countries such as Indonesia, which has announced it will reduce greenhouse gases by 26 percent by 2020. The Korean government also has proposed establishing a registry within the secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to encourage and support the voluntary reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by developing countries. In addition, the government, through its “East Asia Climate Partnership,” is investing USD \$200 million over the next five years to fund programs that will assist East Asian countries in promoting economic growth compatible with climate change.

To further deal with the global challenge of climate change, the Lee administration has announced an ambitious plan to develop a new paradigm for economic development based on “Low Carbon, Green Growth.” Over the next five years, the government working in conjunction with the private sector, plans to invest nearly USD \$100 billion in developing green technologies, improving energy efficiency in the industrial sector, and promoting green lifestyle changes to reduce energy consumption and resource use. Thus, the Korean government has decided to take a leadership role not only in increasing global awareness of the dangers of climate change, but also in fostering international cooperation to address this problem and in reducing gas emissions through the Low Carbon, Green Growth economic model.

The Lee administration also has announced that it will strengthen

cooperation with China, Mongolia, and North Korea to resolve one of the most serious environmental problems in Northeast Asia—the dust and sandstorms (DSS) that are highly detrimental to people’s health and the economies of countries in Northeast Asia. The sandstorms, which have increased in their intensity and frequency in the last fifty years, blow from the deserts of Mongolia and China and, as they pass over the Korean Peninsula and Japan each spring, deposit dust and fine sand particles below. As the dust particles pass through the industrial complexes in eastern China, they pick up pollutants that cause respiratory, skin, and eye ailments, lung and immune diseases, and damage to the farming and industrial sectors amounting to billions of dollars.

Korea has tried to tackle the DSS problem multilaterally, as well as bilaterally, by establishing monitoring stations and promoting reforestation efforts. But regional cooperation in mitigating DSS has been difficult due to the security implications of sharing weather observation data. In 2006 Korea, China, Japan, and Mongolia agreed to create a regional DSS monitoring network, which would provide real-time data on dust levels and wind movements to be shared by the four countries. But, according to a Japanese press report, just before the start of the test run in February 2008, the Chinese government notified the Japanese government that it would not be able to provide the meteorological data, citing the passage of a law prohibiting the release of the data as a state secret affecting national security and interests. Insofar as most of the DSS originate in China, the country’s lack of participation in the project casts serious doubt on the feasibility of a regional monitoring network. In contrast to China’s reluctance to share its weather data with Japan, Korea—which signed a bilateral agreement with China in 2005 to establish monitoring stations in central China to better observe and predict the movement of DSS—continues to receive data from ten Korea-China Collaborative DSS Observation centers in China. But the transmission of data to South Korea from similar DSS observation facilities in North Korea, which the ROK government established in 2007, has been suspended.

In addition to the efforts of the Korean government to work with other Northeast Asian countries in developing a regional monitoring and forecasting network, it has tried to curtail the frequency and the intensity of DSS by funding reforestation projects in the region. From 2000 to 2006, Korea’s Ministry of Environment spent USD \$5 million on reforestation in China and Mongolia by planting twenty million trees to prevent further desertification. Korea also plans to continue helping Mongolia with its

forestation efforts by planting five hundred hectares of trees every year from 2007 to 2016 in Mongolia. Lastly, the four Northeast Asian countries are working with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in monitoring and reducing dust levels through information sharing.

Conclusion

With the Lee Myung-bak administration, a major shift has occurred in the way Korea views and responds to the increasing array of new and diverse threats to its security in the twenty-first century. The Korean government is acutely aware that, while the traditional military threat remains high in the Korean Peninsula due to the ongoing controversy over the North Korean nuclear issue, ROK faces new transnational or nontraditional threats that often are not subject to the control of national governments. As a result, the Korean government is cognizant of the importance of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in mitigating the danger that the threats pose to the security and welfare of the Korean people.

By elevating the ROK-US alliance to a strategic partnership, the Lee Myung-bak administration has broadened the scope of bilateral cooperation with the United States to counter transnational threats at the regional and global levels. Another noteworthy development that signals a marked departure from previous administrations is the heightened determination of the current government to work with the international community in mitigating transnational threats, not by passively following the lead of others, but by taking the lead in addressing those threats by shaping the agenda, setting an example, and contributing expertise and resources. This proactive response on the part of the Korean government is a reflection of a growing sense of its own global responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, of which Korea has been a beneficiary in its rise to a prominent position in the international community. By playing a global role in addressing these threats commensurate with its national power, Korea believes that what it is doing is good for the international community and, ultimately, good for meeting Korea's own future challenges.

¹“*Global Views 2004: Comparing South Korean and American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2004, http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/POS%202004/2004%20US_Korea%20Comparative%20Global_Views.pdf (accessed December 3, 2009).

Afghanistan at a Crossroads: Transnational Challenges and the New Afghan State

Kerry Lynn Nankivell

Key Findings

- Afghanistan faces existential transnational threats such as cross-border militancy and weapons smuggling, smuggling and trafficking of both licit and illicit goods—including opiates and refined heroin—and ethnically based extremist ideology.
- Though the movement of militants across Afghanistan's border is of concern, it is important to remember that insurgency is fuelled by the movement of goods, including arms, drugs, and smuggled goods such as timber, gems, and precious metals.
- The center of gravity for these threats remains the Afghan-Pakistani border, though important trends show an increase in the movement of guns and drugs across the northern border with Central Asia.
- Improving local governance, with a view to accommodating local power structures where possible, will be key to strengthening border security and increasing Afghans' stake in the viability of the Afghan state and its institutions of governance.
- The spectrum of activities undertaken by the US-led coalition will have no lasting result if the activities are not locally adopted in a sustainable manner. Only by strengthening the Afghan state can the coalition ensure that Afghanistan is no longer vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation by outside state and nonstate actors.

Afghanistan is not a country that suffers from transnational problems, Afghanistan is a transnational problem. A failed state in every sense of the word, a lawless Afghanistan mired in war for almost three decades has been the cradle for transnational problems that continue to plague the Central Asian region. Militancy, arms transfers, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and the spread of transnational ethnic and religious ideologies deployed against established states are only the most urgent of these. This

analysis will consider these problems under three wider headings: militancy (including arms transfers), smuggling and trafficking (with an emphasis on the latter), and the poor governance of Afghanistan's multiethnic polity, contributing to state weakness. These challenges are considered the most important in terms of the dangers they pose for the Afghan state and its population; they are by no means exhaustive.

In Afghanistan, transnational challenges are more than an academic diversion from traditional national security concerns. Indeed, the Afghan government's ability to effectively address these problems will determine the success or failure of the post-9/11 Afghan state.

Fluid Battleground: Transnational Militancy

There is a widespread myth that Afghanistan is unusually resistant to foreign domination. An unromanticized view of the history of this troubled country cannot but vigorously refute this. Even if we discount the major movements of foreign armies and establishments of great imperial regimes over Afghan people in the premodern period, a cursory examination of Afghanistan since 1747 shows that it has been consistently victim to foreign intrigue and the overwhelming presence of foreign players, whether political or military. Most recently, Afghanistan has been vulnerable to the interest of a range of external players: Pakistan, the United States, Saudi Arabia, India, the Soviet Union, and Iran, but also the Central Asian states and the North American Treaty Organization (NATO). Each of the named states has provided funds, arms, or military forces to effect political change in Afghanistan. Of course, the domestic interests of Afghans themselves have shaped and guided modern Afghanistan. The Taliban was an Afghan movement (or at least, a Pashtun one) with Afghan political goals. It was sustained, however, with considerable outside intervention, both financially and in terms of equipment and men in arms. In fact, the majority of Afghan governments have been enabled by foreign support, including both the celebrated mujahidin and the current Karzai government. The domestic political environment in Afghanistan has been heavily influenced by the transnational movement of funds, arms, and militants. Stemming the tide of arms and militants flowing into Afghanistan from neighboring states, primarily Pakistan, presents a continuing challenge to the current Afghan government.

Focus on Pakistan: The Pashtun Connection

Though the movement of troops, arms, and financing for insurgency flows into Afghanistan from each one of its neighbors, the widest and most reliable stream has come from Pakistan. It is well known and undisputed that today Taliban forces make generous use of Pakistani territory for staging posts and logistical rear bases, recruitment and rest and recuperation. Though as late as 2007 this circulation of men, arms, and money seemed to affect only Afghanistan, developments in Pakistan demonstrate that the free movement of militant groups in the Afghan-Pakistan border area presents a grave threat to both Islamabad and Kabul in equal measure.

Pakistan has much to gain by pursuing a regional strategy against the movement of militants and arms across its shared border with Afghanistan. While Pakistani leaders, beginning with Zia ul-Haq, believed that an Islamist Afghanistan would provide strategic depth to Pakistan vis-à-vis India, exactly the reverse has happened: Pakistan's provincially and federally administered territories have provided strategic depth to the Taliban. Decades of policies, nurturing first a refugee-based insurgency, an arms pipeline, and an extremist Islamist regime next door, have seriously threatened not only Pakistani democracy but also the integrity of the Pakistani state.

Equipping Militants: Transnational Arms Flows

Transnational militancy in Afghanistan is multiplied by the immensity of transnational arms flows in the same region. The ubiquity of small and light weapons in Afghanistan, particularly in the border region, means that rival power centers are well armed and easily mobilized against the central government. Afghanistan is neither a producer nor an exporter of small weapons but is awash in illegally imported weaponry as a legacy of the campaign against the Soviet Union. During this period, the United States and Saudi Arabia financed the largest known transfer of small and light weapons into any single country. The structural design of this covert arms-smuggling operation probably made the creation of an illicit, transborder weapons market inevitable. Because the militants conducted training and recruitment on one side of the border and insurgent operations on the other, both rural Afghanistan and Pakistan became irreversibly weaponized. Following the withdrawal of the Soviets and the fall of the Najibullah government in 1992, considerable stockpiles of weaponry were

redistributed to competing Afghan forces. Mujahidin-era weaponry remains the single largest category of weaponry in use in Afghanistan. The presence of these weapons has presented a decades-long transnational challenge for both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Today, Pakistani weapons bazaars, in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in particular, are the site of the sale of both Afghan and Pakistani weapons to both Afghan and Pakistani nationals. Since the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, prices of small and light weapons in Afghanistan and Pakistan have undergone significant fluctuations, telling us something about the forces of supply and demand. In 2002, for example, weapon prices inside Afghanistan appeared to collapse while the same weapons were sold for three times as much in the Pakistani border area. This resulted in a net outflow of weapons from Afghanistan into illegal Pakistani markets. More recent anecdotal reports suggest that weapons prices have again increased inside Afghanistan. A report published in 2006 by the *Christian Science Monitor* alleges that weapons prices in northern Afghanistan in particular were on the rise, suggesting that communities were re-arming in anticipation of increased Taliban activity. This price increase will no doubt be reflected in an increased flow of weapons into Afghanistan from Pakistani markets.

Although the scale of the problem is of a different order, there is evidence that some arms flows originate from Central Asia as well. An academic quantitative study conducted by Michael Bhatia and Mark Sedra identifies the border area around Kunduz in particular as a transit point for “specialized and rare” light weapons coming from Russia. Weapons enter Afghanistan from both its northern borders with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, as well as from the western border with Iran, although the center of gravity for the transfer of weapons continues to be the Afghan-Pakistani frontier.

Illicit Economy: Smuggling and Trafficking

Afghanistan is often described as the ancient transit hub of Eurasia. Today, Afghanistan continues to exploit its comparative advantage as a transit route linking South Asia, Iran, Russia, the Central Asian Republics, and China by acting as a lucrative conduit of smuggled and trafficked goods. Some of these goods transit through the country, illegally and without the payment of custom or duty; some of this contraband—notably opium, refined heroin, timber, gems, and precious stones—is produced

inside Afghanistan and trafficked elsewhere. Both the smuggling of licit goods and the trafficking of illicit ones are important revenue streams for nonstate actors seeking to control Afghanistan.

Contrary to some literature on this subject, smuggling and the reemerging narco-economy in particular are not new phenomena to the Afghan economic landscape. The narco-economy, though disrupted by the Taliban’s eradication campaign in 2000 and the international invasion in 2001, has long been a pillar of Afghanistan’s real economy. But there have been changes in the last five years to the structure of Afghanistan’s smuggling problem. These changes reflect shifts occurring in the global economy of the post–Cold War world. Traditional smuggling routes out of Afghanistan have been across the southern and western borders, through Iran and Pakistan. Analysts believe that Iran remains the primary route for drug traffickers, because of the relative ease with which contraband can be moved through Iran and then to Turkey and Western Europe. Iran also provides an important consumer market for heroin, with the number of addicts estimated in the millions. Tehran has consistently waged an aggressive and sometimes violent border campaign against smugglers and traffickers, but the movement of goods continues nonetheless. Pakistan also has seen a lot of illicit activity across almost the entire border, for several reasons. First, the administrative freedoms granted by Islamabad to the NWFP and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have facilitated an illicit economy out of the view of national authorities. Second, the existence of transborder kinship groups in the Pashtun community provide built-in commercial relationships across the border. Third, until a crackdown in the late 1990s, Pakistan itself was a significant global producer of opium, and though cultivation was successfully eliminated before 2000, trafficking by transport mafias in that area continues to operate with Afghan opiates alone. Finally, the so-called “arms pipeline” that was established to move small and light weapons to the mujahidin in their campaign against the Russians meant that an illicit transport corridor linking Afghanistan and Pakistan was well established by the mid-1980s and could be adopted for dual use.

In recent years, however, smuggling routes have been increasingly a problem across Afghanistan’s northern border as well, with large surges in drug trafficking reported. UN studies allege that Central Asia is now the destination for as much as 65 percent of Afghan opiates, with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan identified as the primary northern routes. Some of the contraband travels to Russia and Europe, but much of it is consumed in

Central Asia. Today, Central Asia provides the largest single market for opiates and heroin, with more users of these substances identified there than in all of Western Europe. Tajikistan in particular has seen a substantial increase in opiate-related crime, whether consumption and addiction, or cross-border or local trafficking. Like Pakistan, Tajikistan has a recent history of border porousness with northern Afghanistan. Cross-border Tajik ethnic communities meant that militants found sympathy and refuge in each others' territory (e.g., Afghan Tajiks during their campaign against the Taliban; Tajik Islamist militants in their campaign against the post-Soviet government). Turkmenistan found itself vulnerable because of President Niyazov's conciliatory policy toward the Taliban, which facilitated both licit and illicit trade. All of the Central Asian republics can attribute at least part of the explosion in drug trade across their borders to the fact that the Russian mafia was already active in this region. Organized criminal elements from Russia successfully acted as a bridge linking Central Asia to Russian and Western European markets, encouraging a surge in drug flow. In sum, an unfortunate mix of preexisting communities of interest, working supply routes, and criminal elements conspired to ensure that Afghanistan's northern boundary witnessed the movement of a healthy share of Afghanistan's heroin exports.

Poppy production centers have shifted to reflect this change in supply routes to favor the northern border. For instance, Badakhshan in northeastern Afghanistan is now among the most productive Afghan provinces with respect to poppies. From Afghanistan's northern border opiates are moved through Central Asia to Russia and on to Europe. Today, almost all of the heroin consumed in Russia originates in Afghanistan, as does almost all of that consumed as far west as the United Kingdom.

Agents of Change

Not surprisingly, the first impetus to act against the drug trade in Afghanistan was prompted by an outcry by Afghanistan's northern neighbors. Relatively unaffected by militancy in Afghanistan, Russia and the Central Asian states succeeded in convincing both the US administration and its client administration in Afghanistan that measures needed to be taken to curb the exploding drug trade. By 2004, opium production in Afghanistan had reached unprecedented levels, and new transit routes across Afghanistan's border were causing harm to the

national interests of Afghanistan's northern neighbors. Thus, responding to Russian and Central Asian concerns, the Bush administration identified the drug trade as a priority for US operations there in that year.

Still, this was not viewed primarily as a transnational challenge. Rather, the US administration viewed the drug trade through the lens of domestic militancy; i.e., its interest in combating drugs trafficking was based on the fact that the drug trade was financing insurgent operations in Afghanistan. This narrow concern for insurgency and terrorism within Afghanistan alone meant that the energies of the administration and its allies were immediately focused on domestic approaches only: crop eradication, crop substitution, and law enforcement. This policy was pursued in the following years with a variety of agencies—including the Afghan National Police, US forces, the US Drug Enforcement Administration, and Afghan provincial governors—but was limited to activity within Afghanistan itself and not in the administrative in-between spaces of Afghanistan's border control strategy. Such an approach ignores the important transnational nature of the problem.

This domestic strategy appears not to have borne results. The manual eradication that formed the backbone of coalition antidrug campaigns resulted in only a mild drop in the number of hectares cultivated. For much of 2002 to 2008, critics alleged that international policy on what to do about Afghanistan's emerging narco-economy was stagnated by disagreements within NATO itself about the appropriate use of military force and the lagging enthusiasm from the Afghan government. This latter problem is most often attributed to the fact that key players in the international trafficking business in Afghanistan are also key government officials. Many of them are local strongmen or warlords who were offered attractive government posts as part of the reconstruction of the Afghan state. Some argued that the situation was unavoidable: the participation of drug lords in government was a means of increasing local loyalty to the new central government and co-opting potential rival sources of power in the Afghan countryside. In other words, the counternarcotics agenda was sidelined in favor of a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism agenda. By 2008, it seemed clear that this was a false dichotomy. The revenue streams provided to terrorist and insurgent groups in Afghanistan meant that counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency campaigns needed to be simultaneously pursued.

Responses to other forms of smuggling also have been made subordinate to other mission goals. Though the movement of precious

metals, timber, and semiprecious stones across the border is a known source of Taliban financing, action taken against smugglers seems to have been taken only on an as-needed basis. Piecemeal and locally driven responses have been enacted recently, including the setting up of checkpoints in Kunar province by US military forces. The checkpoints are intended to hinder the steady flow of illegal timber exported out of Kunar into Pakistan. Local officials say the timber trade is used to finance arms purchases to further the insurgency. The primitively equipped but surprisingly effective smugglers move their contraband largely by river and pack mule, keeping their operation outside of the usual day-to-day sight of coalition forces. However, according to US Army Public Affairs material, a request by the governor of Kunar Province to US forces operating in the region prompted the establishment of checkpoints along the riverine routes in use by smugglers. The action has not resulted in confrontations with smugglers thus far; smugglers have chosen to abandon their shipments en route rather than face stiff coalition resistance.

Recent statements made by top US envoy to Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke, suggest that, at least with respect to the drugs trade, a major policy overhaul will replace this ad hoc strategy with something more coherent. Holbrooke told G8 foreign ministers at their meeting in Italy in the summer of 2009 that the United States was abandoning its crop eradication campaign, previously a central element to its strategy. Holbrooke maintains that the United States, using data collected from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, now recognizes that the eradication campaign has not reduced the revenue stream that the drug trade brings to Taliban elements inside Afghanistan. Though the contours of a new drug policy for Afghanistan were not made clear, Holbrooke did confirm that the United States intends to increase its funding for crop substitution programs tenfold. Holbrooke also noted that the United States will take steps to improve interdiction and rule of law. Perhaps already indicating a shift in priorities, US and other NATO forces have, since late 2008, focused military operations not only on Taliban positions, but also on known or suspected Taliban drug labs and opium storage sites. Clearly, NATO has made important shifts in drug policy, though these shifts have not been made public thus far.

The Idea of State and the Problem of Governance

In considering Afghanistan's substantial transnational challenges, it is

important to recognize that at its core, Afghanistan suffers from weakness as a cohesive state. Afghanistan is challenged by inhospitable terrain, a multiethnic, multilinguistic population base, poor infrastructure, weak economic indicators, and an almost total lack of established national institutions. All of these factors contribute to the weakness of the Afghan state as a source of social organization among Afghans themselves. This is not simply a legacy of colonialism or a problem of a multiethnic polity, although it is often framed this way by the Afghan-Pakistani Pashtun community in particular; it cannot be remedied by redrawing the borders of the modern Afghan state. There is no reasonable way to draw borders that will make Afghanistan less multiethnic, less mountainous, more institutionally developed or better economically endowed. The more logical solution to Afghanistan's political fractiousness is to improve governance in real and tangible ways. This is the only way local communities, of whatever ethnicity, will feel vested in the Afghan state and its future.

Thus, the development of institutions of governance—though a domestic endeavor—will be an important step to addressing Afghanistan's transnational challenges. The immensity of the governance challenge in Afghanistan becomes clear when one considers the predominance of what Afghan scholar Amin Saikal terms Afghanistan's "microsocieties" vis-à-vis successive central governments. Though these microsocieties have long been a feature of Afghan society, their "ancestral" nature should not be overstated. In modern Afghanistan, local leaders are largely legitimated by their ability to distribute patronage and provide security, not simply by their ethnic, religious, or tribal credentials. The bases of power in Afghanistan's microsocieties are highly localized and cannot be approached with a general view as to whether they are competitors or allies of the new Afghan state. This complicates NATO's nation-building efforts in Afghanistan, because it means that policymakers cannot exploit economies of scale with respect to governance. Governance will need to be implemented locally on a case-by-case basis. Community by community, the success of nation-building in Afghanistan will be largely dependent on the central government's ability to co-opt these microsocieties and institutionalize a stable working relationship between local autonomy centers and Kabul. It will be crucial that nation-builders in Afghanistan pay particular attention to local dynamics, working with local partners where possible and taking on competitors where necessary. This will require an immense store of local knowledge, patience, and

persistence. Without all three assets, the NATO-led Afghan nation-building project, like so many before it, may not survive beyond the international patronage that supports it.

Final Thoughts: Avenues Forward

This abbreviated look makes it clear that the Afghan-Pakistani frontier is the center of gravity for Afghanistan's most urgent transnational problems. Still, the challenge is more easily identified than met. Several obstacles to increased border security between Pakistan and Afghanistan are immediately apparent. First, the terrain makes full border control difficult, if not impossible. Second, the existence of a single ethnic community straddling the border strengthens local resistance to attempts to tighten security. Third, historical antipathy between local communities and national governments in the border region make national border security strategies seem incompatible with sound local governance. Fourth, the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been unstable and often disrupted by diplomatic breaks (most recently in 2007).

Thus, few meaningful initiatives have been launched to improve border security and stem the movement of fighters, arms or other illicit materials across the border. What progress has been made has been facilitated by outside powers. For instance, in May 2009, a bilateral announcement was made by Interior Minister Rehman Malik of Pakistan and his Afghan counterpart, Minister Abdul Hanif Autaf, that border security would be enhanced. The announcement was the result of a meeting facilitated by US officials in Washington. With third-party facilitation, Afghan officials and their Pakistani counterparts signaled an intention to take important first steps in bringing law and order to their shared border. This includes the introduction of a new system of documenting expatriates living in each other's countries who have, until now, routinely crossed the border unregulated. This task of identifying border-crossers is not a small one; the number of expatriates crossing the Afghan-Pakistani border annually without any validating documentation is estimated at fifty thousand. Most of these undocumented travelers are likely Pashtuns who may have commercial interests, friends or family on either side of the border. The introduction of government control to their movements in this historically Pashtun territory will excite opposition by many locals. This is particularly the case on the Pakistani side of the border, where many Pashtuns currently reside in territories that have been historically administered at arm's length from Punjabi-dominated

Islamabad.

Another example of externally facilitated bilateral progress is seen in the Canadian-sponsored Dubai Process. Following the launch of the G8 Afghanistan-Pakistan Initiative at the 2007 Potsdam G8 conference, Canada took the lead in establishing a series of workshops in which Afghan and Pakistani officials could dialogue about their shared concerns. Before its suspension in 2008, the Dubai Process yielded five documents recommending further action on customs, counternarcotics, managing the movement of people, law enforcement, and connecting government to the people through social and economic development. In November 2007, Afghan and Pakistani officials agreed to develop a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that will allow the opening of their three legal crossing points seven days a week (up from five) and discussed the development of an MOU on a Customs-to-Customs agreement. Following a suspension of the process in 2008, Canada says that it is now committed to "revitalizing" the process. No workshops or facilitations are currently publicly scheduled.

All of these initiatives are embryonic and largely dependent on the success of the greater NATO reconstruction mission in Afghanistan as a whole. Training of border police and capacity-building across the Afghan security sector need to go hand-in-hand with bilateral cooperative policy changes in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Furthermore, evidence suggests that badly needed Afghan-Pakistani bilateral cooperation will materialize only with third-party facilitation. In a sense, NATO players active in the Afghan border regions will need to build capacity in diplomacy and transnational border policymaking. Despite the urgency of the problem and its centrality to the successful establishment of a viable Afghan state, this process of capacity-building is likely to be slow and incremental.

Transnational Security Challenges in India

Rollie Lal

Key Findings

- India's security situation is complex, with traditional and transnational threats overlapping in many instances.
- India faces terrorist activity emanating from Islamic radical groups based in Pakistan and insurgent activity stemming from Maoist and separatist groups inside India.
- Organized crime poses a serious problem for India, with well-established trade in drugs, weapons, and humans supported by the informal hawala money transfer network.
- Traditional security challenges from Pakistan and China have created barriers against cooperative solutions to various transnational threats endemic to the region.
- Rapid growth is causing environmental challenges such as pollution, and water disputes continue with the neighboring countries of Pakistan, China, and Bangladesh.
- Collaboration with the United States and regional actors on information sharing regarding terror and criminal threats, and collaboration on cleaner technologies to deal with environmental challenges, will be central to India's ability to address these challenges.

India's security environment faces a wide variety of traditional and transnational challenges. As a massive nation with both land and sea borders, the security sector must balance many threats vying for attention and resources. In addition, the traditional and transnational threats overlap in many ways. According to Indian policymakers, terrorism and insurgency are the most significant among India's security challenges. These are followed by organized crime and environmental degradation.

India has been faced with a tense security environment since its independence. To the northwest, poor relations with Pakistan have led to multiple wars and intermittent skirmishes over the decades. The conflict

over Kashmir has been a central issue in the bilateral relationship. Pakistan asserts that Muslim-dominated Kashmir's existence as an integral part of the country is necessary to keep the country unified. Conversely, India argues that the Muslim state of Kashmir is a testament to India's multiethnic and secular concept of a state. The dispute has expanded beyond traditional war, providing fuel for terrorist and insurgent activity.

On the northeast border, the situation has been no more sanguine. In 1962, India fought an unsuccessful border war with China. Mistrust and an unsettled border dispute linger, although rapidly growing economic ties are moving the relationship to a better footing.

Overall, traditional security challenges from Pakistan and China have created barriers against cooperative solutions to various transnational threats endemic to the region. Terrorism, a threat faced by both India and Pakistan, is exacerbated by the existence of the Kashmir dispute and poor bilateral ties. Organized crime operates more effectively than legitimate commerce through South Asia, connecting the countries through a strong trade in illicit drugs, people, weapons, and money. In fact, the criminal networks revel in the lack of regional cooperation, which enables their profit. Rapid economic growth, mixed with traditional tensions between regional actors, creates a struggle over scarce water resources. Certainly, there is a lack of attention paid to transnational threats not connected to regional traditional security challenges. Whereas reports of terrorism, crime, and water disputes remain in the news because of their connection to tense bilateral relationships, pollution and environmental degradation—as well as diseases such as acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)—may not be receiving adequate attention from the media or from the government.

Terrorism and Insurgency

The transnational threat of terrorism is closely related to India's traditional security threat vis-à-vis Pakistan. The radical Islamic groups operating in Indian Kashmir, insurgent groups in the northeastern provinces, and groups launching attacks on major cities generally have ties to Pakistani extremist groups. As a result, it is difficult for Indian security practitioners to rank this transnational threat against traditional ones.

Although the terrorist threat in India is not new, the growth of fundamentalist and radical Islam in India is a relatively recent phenomenon. Outside of Jammu and Kashmir, Muslims in India have

advocated moderate politics, largely supporting the center-left Congress Party since independence. However, in the years after 9/11, Indian fundamentalist groups have increasingly forged connections with the global radical Islamic movement and with terror groups based in Pakistan.ⁱ This has meant a growing sentiment among Indian Muslim radicals that their ultimate goals are similar to those of Pakistani groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. The globalized mindset also has increased sympathies of these radical groups with Al-Qaeda and has led to the inclusion of disparate regional themes such as Palestine in the ideological bases for their activities. While Kashmiri terrorist groups continue to focus their primary tactical efforts in the region of Kashmir, they have initiated a new strategy to include large urban areas across India. Attacks such as those on India's parliament in 2001, on the US Consulate in Calcutta in 2002, and the Mumbai attacks of 2008, indicate a much larger area and scale of attacks under consideration by South Asian terror groups.

Radical Maoist insurgents, known as the Naxalites, are a serious threat across several central Indian states including Orissa, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Andhra Pradesh. Naxalites are violently against the perceived intrusion of foreign companies inside India and often attack foreign commercial interests, such as mining operations, to force their departure. The groups seek to overthrow the central government and attack the land-owning classes and upper castes. With an appeal to the downtrodden, the Naxalite movement attracts followers particularly from the tribal areas, a group most often left behind by India's progress. After numerous deadly attacks on police forces in these areas, the state governments have stepped up their response. In 2008, seventy-four security personnel and twenty-two civilians were killed by the Naxalites in Orissa. The government of Orissa has appointed two thousand one hundred special police officers and has raised four battalions of the Indian Reserve Police to counter the insurgents.ⁱⁱ Overall, almost a thousand people are estimated to have been killed by Naxalites in 2008. Conversely, an untold number of Naxalites have been killed by government forces. Despite the strong appeal of the group to underserved groups such as tribals, the Indian government largely persists in treating the challenge as a law and order problem rather than a sociopolitical concern.ⁱⁱⁱ Policies emphasize police mobilization rather than economic development of the target areas.

In the northeast, insurgent groups similarly operate in Nagaland,

Manipur, Assam, Tripura, and Meghalaya. These states have a history of poor governance and are ethnically isolated from the rest of India. Insurgencies in these states reflect separatist sentiments that the central government has had difficulty addressing. Various groups have often adopted socialist, and even Maoist ideologies to counter the existing political structures. Migration from Bangladesh into the region has exacerbated the situation, causing tensions in indigenous communities who sense a cultural and economic threat from the immigrants. Absence of coherent governing structures also has created a vacuum for insurgent groups to fill. Groups in these areas often are able to collect taxes and administer localities through brute force. Furthermore, insurgent groups have developed bases in countries across the border including Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Myanmar, turning an internal issue into a transnational one.

Organized Crime

Organized crime is a threat that is well connected with terrorism in India and Pakistan. Criminal groups in South Asia have been known to collaborate with terrorist groups in international operations on a variety of levels. The connections include logistical support in weapons procurement, shared routes, training, and ideological overlap. Criminal syndicates have also been identified for their involvement in the nuclear smuggling network of Pakistan's A. Q. Khan.^{iv}

South Asian organized crime syndicates are transnational in character. In response to efforts to intercept them, these groups increasingly seek refuge in Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries further afield such as Canada, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Kenya, and Portugal. By fleeing across borders, their identities are difficult to track, and their entry may go unnoticed. Some countries may tacitly allow their presence. During the 1980s, Pakistan's military developed strong links to drug barons involved in the Afghan heroin trade. By the 1990s, government and military efforts began in earnest to address the threat but had limited effect. Money laundering and kickbacks had already been well integrated into Pakistani politics and industry, and laundered money comprised a significant portion of the Pakistani economy.^v

Organized crime in Pakistan, and to a lesser extent in India, has invested in its own political support network by a combination of carrots and sticks: contributing to political candidates and strong-arming local officials. Furthermore, inside both India and Pakistan, organized crime

networks have constructed a strong cooperative relationship with terrorist groups in the region. Terrorist groups leverage criminal trafficking routes for the transport of weaponry, while the syndicates in return request training in the use of guns and explosives and safe passage through militant territory.^{vi}

Drug trafficking poses a highly entrenched threat to India. Much of the trafficking of narcotics and other illegal drugs in Asia traverses South Asia. Routes cross from Burma, Laos and Thailand (Golden Triangle) through India, as well as from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran (Golden Crescent). Traffickers send narcotics from Afghanistan to Pakistan and through south India to the ocean and on to destinations in Europe and Russia. Heroin and other drugs are transferred from Southeast Asia and Myanmar through India to western destinations. India is also the world's largest legal producer of opium for pharmaceutical purposes. A small part of this licit production is diverted to be sold abroad illegally by organized crime, although the majority of diverted opium is used locally.^{vii}

Crime syndicates dominate the trade in people in South Asia, and the numbers of prostitutes in or trafficked from the region runs into the millions. Women are smuggled into India from Nepal and Bangladesh. The trafficking leads to yet another transnational threat, the rapid spread of AIDS in the region. Approximately 0.36 percent of the adult population of India was infected with AIDS in 2006, representing more than 2.5 million people.^{viii} The fact that a large number of the prostitutes in India are trafficked underlines the need for a concerted effort to combat both challenges.

In addition to human trafficking within South Asia, an unknown large number of young girls are sent and sold to Arab countries each year, and small boys are also sold to the Arab states as camel racers. Dubai remains a popular destination and transfer point for prostitution organized by Indian criminal networks. These human smuggling routes could easily be leveraged by terrorist groups to transfer personnel and weaponry.

Transnational money laundering networks, also known in South Asia as hawala, pose a threat in several arenas. These hawala networks originally arose from the weakness of the banking system in rural areas. The system, which relies on trust between individuals and social networks, is common in South Asia and the Middle East. Transactions can be as simple as an individual in Mumbai paying the illegal vendor \$5,000 in cash (in Rupees), with another individual receiving the \$5,000 in dollars in New York, with little or no record of the transaction having taken place.

The scale of such transactions is unknown, thereby leading to ubiquitous use of hawala by criminal and terrorist groups to transfer illegal proceeds.

Environmental Degradation

India's economic growth has brought with it the challenge of environmental degradation. Deforestation, air and water pollution, poor sanitation, and the oversubsidized use of natural resources are just a few of the problems plaguing the nation. Excessive bureaucracy hampers the ability of any agency to oversee and implement change. Lack of accountability among the agencies adds to the confusion, deterring interagency cooperation on solving critical problems. As an example, the Yamuna River in Delhi demonstrates bureaucratic failure in addressing pollution. Although the state water board built new wastewater treatment plants to deal with the flow of heavily tainted water in the river, the municipal government had not cleared the garbage that was blocking the drains. The result was that in 2008, the treatment plants were running at 30 percent of capacity, and the population succumbed to a cholera epidemic.^{ix} A recent report by the Central Pollution Control Board stated that 70 percent of Indian urban areas have critically unhealthy air pollutant levels. The report placed responsibility for these rising pollution levels on increased vehicle usage and industrial production. Whereas car and two-wheeler sales are increasing at the rate of 15 percent per year, road capacity is expanding at less than 1 percent.^x The result is severe congestion and rising emissions.

In addition, the shortage of environmental resources plays into regional tensions with India's neighbors. The border of Pakistan and India cuts across critical waterways for both countries. The Indus Water Treaty regulates the use of this water between the two and has generally been respected by both sides since its inception in 1960. However, infringements do occur, creating mistrust over intentions. India's construction of the Baglihar hydroelectric dam over the Chenab River in 2008 is representative of the type of dispute between India and Pakistan over river usage. During construction of the Baglihar project, Pakistan suffered a shortage of two hundred thousand acre-feet of water as a result of alleged blockage of the Chenab River to fill the dam reservoir.^{xi} Pakistan has subsequently demanded compensation from India. Bangladesh similarly has water disputes with India. The Ganges River takes 92 percent of its journey on the Indian side of the Himalayas before

leading into the Brahmaputra and Meghna Rivers in Bangladesh. India diverts waters at the Farraka Barrage, inside Indian territory, to help clear silt from the port of Kolkata. During dry season, this diversion creates shortages for agricultural use in Bangladesh.^{xiii} In 1996, India and Bangladesh signed a treaty to organize the division of water, but implementation has been difficult.

India faces the converse problem with China regarding water scarcity. The Brahmaputra River in India begins its journey in Tibet as the Yalong Tsangpo, travels through Bangladesh, and then enters India along with the Ganges. China plans to divert waters from the river inside Tibet for hydroelectric power, farming, and industrial use in the dry north and northwestern regions of China. Critics of this plan argue that the Tibetan water is sourced not only from rainfall, but also from melting glaciers. As a result, heavy usage by China for the desert areas will cause Tibet to become water scarce within decades, leading to catastrophic environmental damage. The effects of water diversion would also create significant regional tensions between South Asia and China. Diversion would create shortages in both India and Bangladesh, raising alarm in both countries that China will wield greater power over the region's critical water resources.^{xiii}

Water scarcity in South Asia represents a transnational challenge to neighboring countries that easily translates into bilateral tensions of a more traditional type.

How India is Coping with the Challenge

The government of India is addressing the terrorist and organized crime elements of the challenge through better legal infrastructure and information sharing. Moreover, in the past decade India has passed legislation that grants law enforcement the ability to expedite prosecution in organized crime cases. Ideologically, the Indian government has historically taken the stance that religion must remain divorced from the concept of terrorism, in order to contain the possibility of communal violence erupting in the multireligious nation. For the Indian government, terrorists are terrorists, regardless of their religious affiliation. In urban areas, the police take the initiative with regard to counterterrorist activity, and efforts are being made to enhance interagency capabilities. India also has enhanced border security using fencing, sensor technology, and the deployment of additional security forces.^{xiv}

Compared with the counterterrorist measures, India's counterinsurgency policies are arguably less effective, in that the government has a significant focus on responding to attacks and physically destroying militant groups rather than addressing the underlying economic issues driving the groups' rise in popularity.

India's tense relationship with Pakistan hinders its ability to collaborate on solutions. In November 2008, India faced a series of more than ten terrorist attacks, including bombings and shootings, across Mumbai. The attacks killed more than 179 people. The sole captured militant stated that the attackers were part of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist organization based out of Pakistan. Nonetheless, Pakistan initially denied the affiliation of Pakistani citizens in the attacks, stonewalling further progress in the investigation until months after the event. Cooperation with Pakistan on information exchange in the context of tense bilateral relations is a challenge for Indian leadership and the security sector. Despite this, the Indian government has taken the stance that efforts in support of counterterror cooperation with Pakistan must continue. The administration of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2009 stated to Pakistan that, "action on terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process, and, therefore, cannot await other developments. It was agreed that the two countries will share real time, credible and actionable information on any future terrorist threats."^{xv}

The regional organization built to address these types of transnational issues is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). SAARC has moved forward in trying to address the challenges of information sharing and legal issues regarding crime and terrorism across South Asian borders. In August 2008, SAARC countries signed an agreement to provide mutual assistance in legal matters. This convention was intended to provide a framework for greater cooperation among security forces of the member countries to extradite criminals and terrorists from member countries.^{xvi} However, the case of the Mumbai attacks indicates that the convention has not been as effective as originally anticipated. Weaknesses in the bilateral relationships between SAARC states undermine the ability of members to cohesively agree upon and implement the organization's initiatives.

In the environmental arena, India has acknowledged that it has responsibility in the debate on climate change. Nonetheless, India's Minister for Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh, says that by 2020 developed countries should commit to a 40 percent reduction in emission

levels compared with 1990 levels. He also has indicated that India and China are coordinating closely on the topic in response to developed world demands for developing country concessions. Discussions with China include coordination of positions on forestry, adaptation, and financing technology.^{xvii} In Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's 2009 meetings with US President Obama, the two countries agreed upon a clean energy initiative designed to create jobs and improve access to cleaner, more affordable energy; a partnership to reduce poverty through sustainable and equitable development; and an effort to phase out subsidies for fossil fuels.^{xviii}

Important Next Steps

The challenge of terrorism will continue to be difficult for India to fully address. Instances of domestic terrorist activity stemming from disaffected Indian communities can be more effectively approached by improving governance and accountability in the concerned areas. In addition, a greater focus on human rights issues and transparency will build trust and confidence among these communities, whether in the Muslim areas of Mumbai and Kashmir, or in the separatist regions of northeast India. The solution is far more complex with regard to transnationally supported activity. Pakistani cooperation will be integral to interdicting terrorist groups in the future.

Organized crime remains a difficult issue for domestic authorities, and one that is compounded by syndicate ties to Pakistan and the Middle East. Inside India, criminal groups are rarely brought to justice for a variety of basic and remediable reasons. Police forces have little training in forensic techniques and in the legal bases for indictment. As a result, captured criminals are often able to slip through the grasp of the legal system and are returned to the streets to continue their business interests. In addition, those criminals who are captured often are able to effectively use their money or power to evade incarceration. Lingering challenges in the legal system include readily available bail and prevalent pressuring of witnesses.

Additional time and resources should be spent in training law enforcement in legal and forensic techniques to aid in detaining organized crime groups. At the strategic level, an increased focus on government transparency and judicial reforms would help in addressing bureaucratic roadblocks. To fully capitalize upon such training and education on legal

and technical issues, the countries of South Asia must embark upon a more robust set of confidence-building measures. Trust and collaborative approaches are greatly needed among the regional actors to effectively interdict organized crime. Criminal networks depend on the cracks in bilateral relationships to negotiate their evasion of law enforcement.

In the arena of environmental degradation, government incentives to implement clean best practices would move India in the right direction. A new emphasis on local and state government accountability and streamlined bureaucratic procedures for environmental cleanup are also necessary. For India's environmental policy to be truly effective, the government will need a multipronged approach including innovative ideas, effective government, and support from the central government in terms of best practices, funding, and political pressure where needed.

Consequences and Engagement Opportunities for the United States

The transnational threats facing India today are intrinsically linked to US national security interests. The Mumbai attacks of November 2008 killed six US citizens, and investigations revealed that the terrorists targeted US citizens at the locations. Radicals involved in terrorist activity against India no longer differentiate between the government of India and that of the United States. Terrorist groups operating in India and Pakistan have already shown their ability to affect the United States through the attacks on 9/11, as well as through the militancy operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The ideology that existed as the basis for the Indian Islamic militant in the past was largely regional in nature, and the militant groups were highly focused on the Kashmir conflict and its resolution. With the growth of the internationalist Islamic radical ideology espoused by Al-Qaeda, Indian militants no longer constrain their goals geographically. US targets inside India, as well as abroad, are the new terrain for these terrorist groups.

Organized criminal networks have a similar profile with regard to their international agenda. Globalization is connecting economies and countries in ways unforeseen. Criminal organizations are leveraging the new semiborderless world with innovative uses of financial transactions and concealed transport of weapons, people, and drugs under cover of legitimate trade. This creates increased pressure to improve and streamline border security. International coordination with trade partners and

countries that do not have close ties with the United States is also critical.

Criminal networks are highly adept in maneuvering through the coordination gaps caused by poor bilateral relations.

The United States could play a significant role in addressing India's environmental challenges caused by pollution, and water scarcity. Collaboration with the United States to identify environmentally friendly technologies and best practices in management could provide Indian federal and state actors the necessary skills and tools to counter these seemingly intractable challenges.

Collaboration through the sharing of information and intelligence about terrorism and organized crime is a fundamental need. Additional training for law enforcement and judiciaries could strengthen the Indian response to organized crime and terror threats. India and the United States have increased cooperation in the wake of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, with a focus on information sharing. Areas of enhanced cooperation include terrorist financing, law enforcement, and aviation security.

As these transnational threats evolve over time, it is clear that many challenges overlap and compound each other. While it is necessary to deal with each separately, a common thread connects them all. Regional and international cooperation is needed, and collaborative solutions must be created to resolve the upcoming threats we face.

ⁱRollie Lal, "Islam in India," in *The Muslim World after 9/11* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2004) p. 316.

ⁱⁱMohit Joshi, "Orissa Government Determined to Root Out Naxalism," July 27, 2009, *TopNews.In*, accessed at <http://www.topnews.in/orissa-government-determined-root-out-naxalism-2194595>

ⁱⁱⁱManjeet Kripalani, "In India, Death to Global Business," *Business Week*, May 7, 2008, accessed at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_20/b4084044908374.htm

^{iv}William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "As Nuclear Secrets Emerge, More are Suspected," *New York Times*, Dec. 26, 2004.

^vAhmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 121–23.

^{vi}S. Hussain Zaidi, *Black Friday: The True Story of the Bombay Bomb Blasts* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2002).

^{vii}Rollie Lal, "South Asian Organized Crime and Terrorist Networks," *Orbis*, Vol. 49, No. 2, Spring 2005.

^{viii}UNAIDS Data, accessed December 22, 2009 at <http://www.unaids.org.in/>

^{ix}Jason Overdorf, "Putrid Rivers of Sludge," *Newsweek*, July 7–14, 2008.

^xChetan Chauhan, "Air Unhealthy in 70% of Areas in Urban India," *Hindustan Times*,

September 28, 2009.

^{xii}"Pakistan Warns Water Dispute with India May Threaten Peace Talks," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, October 13, 2008.

^{xiii}Joel McGregor, "The Internationalization of Disputes Over Water: The Case of Bangladesh and India," Paper for the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, October 2000, accessed December 21, 2009 at <http://apsa2000.anu.edu.au/confpapers/mcgregor.rtf>

^{xiv}Sudha Ramachandran, "India Quakes Over China's Water Plan," *Asia Times*, December 9, 2008, accessed at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JL09Ad01.html>

^{xv}Ajit Doval, "Islamic Terrorism in South Asia and India's Strategic Response," *Policing* 2007 1(1):63–69, Oxford University Press, accessed at <http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/1/1/63>

^{xvi}No dilution in India's stand on terrorism: Manmohan (Roundup), *Thaindian.com*, July 17, 2009 accessed at http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/no-dilution-in-indias-stand-on-terrorism-manmohan-roundup_100219451.html#ixzz0eh9LID4Q

^{xvii}"SAARC Convention to Help in Combating Terrorism," Press Release from the Government of Sri Lanka, August 27, 2008.

^{xviii}Jayshree Bajoria, "India's Climate Change Forecast," Council on Foreign Relations, September 22, 2009, accessed at <http://www.cfr.org/publication/20248/>

^{xix}Merle David Kellerhals Jr., "Obama, Singh Pledge Support and Cooperation," November 24, 2009, *America.gov*

Perceptions of Transnational Security Threats in Malaysia and Singapore: Windows of Cooperative Opportunities for the United States

Yoichiro Sato, Professor,
Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (Former APCSS Professor)

Key Lessons

- Malaysia and Singapore face a similar set of transnational security challenges, but their perceptions differ considerably due to the differences in their economic status, ethnic and religious composition, and law-enforcement capacity.
- Concerns regarding the rise of China are shared by Malaysia and Singapore. Both have an interest in the increased maritime power of China.
- Concerns about transnational criminal activities by Chinese nationals are strong in Malaysia, whereas Singapore is confident of its own ability to control such activities.
- While Singapore is confident of its ability to control transnational labor flows, Malaysia lacks law-enforcement capabilities to deal with illegal aliens and transnational crimes such as drug and human smuggling.
- Malaysia would benefit from increased security cooperation on drug trafficking and broad maritime security capacity-building in the tri-border area, but not in the Malacca Strait. Piracy, terrorism, human trafficking, and money laundering are not among the country's priorities.
- Singapore considers terrorism, global economic slumps, and maritime piracy as important transnational security threats. The country is confident of its ability to deal with drug issues and illegal migrant workers. The Singapore government does not officially acknowledge money laundering to be a serious issue, in view of the country's claims to have a highly effective regulatory framework. However, international experts have noted

shortcomings in Singapore's measures and have stopped short of giving a full mark to the country's performance.

- Cooperative opportunities for the United States are limited. Singapore sees itself capable of dealing with most transnational challenges—except for terrorism and maritime security, where the only limits to cooperation with the United States are perceptions of its neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia. Malaysia's perceived transnational threats are deeply embedded in the country's domestic political economy, thereby making the government efforts to address these issues half-hearted at best. Cooperation with the United States on terrorism faces political sensitivity within Malaysia's Muslim population, leaving a narrow window of cooperation on the drug problem.

Introduction

The transnational security issues faced by Malaysia and Singapore are nearly identical, but the two countries' perceptions of transnational threats differ considerably. Being former British colonies—which by twists of history became two separate states—Malaysia and Singapore have grown into two distinct political systems with differing degrees of economic performance. These domestic factors inevitably affect each country's perceptions of transnational threats in the region. US efforts to extend a cooperative hand must take into account the similarities and differences of these two countries.

Malaysia and Singapore—Commonalities and Differences

Both Malaysia and Singapore are highly open economies and societies. Their geographical locations along a major trade path have historically exposed them to heavy international traffic and associated transnational issues. Government policies in both countries in recent years clearly aim at taking advantage of the global economic linkage, encouraging trade, labor, tourist, and international student flows. Both Malaysia and Singapore are highly dependent on international trade. Malaysia's trade per gross domestic product (GDP) ratio stands at 159.1 percent, whereas Singapore's ratio is 309.1 percent.¹ Previously Singapore monopolized the profitable transit trade, but Malaysia is cutting into Singapore's share.

Compared with other countries in the region, both Malaysia and Singapore enjoy a relatively high standard of living, although the latter is much richer than the former.ⁱⁱ As a result, both countries receive a large influx of foreign workers from the rest of Southeast Asia and beyond.

The two countries differ, however, in some important aspects. In Malaysia, ethnic Chinese are the minority, along with the Indians. The issue of ethnic relations with the dominant plurality (officially the majority) of the Malays is a controversial topic in Malaysia. The “Malay first” policy of favoring ethnic Malays over other ethnicities in economic and educational opportunities has provided the politically connected Malay businesspeople with many benefits and protection against competition. This measure was justified in the name of narrowing the socioeconomic gap with the richer Chinese. Malay skepticism of the Chinese also has a root in the communist insurgencies of the 1960s backed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Meanwhile, in Singapore, ethnic Chinese are the majority. Malay dominance in Malaysia has a religious dimension as well. Ethnic Malays are considered Muslims by the virtue of their birth, and Islam is the state religion. Malaysia is active in the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and maintains special relationships with Islamic countries of Middle East, North Africa, and South and West Asia. Singapore, on the other hand, is a secular state that closely identifies itself with the developed Western world, except for the latter’s emphasis on human rights and democracy.

Although both Malaysia and Singapore attract a large number of foreign workers, the gap in economic standings between Malaysia and Singapore and the former’s lax regulations make Malaysia a transit country for illegal workers as well. Singapore’s much stricter regulations mean that those who want to transit through Singapore to other countries, like Australia, tend to go through legal permanent residency status and therefore are clearly visible to the government authority.

The other difference between Malaysia and Singapore is in their law-enforcement capacities. Malaysian government suffers to a greater extent from corruption, and its ability to effectively deal with transnational security threats is hampered by widespread corruption from the lowest to the highest levels of government. In Singapore, the authoritarian government sees corruption as a potential means of self-destruction of its otherwise successful governance. However, its lax regulations in the financial sector to attract foreign money have offered a high degree of secrecy to potential abusers of the island’s financial system.

Malaysia

Within the Southeast Asia region, Malaysia is a highly open economy due to its maritime location, historically porous borders, geographic proximity to major trade and traffic routes, small population combined with relative affluence, shared ethnic heritages with the neighboring countries inside and outside Southeast Asia, government policy to encourage ties with the Islamic world, and globally oriented economic outlook.

Benefits of international trade are clearly visible in the country’s rising trade volume and trade-per-GDP ratio. In addition to attracting foreign investments and signing free trade agreements (FTAs) with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members and other countries in Asia and beyond, the Malaysian government has decided to compete for the regional transshipment market against the previously dominant Singapore. While Singapore has an advantage in advanced facilities and cumulative management expertise, Malaysia offers lower costs in labor and land.

Migrant workers are attracted to Malaysia because of the country’s relative affluence compared with its Southeast Asian neighbors (excluding Singapore and Brunei) and other countries in Asia. Malaysia’s small population and higher local labor costs disadvantage its labor-intensive sectors and domestically focused industries. Foreign migrant workers are introduced both legally and illegally in such sectors as farming, food processing, mining, construction, and housekeeping. Promotion of the tourism industry also requires a large pool of low-skilled labor. The largest source of migrant workers is Indonesia, but many workers from the Philippines, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Cambodia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are also present. On record, migrant workers represent 12 percent of the country’s population of 25.7 million,ⁱⁱⁱ but the number of overstayers (those who enter the country legally but overstay the term of their visas) is estimated to be three to four million, adding to the “official” foreign population. Undocumented entries of an estimated two million people further augment this number. Because transit use of the Malaysian territory is also common in this category, Malaysia’s official population figure is somewhat unreliable.

Opportunities for transnational crimes coincide with Malaysia’s growing migrant population and increased trade. At the same time, Malaysian observers are cautious not to blame everything on the recent globalization. In fact, Malaysia’s geographic location has exposed the country to long-distance commerce and migration since its precolonial

history, and many of the transnational issues Malaysia faces today have been present for a long time but have only recently been recognized as “problems.” Among these transnational issues, drug smuggling and illegal workers are given the most attention by Malaysian experts. Human trafficking is subsumed under the illegal workers category, leading the government to focus on visa violations of the trafficked victims. Terrorism and maritime piracy—to which the United States pays close attention—are not considered major problems; however, US reactions to these issues are.

Drug Issues

Drug issues have existed in Malaysia for a long time. The increased opiate trafficking out of the Golden Triangle in the 1970s entered Malaysia through the transshipment point in Penang. By 1983 the problem had worsened to the point that the Malaysian government declared drug trafficking the number one threat to the country. In more recent years, drug production in Thailand and Myanmar shifted to synthetic drugs, and drug usage in Malaysia followed suit. Today, drug users in Malaysia are overcrowding the prisons. Increases in the number of arrests of Malaysian “mules” (lowest-level traffickers, including many females) in both Malaysia and neighboring countries and drug usage among the Malay middle class are perceived as problematic by the security experts there. Arrest data indicate that the trafficking routes have considerably diversified. Drug money is also laundered throughout Southeast Asia (including Malaysia) by Chinese criminal networks.

Illegal Migrant Workers and Human Trafficking

Malaysia sees itself on the receiving end of human trafficking. Foreign victims of human trafficking in Malaysia have received little government attention because they are not seen as doing much harm and are perceived as being needed by the domestic economy. The country has signed the international antihuman trafficking convention but has not ratified it. The lack of government interest partly stems from the fact that the sectors in which trafficked victims are forced to work also attract willing workers who volunteer to be smuggled into Malaysia. Local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have clarified the distinction between “trafficked” (involuntarily brought in through coercion or deceit)

and “smuggled” (willingly and knowingly brought in) people, but government policy lags behind because the illegal status of these workers provides the labor market flexibility and conveniently denies them certain state benefits that are only available to legal migrant workers. Both trafficked and smuggled workers are bonded by the recruiters, and treating the trafficked people as victims in need of protection would place additional financial burdens on the Malaysian government.

During the economic boom of the 1990s and the recovery from the Asian financial crisis, job categories such as waiters, housemaids, and construction and plantation workers attracted few local workers and were subsequently filled by foreign workers. The ongoing economic recession has turned local Chinese and Indian workers against foreign workers to compete for their jobs. The downturn has also turned the trade unions with Malay workers against foreign workers, resulting in massive deportations and cancellations of visas for non-Malay foreign workers. However, political sensitivity about the treatment of Indonesian workers grants them slightly better treatment than that of other migrant workers. Ethnic Malays in Malaysia see Indonesian workers as brothers and sisters, and resent domestic Chinese and Indian allegations that Indonesian workers commit many crimes. Deported Indonesian workers are normally allowed to apply for legal entry.

Land routes of entries include illegal crossing from the Indonesian side on the island of Borneo and from the southern provinces of Thailand. The porous nature of both borders and the corruption at official crossing points are both identified as causes of Malaysia’s ineffective immigration management. Sea routes include the Malacca Strait, South China Sea, and the tri-border area from the Southern Philippines to the Celebes Sea. Between southern Mindanao and Sabah in particular, the presence of traditional seafarers who have their relatives living on both sides and their stateless nature are abused by smugglers and traffickers.

Further compounding the problem of illegal entries, overstayers and those with other visa violations can potentially be exploited by more serious criminals, including terrorists. “China dolls” is the term used by Malaysians to describe Chinese female students working in prostitution. Faked marriages are said to be used to bring in Vietnamese plantation workers. Malaysia accepts a large number of foreign students and tourists from Islamic countries. In order to promote Arab tourism, Malaysia has offered visa-free entries to tourists from Islamic countries. Overstaying Nigerians are settling in parts of the country and are said to be developing

criminal ties with Chinese crime syndicates. Malaysia took advantage of the post-9/11 visa tightening in North America and Europe against students from Islamic countries to attract fee-paying foreign students. Some Malaysians fear that with these entries comes the influence of conservative Wahhabism, which challenges the Malaysian government's emphasis on progressive Islam, and that radicalized Islam may lead to terrorism.^{iv}

Terrorism

Malaysia's perception of terrorism is not based on a strong and genuine concern that the country may be targeted by terrorists. Rather, it is more concerned about what the United States does in the region in response to terrorism concerns. Accordingly, Malaysia's responses to terrorism are partly for precluding US actions. Malaysia's half-hearted counterterrorism posture is also driven by domestic political considerations. The ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) has viewed Islam as an important source of popular support for the government. However, its emphasis on "progressive Islam" (as opposed to more conservative/radical interpretations) has not developed strong roots in Malaysia, and emotional ties with the Middle East have persisted. The government approach is also viewed as aiming to discredit the opposition Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).

While the country maintains an ambivalent stance on terrorism, Malaysia's corrupt political system has revealed governance weakness with regard to combating transnational crimes. The implication of high-ranking Malaysian government officials and their family connections in such scandals as the corrupt UN Oil-for-Food program for Iraq and Dr. Khan's nuclear proliferation network have illustrated that Malaysian ties to the Middle East and South Asia could be more than emotional.

Maritime Piracy

Malaysia does not see piracy as a serious problem. In fact, most incidents in the Malacca Strait occur in Indonesian waters. Malaysia jealously guards its sovereign claims over the Malacca Strait, resisting the user states' effort to multilateralize policing of this strait. Malaysia and Indonesia strongly and negatively reacted to reports that Admiral Thomas Fargo had suggested the United States might deploy "marines or special

forces on high-speed boats" to the strait. Malaysia is more open to maritime security cooperation (broadly defined) in the tri-border area (from Sulu Sea to Celebes Sea), where improved maritime domain awareness would help the Malaysian authorities deal with various transnational criminal activities. The Malaysian perception that the Chinese navy is tacitly aiding its nationals in certain criminal activities (such as illegal fishing) is also a motivating factor for Malaysia to seek cooperation from the United States.

Singapore

Singapore has a long history of viewing security from a broad, comprehensive perspective. Its "total defense" doctrine since the mid-1980s has encompassed military, economic, psychosocial, and environmental dimensions of security. Being a small city-state, Singapore sees that all threats are transnational and interlinked. Major security issues Singapore faced during the last decade—including the Asian economic crisis, the sudden acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, avian flu, the 2002 Bali bombing, and the regional haze problems—only enhanced Singapore's comprehensive security perspective. Unlike Malaysia, Singapore does not suffer from weak governance in facing transnational threats. Its meritocratic bureaucracy and the ruling Peoples' Action Party (PAP) maintain a well-coordinated and stable working relationship that is atypical of Southeast Asia.

Singapore considers terrorism and global economic slumps as its most serious transnational security threats, perhaps closely followed by maritime piracy. Drug issues, illegal migrant workers, and money laundering are not considered major problems. Singapore's transnational security perceptions are directly linked to what the country is able and willing to control. With exceptionally strong governance capacities, the Singapore government is confident that most transnational threats it wishes to control are controllable. Drug syndicates, migrant workers, and Chinese criminals all fall in this category. The government is still working on improving the state's antiterrorism capacities. The perception of piracy threats due to problems on Indonesian waters is partly beyond Singapore's control. As for economic security, the country is at the mercy of global economic conditions.

Singapore most openly welcomes US involvement in the region's transnational security issues, including terrorism. In its domestic

population, Muslims are the minority, and this frees Singapore from having to pay closer attention to domestic reactions to the government's close cooperation with the United States. Singapore's working relationship with the United States is also driven by its ambivalence about China's growing status and maritime military buildup. Transnational issues associated with the inflow of Chinese migrants are considered to be within Singapore's controlling abilities. Yet, as a state, China poses a potential threat to Singapore due to its strategic maritime location, which has lured major powers for control (such as the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century and Japan during World War II). The Multilateral Maritime Information Fusion Center in Singapore is a manifestation of Singapore's overlapping concerns about transnational threats and a rising China. The center also demonstrates Singapore's willingness to keep the United States engaged.

Migrant population

Singapore's higher income level and economic openness attract a large number of migrant workers. Out of its population of roughly 4.7 million,^v one million are estimated to be foreign workers. While many foreign workers enter Singapore with fixed-term visas and go through periodic renewals, the presence of a significant number of unregistered foreign workers is suspected. Singapore is listed on the Tier 2 Watch List for human trafficking by the US State Department for the presence of many trafficked workers there. Old criminal syndicates are suspected of bringing in foreign sex workers into the country. Unlike in Malaysia, the large inflow of mainland Chinese into Singapore as permanent residents is not perceived as a security threat, perhaps partly for ethnic affinity, but more importantly because of the country's highly selective and controlled recruitment of foreign workers. Singapore's highly taxed items, such as cigarette and liquor, are often smuggled in. Indonesian workers are known for their frequent smuggling in of cigarettes.

Drugs

Singaporeans are fairly confident that no major local drug syndicate operates in the city-state. However, drugs from Thailand find their way into Singapore, and some Singaporeans are working as "mules" to carry illicit drugs across state borders. Overall, the drug problem in Singapore is

not perceived to be as bad as that of Malaysia. One major difference is Singapore's comprehensive approach to the drug issue, which provides treatment and rehabilitation for drug users. Singaporeans view drug businesses in Thailand as being partly run by political groups, including former communists and secessionists in the South. While this perception was accurate in the past, more recent analyses see neither of these two groups as significant actors in drug smuggling through Thailand.^{vi}

Maritime Piracy

Singapore's strategic maritime location, connecting the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, has made the country a world-class transshipping point. Its economy depends on uninterrupted maritime traffic, and piracy poses a major threat to its industry. As pirates are no longer based in the tightly governed Singapore, Singaporeans see themselves as victims of poor governance in the neighboring countries. Most notably, economic conditions on the island of Sumatra (Indonesia) are perceived as a key determinant of piracy activities in the Malacca Strait. For Singapore, piracy poses a threat to the physical danger of Singaporeans and the potential loss of ships and cargos. However, the threats are perceived more in terms of lost business, as high insurance rates drive shipping companies away from the Malacca Strait.

Money Laundering

Singapore's openness as a regional financial center attracts a large sum of transnational money. Like many other offshore financial centers, Singapore has become a place for laundering money of illegitimate and dubious origins. The opening of a major casino on the Sentosa Island in February 2010 further enhanced this perception. In competition with other offshore financial centers, Singapore has kept lax financial regulations in place. Based on its March 2007 evaluation of Singapore, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which works with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), noted "[o]verall, the regime for investigating ML [money laundering] has not been effectively implemented, as is illustrated by the low number of ML investigations."^{vii} In fact, the absence of comprehensive rules was less problematic in Singapore than was the lack of will to enforce them. The evaluation further stated:

MAS [the Monetary Authority Singapore] reports that administrative sanctions such as letter of reprimand or letter requiring remedial action have been very effective in getting financial institutions to rectify their breaches and deficiencies. No criminal sanctions have been issued; fines have only been issued against money remitters and bureau de change.^{viii}

Singapore avoided being listed by the OECD in 2000 as one of the thirty-five offshore tax havens. However, Singapore's law protected financial information of the clients of banks and other financial services to such an extent that sharing of their tax-related information with treaty partners was practically impossible. According to Jeffrey Owens, director of the OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration, Singapore has "used the fact that it is not on the OECD list of tax havens and the restrictive exchange of information provisions in its tax treaties to market itself as the ultimate secrecy jurisdiction."^{ix}

While the FATF acknowledged some improvements, lack of sufficient progress earned the country a "gray" designation by the OECD in early 2009—which indicated less-than-substantial implementation of the OECD standard on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes. Since then, Singapore has passed new laws to empower the domestic tax authority to "exchange information, including bank and fiduciary information, with tax authorities in other countries" and signed a protocol with France to bring their bilateral tax treaty up to the OECD standard—a move that qualified Singapore as a "white list" (substantial implementation) country.^x It is too soon to evaluate efficacy and implementation of these new measures.

Economic Slumps

Singaporeans see economic slumps as the trigger and multiplier of transnational security problems. For instance, at times of economic crisis and high unemployment inside Indonesia, the influx of illegal workers from Indonesia is feared. Similarly, Singapore views piracy as closely associated with Sumatra's economic conditions. Furthermore, at times of economic slump, political instability may ensue in the neighboring countries and spill over into Singapore. Most notably, the governing elite of Singapore is concerned that during economic crises transitional democracies in the region may face open criticism and disfranchisement of the populace, and the same pressure may reach the Singaporean government.

Conclusion

Although Malaysia and Singapore share borders and face similar transnational security challenges, their perceptions of such challenges differ considerably due to differences in domestic, political, economic, and societal factors. The two countries are similar in their dismissive perceptions about the seriousness of the human trafficking problem, for these countries are recipient and transit (Malaysia) countries rather than source countries (like the Philippines and Indonesia). Malaysia and Singapore, however, differ in their ability to assess the extent of their illegal worker problems and to deal with the issues. Malaysians view the issue as a bigger problem than do Singaporeans, due to the former's lack of confidence in its own monitoring and enforcement capabilities and historically held negative perceptions about the Chinese. Singapore, with a Muslim-Malay minority, does not overtly demonstrate such ethno-religious bias, partly due to its emphasis on meritocratic society, and also because of its confidence in monitoring and enforcement capabilities for dealing with the imported workers and transnational criminals. For issues related to illegal workers, Singapore does not need external help, and Malaysia does not want external help, for illegal workers are heavily entrenched in the country's economic interests.

On drug problems, both Singapore and Malaysia face common challenges that mainly stem from Thailand. Both countries impose tough penalties against traffickers, but the two countries differ in their ways of dealing with drug users. Malaysia's straightforward criminalization of drug use without rehabilitation of the users is less effective than Singapore's comprehensive approach. The drug issue is a potential venue of closer cooperation between the United States and Malaysia. For example, the Joint Interagency Taskforce-West (JIATF-West) of the US Pacific Command has been active in counternarcotics efforts in Thailand. Extending this cooperation to Malaysian ground and maritime law-enforcement agencies with minimal footprints, mainly focusing on information sharing, may open up further venues of cooperation in the future. As Singapore's success indicates, a rehabilitation program for drug users in Malaysia would complement the countertrafficking approach. Quiet US assistance in this venue would also be welcomed by Malaysia.

The expressed concerns about terrorism in the region are more genuine in Singapore, which welcomes closer cooperation with the United States in every conceivable way, provided that such cooperation is not aimed at Singapore's two most immediate neighbors—Malaysia and Indonesia. In

Malaysia, the primary concern with terrorism has to do with US actions in the region and the repercussions of these actions on domestic politics. Malaysians recognize that the country is more prone to the influence of radicalized Islam from West Asia, South Asia, and North Africa and that its territory may harbor terrorists and their sympathizers. However, Malaysians seem to take some comfort in their belief that the terrorists' targets are elsewhere. Terrorism and its perceived association with Islam are sensitive topics in Malaysia's domestic party politics. The country's ethnoreligious divide on these topics largely precludes publicly visible antiterrorism cooperation with the United States. Singapore's concerns about maritime piracy are not closely shared by Malaysia. Malaysia's strong sovereign claims over its territorial waters in the Malacca Strait preclude formalized multilateral cooperation that includes nonlittoral partners.^{xi} The two countries, however, share concerns about the expansion of Chinese naval activities in Southeast Asia. To counter the increasing Chinese naval activities, Singapore openly welcomes a US naval presence in the country. However, Malaysia cannot do the same for domestic considerations. With Malaysia, broader maritime security cooperation outside the Malacca Strait—which only implicitly embeds improvement of the antipiracy capabilities—is more likely to be fruitful. Such cooperation could go a long way toward improving Malaysia's Maritime Enforcement Agency's capabilities in maritime border patrol and interceptions, information-sharing with other agencies (such as immigration, police, customs, the navy, and other regional governments), legal prosecuting capabilities, and anticorruption measures at the enforcement level.

Finally, both Malaysia and Singapore are hotbeds of money laundering. The presence of traditional transnational criminal networks in the region, combined with the recent “race to the bottom” (financial liberalization and deregulation) among the regional financial centers in terms of liberalization of cross-border financial transactions, has made criminal money an important part of Southeast Asian economies. White-collar crimes and unethical but legal (due to lax regulations) business practices have the potential to severely destabilize the security of the region, as Singaporeans clearly see economic conditions in the region as a critical variable affecting all other transnational security issues. The money laundering issue, however, involves enhancement of the global financial rules and standardization of the national rules, which are far beyond the scope of security cooperation

measures by a regional military command or the US Department of Defense. Instead, windows of opportunities for the United States are found in anti-drug and maritime law enforcement efforts, where developing the capacity of the partner country's authority in a quiet manner is welcomed.

ⁱEstimated as of 2008. Computed from data in the CIA, *World Factbook*, 2009.

ⁱⁱSingapore's estimated GDP per capita (purchase power parity) for 2008 was US\$51,500, whereas Malaysia's figure for the same year was US\$15,200. They both compare favorably against most other countries in the region, like Burma (US\$1,200), Bangladesh (US\$1,500), Cambodia (US\$2,000), Vietnam (US\$2,800), the Philippines (US\$3,300), Indonesia (US\$3,900), China (US\$6,000), and Thailand (US\$8,400). Data source: CIA, *World Factbook*, 2009.

ⁱⁱⁱEstimated as of July 2009. CIA, *World Factbook*, 2009.

^{iv}For a history of Wahhabism's influence in Malaysia and its link to Jemaah Islamiya, see Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 125–38.

^vEstimated as of July 2009. CIA, *World Factbook* 2009.

^{vi}“Thailand Islamic Insurgency,” GlobalSecurity.org. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/thailand2.htm>. Accessed on 9 December 2009.

^{vii}Financial Action Task Force, “Third Mutual Evaluation on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, Singapore, Executive Summary,” Paris: Financial Action Task Force, 29 February 2008, p. 5. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/52/40211135.pdf>. Downloaded on 9 December 2009.

^{viii}Financial Action Task Force, p. 7.

^{ix}US Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, “Written Testimony of Jeffrey Owens, Director, OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration before Senate Finance Committee on Offshore Tax Evasion,” 3 May 2007, pp. 7–8, 15. <http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2007test/050307testjo.pdf>. Downloaded on 9 December 2009.

^xFrancis Chin, “S'pore in the white,” *Strait Times*, 14 November 2009, reproduced on the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at: http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View.14045. Accessed on 9 December 2009.

^{xi}Yoichiro Sato, “Southeast Asian Receptiveness to Japan's Maritime Security Cooperation,” Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, September 2007. <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Maritime%20security%20cooperation%20Japan-SE%20Asia%20Sato.pdf>. Accessed on 9 December 2009.

Sri Lanka: Transnational Security and Postinsurgency Issues

Shyam Tekwani

Key Findings

- Sri Lanka's quarter-century civil war may be over, but many of the underlying causes of the war continue to linger.
- The international network of the defeated Tamil Tigers continues to control immense financial and logistical resources and is supported by the nearly one million Tamil diaspora. Meanwhile, the victorious Rajapaksa government has been slow in implementing its promise of political settlement and integrating the minorities into the political and socioeconomic life of the country. These realities may contribute to the radicalization of a new generation of Tamils, both on the island and in the diaspora in North America, Europe, Australia and Asia.
- International sanctions on the island nation will impede the process of reconstruction and resettlement—even as inflation drags the economy down further—and lead to social unrest.
- No amount of foreign aid will mitigate Sri Lanka's problems without ensuring better governance to address the country's serious economic and political challenges.
- The last stages of the war saw a rush of internally displaced persons (IDPs) take to the high seas, sailing off to countries of the European Union, Canada and Australia seeking asylum as refugees. The urgent task of resettling three hundred thousand Tamil IDPs has been slow, creating further resentment among the minority community.
- The last stages of the war saw a rush of internally displaced persons (IDPs) take to the high seas, sailing off to countries of the European Union, Canada and Australia seeking asylum as refugees. The urgent task of resettling three hundred thousand Tamil IDPs has been slow, creating further resentment among the minority community.

- Ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka have the potential to spill over and destabilize India, America's key economic and strategic partner in South Asia. Given that Sri Lanka has been a friend and democratic partner of the United States since gaining independence in 1948, disengaging from Sri Lanka could have negative consequences for US geostrategic interests in the region.

For more than a quarter century, a war between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ravaged the island nation in the Indian Ocean, killing more than seventy thousand people as the ruling ethnic Sinhalese majority fought the separatist Tamils. The fighting came to an end in May 2009, as Sri Lanka's army trapped the remnants of the LTTE in the nation's northeast, killed Velupillai Prabhakaran (the group's elusive supremo) and took control of the entire country for the first time since the riots of July 1983. The victory came at a great cost: with the GOSL suppressing dissent, curtailing human rights and, in the final onslaught, according to the United Nations, killing seven thousand civilians.

During the final stages of the war, Sri Lanka came under increasing attack—for violations of international humanitarian law and the internment of more than a quarter million Tamils displaced by the fighting—by the very countries that had provided it legal, diplomatic, military hardware and muscle. The United States terminated its supply of arms and allied itself with the European Union in its effort to pass a resolution against Sri Lanka in the United Nations Security Council. The European Union, based on its commissioned report on Sri Lanka's failure to honor human rights commitments, scrapped a trade concession known as the "GSP Plus" and lobbied intensively against the grant of a US\$2.6 billion loan by the International Monetary Fund toward reconstruction of the country following the devastation of the twenty-six-year-old war.

This paper argues that it would be counterproductive for the United States and the European Union to disengage from Sri Lanka and deny it the sustenance it requires for the reconstruction of the country. The potential outcomes of a policy of disengagement and noncooperation are the reemergence of an insurgent group that used terror as a tactic, providing a model for learning by other insurgent groups and an increase in influence over a strategic location by regional powers like China, Russia and India.

Transnational Insurgency: Local agenda, global network

THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM

Centuries of mistrust between ethnic Tamils and Sinhalese preceded British colonial rule (1815–1948). The divisions deepened after independence and a militarized Tamil insurgency took form during the late 1970s. Following an internecine war among the assorted militant groups, the Tigers emerged supreme and dictated the course of the country's history from July 1983 to May 2009. The Tigers—labeled as the most ruthless terrorist organization in the world—were pioneers of suicide bombing as an insurgent tactic and were the only group to have assassinated two heads of state. At the height of its power the LTTE controlled a quarter of the country with its fully developed armed capabilities on land, sea and air; the LTTE also installed its own system of roads, taxes, police and courts.

The LTTE's achievements were the result of the global scale on which it operated. To its supporters, the Tigers were freedom fighters struggling to carve out *Eelam*, a Tamil homeland in the northeastern part of the Sinhalese-majority island. That view had sympathy among the majority of the nearly one million Tamil diaspora in the West. The overseas operations of the Tigers were central to their ability to sustain an armed campaign for more than a quarter century.

INDIA: THE TAMIL CONNECTION

Home to more than seventy million Tamils in the southern state of Tamilnadu—and with fewer than twenty nautical miles separating it from the northern coast of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean—India played a key role in actively supporting and sponsoring Tamil militant groups during the early 1980s, providing them training, arms and funds. This support was also a product of wider ideological and geopolitical concerns during the Cold War. The LTTE attained dominance among the other militant groups and emerged as the sole representative of the Tamil cause for a separate state by the mid-80s, with support and infrastructure networks based in India.

In an attempt to stabilize the region, the new government of Rajiv Gandhi in India underwrote a peace accord between the GOSL and the LTTE in July 1987, and Indian troops were sent to Sri Lanka as the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). The LTTE, unhappy with India's firm

refusal to endorse Tamil separatism, launched an offensive against the IPKF. India's two and one-half year experience on the island ended with a humiliating withdrawal and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by a female suicide bomber a year later. Following the assassination, Indian support for the Tamil cause dried up, the group was proscribed as a terrorist organization and India adopted a "hands-off" policy in the affairs of the island.

INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS AND FUNDS

In the aftermath of the July 1983 Sinhala-Tamil riots in Sri Lanka, a large number of minority Tamils fled the country as refugees, mainly to India, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States and Europe. Shortly thereafter, and with the passive support of the liberal-democratic host countries, the LTTE set about leveraging the scattered diaspora—a group earning and saving in the world's strongest currencies—through its offices in more than sixty countries to establish a sophisticated and extensive network of propaganda, funding and arms procurement to sustain its armed insurgency. About 80 percent of the LTTE's US\$1 billion in annual donations came from the diaspora. Following the crackdown on the LTTE by Canada and the European Union in 2006, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police released a report of its four-year investigation (Operation Osaluki) of the fundraising efforts of the Tamil Tigers in Canada. The report revealed that the LTTE had subjected Sri Lankan Tamils living in Canada and other Western countries to intimidation, extortion and even violence to ensure a steady flow of funds for its operations. Other sources of its revenue were front organizations and proxy businesses.

Testimony in May 2003 by an officer of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) at a hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee revealed that since the mid-1980s Tamil Tiger communities in Europe were involved in narcotics smuggling, having historically served as drug couriers moving narcotics into Europe. The report also indicated that the LTTE had close ties to drug trafficking networks in Burma, and that Tamil expatriates carried drugs in exchange for training from Burma, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The testimony concluded that Sri Lanka's preoccupation with the LTTE depleted its resources, preventing the adequate patrol of Sri Lanka's nine hundred miles of coastline to effectively curb the drug trade. The most significant sources of weapons for the LTTE were Cambodia

and the rest of Southeast Asia, North Korea, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Ukraine.

9/11 AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: THE CHANGED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

In July 2001 the LTTE staged attacks on the Sri Lankan Air Force base and the Bandaranaike International Airport in Colombo, wiping out half of the country's civil aviation fleet, in addition to a few military aircraft. With Sri Lanka's army in a deadlock, the navy restrained and the air fleet neutralized, the LTTE seemed on the verge of a major victory.

Two months later, the planes that brought the twin towers crashing down in New York on September 11 laid the groundwork for a hardening of global opinion against the kind of violent tactics used by the LTTE, and Western attitudes underwent a shift to resolve regional conflicts. The LTTE had already been proscribed as a terrorist organization in India, the United States and the United Kingdom before September 11 and subsequently saw its credibility erode further when Canada and the European Union also banned it in July 2006, curtailing the LTTE's financial operations. Due in part to this bolstered legal awareness, an international crackdown by law enforcement agencies on the LTTE's overseas network resulted in numerous arrests and crippled the group's fundraising and arms procurement capabilities. In the United States, an FBI sting operation in early 2007 led to the capture of four Indonesians, a Singaporean and a Sri Lankan Tamil who pleaded guilty to attempting to smuggle weapons to the LTTE.

With the LTTE's smuggling and trafficking routes cut off, its flow of arms and funds drying up, and its maritime capability reduced, the GOSL was emboldened to revive its own war on terror. This culminated in a military victory over the LTTE—an organization that had transformed Sri Lanka from a major tourist destination with a model democracy and an open economy to a country whose very existence as a nation-state was threatened.

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Sri Lanka's defiance of Western governments that railed against the country's conduct during the final phase of the war signaled a historic shift in Sri Lanka's foreign policy. Sri Lanka's international cooperation on

transnational security is most intensive with India and China. India's tacit support in the sphere of strategic intelligence, maritime cooperation and air defense contributed to the military victory over the LTTE. Sri Lanka's war machine also was fostered by Chinese and Pakistani military hardware, foreign intelligence sharing, and a focus on military professionalism. The United States supplied intelligence on LTTE ship movements, which helped Sri Lanka choke illegal arms imports.

Help also came from Burma, Russia, Libya and Iran as Sri Lanka turned toward countries that offered donations without criticism of its human rights violations. Iran emerged as a major economic donor—when Sri Lanka was under pressure on human rights issues during the war—with a US\$1.9 billion line of credit, primarily to buy Iranian oil and for a hydroelectric and irrigation scheme to upgrade a refinery. President Rajapaksa became the first Sri Lankan head of state to visit Libya when he called on the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, toward the closing phase of the war when Western criticism was at its highest. The meeting, ostensibly aimed at improving trade relations and economic cooperation, yielded a US\$500 million financial package for development along with an appreciative comment from the Libyan leader on Sri Lanka's handling of the ongoing war against the Tamil Tigers.

Burma and Sri Lanka stepped up bilateral cooperation to curb terrorism and to increase investments, trade and tourism. The Burmese denied the enfeebled Tigers any further use of their traditional sanctuaries in Burma. Russia, one of Sri Lanka's main arms suppliers, backed Colombo at the Geneva human rights council to deflect a debate over the conduct of the war in Sri Lanka. Moscow, along with Tripoli, is one of the largest buyers of tea from Sri Lanka. Within a week of being reelected as president for a second term in January 2010, Mr. Rajapaksa signed a US\$300 million loan to buy military and dual-purpose equipment from Russia despite an end to the quarter-century war. Sri Lanka's 2009 defense spending was estimated at US\$1.74 billion (from US\$1.48 billion in 2008), which represents 17 percent of the country's total estimated expenditure and about 5 percent of GDP, nearly double that spent by India and Pakistan. The Russia deal came after the former army commander said the island nation had cancelled a US\$200 million purchase of arms from Pakistan and China after the end of its war with the Tamil Tigers in May 2009. Meanwhile India, whose two-way trade with Sri Lanka surged to over US\$4 billion last year, extended loans of US\$700 million to improve Sri Lanka's railways.

ROLE OF CHINA

During the closing stages of the war in early 2009, when reports of tens of thousands civilians trapped in the war zone began filtering out despite a ban on the media, UN Security Council members Austria, Mexico and Costa Rica, backed by the United States and Britain, called for an informal briefing on the humanitarian crisis. China, supported by Russia, blocked the move declaring that it was “an internal matter” for Sri Lanka and was not a threat to international security. China’s decision increased its influence in Sri Lanka. In an effort to revive its US\$40 billion economy, Sri Lanka granted China an exclusive economic zone in its first postwar drive to attract more foreign direct investment and also gave a green light to an US\$891 million power project, even as the United States warned its citizens against traveling to Sri Lanka.

With the United States ending direct military aid to Sri Lanka over its questionable human rights record, China agreed to sell significant quantities of arms (worth US\$37.6 million) including Jian-7 fighter jets, anti-aircraft guns, sophisticated JY-11 3D air surveillance radars and other military hardware and munitions that helped tip the balance against the insurgents.

In 2007 Beijing moved to secure its maritime strategic goals through brokering a US\$1 billion deal with Colombo to develop a deepwater port in the southern town of Hambantota into a major transshipment hub with a container port, a bunkering system, an oil refinery, an airport and other facilities. Hambantota, on the southern tip of Sri Lanka, is just six nautical miles from the main east-west trade route across the Indian Ocean. Around 70 percent of China’s oil imports are shipped through this sea lane, which stretches from the Middle East through the Strait of Malacca to Chinese ports. China has been expanding its navy to preempt any potential vulnerability in the event of a conflict, particularly with the United States. China also has been developing a “string of pearls,” a phrase coined by defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton to describe the shipping routes along strategic sea lines to ensure a steady supply of oil by developing port facilities across the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca and across the Indian Ocean, and on to the Arabian Gulf.ⁱ Hambantota, like the Chinese-built port of Gwadar in Pakistan and Sittwe in Burma, is one such pearl.

China also provided US\$1 billion in economic assistance last year (replacing Japan as Sri Lanka’s largest foreign donor) while the United States gave US\$7.4 million and the United Kingdom gave US\$2 million.

In 2009, Colombo granted Beijing an exclusive investment zone in Mirigama, thirty-four miles from Colombo’s port. This was enough to concern both the United States and India, despite Chinese insistence that such actions are purely a commercial venture. While some accept the Chinese viewpoint at face value—given the fact that around 70 percent of China’s oil imports are shipped via this sea lane from the Middle East to Chinese ports—others see ominous designs behind the project. India’s home minister, Sri Lanka’s long-time ally and the dominant power in South Asia, warned, “China is fishing in troubled waters.”ⁱⁱ

ISSUES OF GOVERNANCE

Far from the ruins of war in the northeast, Colombo is enjoying a peace dividend. The economy, suffering from a slump in garment exports and tourism because of the war, is vibrant. This year the country is expected to see some six hundred thousand foreign tourists, compared with five hundred thousand in 2009. The *New York Times* has named Sri Lanka its top tourist destination for 2010. Annual remittances from the overseas Sri Lankan workforce are rebounding to around US\$3 billion. Last year the Sri Lankan stock market more than doubled in value, making it one of the best performing in the world. Food prices remain high. The economy is expected to grow by around 6 percent this year. And yet much needs to be done if Sri Lanka is to ride the current wave of optimism toward sustainable growth.

Despite 5 percent annual growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in recent years and the highest per capita income in South Asia (US\$2,000), the strength of Sri Lanka’s economy is tenuous as the budget was skewed heavily toward the war effort. The fragile economy will require massive amounts of money for reconstruction and development. Towards that end, the recently approved US\$2.6 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan will bolster Sri Lanka’s reserves. However, the European Union’s decision to suspend special trade preferences known as “GSP Plus” (unless progress is made on human rights and political freedoms), entails the withdrawal of trade benefits worth about US\$135m that will hit the garment and fishing industries the hardest.

In contrast to its bigger neighbors, India and Pakistan, Sri Lanka’s security force was largely symbolic. It was only after the emergence of the separatist Tamil insurgency in the 1980s that Sri Lanka’s armed forces underwent a transformation and began to focus exclusively on

counterinsurgency. Since then, the government's spending priorities have not been in line with the challenges the country faces, as evidenced by the 20 percent increase (over the US\$1.74 billion expenditure in 2009) in the defense budget despite the fact that the war has ended. Analysts predict that the increased defense spending would put pressure on its budget deficit, which the government had agreed to contain by the end of this year as an assurance for the loan from the IMF.

A 2006 study ("Cost of Conflict in Sri Lanka") by the Mumbai-based think tank Strategic Foresight Group (SFG) reported that Sri Lanka was one of the most militarized societies in South Asia. The study said the island nation had eight thousand military personnel per one million people. Even Pakistan has only half that number. The corresponding figures for other South Asian countries are 2,700 in Nepal, 1,300 in India, and 1,000 in Bangladesh. In terms of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, Sri Lanka spent the most (4.1 percent), compared with Pakistan (3.5 percent), India and Nepal (2.5 percent), and Bangladesh (1.5 percent).

The victory of the military forces over the separatists has opened up a range of opportunities for the government to address other issues of governance that were dealt with distractedly during the course of the war. The war had its greatest impact largely on the populations in the northeast and the bordering areas of the island nation. Psychological trauma, damage to infrastructure and homes, displacement, restricted mobility, disruption of local economies, disruption of community and institutional networks, and the deterioration of health services are the most affected. Sri Lanka, according to the World Health Organization, is in an epidemiological transition. While malaria and diarrhea are prevalent among IDPs and those living in the uncleared areas in the northeast (the main theater of the war), diseases like tuberculosis, dengue, Japanese encephalitis, diarrhea and acute respiratory infections are still prevalent. The two and a half decades of war also saw an increase in tobacco, substance and alcohol abuse.

Environmental issues demand equal attention. Demining the populated areas of the northeast is essential to the resettlement of IDPs who wish to return to the villages they were forced to abandon during the course of the war. Sri Lanka is prone to occasional cyclones and tornadoes, and the tsunami of December 2004 killed about 31,000 people, left more than 6,300 missing, 443,000 displaced, and destroyed an estimated US\$1.5 billion worth of property. Issues of deforestation, soil erosion, and coastal degradation from mining activities are beginning to cause concern. With

freshwater resources being polluted by industrial waste and poor drainage, water scarcity is a looming threat. Increased pollution, poaching and urbanization pose a great threat to wildlife populations.

As a source and destination for human trafficking, Sri Lanka ranks as a Tier 2 Watch List country by the US State Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP). Tier 2 Watch List countries are those whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) but are making significant efforts toward compliance. A recent announcement by the G/TIP that it would fund an International Organization for Migration (IOM) project to help Sri Lanka develop a national strategy on combating human trafficking is a step in the right direction. The US\$300,000 program, which will build on an earlier US-funded IOM countertrafficking project in Sri Lanka, will provide training for law enforcement and government officials. Technical support also will be provided for the government's antitrafficking task force to help it develop a comprehensive national strategy. Similar support for other development and governance-related programs will strengthen US-Sri Lanka relations and assist in the development of the island nation.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

For the United States, stability in Sri Lanka is essential to securing its energy resources from the Persian Gulf and ensuring the free flow of trade in the Indian Ocean. After a highly publicized fallout with Colombo over alleged atrocities during the final stages of war with the Tigers, the US administration is now working on a more pragmatic policy toward Sri Lanka on the basis of a new report by the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The report recommends that "the Obama administration should take a broader and more robust approach to Sri Lanka that appreciates new political and economic realities in Sri Lanka and US geostrategic interests. Such an approach should be multidimensional so that US policy is not driven by short-term humanitarian concerns but rather an integrated strategy that leverages political, economic, and security tools for more effective long-term (political) reforms."ⁱⁱⁱ

Emphasizing that the United States cannot afford to "lose" Sri Lanka, the report expounds on the "geostrategic interests" of Washington and says they could be further jeopardized if the current state of strained relations

were to continue. “Sri Lanka is strategically located at the nexus of maritime trading routes connecting Europe and the Middle East to China and the rest of Asia, where an estimated half of the world’s container ships transit the Indian Ocean.”^{iv}

Equally important for the United States is the prevention of the reemergence of Tamil militancy. The LTTE was an integral part of the international terror network, and by all accounts it offered a model for tactical and operational learning for other terrorist groups. The LTTE represented the terrorist model of the future, having harnessed the forces of globalization to attain maximum strategic reach with a global diaspora support network of one million Tamils, pioneering the use of suicide bombers and maritime attacks, being adept in the use of new media technologies, and preceding the Al-Qaeda network by almost two decades.

A senior policy analyst testifying before the Subcommittee on National Security in April 2001 observed, “Although fighting a national war of liberation, the long established and formidably skilled, organized and equipped maritime arm of the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) presents Al-Qaeda with a source to plagiarize for maritime terrorism knowledge. Moreover, the LTTE perpetuated its expertise in a maritime school and academy, formally packaging and publishing a body of knowledge applicable to maritime terrorism.”^v

IMPORTANT NEXT STEPS

The victory of incumbent President Rajapaksa in the 26 January 2010 election by a margin of 1.8 million votes (58 percent of the vote) has ensured him another seven years in power. While his victory has placed the possibility of reforms on the table for the first time since the country gained independence in 1948, the electoral challenge by his erstwhile Army Chief General, Sarath Fonseka, highlighted the politicization of the armed forces. The general’s defeat resulted in a purge in the higher echelons of the military and the detention of several former military officers and soldiers.

The rump of the LTTE is still active in Sri Lanka, with a few hundred armed cadres hiding in the jungles. These groups aim to rekindle their insurgency and make use of large quantities of arms buried in hideouts. The million-strong Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora is a crucial factor for any revival of the LTTE. Colombo will need to continue working with countries to prevent a resurgence of support for militancy and will need to

reach out to the diaspora groups to become partners in rebuilding the country. In addition, the government will need to accelerate the resettlement process, and ensure a lasting political settlement to the ethnic issue.

The return in January 2010 of nearly two hundred thousand IDPs to their home districts and the increased freedom of movement for the one hundred thousand still remaining in military-run camps are important steps forward and were brought about mostly as a result of international pressure and the political need to win Tamil votes. With high literacy rates, a young population and a strategic location along trade routes, the island of Sri Lanka is on the cusp of becoming a vibrant business hub and the paradise that its tourist brochures describe. This will require the assistance of the international community to reconstruct the country’s battered democratic institutions and establish conditions for enduring peace. Political and governance reforms will be resisted until the northeast is reconstructed and developed. Until the grievances that generated and sustained the militancy are resolved, and constitutional reforms to end the marginalization of the Tamils are made, there will be neither enduring peace nor political stability.

To achieve enduring peace and stability, the international community will need to engage and use its financial clout to ensure reconstruction and development in Sri Lanka. The United States is uniquely placed to lead the effort, due to its influence in Sri Lanka as a friend and democratic partner since 1948.^{vi}

The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations states, “The United States and Sri Lanka have a long history of cordial relations based in large part on shared democratic traditions.”^{vii} Accounting for more than one-quarter of Sri Lanka’s total exports, the United States is its most important trade partner. The report’s recommendation that the United States recalibrates its relationship in tune with new political and economic realities is a sound one. So too is the recognition that foreign policy should not be dominated by a single agenda—in this case, violations of humanitarian law—which works against US geostrategic interests in the region. In the words of Mahinda Rajapaksa, the president of Sri Lanka, who made an appeal through the op-ed column of the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, “Reconciliation will be a multifaceted task, and it is important to look at the many aspects of nation-building through a broad lens, rather than a narrow one.”^{viii} More importantly, however, will be the leadership the United States will have to provide to engage the international

community, Western donors, the World Bank and the European Union in developing resettlement, development and reconstruction strategies.

ⁱ From a 2005 report commissioned by the US Department of Defense's Office of Net Assessment, titled "Energy Futures in Asia."

ⁱⁱ "China is fishing in troubled waters in Sri Lanka: Chidambaram"; *Hindustan Times* dated April 25, 2009. Available online: (www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/india/China-is-fishing-in-troubled-waters-in-Lanka-Chidambaram/Article1-404073.aspx) . Accessed 25 March 2010.

ⁱⁱⁱ "Sri Lanka: Recharting US Strategy after the War", a report by the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 7, 2009.

^{iv} Ibid.

^v Testimony of Frank J. Cilluffo Senior Policy Analyst Center for Strategic & International before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, House Committee on Government 03 April 2001 as cited in Captain James Pelkofski "Al Qaeda's Maritime Campaign". Available online: <http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,83909,00.html> Accessed 25 March 2010.

^{vi} "Sri Lanka: Recharting US Strategy after the War", a report by the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 7, 2009.

^{vii} Ibid.

^{viii} "How Sri Lanka defeated terrorism" by Mahinda Rajapaksa in *The Philadelphia Inquirer*. Available online: <http://www.philly.com/inquirer/currents/81082802.html> Accessed 25 March 2010

Vietnamese Perspectives on Transnational Security Challenges

Alexander Vuving

Key Findings

- Vietnam's perspectives on security challenges are being shaped by four paradigms: regime security, rapid wealth creation, human security, and national survival.
- The regime security and rapid wealth creation agendas are dominant, but the government is under increasing pressure from forces representing the human security and national survival agendas.
- The major transnational security challenges as perceived by the Vietnamese are those that threaten the values upheld by the four paradigms. These include regime opposition, terrorism, infectious diseases, natural disasters, environmental crimes, climate change, resource scarcity, hazardous cheap products, drug trafficking, and human trafficking. Also of concern are sea attacks and oil spills in the South China Sea, illegal immigration from China, and money laundering.
- As Vietnam pursues two conflicting grand strategies—international integration versus regime preservation—its officials share a thin common view on security challenges, and the government's perspective suffers from a lack of coherence.
- Microlevel perspectives, stovepiped practices, lack of social responsiveness, and a general tendency to pass the buck to others are prevalent features of Vietnam's government approach to transnational security issues. However, the reform-minded portion of the media, which still has to operate under state ownership, is playing an important role in mobilizing societal forces and pressuring government agencies toward action.
- With increasing convergence on some strategic interests between the US and Vietnam related to China's rise, there is greater

potential for closer cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally, between the two countries. The areas of greater potential are as various as combating drug trafficking, infectious diseases and terrorism, environment protection, disaster management, enhancing resource security, and coping with climate change

The Views Behind the Views

In the second half of the 1980s, serious debates emerged within the Vietnamese leadership over the country's security outlook. At first, the debates revolved around the question of "security by what" and not "security for whom." While the focus was state security rather than human security, adherents of "new thinking" argued that security would be more effectively provided by economic means than by military means. This was because the rigid binary structure of a military confrontation between the socialist bloc (of which Vietnam was a member) and the capitalist world had given way to interdependence and globalization. In accordance with their worldview, the new thinkers advocated liberalization inside the country and a more open approach to the outside world. However, old thinkers, clinging to an anti-imperialist doctrine that prioritizes regime stability, feared that such measures would bring in "negative elements"—human, ideological or otherwise—from outside and increase subversive and criminal activities. In response, new thinkers agreed to the need for political stability but maintained that the benefits of international integration would outweigh the costs of transnational security challenges.

While the core debate remained unsettled, the two camps cut a pragmatic compromise. Both economic reform and political stability became the dual linchpins of Vietnamese policies in the era of *doi moi* ("renewal"), which began in the late 1980s. Vietnam's security outlook in the current era reflects the ongoing conflicting visions of anti-imperialism and integration. Two major experiences have defined the main thrust of anti-imperialism and integration since the late 1980s. The first is the experience of an economy on the verge of collapse. This gave rise to integration. The second is the experience of a regime on the verge of collapse. This determined the content of anti-imperialism in the post-Cold War era. After decades of warfare and experiments with a socialist command economy, Vietnam fell into economic collapse in the mid-1980s. This prompted the country's leadership to adopt wide-ranging reforms both in domestic and foreign policies. A main lesson learned was that one

must rehabilitate market mechanisms and join the global mainstream. However, these measures also undermined the communist regime. The Tiananmen Square protests in China and the transformation of communist regimes in Eastern Europe during 1989 provided an object lesson for anti-imperialists in this regard. For the old thinkers, such events could happen because liberal ideas originating in the West had crossed the border and influenced parts of the population, including the elite. The process was called "peaceful evolution" and was identified by anti-imperialists as the primary threat to Vietnam's security in the era of *doi moi*.

Poverty and peaceful evolution are the two traumas that have driven Vietnamese policies in the 1990s and well into the twenty-first century. Correspondingly, the chief objectives of Vietnamese politics in the post-Cold War period have been economic growth and regime preservation, with the latter enjoying a slight primacy throughout most of the period.

The cohabitation of these two paradigms has exerted an enormous impact on how Vietnam's policymakers perceive and manage the transnational security challenges to their country. Integrationists generally favor greater openness with the world and see transnational activities as bringing more good than harm. On the contrary, anti-imperialists tend to emphasize the negative effects of external influence. Hence, security challenges are given different priorities according to whether they are political or socioeconomic in nature. Political security challenges are defined by the authorities as those activities that are directed against the communist regime or undermining the ideological and organizational foundation of the regime. High priority is put on fighting political security challenges, sometimes at the expense of measures to curb socioeconomic security problems. As a result, threats to the communist regime are likely to be seen as more alarming and are met with tougher countermeasures than are threats to the livelihood of the population.

In Vietnam's government agencies, the perspectives of anti-imperialism and integration, along with the underlying values of regime security and rapid wealth creation, continue to prevail over other perspectives. The government is, however, under increasing pressure from two recent developments. First, two decades of limited liberalization have opened up some breathing space for civil society, which, in its function as a corrective to the authorities, emphasizes the values of human security and sustainable development. Second is the perception of a great danger to national survival that emanates from a powerful, assertive, and expanding China. This perception expresses itself more emphatically through civil

society actors but is also present among a large part of the ruling elite when they are in their private capacity. Symbolically, General Vo Nguyen Giap, the only living founder of the socialist republic, is a prominent figure in these emerging forces.

Major Transnational Security Threats

Regime opposition and terrorism. Regime opposition normally is considered an internal threat. But in an age of globalization and with millions of Vietnamese exiled from their country after the communist takeover of South Vietnam, regime opposition has acquired a transnational nature and is arguably the top security concern of the Vietnamese government. A communist state, Vietnam does not allow legal opposition to the government. Even public “critical feedback” (*phan bien*) is not tolerated. With this mindset, Vietnam’s government has an extremely broad view of what it sees as oppositional activities. For example, getting in contact with an exile Vietnamese group that advocates democracy and human rights in Vietnam is seen as a threat to the communist regime. Propagating liberal ideas is also seen by the authorities as a dangerous phenomenon. A medical doctor was arrested and sentenced to five years in prison and three years of house arrest after he translated and posted online an article from the US Embassy website entitled “What Is Democracy?” Missionary activities to create organized communities of faith that are independent from the state are also perceived as threatening. Control of political ideology and control of organized association are two strongholds of Communist Party power. Thus, activities that challenge the regime’s control of these spheres will be watched with the highest vigilance and treated with the harshest methods.

Vietnam has tried to secure the cooperation of foreign governments in fighting its regime opposition. It has reached mutual agreements with noncommunist neighbors such as Cambodia, Thailand, and the Philippines with regard to not allowing dissidents to organize within each other’s territory. Vietnam also took advantage of increased US terrorism concerns to gain support from the United States. While taking US requests to fight terrorism seriously, it also labeled some US-based Vietnamese groups as “terrorists” and requested that Washington do the same. The subtext was simple: If I help you fight your enemy, you must also help me fight my enemy. However, much to the disappointment of Hanoi, Washington refused to reciprocate, stating that these groups were

promoting their opinion peacefully and did not engage in terrorist activities.

Infectious diseases. The last two decades have seen Vietnam heavily exposed to a number of pandemic diseases such as the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and H5N1 (bird flu). More recently, through the country’s human connections with the United States, H1N1 (swine flu) also has been spreading rapidly in Vietnam. Because infectious diseases threaten the well-being of a vast number of the population, the issue is perennial on the watch lists of advocates for human security, rapid wealth creation, and national survival.

HIV was introduced to the country in the 1990s, along with Vietnam’s international opening and economic liberalization. The spread of HIV has been closely related to the sex industry and the narcotics trade, which are considered by Vietnamese as two of the most dangerous social crimes. Despite sustained efforts by authorities, HIV, prostitution, and drug abuse remain acute and widespread. This current reality seems to be attributable to the lack of political will and material resources to fight against these challenges.

SARS was introduced to Vietnam in early 2003 by a businessman flying in from Hong Kong. Within weeks, the disease caused the death of this man and four other people who had contact with him in the hospital. The dramatic loss of life raised public awareness of pandemic health concerns, and the management of this disease provided valuable lessons for the subsequent cases. Drawing upon the lessons learned from SARS, Vietnam was relatively successful in limiting the negative effects of the avian influenza pandemic. The government spent a large amount of money to compensate for farmers’ losses, and there were effective efforts to quarantine the virus. These efforts, according to a senior healthcare official, are the major reasons for the success. However, both the H5N1 and the H1N1 influenza were spreading with high speed over large areas. This was largely because many of the infected (in the case of H1N1) and the affected (in the case of H5N1) did not comply with the quarantine procedures. Lax hygiene practices and the spread of contaminated food are also some of the main causes of recurrent diarrhea outbreaks in recent years.

Natural disasters, environmental crimes, climate change, and resource scarcity. These threats, separately or in combination, place Vietnam's natural and material resources and those who depend on them in a precarious position. The issues are placed high on the human security and national survival agendas. While these challenges do not directly threaten the ruling regime's security, they pose a challenge to the rapid wealth agenda. However, the long-term nature of the above issues (except natural disasters) ensures that they are not a high priority on the rapid wealth creation agenda, which is characterized by its short-term sight and its role in contributing to these threats.

Tropical storms and floods are the two major types of natural disasters in Vietnam. Every year, a dozen typhoons come from the South China Sea and ravage the country's most populous areas. On sea, the typhoons pose a recurrent existential threat to thousands of Vietnam's small and ill-equipped fishing boats. On land, heavy rains cause floods and landslides, while strong winds damage or destroy cities and villages. These problems have been exacerbated in recent years by an economic expansion that often included the leveling of lakes and the burning of forests to make way for new urban, mining, and agricultural areas.

Vietnam has a well-developed system of coordination among governmental agencies at all territorial levels to deal with flooding and storms. Recently, a national committee for search and rescue, with the military as the lead agency, has also been set up. The political will is, however, often compromised by poor equipment, corrupt officials, and a limited budget. For example, damage caused by storms has been made more severe by the poor capacities of Vietnam's state-owned weather forecasters.

While Vietnam's rapid economic development in recent decades has dramatically raised the wealth of the nation, it also has placed a huge stress on the environment. Parallel with the mushrooming of industrial factories is the dramatic increase of chemicals that are discharged into the soil and the air. In the race for fast profit, most factories do not comply with the law and instead shift the environmental costs to their surrounding areas. One popular case is the decade-long pollution of the Thi Vai River in Dong Nai Province by a food factory supported by foreign investment. There is also increased media coverage about "cancer villages," where significant numbers of villagers are killed by strange cancers after a factory is built in the neighborhood. The overuse of chemicals in manufacturing, agriculture, and food processing has become widespread in

recent decades. In addition, Vietnam's water and forest resources are being rapidly diminished by the expansion of mining, hydropower, logging, land development, and other industries.

According to the World Bank, Vietnam is one of the five countries most threatened by climate change. Experts have estimated that a one-meter rise in sea level would result in 10 percent of Vietnam's population being displaced and 4.4 percent of the country's territory—including 90 percent of rice fields in the Mekong delta—being permanently submerged. If the sea level were to rise one meter, Vietnam's largest city, Ho Chi Minh City, which is now home to eight million inhabitants, would lose half of its current area, while one-third of the Vietnamese portion of the Mekong Delta, which is home to eighteen million people, or 22 percent of Vietnam's population, also would be inundated. Although Ho Chi Minh City accounts for nearly 30 percent of Vietnam's industrial output, the Mekong Delta produces half of Vietnam's rice and more than a quarter of its gross domestic product (GDP). The rise in sea level, combined with economic expansion in Greater Mekong, has already caused water scarcity for Vietnam and other countries in Lower Mekong. Food insecurity and massive migration are expected if this issue is not effectively dealt with.

Hazardous cheap products. Few countries would identify hazardous products as a major transnational security challenge. But in Vietnam, the abundance of cheap, poor-quality but products, mostly of Chinese origin, has become a security concern. These goods include foods, garments, chemicals, and other products containing a high level of toxic preserving agents, formaldehyde, and other hazardous ingredients used to drastically reduce the costs of production. Another type of hazardous product is the equipment of an older technological generation that produces low-quality goods at a high environmental cost. These products are sold at incredibly cheap prices and have been conquering large segments of Vietnam's domestic market. The issue of hazardous cheap products, most of which are imported or smuggled from China, is high on the human security and national survival agendas, which see these products and their flooding of the domestic market as a danger to Vietnamese consumers, producers, and the environment. However, proponents of regime security and rapid wealth creation view things differently. Hazardous products do not pose a direct threat to the regime. Rather, they have helped many Vietnamese enterprises, both state-owned and private, in their race for quantity and

speed, which is pursued regardless of quality and long-term consequences. For years, the Vietnamese government has suppressed complaints about the overabundance of hazardous, cheap products from China. Nor have the authorities done anything significant to improve quality control and border protection against the smuggling of these products. The issue was only recently (i.e., 2009) brought to larger public awareness. But after a Chinese Embassy counselor intervened with the Vietnamese Ministry of Information and Communications, Vietnam's state-controlled media stopped calling attention to the issue. The counselor noted that the opinions voiced by some Vietnamese newspapers were "unfriendly" to China and needed to be controlled. Vietnam, having formally pledged to be a "good neighbor, good friend, good comrade, good partner" of China, is under pressure to behave faithfully to its pledge.

Drug trafficking. Several factors have made Vietnam a key transit point in the global network of drug trafficking routes. These include the country's proximity to the Golden Triangle, a world center for narcotic production; the long and porous land borders with Laos, a large supply market, and with China, a large consumer market; and the ethnic Vietnamese connections with the advanced industrial countries, which also is a large consumer market.

Vietnam is also a destination for drug traffickers. Drug abuse has become a widespread phenomenon not only in urban areas but also in the countryside, affecting all strata of Vietnamese society. The drug issue is placed high on the human security agenda. However, the authorities' handling of this issue remains ineffective. A common excuse is that authorities lack finance, equipment, and personnel. But from an alternative perspective, factors such as corruption, the lack of political will, and the lack of effective interagency collaboration present major hurdles in coping with drug abuse and trafficking.

Human trafficking. Vietnam has been at a crossroads of people ever since human memory. Today, human trafficking is a pressing threat to security in the country. Young women, men, and boys are the major targets of the traffickers. Young women in poor families with poor education are especially vulnerable to traffickers who pretend to broker jobs for them in larger cities or abroad. Many women then are sold and forced to become

sex workers, mostly in China, Cambodia and the larger cities of Vietnam, but also in Macau, Thailand, and Malaysia. Tens of thousands of Vietnamese women have been sold as wives to Chinese men, mostly in rural areas, where the men are incapable of finding local wives. Traffickers also lure young Vietnamese men and sell them across the borders to illegal factories that use captive workers in China, mostly brickworks factories, where they work like slaves. Men sold to illegal factories are typically chained so they cannot escape.

Because of its one-child policy and the popular preference for male children, China is also a big market for the trafficking of young boys and babies from neighboring Vietnam. In the areas bordering China, this has created a serious security threat to young boys, male babies, and their families. The media have reported cases in which traffickers murdered an entire family in order to take the newborn and young boys across the border, where they would be sold at a high price. Despite the authorities' efforts, the issue of human trafficking remains intractable. Typically, traffickers are local people who know the victims very well. Like the traffic of drugs, the illicit trade of women in Vietnam is usually organized in pyramid schemes. Many victims become conduits in the network and, trying to make profit from their local knowledge, return to their home villages and lure their own recruits. This creates a hard nut for the authorities to crack as victims become culprits and are fearful of revenge. In other situations, women are sold to remote areas, where local authorities are unable to identify the women's origins.

Approaches to Dealing with the Threats

The centralized bureaucratic nature of the Vietnamese government augments the challenge of dealing with transnational security issues created by the competing priorities within Vietnamese society. The role of government, as conceived by the ruling Communist Party, is to supervise and manage (*quan ly*) society. The government is differentiated into various ministries and branches (*bo nganh*), each of which is supposed to take control of a distinct sector in society. The mindset and the structure of this "control by sector" approach have promoted microlevel perspectives and stovepiped practices in government agencies.

On the other hand, control by sector has created large overlaps in jurisdiction and vast no-man's lands, since many social and natural phenomena affect different areas and do not pay respect to bureaucratic

categorization. This is especially true of transnational security challenges, which by nature are irrespective of borders. Stovepiped practices, overlaps, and no-man's lands can be balanced by coordination mechanisms, either ad hoc or institutionalized. But the Vietnamese government has an acute lack of these mechanisms.

One way to overcome these problems, then, is for the highest levels of government, that is, the prime minister, or alternatively, the politburo of the Communist Party, to deal with the issue at hand. However, only high-priority issues of the regime security and rapid wealth creation agendas—such as regime opposition, infectious diseases, and natural disasters—are likely to reach these levels.

Low-priority issues are more likely to land in no-man's land. For example, when illegal laborers from China were spotlighted in the media in 2009, no government agency assumed responsibility. The minister of labor said her ministry was in charge of only one part of the whole phenomenon, while the key to solving the issue lay elsewhere. As illegal Chinese workers do not directly challenge the communist regime or pose an immediate threat to economic development, they normally are off the radar of the coalition of anti-imperialists and integrationists that form Vietnam's government. These illegal workers became a security issue only when people looked at them from a different perspective. This different perspective came to the fore via a nascent civil society.

Civil society channels its voice to the public mostly through the reform-minded vein of the state-sanctioned media. Thus, newspapers such as *VietNamNet*, *Tuoi Tre (Youth)*, *Thanh Nien (Young People)*, *Saigon Tiep Thi (Saigon Marketing)*, *Phap Luat Thanh Pho (Ho Chi Minh City Law)*, *Lao Dong (Labor)*, and *Tien Phong (Vanguard)* have become unofficial mouthpieces of the human security and national survival agendas. Typically, these newspapers spotlight the issue, mount a publicity campaign, and try to elicit a response from the officials. Several issues related to environmental crimes have made their way to the prime minister through this approach.

International Cooperation

Vietnam's international cooperation on transnational security is most intensive with its neighbors—Laos, Cambodia, and China—as well as with a few industrial countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and South Korea. Vietnam has a thick history of cooperation with Laos and

Cambodia, and its ties with Laos are the strongest. Vietnam has signed several government-level agreements with Laos and Cambodia on cooperation in fighting transnational security challenges. In addition, Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security annually signs a detailed cooperation plan with its Laotian and Cambodian counterparts. These regional agreements provide a solid framework for cross-border collaboration and foster cooperation in fighting regime opposition, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and goods smuggling. These four issues also top the list of transnational security cooperation between Vietnam and China.

However, Sino-Vietnamese cooperation on transnational security issues still lags far behind that of Vietnam and its two other neighbors. With Australia, the United Kingdom, and South Korea, most of the cooperation is focused on fighting drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and money laundering. Vietnam is also developing transnational security cooperation with other ASEAN countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia.

Many factors determine the intensiveness and effectiveness of international cooperation on transnational security issues. The intensity of cooperation depends on the level of threat and the resources available to the related countries, as well as the partner-friendliness of their approach. Drug and human trafficking, money laundering, and infectious diseases in Vietnam are concentrated in movements between neighboring countries and along ethnic connections. Due to this nature, bilateral cooperation often trumps multilateral cooperation on these issues. One reason Australia and the United Kingdom maintain the best cooperation with Vietnam on transnational security is due to the high value of human security in their overall security perspective, their resources, and the flexibility and patience in their dealings with the partner country. With their sizable ethnic Vietnamese communities, certain countries such as Germany, Russia, the Czech Republic, the United States, and Canada also share significant transnational security issues with Vietnam, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, and money laundering. However, cooperation with Eastern European countries is less intensive due to lack of resources. In Germany, Canada, and the United States, progress has been hampered either by the incompatibility of their approaches or the interference of political interests.

The effectiveness of international cooperation largely depends on how the partners manage their asymmetries of power. According to Vietnamese

officials, it is much easier for Vietnam to put forward its initiatives in cooperation with Laos and Cambodia than with China. And while Vietnam is more ready to cooperate when China proposes initiatives, China is harder for Vietnam to persuade. This may be explained by the fact that less powerful countries tend to defer to the more powerful. This principle also holds true for Vietnam's cooperation with advanced industrial countries. Power asymmetries and the principle of "deference to the powerful"—which is entrenched in the foreign policy culture of Asian countries—are the main culprit for hindering regional cooperation on transnational security issues. One burning issue that has been largely silenced is the negative impact (e.g., resource depletion, water scarcity, food insecurity, and environmental degradation) caused by dams in the Upper Mekong countries, mostly China. Other transnational security issues that recently have stirred great anxiety in Vietnam include oil spills and sea attacks in the South China Sea, but these have little chance of making their way to the policy agenda due to power asymmetries and the deference principle.

Implications for the United States

Historically Vietnam's cooperation on transnational security issues with the United States has concentrated on combating drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, and pandemic diseases. The intensive human connections between the two countries have made cooperation on these issues necessary. However, with each country championing an opposite ideology and political system, security cooperation remains a sensitive issue that demands keen attention and delicate approaches. The situation has begun to change for the better as the two countries' strategic interests have converged in maintaining the status quo in the regional balance of power, and in the face of increased Chinese assertiveness, Vietnam has gained more strategic value in US foreign policy.

Vietnamese officials have indicated that their government would welcome the strengthening of cooperation in protecting against a wide range of threats, including drug and human trafficking, infectious diseases, money laundering, terrorism, environmental pollution, and climate change. Both Vietnam and the United States see poverty and lack of education as root causes of drug and human trafficking and infectious diseases. US assistance can be used to help Vietnam expand education, training, and microfinance programs, especially in rural areas. International partners can help Vietnam with material and ideational

resources for communication programs that aim at enhancing popular awareness, knowledge, and discipline regarding pandemic diseases and environmental pollution. The United States also can effectively assist Vietnam with community healthcare. US experts, volunteers, equipment, and medicine may provide a valuable force to prevent and fight pandemic outbreaks.

Other areas that appear promising for US-Vietnam cooperation include disaster management, environment protection, and coping with climate change. More specifically, Vietnam has dire need of international support to assist with training, equipping and sharing information in weather forecasting, training and joint exercises in search and rescue, and waste treatment in urban and industrial areas. To date, the United States and Vietnam have taken initial steps in cooperation for search and rescue, weather forecasting, and environment protection.

Wartime legacies still linger and hamper cooperation between the United States and Vietnam. In 2009 President Barack Obama signed a bill that doubled US assistance to US\$6 million for dioxin cleanup efforts and related health activities. Agent Orange, or dioxin, a chemical that US forces used for defoliation missions during the Vietnam War, has contaminated the soils surrounding its storage and application sites and has affected a large number of Vietnamese, along with American and South Korean troops and their descendants. Until now, Vietnam has used the issue for propaganda purposes, and the United States has acknowledged only limited responsibility. However, with genuine political will from both sides to overcome the past and look to the future, the two countries can transform a blighted historical legacy into a mutually favorable opportunity for cooperation. Recent US initiatives for closer cooperation with the Lower Mekong countries—Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand—in the areas of the environment, health, education, and infrastructure development, have signaled a new stage and raised great hope for stronger transnational security.

