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Foreword

In September 1994, U.S. military forces were ordered to execute Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. The stated objectives of that undertaking included the return to office of the democratically elected president of that country and the creation of a stable and secure environment in which democratic institutions could take hold. In the short term, these objectives were met: President Aristide reassumed his duties as president, the junta that had ousted him in 1991 was forced to leave the country, and national elections were successfully held in 1996. Although the long-term prognosis for Haiti remains guarded, the democratic process there was given the opportunity to succeed due, in large part, to Operation Uphold Democracy.

The armed forces of the United States have engaged in contingency operations throughout their history, and as the current peace operation in Bosnia demonstrates, they will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. At the time American troops entered Haiti, I was Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. It was my firm conviction that the Army’s experience in Uphold Democracy should be duly recorded, both for posterity and for officers today who have to wrestle with similar, unorthodox situations. The present study is one such contribution to the historical record.

This concise account of the Army’s role in Operation Uphold Democracy was written by three faculty members at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Kretchik and Dr. Robert F. Baumann are members of the Combat Studies Institute, CGSC’s history department; Dr. John T. Fishel, at the time this was written, was assigned to the college’s Department of Joint and Combined Operations. Their narrative and the conclusions drawn from it are based on an extensive review of available documentary material, interviews with key participants in the operation, discussions with a variety of experts on Haitian affairs, and trips to Haiti to obtain a firsthand appreciation for the situation there.

The result of their analysis is not an uncritical assessment of the Army’s activities in Uphold Democracy. Documenting the successes of the operation while ignoring the difficulties and problems encountered by the participants would only distort the record and be of little use today and in the future. What this study does, however, is demonstrate that success is largely dependent on the ability to remain flexible and adapt to continuously changing conditions. It also serves
to increase the data base to which Army officers now and in the future can refer when planning and executing unconventional operations.

GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, U.S. Army (Retired)
Preface

German Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke once noted that if an opponent has but three courses available to him, he will choose the fourth. In Operation Uphold Democracy, the U.S. Army's XVIII Airborne Corps was prepared to carry out any of three distinct military operations. None of those operations were in fact executed. Instead, a fourth military option evolved, literally while the operation was unfolding. Former President Jimmy Carter and his team's successful last-minute diplomatic negotiations with the Haitian military junta on September 18, 1994, altered realpolitik and possibly saved many U.S. and Haitian lives. U.S. military commanders, however, had to react immediately to the dynamic political situation and, in doing so, made complex mission adjustments hours before entering Haiti. Those changes caused U.S. Army personnel, and particularly the 10th Mountain Division, to face a different set of operational circumstances than those for which they had prepared mentally. The shift in strategic and operational conditions required great intellectual finesse in mission execution to achieve political objectives and to avoid potential military disaster.

The U.S. Army in Haiti appears to have achieved its overall objective of restoring democracy in that it set the conditions for President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to reassume his presidency. Furthermore, the $2 billion operation was accomplished with little cost in human life. Yet in deploying the force, the Army had to overcome numerous difficulties associated with peace operations: more frequent deployments, high operational tempo, and confused and uncertain situations. While the media portrayed a fairly confident U.S. force arriving in Haiti for a peace operation, the situation on the ground was actually more perplexing and unpredictable. The resultant turmoil among the force manifested itself not only in mission execution but in the achievement of strategic political objectives, as this study clearly notes.

This study originated from a verbal directive in early 1995 by then-Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan to then-Commander, Combined Arms Center, Lieutenant General John Miller, to write a U.S. Army history of Uphold Democracy. General Sullivan proposed a study that would
prove useful for political and military decision makers. The study, therefore, reflects General Sullivan’s vision; it is intended to help decision makers better understand the complexities of modern peace operations.

This book is not an official history. We, the authors, speak our own views based upon our weighing of the evidence at hand. Thus, this history is a public document, written to educate Army officers and to serve as an accounting to the American public of its Army in Operation Uphold Democracy as seen through a military lens.

The Army is a dynamic institution and therefore has a need for honesty and frankness in order to learn from its experiences. With that in mind, we gathered evidence, weighed our findings, and attempted a critical analysis of events and individual participants. We did so without malice or the assumption that we could have done better ourselves. Clausewitz noted that everything in war is simple, yet the simplest task is difficult to accomplish. So it also seems to be with peace operations. Our findings are the result of two military historians and a political scientist investigating evidence and ascertaining how personalities and events shaped military operations. Character judgments are left to the discretion of the reader.

We authors used a wide variety of sources to produce this book. We had access to over 75,000 primary source documents generated by various headquarters who either participated in or supported Operation Uphold Democracy. We also made extensive use of oral history interviews and commentary from U.S. military personnel and Haitians who lived through the day-to-day events in Haiti. We personally went to Haiti to see firsthand where events occurred and to obtain a feel for the conditions that U.S. Army personnel encountered in that country. Those trips proved to be invaluable.

The scope of our investigation embraces but a small portion of the U.S. military’s role in Uphold Democracy; our assessment is not all-encompassing. Constraints in time, space, and resources necessitated focusing primarily on the activities of the U.S. Army, and more specifically on those of the active component. Where possible, the study contains information regarding joint, multinational, and reserve component activities to explain better what happened and why. Perhaps other historians can use this study in their areas of concern as a basis for further research publications within their own headquarters.

Finally, this study is unique in that it is the first cooperative effort between the Combat Studies Institute and the Department of Joint and
Combined Operations of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Walter E. Kretchik, CSI
Robert F. Baumann, CSI
John T. Fishel, DJCO
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We also appreciate the reference work conducted by librarians Ms. Elaine McConnell, Ms. Karla Norman, and Ms. Pamela Kontowicz at the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth. Dr. Bryant Freeman of the University of Kansas' Institute of Haitian Studies provided eyewitness information in reference to the Harlan County incident and other facets of Haitian life under the Cedras-led junta. His experience as an adviser to the United Nations Mission in Haiti was of tremendous value. Dr. Leslie Desmangles, president of the Haitian Studies Association, and his hard-working associate, Alix Contave, provided critical feedback on U.S.-Haitian relations. Many other members of the Haitian Studies Association provided considerable insight into, and firsthand observations of, U.S. Army forces and their activities during Uphold Democracy. Thanks are also due Mr. Otis Van Cecil (USMC, ret.) for his time and recollections.

We are in debt as well to over one hundred CGSC students of all branches and services who shared their personal experiences, conducted research, performed oral histories, and wrote numerous papers for us on the operation. The following students deserve special acknowledgment (listed in random order): Major Christian Klinefelter, Major Marty Urquhart, Major Damian Carr, Major Jean Malone, USMC, Major Robert Young, Lieutenant Commander Donald J. Hurley, USN, Lieutenant Commander Phil Patee, Major Mike Hoyt, Major John Cook, Major Donald McConnaughay, Major Cheryl
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We are also deeply indebted to Major Robert Walsh, Major Walter Pjetra, Captain James Dusenberry, Sergeant First Class James Douglas, Warrant Officer 2 Clifford Hall, First Lieutenant Joseph Prete, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas (“Doc”) Adams, and Master Sergeant Frank Norbury.

Finally, we owe recognition to our fellow CSI and Department of Joint and Combined Operations (DJCO) colleagues, who substituted frequently in our classes when we were absent, listened to our concerns, provided feedback on our writing, and offered help freely. We could not ask to serve with a better group of U.S. Army and Department of the Army civilian professionals and educators.
The Historical Context of American Intervention

Robert F. Baumann

The American decision to head a multinational and then United Nations intervention in Haiti (see map 1) in 1994 may be a portent of closer relations between the two neighbors as they approach their third century of intermittent contact. In truth, the United States has ignored Haiti for most of its history, despite the fact that the two states share some common historical experiences. Columbus reached the island he called Hispaniola in 1492, marking the start of European colonization in the New World. Later, in 1697, the French gained formal control of the western third of the island from Spain. For the next century, French colonial lords made St. Domingue (as Haiti was then known) a source of extraordinary wealth for the home empire. This economic boom was based on large-scale enslavement of West Africans who, unlike the indigenous population, were immune to the diseases introduced by Europeans to the New World.

The Haitian revolution, which followed the American Revolution by only a few years, attracted much attention, but little empathy in the
United States. Pervasive racial prejudice, sharp cultural differences, and the bloody turmoil of the French Revolution blinded most Americans to the historic import of events in the Caribbean. Only in a single, fleeting episode did the first revolutionary republic in the New World demonstrate any benevolent concern for the second. In September 1799, as Haiti's "great liberator," Toussaint Louverture, struggled to put down a domestic threat to the new revolutionary order in Haiti, President John Adams shipped military supplies to him as a gesture of support. In exchange, Port-au-Prince was opened to American business interests, and Toussaint pledged to curb pirating. The United States subsequently stood aside as Haitians fought to assert their independence from Napoleonic France.

Haiti's revolution, born of gross inequities and the cruelty characteristic of the French colonial rule of St. Domingue, drew its inspiration from the revolutions of the United States and France. Haiti's course, however, more closely followed the pattern of the latter, where revolution unleashed volatile social forces, resulting in a bloodbath and tyranny. But unlike the French, who had a sufficiently developed civic culture to regain their political balance and rebuild a national consensus, Haitians lacked any recent experience in self-rule and, therefore, were unable to forge a civic consensus. In fact, the vast majority of the populace had only recently escaped the bondage of slavery. Legally, this was achieved by declarations emanating from revolutionary France. In practical terms, Haiti's own revolution confirmed these gains. The legacy of the Haitian revolution, however, was mass illiteracy and a racial caste system.

Even the total overthrow of white rule could not wipe away an obsession with color in Haitian society. A century before its revolution, Haiti contained three classes of free people: the grands blancs, the
Haitians fighting the French Army

petits blancs, and the gens de couleur. If the white population of the first two classes recognized social distinction among themselves based on wealth, the third group was marked by its mixed European and African ancestry. The mixed blood or mulatto population exercised the political rights of free Frenchmen, shared in the wealth of the country, owned slaves, and even sent their children to Paris for a French education. The only population fully excluded from wealth and society was the large mass of black slaves, many recent arrivals from West Africa.

Tension between the white and mulatto populations, accompanied by the loss of political rights among the latter, arose in the middle of the eighteenth century. By the 1790s, the influence of the French Revolution fundamentally destabilized colonial Haiti. Notions of freedom and equality were at odds with Haiti's social structure. Fearful of losing their power and privilege, most French landowners in Haiti remained fiercely determined to maintain exclusive social control, despite the onset of rapid ideological and social change that engulfed France. In some instances, the French colonial masters, believing that they could suppress any incipient notions of freedom, began to practice a brutality towards their slaves unprecedented even in Haiti. The colonists' intuition concerning a loss of power was correct, but their methods failed utterly to stem the coming tide. In 1791, northern Haiti became the scene of a series of massacres
of whites by slaves in revolt. Reports abounded that Voodoo religious ceremonies provided the focal point for the organization of resistance. What followed was a grim and merciless struggle for dominance. As one scholar of Haiti put it, "the reign of terror in France was decorous by comparison."3

Amid the bloody chaos in Haiti, British and Spanish troops intervened in hopes of snatching the rich prize of St. Domingue from France. Here emerged the remarkable General Toussaint Louverture, a former Haitian slave, who earned a considerable military reputation battling the invaders and, in 1801, actually gained temporary control of the entire island of Hispaniola. His army, which consisted predominantly of former slaves and at its peak surpassed 20,000 soldiers, astonished foreign observers with its performance in battle.4 Moreover, Toussaint possessed the diplomatic acumen to exploit the ambitions of the rival European powers by playing one against another. Subsequently, as Haiti divided racially against itself, Toussaint assumed the mantle of leadership of the black revolution. Sensing the urgency of ending civil war and consolidating political control, Toussaint issued a decree vaguely reminiscent of the levée en masse that had mobilized the French populace for military service or labor. Toussaint's decree included a blunt warning: "All overseers, drivers, and field laborers who will not perform with assiduity the duties required of them shall be arrested and punished as severely as soldiers deviating from their duty."5 Toussaint's extraordinary leadership earned grudging admiration, even in Europe, but he attracted powerful enemies as well, especially after proclaiming himself military governor of St. Domingue for life in 1801.

The next year, Napoleon sent an army of 17,000 under General Victor-Emmanuel Leclerc to restore French authority in Haiti. Leclerc
enjoyed initial success in the coastal cities and towns, which easily succumbed to conventional tactics and firepower. Anticipating a French victory, Toussaint’s rival commanders maneuvered to ingratiate themselves with the French, even to the point of changing sides. Forced to seek a diplomatic solution, Toussaint was tricked into a meeting where he was seized for deportation to France. Still, resistance continued under new leaders, and French forces, worn down by combat and the severe environment, and then ravaged by yellow fever, withdrew in 1803. Ultimately, the French failed despite the dispatch of over 50,000 troops to Haiti. This defeat so weakened French influence in the New World that a cash-strapped Napoleon elected to sell the Louisiana Territory to the United States.6

On January 1, 1804, the Haitian Republic proclaimed its independence. However, as observed by historian Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “Political independence only increased the gap between leaders and producers, because while it confirmed the end of slavery, it also confirmed the existence of the state that embodied the gap.” Those who led the state were predominantly mulattoes who had been free before the revolution and believed in the perpetuation of a plantation economy. The laborers, in turn, were blacks, a good many recent arrivals from West Africa who gained freedom through the revolution. Lacking visionary leadership, education, and organization, they could not effectively turn their numerical superiority to political advantage. Consequently, Haiti’s independence scarcely signified an end to wanton exploitation of agricultural laborers.7

In a gesture that foreshadowed future trials, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, an illiterate general who had served with Toussaint and personally revived resistance against France after Toussaint’s arrest in 1802, named himself governor-general for life. Opposed by the mulatto elite for his intention to nationalize vast tracts of land, Dessalines was murdered in 1806. General Henri Christophe, a black who had fought with a French contingent on the side of the American Revolution at
Savannah, assumed power in 1807 only to find his position challenged by General Alexandre Petion, a mulatto who soon dominated southern Haiti. In the meantime, reflecting the social paradox of Haiti's revolution, Christophe banned whips as emblematic of the curse of slavery, even as he affirmed the resumption of legal bondage of laborers to the soil.

Reunified under Jean-Pierre Boyer in 1820, Haiti brought Santo Domingo (the modern Dominican Republic) under its sway and held it until 1843. In that year, following Boyer's fall, Haiti plunged anew into chaos. From that moment forward, Haitian political life remained in perpetual, bloody turmoil. Between 1843 and 1915, Haiti had twenty-two heads of state, of whom fourteen were deposed and only one served a complete term of office.

For over half of the nineteenth century, the United States did not recognize the Republic of Haiti. Politicians of the slave-holding Southern states could only look on the black revolution in that country with fear and loathing. Furthermore, to confer legitimacy on the Haitian regime through the extension of diplomatic relations would pose an implicit threat to the ideological foundations of slavery in the United States. The political isolation of Haiti, however, did not imply commercial isolation. U.S. trade ties with the black republic remained robust. Otherwise, aside from a few Southern fantasies of the extension of an American slave-holding empire across the Caribbean, Americans took little political interest in the fledgling republic.

American recognition of Haiti came only in 1862, when the United States was torn by a civil war caused, in large part, by the long-smoldering dispute over slavery. Still, diplomatic acknowledgment hardly signified an equal relationship. U.S. policy towards Haiti until the First World War focused on maintaining commercial relations and curbing the influence of foreign powers, especially Germany, in the country. American diplomats demonstrated a particular interest in the northwestern harbor of the Môle St. Nicolas as a potential naval base, and U.S. Marines paid intermittent visits to Haiti, even serving as debt collectors on at least one occasion.

All the while, Haiti remained beset by domestic turmoil, political revolts, assassinations, and extreme social divisions that left it vulnerable to foreign intrigue and financial domination. An economy specializing in the production of agricultural goods for export preserved a deep social chasm between the tiny, wealthy, predominantly mulatto elite and an impoverished black peasantry. Furthermore, economic mismanagement and periodic rebellions...
fostered a steady erosion of the civic ethos and the entrenchment of strongman politics. The resultant chaos contributed to an attendant decline in living conditions.

The convergence of Haiti's misery with America's abrupt turn towards an assertive global policy at the turn of the century set the stage for the U.S. occupation of Haiti in 1915. The opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 elevated the strategic importance of Haiti and the Windward Passage in American eyes, at the very time that the outbreak of World War I raised concerns about the expansion of German influence in the Caribbean. Nonetheless, the proximate cause of the occupation was a furious new round of political unrest from 1911 to 1915, during which Haiti had seven presidents. The brutal, public murder of Haitian President Guillaume Sam by an enraged mob in the streets of Port-au-Prince on July 27, 1915, prompted the dispatch a day later of a battalion of U.S. Marines from the USS Washington, which had been positioned offshore under the command of Rear Admiral William Banks Caperton, ostensibly to ensure the safety of the foreign community. Caperton took charge on the scene, and the Marines moved swiftly to establish order. In the process, the United States imposed a treaty on the new American-backed Haitian president, Philippe Dartiguenave. The terms included creation of a customs receivership and provided for extensive American intrusion in the management of the Haitian economy. Although the United States also proposed to undertake a series of benevolent projects, ranging from sanitation works, to agricultural assistance, to spreading public education, the intrusiveness of America's presence could hardly fail to stir deep-seated native resentment.

As the Americans settled in to restore order across the country, the Marines encountered assorted bands of "cacos," mercenary fighters from the rugged interior of the country who typically found employment in Haiti's struggles for political power. Under ambiguous
and confusing circumstances, young Marine officers often found themselves attempting to conduct negotiations with caco chieftains, a task for which they had received no special preparation.

Cultural appreciation of Haiti was sadly lacking. As late as 1929, according to one Marine veteran, there was no special preparation of any kind for deployment to Haiti, only standard basic training at Parris Island. Indeed, Marine trainees sometimes learned of their destination only days before departure.\(^{11}\)

Because events in Europe commanded the international spotlight, Marines in Haiti found themselves with little political supervision, especially following the American entry into the First World War in 1917. The Marines established small garrison posts across the country in an effort to maintain political and social order. Among the most successful methods of control was the bribing of resistance leaders and groups to obtain the surrender of their persons or their arms.\(^{12}\)

The effect of American racial prejudice in Haiti during the occupation remains the subject of scholarly dispute, but at least some adverse consequences were inevitable. Though the Marines maintained a veneer of polite civility with Haitian leaders, many Americans, in private, voiced contempt for the native leadership and the populace as a whole. Unlike the foreign businessmen in Haiti, who made some effort at racial accommodation, the Marines insisted on establishing the Jim Crow standards of the American South as soon as they settled in and U.S. dependents began arriving.\(^{13}\) One tragic irony was that American attitudes aggravated the racial polarization between mulattos and blacks, already deeply rooted in Haitian society. In fact, Haiti's lighter-complexed native mulatto elite, deeply resentful of the arrogant conduct of white Americans, found in those same attitudes moral confirmation of their own social station relative to the mass of black Haitians. And for good measure, Haiti's upper class held black Americans in the same low regard heretofore reserved for the black Haitian majority. One consequence was that President Harding found himself unable to appoint black Republicans to diplomatic posts in Haiti. This fact sustained the appearance of the American presence as all white.\(^{14}\) In the end, racism had a poisonous influence on what was already a dubious American presence.

At their best, the Americans sought to modernize the Haitian infrastructure and create a foundation for modernization and stability. That U.S. commercial interests would be well served in the process was doubtless true, although it would be easy to overestimate the wealth that flowed to American citizens as a result. Given the prevalent disorder in
Haitian society as well as its dilapidated infrastructure, prospects for near-term economic development were modest. The United States, however, did make a reasonable effort to bring improvements to Haiti, even if those improvements did not necessarily fit comfortably into the native culture. Because U.S.-engineered social change threatened to disrupt the prevailing social order, Haiti’s upper class proved uncooperative. For example, American accounting practices and restrictions on political patronage aroused the resentment of Haitian officials accustomed to plundering the national treasury. Furthermore, American-sponsored efforts to bring education to the peasantry met with considerable resistance. In the minds of at least some of the native elite, the idea of spreading literacy and basic learning among Haiti’s downtrodden seemed calculated only to engender discontent in what was already a most volatile culture. In addition, many educated Haitians prized their French cultural heritage and held Americans in contempt for their crass materialism. As one literate Haitian put it, the Americans were “parvenus in matters of intellect and understanding.”

Overall, American programs to assist Haiti left a checkered legacy. While efforts to distribute food and provide limited medical assistance were welcome and useful in the short term, the drive to remake Haitian government left much to be desired. In light of rampant corruption and inefficiency, it made sense for Americans to assume control of customs and many local administrative functions. Foreign usurpation of basic institutions, however, did little to prepare Haiti for the inevitable American departure years down the road. In fact, the United States would not completely relinquish its hold on Haitian fiscal affairs until 1947, thirteen years after the Marines’ departure.

Meanwhile, the American occupation force confronted a sporadic guerrilla resistance carried out by bands of ill-trained cacos drawn mainly from the northern interior of Haiti. Armed opposition to the U.S. presence initially took the form of harassment, through cutting the movement of food supplies to the cities, disruption of rail lines, and occasional raids. The Marines put a stop to these activities, not so much through combat as through cash subsidies in return either for negotiated surrender or the turn in of weapons. In some cases, however, Marines were compelled to pursue and destroy armed bands, which had the effect of encouraging others to comply peacefully with American demands.

One well-chronicled pursuit was led by Captain Smedley Butler (later a colonel during the occupation, and subsequently a general after
his return to the United States), who was one of four Americans to earn the Medal of Honor for service in Haiti. Brash and self-confident, Butler had little use for complex campaign plans and disdained elaborate logistical support. In a memoir, he described his commander as “overeducated” and “afraid to run risks.” When in 1915 it became apparent that the Marines were going to have to clear the zone between Cap Haitien and Fort Liberté, Butler scoffed at a plan calling for a sweep by six battalions. Instead, he requested the sum of $200 to outfit a force of twenty-seven men with four dozen pack animals, rations, and a machine gun.

As Butler later related his experience, the cacos had such poor trail discipline that it was possible to track them through the jungle by following discarded orange peels. The main risk was from ambush by the poorly armed cacos, most of whom did not even possess outdated black powder rifles. If they sensed advantage, the cacos were capable of a ferocious attack. The key, therefore, was to compel them to fight positional battles. Because the cacos tended to withdraw into old fortifications, the Marines gained the opportunity to exploit their tactical training. Butler reported sweeping one such fort and then spending an entire night hunting down caco fugitives. By his estimate, the Marines suffered one man wounded, while killing seventy-five cacos.

In a subsequent assault against a relatively formidable caco stronghold at Ft. Riviere on November 16, 1915, Butler divided a 100-man force into four columns that were to attack along converging lines. Approaching the rugged stone fort over steep terrain proved difficult under fire. Once a penetration was achieved, the cacos offered bold hand-to-hand resistance but were quickly defeated due to the lack of any tactical organization. As a reward for his exploits, Butler received a splendid horse as a gift from President Dartiguenave.

Generally, the problem of defeating the cacos boiled down to an issue of terrain and communications infrastructure. The Marines were vastly better armed. More important, their discipline and tactical cohesion guaranteed their superiority in any pitched combat. In a classic guerrilla scenario, however, the cacos were far more knowledgeable of the topography and could easily withdraw into the mountains or jungle interior, where the Marines’ advantages were easily negated. The Marine mission, therefore, soon focused on establishing security in the major cities and developing the indigenous road network to permit easier and swifter travel. The Marines’ modus operandi entailed sending small patrols under the command of
lieutenants or senior noncommissioned officers around the country, many operating from temporary outposts.24

In addition, the Marines formed a Haitian gendarmerie to be commanded temporarily by American officers. Conceptually, the gendarmerie adhered to standard American principles. The intent was to guarantee that an armed force would be subordinate to civilian authority so as to minimize the threat of a military takeover. Equally important, the Americans also aimed at establishing a professional ethos that would keep the military out of politics. That American-style controls would not long be effective in the Haitian culture of strongman politics was a reality few Marines could grasp at the time.

The mere act of creating a gendarmerie under American control in 1915 met stubborn resistance in the Haitian National Assembly, causing Butler, in what by his own account was a highhanded maneuver, to threaten to use force to obtain cabinet support for the American position.25 As the United States later learned when it tried to fill officer vacancies in the gendarmerie, native opposition transcended the halls of government in Port-au-Prince. Neither educated Haitians, most of whom perceived such service to be beneath their social station, nor American Marines, needed at first to provide leadership and role models, initially proved anxious to accept positions. Indeed, according
to Haitian scholar Michel Laguerre, numerous young Haitians feared becoming social outcasts as a result of collaboration with the American occupation and were further put off by the pervasive racial prejudice evidenced by the American community in Haiti.26

One of those Marines who did accept a post in the gendarmerie was Smedley Butler, who assumed the rank of lieutenant colonel and inherited a broad job description. As he recounted: "Commanding the gendarmerie required versatility. My duties seemed to involve everything from filling a cabinet vacancy to buying and equipping a navy."27 Enough Americans were eventually lured by special incentives, such as forty-five days annual leave outside Haiti and inflated salaries, to get the program started. Still, the requirement to learn elementary Creole proved an impediment to many would-be volunteers. Initially, a contingent of 120 U.S. Marines provided training for 2,600 Haitians, and by February 1916, the new gendarmerie began its duties.28 Thereafter, the commissioning of Haitian officers occurred little by little, through promotions from the enlisted ranks. The creation of the École Militaire in 1928 formalized the process and improved the preparation of officer candidates for what came to be known as the Garde d'Haiti. In any event, Americans remained on top of the command hierarchy.
Meanwhile, serving as officers in scattered districts across Haiti, Marines ended up, by default, exercising a host of judicial and civil functions, all without a basic grasp of Haitian Creole. As the conduit for government funds to localities, they managed budgets for everything from paying school teachers to public works projects. Given such an extraordinarily broad mission, it is amazing that the American Marines did as well as they did. On the other hand, such circumstances virtually assured a degree of mismanagement and abuse of power.

The blessing and curse of American interference was especially brought to light by the program to rebuild Haiti's antiquated road network. Lacking funds for such a large undertaking, Smedley Butler, who became the Marine commander in Haiti, turned to the expedient measure of conscripting native labor, as allowed by the nearly forgotten Haitian law of 1864 that permitted the drafting of peasants for road construction. The requisition of labor was not necessary, initially, because workers were asked to perform a service in areas near their homes, or pay a tax in lieu of service. Conscription policy, however, was adopted when workers proved reluctant to follow the proposed construction into the lightly populated interior of the country. While the construction of roads progressed significantly, the political side effects were poisonous. In the first place, the employment of conscripted labor in a society whose cultural memory had been indelibly seared by the experience of slavery, followed by a century of general impoverishment and exploitation, was bound to arouse hostility. Second, when rebellion subsequently prompted resort to such harsh and demeaning measures as the roping together of workers, as though the men were convicts or slave gangs, even Americans came to question both the purpose and propriety of such methods.

Termination of conscripted labor in October 1918 occurred too late to prevent a revival of caco resistance under the leadership of Charlemagne Peralte, an educated former Haitian army captain. Furthermore, the extension of conscript labor in the north and interior of Haiti by a Marine district commander in violation of the termination order helped to focus discontent on the region of Haiti historically prone to rebellion. An official investigation found the district commander responsible for fostering a “reign of terror,” which resulted in his being relieved, but the damage done was irreversible. Official figures for the year 1919 indicated that 1,861 Haitians had been killed in the course of the American antiguerrilla campaign. The burden of
prosecuting the campaign fell mainly on the Marines, who had not trained the gendarmerie for combat missions.\textsuperscript{30}

As in most wars by conventional powers against guerrilla insurgents, the Marines found that the rebels blended into the countryside in such a way as to make it impossible for an outsider to distinguish friend from foe. The lack of Creole speakers on the American side almost certainly exacerbated the problem. Exhausting hunts deep into the jungle interior under extraordinarily stressful climatic conditions taxed the stamina of the Marines to the limit. Communication among separated units remained difficult before the ready availability of portable radios. Along the way, the Americans doubtless killed an untold number of innocents, and executions of prisoners reportedly numbered in the hundreds. Particular brutality towards prisoners in the region around Hinche was attributed to the orders of district commander Major Clark Wells, who was never formally charged and prosecuted. Investigations did little to illuminate the situation, but the Marine Corps did communicate to the field in October 1919 that such conduct was unacceptable.\textsuperscript{31} Public allegations were sufficient, however, to stir political attacks on the Wilson administration at home. With his assumption of office in 1921, Republican President Warren Harding promised to chart a new course.

No longer distracted by World War I, the United States during Harding’s term began to look more attentively at developments in Haiti. In 1922, the administration selected Brigadier General John H. Russell, a man with innate diplomatic talent and a French-speaking wife, as the high commissioner in Haiti to oversee the American occupation with a new face and emphasis. In turn, President Dartiguenave was replaced by Louis Borno, whom the Americans judged a more suitable partner given his relatively benign view of the foreign presence. Meanwhile, a major component of the reorganization of the occupation was the delivery of a loan to finance Haiti’s foreign debt, a loan that, in turn, justified continued occupation to protect the interests of American creditors.\textsuperscript{32}

Overall, Haiti remained relatively calm and stable after the first four years of American occupation. During this time, the most important project for the country’s long-term future was the development of the Garde d’Haiti. As time passed, the Marines gradually turned over greater responsibility for control of the force to the Haitians, as reflected in the steady increase from 1919 in the number of native officers. Not until 1931, however, did Haitians constitute a majority of the Garde’s officers. (See table 1.)
The extent of Haitian personnel in the force was further reflected by the fact that, at the end of 1931, 84.6 percent of junior grade officers and lower were Haitians, and 40 percent of all district commanders were Haitian. The latter included the important Military Departments of the Center and West. The composition of the officer corps of the Garde d’Haiti evolved according to a timetable established by the Herbert Hoover administration for the total withdrawal of U.S. officers by the end of 1936. By that time, there were 199 Haitian officers in all, headed by a major general. The goal of the force was primarily to maintain domestic security. As of 1931, the principal duties of the Garde d’Haiti included the prevention of smuggling, the construction and maintenance of trails, the control of arms and ammunition throughout the republic, providing assistance to the government bureaucracy in the delivery of official paychecks, supervision of the prisons, providing security for tax collectors, protecting the president, the upkeep of landing fields for Marine aircraft, and the gathering of intelligence. In the event of war, the enlistment and training of new recruits would have been necessary.34

By 1932, official Marine assessments of the Garde d’Haiti were highly favorable: “In general, due to the fact that no organized banditry

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Table 1. Officer composition of the Haitian Army

The extent of Haitian personnel in the force was further reflected by the fact that, at the end of 1931, 84.6 percent of junior grade officers and lower were Haitians, and 40 percent of all district commanders were Haitian. The latter included the important Military Departments of the Center and West. The composition of the officer corps of the Garde d’Haiti evolved according to a timetable established by the Herbert Hoover administration for the total withdrawal of U.S. officers by the end of 1936. By that time, there were 199 Haitian officers in all, headed by a major general. The goal of the force was primarily to maintain domestic security. As of 1931, the principal duties of the Garde d’Haiti included the prevention of smuggling, the construction and maintenance of trails, the control of arms and ammunition throughout the republic, providing assistance to the government bureaucracy in the delivery of official paychecks, supervision of the prisons, providing security for tax collectors, protecting the president, the upkeep of landing fields for Marine aircraft, and the gathering of intelligence. In the event of war, the enlistment and training of new recruits would have been necessary.34

By 1932, official Marine assessments of the Garde d’Haiti were highly favorable: “In general, due to the fact that no organized banditry
has existed in Haiti during recent years, the activities of the Garde have been confined to military and police duties." Haitian guardsmen were further described as "loyal, courageous and efficient" in the performance of their duties, including actions against the cacos and the suppression of civil disorders. Activity was particularly brisk along the border with the Dominican Republic, where large amounts of contraband weapons were seized. Haitian prisons at that time held a population of 3,044 among a population of 2.2 million. Pay, which ranged from $10 per month for a private to $250 per month for a major general, was lavish by Haitian standards.

Training and education in the Garde d'Haiti also gave evidence of the maturation of the force. In 1931, of 1,219 men tested for marksmanship, 918 or 86.9 percent met qualifying standards. Meanwhile, at the École Militaire, where 100 percent met the standards, admission was based on competitive examination. The curriculum focused on cultivation of infantry skills, administrative law, quartermaster duties, and guard and ceremonial roles. The program was patterned after instruction on police methods and basic tactics for dealing with unruly mobs as conducted at the U.S. Infantry School at Ft. Benning.

Development of the Garde d'Haiti did much to advance the centralization of authority in Port-au-Prince. The creation of a communications infrastructure of roads and telephone and telegraph lines, with the capital as its hub, greatly eased the problem of central control. Combined with the disarming of the populace in the hinterlands, the establishment of a capable national military force reduced the risk of rebel movements forming in the countryside to overthrow the regime.

By their conduct, however, the Americans undermined their vision of a politically detached, professional military organization. As Laguerre notes, "During the entire period of the occupation, it was evident to any observer that control of the country was not in the hands of the Haitian president, but rather of the US Marines." Smedley Butler corroborated this interpretation in his memoirs. As the only organized armed force in Haiti, the Garde d'Haiti was well situated to pick up where its American mentors left off. Within ten years of the Marines' departure, the Haitian Army conducted its first coup d'état.

The generally condescending tone of the U.S. occupation also served to undermine the American interest in shaping future Haitian politics and civil society. As outsiders, Americans were able to discern that Haiti was rife with factionalism, beset by racial and class
antagonism, and weakened by ceaseless political turbulence. Further, they could at least dimly understand Haitian pride at their historic liberation from the French colonialists. Many complexities of Haitian culture, however, particularly those rooted deeply in African tradition—Voodoo and its distinctively intertwined relationship with Catholicism, the role of secret societies, and rich interpretations of the spirit world—were simply unknown, ignored, or prohibited by Americans. The ban on Voodoo, not always strictly enforced in practice, illustrated American disregard for a fundamental part of Haitian religious and spiritual life. The American rationale for the ban was based on the historic connection between clandestine groups and the instability of Haitian political life. The actual impact of the prohibition on Voodoo ceremony, of course, worked in a way diametrically opposed to its intent. By stubbornly applying their own sociopolitical template to analysis of Haiti, Americans often found themselves unable to gain compliance with their prohibitions except through the use of force or intimidation. Ultimately, the occupation energized civil opposition to the American presence that resonated as far away as Harlem, a gathering place in the United States for many prominent oppositionist Haitian emigres. Student strikes at Haiti’s schools of agriculture, medicine, and law in 1929 garnered popular support against the occupation. The situation deteriorated rapidly as U.S. Marines lost control of an unruly crowd of protesters on December 5 in Les Cayes, opened fire, and killed about a dozen Haitians. These and other events necessarily forced the Haitian government to distance itself from the American presence.

Shortly thereafter, President Hoover formed a commission under Cameron Forbes, a prominent Boston attorney and former governor of the Philippines, to investigate conditions in Haiti and recommend a course leading to American withdrawal. The eventual date of the U.S. departure became Haiti’s second “independence day.” In the long run, American contributions to the social infrastructure in Haiti, by no means insignificant, were less enduring than the legacy of resentment and the failure to transform Haiti’s political culture.

During the 1940s and 1950s, a relative calm prevailed, and Haitian politics reverted to its accustomed pattern. Economic crisis, corrupt and mildly repressive rule, social stagnation, and pompous, officially declared nonsense held sway. American writer, Herb Gold, who visited Haiti in 1953 for an extended stay, subsequently referred to that time as “The Golden Age of Strange.”41 “Later,” Gold observed, “after the long havoc of the Duvaliers... the negligent corruption of General
[Paul] Magloire [president from 1950 to 1956] came to be remembered with nostalgia. With characteristically delusional rhetoric, government radio proclaimed one day, “The General of Division Paul F. Magloire is a conqueror unequaled in history since Julius Caesar and Alexander the Great.” In like spirit, a newspaper column intoned, “The smile of His Excellency is the best guarantee of our liberties.” The “guarantee” crumbled along with Magloire’s popularity, and he relinquished the presidency in December 1956.

The election of President Francois (“Papa Doc”) Duvalier in 1957 ushered in the modern phase of Haitian political life. Duvalier, taking power at age fifty, possessed a medical degree and lengthy experience in the public health field. His unassuming manner impressed foreign observers. Philosophically, he espoused “negritude,” a blend of Voodoo, mysticism, and a spiritual reverence for Africa. Gradually, paranoia and a willingness to rule by terror became the trademarks of his presidency. In 1966, he declared himself “president for life.”

Fully cognizant of the role of the army in politics, Duvalier reconfigured the political-military balance of power by creating a presidential guard in 1959 under his exclusive control. To curtail the independence of the army, he selectively purged the officer corps and in 1961 closed the Haitian Military Academy, thereby assuring the appointment from the ranks of officers more loyal to himself. Duvalier further strengthened his grip on power with the founding of the Tonton Macoute (Haitian militia). This ill-trained body, which soon substantially outnumbered the army, operated as hired political thugs around the country at the behest of the Duvalier regime. A signature political characteristic of Duvalier’s rule was the symbolic transfer (somewhat illusory in fact) of influence away from the mulatto elite to a populist black leadership that purported to represent the majority of the populace. In reality, the regime acted strictly in its own narrow interests, playing various constituencies off against one another. In addition, Duvalier skillfully manipulated American anticommunism to enlist outside financial and material support, much of the latter in the form of weapons. Later, in 1971, the United States financed the training of a special counterinsurgency force in Haiti known as the Leopards.

Perhaps the most emblematic gesture of Papa Doc’s tenure was a referendum ensuring the direct succession of his son, Jean-Claude, which carried by the absurd total of 2,391,916 to 0. Just months later, in April 1971, Papa Doc died, and the succession was consummated. However, Jean-Claude Duvalier, also known as “Baby Doc,” took little
interest in the art of government, even for the purpose of maintaining
his own power. Tossing a $2 million wedding for his bride, Michele
Bennett, who just happened to be the daughter of a rich mulatto,
eventually helped undermine his popularity. When by 1980 swarms of
Haitian refugees in small vessels began making their way across the
Caribbean in significant numbers, Duvalier’s extravagance attracted
unwanted international attention. In the meantime, U.S. media interest
focused on the prevalent corruption and squalor in Haiti, arousing
public pressure on the American government to withdraw support.48
Antiregime conspiracies hatched among Haitian army officers and
other important and disaffected constituencies. Widespread outbreaks
of unrest across Haiti placed the regime on the brink of collapse.
Duvalier, sensing the inevitable and lacking the will to resist, resigned
in 1986 and departed Haiti for a life in exile.

Duvalier’s absence hardly solved Haiti’s political crisis, for none of
the underlying factors contributing to Duvalierism, or what is widely
referred to as the “predator state,” had vanished with him. Jean-Claude
gave way to a junta led by Lieutenant General Henri Namphy. To
create a semblance of legitimacy, the junta orchestrated the election of
Professor Leslie Manigat, who lasted only five months in the
presidency before Namphy claimed the office for himself in June 1988.
Namphy, in turn, lasted about three months before his ouster by Prosper
Avril. Avril served over a year before yielding to an interim
presidency, which was followed in 1990 by the election of President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Aristide’s election, while reflective of popular support for the charismatic
priest, did not signify a basic change in Haiti’s political culture. As an
outspoken advocate for society’s have-nots, frequently through the medium
of Catholic and Voodoo theology, Aristide was deeply involved in the bitter
societal conflict that dominated Haitian politics. Once a relatively obscure
priest at St. Jean Bosco church in the impoverished community of La Saline,
Aristide had emerged as a national figure in 1986 by virtue of his courageous
public criticism of the Duvalier regime. Moreover, his ability to survive
attempted assassination conferred on him an extraordinary mystique among
Haiti’s poor. In the policy arena, Aristide condemned capitalism and
embraced a vaguely defined brand of socialism. Detenders of the social
status quo reflexively viewed his politics as revolutionary, fearing not
only loss of wealth and prerogatives but the revenge of the masses.

As president, Aristide faced formidable challenges. Lacking
practical political experience, he possessed neither the tact nor
pragmatism needed to lead his tormented country to a social consensus.
Indeed, his sometimes inflammatory rhetoric had quite the opposite effect, troubling even some Haitian moderates and many potential supporters in the United States. Particularly disquieting to some observers was his failure in January 1991 to denounce mob attacks on the Vatican's diplomatic mission, seen as a symbol of the ruling order in Haiti. Hard evidence of American and international reserve towards Aristide was the minimal matériel support extended to the new government during its brief hold on power.

With Aristide's ouster by a military coup on September 30, 1991, the elements of a new crisis involving the United States were in place. Haiti's latest junta was led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, Aristide's hand-picked chief of staff of the army and a member of the first class to graduate from the Haitian Military Academy after its reestablishment in 1972. International outrage, fueled in large part by the well-publicized flotilla of "boat people" bound for Florida, put Haiti abruptly in the international spotlight. For the Bush administration, Haiti's crisis was an unwelcome distraction at a time when attention was riveted on the death throes of the Soviet Union and the aftermath of the Gulf War. For the U.S. military, which would be summoned to play a role in restoring the fledgling democracy, events in Haiti came at a time of important institutional transition. Sweeping change in the international environment signaled changes in priorities, force structure, and missions.
Notes

Chapter 1


6. Leyburn, *The Haitian People*, 33; Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood*, 95–125. See also Thomas Madiou, *Histoire D’Haiti*, T. 2, 3 (Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 1923). Also invaluable for understanding this subject was an interview with Dr. Bryant Freeman, director of the Haitian Studies Center at the University of Kansas, May 5, 1997.


14. Ibid., 141; Peter Bunce, “Foundation on Sand,” unpublished manuscript, 46.


18. Ibid., 83–84.


20. Ibid., 191.


23. Ibid., 201–8.


28. Ibid., 210. Van Cecil Interview, January 16, 1997. Van Cecil relates how he contemplated joining the Haitian Army for the pay but was held back, in part, by the requirement to learn Creole.

29. Schmidt, *The U.S. Occupation of Haiti*, 100–101, and Balch, 125. See also Millspaugh.


32. Schmidt, 131–33.


34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., 804–700.

37. Ibid., 804–600.


39. Ibid., 76.


42. Ibid., 27.

43. Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 562.

44. Laguerre, The Military and Society, 110, and Trouillot, Haiti: State Against Nation, 156–57. Dr. Bryant Freeman met Papa Doc Duvalier and notes that the terror he imposed in Haiti began after a severe medical episode in which Duvalier had lapsed into a coma. Papa Doc was never the same afterwards.


Planning for "Intervasion":
The Strategic and Operational Setting for Uphold Democracy

Walter E. Kretchik

The key to this operation is synchronicity, and violence of action with spontaneity and simultaneity.

—Anonymous Uphold Democracy plans officer

On September 30, 1991, when Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide fled Haiti for Venezuela, the Department of Defense (DOD) was immersed in a rapidly changing global situation due in part to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the August 1991 coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. As America’s Cold War nemesis began to disintegrate, DOD found itself involved in monitoring compliance with President George Bush’s directive to eliminate ground-launched theater nuclear weapons in Europe and in determining ways to ensure control of nuclear weapons and chemical munitions in Eastern Europe. The same month as the unsuccessful uprising against Gorbachev, over half a million service men and women returned from the Gulf War to face base closures, reductions in personnel, elimination of units, and budget cuts. As if things were not hectic enough, DOD continued during this rapidly changing time to train, equip, and prepare forces to engage in a variety of operations categorized as low-intensity conflict (LIC).

At the time, peace operations fell under the LIC umbrella. By the mid-nineties, they had become one subset of a new category, operations other than war. Regardless of these shifts in doctrinal labels, peace operations have traditionally confronted the U.S. military with a variety of situations in which the use of force was either a distinct possibility (as in peace enforcement or peace keeping), or very unlikely (as in disaster relief or humanitarian assistance). Furthermore, since peace operations are often guided by the United Nations or some regional organization, the commitment of American troops to a multinational undertaking is often accompanied by a heated dialogue over who
should exercise command and control over them—U.S. or foreign officers.

Also a topic of perennial debate with respect to peace operations has been how the U.S. military community should best train and prepare its units for such undertakings. Peace operations, as opposed to more orthodox military operations, often lack a traditional enemy, tend to be highly ambiguous, and are subject to frequently changing political guidance. Because of these patterns, some senior military leaders have argued that certain U.S. military units should be trained purely in peace operations instead of conventional combat. Other, more traditionalist-minded officers have responded that the role of the U.S. military remains unchanged: to fight and win America’s conventional wars. To these officers, a peace operation is nothing more than a special mission requiring only specific training prior to the commitment of troops. Moreover, they contend, traditional training is essential for a shrinking military that, still burdened with global security responsibilities, must be ready to deploy anywhere to fight a conventional conflict deemed to be in the national interest. Thus far in the debate, the traditional thinkers have prevailed.

The Defense Planning System

The peace operation launched in Haiti in 1994 would employ conventional units with Special Operations Forces (SOF). The policy they would implement had evolved over many months, during which time U.S. staff officers used the Defense Planning System to formulate the military plans that eventually became Operation Uphold Democracy. That planning system, also known as the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES), was and remains the prescribed method for military planning at the strategic and operational level (see figure 1).

There are two strategic-operational planning options within JOPES: (1) deliberate or peacetime planning and (2) time-sensitive or crisis-action planning (CAP). Deliberate planning is used to develop plans when concerns about time are not urgent (see table 2). Most of Operation Uphold Democracy, however, was planned using CAP, the option reserved for crises in which time is a critical factor. CAP calls on combatant commanders in chief (CINCs) to formulate and transmit executable courses of action up the chain of command for consideration by the National Command Authority (NCA). Once the NCA has
decided on a course of action, the appropriate CINC may be ordered to implement the decision. The CAP process has six phases, any two or more of which may happen sequentially or simultaneously.

- **Phase I, Situation Development**, in which an event occurs that has potential national security implications. The CINC, in whose area of responsibility the event occurs, monitors the situation and submits an “assessment” to the NCA/Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

- **Phase II, Crisis Assessment**, in which the NCA receives the CINC’s assessment. The CINC continues to monitor the situation and to increase reporting, while the JCS advises the NCA on potential options. If warranted, the NCA and the JCS develop a military course of action.

- **Phase III, Course of Action Development**, in which the chairman, JCS, publishes a “warning order,” notifying the CINC of potential military action. The CINC then develops courses of action, weighs them, and submits a “commander’s estimate,” with a recommended course of action to the JCS.

- **Phase IV, Course of Action Selection**, in which the chairman, JCS, presents the NCA with refined courses of action and advises the NCA on options. The JCS may provide the CINC with a “planning order” to begin execution planning. After the NCA selects a course of action, the JCS publishes an “alert order” for the CINC.
• Phase V, *Execution Planning*, where the CINC receives his planning order or alert order. The CINC looks at available forces, identifies force movement requirements and the tasks that the units must accomplish, and converts the course of action into an "operation order." The JCS continues to monitor developments with respect to the orders issued.

• Phase VI, *Execution Planning*, in which the NCA decides to execute the operation order and use military force. The chairman, JCS, publishes the "execute order" by the authority of the Secretary of Defense. The CINC then executes the mission.

Generally speaking, operations plans formulated under the deliberate planning system are written within the Strategic Plans and Policy section of a headquarters staff. Normally, that staff section is identified as joint operations, or J5, if more than one U.S. military service is involved, or as combined operations, or C5, if foreign officers work alongside their U.S. counterparts. Once a plan is written and approved, it can be set aside until given for execution to the Current Operations staff section, which would be the J3 in the operations and planning cell of the joint staff, the C3 in a combined staff. Under crisis-action conditions, however, planning is normally performed by the J3 or C3, rather than the J5 or C5.
The United States Army Decision-Making Process

Once a plan is conceived at the operational level, it is provided to a headquarters at the tactical level for further refinement. The U.S. Army endorses a standardized, tactical decision-making process that serves as a methodology for guiding tactical commanders and their staffs in the development of operational plans and orders. Army Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, is the primary doctrinal source that describes the tactical decision-making process, which consists of four steps.

• **Mission Analysis.** This is a command and staff action to gather facts, make assumptions, analyze the higher headquarters' mission and intent, and focus the staff for planning the mission. This step ends when the staff briefs the commander about the current situation. The commander then approves a restated mission that incorporates the essential tasks from the higher headquarters' mission and intent. The commander then issues planning guidance to the staff for developing courses of action to accomplish the mission.

• **Course of Action Development.** The staff now focuses on whatever information the commander requires to make decisions about courses of action. The staff analyzes the current situation by arraying both friendly and opposing forces on a map, developing a scheme of maneuver or concept for accomplishing the mission with available forces, and preparing sketches and written statements to help the commander visualize each course of action. The staff develops as many feasible courses of action as time permits. This step ends with the staff recommending courses of action to the commander, who then determines which ones he would like to see developed in greater detail.

• **Course of Action Analysis.** The staff subsequently uses a wargame technique to analyze the courses of action that the commander has selected. Each course of action is examined separately, using a friendly action-enemy reaction-friendly counteraction methodology or wargame. Simply put, the wargaming method reasons "If I do this, he can do that, then I will counter his move by doing this." The "best" course of action is the one that has the highest probability of
success. The step ends with the staff briefing the results of its analysis to the commander, along with a recommended course of action.

- **Decision-Execution.** The commander decides upon which course of action to accept; whereupon, the staff prepares either a plan or an operations order for execution of the selected course of action.

The Army, unlike the higher joint staffs, does not have a separate staff section for plans. Rather, Army plans officers work within numerous staff sections, with the primary plans officer subordinate to and working in the G3 or operations section. The plans officers can also place plans aside for future use or hand them over to current operations in the G3 for execution.

**Initial Planning**

In September 1991, while the Pentagon contended with internal change and a rapidly shifting international environment, the primary focus of U.S. military planning for the deteriorating situation in Haiti was on the possible evacuation of American citizens and selected third-party foreign nationals to the United States or other designated safe havens. The 82d Airborne Division, a subordinate unit to XVIII Airborne Corps, promised to be the primary force to enter Haiti if an evacuation were required. From September 1991 until February 1992, the 82d staff at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, dusted off and revised an early 1980s plan, designated Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 2367, calling for a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) in Haiti. The plan encompassed several options, each corresponding to a perceived level of threat. The option calling for the use of the airborne division postulated a forcible entry into Haiti, with an expected ten-day NEO to extract up to ten thousand noncombatants. The 82d was not the only headquarters working on a plan for the immediate crisis. At Norfolk, the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) also had a NEO option for Haiti, one in which U.S. Marines staging at Guantanamo Bay would seize an airfield in Haiti and use it to conduct a more permissive or noncontested NEO (see map 2). In February 1992, the urgency for planning a NEO into Haiti diminished, and the USACOM plan was shelved. But as the crisis in Haiti continued into 1993, USACOM monitored the deteriorating situation.
The Governors Island Agreement

In February of 1993, the junta that had ousted President Aristide denied the deployment of international human rights observers to monitor conditions in Haiti. As explained by Haitian strongman Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, the observers could enter the country only if certain conditions were met, including international recognition of the junta-backed government of Prime Minister Marc Bazin and the lifting of the economic embargo. When United Nations (UN) negotiator Dante Caputo arrived in Haiti to work out an arrangement, he was met by demonstrations and insults. A frustrated Caputo eventually left the country under escort to protect him from possible mob violence. On a more positive note, continued international pressure did eventually convince Cedras to allow the observers into Haiti. In the United States, President Bill Clinton in March 1993 declared his intention to restore Aristide to power and to rebuild the Haitian economy. Following this, Caputo again notified the Haitian junta that they should relinquish power. In April 1993, Cedras agreed to resign in exchange for amnesty for himself, his family, and members of his staff. Aristide, in exile, agreed to those conditions. When Caputo returned to Haiti in April 1993, however, he met more resistance from the Haitian junta. In effect, Cedras and his henchmen
did not trust Aristide, nor did they believe that the UN or the United States would follow up on threats to impose more economic sanctions. As Donald Schulz and Gabriel Marcella put it:

[Domestic] pressure on the Clinton administration to take stronger action to resolve the refugee problem had lessened as a result of the president’s decision to continue his predecessor’s policy of forcible repatriation. The obvious reluctance of Washington and its allies to intervene militarily or even to substantially tighten the embargo . . . gave hope to the Haitian rulers that, when push came to shove, their foreign advisors would back off.10

Cedras, in effect, was playing a game, attempting to deflect increased economic sanctions by agreeing to vacate power. When pressured to leave, however, he would renege on any agreement he had made. On June 16, 1993, the United Nations Security Council, tired of Cedras’ duplicity, voted to impose a ban on petroleum sales to Haiti while freezing the financial assets of important Haitians. This action seemed to have the desired effect. On June 27, four days after the sanctions went into effect, Cedras and Aristide met separately with mediators at Governors Island, New York, to forge a workable agreement to return Aristide to power.

On July 3, the Governors Island Agreement was signed, first by Cedras, who then left for Haiti, and later by Aristide. That agreement called for the Haitian president to nominate a prime minister, who would be confirmed by the Haitian parliament. Furthermore, Haitians who participated in the 1991 coup would receive amnesty, Cedras would retire, and international sanctions imposed under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 841 would be lifted. Aristide would then return to Haiti on October 30, 1993. Most important, the accord allowed for UN military forces and police personnel to enter Haiti, prior to Aristide’s return, to train the Haitian police and army and to help rebuild the nation’s shattered infrastructure. If implemented, the accord promised to ease if not end Haiti’s internal crisis, not to mention its political fallout in the United States. There were those at the time, however, including planners at USACOM and Fort Bragg, who believed that the recently agreed-to accord might be unenforceable.11 Soon after the Governors Island Agreement was signed, Haiti underwent its worst period of violence since the 1991 coup. Hundreds of Haitians were killed or disappeared, while pro-Aristide activists were beaten, intimidated, or arrested, often in front of UN observers. Numerous corpses turned up on the doorstep of hotels where UN
observers lived, and gunfire was a daily occurrence. Instead of preparing his departure from office, Cedras was consolidating his power by eliminating all potential rivals, to include staunch supporters of Aristide.

**The Harlan County Debacle**

In August 1993, USACOM, at the direction of the Joint Staff, created the Joint Task Force Haiti Assistance Group (JTF HAG) and named Colonel J. G. Pulley, then commander of the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, as the commander. JTF HAG was an ad hoc organization whose personnel ranged from various subject-matter experts on Haiti to officers who knew nothing about the country and its problems. Many assigned to the JTF had little idea of what they were expected to do. One such individual was U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Phil Baker, then a military history instructor at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. As JTF HAG was being stood up, Baker was notified to deploy from the classroom to Norfolk, Virginia, within twenty-four hours. En route, he stopped off at the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Fort Monroe, Virginia, where in a briefing session with Major General Carl Ernst he, for the first time, received some indication of his mission. Ernst essentially told Baker that he would be heading a team to professionalize and train the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAd’H) and, as Baker recalled, to “do good things as a representative of the United States Army.” Upon arriving in Norfolk, Baker was told that he would not be in charge of the entire professionalization program, but that he was to develop a plan to professionalize and train the Haitian Army staff. He then went to the HAG planning cell where he observed,

Everything was in chaos. Planners from all services were thrown together trying to figure out what they were doing without much organization. Lots of people were just doing what they thought they needed to do; what they were comfortable with whether or not it had anything to do with the plan. Everybody at least looked busy. In the middle of this chaos was a Marine lieutenant colonel under a lot of pressure trying to produce an operations order. I remember that chairs were scarce; if you left yours for even a second, someone stole it.

Pulley eventually met with his principal staff at the base officers’ club where he laid out his plans for the HAG. The colonel directed his staff to plan for separating the Haitian Police from the military, and then for reforming and professionalizing the FAd’H. As the staff tried to figure out what was meant by “professionalizing” the Haitian military,
they received information that the Haitians did not want such training anyway. Lieutenant Colonel Mike Jones, a Special Forces commander and the leader of the Haiti site survey party that went ahead of the HAG, notified the JTF on September 16, 1993, that the Haitian Army believed that they were already professional and, instead, wanted new equipment and marksmanship training. Throughout the month of September, while the HAG continued to plan, Haitians were subjected to more regime-sponsored acts of violence. Five people were killed, and many others wounded in a Port-au-Prince riot originating from Mayor Evans Paul returning to office after his ouster in 1991. On September 11, Antoine Izmery, a strong Aristide supporter, was assassinated. Numerous Haitian officials were threatened with personal violence, and the U.S. Embassy had its electricity cut off. As the violence escalated, the UN Security Council on September 23 authorized the sending of 1,267 police and military personnel into Haiti in accordance with the Governors Island Agreement. By the end of September, two U.S. Navy ships were ready to transport the HAG to Haiti. The USS Harlan County would depart first with 225 UN observers, followed later by the USS Fairfax County. The Harlan County departure was anything but smooth. USACOM provided few instructions for embarkation and departure. Therefore, JTF HAG personnel boarded the ship in dribbles over a twenty-four-hour period, with many members arriving late at night. Lieutenant Colonel Baker was standing around with other personnel preparing to board the ship when a “Navy officer, the ship’s executive officer, wanted to know who was in charge of the boarding troops. Everyone looked around or at their feet. I noticed that I was the senior officer so I said that I guess I was. The executive officer then asked for a manifest, a list of equipment, copies of orders, and other administrative paperwork. I stared at him because no one had thought about any of that stuff.” Baker immediately found the senior noncommissioned officer and an Army captain, whom he appointed as his first sergeant and executive officer, respectively. They then began the laborious process of accounting for personnel, most of whom belonged to U.S. Army Special Forces and a U.S. Marine Corps military police platoon. A Marine warrant officer, “Gunner” Hayes, loaded every piece of equipment he could find as efficiently as time and space allowed. The Harlan County departed the next morning as a Navy doctor ran up the gangway and threw himself and his gear aboard.

In addition to the personnel accountability problem, a command situation existed that would later prove significant. Neither the Harlan County, commanded by U.S. Navy Commander Marvin E. Butcher, nor the
Fairfax County was part of JTF HAG or subordinate to it during the movement to Haiti. Butcher took his orders not from Colonel Pulley but from USACOM through the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT). Butcher's mission was to transport the JTF to Haiti, then provide berthing and life support to the embarked troops until they moved onto the dock. Once completely ashore, the troops would come under the command of Colonel Pulley, who had flown ahead and would meet the ship in Port-au-Prince.

Upon leaving Norfolk, the Harlan County stopped at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, to embark a U.S. Navy construction battalion as well as Canadian engineers. The scheduled departure from Puerto Rico was then delayed as events in Haiti became more violent. The United Nations Security Council resolution did not call for a forced entry into the country, and despite the increase in violence there, U.S. military personnel continued to view the situation in Haiti as a permissive one. According to Baker, "We were suppose to do the high visibility things, the medical and construction and humanitarian things, with the intention of showing the Haitians that Aristide was returning, and look at the money he's bringing back; hey, this is a good deal."\[20\]

On October 3, 1993, while the Harlan County was preparing to move to Haiti, eighteen U.S. Army soldiers, many of them Rangers, were killed in Somalia in support of the UN-directed mission, Restore Hope. Thirty-one other soldiers were injured. News of the firefight, accompanied by the Cable News Network's (CNN) graphic images of dead American troops being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by Somali gunmen, shocked the American public and their political and military leaders. As Shulz and Marcella note:

The incident ... [intensified] U.S. fears of further involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. By now, ... the Pentagon was leery of becoming involved in Haiti. ... DOD planners sensed, quite correctly, that the small, lightly armed international force that was scheduled to go into the country would be incapable of preventing violence ... This was a prescription for disaster and led to an unseemly spate of public bickering between State and Defense Departments.\[22\]

The Haitian junta, meanwhile, followed news coverage of the debates precipitated by the firefight and concluded that "[T]he United States was weak and irresolute. If the Americans could be persuaded that Haiti was another Somalia, the Clinton administration would be forced to back down."\[23\] Consequently, Cedras began to plan a public
demonstration that would seek to intimidate JTF HAG and discredit both the UN mission and the United States.

By then, the Harlan County was steaming toward Port-au-Prince with its multinational forces feverishly sewing on UN patches, while Lieutenant Colonel Baker taught a class on how to properly wear blue berets. Commander Butcher was informed that Colonel Pulley intended to host a reception for local Haitian dignitaries aboard his ship on arrival, as a peaceful gesture. Butcher balked, noting that Navy regulations forbid the inspection of warships by foreign citizens. Butcher, moreover, noted that the less the Haitians knew about his ship, the more respect they would have for it. To accommodate Pulley, however, Butcher agreed to a topside deck tour, with Haitians under close escort.

The Harlan County arrived in Port-au-Prince at 0200 on Monday, October 11, 1993. Butcher discovered a maze of ships anchored around the harbor approaches in what appeared to be a deliberate attempt to slow access to the port. The commander safely negotiated his way around the ships and dropped anchor at 0500. As he did so, he noticed that the Haitian police were forcing civilian work crews off the merchant ships at pier side. Butcher sought to berth his ship but found that an old Cuban tanker was occupying his mooring. Without a clear space to maneuver his ship, Butcher decided to launch a small LCPL (landing craft personnel [large]) to assess the situation. He, along with "Gunner" Hayes and a U.S. Army Special Forces major, came within fifty feet of the pier, where they saw a group of Haitian policemen but little other activity. A U.S. Coast Guard commander actually reached the pier but informed the Harlan County that he was leaving due to gunfire. Butcher could hear gunfire as well, although he was not fired upon. The planning assumption of a permissive entry, at least in Butcher's mind, was now in question.

Butcher returned to his ship and reported his situation to CINCLANTFLT. He then directed all JTF personnel to go to their rooms and wait. In the harbor, several Haitian boats, some flying the flag of the "Tonton Macoute" (the secret police of the Duvalier era), circled the ship. Butcher ordered his crew to man the ship's caliber .50 machine guns, after which the Haitian boats beat a hasty retreat.

Meanwhile, Ms. Nikki Huddleston, the U.S. charge d'affaires in Haiti, was observing the Harlan County from the balcony of the Montana Hotel with, among others, Colonel Pulley and Dr. Bryant Freeman, a specialist on Haiti from the University of Kansas. When Huddleston heard about the situation in the harbor, she decided to go to
the port area in an attempt to fix the problem. Pulley advised her not to make the trip. At 0700 that morning, he had witnessed about forty Haitians arriving at the dock by bus. He had then watched as the group drank free liquor and worked themselves into a frenzy, while some fired weapons into the air and chanted anti-American slogans. He further observed the Haitians drag two corpses off the bus and throw them into the middle of the demonstration. Despite the horror of the scene, Pulley saw that the demonstrators were separated from the pier by a fourteen-foot-high fence and a masonry wall. In his opinion, the unruly mob was loud but disorganized and posed little threat to the troops aboard the Harlan County. Huddleston considered the colonel’s warnings but decided to go to the dock area anyway. She arrived on the scene in her armored sedan to discover that the gate to the port was locked and that the key was nowhere to be found. Moreover, the drunken Haitians, in essence a mob being goaded and paid by the Revolutionary Front for Haitian Advancement and Progress (FRAPH), were chanting “Remember Somalia!” Recognizing Huddleston, they began to beat on her car with ax handles. Although there was little chance of the charge being injured or her car immobilized, the live video CNN ran of her reluctant retreat from the port area created a different impression.

Butcher, from aboard his ship, was in a three-way telephone conversation with Pulley and a USACOM representative in Norfolk.
Pulley continued to maintain that although the situation was tense, the environment, in his mind, was still permissive. Butcher disagreed and expressed strong concern over what he believed were gunshots from the pier. When Pulley insisted that the mob would run off if challenged, Butcher offered to land a contingent of armed U.S. Marines to intimidate the crowd. The available Marines, however, had already donned UN blue berets and soldier patches and had had their vehicles painted white, with a large “UN” prominently displayed on each. Any landing force would thus be acting under the auspices of the United Nations, and violence was the one thing that the UN wanted to avoid. Moreover, the USCOM representative, well aware of the recent Somalia disaster, advised Pulley that any American casualties would be unacceptable. Pulley had little to say in the matter, as his troops were aboard the Harlan County and not under his command until they came ashore. Later that day, Haitian patrol boats circled the American ship but remained well clear when they noticed that the guns were manned. The rest of the day passed without incident. Once darkness fell, U.S. Special Forces and intelligence personnel aboard the ship did what they could to reconnoiter the shore. At one point, the Haitians had several cars park in a line along the shore and shine their headlights on the Harlan County. At another point, the Americans aboard ship, using night-vision devices, observed what they believed to be two V-150 armored personnel carriers with 90-mm guns hidden behind the pier. Butcher knew that those guns could severely damage his ship and questioned again whether the situation was really permissive.

At dawn, after a tense but quiet night, Butcher ordered the U.S. National Anthem played loudly across the ship’s broadcast system for morning colors. Pulley, meanwhile, tried to negotiate a landing of ground forces north of Port-au-Prince and sent an advance party to scout the beach area. Butcher, however, told Pulley that a complete shore survey by a U.S. Navy sea-air-land (SEAL) team was required before he could beach his ship. Butcher then offered to transfer the troops to shore by landing craft. Unable to agree upon a course of action, both officers continued to await further developments.

The morning passed quietly until Butcher received a call from the U.S. Embassy to recover his LCPLs. Butcher refused on the basis that he was using those boats to maintain a floating security ring around his ship. A representative from CINCLANTFLT called minutes later and asked if Butcher could at least pull the small craft in closer. As Butcher was discussing that issue, two Haitian gunboats emerged from their naval base and rapidly approached the Harlan County. These ships,
twenty-five-foot Montauk motor vessels, possessed caliber .50
machine guns and were carrying Haitian Police and Haitian Army and
Navy personnel. The Haitians were standing alongside the machine
guns. Butcher ordered all ships’ guns manned and stationed sniper
teams along the deck. His orders were simple: if the Haitians put their
hands on the triggers of the machine guns, open fire.32 Believing that
the Haitians were monitoring his unsecure radio communications,
Butcher called the U.S. Embassy over an open line. He announced, for
Haitian consumption, that his number one priority was to protect his
ship and stressed that if any gunboat got within 1,000 yards of the
Harlan County, he would destroy it. The Haitian gunboats soon left.
About two hours later, they returned but kept a respectful distance from
the American vessel.

Butcher now took some time to assess the situation and determined
that his position was untenable. Armed Haitian gunboats floated about
2,500 yards from his ship. The port possibly contained two well-armed
armored cars. The berth was blocked, therefore he could not dock.
Shots had been fired near the pier. Another night in the harbor might
cause mishaps that, in turn, could lead to violence. The commander
concluded that the environment was no longer permissive and notified
CINCLANTFLT that he was pulling out. The CINCLANTFLT watch
officer asked Butcher if he could wait until he received concurrence
from the Navy admiral on duty. Butcher said that, regardless of what
was being discussed in Norfolk, he was weighing anchor. About
thirty-five minutes later, CINCLANTFLT notified Butcher that it
would support his decision.

The Haitians and especially the FRAPH stared in amazement as the
Harlan County left Port-au-Prince and steamed for Guantanamo Bay.
Later, the U.S. government announced that it had ordered the ship out of
Haiti because it could not guarantee the safety of the vessel and its
personnel.33 Despite that rationale, many individuals saw the Harlan
County’s departure as a blow to U.S. prestige and UN credibility. Dr.
Bryant Freeman stated that “I watched the ship leave the port and for the
first time in my life I was not proud to be an American.”34

Joint Task Force (JTF) 120

On October 14, 1993, President Clinton expressed his concern about
the safety of the Haitian people, in general, and members of the Haitian
government, in particular. Less than two hours after he issued the
statement, Guy Malary, the Haitian minister of justice, was gunned
down in Port-au-Prince. In response to that incident, as well as to the rebuke of the *Haitian County*, the United Nations on October 16 imposed a naval blockade on Haiti. The blockade, the result of the UN Security Council’s reestablishing an embargo on Haiti three days earlier, was executed in part by JTF 120.

Commanded by Rear Admiral Charles J. Abbott, JTF 120 was primarily a naval task force that also incorporated a U.S. Special Forces Planning Cell. The unit was activated on October 16 aboard the command ship USS Nassau and consisted of a commander, staff, and a reinforced U.S. Marine battalion (Special Marine Air/Ground Task Force, or SPMAGTF). Under UN authorization, JTF 120 was to conduct a maritime interdiction operation (MIO), tracking, boarding, and diverting commercial shipping going to and from Haiti. The embargo targeted selected Haitian imports, the most important of which was fuel. The idea was to immobilize the Haitian transportation system and close certain fuel-dependent businesses owned by the more affluent Haitian elites, thus increasing the pressure on the Cedras regime to give up power. Care was taken not to prohibit the delivery of humanitarian items, such as cooking oil, in an effort to convince the Haitian people that the embargo was directed at the illegal government and not at them.35 JTF 120 performed other missions besides enforcing the embargo. The commander, JTF 120, was to be ready to conduct, on order, a NEO of American citizens and selected third-country nationals, possibly in March or April 1994. U.S. Special Operations units sent planners and pre-positioned important equipment aboard the USS Nassau that would facilitate the execution of the NEO, should it become necessary. The commander, JTF 120, was also to intercept and repatriate the growing numbers of Haitian nationals who were fleeing the island by boat.

JTF 120 operated in international waters with nine ships covering thirteen “boxes” or maritime areas of operation. The ships rotated from box to box, stopping vessels bound for or leaving Haiti, then boarding them to search for contraband. Ships found to be carrying forbidden items were redirected to ports outside of Haiti. Intercepted “Boat People” were taken to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to be processed for repatriation or possible permission to enter the United States. To stop small vessels smuggling in gasoline, JTF 120 employed naval special warfare assets, including Cyclone-class patrol coastals (PCs), SEALs, and rigid-hull inflatable boats, which plied the shallow coastal waters.
Jade Green and the Development of the Political-Military Plan

Back in the United States, the political storm over what to do about Haiti continued unabated. From his position as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) prodded the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to announce that Aristide was psychologically unstable, drug addicted, and prone to violence. Meanwhile, the CIA was itself being criticized for allegedly paying Cedras and several of his henchmen as informants prior to the 1991 Haitian coup.36 By year’s end, analysts saw America being held hostage by the threat of refugees. In mid-December, representatives from the United States, France, Canada, and Venezuela arrived in Haiti in an effort to persuade Cedras to honor the Governors Island Agreement by January 15, 1994, lest he face additional punitive sanctions. Cedras refused to see the party.37 As diplomacy stalled, the U.S. military kept abreast of the situation. Planning for a NEO had continued in earnest until October 1993, when the USS Harlan County left Port-au-Prince harbor.38 Soon after that, the JCS directed USACOM to change their planning focus from a NEO to a forcible-entry option. In November, USACOM formed a planning cell composed of its own officers, as well as planners from its subordinate component headquarters. This group considered potential U.S. political objectives in Haiti and began calculating how military power could be employed to achieve those ends. It also contributed to the development of two plans: one envisaged the use of interagency assets of the executive branch of the U.S. government; the other, code named “Jade Green,” became the forerunner of Operation Plan (OPLAN) 2370.

“Jade Green” started out as a concept in need of detail, which the USACOM Plans staff, under the supervision of U.S. Marine Corps Major General Michael J. Byron, the director for USACOM’s J5 Strategic Plans and Policy Section, sought to provide. This process began with a review of previous Haiti-related contingency plans to determine if one of them was suitable for the current Haitian situation. The plans officers favored a 1988 USACOM plan that focused on a NEO option in Haiti, and they determined that a subordinate portion of the plan, written by the Forces Command (FORSCOM), best fit the situation.39 The problem was that the FORSCOM plan consisted primarily of a list of units likely to be available and information on how to deploy them to Haiti. The plan did not address how those forces
would be used operationally. Consequently, the USACOM planning staff had to modify the FORSCOM plan to reflect a combat situation.

While some USACOM planners worked on fleshing out the “Jade Green” concept, others were developing a political-military plan for the USACOM Commander in Chief (CINC), Admiral Paul D. Miller. The plan would be submitted to the JCS and the National Security Council (NSC) interagency working group for Haiti as a basis for synchronizing official cooperation for a Haitian incursion. Lieutenant Colonel Ed Donnelly, a U.S. Army officer working within the USACOM J5, wrote the weapons control portions of the political-military plan and noted that

Essentially, USACOM put together a document that told the Interagency Working Group within the National Security Council what they would be expected to contribute to an operation in Haiti. USACOM laid out the purpose of the operation, the endstate, and defined criteria for military success. That document went to the JCS and then the NSC where it was codified. The document then came back with corrections but essentially USACOM wrote the document.46

The political-military plan for Haiti was a first, according to Donnelly, because numerous government agencies and a unified command, USACOM, participated in its creation.47 The political-military plan approved by the NSC was authoritative to all. The plan, moreover, further served to shape the Jade Green OPLAN that was rapidly coming to fruition.

A key portion of the political-military plan centered upon Haitian security. Planners at the NSC and USACOM believed that any military operation into Haiti must remove the FAd’H and the Haitian Police in order to establish security on the island. Removing those organizations meant either replacing them with a U.S. military force (not an acceptable option) or retraining and reestablishing the FAd’H, the Haitian Police, or both. Some type of armed force was needed to provide a stable and secure environment in which democracy could flourish once the Haitian junta was removed and Aristide returned.

Major General Byron and Lieutenant Colonel Donnelly later went to Washington, D.C., to brief selected members of the NSC interagency working group on Haiti. Byron told the group that DOD did not view training the Haitian Police as a military mission and that the Department of Justice, under the Department of State, should have the lead in developing a plan to vet and train the new Haitian police force
properly (see figure 2). The interagency working group approved that concept in April 1994. The group further agreed to conduct an interagency rehearsal prior to an invasion, if one occurred, to ensure that each governmental department was prepared to meet its taskings as specified in the political-military plan.

The Haitian Migrant Crisis and Operation Plan 2370

In January 1994, the deadline for Cedras to step down from power came and went. France and Canada immediately urged that sanctions against Haiti increase. The United States, however, fearing a renewed flow of refugees who would seek asylum in the United States, continued its policy of repatriating fleeing Haitians. President Aristide, critical of U.S. policy, moved into the public eye through a series of Congressional meetings, public demonstrations, and media interviews. Meanwhile, on orders from the JCS, USACOM began the conceptual evolution of what would become OPLAN 2370, the invasion of Haiti by the 82d Airborne Division and a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).

The parent headquarters of the 82d is the XVIII Airborne Corps. At this point, its staff received its first indication that a Haiti contingency operation might actually be executed that January. As Major William B. Garrett, a plans officer on the corps staff, recalled: “On January 8th [1994] I received a call to meet Brigadier General Frank Akers, Chief of Staff, XVIIIth Airborne Corps, and Colonel Dan McNeill, the corps G3, . . . and fly up to Norfolk, Virginia, to receive a USACOM briefing on Haiti. That was the first official [notification] we received to begin planning the invasion of Haiti. We began planning the invasion on the 8th of January 1994.” The XVIII Airborne Corps planning cell arrived in Norfolk and was told by USACOM planners that the corps would be designated
JTIF 180 for the purposes of the operation. The planning cell mission was to design a forcible entry, or combat operation, into Haiti. Admiral Miller, the CINC, also relayed his personal intent that the operation “capitalize on the [U.S. and Haitian force] asymmetries in respect to mobility, C2I [command, control, communications, and intelligence], and decision cycles.” Miller indicated that the Haiti invasion should “use surprise, shock, and simultaneity in execution.” Garrett led a small group within the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters that was planning the Haiti invasion. To keep the plan “under wraps,” he and a fellow plans officer, Major Kevin Benson, cleaned out a supply closet on the third floor of the headquarters building, occupied it, and began planning. In this sense, OPLAN 2370 was developed in a “compartment,” that is to say, only selected individuals knew that the plan was under development. There were many compartments in several different headquarters, as well as within the same headquarters in some cases. Compartmented planners did not share information with anyone outside their own compartment. Thus, compartmentalized planning frustrated many planners who needed information to deconflict problems and work through the complexities of the operation. As one officer put it:

This compartmentalization led to coordination problems between... planning agencies, specifically between USACOM, XVIII

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Airborne Corps, USASOC [United States Army Special Operations Command], 82d Airborne Division. . . . The code words and procedures used that would allow individuals to talk about the plan were not the same at [XVIII Airborne] Corps and USASOC. So . . . parties could only stare and nod knowingly at each other."

Many plans officers who needed to be brought into a compartment because of their planning expertise were not allowed to do so because they lacked a top secret clearance. Since it can take up to six months to obtain approval for a clearance of that level, many officers who had much-needed planning skills could not participate in the planning for Haiti. Adding to the frustration was the fact that, as a matter of routine, several planning officers were scheduled to rotate to new assignments. Their replacements had to gain access to the compartment, if they met security requirements, and then spend several weeks trying to get caught up on what had transpired to date.

While officers at various levels sought ways to work around the compartmented planning dilemmas, Lieutenant General Henry H. ("Hugh") Shelton, the XVIII Airborne Corps commander, mulled over the operational guidance he received from Admiral Miller. Shelton then provided Major Garrett with his own guidance that the operation would occur at night and be a forcible entry. In concept, U.S. forces would descend on Haiti in the dark and quickly secure critical targets all over the island. Once daylight approached, the average Haitian soldier or civilian would arise to discover that the Americans owned everything. Garrett and other XVIII Airborne Corps plans officers later presented Shelton with a mission analysis briefing. From that presentation, Shelton developed courses of action to determine the best way to accomplish the mission and selected the alternative that he thought was the most feasible and acceptable. What he selected was an option that called for eight airborne battalions to descend on Haiti—five battalions in Port-au-Prince, two north of Port-au-Prince, and one at Cap Haitien—with the intent of securing the island without firing a shot. In addition, a JSOTF would move inland and secure the countryside while searching for weapons caches.

OPLAN 2370 was now coming together per the guidance and direction of Miller and Shelton. As Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Bonham, the XVIII Airborne Corps chief of plans, noted: "The primary objectives of [OPLAN 2370] were to neutralize the FAH and police; to protect U.S. citizens, third country nationals, designated Haitians' interests and property; to conduct a NEO as required; to restore civil order; to establish essential services; . . . and to set the conditions for the
re-establishment of the legitimate government of Haiti."\(^{51}\) OPLAN 2370 further required that U.S. forces would assist in the reorganization of the Haitian armed forces and the police. The XVIII Airborne Corps staff completed a draft OPLAN, received Shelton's approval, and then briefed the plan to USACOM on February 23, 1994.

OPLAN 2370 established a joint operations area (JOA) encompassing all of Haiti and the island of Great Inagua (see map 3). A large amount of the Caribbean west and southwest of Haiti was included in the JOA as well, together with the naval bases at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The large JOA was designed to provide operational maneuver space for numerous invading ships and aircraft; it would also serve to establish logistical support and staging bases for the deployment of U.S. ground forces.

The planners considered both friendly and enemy centers of gravity. A center of gravity, according to the great nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, is "the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends."\(^{52}\) Protecting one's own center of gravity while getting at the opposing center of gravity is critical to achieving success in a military operation. The XVIII Airborne Corps plans officers determined that the friendly strategic center of gravity was U.S. public support for an invasion and the political leadership's will to see it through, while the operational center of gravity was control of Port-au-Prince. Conversely, the Haitian strategic center of gravity was viewed as the politico-military leadership, while the operational center of gravity was the FAd'H.\(^{53}\)

The corps intelligence collection priorities focused on finding the location of every Haitian FAd'H and police unit down to company size on the island. It was discovered that there were nine police companies and eight FAd'H companies, some with heavy weapons, in Port-au-Prince. In addition, thirty-three other FAd'H companies and three more police companies were dispersed outside the capital in other
cities around the island. Each company’s exact location was pinpointed and, in most cases, the staff identified the unit’s precise headquarters (see map 4). In addition to finding out about FAd’H and Haitian Police locations and capabilities, Shelton also wanted specific information regarding the Government Center in the capital, the status of security at Port-au-Prince International Airport, and the capabilities of a FAd’H heavy weapons company at Camp d’Application.

The operational concept envisioned a twenty-four-day mission separated into five phases. Phase One (predeployment-crisis action) began four days prior to invasion and consisted of activating JTF 180, establishing intermediate support bases at Guantanamo Bay and Great Inagua, and conducting some initial force operations, such as predeploying helicopter assets. Phase Two (deployment-combat operations) would last three days and consist of simultaneous airborne, air, and amphibious assaults to neutralize the FAd’H and police, secure key facilities such as the airport and the U.S. Ambassador’s residence, restore civil order, and begin foreign internal defense, such as the rebuilding of Haitian security forces. Phase Three (force buildup and initial civil-military operations) envisioned establishing relations with local Haitian leaders, reorganizing the FAd’H, and preparing to receive a follow-on U.S. or multinational force. Phase Four (civil-military operations) called for a transition to a follow-on force, expanding civil-military operations throughout Haiti, reorganizing the Haitian Police, and redeploying selected forces. Phase Five (redeployment)
envisioned a final transfer of responsibility to a follow-on force and the redeployment of JTF 180.56

The major ground forces involved in the operation would be an Army Force (ARFOR), consisting of the 82d Airborne Division, and a Joint Special Operations Task Force composed of Army Rangers, Army Special Forces, and other service forces such as Navy SEALs. Later, the OPLAN would be modified to include U.S. Marines.57 The ARFOR would parachute and air assault onto Haiti to secure objectives, while a large JSOTF would attack selected targets in Port-au-Prince and occupy the Haitian countryside. Each type of unit, airborne or Special Operations force, was given objectives based upon its capabilities. The airborne troops were assigned targets where a rapid assault was required, while the JSOTF was used for more precise operations involving interaction with the local population.

The 82d Airborne Division commander, Major General William M. Steele, thought that the operation could be done in forty-five days or less. He envisioned a simultaneous airborne, air assault, and ground assault operation throughout Haiti over a six-hour period. In that the division’s paratroopers were equipped with night-vision devices to assist them in the accomplishment of their mission with little or no light, the operation would take place at night. The division would take
one morning to eliminate the FA'd'H, seize every Haitian police station, and secure its remaining targets.

The forcible-entry operation would conceivably be executed within nine days from notification and last no longer than a few hours. The division’s mission statement noted that the 82d would conduct multiple airborne assaults onto Haiti to establish three lodgements, protect American citizens and property and designated foreign nationals, and neutralize the Haitian Armed Forces and Police. The division commander’s intent was for the division to enter quickly, secure a lodgement, secure the island, then in six weeks hand over the operation to a follow-on force, such as the United Nations or U.S. Forces, Haiti.

The division anticipated securing forty D-day objectives that would require 3,848 paratroopers using 113 U.S. Air Force transports over two designated drop zones (DZ). The battalions from the 1st Brigade (unofficially known as the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, or 504th PIR), 82d Airborne Division, would seize the primary DZ, Port-au-Prince International Airport, and establish a second lodgement at a port facility. The division’s 2d Brigade (known as the 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment) would relieve the 1st Brigade after the airborne assault and expand the lodgement. An additional 4,500 paratroopers, to include the division artillery, would arrive by aircraft once the airport was secure. Using the airfield as a base, the artillery would then provide fire support throughout the island. Meanwhile, north of Port-au-Prince, several battalions from the 3d Brigade, or 505th PIR, would seize Pegasus, the second DZ, which would then be expanded to contain the Division Support Command, the aviation brigade assault command post, a logistics element, a security element, and eventually the division headquarters base of operations. Pegasus DZ was planned to accommodate 28,000 gallons of aviation fuel, about a twenty-four-hour supply for the division. Moreover, six M551 Sheridan tanks would also be placed in Pegasus as a reaction force to counter most Haitian FA'd'H threats (see map 5).

Using its own assets, the 82d Airborne Division planned to deploy its Aviation Brigade to Great Inagua, a remote island north of Haiti, over a two-day period before the invasion. Over fifty helicopters would fly 600 miles from Simmons Army Airfield at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, the first day. The next day, the aircraft would fly 450 miles to Great Inagua and be pre-positioned to support the invasion. That task was complex and required great navigational skill. In addition, the division planners conceived that fifty equipment pallets for C-130 aircraft heavy drop would arrive at
Port-au-Prince International Airport, with an additional seventy-one pallets to be dropped by C-141 aircraft at Pegasus DZ. If the plan went well, the 82d Airborne Division would conduct what they called “the largest [U.S.] airborne invasion since Operation MARKET GARDEN during World War Two.”

While the 82d was concentrating on its objectives, the JSOTF would be securing parts of Port-au-Prince International Airport, the National Palace, Dessalines Barracks, the Haitian 4th Police Company Headquarters, and Camp d’Application. AC-130 Spectre gunships would begin firing at designated targets in Haiti at H-hour on the morning of D-day (see map 6), while a forty-five-man SEAL detachment, delivered to their target by U.S. Army MH-60 helicopters, would eliminate the Haitian 4th Police Company, which controlled the roads to the National Palace. Simultaneously, approximately 265 Rangers would conduct a helicopter assault from Guantanamo Bay to Camp d’Application and eliminate the FAd’H main threat, the fifty-man heavy weapons company

Map 5. JTF 180’s 82d Airborne Division air movement plan
equipped with several V-150 Commando armored cars. Concurrently, a separate Ranger platoon would secure the U.S. Embassy. Another 480 Rangers would arrive simultaneously by helicopter to attack and secure Dessalines Barracks and the National Palace. Two SEAL teams would reinforce the Rangers at the National Palace—one after thirty minutes and the other, two hours later (see map 7). Twenty minutes after the initial H-hour attacks, 445 Rangers would parachute onto a deserted farm field west of Port-au-Prince to establish Forward Operating Base Dallas. If all went well, the plan assumed that the entire JSOTF assault would be over in less than four hours. Army Special Forces teams, meanwhile, would also be landing in Haiti, primarily to secure the countryside and search for hidden weapons caches.63

Delivering such a large amount of forces by air required that the aircraft be carefully controlled. That task fell to Twelfth Air Force Commander, Major General James Record. Record was designated the joint forces air component commander (JFACC), whose mission was to coordinate air operations, to include ensuring that all air missions, fixed and rotary-wing, were approved in advance through an air tasking order (ATO).64
To minimize the possibility of fratricide (casualties resulting from friendly fire), soldiers would wear a one-inch by one-inch piece of glint tape on their left shoulders and on the top of their helmets for identification. All vehicles would be marked with glint tape on all four corners, and a VS-17 orange panel would be placed on top of the hood, roof, or turret to be observed from the air.

The logistical concept of support was designed to sustain the operation for several weeks. Each service would be responsible for supplying its own forces. All units would deploy with five days’ supply on hand and with three days’ supply as emergency backup. Supplies would stage out of four major airheads (McGuire Air Force Base [AFB], Pope AFB, Charleston AFB, and MacDill AFB) and five intermediate staging bases (ISB) (Hunter Army Airfield; Homestead AFB; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Great Inagua; and Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico) (see map 8).

Supplying food and water was of critical concern for the planners because of Haiti’s extreme heat. Food was expected to be resupplied beginning with the arrival of eighteen twenty-foot refrigerator vans for storing fresh food on D-day and a delivery of 8,901 cases of meals, ready to eat (MRE) on D+2. Logistics planners also expected to see 970 short tons of food delivered on D+5, D+15, and D+20. Units would deploy with one day’s supply of water, with 52,000 gallons being required the next day. The XVIII Airborne Corps Support Command
would bring in four reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPU) that would begin producing 240,000 gallons of water by D+1.65

Fuel considerations consisted of ensuring that the force had 12,000 gallons on the ground for use by H+8, to be delivered by air initially, then by barge. Total D-day fuel deliveries to create a thirty-day supply included 33,600 gallons of motor gasoline (MOGAS) for selected vehicles and cooking stoves, 600,000 gallons of diesel fuel for vehicles, and 2,402,000 gallons of aviation fuel.

Medical support would be provided early in the operation by surgical teams inserted with the assaulting forces. Each team could perform field surgery and had a limited capacity for air evacuation. U.S. medics would provide emergency health care to Haitians in life-threatening situations, and by D+6, U.S. medical forces were scheduled to have established a 100-bed hospital in Port-au-Prince. That hospital would be capable of surgery, ground and air evacuation, dental care, veterinary (primarily food inspection services), preventive medicine, medical logistics, and command functions. The hospital at Roosevelt

Map 8. Force deployment scheme
Roads, Puerto Rico, would be used for evacuated soldiers who needed additional care. Medical planners would augment the JSOTF with additional medical teams, while Navy Forces (or NAVFOR, the naval forces component command, joint forces) and Marines would provide their own medical support. The Air Force would provide air evacuation to the continental United States (CONUS) or Roosevelt Roads as required, with JSOTF soldiers going to Guantanamo Bay and then to CONUS.66

Possibly the most complex aspect of the operation would be the communications linkages required for control. The primary means of communication would be by tactical satellite (TACSAT). The JTF 180 headquarters would locate itself on the USS Mount Whitney, a highly modern command and control vessel belonging to USACOM. The JTF headquarters would talk via TACSAT to an airborne command post that would then talk to USACOM in Norfolk, Virginia. Other TACSAT links were put in so that the JTF 180 commander and staff could talk to the JSOF, ARFOR, NAVFOR, the JTF main headquarters at Fort Bragg, the JCS, and various airborne command and control aircraft within the JOA.67

On April 6, 1994, while OPLAN 2370 was being framed, Aristide publicly attacked President Clinton’s policy toward Haiti, using well-publicized accounts of Haitian brutality and human rights abuses to accuse the administration of a “racist policy” toward Haitians. Aristide, moreover, informed Clinton that he was issuing a six-month notice for the United States to repeal a 1981 treaty between the United States and Haiti regarding the interception of Haitians in international waters and their forcible return to Haiti. A few days later, Randall Robinson, the executive director of TransAfrica, announced he was going on a hunger strike to protest U.S. policy toward Haiti. His protest garnered strong media attention and the support of the Congressional Black Caucus, especially when Robinson indicated that his life was now in the hands of President Clinton. Robinson ended his hunger strike in May, but only after the Clinton administration agreed to change its procedures for processing Haitian migrants. Every refugee could now make a case for asylum, while the administration also set up new immigration centers aboard the USS Comfort in Jamaica.

Meanwhile, on April 15, 1994, JTF 180 was disestablished when it was believed that the Haiti invasion would no longer occur. The joint Special Operations community continued to work with the forcible-entry plan into May, just in case the crisis heated up again.
A Change of Plans

In late May, the JCS indicated to USACOM that it might want to consider developing another plan that envisioned a peaceful entry into Haiti instead of combat. On June 2, 1994, USACOM notified the XVIII Airborne Corps to begin creating a second option, one that enabled U.S. forces to enter Haiti permissively, with a handover to a United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The new plan deleted the neutralization of the FAd'H and Haitian Police contained in the forcible-entry option, while retaining the other missions, including the reestablishment of a legitimate Haitian government. CONPLAN (operation plan in concept format) 2380, as it was initially called, went to the JCS for review on June 17. The JCS replied to USACOM on June 29, directing that the CONPLAN be changed into an operations order (OPORD). The change from CONPLAN to OPORD caused much excitement at Fort Bragg, for as Lieutenant Colonel Bonham put it, "The word OPORD is significant in joint [military] lexicon because [it] indicates a high likelihood of execution to include a date, time for execution. The JCS directing the OPORD sent tremors through [us] and we began planning in earnest in July of 1994."68

As planning went forward, U.S. ships intercepted about 20,000 Haitian refugees at sea within the period from mid-June to early July. On June 28, Guantanamo Bay's refugee camps reopened to handle the flow of refugees. A week later, the Clinton administration announced that it would no longer allow Haitian refugees to resettle in the United States, even if qualified. The U.S. Coast Guard returned refugees to Haiti at a rate of over 600 a day.59 When word reached Haiti that refugees would no longer be allowed to move into the United States, the amount of Haitians afloat reduced significantly in numbers.

The crisis, however, remained unresolved, necessitating further planning and the involvement of additional headquarters. By the summer of 1994, the XVIII Airborne Corps staff was simultaneously working with two major contingency plans for Haiti. In concept, at least, the two plans, OPLAN 2380 and OPLAN 2370, contrasted markedly on the issue of duration. As Lieutenant Colonel Bonham put it: "[OPLAN] 2380 was a much longer operation; minimum of 179 days. For that reason, the FORSCOM Commander and the XVII th Airborne Corps Commander were concerned about having the key forcible entry assets, the 82d Airborne Division and our JSOTF forces, being fixed or committed for an extended period in time and not be able to react to other contingencies."70
To allay this concern, General Dennis Reimer, the FORSCOM commander and, in one of his several hats, the Army component commander for USACOM, intervened to redistribute the workload. With the concurrence of Lieutenant General Shelton, Reimer indicated that he wanted a new headquarters, the 10th Mountain Division, from Fort Drum, New York, to be given responsibility for refining OPLAN 2380. The CINC, USACOM, decided that this was the preferred course of action, so on July 29, Major General David C. Meade, Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division, along with his chief of staff, operations officer, and planners arrived at Fort Bragg to receive an OPLAN 2380 mission briefing from the XVIII Airborne Corps staff. Also present at the meeting was Major General Byron from USACOM J5.

Two different headquarters were now developing two plans, simultaneously, and at two different locations. As the 10th Mountain picked up OPLAN 2380, JTF 180 continued to plan 2370, which would employ the 82d Airborne Division in the kinds of operations for which it, but not the 10th Mountain, had been specifically trained. As for the 10th Mountain Division, although it was subordinate to and less robust than the XVIII Airborne Corps, it was being directed to design an operation that was normally developed by a much larger headquarters.

OPLAN 2380

At Fort Drum, the 10th Mountain Division completed an initial OPLAN 2380 concept, and Meade briefed CINC, USACOM, on August 3, 1994. As presented, the 10th Mountain Division mission included a planned noncombatant evacuation to remove U.S. citizens and other designated individuals and the return of the government of Haiti to a "proper functioning" status. Most important, 10th Mountain Division saw itself "establishing and maintaining a stable and secure environment." Conceptually, the division would "deploy forces quickly and execute rapid entry of forces; control the center of gravity (Port-au-Prince) and Cap Haitien; control the countryside using a JSOTF; return President Aristide to power; maintain the initiative; stand up a Haitian public security force; and ensure unity of effort before turning the operation over to the United Nations." (See map 9.)

The 10th Mountain Division plan envisioned a five-phase operation extending for 180 days. Phase I—or predeployment—began thirteen days prior to the day of the invasion. During this two-week period, the
division’s commanding general would become Commander, JTF (COMJTF) 190, and begin staging forces forward under command of Task Force (TF) Mountain, a unit built around the division’s artillery and logistics headquarters. The JTF would also deploy its command group to Guantanamo Bay or Roosevelt Roads to create an intermediate staging base, begin moving the division main body by rail and convoy to sea ports of embarkation, and begin a psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign in Haiti.74 With the addition of multinational forces, JTF 190 would later become Combined/Joint Task Force 190 (CJTF).

Phase II—or deployment—initial security operations—would begin on D-day and continue through D+6. During this phase, the CJTF would establish conditions conducive to stability in Haiti. Colonel Andrew R. Berdy, with his 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), would conduct an air assault from helicopters off the USS Eisenhower and secure the aerial port of debarkation (APOD) and seaport of debarkation (SPOD) in Port-au-Prince. He would also establish a quick reaction force at the airfield for contingencies. The 2d BCT,
commanded by Colonel Jim Dubik, would sea-land forces in Cap Haitien to seize the airfield and the port facilities. Both BCTs, together with TF Mountain, would protect key Haitian leaders and establish civil order and a security area as their D-day objectives. The CJTF 190, NAVFOR, would be in reserve, with an additional mission of conducting a noncombatant evacuation order if required.75

Phase III—extended security operations and initial civil-military operations—was to begin on D+7 and last until D+20. The plan saw a buildup of U.S. forces in the outlying areas of Haiti, an assessment of the feasibility of efforts to professionalize the FA d'H, the integration of multinational coalition forces into the operation, and the buildup of logistics. The CJTF would also establish freedom of movement within Haiti for Haitians, work with the U.S. Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) to form the Haitian Police, and continue to provide security and stability throughout Haiti.76

The next phase, Phase IV, envisioned an expansion of civil-military operations from D+21 to D+120. During this phase, the JSOTF would begin training the Haitian military. Priority would be given to civil affairs operations designed to ensure security and stability in the country. Furthermore, logistics agencies would be working contracts to prepare for the transition to the United Nations. If practical, some U.S. forces would return home during this phase.

The last phase, the transition to the United Nations Mission in Haiti and the redeployment of CJTF Haiti, would occur between D+121 and D+180. During that time, UNMIH forces would arrive and accept mission responsibility from CJTF 190, civilian contractors would take over the logistics functions, and the U.S. force would return to home station.77

The plan was unique for several reasons. A large portion of the 10th Mountain Division would assault from an aircraft carrier with Army helicopter assets. The notion of lifting a light division from an aircraft carrier into a potential war zone is not something the Army routinely trains to do. It was believed, however, that by doing just that, the JTF 190 commander would gain increased flexibility by having a robust force offshore that he could send anywhere in Haiti.

The OPLAN was also risky in that it used the 10th Mountain Division. That unit had just come out of Somalia and might now have to deploy to yet another major contingency. Although 10th Mountain Division personnel believed they were up to the task, the unit had been
moving at a grueling pace for almost two years. OPLAN 2380, moreover, did not envision replacing the 10th Mountain Division for six months, and then only upon the transition to UNMIH, not to U.S. forces. The transition to UNMIH, a multinational coalition, would require much more intensive planning than turning over the same operation to another U.S. unit that shared the same doctrine, language, equipment, and methods of operation.

The CINC, USACOM, approved the plan in concept and recommended that the planning continue. On August 10, the 10th Mountain Division staff completed the draft of OPLAN 2380 and conducted a full-scale operational rehearsal at Fort Drum. After some minor corrections, the division published the final plan on September 1, 1994, with change 1 being released on September 8.

**Tweaking OPLAN 2370**

Soon after the JTF 180 planners passed OPLAN 2380 to the 10th Mountain Division, they were told that CINC, USACOM, had changed the planning guidance for OPLAN 2370. Admiral Miller told Shelton to scratch the notion of using eight airborne battalions in Haiti and to go with five battalions instead. The basis for the reduction seemed to be the CINC's new guidance that he wanted to include Marines in the invasion. Shelton joked that the next surprise would be the development of an OPLAN that merged 2370 and 2380. Time would prove just how clairvoyant he was. Meanwhile, in keeping with Miller's directive, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) was designated as the U.S. Marine headquarters to enter Haiti. In mid-August 1994, the 24th was replaced by the 22d Marine Regiment, the 24th MEU's landing force.

Shelton and his planners were not happy with the addition of the Marine unit. The JTF 180 planners believed that USACOM staff officers, in briefing their superiors, were greatly exaggerating the potential threat in Haiti to U.S. forces. According to this view, the USACOM J5 staff was arguing that airborne battalions did not have sufficient survivability if the FAd'H organized strong resistance to oppose the invasion. That possibility increased operational risks and drove the CINC to add the Marines, with their greater firepower and protection capabilities, at the expense of several airborne battalions. As Bonham put it:

> we felt that they [USACOM] had misrepresented us . . . they misrepresented the facts to the DCINC [Deputy CINC] and he gave a
briefing inaccurately [to the CINC]. [Later] they [USACOM] said “We need to go brief the CINC on your plan again so send us your briefing slides.” We said, “No. If the CINC wants to know why we need those [airborne] battalions we will come up and brief the CINC.” USACOM staff did not know the [OPLAN] details. So we played games, they asked for slides and we said [no] we would brief. We did that for quite a while.79

Shelton eventually argued with Miller to retain the original OPLAN 2370. The general explained that he needed airborne forces to provide a rapid entry and shock action. Without eight airborne battalions, the force would become highly dependent upon capturing the airfield at Port-au-Prince and that, in itself, could slow the operation and put the force at higher risk. Miller listened, then stated: “Noted, now go develop a new plan.”80 The admiral provided additional guidance that directed Shelton to ensure that the Marines were used specifically in Port-au-Prince. Miller then conceded that, should the plan be executed in less than ninety-six hours from notification, then Shelton could use eight airborne battalions. If the option was ten days out from execution, however, then five airborne battalions and the Marines would be used. The tactical objectives would be split between Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, with the Marines going into Port-au-Prince.

Shelton returned to Fort Bragg and directed his planners to develop a new plan using Marines. On 21 July, the JTF 180 planners, together with other service planners in support of JTF 180, returned to USACOM and briefed the USACOM J3 operations officer on the new plan (see map 10). During the briefing, Miller walked in and stated, “I already know what I am going to do but go ahead and tell me what you’ve got.”81 Every planner from every service told Miller that putting Marines into Port-au-Prince made no tactical sense. The 82d Airborne Division had already planned the operation, the airspace would be crowded, the JSOTF knew what it was doing, the potential for fratricide would be increased, and the Marines would be better off in Cap Haitien where they could logistically sustain themselves while ashore. Although Miller said nothing, the JTF 180 planners returned to Fort Bragg believing that his mind was already made up.

Later that week, JTF 180 received a message from USACOM directing that they plan on using the five airborne battalions instead of the Marines in Port-au-Prince. The Marines, labeled Special Marine Air/Ground Task Force Caribbean and placed under the command of the NAVFOR, would land on the north part of Haiti and secure Cap Haitien within Area of Operations Hanneken. In essence, Miller
conceded that the JTF commander best knew where to employ his forces, but he still insisted on using Marines in the operation. That concession meant another rewrite of OPLAN 2370. JTF 180 had to recall its Air Force planners from Tucson, Arizona, plus assemble other joint service planners from across the United States. New force structures had to be conceived and new logistical concepts devised and resourced. Still, by August 7, the revised plan was returned to USACOM for approval (see figure 3). 82

Revising OPLAN 2370 was further complicated by the fact that the XVIII Airborne Corps planners at Fort Bragg were also working simultaneously with the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum. The 10th Mountain Division was not doctrinally trained or organized to plan JTF operations and required tremendous augmentation to do so. Major Garrett noted that planning in two locations presented a unique and stressful challenge:

...we [continually] sent people up to [Fort] Drum and vice versa. The problem was that a lot of [subordinate] planners [here] ... were trying
to plan for the forcible entry piece [at Fort Bragg] while trying to plan to support the benign entry that 10th Mountain Division was working on [at Fort Drum]. I am sure they were stretched. The planning was the longest nine months of my life with my work hours going from six in the morning until nine at night Monday through Saturday. We usually took Sunday morning off and then we would come in and work all afternoon.83

**CARICOM Contingent**

In July 1994, USACOM received planning guidance from the JCS to develop plans to include Caribbean nations in the Haiti invasion. Initially, that task fell to Major General Byron, USACOM J5. Through coordination with the U.S. State Department, an initial meeting of several Caribbean nations and U.S. representatives was held in Puerto Rico on July 12, 1994, to discuss the need for and the possibility of creating a Caribbean task force to assist the United Nations in Haiti.

Byron gave the task of developing the Caribbean Command (CARICOM) to U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Chris Olson, USACOM J5, about one week after he arrived in Norfolk, Virginia, after graduating from the National War College.84 Olson received
guidance from Byron to “get as many flags as possible” from the Caribbean nations, even if they could only provide a platoon.\textsuperscript{65} Olson initially coordinated his mission through the State Department, which contacted embassy personnel in the respective Caribbean nations to determine the possibility of their contributing forces to a CARICOM Contingent. Once the State Department received word on which nations were interested, USACOM received permission to begin direct military-to-military discussions on how this unit would form.

Byron went to Port Royal, Jamaica, on July 22, 1994, to meet with military representatives of several Caribbean nations. The purpose of the meeting was to examine the military tasks to be accomplished by a CARICOM force in Haiti once the junta departed. Byron addressed the group by first reading excerpts from a UNSCR dated July 15, 1994, and then stating that “heightened UN activities” required another short-notice meeting of the Caribbean nations.\textsuperscript{86} After a detailed briefing from USACOM on the situation in Haiti, the nations of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Bahamas, Belize, Barbados, Antigua, and Barbuda jointly agreed to provide one platoon of soldiers each.

The meeting further refined mission requirements and provisions for weapons, ammunition, task organization, logistical support, and pay. CARICOM would follow the U.S. invasion force into Haiti after the country was secure. A memorandum of agreement was composed to delineate command and discipline of troops, as well as the chain of command and national lines of communication. The representatives also discussed conducting a peace operation train up in Roosevelt Roads, as well as setting each participant’s minimum-required levels of expertise and service experience. Finally, the parties agreed that the force would ultimately serve under a United Nations mandate.

The CARICOM Contingent would “show that seven islands around Haiti were displeased with the Cedras regime and were joining the United States to help Haiti.”\textsuperscript{87} By having international “flags” committed to the operation, moreover, the invasion shifted from a unilateral U.S. intervention to a United Nations-sanctioned multinational action. A final meeting of the CARICOM participants, USACOM, and the U.S. State Department on August 19, 1994, continued to work out the details of the training plan, organizational issues, logistics, and funding.\textsuperscript{88}
**Border Monitors**

While XVIII Airborne Corps and the 10th Mountain Division worked on their respective OPLANs, another situation unfolded that required U.S. Army forces. It was noted that fuel was being smuggled into Haiti from the Dominican Republic.\(^8\) In the effort to keep pressure on the Cedras junta, UN sanctions had specifically denied fuel imports into Haiti. The Haitian-Dominican border, however, was impossible to monitor without additional forces and technology. Military planners now had to figure out what exactly was needed to monitor the border for compliance with the sanctions and how this task could be best accomplished.

In April 1994, the government of the Dominican Republic transmitted a message to the United Nations Security Council specifying what measures it had taken to enforce the Haitian embargo. The message also requested additional assistance in assessing what further actions might be necessary. On May 6, 1994, Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer established a high commission to oversee the Haitian-Dominican border to prevent border violations and curb smuggling. President Balaguer further requested international border monitors to ensure that the sanctions were being observed.

A United Nations technical group visited the Dominican Republic during May 19–24 and concluded that Santo Domingo should “seek assistance (logistical, technical, and/or personnel) from a friendly country or countries.” The United Nations Security Council, for fear of establishing a precedent for future operations of this type, declined to provide the technical advisers. The Dominican government then asked for United States assistance. On June 1, 1994, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered USACOM to deploy a Technical Assistance Team (TAT) to the Dominican Republic.

USACOM requested that FORSCOM provide an Army unit to conduct three tasks over three days. The tasks were (1) to assess the support requirements for a multinational observer group (MOG) to assist the Dominicans in monitoring, detecting, and reporting UNSCR 917 violations, (2) to operate with the Dominican military in identifying potential border observer sites and observer duties, and (3) to conduct an aviation maintenance assessment of the Dominican military’s aviation. FORSCOM gave the TAT mission to the 1st Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light) (also called the 9th Infantry Regiment), based at Fort Lewis, Washington, and commanded by
Colonel Willie McMillian. McMillian, who did not speak Spanish, received notification of the mission on June 4, 1994.\textsuperscript{90}

McMillian's staff assembled a team of eight officers from within his brigade and six additional personnel from other government agencies for the mission. The group spent June 4–5 going over the political climate within the Dominican Republic and identifying tasks that they might have to accomplish to complete their mission. The TAT departed Fort Lewis on June 6, received additional mission guidance and information at FORSCOM, then departed for the Dominican Republic on June 8.

Upon arrival in the Dominican Republic, McMillian met with U.S. Embassy personnel to coordinate for support and receive additional guidance. The TAT then deployed to five separate sites along the Haitian-Dominican border. The team spent two days examining the sites for their utility in monitoring illegal border crossings. The TAT then moved to the USS Wasp, the headquarters ship for JTF 120, which was anchored in Guantanamo Bay.

The assessment team used the next two days to mull over its findings. McMillian first prebriefed Rear Admiral Abbot, Commander, JTF 120, on his appraisal, then gave a lengthier briefing to CINC, USACOM, via video telephone conference (VTC). According to one observer, McMillian, who had exhausted himself by staying awake almost seventy-two hours, did not "present the excellence that was contained in the actual [written] report." In fact, Rear Admiral Abbot had to "reassure Admiral Miller several times during the briefing that the TAT had conducted an excellent analysis and that the report would 'answer the mail.'"\textsuperscript{91}

The TAT assessment noted several key findings. McMillian believed that the mission could be accomplished but would require more personnel than initially envisioned because of the lengthy border and the need for force protection. The TAT report also delineated the need for robust communications support, to include tactical satellite radios and commercial phones because of the ruggedness of the terrain and its detrimental effect upon communications signals. Logistically, the TAT noted that any mission support package would be almost as large as the unit conducting the operation. Since that kind of support was unlikely, funds would have to be found to pay for host nation provisions, contractors, and U.S. Embassy assistance, particularly in the areas of soldier services, water, food, transportation, and medical support. The aviation assessment, moreover, was grim. For instance, Dominican helicopters were rated unsafe for use by U.S. personnel.
Following the briefing to Miller, the TAT briefed their findings to General Reimer at FORSCOM and then returned to Fort Lewis, where it disbanded.

Those who had been members of the TAT now prepared for possible deployment to the Dominican Republic as border observers. In addition to personal preparation, they worked with the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry—the unit designated to perform the actual border observation mission. That unit trained on weapons qualification, rules of engagement, and situational exercises that included both friendly and hostile military and civilians, reporting procedures, and sanction violation reporting.

On July 2, 1994, the chairman of the JCS published an alert order with the requirement that USACOM develop a MOG order for a multinational headquarters no later than July 11, 1994. USACOM, in turn, tasked JTF 120 to provide the draft order by July 7. CINC, FORSCOM, appointed Colonel William A. McDonough, a Spanish-speaking U.S. officer, as the MOG commander, and he reported to the USS Wasp on July 12. The same day, the U.S. State Department tentatively identified MOG members from Canada, Argentina, France, and several Caribbean nations.

The MOG advanced echelon (ADVON) deployed to the Dominican Republic on July 25 and began extensive preparation of the five observation sites. The United States would place forces at two sites, Peppillo Salcedo and Dajabon, while Argentina, Canada, and the Caribbean troops would control the others. Each site also had representatives from the Dominican military and police, who would react to border violations and provide local security for the observers.

The MOG main body, after going through training at Fort Benning, Georgia, began arriving in the Dominican Republic on September 1. The MOG was now designated CJTF 125 and placed under the control of JTF 120. The U.S., Argentinean, Canadian, and Caribbean forces were coequal headquarters under CJTF 125. All nations went through a mission certification process before assuming their observation site duties on September 11. Each day, the teams sent situation reports on border activity to CJTF 125 headquarters, where they were collated and passed on to JTF 120. A Dominican liaison officer synchronized the site reports with his military so that they could respond to border violations as they occurred.

While the MOG mission was ongoing, McDonough received a message from JTF 120 to develop a plan to pull the MOG off the border
in case Haiti was invaded. On September 17, the MOG was ordered to return to Santo Domingo, which it did without incident. The MOG remained in the Dominican capital until the sanctions on Haiti were lifted on September 26, whereupon the MOG disbanded and returned to their respective home stations.

Building a Bridge

While the MOG was standing up and deploying to the Dominican Republic, the United States, in late July, was persuading the UN Security Council to approve a resolution that allowed member states to force the Haitian junta to accept Aristide's return. As Robert Pastor noted, "This was a watershed event in international relations—the first time that the UN Security Council had authorized the use of force [UNSCR 940] for the purpose of restoring democracy to a member state." UNSCR 940 called for the "application of all necessary means" to restore democracy in Haiti and for the establishment of a multinational force for Haiti.

At USACOM, planners had been watching the diplomatic traffic in earnest and now perceived that an invasion of Haiti was imminent. Consequently, they put tremendous pressure on the XVIII Airborne Corps to finalize OPLAN 2370 and on the 10th Mountain Division to finish OPLAN 2380. In a final burst of effort, both staffs completed their respective plans. On August 29, Lieutenant General William Hartzog, the USACOM Deputy CINC, briefed both plans to the JCS for approval.

In early September 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry authorized CINC, USACOM, to pre-position U.S. forces in anticipation of an operation to invade Haiti. Soon after that authorization, on Friday, September 2, JTF 180 planners, together with representatives from the 10th Mountain Division, were called to USACOM (see figure 4). The command had received recent guidance from the JCS that a new plan needed to be developed—one that would "bridge" the two OPLANs. In essence, the JCS wanted to find an option in the middle—between OPLAN 2370, with its "kick the door down" approach, and OPLAN 2380, where U.S. forces were invited guests. General Hartzog opened the new planning session by stating that "If anyone repeats this I will cut him off at the knees but I feel that we will be in Haiti within the next thirty days." The unit staffs began to brainstorm what the "bridge" plan would be. The XVIII Airborne Corps called the new plan OPLAN 2375.
Figure 4. Haiti command and control political-military channels

prediction of an OPLAN merger back in July had come to fruition. The new plan, according to Major General Meade, needed to reflect “increased flexibility and more options at the last minute than either of the two plans had separately.”

OPLAN 2375 envisioned that OPLAN 2370 would be executed initially but last only two days because of a more passive and cooperative Haitian regime that would pass from the scene rather quickly. OPLAN 2380 would then take over, with the exception that JTF 180 (the XVIII Airborne Corps) would remain in command of the operation, with JTF 190 (the 10th Mountain Division) as a subordinate headquarters. Since both OPLAN 2370 and OPLAN 2380 were still viable options, there were now three OPLANs that needed to be continually refined and resourced for possible execution. The merged OPLAN 2375 required that command and control channels be very clear, since using pieces of two plans could cause confusion. As one Special Forces planner noted, “The most significant challenge was to ensure that SOF [Special Operations Forces] command-and-control channels remained clear during and after transition between JTF 180 and JTF 190.”

On September 9, 1994, XVIII Airborne Corps received an alert order activating both itself, as JTF 180, and the 10th Mountain Division, as JTF 190. JTF 180 planners now worked around the clock to finalize
OPLAN 2375. Simultaneously, the same staff remained prepared to execute either OPLAN 2370 or OPLAN 2380, depending on which option was directed by USACOM. The alert order also stated that OPLANs 2370 and 2380 were approved for execution, with C-day (the date forces would begin to deploy from the United States) being September 10. JTF 190 was directed to begin deployment and began boarding the USS Eisenhower, while the JSOTF boarded the USS America.97

Byron and Donnelly from USACOM J5 went to the National Security Council on September 11 to attend the Haiti Interagency Working Group (IWG). The purpose of the meeting was to conduct a final walk through of the political-military plan as agreed to earlier in the year. Byron briefed the Haiti invasion concept to the entire IWG for the first time and, by doing so, brought the plan "out of the compartment." As Byron began briefing, Donnelly noted that many members of the working group stared in disbelief; not even their own people, who had known about the plan for over a year, had let the secret out. At one point, Byron turned to the Department of Justice representative to explain just how that department was going to train and equip the new Haitian Police force. The Department of Justice representative stated the department could not handle the mission. Byron immediately called USACOM, where the mission was given to Lieutenant Colonel Phil Idiart, in J5. Idiart spent the next three days working at his desk to assemble a plan to create the Interim Public Security Force and the International Police Monitors.98

The Haiti operation remained a secret despite the complications in coordinating planning activities. In the course of a year, no one in the planning compartment had leaked any information regarding Jade Green or any OPLAN variant. Once the plan was briefed to the interagency on September 11, however, the invasion concept appeared in the media within days, to include operational sketches and potential targets (see map 11).99

As the JTF 180 and JTF 190 forces deployed, no one was sure which plan would be executed. Based upon the various orders they had received, unit commanders knew that they were executing OPLAN 2370. Yet force packages for both OPLAN 2370 and OPLAN 2380 had deployed. Moreover, JTF 180 planners were working hard to complete OPLAN 2375, finally producing a feasible "just-in-case" version by September 12. The 2375 plan was briefed to key leaders the next day.

Also that day, the CARICOM Contingent deployed to Puerto Rico for training in peace operations, as specified in a JCS execute order of
September 5. After the meeting in Jamaica, USACOM had issued a planning order on August 27 to coordinate the training and logistical support for the contingent. Lieutenant Colonel Olson used Special Operations Forces to visit participating Caribbean countries to identify what equipment they would need. He discovered that many of the CARICOM soldiers needed everything from canteens, to underwear, to boots. Olson spent his days making hundreds of phone calls to various U.S. equipment depots to locate the items. While doing so, he also discovered that depot personnel did not share his sense of urgency. He could not tell the inquisitive employees specifically why he needed the items because, at that level, the plan was still compartmented. Instead, Olson used his powers of persistence and persuasion to eventually get the supplies he needed.

It was imperative that the supplies be in Puerto Rico so that the CARICOM Contingent could begin a twenty-one-day training cycle on September 13. Olson placed Special Forces personnel at airports, seaports, and rail hubs to update him constantly where each shipment was and to notify him when the supplies arrived in Puerto Rico. Other supplies were coming from the participating nations. Special Forces troops assisted the CARICOM nations in putting their equipment on pallets according to U.S. Air Force specifications so that the items could be flown to Puerto Rico. Olson and his Special Forces "chain of informants" painstakingly tracked every shipment, and CARICOM
training began on schedule. Olson noted that “MG Byron ensured that CNN covered the arrival of the CARICOM forces in Puerto Rico to play ‘mind games’ with Cedras.”

The CARICOM Contingent of about 300 soldiers was eventually joined by a total of twenty-five nations to create the United Nations Mission in Haiti. The contingent’s mission was to conduct peace operations, including guarding the airport, escorting vehicles, and conducting limited security operations in selected Haitian cities. The unit was not to participate in the actual invasion but would follow the invading force at a later date. The CARICOM Contingent was placed under the command and control of the USACOM J5 until it arrived in Haiti, where it would be put under the command of the JTF 190 headquarters.

About the same time that CARICOM was beginning its training, the JTF 180 staff raised two concerns with USACOM. The first issue was the invasion date (D-day), which USACOM had yet to establish. JTF 180’s concern was that, with U.S. forces deploying, the junta would discover that the invasion was about to occur and plan accordingly. The second concern was that many U.S. units were moving to ISBs in Guantanamo Bay, as well as afloat off the coast of Haiti, with no deception plan in effect to try and confuse the Haitian government as to what was happening. Without a deception plan, the JTF 180 staff believed that Cedras and the ruling junta in Haiti would be tipped off as to the imminent invasion. Cedras might then prepare a strong defense that would cost American lives.

USACOM responded to JTF 180’s concerns by stating that a D-day had not yet been determined. JTF 180 planners then assumed that the invasion would occur on September 20, based upon the previously planned ten-day scenario. As far as a deception plan was concerned, Lieutenant Colonel Bonham summed it up by saying, “I don’t think the higher ups ever thought about that or were much concerned about [deception] since they wanted to send a clear signal that this is your final option to get out.” USACOM later notified JTF 180 that D-day would probably be September 19.

On the evening of September 15, 1994, President Clinton addressed the nation, informing his audience that he was directing the secretary of defense to call up military reservists in support of U.S. troops in any action that might be taken in Haiti. Furthermore, he announced that he was ordering two aircraft carriers, the USS Eisenhower and the USS America, into the region. In explaining his actions, the president declared that “beyond the human rights violations, the immigration
problems, the importance of democracy, the United States also has strong interests in not letting dictators, especially in our own region, break their word to the United States and the United Nations.\textsuperscript{106}

The next day, President Clinton notified his subordinate military commanders that he had decided to implement the Haiti military operation. But as the military planners began to prepare to execute this mission, scheduled for the morning of September 19, fate took another twist. Cedras and the junta, which previously had shown no outward signs of responding to diplomatic signals for them to relinquish power, had contacted former President Jimmy Carter and asked for his assistance in negotiating some type of settlement. On September 17, a hastily formed negotiation team consisting of Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and retired General Colin Powell arrived in Haiti to begin—with the permission of President Clinton—negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the crisis.

On September 18, aboard the USS \textit{Mount Whitney}, the command and control ship for JTF 180, the planners had just finished briefing Shelton on OPLAN 2370 and were preparing to go over OPLAN 2375, when the general informed the plans officers that the Carter team was going into Haiti to try and reach an agreement.\textsuperscript{107} What soon developed would test the flexibility of JTF 180's commanders and plans officers. At 1800 on the 18th, CNN announced that the Carter team was still negotiating with Cedras and the de facto government of Haiti. Soon after the CNN announcement, word was received aboard

\textbf{USS Mount Whitney}
Soldiers of the 82d Airborne Division preparing to invade Haiti

Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina
the USS Mount Whitney that the secretary of defense had just signed the execute order for OPLAN 2370. JTF 180 received a CINC, USACOM, message at 2231Z authorizing Operation Uphold Democracy, with D-day–H-hour designated as September 19, 1994, at 0401Z.108

As preparations proceeded for an invasion of Haiti, rumors spread through the Joint Operations Center at USACOM that the Carter team might reach an agreement with the junta. In the meantime, Admiral Miller informed General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the first C-130 aircraft were launching at 1846 and that he, Miller, needed “a call back to give me a degree of confidence so I can start this operation.”109

Admiral Miller began to think through his options. He held discussions with his watch officers over the possible use of OPLAN 2380 vice 2370 and his growing concern of how Shelton would get into Haiti and take charge from the junta. As Miller contemplated the situation, he received word that sixteen C-130s carrying paratroopers had lifted off at 1847 and were now en route to Haiti. Another group of paratroopers was scheduled to lift off at 1930. Miller then directed his transportation officer to allow those soldiers to load up, but not to lift off without his order.

At 1922, CINC, Special Operations Command, called to let Miller know that the Army Rangers were going to lift off from Fort Stewart, Georgia, at 2030. A few minutes later, CNN announced that Carter and Cedras had met for an hour and that a motorcade had just left the embassy. Shortly thereafter, USACOM received word that Carter had reached an agreement for Cedras and his junta to leave Haiti by October 15; there would be an administrative landing of U.S. forces rather than a combat operation.

Miller once again called the JCS and notified them that there were now sixty-two aircraft in the air. He further added that the mission must be canceled by 2100 or aircraft would run out of gas and have to terminate (see figure 5). The JCS, however, would not authorize aborting the mission. At 1940, Miller again called the JCS and stated that “Based upon your verbal authorization, I will put out a message to stop the flow.”110 On September 18, at 2347Z, CINC, USACOM, notified JTF 180 to cease the H-hour countdown and to reset for a “possible OPLAN 2380 the next day.”

With OPLAN 2370 now called off, Miller began to reassess the situation and determine what to do next. He believed that it was imperative to get U.S. forces on the ground as quickly as possible. In
this vein, Shelton received word that he should expect to be meeting with the junta in the morning. Miller also contacted U.S. Ambassador William Swing in Haiti and asked for his advice. Swing stated that it would be of the utmost importance to get a large number of troops on the ground quickly. Miller told Swing that he would be "sending in Shelton early" and that he wanted to put a company on the ground "for atmosphere." 111

An intelligence source mentioned that it would be important to bring in enough forces in case "Cedras stiffs us." Miller agreed. He wanted to ensure that a force went into Camp d’Application right away to show that it was no longer under control of the FAd’H. His operations and intelligence officers also believed that flowing in a large amount of forces quickly would reduce Haitian-versus-Haitian violence. 112

Aboard the USS Mount Whitney, the JTF 180 planners had been working on other missions and were unaware that the operation had changed. Lieutenant Colonel Bonham was surprised when, as he put it, "I was on my way to the Joint Operations Center [aboard the USS Mount Whitney] when I ran into Colonel Stafford. He said ‘Well, I guess you heard that the operation has been canceled.’ I said ‘Goddamn,’ and he said, ‘Yeah, the President’s going to speak in a little while; it’s been canceled.’" 113

The planners immediately convened at 2300. Shelton was shocked that he would be dealing directly with Cedras but agreed to meet with
him at the Port-au-Prince airfield at 1000 the next morning. Shelton gave Bonham two hours to come up with an executable OPLAN based upon the “spirit” of the Carter negotiations.

Bonham sat down at a chalkboard and wrote “ten o’clock meeting with Cedras” on a timeline. Bonham and the rest of the planners realized that they had less than twelve hours to come up with a new OPLAN—one that merged the three OPLANS currently in existence. He then led the staff in planning all the activities required to have security in place by the time of the meeting: an air assault to seize the airport, the securing of the port facility in Port-au-Prince, movement of harbor shipping, the flow of aircraft, and other key events. Also critical was the seizure of a FAD’H weapons cache near the airport known as “Target 27.”

Although the new mission was released as JTF 180 Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 35, the document became known as Uphold Democracy “2380-Plus” because it designated the force package associated with OPLAN 2380 as the main effort. The operational conditions of 2380 Plus, however, were changed from the benign entry of OPLAN 2380 to one taking place in an uncertain environment. The political events of the previous twenty-four hours had occurred so fast that no one was quite sure what to expect.

OPLAN 2380 Plus noted that, while the Carter visit had succeeded, the Haitian environment remained ambiguous. No OPLAN had envisioned that the junta would not only be in power after U.S. forces arrived but that it would have to be dealt with for several weeks before Aristide returned. The order therefore stressed that U.S. forces must enter Haiti quickly, gain the trust of the Haitian people, and stabilize the population, but not in a way that could be considered as overly aggressive. U.S. forces would conduct military operations to restore and preserve civil order; protect U.S. citizens and interests and designated Haitians and third-country nationals; create a secure environment for the restoration of the legitimate government of Haiti; and provide technical assistance to the government of Haiti.

OPLAN 2380 Plus, moreover, emphasized securing Camp d’Application, with its heavy weapons cache, securing Port-au-Prince airfield, and rapidly building up the U.S. military presence on the island.

Shelton approved the 2380 Plus concept at 0100 in the morning on September 19, and by 0300, an OPORD had been issued to the appropriate forces for mission accomplishment. Just after 0900, in a scene reminiscent of the film Apocalypse Now, U.S. Army forces
arrived in Haiti via Blackhawk helicopters. As CNN cameras rolled, 10th Mountain Division soldiers, many of them veterans of Somalia, leapt from their helicopters and, with weapons at the ready, threw themselves down on the tarmac behind their rucksacks. A U.S. Embassy Army officer, wearing his summer Class B uniform, strode out to meet the camouflaged combat troops and told them to relax. Soon, Shelton arrived at Port-au-Prince International Airport, then traveled to the National Palace, where he notified Cedras that he, Shelton, was now in charge. He then began arrangements for Cedras and his fellow junta members to leave the country safely. The next step would then be to return President Aristide to office. The growing mass of 10th Mountain Division troops, meanwhile, tentatively began to move off the airport towards the Light Industrial Complex in Port-au-Prince. The second American occupation of Haiti this century was now unfolding.
Notes

Chapter 2


3. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, March 23, 1994), 204. JOPES is a continuously evolving system that is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations.


5. Armed Forces Staff College Pub 1. The letter "J" means joint or multiservice, "C" stands for combined or multinational, and "G" means general staff or a staff that works for a general officer.


7. CONPLAN stands for "concept plan," a plan put in a concept format, less detailed than a fully developed operations plan or OPLAN.


11. Several plans officers believed that Cedras signed the agreement to placate the United Nations and to buy time to continue solidifying his fellow junta members’ power base.


15. Baker Interview. Also see Lieutenant Commander Peter J. Riehm, “The USS Harlan County Affair,” in *Military Review* (July-August 1997). Riehm conducted extensive oral history interviews with Colonel Pulley, Commander Butcher, and other witnesses to the incident.

16. Freeman Interview. Freeman was in Haiti working for Pax Christi at the time.


19. CINCLANTFLT is the U.S. Navy headquarters subordinate to USACOM and responsible for controlling naval assets for missions such as this one.


21. According to a U.S. Army officer, present estimates are that over 700 Somali gunmen were also killed.


25. Conversation with Riehm by Walter E. Kretchik, May 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. Riehm noted that the boat reconnaissance is standard procedure and generally practiced.


27. Freeman Interview. Riehm, "The USS Harlan County Affair," 33.


29. Freeman Interview.

30. Baker Interview.


32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Freeman Interview.

35. Although care was taken to inform the Haitian people as to the purpose of the embargo, their quality of life, and especially that of the poor, suffered tremendously.


38. The "Harlan County incident" shocked many Americans as well as the international community, who perceived that the ship departed under threats from FAd'H-controlled Haitian thugs. Numerous plans officers believe that the incident backed the United States into a corner and forced the eventual U.S. invasion of Haiti to "save face."
39. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Ed Donnelly by Walter E. Kretchik, October 1995, U.S. Atlantic Command, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP. FORSCOM is USACOM's Army subordinate headquarters that provides Army units for various contingency operations. As an example, if USACOM required a certain type of Army unit for a mission, FORSCOM would help to determine which Army unit would best meet the requirement and then task that unit or its headquarters to support USACOM's mission.

40. Donnelly Interview.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Faïola, Haitian Frustrations, 84.

44. The crisis-action process under JOPES produces an OPORD, not an OPLAN. For historical clarity, however, titles will be used as the various commands referred to them.


46. As commonly applied, there is a difference in meaning between "force entry" and "forcible entry." Force entry is a planning term for an operation where a military force enters another nation-state opposed or unopposed. Forcible entry implies that the force will be opposed.


48. Both Garrett and Benson are graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), a second-year follow-on course for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. SAMS officers receive detailed instruction in the theory of war and peace operations. SAMS graduates first received acclaim as
the “Jedi Knights” for their role in planning Operation Desert Storm.


50. Garrett Interview, 45.

51. Bonham Interview, 9.


53. JTF 180 OPLAN 2370 briefing slides.

54. Haitian police at the time were FAd’H military police, not civil police as in other countries.

55. The heavy weapons company was a major concern for the invasion force, as it represented most of the Haitian Army’s firepower.

56. JTF 180 OPLAN 2370 briefing slides.

57. Bonham points out that Marines were not part of the initial OPLAN 2370 and were added much later. The addition of Marines frustrated the planners, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

58. The 82d Airborne Division chooses to use nonjoint service or U.S. Army official brigade-size unit designations. The unofficial regimental names date back to World War II and are used to inspire tradition and esprit within the 82d.

59. The actual aviation deployment consisted of 583 aviation personnel from two battalions, thirty-three UH-60 Blackhawks, seventeen CH-47s and eight OH-58D Kiowas.


62. Written comment from Dr. John Partin, command historian, U.S. Special Operations Command, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, to Dr. Lawrence Yates, Combat Studies Institute, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. H-hour is the time the operation commenced, with the exact time to be decided based upon the situation and the commander’s intent.


64. OPLAN 2370 briefing slides.

65. Ibid.


67. OPLAN 2370 briefing slides.

68. Bonham Interview, 10. The JCS directed the use of the term “OPORD,” as that is the appropriate document that results from crisis-action planning. The Army corps planners kept referring to an “OPLAN” as a product of deliberate planning, so the JCS attempted to clarify the language. In the Army, however, OPORD means “execute,” as Bonham explains. Therefore, the XVIII Airborne Corps personnel thought for a brief period of time that they were about to invade Haiti.

69. Faiola, Haitian Frustrations, 86.

70. Bonham Interview, 10.

71. Bonham Interview, 11.
72. U.S. Army doctrine does not direct a division to act as a JTF and, therefore, the headquarters has neither the equipment, personnel, nor training to do so. Despite the enthusiasm of many members of the 10th Mountain Division's staff regarding their ability to do joint planning, Major General Meade acknowledged that his staff did not have the maturity or experience required for that mission. See Interview with Major General David Meade by Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski, October 27, 1994, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.


75. Operation Plan 2380, 6-7.


77. 10th Mountain Division Handbook, 7.

78. As Lieutenant General Shelton joked, OPLAN 2375 was devised and written only several days prior to the invasion because of the changing political conditions in Haiti.


80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Revising a plan this complex is not easy and required the staff to work around the clock for several days.

83. Garrett Interview, 45.
84. CARICOM is an acronym for the Caribbean Community, an economic and political organization of English-speaking Caribbean nations. CARICOM was used by the USACOM planners to mean Caribbean Command, instead of Caribbean Community. CARICOM provided a battalion-sized force, with the participating countries each providing about a platoon or around forty personnel.


86. Headquarters, Jamaica Defense Force, “Minutes of a Meeting of the Caribbean Region Executive Session held at the Morgan’s Harbour Hotel on Friday, July 22, 1994.”

87. Olson Interview.


89. The term “fuel” is used loosely. According to one observer, a gallon of fuel was made up of about one-half gallon of fuel, with the remainder being urine and kerosene. The concoction cost about $4 U.S. a gallon.

90. The 1st Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light), was the official name for the 9th Infantry Regiment. Like the 82d Airborne Division, the 9th Regiment commander chose to mimic the use of an unofficial unit designation. The 9th Regiment moniker was adopted primarily because the subordinate battalions are all from the 9th Infantry. Moreover, when the 7th Infantry Division was reformed at Fort Ord, California, former airborne officers with an airborne tradition of using regiments instead of brigade designations made up a great deal of the leadership. I was the I Corps chief of plans at Fort Lewis, Washington, in 1993–94 and watched the process of nominating the 9th Regiment for the Dominican Republic mission. The 9th Infantry Regiment was a unit in limbo in 1993–94, as the 7th Infantry Division (Light) no longer existed except in name only. A large majority of the division, less the 9th Regiment and its own support units, was
inactivated as part of the early 1990s force drawdown mentioned earlier in this chapter. The 9th Regiment, now an independent or separate brigade, was seeking missions to avoid being caught in the drawdown itself. The leaders of I Corps, the senior headquarters at Fort Lewis, saw the MOG mission as an ideal way to give the 9th Regiment a real mission within its capabilities. Trenda noted that McMillian’s lack of Spanish proved to be detrimental and led to his removal as the MOG commander later on. Trenda, in a separate comment to this author, identified McMillian as a hyper individual who had trouble relaxing and getting some sleep. According to Trenda, McMillian drove himself and his staff to the point of exhaustion, thus his removal from the team was more due to McMillian’s personality than his lacking Spanish.

91. Trenda Interview.
93. Bonham Interview, 32.
94. In this publication, for the sake of consistency, the plan will also be called OPLAN 2375.
95. Interview with Major David Stahl by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Dietrich, Center of Military History, 1994, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

100. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Execute Order 051658Z, September 1994.”

101. Olson Interview

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid

104. Ibid.

105. Bonham Interview, 36.


107. Major General Meade said that when he and Lieutenant General Shelton arrived in Guantanamo Bay on September 18, 1994, they did not know, had not been informed of, President Carter’s mission. Meade statement, INSS Conference, National Defense University, January 24, 1997.


109. Crisis Action Team A, Colonel (first name not provided) Fawcett, journal UPDATE A.919, entry number 463, undated, 1.

110. Crisis Action Team A journal, 1.

111. Ibid., 2.

112. Ibid.

113. Bonham Interview, 38.

114. Bonham, 38–40. Also see OPLAN 2380 target list.

116. Ibid.
3

Operation Uphold Democracy:
The Execution Phase

Dr. Robert Baumann and Dr. John Fishel

The Prelude

Operation Uphold Democracy marked the United States' first overt, large-scale military involvement in Haitian affairs since the great misadventure that began in 1915 and dragged on until 1934. This time, the Americans were determined not to repeat the Marines' experience. To begin, U.S. troops would be part of a multinational force with broad international approval for their mission. They brought with them, moreover, a commitment to respect the populace and not to do for Haitians what Haitians might reasonably be expected to do for themselves. Still, circumstances constrained American options. Intense political controversy over the mission in Congress dictated that it be cautious, relatively brief, and confined to achieving minimum objectives that would facilitate the restoration of elective government and stability in Haiti.

Meanwhile, even as they stood by to board their aircraft at Pope Air Force Base, some soldiers, aware from news reports of the Carter mission to Haiti, suspected that operations would be suspended. As explained by Major Mike Davino, 4th Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment,

Although we had received the order to execute, I had a feeling that the operation would still get called off. I had heard earlier that afternoon about the mission former President Jimmy Carter was leading to Haiti to try to head off an invasion. I purposely held off camouflaging my face. After I reported to my plane and drew my parachute at plane side ... Sonny [Moore, the division chaplain] told me that he heard that the mission had been canceled and that the first serial would be turning around and returning to Pope Air Force Base. Sure enough, shortly after I returned to my plane, we heard over the commercial radio on a TMP vehicle that the invasion had been called off. A few minutes later, we got the official word through the chain of command.
The cancellation signified that U.S. troops would enter Haiti unopposed, but not without cost. As the risk of casualties diminished, so, too, did the clarity of the situation. Under the best of circumstances, involvement in the internal affairs of another country, even when greeted by popular support among the host population, is invariably a complex, sensitive, and even risky enterprise. The agreement permitting the peaceful entry of U.S. and multinational troops into Haiti complicated matters by introducing severe ambiguity into what to that point had seemed a difficult but fairly straightforward undertaking.

**Changing Horses in Midstream**

As Clausewitz observed, one should never embark on a war (or, in this case, a military operation other than war) without possessing a clear understanding of objectives and means. OPLAN 2380 Plus, based on an ambiguous assessment of entry conditions in Haiti, represented a hasty amalgamation of elements of OPLANs 2370 and 2380. Planning did not, however, consider the improbable contingency that the OPLAN 2370 take-down plan would be subject to reversal once it was in motion (see figure 6). The abrupt turn of events was fraught with unforeseen implications.

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**Figure 6. Multinational Force command and control organization**

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As Lieutenant General Shelton observed in an interview, “Never in my wildest imagination did I think that I would be coming in here with the mission of cooperating and coordinating in an atmosphere of mutual respect.”

The abrupt switch in approach just hours after forcible-entry operations had been put into motion not only necessitated a hasty psychological adjustment but left considerable uncertainty about the situation on the ground in Haiti. Shelton had no clear knowledge that all armed agencies in Haiti would respect the terms of the new agreement. Had a forcible entry been conducted, armed opposition elements presumably would have been destroyed or at least isolated within a few days. Suddenly, according to the new rules and conditions of American entry, Shelton had to transform himself from a soldier into a diplomat. Nothing in JTF 180 planning to that point had prepared him to undertake direct, peaceful negotiations with the Cedras regime, which only hours earlier he had expected to remove by force.

Compelled to choose a course of action, Shelton opted to err on the side of caution, balancing impressive displays of military power with a civil but firm personal demeanor. He decided that from the moment of his arrival, his personal posture should reflect the confident authority of one who enjoys unquestioned control of the situation, notwithstanding his private reservations. Accordingly, upon landing by helicopter at Port-au-Prince International Airport, the general stepped out in camouflage uniform and beret, looking professional and exuding confidence. He subsequently attempted to press his point home in face-to-face meetings with Cedras and other leaders of the current regime by means of tough talk and unequivocal demands for prompt compliance with all his directives. The posture of American forces in the streets of Port-au-Prince and elsewhere was to reinforce this message for the benefit of the public at large. Shelton wanted America’s military presence to be visible, simultaneously imposing and reassuring.

Establishing just such a posture proved a bit difficult in the initial stages of operations. Part of the problem stemmed from popular expectations among most of the Haitian populace. Many anticipated the immediate arrest or worse of all persons associated with the repressive junta and its armed forces. Instead, they heard conciliatory statements from U.S. spokespersons. As General Powell put it at a news conference with President Clinton and former President Carter, “We have not had to do something which may have contaminated the relationship between the two countries for years, decades to come.” However, the unfolding
scenario in which American liberators appeared to be cooperating with Cedras and the FAd'H (Armed Forces of Haiti) proved confusing and disillusioning to many Haitians. The apparent contradiction in the U.S. approach drew fire from the American press, which later reported that, as a result of the negotiated entry, soldiers received briefings to the effect that the FRAPH (Revolutionary Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti), the paramilitary henchmen of the junta who would have been quickly neutralized according to the original plan, should be considered representatives of a legitimate opposition political party. This portrayal differed sharply from intelligence assessments preceding the mission.

Shelton, nevertheless, had to play the hand he had been dealt. He now saw his objective as severing the junta leadership from the FAd'H without provoking a panic among the rank and file. To facilitate this, he negotiated a turnover of command from Cedras to Major General Jean-Claude Duperval, who in turn promoted figures acceptable to Aristide into high positions in the FAd'H. Believing that he needed the FAd'H in the short run to avert anarchy, Shelton determined to reform the organization incrementally. Its abrupt collapse, he feared, would start a rapid and uncontrollable social decompression that might result in fugitive members forming an anti-Aristide guerrilla movement in the hills. His preferred course, therefore, was to coopt those elements of the FAd'H that were not hopelessly compromised by direct participation in the 1991 coup or complicity in subsequent human rights violations.

As a practical matter, the FAd'H, for all its grave faults, remained the only fully functioning public institution in Haitian society. In recent years, this situation, by default, had conferred on the FAd'H far-reaching civil and judicial authority. Its immediate dissolution would have left none but the American forces (and their multinational partners) in Haiti to fill the void, a role for which they were not adequately equipped due, among other things, to a shortage of Creole linguists and lack of cultural familiarity. Fulfillment of such a role by the Americans, furthermore, would have made the United States and its multinational partners entirely responsible for civil order and welfare across Haiti. Conversely, employment of the popularly despised FAd'H to establish a stable and secure environment in Haiti during the transition of power seemed at best paradoxical. The forced-entry plan, after all, had painted a bull's-eye on the FAd'H, marking it as the enemy. In addition, the assumption, even after the American arrival,
that the FAd‘H could maintain order in Haiti without resort to its customary methods of terror and intimidation proved unsound.

The change in American posture, consequently, not only clouded the soldiers’ sense of the mission but left the Haitian populace baffled and disillusioned. Inclined initially to view the Americans as liberators, most ordinary Haitians experienced a profound sense of unfulfilled expectations upon discovery that American soldiers were negotiating and then collaborating with the despised FAd‘H in maintaining order in the capital. To be sure, many Haitians had expected U.S. forces to exact retribution from members of the junta. Indeed, some envisioned scenes of street justice against their former oppressors of the sort that have long marked transitions of power in the two centuries since the Haitian Revolution. As one American officer observed, all too often in Haiti’s past, vigilante justice was the only kind available to the average Haitian. Indeed, some envisioned scenes of street justice against their former oppressors of the sort that have long marked transitions of power in the two centuries since the Haitian Revolution. As one American officer observed, all too often in Haiti’s past, vigilante justice was the only kind available to the average Haitian. Outbreaks of mob retribution, however, were never part of the American scenario for restoring democracy in Haiti. Thus, at the behest of the United States and the UN, President Aristide urged the populace to remain calm until his return. Whether his public statements in support of reconciliation with his enemies reflected his true feelings was doubted by some. Former Haitian Prime Minister Robert Malval expressed his own skepticism: “In his [Aristide’s] mind, reconciliation meant that the masses and traditional bourgeois would join forces and everyone in between would be left aside.” Whatever the reality, realization that a deal had been cut and that the leaders of the military junta would go unpunished caused palpable disappointment among most Haitians.

Events quickly placed these tensions in full view of the international press corps. The day after the mission began, on September 20, a tragic incident illustrated the initial illogic of the situation. Near the harbor, astonished and frustrated American troops stood by passively while
members of the FAd’H lunged into a peaceful crowd that had gathered to celebrate and observe the extraordinary events unfolding in the capital. The police swiftly attacked the Haitian civilians and brutally beat one man to death. Witnessed by television crews and an international audience, the affair created a public relations crisis. In point of fact, similar incidents had already occurred outside the view of the media. Initial guidance directed that U.S. troops would not supplant the FAd’H in maintaining public order in Haiti; nor would they intervene in “Haitian-on-Haitian violence.” The politically neutral tone of this phrase, in the eyes of some observers, suggested that the Americans were willing to forget the human rights record of the junta and its backers.

The painful result was a loss of prestige and legitimacy among the U.S. and the Multinational Force (MNF), not to mention their initial failure to establish order in Port-au-Prince. The affair not only exasperated American soldiers but publicly humiliated the United States and enhanced the credibility of the FAd’H. Ordinary Haitians were left in doubt as to who was actually in charge. The same day, an American soldier reflected on the situation to a correspondent for the New York Times: “I’m disgusted.” Although U.S. forces adjusted quickly, modifying their rules of engagement (ROE) to prevent a repetition of such incidents, the damage had already been done, and the United States and the Multinational Force had to work diligently to establish the legitimacy that Shelton’s military posture had been intended to achieve. Behind the scenes, Shelton sent an emissary, Colonel Michael Sullivan, commander of the 16th Military Police (MP) Brigade, to Port-au-Prince Police Chief Colonel Michel Francois with an unequivocal message that assaults on the populace would stop or Francois would be held accountable.

Meanwhile, in Haiti’s second city, Cap Haitien, situated on the northern “claw” of the island, the popular “legitimacy” of the intervention was no less at risk. There, however, the U.S. Marines who conducted the initial occupation of the city interpreted the ROE in a less restrictive manner than did Army forces of the 10th Mountain Division’s 1st Brigade Combat Team (1 BCT) in Port-au-Prince. The Marines began aggressive foot patrols upon arrival, thereby establishing a high-visibility presence. On September 24, as one such patrol led by a Marine lieutenant approached the Cap Haitien police station, FAd’H members outside began to make what the lieutenant perceived to be threatening gestures, including one man reaching for a weapon. The Marines opened fire, killing ten of the FAd’H in a brief
fight; no Marines were hit. Third Special Forces Group commander, Colonel Mark Boyatt, later concluded that the incident, however tragic in the immediate context, was from a security perspective the best thing that could have happened.12 10th Mountain’s 2 BCT commander, Colonel James Dubik, concurred that the incident dispelled doubt in the city that U.S. forces were in charge and enhanced the legitimacy of the mission in the public’s mind.13 On the other hand, as Major General David Meade noted, news of the episode inevitably strained working relations with the FAd’H.14

Word of the firefight spread like wildfire, first throughout Cap Haitien and then the entire country. The Haitian people in the main responded enthusiastically. On the following day, September 25, mobs in Cap Haitien looted four police stations. In a related occurrence, rioting and pillage broke out at a warehouse in the city. The Marines sent a Light Armored Reconnaissance Company to halt the disorder. Three days later, on the 29th, a terrorist hurled a grenade into a crowd at a ceremony marking the reinstallation of popular Port-au-Prince mayor, Evans Paul.15 To calm the capital, maneuver elements of JTF 190 poured into the city in force. On September 30, a patrol apprehended “Bobby,” the notorious FRAPH terrorist responsible for the grenade incident. His subsequent interrogation yielded a bounty of information on other operatives. Besides HUMINT (human intelligence) passed on by well-meaning civilians, CNN reporting constantly monitored at headquarters often proved a valuable source of timely reports of breaking events in the capital.16

Although ten deaths and limited disorder were the price of the firefight in Cap Haitien, the message resonated widely that the Americans were serious. About that time, the ROE in Port-au-Prince were clarified to make certain that U.S. soldiers could employ
discretionary force as necessary to prevent any violence directed at members of the Multinational Force or Haitian people. Meanwhile, when 2 BCT under Colonel Dubik replaced the Marines in Cap Haitien on October 2, his troops were perceived by the people as a legitimate force whose mission was to protect them from the predators of the former regime.

Unfortunately, 1 BCT and TF Mountain continued to send mixed signals to the populace in Port-au-Prince. This difficulty apparently stemmed, in part, from Major General Meade’s stringent force protection policy and early hesitation to become engaged in the streets, which in turn flowed from uncertain intelligence and the division’s recent experience in Somalia. Conditioned to a more hostile and explosive environment, the command of the 10th did not interpret and carry out its mission as hoped by Lieutenant General Shelton.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Edward Anderson, the J3 civil affairs officer with JTF 180, the JTF 190 commander and staff did not share Shelton’s view that the mission required U.S. forces to become attuned to “street rhythms” and therefore to maximize engagement of the populace.

JTF 190: The 10th Mountain Division

On July 29, 1994, the 10th Mountain Division “stood up” as Joint Task Force 190 for planning purposes. (The planning effort that resulted in OPLAN 2380 is covered in chapter 2.) One pressing issue concerned the need to transform the division staff into a joint staff, capable of planning for, and exercising control over, a JTF. In part, this meant expanding the 10th Mountain staff to more than double its size (from some 300 to 800), a process that, once completed, resulted in a staff that was joint in name only. There were neither augmentees from the other services nor a “joint plug” from USACOM. As for the newly arrived Army augmentees, some later confessed that they felt like outsiders, isolated from a division staff that had been working together for some time.

In the midst of these adjustments, the division began a mission rehearsal on August 30. Less than two weeks later, it received its deployment order. On September 12, the Aviation Brigade and Colonel
Andrew R. Berdy's 1 BCT deployed by air to Norfolk, Virginia, where they boarded the aircraft carrier, USS Eisenhower. The use of the Eisenhower as an Army helicopter and troop carrier was the first operational test of the concept of adaptive joint force packaging (AJFP), which the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, had directed CINCCOM, Admiral Paul David Miller, to develop. Relatively simple in concept, this arrangement entailed a host of practical problems, beginning with the fact that Army helicopters are large and require greater storage space than their Navy counterparts. Not only did AJFP include using the carrier to transport Army helicopters and troops, but it also required the Navy to support the Army in innovative ways with such services as intelligence. The rest of the division's equipment, meanwhile, deployed by rail to Bayonne, New Jersey, where it was shipped by sea to Haiti. There, units arriving by air would rejoin their equipment.

On the morning of September 19, 1 BCT conducted an air assault into Port-au-Prince International Airport, where it greeted the arrival of Lieutenant General Shelton. Aircraft streamed in, soldiers and matériel stacked up, the press corps assembled, and throngs of Haitians lined the fence marking the airfield perimeter. Confusion reigned. Adding to the muddled scene was the sight of combat troops of 1 BCT taking up defensive positions on the airfield in their BDUs, with body armor, kevlar helmets, and loaded weapons, while a field grade U.S. Army officer in short-sleeve summer uniform and embassy personnel in business suits greeted Shelton, who was wearing his beret and BDUs.

At first, living conditions for U.S. troops were, to put it mildly, Spartan. Latrines were in short supply, as was fresh water. Arriving units gathered their equipment and set up their tents around the airfield, a convenient, if sometimes soggy, location after the rains began. As if the oppressive heat, spiders, and mice were not sufficient reminders of nature's grip on life in Haiti, the fields around the airstrips were sloped to ensure that rainwater drained away from the runways. While conducive to air traffic, this particular landscaping meant that water collected in living and working areas. Following Tropical Storm Gordon, water in the vicinity of the airfield was ankle deep. Conditions on the ground in Port-au-Prince were generally worse than expected, particularly from an engineering standpoint. Engineers were not adequately represented in the planning process, partly as a result of extreme compartmentalization and incomplete intelligence. Once they arrived in country, they had to adopt a number of ad hoc responses to the conditions they discovered. Landfill sites pushed beyond capacity,
inadequate drainage in many places, uncertainty as to the structural soundness of bridges, and the enormity of the sanitation crisis initially took the Americans by surprise.22

The main operational and living center, meanwhile, was set up at the nearby Light Industrial Complex. There, sandbags and concertina wire secured the front perimeter of the encampment facing the road to the airport. Physical security measures, such as a fence, were gradually developed in the rear of the compound, which was bordered by open fields. The chief security measure initiated outside the encampment was the clearing of massive piles of foul garbage and waste, often ten feet deep, that constricted the city’s main streets.

Between September 20 and 28, follow-on elements of the 10th Mountain Division reached Haiti, and a sense of order gradually prevailed. In addition to 1 BCT in Port-au-Prince and 2 BCT in Cap Haitien, Task Force Mountain arrived to form a third maneuver element of the 10th. Based in Port-au-Prince, Task Force Mountain, under the command of Brigadier General George Close, organized remaining division assets around 10th Mountain’s artillery element, which was reconfigured to operate as a headquarters. This organizational expedient, already tested in Somalia, worked out effectively, given that there was no requirement for standard artillery in Haiti and that the division artillery possessed the requisite staff and communications infrastructure to support a maneuver element.

To his credit, Major General Meade recognized that neither U.S. troops nor the MNF could impose a political solution on Haiti that would secure democracy. A Haitian solution offered the only path to stability. Given that precondition, U.S. forces and the MNF could not assume the role of Aristide’s police force, rounding up every last paramilitary thug or weapon, an impossible task in any event. Furthermore, an endless search of dwellings, churches, and schools might drive the enemies of the regime to resort to desperate measures, including attacks on U.S. and MNF soldiers. Meade thus concluded that Aristide needed to preserve, and probably coopt, the military and police with the exception of those
personnel whose criminality was beyond doubt. Resurrection of the judiciary would be the next essential step on the road to elections. Unfortunately, in Meade’s view, the Aristide government appeared to have no such vision, and without strategic guidance, day to day operations by the MNF lacked overarching purpose. Given the circumstances, Meade did not intend to risk his troops by flailing aimlessly about the capital.

The concept of operations that guided the 10th Mountain Division’s share of JTF 190 was that 1 BCT and Task Force Mountain would control the principal center of gravity, which had been identified as Port-au-Prince, while 2 BCT would control Cap Haitien, the secondary center of gravity. Troops of the 10th Mountain Division began patrolling the capital by day and later expanded operations to include missions “out of sector” and, beginning on October 1, so-called “mountain strikes” in search of concealed weapons stores. The timing of the campaign reflected a desire to disarm likely troublemakers before the arrival of President Aristide later that month. Searching for weapons soon revealed that not all tips were reliable and that some may have been inspired by ulterior motives, such as personal revenge. According to Major Chris Hughes, who accompanied the force in the field as an analyst for the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), 90 percent of searches turned up no weapons. In one such foray on October 7, a combined arms team from TF Mountain confronted a band of FRAPH members at a barricaded site in central Port-au-Prince. With the help of a few smoke grenades and warning shots, they managed to clear the building but turned up no weapons.

Of equal concern was the fact that for many Haitians, who tended to congregate wherever there were groups of U.S. troops, the mere search of a local residence implied that the occupants were supporters or henchmen of the Cedras regime. As observed by CALL analysts, crowds acting on that assumption sometimes stormed and looted homes in the wake of the American inspections. Though an unintended consequence of U.S. actions, such outbursts might have been anticipated. To preclude further violence of this nature, American PSYOP teams attached to search and seizure missions began announcing by loudspeaker when no weapons were found and urged that the property of those whose homes had been searched should be respected.

U.S. Military Police proved invaluable in many street situations in Port-au-Prince. More accustomed by training than infantrymen to carrying out arrests and other missions at the low end of the violence
Locating a weapons cache site

continuum, MPs demonstrated the ability to seize suspects, while exercising restraint and preventing situations that might have degenerated into exchanges of gunfire. In one instance, when a group of U.S. infantrymen was in pursuit of a notorious and armed fugitive, MPs on the scene calmly approached the suspect, instructed him to leave his vehicle and turn over his weapons, and took him into custody without creating any disturbance. The MPs exercised extraordinary latitude in the arrest and detention of suspects, who were taken to a holding facility upon apprehension. MPs at the facility had not only to maintain humane conditions but were prepared to receive attorneys, family members, and even diplomats who came to visit detainees. Their mission also entailed facilitating the release of individuals who, although found innocent of any crimes, might become the targets of retribution from Haitians perceiving them to have been associated with the hated former regime. The issuance of identification cards in Haitian Creole, affirming that the U.S. Army had not found the individual in question responsible for any crimes against the populace or members of the Multinational Force, was one way of dealing with this problem.

Throughout Port au Prince, MPs began to take shifts at Haitian police stations, both to provide supervision and to set a professional example. Female MPs, at first a curiosity in the context of male-dominated Haitian culture, acquitted themselves well. The MP Corps also introduced police dogs to Haiti. The large American shepherds, gigantic by comparison to the scrawny curs that scurried about the streets of the
-capital, immediately gained the respect of potentially rowdy individuals. Their presence also tended to facilitate successful interrogations. In addition to patrolling the streets of Port-au-Prince, MPs and other elements of 1 BCT and Task Force Mountain eventually provided security for President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the Presidential Palace, guarded key locations, conducted reconnaissance, and provided logistical and administrative support.

Meanwhile, acting as a JTF headquarters, the 10th Mountain Division served also as the Multinational Force headquarters and assumed responsibility for the reception, tasking, and supervision of MNF units (see map 12). This began with the arrival of the CARICOM battalion on October 4, a Guatemalan company on October 24, a Bangladesh battalion on October 28, and finally a platoon from Costa Rica. The division further served as the higher headquarters for the International Police Monitors and UN observers. Not least of all, it also carried out the weapons buy-back program, with varied success, and helped supervise the repatriation to Haiti of refugees deported from Guantanamo Bay.

Still, as noted previously, the execution of operations by the 10th Mountain Division in Port-au-Prince did not fully meet the expectations of Shelton and JTF 180 headquarters. Some observers believed a “base camp” mentality pervaded the force. Restriction of personnel to Camp Democracy (as the LIC became known) was so tight that the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) could not function effectively;
Viewed from left, Lieutenant Colonel Graham (Jamaica), Commander, CARICOM, talks with Admiral Paul D. Miller and Lieutenant General Henry H. Shelton

furthermore, security requirements made it difficult to bring Haitians within the compound. Civil affairs officers subsequently found it somewhat easier to work outside the LIC, in the Haiti Assistance Coordination Center, or HACC. 31

Without question, Meade kept force protection at the forefront of his concerns from the outset and demanded the strictest possible adherence. On the day U.S. troops began arriving, soldiers were ordered in no uncertain terms not to fraternize with Haitians through the chain link fence around the airfield at Port-au-Prince. Moreover, despite the oppressive heat and humidity, even slight deviations in the wearing of kevlar helmets with chin straps fastened, not to mention full body armor, were liable to draw a stern rebuke or worse. The general was entirely justified in making force protection a priority until the threat to U.S. personnel in Haiti could be clarified. The division’s policy was inflexible, however, and did not change in a timely fashion, either to reflect the virtual absence of resistance or Shelton’s sense of the mission 32

It could hardly have been expected that the 10th would easily put behind it the experience of Somalia, where a humanitarian mission devolved into a conflict leading to the deaths of eighteen Army Rangers in a firefight. The highly publicized incident attracted intense political scrutiny and led to a reversal of U.S. policy and a withdrawal of
American troops. Many officers in the division had been to Somalia, and one survey indicated that 40 percent of enlisted personnel in the 10th had previously deployed there. Although the division had been chosen for the permissive-entry mission in Haiti, training at Ft. Drum prior to deployment stressed combat tasks, including the use of mortars, artillery, and C-130 gunships. The division staff did not assume that entry would in fact be permissive. Whatever his own perceptions prior to deployment, it would be mistaken to infer that Meade failed to realize that Haiti was not another Somalia after the division began operations in Haiti. Meade's grasp of the difference emerged in a personal memorandum sent not long after October 15 to Admiral Miller at ACOM. Noting that the level of threat constituted the "biggest difference" between Somalia and Haiti, Meade explained that the 10th had entered a Somalia where five years of civil war had created entrenched, armed factions. There, the United States had forfeited its neutrality and been drawn into the conflict. Many of the Somali officers were not only veteran fighters but had at one time trained either in the United States or Soviet Union. In contrast, "The threat in Haiti was not well armed or equipped." The U.S. forces had established and preserved a position of neutrality in Haiti, as confirmed by the fact that "we still get calls for assistance from all sides." Above all, in Meade's view, the force remained popular with the general public.

Notwithstanding his clear-eyed appraisal of the stark difference between conditions in Somalia and Haiti, Meade added a cautionary note: "But as we learned in Somalia, we cannot let our guard down and must be ever vigilant. You can never tell when the population may get excited or when just a single person or group of people may threaten the safety of American soldiers." Force protection policy in Port-au-Prince reflected this concern.

American troops rarely left the living compound at the Light Industrial Complex because of restrictions imposed as part of the division force protection policy. Consequently, 10th Mountain Division units during the first two weeks of the mission in Port-au-Prince did not actively patrol the city by night, thereby unintentionally leaving the streets to the regime's armed thugs. One particularly harmful consequence was that Haitians who voluntarily brought valuable information to the Americans about the whereabouts of weapons caches or noted criminal figures associated with the old regime were left vulnerable to reprisal. A notable feature of life in Port-au-Prince, especially in the beginning of Uphold Democracy, was that each morning dead bodies could be found in the streets. When
American troops did venture out of doors, they wore helmets and body armor. The force protection posture gradually eased within the compound but remained in full force for anyone venturing into the city. This proved especially frustrating and demoralizing for some of the Army's Haitian-American linguists who were prevented from visiting their families early in the mission.\textsuperscript{36} Inactivity, moreover, bred boredom among the troops and nurtured the perception that the mission lacked a real purpose.

According to one well-placed officer, Meade's emphasis on force protection compelled Shelton, who initially expected to remain with JTF 180 in Haiti for only about a week, to extend his stay to thirty-five days in order to supervise the mission personally.\textsuperscript{37} Shelton and the JTF 180 staff could not comprehend initially why the 10th Mountain Division had not moved quickly to define sectors in Port-au-Prince and cultivate an active presence in the city. From the perspective of the division, roving patrols of MPs were adequate to achieve the intended effect. This led Lieutenant Colonel Anderson of JTF 180 to conclude, "The 10th Mountain Division seems to have come out of their experience in Somalia with a siege mentality, where it seems that they have made the determination, at least from their actions, that there is a significant threat out there. ... And, of course, our assessment is totally the opposite."\textsuperscript{38} Whatever Meade's misgivings, Shelton wanted American soldiers in the streets engaging the populace.

Gradually, and after much prodding, the 10th Mountain Division became more active in Port-au-Prince and its environs. Ultimately, U.S. troops found that the most opportune time to move convoys through the streets of the capital was at night, when movement was not impeded by the heavy traffic that prevailed during daylight. Furthermore, they abandoned all pretense of moving with tactical stealth during darkness. In the first place, barking dogs announced all comers in the generally quiet streets. In the second, the troops concluded that overt movement at night actually reduced the chances of precipitating an incident.\textsuperscript{39}

**Engaging the Populace**

In brief, the U.S. mission as sanctioned by the United Nations called for the establishment of a safe and secure environment suitable to the restoration of the Aristide presidency and the near-term conduct of national elections. If the objective itself was reasonably clear, the
concrete steps by which it was to be obtained were less so, and the consequent ambiguity contributed to divergent approaches.

In analyzing the prospects for violence against U.S. forces in Haiti, Army intelligence had anticipated more random attacks on American soldiers than actually occurred. 40 Indeed, OPLAN 2380 stated, “There will be armed individuals, criminal bands, dissidents, malcontents, opportunists or whomever, ready to cause trouble and, given the opportunity, harm the force, and thus the mission.” 41 The resultant caution exercised by JTF 190, however, was self-reinforcing. The failure to be more active in the streets denied Meade’s headquarters the human intelligence that might have changed their perception of the threat. The reality in Haiti was that, once the Americans had consolidated their position in the capital, the most significant threats were the deplorable state of sanitation, low-hanging power lines, and the virtual absence of manhole covers along city streets. 42 Recognizing this fact, nonmilitary observers, who moved throughout the capital extensively, drew their own conclusions. According to Dr. Bryant Freeman, a long-time expert on Haiti from the University of Kansas, who subsequently served as an adviser to Major General Joseph Kinzer, commander of the United Nations Mission beginning in March 1995, the preoccupation of American forces in Port-au-Prince could be summed up in two words: “no casualties.” Gradually, especially after the departure of the 10th, the American posture moderated, in this respect, but conventional forces in the capital never let down their guard. 43

Many in the press offered scathing commentary on this tendency. Writing an opinion piece for the New York Times, Bob Shacochis charged in January 1995, “If one lesson has emerged from the occupation, it is this: in the post-Cold War world of small, messy conflicts, the U.S. Army might as well leave the infantry at home.” The “muscle-bound” 10th Mountain Division, he claimed, “has rarely seemed capable of pushing more than two buttons[,] establishing secure perimeters around ports and airfields or sending limited patrols out as a show of force.” 44

In the view of the JTF 180 leadership, achievement of the mission required winning the trust and confidence of the populace, a task calling for far more intimate contact with the people in their own streets and neighborhoods. Not only would such contact serve to create the proper psychological climate for the restoration of civil life, but such engagement, on a regular and sustained basis, would predictably yield a bounty of information on local circumstances and events. 45 A civil
affairs officer, one of the few American soldiers with the freedom to move around the capital, asserted that the JTF 190 leadership had isolated itself and lacked an appreciation of the public mood.46 The Americans, moreover, were not playing to their strength. As summarized in CALL’s Initial Impressions Report II, published in April 1995, “The American soldier and his presence on the streets, market places, parks, schools, and businesses of the cities and on the roads, fields, and villages of the countryside were the greatest weapon present to prevent oppression.”47

A related question concerning the employment of U.S. forces was the continuing requirement that troops in Port-au-Prince wear helmets and body armor whenever they moved outside the compound, despite the intense tropical heat and a declining perception of the threat. In fact, the first CALL team to return from Haiti recommended a reassessment of this requirement in its November briefing.48 U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers, free of this requirement in the hinterlands, came sarcastically to refer to the Port-au-Prince area as the “kevlar zone.”49 Yet as one officer in the 10th observed, no U.S. soldiers were lost in Port-au-Prince, at least in part because of their “no nonsense” posture.50

In general, the preoccupation with force protection varied inversely with proximity to the JTF 190 headquarters. The 2 BCT, 10th Mountain Division, in Cap Haitien operated more assertively than did 1 BCT and TF Mountain. There, of course, the Marines had set the early tone, and
the distance from division headquarters encouraged greater initiative. Furthermore, Meade, preoccupied with the task of controlling Port-au-Prince, neither phoned nor summoned Colonel Dubik on a regular basis. The refusal to interfere was to Meade’s credit. In the meantime, the transition from Marine to Army operations in Haiti’s second largest city went relatively smoothly. Two weeks before the handover, the Army sent a Forward Support Battalion into operation in Cap Haitien to ensure advance coordination and proper logistical support for arriving Army elements. The additional time also provided an opportunity to establish security around the port facilities and the U.S. encampment. There, Americans soon concluded that the greatest threat to security was the apparent absence of a threat, a perception that might breed complacency and negligence.51 Regardless of the circumstances, U.S. soldiers could not afford to become casual about security.

The desired military end state, a secure and stable environment, ultimately required definition by commanders on the ground. Dubik offered a general definition and formulation: “Acts of violence and criminal acts below the threshold that interrupts normal civic and economic life. . . . [S]ea and airports open to normal traffic and functions.”52 Accordingly, he developed a four-phased campaign plan to achieve this end state. Phase I consisted of occupying the port and airfield at Cap Haitien (see map 13). Phase II involved airport and port
security operations and city security. Phase III saw the addition of operations in outlying areas, and Phase IV prepared and executed partial redeployment of the force in conjunction with the planned transition to UNMIH. Specific security operations included securing fixed facilities, conducting patrols in the city and over 14,000 square kilometers of northern Haiti, emplacing U.S. Army Special Forces Operational Detachments Alpha or ODAs ("A-teams," normally consisting of a dozen soldiers, but often split up into smaller groups in Haiti) in the small villages of the zone, and establishing the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) and the local prison. These activities were supported by civic-action projects and a coordinated information campaign.

By mid-October, elements of the Multinational Force had arrived, requiring General Meade, its commander (as well as that of JTF 190) to negotiate the missions of the third-country forces allocated to him. The situation was even more complex in Cap Haitien, where Dubik commanded the joint and multinational 2 BCT built around the 2d Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division and consisting of U.S. Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard elements; a Caribbean battalion; a Guatemalan composite company; Haitian IPSF police; United Nations Observers; and International Police Monitors. Overall, Dubik oversaw or coordinated with personnel from nearly a dozen nations (see figure 7).

Map 13. Special Operations Forces locations
The U.S. Understanding of Haiti

Without doubt, the diverging points of view held by U.S. commands stemmed in part from a collective shortage of knowledge about Haiti and Haitians. Though armed with considerable intelligence on Haitian politics, heavy weapons stocks, and port facilities, the Americans’ cultural understanding of Haitians was generally superficial. Even Shelton indirectly acknowledged this fact. His background meetings on Haitian culture, by his own account, focused on the roles and probable actions of central political figures. Former acting ambassador to Haiti, Barry Watson, offered advice on the likely behavior of the Haitian public to the Americans on their arrival, as did the general’s aide, Haitian-American linguist, Captain Berthony Ladouceur. Still, this offered a limited prognosis on the effects of the prolonged, direct interaction between Americans and Haitians that was to follow.

Given this cursory understanding of Haitian political culture, Shelton’s guiding adage for American conduct was short and to the point: “...there are two things that they [Haitians] understood: one was force and one was fear.” In fact, this was more a prescription for handling Cedras and his henchmen than for dealing with ordinary Haitians, whom American soldiers would come to understand through direct engagement.

In the meantime, American understanding of Haitians depended inordinately on the knowledge of Haitian-Americans in the force, most of whom served as linguists in support of the mission. The essential
PERSONNEL:
US FORCES MNF HAITI
MILITARY 16253
CIVILIAN 195
COALITION FORCES 551
US FORCES IN JOA 11773
TOTAL STRENGTH 28762

INFANTRY BATTALIONS: 5 (6 US, 1 CARICOM)
MP COMPANIES: 8

AIRCRAFT
OH58 12
AH1 14
UH60 28
CH47 17
UH60V 9
TOTAL 80

ARMORED VEHICLES:
BRADLEY FV (M2) 14
SHERIDAN (M551) 29

Figure 7. Multinational Force, Haiti, October 15, 1994

contribution of Creole linguists can hardly be overstated in as much as they were integral to virtually all communication and interaction with the native populace. Still, the utter dependency of the force on a relative handful of cultural navigators was a source of slight discomfort as well. The information provided by members of the Haitian community in the United States, even those who were full-time soldiers, could not be easily confirmed due to the virtual absence of alternative sources. This was a concern for two reasons. First, many Haitian-Americans had spent little or no time in Haiti during the previous fifteen to twenty years and therefore had little direct knowledge of the country’s current social and political climate. On the other hand, the fact that many retained familial or other ties to the Republic of Haiti mitigated this concern to some degree, but in turn suggested a new problem. To the extent that Haitian-American soldiers were connected through relatives or contacts to affairs in their former country, it was not unreasonable to assume that some might be unduly influenced in the way they approached the mission.57

Some native Haitians drew the same conclusion and were reticent in dealing with Haitian-American linguists out of concern for the possible ties these people might have to elements inside the Haitian regime. According to Dr. Bryant Freeman, a knowledgeable Haitian citizen whom he brought over for an interview with Major General Kinzer (Commander, UNMIH) in 1995 refused to discuss anything of importance in the presence of a Haitian-American lieutenant colonel.58
At the same time, some Haitian-American soldiers harbored apprehensions about their own personal security or that of relatives and friends. Captain Ladouceur observed that some of the linguists declined upon arrival to wear name tags for fear of recognition by figures hostile to the American presence.59

Still, Haitian-American soldiers often helped clear up simple misconceptions. For example, one Army primer on Haiti erroneously advised against wearing red hats, suggesting that Haitians would construe this as threatening. On a strategic level, Haitian-Americans such as Ladouceur repeatedly emphasized that they did not expect significant resistance in Haiti and that the environment there would not, on the whole, prove threatening to U.S. troops.60 Events proved this observation well founded. Finally, linguists were critical to making assessments on the spot, especially in remote areas. Conversely, the absence of linguists could have adverse consequences. In one instance, Special Forces soldiers, lacking a linguist, were led by an English-speaking Haitian woman to arrest a local figure, whom she identified as a criminal thug. Shortly thereafter, a large crowd formed outside the jail to protest the incarceration of one of the town's leading proponents of democracy.61

In the final analysis, the United States had little choice but to depend on Haitian-Americans, not only for cultural assessments but for their services as linguists. An early survey by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) revealed that the Army simply did not have the minimum essential number of Creole linguists in its ranks. As a result, the Army was forced to seek the assistance of a private contractor, BDM Corporation, to bolster linguistic support.62 To be sure, the Army possessed a small number of Creole speakers of non-Haitian origin among the Special Forces contingent, but facility with the language was in general lacking, as was an understanding of the country. Fluency in French, as opposed to Creole, was an asset but provided access only to the small, educated slice of the populace who spoke the language.

Special Forces (SF) in Haiti

While the main elements of the 10th Mountain Division operated out of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, both regarded as centers of gravity in Uphold Democracy, the remainder of the country belonged to U.S. Army Special Forces in an "economy of force" role. Like the rest of JTF 190, Special Forces had not anticipated the sudden switch of
missions following the Carter-Cedras agreement. One immediate consequence was that the aircraft called for under the forcible entry plan to get them to Haiti were not available. They deployed, nevertheless, courtesy of Air Force Special Operations Command aircraft, which had originally been assigned to combat missions. Once on the ground, the Special Forces promptly fanned across Haiti in a “hub and spoke” network (see figure 8), establishing themselves in one area, then moving on to new ones.

From the outset, Special Forces elements did not hesitate to take charge. As they radiated out from forward operating bases in Jacmel, Cap Haitien, and Gonaives (the “hubs”), SF A-Teams demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to local conditions and take the initiative. Above all, they quickly implemented a policy of maximum engagement of the populace. Their assessment upon arrival was that the threat to U.S. forces in Haiti was relatively low, and they reached out accordingly. Given their small numbers, Special Forces teams needed all available hands if they were to make a difference by their presence. They established contact with community leaders (or, on occasion, even appointed them if none could be found), patiently explained the nature of their mission, and enlisted the cooperation of locals in moving quickly to establish area security. An important piece of this action was to identify the worst local criminals and human rights abusers. Under the rules for weapons seizures in UN Chapter VII, the Special Forces had broad discretion to hold individuals the natives

![Figure 8. The 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne) "Hub and Spoke" Concept](image-url)
identified as threats to peace and order until hearings could be conducted. (In one instance at Fort Liberté, Special Forces and Rangers apprehended seventeen suspected "attachés," the U.S. term for proregime vigilantes in a barracks and seized fifty to sixty semiautomatic assault weapons. The guns turned out to be in poor condition but still could have posed a threat to U.S. personnel.)63 Determining who should be detained resulted in occasional errors, most of which were rectified as soon as they were discovered.64

Sometimes, the arrest of well-known thugs reaped huge public relations dividends for American soldiers. In one small town, when Sergeant First Class Sam Makanani single-handedly captured a much-despised FAd'H member, his persona quickly catapulted to hero status, and he was lionized in songs and stories. Makanani’s ability to speak French and play the guitar further enhanced his celebrity and fostered his emotional connection to the people.65

In establishing area security, the Special Forces had to be careful not to undermine completely the remnants of the FAd'H, an organization with which they would have to work, if possible, during the period of transition to a new police force. One instance related by a Special Forces officer illustrates the delicacy of the situation as well as the need for quick decisions. On the day in September when Major Tony Schwalm arrived in Jacmel to assume control of the city, he observed a crowd that had already formed at the airfield. As Schwalm looked on, a
group of Haitians attacked and disarmed a member of the FAd’H who was doing guard duty along the airfield’s perimeter. Responding rapidly to keep the situation under control, a Special Forces NCO jumped into the crowd, seized the weapon the group had taken from the guard, and returned it to the FAd’H soldier, in the process making the point that acts of violence against FAd’H members, and anarchy in general, were unacceptable.

As they carried out arrests and engaged the population, Special Forces soldiers remained attuned to Haitian cultural concerns. They cuffed the hands of detainees in front of their bodies, rather than in back, the latter method having associations with slavery and thus regarded as particularly humiliating. In another instance, a Special Forces medic brought a Voodoo priest with him to treat a seriously ill Haitian patient. Rather than clash with Haitian beliefs about the spiritual dimensions of sickness, the medic applied conventional, modern medicine within the prevailing belief system of rural Haiti.

At times, the Americans also had to learn from their mistakes. In Jacmel, Special Forces organized Haitians and helped them repaint a FAd’H station so as to erase its association with the junta’s brutality. The SF subsequently learned that their active participation in this task was perceived by the locals as usurping a role that properly should have been filled by Haitians. Special Forces officers often found themselves exercising authority over extremely large areas. With thirty-five soldiers (soon cut to twenty-five) under his command, Captain James Dusenberry served as the senior U.S. officer on La Gonave, an island with a population of about 80,000. As part of his duties, Dusenberry had to sort out conflicting accusations about which locals were guilty of crimes against the population and who might be concealing arms and so forth. He prudently stuck to U.S. standards of jurisprudence and declined to “go around busting down doors every time someone accused someone else of having a weapon.” On one occasion, locals urged him to arrest a seventy-year-old blind woman who, they claimed, was a werewolf. Dusenberry chose not to act on this recommendation. Elsewhere in Haiti reports of zombies, ghosts, and witches were not unusual.

Among the first projects in which SF participated was the Weapons Buy Back Program, conducted at thirteen sites across Haiti. Although there would be debate about the effectiveness of the operation, it did help address popular and governmental concerns that hidden weapons might be used by supporters of the junta to undermine Haiti’s democracy.
directed a month-long PSYOP effort to secure public cooperation. Still, initial collection proved a problem. In a typical case at Bowen airfield on September 27–28, only eight guns were accepted on the first day. As a result, intelligence teams from JTF 190 went into the field to survey the public to find out what went wrong. The answer should not have come as a great surprise: the presence of FAd'H personnel at the site intimidated many. Others were overawed by the throngs of reporters who besieged the first Haitians who turned in weapons. Another factor was that cash payments were initially lower than the market value of the weapons. Soon, procedures were altered both to raise the payments for weapons and to pay for information leading to weapons seizures.

As an integral part of neutralizing security concerns, Special Forces moved proactively to build local support, working quietly to help restore functioning local government. This often meant giving lessons in the elementary civics of a democracy or calling town meetings. Special Forces organized the populace to undertake infrastructure repairs and, as necessary, provide expertise to restore well pumps and power generators. All the while, they tried to resist the temptation to do for the natives what the natives could do for themselves. When necessary, Special Forces prodded local judges to hear outstanding cases of individuals who had long been held in Haitian prisons without formal charges or without formal notification of their next of kin. Haiti’s judicial system had scarcely functioned prior to Uphold Democracy. In Les Cayes, on Haiti’s south coast, SF soldiers entered the notorious local jail, where they found forty-two emaciated prisoners confined to a single cell in conditions of criminal neglect. Special Forces teams located the responsible parties and instructed them to make immediate changes.

Even the Special Forces, of course, could not ignore the threat of sporadic attacks in Haiti. Proof came relatively early in the mission when a member of the FAd'H shot and wounded a Special Forces soldier in Les Cayes. The area Special Forces commander, Major Tony Schwalm, disarmed all of the local FAd'H on the following day. At the request of Brigadier General Richard Potter, the commander of TF Raleigh, a quick reaction force of U.S. Army Rangers, in full body armor, promptly reached the scene by U.S. Army MH-47 Chinook helicopter to offer vivid demonstration of the combat power readily available to remotely situated A-Teams. The Rangers searched the homes of area FAd'H members and seized their weapons. In Potter’s view, the episode marked a “turning point” in establishing calm in the
vicinity of Les Cayes. Potter directed the rotation of two Ranger companies through the area for nine days to make his point. Gradually, the quick-reaction-force role passed to infantry of the 10th Mountain Division.

Unfortunately, the working relationship between Special Forces and conventional forces operating in Port-au-Prince was not always smooth. In the first place, SF soldiers, who did not routinely wear helmet and body armor in the countryside, chafed under the restrictive force protection controls they encountered upon entering the "kevlar zone." Owing largely to differences in doctrine, training, and SOF culture, Special Forces, PSYOP, and civil affairs personnel, on the one hand, and conventional warriors, on the other, sometimes lacked a common perspective. At times, personnel of the 10th Mountain Division were unaware of what was happening in the countryside and on occasion were surprised to encounter Special Forces teams when conducting out-of-sector missions in more remote parts of Haiti. In a muted reference to this problem, Potter observed on October 23, "I think there is a misunderstanding [on the part of 10th Mountain and the JTF 190 command] of what SOF does and how it does it."

Consisting of exceptionally mature, self-reliant soldiers, SF teams in the field must constantly improvise and are sometimes accustomed to operating with less formality and regimentation than is customary in many conventional units. What Special Forces often construe as accommodation to local conditions, conventional troops sometimes view as a violation of good order and soldierly conduct. On occasion, despite warnings from their own officers, SF soldiers neglected to adopt the prescribed dress standard when they entered the Port-au-Prince area and were subject to punishments of varying severity. A few were personally reprimanded by Major General Meade. In one encounter on the first day of operations in Haiti, Brigadier General George Close, 10th Mountain's assistant deputy commander, instructed bewildered Special Forces soldiers in no uncertain terms not to mingle with Haitians through the fence at the airport. Soldiers who have operated in conventional and unconventional environments attest both to the differences in military culture between the two and to the fact that misperceptions are not uncommon. In this case, the Special Forces soldiers' sense of what their mission naturally entailed, engagement of the populace collided with the JTF 190 requirement for force protection.

One oft-mentioned instance of misunderstanding in Haiti occurred just days into the mission at Camp d'Application, home to the Haitian
Military Academy (and, subsequently, the new police academy) and the FAd'H special weapons company, identified as a principal threat by Army intelligence prior to Uphold Democracy. Soldiers from 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne) reached the camp with the mission of taking control of the grounds and weapons but also of building a working relationship with FAd'H soldiers there, with whom they would have to cooperate soon. In this spirit, Special Forces and members of the FAd'H set up shared accommodations in the barracks. By chance, and without prior coordination between the conventional and unconventional forces, a unit from the 10th Mountain Division subsequently arrived on the scene to retrieve the camp’s heavy weapons. Unaware of what Special Forces were trying to accomplish, they adopted a battle-ready stance, backed by armored vehicles and infantry in full combat gear in accord with standard procedure, and appeared to regard the FAd’H as an enemy force. Fear among the FAd’H was immediately palpable. Concerned that their own mission was being compromised, one or more Special Forces soldiers sought to relieve the building tension. They taught the assembled Haitian soldiers to “do the wave.” This gesture, in turn, was perceived as an act of disrespect by officers of the 10th Mountain Division. In an atmosphere of mutual indignation, charges and an investigation of the SF unit followed. No one, however, was punished as a result.

Regrettably, the incident at Camp d’Application seemed to set the tone for relations between special and conventional forces. Some Special Forces soldiers, on increasingly infrequent visits, found the regimented atmosphere at the Light Industrial Complex frustrating and oppressive and much preferred the relative informality of remote field operations. Overall, SF soldiers were outspokenly critical of the JTF 190 force protection posture, and a few even marked the frontier on maps with caricatures of soldiers mummified in kevlar. The contrast in approaches between conventional and Special Forces in Haiti was not missed by the press and other observers. According to a New York Times columnist, “The more ambiguous threat [in Haiti] is better addressed by the Special Forces, not the infantry, which has had little to do in Haiti since October except guard itself.” In contrast, “They [Special Forces] do everything from repairing wells and delivering babies to arresting notorious thugs and rescuing victims of mob violence.” Gradually, however, as more units from 10th Mountain Division participated in out-of-sector missions in the countryside where they dealt directly with Special Forces teams, the climate between the two groups improved.
As the mission in Haiti unfolded, some conventional soldiers and Special Forces alike voiced questions about the purpose of keeping military forces in the country. Some Special Forces felt that, as the situation stabilized, SF teams were no longer required for tasks that could be performed equally well by Army engineers or members of the Peace Corps. Generally, however, in rural areas across Haiti, Special Forces found the populace receptive to their presence, a fact that contributed to a relatively high sense of satisfaction that Haitians were actually benefiting from the American presence. Through constant, low-level interaction, bonds of trust and understanding formed.

Civil Affairs

What many participants construed as vague guidance with regard to the mission on the ground in Haiti compounded existing uncertainties. Although the Americans were to help establish conditions for a secure return of Aristide and the conduct of free elections, they were directed not to take over functions of local or national government or in any way substitute themselves for private organizations performing charitable and developmental work in Haiti. The ambiguities inherent in this mission surfaced early, especially in the civil affairs arena.

Major General George Fisher, commander of the 25th Infantry Division, which replaced the 10th in January 1995, observed, “There was a conscious decision by the United States not to engage in nation building and the mission expansion and mission creep that accompanies nation building.” Fisher expected that funds and assistance for development projects would flow from international and interagency sources following the establishment of U.S. forces in Haiti. To the surprise of military planners, the expected support did not arrive. Meanwhile, U.S. forces lacked Title 10 authority from Congress to assume responsibility for providing a broad array of support and relief. Likewise, according to Lieutenant Colonel Edward Anderson, the J3 civil affairs officer for JTF 180, mission intent explicitly excluded extensive projects for rebuilding Haiti’s infrastructure, or so-called nation building. Rather, U.S. forces were to assist civil authorities, even to the extent of ensuring that primary credit for any services provided by the Army go to local figures.

Unfortunately, these guidelines left important issues unaddressed. For instance, no one initially seemed to have a comprehensive list of private aid organizations operating in Haiti, much less lists of contacts and phone numbers. An absence of close interagency cooperation, or even accepted
channels for coordination, often left civil affairs officers in the field operating in a vacuum. Responsibility for answering questions, such as who would take responsibility for vetting the FAd’H or handling interagency coordination, gradually fell by default to the JCS J5, Lieutenant General Wes Clark, and his chief of the Political-Military Branch, Brigadier General John Walsh.83

Identification of civil affairs projects placed top priority on spotting potential crisis situations in their incipient stage. Particular focus was on incidents that might result in loss of life, flagrant human rights abuses, or serious outbreaks of disease. Contaminated sources of drinking water were a special concern, as was the possibility of widespread fire or large-scale rioting in the city.84

Regardless of initial intentions, discrepancies soon appeared in the American approach to civil affairs projects in Haiti. If the plan was to minimize dependency on American support and to deflect credit to local authorities, some U.S. participants, such as Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, believed practice soon deviated from policy. At the direction of Admiral Miller, U.S. troops stepped in and restored electric power, provided temporary sources of clean water, and otherwise engaged in projects that, however useful in the short term, may have contributed to the perception among Haitians that the U.S. military “can come in and fix anything.” Absent any long-term mandate for American forces in Haiti to prop up the local infrastructure, Anderson felt that U.S. actions served to raise expectations of help the natives would receive from Americans rather than from their own government. Anderson observed, “Basically, it’s a formula for failure, and it’s been written about in every development manual that the American military has ever put out.”85

More to Anderson’s liking were the efforts of the Special Forces teams in the Haitian countryside. Special Operations Forces, collectively called Task Force Raleigh, included ten Civil Affairs Direct Support Teams, all of which scrupulously avoided becoming the principal actors in getting things done. Rather, they encouraged and supported locals in
the distribution of food and fuel, the establishment of local security, and the restoration of effective local government. On occasion, they served as basic civics instructors or repair mechanics but left the essential work to those who would have to carry it on after they left.

Despite these contributions, and contrary to the view of Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, many civil affairs (and other) officers felt that the United States could and should have been doing more, not less. Only the humane emergency created by Tropical Storm Gordon’s devastation brought forth resources needed to tackle even modest infrastructure development projects in outlying areas. Many participants felt that the tangible assistance to devastated areas enhanced the credibility of the mission.  

In reality, the civil affairs function, particularly in the form of engineering projects, extended well beyond the transfer of the mission in Haiti from the American-led Multinational Forces to the United Nations Mission in Haiti. Foremost among the ongoing projects was the restoration of electric power across the country. Because Port-au-Prince had the only modern power grid in the country, it was the logical place to begin. In outlying areas, restoration of power depended on the delivery of fuel or spare parts to repair generators. Another major engineering effort entailed the improvement of numerous major roads. In addition, a team of thirty-four Army Reserve civil affairs officers provided advice to Haiti’s twelve governmental
ministries and helped assess Haiti's most urgent needs in preparing a return to effective democratic administration. The team reported to U.S. Ambassador William Swing and passed its findings to organizations such as the United States Agency for International Development.88

Assessing the overall civil-military operations effort, Colonel Jonathan Thompson, commander of the 20th Engineering Brigade, contended that more could and should have been done in Haiti and "that [the] safe and secure environment that we're establishing here is dependent upon more than armed soldiers policing the streets."89

**PSYOP**

Closely related to the civil affairs effort was the PSYOP campaign conducted by U.S. forces in and around Haiti. Given the delicacy of native perceptions about the role of U.S. forces and Multinational Forces in Haiti, the American-directed information campaign was essential to preserving a psychological climate conducive to fulfillment of the military mission, the restoration of Aristide, and the eventual conduct of national elections. Here, in particular, American forces had to overcome not only the memory of the Marine intervention of 1915–34 but also the unmistakable impression left by the *Harlan County* episode that the Americans lacked the resolve to face down elements in Haiti that opposed fulfillment of the Governors Island Accord.

Execution of the PSYOP campaign began in advance of ground operations in September. On August 22–23, for example, the Air Force conducted a leaflet drop at St. More. A typical leaflet displayed the words "democracy," "prosperity," "opportunity," "education," and "law," overlaying a drawing of three persons moving into the sunlight. From September 13–17, roughly 7 million leaflets were released over Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien, and Les Cayes.90 Broad guidance for the campaign came from the Military Information Support Team in Washington, which cleared all its plans through the National Security Council.

A major part of American efforts was the use of EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft for radio broadcast operations by the 4th Psychological Operations Group working through the Air Force 193d Special Operations Group (of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard). To facilitate the effectiveness of the broadcast campaign, the Air Force dropped roughly 10,000 radios across parts of Haiti. Broadcast messages, transmitted on three FM bands, sought to discourage the
flotillas of boat people by announcing that entry to the United States would henceforth be possible only through the INS office in Port-au-Prince. A dramatic drop in boat interceptions after July 7, 1994, suggests that the campaign had the intended effect.91 Later messages aimed at preventing local vigilantes from taking retribution against supporters of the Cedras regime.

From the beginning of operations in the country, both JTF 180 and JTF 190 incorporated tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs) with loudspeakers. Each team normally consisted of four persons, although some split into two-person teams in support of remote Special Forces operations. Those TPTs that would have supported a forced entry were armed with taped messages in Creole demanding immediate surrender. Company A of the 9th PSYOP Battalion was attached to the 82d Airborne Division for the take-down mission.92 Loudspeaker systems aboard UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters were also ready to go in to broadcast messages. Instead, of course, TPT operations supported the peaceful entry of American forces through calls for calm and order when they announced the peaceful arrival of U.S. forces. Subsequently, TPTs broadcast declarations of support for the Aristide presidency and proclamations concerning the guns-for-cash program. The latter attracted much media attention but probably had little impact on the total number of guns in Haiti, particularly given the relatively porous frontier with the Dominican Republic. Indispensable for informing the
public and quelling brushfire rumors in the streets, PSYOP teams typically accompanied routine patrols and cordon-and-search missions as well.\textsuperscript{93}

Getting word out to the populace in outlying areas, nevertheless, required close attention. According to Major James Boisselle, who participated in the planning and execution of the PSYOP campaign in Haiti (early reports from TF Raleigh’s Forward Operational Base 33 and Operational Detachment B 370 [SFODB 370] in Gonaives), “many Haitians did not yet know that the United States had landed forces in large numbers throughout the country and, if they did know, they were not aware of the purpose and intent of the operation.”\textsuperscript{94} The message subsequently went out by means of airborne loudspeakers and leaflet drops. Troops of the Multinational Force also succeeded in peaceably taking over Haiti Radio and TV Nationale and restoring them to the control of the legitimate government.

Some elements of PSYOP, of course, remained unplanned or at least unintentional. Captain Ladouceur reported that, early in the deployment, after an address by Shelton to the Haitian people went over the air in translation, many Haitians believed that the general himself was actually a Creole speaker. Figuring that this perception enhanced the credibility of U.S. operations, Ladouceur did nothing to discourage this belief when directly questioned by ordinary Haitians whom he encountered.\textsuperscript{95} Beyond such small incidents, the general posture of American forces conveyed a message as well, although different components of the force may have diverged in the messages they delivered.

Support of 10th Mountain Division fell to Company B, 9th PSYOP Battalion, which assigned TPTs to Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien.
The JPOTF in Port-au-Prince soon included about 250 personnel, among them 33 Haitian Creole linguists and Dr. Stephen Brown from the 4th PSYOP Group’s Strategic Studies Detachment. Program content was largely educational, embracing explanations of the concept of democracy, the creation of a new public security force, and the functions to be performed by the Multinational Forces arriving in the country. In addition, the JPOTF took the lead in encouraging the 10th Division to establish a higher-profile presence in the neighborhoods of the capital.  

Despite PSYOP efforts in Port-au-Prince, looting remained a problem in the early stages of Uphold Democracy. TPTs became a standard piece of the response team in support of the 16th Military Police Brigade. During a large-scale episode on September 29, airborne loudspeakers appeared on the scene and for several hours appealed to a crowd estimated at 3,000 to disperse. Eventually, the mob broke up without requiring U.S. troops to employ riot control agents. Continued strife appeared in the streets of Port-au-Prince that, based on an analysis by Dr. Stephen Brown, reflected a vacuum in public security resulting from the passivity of the Haitian police. Eventually, however, the populace began to feel more secure and, in a sense, “took back their own streets.”

At one point, evidence began to surface that the creation of joint U.S.-Haitian police patrols was being interpreted by the man in the street to symbolize an emerging alliance between the United States and the repressive organs of the Cedras regime. Many Haitians were deeply
concerned that the Americans had done little or nothing to round up local "attachés." Colonel Jeff Jones, commander of the 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne), specifically addressed this problem in a memorandum to the JTF 180 commander on October 2. In short, the United States appeared a "paper tiger" in Port-au-Prince. American raids on weapons stores and FRAPH and attaché hideouts followed. Generally, PSYOP teams appeared on the scene to broadcast a series of graduated warnings that, if necessary, ended with an ultimatum. Standard procedure entailed isolating the suspected site by clearing adjoining buildings and forming a cordon around the target. From that point, infantry units ordinarily had little trouble weeding out those who did not surrender immediately. It was often the case, however, that when U.S. patrols appeared in a neighborhood, the locals would inform them that members of the FRAPH had fled hours earlier.
Even dealing with friendly crowds often required assistance from tactical PSYOP teams. According to one infantry company commander who commanded Bradley vehicles assigned to Haiti as a quick reaction force, “Without a civil affairs or bullhorn team or loudspeaker team, I would get nowhere in Port-au-Prince.” This commander found that his Bradleys created a sensation wherever they went. Given the tight streets in the capital and the speed with which swarms of friendly Haitians gathered, movement could quickly come to a standstill.

Perhaps the greatest PSYOP challenge in Haiti was selling the public on the program to professionalize the armed forces and reconstitute the Haitian National Police. Given the extensive involvement of these organizations in repressive acts by assorted dictatorial regimes over the years, public skepticism toward them was only natural. (Indeed, it is instructive for Americans to remember that the framers of the U.S. Constitution shared deep misgivings about the potential of a standing army to abuse the citizenry.) The JPOTF, therefore, produced a series of publications designed to inform members of the police and security forces in Haiti of the concepts of civilian control and professional standards of conduct as incorporated in the Haitian constitution.

By the end of October 1994, the JPOTF had a plethora of programs in operation as described by Boisselle:

Techniques and tools for disseminating PSYOP themes now included not only traditional methods, such as radio, television, handbills, loudspeakers, and leaflets, but also innovative promotional techniques such as T-shirts, billboards, buttons, and even a new national song of reconciliation. This song, titled “Long Live Peace,” called for an end to violence and a renewal of justice and peace. Tactical PSYOP teams distributed over 20 million copies of handbills, posters, flags, and bumper stickers and conducted over 750 ground and 67 aerial loudspeaker missions.

Medical Support in Haiti

Yet another critical component of U.S. military operations in Haiti was the work of American medical teams. Without a doubt, Haiti presents one of the most medically challenging environments in the world. One U.S. medical assessment compiled before operations commenced put the problem this way:

The general level of health in Haiti is the lowest in the Western Hemisphere. There is a high incidence of communicable diseases due to extremely poor sanitation and health practices. Disease prevention
and soldier protection cannot be overemphasized. Command emphasis throughout the force is required to ensure that deploying service members are properly briefed and disciplined in protective measures, and that field sanitation teams are properly employed.\(^{104}\)

The 10th Mountain Division surgeon, Lieutenant Colonel Larry Godfrey, was first alerted to the possibility of a Haitian mission on July 27, 1994. Upon learning soon thereafter that the division would be functioning as JTF 190, Godfrey discovered that no guidelines existed for setting up a JTF Health Service Support Plan. With some difficulty, he managed to obtain a sanitized copy of the XVIII Airborne Corps plan. Joint coordination was to be handled through USACOM, which agreed to answer specific questions but otherwise had little to offer in the way of a template for a joint setup.\(^{105}\)

The eventual plan included several important assumptions. First, no host-nation medical services would be available. Nor, in turn, was the U.S. military to become extensively involved in the treatment of Haitians. As noted in the plan, “Except for detainees, JTF medical forces will limit care for Haitians to emergency care for persons injured as a result of US/UN action and emergency care necessary to prevent loss of life and limb.” JTF 190-ARFOR medical services, however, could assist on a case by case basis as approved by the commanding surgeon and requested by the J3 civil affairs. Still, primary responsibility for providing help to the indigenous medical infrastructure belonged to local authorities and assorted international and nonmilitary U.S. agencies.\(^{106}\)

One form of support extended to both governmental and nongovernmental organizations providing medical assistance in Haiti was a series of evaluations compiled for the Army’s first Health Facility Assessment Team (HFAT). Brigadier General Peake, the JTF 180 surgeon and Commander, 44th Medical Brigade, deployed a team to carry out inspections of local medical facilities to expedite the referral of injured or ill Haitian nationals. Eventually two teams were deployed, each consisting of a facility planning officer, nurse methods analyst, biomedical equipment technician, environmental engineer, and Haitian linguist.\(^{107}\)

On occasion, teams inspected nonmedical facilities to evaluate their suitability for conversion to temporary general hospitals. In one such case, Major Patty Horoho, a nurse methods analyst, went with an HFAT to assess the Hotel Simbie in Port-au-Prince. Her description speaks volumes about initial conditions in Haiti:
When we arrived we found 200 families living in the abandoned hotel.
The hotel was dilapidated and filthy. There were waste products all
ever and dripping off some of the balconies. A few dirty needles were
lying on the ground in some areas, and a few elderly males were lying
curl up in a corner dying of starvation. There was no electricity or
running water. Children ran around without any clothes and urinated
wherever. Initially the occupants were guarded because they felt that
we were going to take away their home. SGT Jacques and I were
cornered on the second floor by approximately 25 hostile occupants.
We both remained calm and SGT Jacques did an excellent job of
talking to them in Creole and was able to calm them down. . . . The
initial assessment was that the hotel could be renovated into a general
hospital but would require a lot of work.108

The reason that HFATs had to consider transforming such exotic
candidates as the Hotel Simbie into hospitals was that, not surprisingly,
existing medical facilities were too few in number and generally in a
deplorable state of repair. According to Horoho, most of Haiti’s
hospital equipment was forty to fifty years out of date, and much of that
did not function. Those facilities that did possess reasonably modern
equipment typically lacked the means to repair or maintain it, a bad
situation made worse by the UN embargo. Basic medicines were also in
short supply. In light of these circumstances, Horoho was struck by the
irrepressible good humor of most of the population.109 In any case, it
was not the U.S. military’s mission to improve, replace, or repair
existing facilities. Military personnel did, however, help identify
requirements that could be addressed by aid agencies operating in Haiti.

The Rockwood Case

One of the more intriguing and troubling incidents of Uphold
Democracy from the Army’s point of view was the case of Captain
Larry Rockwood. Assigned to the mission of counterintelligence for
the 10th Mountain Division, Rockwood arrived in Haiti on September
23, 1994. There, he had extensive access to sensitive information from
sources throughout Port-au-Prince. Although informed that his first
concern was the collection of information that might bear on the
security of American forces in Haiti, so-called “Haitian-on-Haitian
violence” was also a priority interest. Rockwood soon became deeply
disturbed at information contained in numerous reports that indicated
serious and continuing human rights abuses in government prisons in
the capital.110 U.S. intelligence had identified five centers for incarceration
and torture in Port-au-Prince and knew of a body dump north of the city.
What especially bothered Rockwood was that the 10th Mountain Division was apparently taking no action, either to verify conditions in the local prisons or to establish a roster of prisoners that would enable the Army to hold prison administrators accountable for the well being of their wards.

Beginning with the legal section, Captain Rockwood pressed his concern through various channels inside and outside his chain of command and was dissatisfied at the lack of urgency that greeted his reports and queries. Finally, on September 30, he complained officially to the division inspector general, fully aware that this action was hardly routine and might adversely affect his career. Believing that he had already “crossed the Rubicon,” Rockwood unilaterally resolved to pay a visit to the infamous National Penitentiary to demand a full accounting of the prisoners and the right to view the facility. Although he had no specific information on torture at the national prison, Captain Rockwood chose to visit it because he knew its exact location and believed he could get there easily. If he could obtain a list of prisoners, he would in effect establish the responsibility of the prison administration for their condition. In executing this plan, he violated an explicit order from his command.

Rockwood subsequently defended his action on the ground that he was carrying out the spirit of President Clinton's mission statement, which included human rights concerns. By implication, he asserted that he had received an illegal order not to intervene. This claim received no support from any figure in the administration. Rockwood’s arrest stemmed specifically from violation of a direct order from a superior, a fact that he fully understood. Although he underwent a psychiatric evaluation that verified his mental health, some speculated whether Rockwood had been predisposed, either emotionally or philosophically, to create an incident due to his well-established interest in human rights and law of war issues. His father, as a GI, had participated in liberating a German concentration camp at the close of World War II and had sensitized Captain Rockwood to questions of rights and prisons. In fact, while a student at Fort Leavenworth, he had researched a paper on the massacre at My Lai. In any case, the implications of Rockwood’s action were many and controversial. One officer of Task Force Mountain cautioned that, in the confusion prevailing at the time, Rockwood’s hasty action potentially could have precipitated politically motivated murders in the prison of the very sort that the captain wanted to prevent. Furthermore, deplorable, even dangerous conditions, could be found in many parts of Port-au-Prince,
not just the prisons. However, another officer who was serving in Haiti with civil affairs at the time sympathized with Rockwood’s intent and believed that the Army should have moved more aggressively to inspect the prisons. Ultimately, Rockwood chose to subject himself to a court-martial rather than accept nonjudicial punishment. One result was his removal from the service.

Though fascinating in its own right, the Rockwood case is significant to the history of Uphold Democracy, both because it reflects the ambiguity of the American position and because it invites further conjecture about the posture of the 10th Mountain Division. Rockwood’s legal defense sought to establish an obligation to intercede on the basis of the law of armed conflict or international law. The Army, in turn, maintained that the timing of any intercession was up to the MNF commander. No legal obligation to inspect the prisons existed, Army lawyers argued, because the United States was not in Haiti as an occupying power within the meaning of the Hague Convention, which would have implied specific obligations for the well-being of the population, but as part of an MNF that entered the country through a negotiated agreement with the Cedras regime. Furthermore, according to the Army, customary international law does not impose any such requirement. Despite this legal position, early revisions of the rules of engagement did authorize members of the Multinational Force to intercede to halt Haitian-on-Haitian violence.

Perhaps the real point is not whether any legal requirement existed but whether it would have promoted American aims in Haiti had an inspection of prisons been made an early priority. A more proactive stance on the part of the 10th Mountain Division might well have garnered public support and mitigated concerns that Americans were not doing enough to put down the FAd’H. The fact that Rockwood’s actions made him a hero to many Haitians is evidence to this effect. Broadly speaking, concern over the prisons may have been shoved aside as a result of command concern in the 10th over force protection and the urgency of establishing order in the streets of Port-au-Prince. Months later, Brigadier General James T. Hill of the 25th Infantry Division confirmed, in a public interview, that horrific conditions still existed in the prison in January 1995 and emphasized that alleviating those conditions was a priority concern.
Transition to the 25th Infantry Division

The 25th Infantry Division received an oral warning in early November that it would replace the 10th Mountain Division in Haiti. A formal order to that effect arrived on December 4. The mission statement of the 25th indicated that, on December 26, it would begin a deployment of about 3,500 soldiers to carry on current peace operations aimed at maintaining a secure and stable environment that would permit the return of normal government and the transition of the entire operation to United Nations (UNMIH) control.

Training of the 25th Infantry Division began immediately, with direct support from the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Major Chris Hughes of CALL, who had spent approximately two months in Haiti with the 10th Mountain Division (along with other lesson collectors), helped the staff of the 25th plan its training program. Hughes and other analysts from CALL had observed as many different aspects of Uphold Democracy as time and circumstances allowed in order to assemble a list of “lessons learned” for dissemination to those who might need them. Furthermore, at the request of 25th Division commander, Major General Fisher, Hughes wrote a series of training vignettes intended to recreate the kinds of ambiguous and often tense situations that typified the daily working environment in Haiti.

These vignettes, based on actual events, covered a broad range of tasks: day and night patrols, fixed-site security, checkpoint operations, search operations, participation in the weapons buy-back program, working with the Haitian police, civil-military operations, VIP escort, and a series of situations, such as crowd control, that might warrant the use of graduated responses. The CALL training package also offered a few basic observations about the nature of Haitian life and culture.

Implementation of the training program began with the assistance of observer-controllers from the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) to create an environment that reflected real conditions on the ground in Haiti. Fortunately, the 25th had already conducted extensive training on its own for tasks ordinarily associated with operations other than war. In addition, some officers of the 25th traveled to Haiti in advance of the force to get a better feeling for the environment. Ultimately, the plan for relieving the 10th Mountain Division allowed for a brief period of overlap, during which members of staffs and units would observe and work with elements of the 10th.
Once the 25th Infantry Division was up and running in Haiti, the time came to hand overall control of operations to the United Nations as of March 31, 1995. USACOM organized a "United Nations Staff Training Program" in early March, the first ever of its type, to forge the diverse multinational staff into a functioning and coherent organization. In a similar fashion, selected Special Forces personnel prepared for a transition from Forward Operational Base (FOB) 31 to FOB 32, which would assume the mission with the transition to UN control. The absence of any Special Forces doctrine for working with a UN command compelled Army SF elements to invent procedures as they went along.

At the top, Major General Joseph Kinzer assumed the dual role of U.S. force commander and United Nations force commander. Kinzer reported directly to Lakdar Brahimi, the Special Representative to the Secretary General of the United Nations. Brahimi, therefore, as the political head of the UN Mission, became the single most influential actor among the UN contingent in Haiti, particularly in terms of policy and the fiscal dimensions of the operation.

The focus now turned to preparations for legislative elections, to be conducted on June 4, and the subsequent presidential election in the fall. As should have been expected, the electoral process encountered practical difficulties in a country where the concept of democracy, at least as Americans understood it, had not yet established roots. Candidates had a specified length of time to file applications with a body known as the Civilian Election Project (CEP), in which the Lavalas party of President Aristide enjoyed a preponderance of influence. Published ballots displayed pictures of the candidates, as well as symbols of party affiliation, to assist voters in making their selections. The party symbols, in fact, were usually better known than the candidates' faces, since the average Haitian did not have access to a television set. Unfortunately, the names of some candidates never found their way onto election ballots. This might have been the product of simple human error, but it contributed to a widespread perception that the process had been manipulated by the CEP. In other instances,
pictures, names, and symbols were inadvertently misaligned, thus sowing confusion. According to one Special Forces commander operating in the countryside, some Haitians burned ballots rather than lend credibility to an election in which their favorite candidates were not included.121

Such popular perceptions held down participation in the subsequent presidential election; the official turnout plummeted to only 28 percent.122 Even worse, participation in local and senatorial elections in April 1997 drew only 5 percent of the eligible voters, and that official figure was judged by some experienced observers to be inflated.123 Still, if the principal objective of the United Nations Mission in Haiti was to maintain a stable and secure environment conducive to the conduct of free and fair elections, that objective was fulfilled.124 Whether or not a foundation for long-term democracy in Haiti had been laid was an altogether different question.

Training the Haitian National Police

Foremost among the tasks that would precede a UN departure was the building of the Haitian National Police. At the direction of ACOM, formation of a model Interim Public Security Force began in Cap Haitien, where the FAd'H had disintegrated following the October 3 clash with the Marines. During the interim, the attempt to bring back some FAd'H members for service met with strong public resistance. Consequently, vetted members of the FAd'H from other cities assumed duties in Cap Haitien. An intensive PSYOP campaign to explain this move to the public followed. The campaign highlighted supervision by International Police Monitors and President Aristide's approval of a vetting commission (see table 3).125

Overall, of the roughly 7,000 persons in the FAd'H, about 3,000 faced removal or reassignment once Ray Kelly, former chief of the New York City Police Department, arrived in October to direct formation of Haiti's new police force. About 620 of the remaining FAd'H were subsequently arrested on the basis of human rights violations.126

At the same time, although the FAd'H had not disintegrated in Port-au-Prince, it lacked effective control of the streets, in large part due to an absence of real police skills and regular patrols. As explained by Colonel Michael Sullivan, commander of the 16th Military Police Brigade, "it took a while, a week or more, for the light to come on for me to realize these guys don't know what the hell they are doing." This
MR RAY KELLY WAS THE HEAD OF IPM (1333 TOTAL: 161 STAFF, 351 INTERPRETERS, 821 IPMS)

- Conducted 24 hour patrols with IPSF and interpreters
- Deployed to Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien, Les Cayes, St Marc, Gonaives, Jaimel, Ft Liberte, Port de Paix, Jeremie and Hinche
- 821 IPMS from 20 nations:

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<td>Denmark</td>
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Table 3. International Police Monitors

became apparent when the FAd'H proved unable to control looting in the capital. Consequently, American MPs “became the de facto police department in Port-au-Prince.” 127 Sullivan placed a company of MPs at each of the six major police stations in the capital. The U.S. role thus became one of guiding as well as controlling the FAd'H until its replacement by a new police force.

Like the Special Forces, the MPs, supported by civil affairs and PSYOP, on the whole dealt effectively with the nuances of working in Haiti. Still, there were occasions when coordination with infantry of the 10th Mountain Division left much to be desired. One early mishap occurred after MPs and civil affairs soldiers had begun working with a FAd'H unit whose barracks adjoined the palace. There, the absence of operational boundaries exacerbated confusion over responsibilities and missions. Two truck loads of infantry from the 10th conducted a raid on a FRAPH compound in the same environs and began making arrests. Learning of the commotion, members of the FAd'H arrived on the scene. In this instance, they were getting out into the streets just as their American MP advisers had been encouraging them to do. As they did so, however, U.S. infantrymen immediately disarmed and arrested them, taped their mouths shut, placed them in handcuffs, and hauled them away. Learning of the affair over CNN that evening, remaining FAd'H members at the station panicked. Some, humiliated and demoralized by the surprising turn of events, burned their uniforms in
protest. Meanwhile, neighborhood civilians, sensing a vacuum of civic order, began rioting. 128

Colonel Sullivan subsequently commented that,

after about a week, if you have sufficient military police forces in an urban area, and all the associated combat support that would be required to sustain the military police force, and you had the special operations forces out in the countryside, and the necessary combat service support to sustain them, the thing to do, in Mike Sullivan’s meager opinion, is to pack up the infantry and send them home and get them trained for the next mission. 129

His point was that the infantry is not well suited to static guard duty. Rather, infantry “are trained to be the king of the hill in their AO (area of operation). And I would say that operations other than war don’t really lend themselves to that, because there’s too much movement that has to take place through those areas and the battle drill of infantrymen, and the skills that senior combat arms officers learn through their careers train them to be closed.” 130

MP and infantry culture also clashed on the question of force protection. According to Major David IeMauk, JTF 190 LNO to the Haitian Police, the wearing of vests and kevlar “gives the wrong impression for the Haitian police because it shows that we’re not practicing what we preach. I think for the population as a whole, that it gives them the impression that they’re being occupied, and that we are
here to oppress, perhaps, rather than to relieve them of the burden of Cedras' government.” Moreover, he added, “The threat here, as far as we are concerned, is insignificant, and it makes our job harder by having to patrol with machine guns and flak vests; it would be better if we could transition to a different uniform, I think, for everyone concerned.”

According to plan, International Police Monitors soon arrived in Haiti as human rights watchdogs. Coordination here, too, proved problematic. LeMauk described the situation:

And, when the IPM’s came in, they took on the same role that the Haitians did; they would, kind of, sit there with them. Sometimes they would go out on patrol, but they would not get out of their vehicle; they would not go into dangerous areas; they would not respond to incidents where the possibility of violence might be... Some of the IPMs refused to go on combined patrol with the US, while at the same time, their Director was saying that he was very much in favor of it.

The environment for police officers in Haiti, unless they happened to be wearing FAad'H uniforms, was not particularly dangerous but did exhibit distinctive cultural nuances. When in November 1994 a Haitian national, College Francois, employed at the American Embassy, murdered three coworkers and fled with $50,000 in cash, he was discovered through the network of Voodoo priests, or houngans. An American investigator working with the International Police Monitors found a houngan who, in turn, had heard that Francois was seeking to purchase a potion from another houngan to make himself invisible. With the assistance of the latter houngan, Francois was lured into a trap. Instructed by the houngan to appear in a remote location, unarmed, carrying the stolen money, wearing only his underwear, and carrying goat meat over his head, Francois delivered himself in the prescribed condition to his captors.

The UN-sponsored CivPol (civilian police) replaced the International Police Monitors in 1995 (see table 4). This group was a composite organization including personnel from Canada, Australia, France, Jordan, the Philippines, and Nepal whose task was to oversee the Interim Public Security Force in Haiti. In practice, Special Forces in the field provided much direct assistance, such as accounting for weapons issued to the IPSF, but coordination was difficult because of the lack of compatible radios and the fact that CivPol lacked its own motor vehicles.
The burden placed on the IPSF was enormous from the beginning. Because many of the temporary cops were vetted members of the FAd’H, the organization was tainted in the eyes of much of the populace, especially supporters of Lavalas. The employment of former FAd’H initially was expedient because there was simply no other source of leadership or experience in Haiti. Human rights observers, such as attorney William O’Neill, a consultant to the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees based in New York City, lamented that “these interim police officers received just four days [actually six days] training and hardly ever left their barracks except when accompanied by the United Nations International Police Monitors.” Thus, public confidence in them was conspicuously absent. In some areas, beleaguered IPSF personnel lacked not only credibility with the population and President Aristide but weapons as well. For example, IPSF personnel in Zone 4, which included Les Cayes, had to be issued revolvers confiscated from other parts of Haiti. Until then, the minority who possessed functioning weapons typically had a mere one or two bullets per weapon. Special Forces Major Walter Pjetraj described the situation this way: “The IPSF, for the most part, did not have handguns. . . . Because of that, these guys were a joke. Not so much that they looked stupid or incapable, but the people just didn’t respect them.” Lacking authority, members of the IPSF were naturally reluctant to carry out their job. To make matters worse, most went months without receiving their pay and had no uniforms but those of the former and still despised FAd’H. Finally, despite public assurances to the contrary,

| PERSONNEL: |
| US FORCES MNF HAITI | MILITARY | 7139 |
| CIVILIAN | 418 |
| COALITION FORCES | 2138 |
| US FORCES IN JOA | 47 |
| TOTAL STRENGTH | 9742 |

**INFANTRY BATTALIONS:** 5 (3 US, 1 BANGLADESH, 1 CARICOM)

**MP COMPANIES:** 4

| ARMY PERSONNEL: |
| MILITARY | 287 |
| COALITION | 38 |
| TOTAL | 325 |

| AIRCRAFT |
| CH58 | 6 |
| AH1 | 5 |
| UH60 | 15 |
| CH47 | 7 |
| UH60V | 4 |
| TOTAL | 37 |

Table 4. Multinational Force, Haiti, January 13, 1995
members of the IPSF had little chance of gaining admission to the police academy.

Police credibility grew as graduates of Haiti’s National Police Training Center began to reach the streets as the new Haitian National Police (HNP). The U.S. Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, which employed a number of retired Special Forces soldiers, retained formal responsibility for testing and instructing candidates for the force. The usual procedure was that Army PSYOP (later information teams) would visit testing centers in advance to get word out to the public. Candidates were advised to bring their own food and water, as well as to provide their own transportation. Unfortunately, the perception, at least in Zone 4, was that the process was rigged by Lavalas, which made selections based on political loyalties rather than merit. In any case, selectees completed the four-month formal course of instruction, which entailed eight weeks at the academy at Camp d’Application in Port-au-Prince and eight weeks at Ft. Leonard Wood. The curriculum included two eight-hour-long courses entitled “Human Dignity” and “Human Rights,” which emphasized the role of law and civil liberties in a democracy.\textsuperscript{137}

However, as pointed out by Colonel David Patton, “they’re [the HNP] all rookies.” As of February 1996, the average HNP officer was twenty-five years old and had 1.9 months experience on the force.\textsuperscript{138} This condition contributed, on one hand, to well-publicized incidents in which HNP members resorted to excessive force, as well as to a reluctance by them to enter the volatile slum of Cite Soleil, on the other. By February 1997, some 400 members of the 5,000-man force had been cited for various abuses, and 13 stood charged with murder.\textsuperscript{139} Yet for all of this, according to Dr. Freeman, the greatest problem with the new HNP was that they are excessively polite, hence commanding insufficient respect, and too few in number. To control a populace of 7 to 8 million with some 5,000 junior policemen is perhaps asking too much.\textsuperscript{140}

\textbf{Conclusion}

What this chapter has shown is that the sage of war, Carl von Clausewitz, was right in his most oft-paraphrased lesson that war is an extension of politics by other means. In other words, Operation Uphold Democracy, as well as its planned predecessor, Restore Democracy, had an objective that was primarily political in nature. That objective, moreover, had to be included in military plans for U.S. operations in
Haiti. It is clear, however, that not even the most far-sighted planners can anticipate everything. No one suspected that OPLAN 2370 would be turned off in the midst of execution, with all the attendant political and military consequences.

The evidence from Uphold Democracy and other recent operations leads to a number of conclusions, including the impression that the U.S. Army is not really structured for modern contingency operations. This is seen particularly in the concept of the joint task force, which has become the norm for the conduct of operations with forces of all sizes. In reality, the only Army organization that can easily adapt to the JTF role is the corps. Yet, in planning for what became Uphold Democracy, the 10th Mountain Division had to become a JTF headquarters, something it could not do without massive augmentation, both from the Army and the joint community. Such vital augmentation was not fully forthcoming from the Army and hardly at all from the responsible unified command, USACOM. On the 10th Mountain's side of the issue, it was hard to adjust to being a joint headquarters rather than a subordinate Army one.

In its execution of the mission, the 10th Mountain Division took limited account of recent experience but perhaps lost perspective in the process. Conscious and unconscious reference to the experience of Somalia, where during the UNISOM II phase the division provided the brigade that acted as the quick reaction force for the UN, raised a false analogy for what the division faced in Haiti. As the situation in Somalia deteriorated, the 10th adopted a siege mentality, and it brought that mentality with it to the planning and execution of Uphold Democracy. An analogy more relevant to the Haitian scenario was the posture of the 10th in Somalia during its initial deployment under Major General Steve Arnold in the first phase of the operation. As the ARFOR in Operation Restore Hope, the 10th had enjoyed a high degree of success in a relatively low-threat environment. In Haiti, the contrast between the behavior of the 10th's units in Port-au-Prince and 2 BCT in Cap Haitien points to the way in which different leaders interpret similar experiences (through different uses of analogy) and establish different command climates, with attendant consequences in terms of attaining military and political objectives.

The Haitian experience underscored the importance of Special Operations Forces, Special Forces, civil affairs, and PSYOP to a complex operation. Each SOF element was used in its appropriate role, resulting in significant force multiplication. Special Forces controlled the countryside largely by themselves, supported by civil affairs direct
support teams. When combat power was needed, it was provided by the Rangers and 10th Mountain units. With respect to civil affairs forces, complications surfaced involving command and control of civil affairs units and the operation of civil affairs units with SF teams. Finally, PSYOP proved extremely effective, a powerful force multiplier, in a wide variety of situations, before, during, and after execution.

The delivery of medical support demonstrated that, in missions of this kind, the whole combat support and combat service support component of the Army brings critical assets to the accomplishment of the operational and strategic objectives. The power of medical support as a force multiplier, nevertheless, was weakened by resource constraints and by its apparent lack of coordination with civil affairs, the latter of which provides the planning and civil-military operations expertise required to develop the link between the host civilian government institutions and the U.S. Army.

The strange ease of Captain Larry Rockwood brings us back to the fact that the Army is not prepared below the level of corps to undertake effective leadership of a JTF. This is especially true in the case of a multinational and interagency environment. The particular problem highlighted by the Rockwood case is the lack of correct prioritization of objectives such that the strategic-political objective drives the operational and tactical, rather than the other way around. It was Rockwood’s misfortune to believe that by violating a lawful order, he could rectify the situation and accomplish what he perceived to be the strategic mission.

A Special Forces sniper team scans the Haitian countryside
The variety of problems encountered by the 10th Mountain Division early in the operation convinced the Army leadership that replacing the 10th at the earliest opportunity would be appropriate. Thus, plans were made to have the 25th Infantry Division relieve the 10th. The process that got the 25th ready and facilitated its smooth transition with the 10th is testimony to the adaptability and flexibility built into the U.S. Army. The question remains—given the high operational tempo of the 10th and the likelihood that the resulting problems could have been anticipated—why a relief of the division by U.S. forces had never been foreseen by the planners.

The subsequent transition to UNMIH was expected, and the planning was generally effective. The execution of the transition itself appeared to be equally effective. Despite the apparent ease of transition to UNMIH, problems of major proportions surfaced as the operation became more multinational and interagency. In the process of establishing interim and long-term Haitian security forces, those problems were highlighted by conflicts among CivPol, ICITAP, and the Haitian government over the new Haitian National Police.

U.S. planners defined the “exit—strategy” in Haiti to be “the planned transition to the host nation of all functions performed on its behalf by peace operations forces.” In the opinion of scholar Michael Mandelbaum, “the exit strategy became the mission.” Still, key conditions for departure—basic order, the return of Aristide, and the conduct of a presidential election resulting in a peaceful transfer of
power—were met. In addition, particularly given the Army's tendency to focus on process and the successful execution of specific jobs, rather than the long-term political objective in Haiti, the official scorecard looked good. Units on the whole performed well. Logistics, infantry, communications, PSYOP, civil affairs, public affairs, aviation, military police, Rangers, medics, and so on all showed proficiency in their doctrinal roles, often overcoming much adversity along the way.

Still, the UN mission dragged on into July 1997 for the simple reason that little in Haiti had fundamentally changed in terms of the big picture. The new Haitian National Police continued to struggle to control the streets, especially in the expansive human tragedy called the slums of Cite Soleil. Politically motivated violence continued intermittently, and newly elected President Preval was forced to purge his own police force. A disastrous economy, overpopulation, ecological ruin, and deep-seated racial (mulatto-versus-black) and class antagonisms remained fundamentally unaltered by three years of intervention.
Notes

Chapter 3


5. Shelton Interview, JTF-180 Uphold Democracy, 64.


8. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Tom Adams by Dr. John Fishel, Dr. Robert Baumann, and Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik, November 16, 1995, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.


13. Interview with Colonel James Dubik by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik, Dr. John Fishel, Dr. Lawrence Yates, and Dr. Robert Baumann, July 27, 1995, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.


16. Ibid., 76–78.


21. Interview with Major Jeff Miser by Dr. Robert Baumann, April 4, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.


23. Major General David Meade, memorandum, personal, for Admiral Miller, Lieutenant General Hartzog, Vice Admiral Gehman, and Lieutenant General Shelton, “The Post Aristide Return Strategy,” undated (judging from the content, written shortly after October 15, 1994), Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. Though no signature appears, this document is from the collection of Meade’s personal papers for JTF 190.

24. Hughes Interview.

25. Urquhart, “The Effectiveness of Human Intelligence,” 89.


28. Ibid. Taped briefing by Major Chris Hughes, Center for Army Lessons Learned, November 1995; Colonel Lawrence Caspar, Commander, 10th Aviation Brigade, interview with Colonel Dennis Mroczkoswki, October 19, 1994, Oral History Interviews, 397; Combined JTF Haiti Operations Plan 2380, 4; interview with Major Dan Godfrey by Dr. Robert Baumann, April 23, 1998, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

29. Hughes Interview.


33. Interview with Major Jack Pritchard by Dr. Robert Baumann, April 24, 1998, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP. Douglas Ide, “A Presence for Peace,” Soldier 49, no. 11 (November 1994): 14. Major Pritchard commanded the headquarters battery of the 10th and trained it to assume the role of ARFOR HQ of TF Mountain. According to Pritchard, members of the ARFOR staff were “very much” influenced by the Somalia experience: “Immediately people drew the same thought that it was a similar mission. . . .” In fact, they perceived the situation to be less permissive than in Somalia.


35. Ibid.


37. Major Berthony Ladouceur Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik and Dr. Robert Baumann, March 1997. Part of
the problem also evidently stemmed from Meade's command style. Virtually every interviewee, both inside and outside JTF 190, with whom the subject of command climate at JTF 190 was broached noted the strained atmosphere at headquarters. Some interview subjects preferred not to be identified with regard to these observations. Numerous references refer to tense encounters between Major General Meade and Lieutenant General Shelton, and between Meade and Brigadier General Potter. To the credit of all participants, such friction as may have existed was kept from public view, but accounts of its existence coincide rather well with differences in perspective over mission priorities and force protection questions. If, as most observers felt, Meade's force protection policy went too far, for too long, it is only fair to note that he was the man on the spot in Port-au-Prince, and the Somalian experience had served as a reminder of how quickly casualties could undermine U.S. foreign policy. Congressional opponents of President Clinton's Haiti policy emphasized more than once that the mission did not justify American casualties. As for the effects of the force protection policy and tedium on morale in Haiti, see Favis Kirkland, Ronald Halverson, and Paul Biase, "Stress and Psychological Readiness in Post-Cold War Operations," Parameters (Summer 1996): 85.


39. Taped briefing by Major Chris Hughes, Center for Army Lessons Learned.

40. Vlahos-Schafer Interview.

41. OPLAN 2380, 4.

42. Hughes Interview.

43. Interview with Dr. Bryant Freeman by Dr. Robert Baumann, May 5, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.


48. Taped briefing by Major Chris Hughes.


50. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel George Steuber, TF Mountain, by Dr. Robert Baumann, January 31, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.


53. 2 BCT briefing slides.


56. Ibid., 63.

57. Interview with U.S. Army lieutenant colonel involved in training by Dr. John Fishel, Dr. Robert Baumann, and Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik, November 16, 1995; Schwalm Interview, March 20, 1997; Colonel Richard Quirk III, Commander, 525th MI Brigade, interview with Captain Thomas Ziek, October 20, 1994, *Oral History Interviews*, 101.
58. Freeman Interview.


60. Ibid., 168–70.

61. Freeman Interview.


68. Freeman Interview.


71. Urquhart, “The Effectiveness of Human Intelligence,” 71.


75. Ibid.


77. Interview with Special Forces Soldiers by Dr. Robert Baumann and Major Robert Shaw, January 16, 1996, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, IIOIIP; interview with Major John Brockington by Major Don McConnaughhay and Dr. Robert Baumann, February 6, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, IIOIIP. Major Brockington was not a witness to events at Camp D’Application but was made aware of them in the course of his legal work for Special Forces in Haiti while he was at Ft. Bragg. Interviews with a number of Special Forces soldiers who were present confirmed the general facts of this event.


79. Special Forces Soldiers Interview, January 16, 1996.


81. Anderson Interview, October 10, 1994, 292.

82. Ibid., 299.

83. Ibid., 300.

84. Ibid., 300–305.

85. Ibid., 308–9.
86. Gaddis Interviews, February 12, March 27, 1997; Schwalm Interview, March 20, 1997.

87. Interview with Colonel David Patton by Dr. John Fishel and Dr. Robert Baumann, January 13, 1996, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, HOHP.


89. Colonel Jonathan Thompson, Commander, 20th Engineer Brigade, Commander, Task Force Castle, interview with Captain Thomas Ziek, October 17, 1994, Oral History Interviews, 203.


95. Interview with Major Berthony Ladouceur by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik and Dr. Robert Baumann, March 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.


98. Interview with Major Clayton Cobb by Dr. Robert Baumann, April 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.


103. Ibid., 22–23.


105. Ibid., 46.

106. Ibid., Q4, Q11.


108. Ibid., 13–14.

109. Ibid., 15.
110. Interview with Captain (U.S. Army, ret.) Larry Rockwood by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik and Dr. Robert Baumann, October 31, 1996, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, HOHP. It is less than clear just how specific, detailed, and accurate were the reports available to Rockwood. Experience of U.S. forces in Haiti suggested that reports of many sorts were often highly exaggerated. However, Major Vlahos-Schafer, who by virtue of her position also saw intelligence reports, confirmed that some did pertain to conditions in the prisons. In any case, there is little dispute that prison conditions were bad. As for whether or not acts of brutality were occurring at that time in the national prison, the evidence is uncertain. Major Schwalm, however, noted in his interview with Major Cook that there were confirmed reports pertaining to other prisons. On the other hand, a lieutenant colonel with TF Mountain observed to the author in an interview on January 31, 1997, that sudden, unauthorized intrusion at the prison might conceivably have triggered acts of violence against prisoners. See also, Nick Adde, "Appeals Court Holds Rockwood Conviction: Captain to Seek Reversal from Highest Court over Haiti Incident," Army Times, March 16, 1998.

111. Ibid.


114. Law and Military Operations in Haiti: Lessons Learned for Judge Advocates, 1994–1995 (Charlottesville, VA: The Judge Advocate General’s School, 1995), 54–56; see also footnote, 174. One of the authors of this volume, Major Mark Martins, generously offered clarification of some legal points to Dr. Baumann.

116. Fisher Interview.

117. Ibid.


119. Interview with Major Walter Pjetraj by Dr. John Fishel, Major Robert Shaw, and Dr. Robert Baumann, January 13, 1996, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, HOHP.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.


123. Freeman Interview.


128. Gaddis Interview. February 12, March 27, 1997; Major David leMauk, LNO to Haitian Police, JTF 190, interview with Colonel Dennis Mroczkowski, October 26, 1994, *Oral History Interviews*, 323.


130. Ibid., 313.

132. Ibid., 322–24.


134. Pjetraj Interview.


136. Pjetraj Interview.


140. Freeman Interview.

141. The experience of the previous decade in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility proved to be not only relevant but also explanatory of what was effective and what was not. SOUTHCOM lessons focused on the ways in which civic action could either mitigate the ill effects of military operations (mitigating civic action) or contribute to national development (development civic action).

Old Principles and New Realities: Measuring Army Effectiveness in Operation Uphold Democracy

John T. Fishel

This chapter attempts to measure the effectiveness of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy and the transition to the follow-on UN Mission in Haiti. In addressing this subject, it is good to take account of the words of former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, in the first edition of the new series of joint doctrine manuals, Joint Pub 1, where he articulates the premise that the modern American way of war is joint warfare. Thus, in Powell's view, the U.S. Army never again will go to war alone; it will always be part of a joint team. And if Operation Uphold Democracy is indeed a harbinger of the future, then the Army in the future will almost invariably participate only as a member of a joint, interagency, and multinational team!

This chapter will consider each of the sequential phases of the operation according to how well or poorly it was executed in terms of standardized principles of U.S. Army and joint doctrine as exemplified in both the nine principles of war and the six principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW). There is significant overlap between the two sets of principles in relation to three of the principles: objective and security, in which the overlap is complete, and unity of command, where that term becomes a subset of the principle of unity of effort. The remaining principles of war are offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, surprise, and simplicity; while those of MOOTW are legitimacy, perseverance, and restraint.

Using the principles of war and MOOTW as criteria for determining the degree of success of the "intervention" of Haiti does not imply that all of these principles were specified by the commanders and their staffs in planning and executing the operation. The principles of war and MOOTW are neither gospel nor dogma. Rather, in the case of Haiti, the principles provided an intellectual underpinning for the operation that was implicit in nature, in some cases, but explicit in others, as in UNMIH commander Major General Joseph Kinzer's statement of intent. U.S. Army officers are nurtured on FM 100-5, Operations,
which addresses both sets of principles directly and is part of the intellectual baggage that officers bring to war and warlike operations.

Operation Uphold Democracy can be divided into five phases for analytical purposes: (1) planning, (2) deployment, (3) employment, (4) transition, and (5) redeployment. These phases will be analyzed in respect to their application to the principles of war and MOOTW. Four possible outcomes of the analysis are contemplated. First, the principle was applied successfully during a particular phase. Second, it was either not applied or applied in inappropriate ways that resulted in failure. Third, the application of the principle by the force was to varying degrees appropriate or not, which resulted in a mixed outcome. Fourth, the principle in question was not applicable to a particular phase of the operation.

Planning

With few exceptions, the principle of the objective was well applied during the planning phase of Operation Uphold Democracy. The objective was stated clearly in the several UN Security Council resolutions on Haiti. These required the restoration to office of the democratically elected president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the removal of the military junta that had replaced him. The conditions required to permit the return of President Aristide were also the conditions necessary to turn the mission over to the UN, that is, the creation of a secure and stable environment in Haiti. The specific terms of such an environment, however, were never clearly articulated or elaborated as an end state at the strategic level. This failing was more than adequately addressed on the ground, however, at the operational level. Nevertheless, restoring democracy and establishing “a secure and stable environment,” in the words of the Carter-Cedras agreement, left some early confusion at the tactical level. Long-term security and stability were linked to the political objective of restoring democracy, which, while never clearly defined, generally seemed to imply the return of the democratically elected president to office and the holding of a series of subsequent free and fair elections that would culminate in the election and inauguration of a new president.

In the planning process, the objective of the offensive was well and fully served by a U.S. Army that is nothing today if not offensive minded. Hence, the concept of OPLAN 2370 was offensive violence inflicted suddenly, from sky and sea, with overwhelming but appropriate force. OPLAN 2380, by contrast, was developed for a
permissive entry but still sought to land large numbers of well-armed troops in an offensive and combat-ready posture. OPLAN 2375 took a position somewhere in between, and when it was further modified and executed as 2380–Plus, it retained the offensive capabilities inherent in OPLANs 2370 and 2380. The one planning failure was in clarifying the rules of engagement for 2380–Plus before the operation was executed. Although not a planning failure per se, no one even considered the possibility that 2370 would be aborted even as it was being executed!

Mass was the certain complement to the offensive in all the plans. It was clear from the beginning of the planning that a large number of forces were going to have to be landed in Haiti expeditiously, after which they would quickly make their presence and power felt in the two centers of gravity in the country, Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien. This was built into all versions of the several plans. The mirror image of mass is economy of force. Here, the planners’ record was mixed. With respect to U.S. forces, the plans called for the use of Special Operations Forces in an economy of force role, occupying the towns and villages of the hinterland. Operation Uphold Democracy was never a unilateral American operation; all plans called for multinational elements, to be led by the CARICOM battalion, either to enter with the U.S. forces in a permissive environment or to act as follow-on forces after a forcible entry. In no case, however, did the plans address in detail how the CARICOM contingent was to be employed. In addition, military planning appears not to have taken into account either additional multinational forces or the follow-on UN mission force, even though this was specified in UNSCR 940. In short, as the planners moved from a U.S.-only military operation to a multinational one, and one that involved interagency players, the planning became less and less complete. Even though Operation Uphold Democracy was the first-ever case of interagency political-military planning directly linked to a military operation, it failed to mass the interagency forces effectively and achieve synergy with the committed military units. This was largely because several of the interagency actors failed to develop the parts of the plan they had agreed to draft. The planners, moreover, did not plan completely through the entire campaign to redeployment.

The above discussion leads directly to consideration of the principles of unity of command and unity of effort. As suggested above, the planners left multinational and interagency operations to be considered in detail later or elsewhere. Although planning for Uphold Democracy included an interagency plan for the first time in any
modern operation, it was in no way comparable in quality to the joint OPLANS. Nor was it entirely integrated with those plans. There were numerous problems in the joint planning as well, especially in the integration of OPLAN 2380 with 2370. The latter was the product of the XVIII Airborne Corps in its role as JTF 180, while 2380 was being developed by the 10th Mountain Division as JTF 190. The division staff, however, was insufficient in numbers and experience to command and control a JTF without augmentation, let alone plan for one, and the augmentation was less than instantaneous in arriving and in achieving full integration. In addition, much of the combat support and combat service support planning was in the hands of the same planners who were developing plans for JTF 180 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. As Walter Kretchik makes clear, this entailed many flights back and forth between Forts Bragg and Drum, with some degradation of the planning effort due to lost time, compartmentalization, and sheer fatigue. Furthermore, all the plans assumed that the 10th Mountain Division would be JTF 190 for the duration. At no time was the 25th Infantry Division mentioned in the plans.

All the plans stressed security of the force in two senses. First, security of the force was developed in terms of force protection and ROEs. Second, the mandate for Uphold Democracy and the Multinational Force dictated that the mission would be complete “when a secure and stable environment has been established and UNMIH has adequate force capability and structure to assume the full range of its functions . . .”

The American military is perhaps the most maneuver-dependent force in the world at the strategic and operational levels. Maneuver, as used here, refers not only to the process of moving forces but, even more important, to that of gaining relative advantage over the adversary. At the strategic level, the CINC, USACOM, chose to enhance his maneuver capability by making use of the adaptive joint force packages he had been experimenting with over the previous two years. As a result, Army helicopters were positioned on the carriers USS America and Eisenhower for SOF and 10th Mountain Division forces respectively. This innovative use of the carriers significantly enhanced the flexibility of the JTFs at the strategic and operational level and permitted a much more rapid transition from a forced-entry plan (2370) to the revised “permissive-entry” plan (2380–Plus).

This maneuver capability was used in an attempt to ensure operational and tactical surprise. Still, with the deliberate sacrificing of strategic surprise for good and sufficient political reasons (the United
States hoped that the demonstration of what it was capable of doing would result in a negotiated departure of the Haitian junta and the return of President Aristide, maintaining secrecy at the operational and tactical levels of the operation was highly problematic. In fact, it was the discovery of the departure of forces from Pope AFB and the report of it to General Biamby during the Carter negotiations that nearly derailed the settlement when the Haitian principals abruptly fled the negotiations only to be re-engaged after Mrs. Cedras told the delegation how to find her husband. In turn, the evidence that the United States was prepared to use whatever force was required finally ensured that the settlement was accepted.9

The plans for the forced-entry operation were in no way simple in execution. Where the overall concept was quite simple—seize Port-au-Prince by airborne assault and Cap Haitien by amphibious landing at night, with forces spreading out over the entire country the next day—the air operations around the capital were extraordinarily complex. At one time, there were to be some 300 aircraft, all operating within the same confined airspace—a nightmare for air traffic control. This expedient did not violate the principle of simplicity; the operation was simple in conception, but it was complex in execution, requiring that special attention be given to control measures—the most important measure of which was rehearsal—designed to deconflict actual operations.

The final principle to be considered in the planning phase is the single most important principle in MOOTW—legitimacy. At the international level, legitimacy was granted by UNSCR 940. In Haiti, the planners concluded that legitimacy would be gained by the restoration of the elected president, Aristide, and the dismemberment of the hated FAd'H and its auxiliaries, variously known as attaches or simply macoutes.10 As it happened, the actual circumstances of Operation Uphold Democracy—the creation and execution of 2380-Plus upon the aborting of 2370 in the midst of execution—determined that the elimination of the FAd'H and its auxiliaries would not happen as rapidly or with the degree of ruthlessness desired by much of the public. The accomplishment of this particular aspect of legitimacy was further impeded by the initial confusion over the proper ROE and the lack of assertiveness by the 10th Mountain Division in and around Port-au-Prince. Finally, the operation would gain legitimacy in the United States if American casualties were limited, if Haitian-on-Haitian violence subsided, and if the illegal waves of Haitian migration to the United State ended.
**Deployment**

The deployment phase of the operation began as soon as the president, through the secretary of defense, issued the warning order to execute OPLAN 2370. With the exception of airborne units, the forces required for Operation Uphold Democracy began to deploy by land to their embarkation stations upon receipt of the warning order. The paratroopers would not begin deployment until the execute order was issued a few days later.

The principle of the objective was adhered to scrupulously in the deployment phase. The strategic objective of restoring democracy (not carefully defined, as noted in the previous section) depended completely on the successful attainment of the operational objective of the mission. It was clearly stated in all the plans and, indeed, remained the same no matter which plan was executed. In essence, the operational objective was to establish a stable and secure environment in Haiti for the return of the democratically elected president to office. At the operational and tactical level, securing this objective meant taking control of the two principal cities of the nation, Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, which were identified as centers of gravity. The deployment from Fort Bragg by air and Norfolk by sea aimed at seizing control of the centers of gravity in a swiftly executed *coup de main*. With the two cities in U.S. hands, SOF forces would move into the rest of the country and establish control.

Mass also was essential to all plans. OPLAN 2370 put SOF and the 82d Airborne Division into Port-au-Prince concurrently with the Special Marine Air-Ground Task Force's (MAGTF) arrival at Cap Haitien. Immediate follow-on would involve the landing of 10th Mountain Division forces from the USS *Eisenhower* by helicopter. These forces were more than sufficient to overwhelm the FAd'H. Once the execute order was given, airborne forces began to deploy, and the ships carrying the command and control elements, the Special MAGTF, and the 10th Mountain moved into assault position. Forces were, thus, effectively massed for the execution of OPLAN 2370 (or any variation of 2370 or 2380, should that be necessary).

All plans designated that economy of force would be achieved by SOF, and those forces were deployed to control the Haitian countryside. Strategic maneuver was the essence of the deployment phase. Generally, the deployment went like clockwork, by sea and air. Operational and tactical maneuver, however, does not become relevant until the employment phase. Deploying the force has been extremely
well developed in the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and well practiced by U.S. military forces over many years, including Panama in 1989, Operation Desert Shield in 1990, and Somalia in 1992. Thus, while there were some innovative refinements to the deployment system, such as the CINCUUSCOM’s use of carriers as the base for his adaptive joint force packages, these only incrementally stressed the strategic maneuver system.

For the deployment phase of the operation, the principle of unity of command clearly took precedence over its twin, unity of effort. Although the operation was generally successful, there were some real problems with air traffic control at Port-au-Prince International Airport. These difficulties were fairly handily resolved, nevertheless, and had no significant or lasting effects on the deployment. Security was addressed by the emphasis on force protection and rules of engagement, which, during the anticipated combat phase, were quite robust. Legitimacy was inherent in the execution of a UN mandate and in the safe and peaceful arrival on the ground of U.S. forces and their initial enthusiastic welcome by the Haitian people.

Finally, U.S. restraint was evident when the deployment was changed from a forcible entry to a permissive one. At that point, the flexibility of the U.S. military was demonstrated when the 82d Airborne was turned around in midair, and the 10th Mountain Division directed to land by helicopter in an ostensibly peaceful environment on the morning of September 19. In short, the overall deployment phase was supremely successful.

Employment

While the objective of Operation Uphold Democracy was clear enough during the planning and deployment phases, it rapidly became more ambiguous after the forces landed in Haiti. This was partly due to the change in plans being executed from 2370 and/or 2380 to 23&O-Plus (with some inspiration from 2375). Although the strategic objective of restoring democracy did not change, nor the operational objective of establishing a secure and stable environment, the supporting objectives to both became fuzzy; nor was it clear whether these objectives required the FAd’H to be replaced. It was not certain if the agreement worked out with Cedras required that the FAd’H be treated as an ally or a threat. Moreover, under the terms of the peacetime ROE initially in effect, there was no guidance for the 10th Mountain trooper if he encountered Haitian-on-Haitian violence being
perpetrated by his newly acquired "allies" in the FAd'H. As a result, the level of confusion was extremely high in Port-au-Prince.

By contrast, the Marines in Cap Haitien had interpreted the ROE to permit the use of deadly force in self-defense when they perceived that deadly force was about to be directed against them. This interpretation resulted in the fortuitous firefight between the Marines and elements of the FAd'H that established in Cap Haitien, and later in the rest of Haiti, the legitimacy of the intervasion force, despite the fact that many Haitians perceived the Carter-Cedras agreement as a "sellout." The Marines' firefight not only bought time for the JTF and MNF headquarters in Port-au-Prince to adjust the ROE so that troops of the 10th Mountain could intervene in Haitian-on-Haitian violence, but it also ensured that the ROE modification would support the objective. Ultimately, in terms of the principle of the objective, significant redefinition was required on the ground, and for a time, that redefining hindered the effective prosecution of the mission. The question remains, why did the 10th Mountain Division and the Special MAGTF interpret the ROE so differently? Was it a difference in service cultures or the result of the peculiar circumstances of the units involved and their commanders?

While the answers to these questions are speculative, it is likely that unit experience and the personal peculiarities of the commanders were the driving forces. Clearly, the 10th Mountain was strongly influenced by its recent experiences in Somalia as the quick reaction force of UNOSOM II, where the ROE were sometimes overly restrictive and, at other times, not restrictive enough. This experience was coupled with the anticipation that Haitians would behave in ways similar to Somalians.

Mass, too, was somewhat misapplied in the early stages of the operation. While the selection of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien as centers of gravity dictated the massing of troops in those two cities, forces were overconcentrated in the capital, as well as poorly utilized. Early in the operation, 10th Mountain soldiers did not conduct any night patrols, leaving the streets to the thugs. For a long time, moreover, the soldiers of the division were not used significantly to patrol outside Port-au-Prince, which irritated CINCUSACOM. Again, this overcautious attitude seemed prompted by the division's experience in Somalia during UNOSOM II.

Problems in the application of economy of force (the alter ego of mass) also occurred in the execution of the operation. On the positive side, the SOF forces were appropriate to the economy of force role and
effectively brought stability—a sense of order and security—in the countryside. However, the need was felt for the presence of the heavier division forces to enhance the credibility of the SOF. But, while Colonel Dubik conducted active patrolling in his sector to support the scattered SOF elements, JTF 190 headquarters, in the capital, seemed reluctant to mount similar operations in the city and countryside. The reluctance to put the troops on the streets with the people meant that the principle of economy of force, like that of mass, was somewhat compromised. The difference between the division’s units in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien seems to rest on two factors. First was the quite different way in which the division commander and Dubik perceived the Somalia analogy, resulting in directives from the former focusing only on the inherent dangers, while those from the latter addressed opportunity, as evidenced in his more aggressive operation. Second, the fact that Dubik was far enough away from Port-au-Prince that face-to-face communication was difficult gave him significantly greater autonomy than his counterpart in 1 BCT.

Although it did not break down in the technical sense, unity of command did not always result in unity of effort or, in some cases, coordinated actions among separate components of the command. Besides the difficulty in getting 10th Mountain Division to conduct night patrols to establish security in Port-au-Prince and to initiate patrols from the capital into the interior, a lack of coordination existed between the Special Operations Forces and the conventional infantry of the 10th Mountain’s 1 BCT. There were also significant discrepancies between JTF 190 and JTF 180, and after the departure of JTF 180, between 190 and USACOM, as well as with various elements of the MNF. By contrast, joint operations in 2 BCT’s area of operation went much more smoothly. As for interagency operations, they left much room for improvement. This was due more to the lack of preparation on the part of the interagency players than problems within the military operation itself.

From the first days of the operation, the commander of JTF 180 was unhappy with the performance of the 10th Mountain Division in the Port-au-Prince operational area. Critical of the division’s lack of aggressive patrolling in the city and of the problems it experienced in adjusting the ROE to fit the changed situation in Haiti, JTF 180 pushed for changes in 10th Mountain’s procedures. After the XVIII Airborne Corps returned to the United States and the 10th assumed responsibility for operations throughout the country as JTF 190, pressure on the division to be more aggressive continued, now emanating from
USACOM. The point was made in a variety of sometimes subtle ways, one of which was a briefing by USACOM for the 10th Mountain on how it envisioned JTF 190 should carry out its mission of aggressive patrolling within and outside the capital. As the higher echelons became more unhappy with the way the 10th Mountain was executing the mission, the 25th Infantry Division was abruptly notified to prepare to take over the operation in Haiti. This notification took place in October.

It should be admitted that as the employment phase progressed, unity of effort began to fall into line. With respect to the MNF, however, effective unity of effort was not achieved until the 25th Infantry Division replaced the 10th Mountain as JTF 190. This change of players had its greatest impact on the way the MNF began to conduct business, with the shift in emphasis from force protection to legitimacy.

While security was generally effective during the employment phase of Operation Uphold Democracy, it was not the rousing success that some initial postoperation discussions made it seem. Security must be considered in terms of force protection as well as the objective of attaining a stable and secure environment. The early emphasis that the 10th Mountain put on force protection—an emphasis it retained throughout its deployment—impacted negatively on its interpretation of the ROE so that initially it refused to act to end Haitian-on-Haitian violence and was reluctant to patrol aggressively within the capital at night and outside the capital at any time. Neither observation pertains to 2 BCT in Cap Haitien, while 1 BCT and Task Force Mountain did become more aggressive as time went on. The result was an increasing balance between security as force protection and security in the achievement of a secure and stable environment.

The employment of military forces during Operation Uphold Democracy clearly reflected the principle of simplicity. With the success of the Carter mission, the need for a complex air operation disappeared and with it any need to violate the principle of simplicity. The only complicating factors came from the MNF and the interagency players. The MNF complication was solved by adherence to the principle of simplicity in assigning the national contingents operating sectors where they were under the tactical control of the MNF commander. While control of interagency players was not established, the solution to the problem they presented was found in the simple expedient of treating them as elements in support of the operation as a whole and gaining their cooperation by request.
Although the perception of the legitimacy of the MNF in Haiti improved significantly from the early days in Port-au-Prince, there was vacillation on the issue. The degree of MNF legitimacy, moreover, varied from zone to zone, depending on what force or unit was in charge. Generally, legitimacy was greater in the Cap Haitien zone than in Port-au-Prince (for reasons already discussed). This was largely because the capital was where overt political activity and resultant problems existed, and these naturally presented the force commander and his political advisers with greater difficulties. Among these was the issue of the prisons, which were not fully brought under MNF control until the 25th Infantry Division relieved the 10th Mountain. In the meantime, the issue resulted in the court-martial of a zealous (some would say overzealous) intelligence captain in the 10th Mountain's Army intelligence, who sought to end what he suspected were human rights abuses in the prisons by taking actions in violation of direct and legal orders from his superiors. Despite, or because of the notoriety brought on by his court-martial, Captain Rockwood was perceived as something of a hero in Haiti. Also complicating the legitimacy issue were a number of things the military forces did not control—the Interim Public Security Force and the new Haitian National Police—as well as the civilian government agencies that needed reestablishing. Although the American military had no control over these organizations, U.S. forces were blamed, to a degree, by the populace for their actions, therefore, U.S. troops took on a more active role than they desired. An example of such involvement was the establishment of Ministry Support Teams from among the U.S. Army civil affairs forces. Borrowing from the experiences in Panama and Kuwait, these teams provided the local government with needed professionals and skills during the critical period in which it was being newly established. Legitimacy was greatest in the interior of the country where the SOF forces held sway and applied their doctrine with great success.

The principle of restraint was successfully applied throughout the employment and subsequent phases of the operation. Even though the U.S. military was criticized at the beginning of the operation for being too restrained, forces over the course of the operation carried out their missions with a high degree of professionalism, innovation, and proper restraint. This result enhanced the operation's credibility and legitimacy.

The principle of perseverance also figured in the operation. Military planning, however, paid limited attention to this precept. This was mostly in the form of the expectation that the largest contingent of the
follow-on UN mission, UNMIH, would be United States forces and
that interagency planning looked to an extended period of support to the
new Haitian government. Planning, in this regard, however, was
neither particularly detailed nor well integrated. At the same time, JTF
180 was being rotated back to the United States, and efforts to reduce
the size of the American force moved rapidly ahead without much
regard for the actual needs on the ground. This reduction of the American
presence was driven by the perception held by America’s political
leadership of the need to have a quick victory, with as few U.S. troops
committed for the long term in Haiti as possible. These conflicting
priorities leave a mixed message with regard to perseverance.

Transition

Operation Uphold Democracy never was meant to be a long-term
U.S.-led mission. Indeed, UNSCR 940, which established the
mandate, also ordered the establishment of a UN Mission advance party
in Haiti and directed “that the multinational force will terminate its
mission and UNMIH will assume the full range of its functions . . . when
a secure and stable environment has been established and UNMIH has
adequate force capability and structure . . .”17 Thus, the mandate not
only established the objective for the mission but also determined a
transition from a member-led mission to a UN peace operation, an
operation that would begin under chapter VII of the UN Charter (threats
to the peace) and end in operations under the terms of chapter VI
(peaceful settlement of disputes).

The MNF and the UNMIH advance team made significant progress
together in determining the objective and its measurement.18 The
measurement of a secure and stable environment had been developed
on the ground largely by Colonel Dubik in Cap Haitien and then
transferred to the rest of the country.19 In effect, this meant that
Haitian-on-Haitian violence would be significantly reduced, President
Aristide would be restored to office, and ministries would begin
operating. It also would indicate that the IPSF was being established
while the new Haitian national police were being trained. Meanwhile,
the MNF would be reduced to the strength of their UNMIH
replacement. With these conditions developing, the UN Security
Council passed UNSCR 975 on January 30, 1995, extending the
UNMIH mandate for six months and directing that the transition from
MNF to UNMIH be completed by March 31, 1995.
As stated above, the UNMIH force was going to be much less robust than the MNF, with a mere 6,000 troops. While this was adequate for the threat, it raised questions about the effective use of the principle of mass. Would there be enough forces available to control the two centers of gravity and the other population centers, or was the force going to assume significantly more risk by accepting an economy of force role in more places than desirable? To make the combination of mass and economy of force work, the newly appointed UNMIH force commander, U.S. Army Major General Joseph Kinzer, developed a vision-intent statement toward the end of 1994. In it, he identified the tenets of the mission as “unity of command, simplicity, economy of force, objective, security, safety and fiscal stewardship of our resources.”

To exercise the principle of mass and attain adequate force protection, Kinzer emphasized readiness and stated, “We will design and exercise a reaction force capable of response within the ROE across the spectrum from guard and patrolling to combined operations.”

Key to carrying out Kinzer’s intent with respect to economy of force was the retention of a U.S. SOF capability, a point which had been the subject of some discussion.

While the official record of unity of effort in the transition to UNMIH is one of unquestioned success, the reality is that there were many hitches in the process. First, there was the problem faced by the UNMIH advance party that was directed by UN Headquarters in New York to maintain its distance from the MNF, even though its mission was to plan the transition from MNF to UNMIH. Second, during the period of the MNF and early days of UNMIH, there was significant conflict between the head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in Haiti and the mission staff, which was only resolved when UN headquarters replaced the UNDP official in question. Third, although General Kinzer stated, “I see interagency cooperation and unity of effort as the keys to successful overall mission accomplishment,” several reports indicate that there was delay and conflict among the agencies—civilian and military, governmental and nongovernmental—that continued to a greater or lesser extent throughout the mission. Symptomatic of the problems in the interagency arena were the complaints of a Canadian CivPol (civilian police) officer about the lack of communication between his organization and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program of the U.S. Department of Justice, which had complementary responsibilities in training the Haitian National Police. Eventually, however, most of these problems were resolved,
and the multinational staff worked well together in the UNMIH environment.

This was especially true of the relationship between General Kinzer and Special Representative to the Secretary General Lakdar Brahimi. Kinzer also found that his Canadian chief of staff, Colonel Bill Fulton, was an invaluable source of information and sound advice in dealing with the UN. Among the trickier points was the need to separate bilateral U.S.-Haitian relations from those with the UN, particularly because Kinzer was “dual hatted” as the commander of U.S. forces in Haiti. The resolution was that his American deputy would undertake all bilateral representations in conjunction with U.S. Ambassador William Swing.

Transition to UNMIH significantly increased the legitimacy of the operation in the eyes of nearly all the relevant publics. This was true even in the case of the Haitian public, which was reassured by the fact that the force commander was an American and that the largest contingent of troops was American. This relieved any remaining apprehension that the “thugs” were going to return in the near future. In the United States, concerns of the American public, which had grown accustomed to blaming the UN for many of the things that had gone wrong with recent U.S. foreign policy adventures, especially in Somalia, were largely assuaged by the fact that UNMIH was commanded by a U.S. Army general and that the operation had gone so well that the American forces participating had been reduced to a mere 2,400, only a few more than 10 percent of what they had been at the peak. For their part, the Haitian leaders were pleased with the transition because it reduced whatever residual fears President Aristide and his supporters may have had over a repetition of the U.S. Marine occupation of Haiti from 1915 until 1934. As a practical matter, it gave Aristide somewhat more room to maneuver than he had had during the American-led and dominated MNF. The issue of “room to maneuver” also benefited Aristide’s opponents, who would have fewer foreign troops interfering in their business, legitimate or not.

The extension of the mandate for six months in January 1995 and again in July was significant in reinforcing both the legitimacy of UNMIH and indicating that the UN was willing to persevere until the mission was completed. The follow-on extensions of the mandate, although the force would no longer include U.S. troops, reinforced both perceptions. When coupled with bilateral American support in the forms of ICITAP, economic assistance, and a U.S. Support Group to coordinate military exercises (especially engineer and medical),
Haitians began to recognize that the international community, including the United States, was prepared to help them help themselves over the long haul. Finally, UN forces, like the MNF before them, exercised admirable restraint in the use of force. Their presence was extremely effective, especially when coupled with behavior that was both restrained but brooked no nonsense. The unanswered question with respect to the use of military forces in a peacekeeping operation remains whether more is gained by regularly moving among the people with kevlar helmets and body armor than is lost by not presenting a view that the environment is adequately secure and stable.

Redeployment

With the end of the third extension of the UN mandate in December 1995, UNMIH began to plan and execute the transition to end the major U.S. participation. A new force commander was named, a Canadian general, and UNMIH's chief of staff, Colonel Fulton, executed a transition that marked the redeployment of all American troops, including those of the U.S. Support Group.

Colonel David Patton, Commander, U.S. Support Group, had planned to stay in Haiti continuously through the changeover from an American-commanded UNMIH to a Canadian command. On Christmas Eve, 1995, Patton briefed General John Shalikashvili, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the Support Group plans, which included leaving its approximately seventy-person headquarters in place. The general complimented him on the plan but said that for political reasons—the administration had promised that all U.S. troops would come out of Haiti—the Support Group was coming out too. It would return after a short but decent interval. With this action, the United States sent several, often conflicting signals. First, it indicated to the UN, the Haitians, the American public, and all concerned that the U.S. government thought its mission in Haiti was over. This both delegitimized the U.S. contingency involvement in the eyes of the American people and indicated to the Haitians that the United States and the international community were not willing to persevere to achieve a long-term solution to Haiti's problems. Second, and conversely, the return of the Support Group and its continued operation, generally with around 500 engineers and/or medical personnel, reinforced both the legitimacy and perseverance of the American involvement. The signals were clearly mixed.
Redeployment of all U.S. military forces along with some UN contingents clearly deemphasized the principle of mass while, at the same time, stressing the principle of economy of force. Indeed, redeployment brought out the most effective economy of force units—the SOF elements, as well as most of the combat forces—replacing them with undertrained and weakly commanded Haitian National Police supported by a CivPol that would, over the next year, be reduced from 900 to 300. ICITAP attempted to train these new police in a new academy, under a five-year contract with the Haitians. Coordination between ICITAP and CivPol was hardly perfect, however, and there is little indication that it has improved to any great extent. As a result, security in Haiti has been reduced somewhat from the days of the original transition to UNMIH, to the extent that President René Preval (who succeeded Aristide) had to request U.S. assistance to retrain his executive protection service after it was found to have been infected with a severe case of politicization.\(^3\) In short, all of the measures of long-term strategic success for the operation are mixed at best.

**Conclusion**

What was accomplished by Operation Uphold Democracy? In simple terms, a bunch of thugs was finally removed from Haiti, and the government was returned to the Haitian president who had been elected by the people. A series of free and relatively fair elections were held to legitimize the holders of legislative and municipal offices, and, finally, a new president was elected who took the office peacefully from his elected predecessor—the first such transition for Haiti since 1804. But democracy is more than free and honest elections, and the efforts to restructure the economy and the judiciary of Haiti have lagged far behind, while the international community, led by the United States, has been rapidly losing interest in the Haitian experiment. As the UNMIH mission wound down, the indications were that Haiti would most likely revert to the kind of authoritarian regime it has known since it won its independence—what scholars of Haiti have dubbed “a predatory regime.”

This conclusion sounds very much like it is heralding the failure of a mission that has been touted as nearly a complete success. How can we explain this seeming paradox? The problem lies in the linkage between the strategic and operational levels of conflict. In fact, the issue is that there was a disconnect between the strategic objective of restoring and upholding democracy and the operational objective of maintaining a
secure and stable environment in Haiti. What was required to ensure strategic success was a set of operational objectives leading clearly to the upholding of democracy, which would describe an operational end state that made the desired democratic outcome as nearly certain as possible. This was not accomplished.

Although the principles of war were addressed at the operational level, emphasis was not on reaching the desired strategic end state. Rather, for example, both planners and executors focused on achieving and maintaining the legitimacy of the force and, only secondarily, on the legitimacy of the government. Thus, it was always assumed that President Aristide had legitimacy because he had been elected and not that he had to work to maintain that legitimacy. As the scheduled presidential elections approached, there appeared to be a campaign to extend Aristide in office to account for his three years in exile or to change the constitution so that he could run again. Although Aristide did not make these arguments, his refusal to endorse the candidacy of his friend, ally, and former prime minister convinced most observers that the president was behind this campaign. As a result, only when Aristide’s behavior demonstrated that he was bent on extending his mandate did UNMIH focus on the legitimacy of the electoral system as opposed to that of the Aristide regime.

Similarly, the principle of security, more often than not, was addressed in terms of force protection rather than with respect to the security of the people of Haiti—those on the streets of Port-au-Prince as well as in the villages of the interior. Nor was security, as a principle, linked to the economic well-being that is essential to the legitimacy of a system of government. In short, the probable strategic failure of the invasion of Haiti has roots in the fact alluded to in our discussion of planning: that is, the political-military plan for Haiti, the first of its kind, was poorly integrated with the strictly military plans. The lesson for future operations is that there is a need to develop political-military plans fully and in complete coordination with—and in such a way that they drive—the military planning process. Only in this way can we be assured that a predatory state will not return to render our efforts useless.
Notes

Chapter 4

1. These principles are found in Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, *Operations*, Washington, D.C., 1993, and Joint Pub 3-0, *Operations*, Washington, D.C., 1993, and Joint Pub 3-07, *Military Operations Other Than War*, Washington, D.C., 1995. The principles of MOOTW are found in both FM 100-5—where they are called principles of operations other than war (a subtle difference)—and the joint pubs. We refer to them and the environment in which they operate as MOOTW out of deference to the recent Army decision to cease using the term OOTW; however, the joint term, by direction of the chairman, JCS, still takes precedence.

2. Although several definitions of “legitimacy” are used in current field manuals, joint pubs, and political science writing, the way in which we are using the term derives from and expands somewhat on these definitions. We use legitimacy to mean the perception that a government has the moral right, as well as the legal right, to govern and that governments or international actors are perceived to be acting in morally and legally right ways.

3. Transition refers to the transition from the UN-sanctioned U.S.-MNF operation to the UN’s own UNMIH operation, as well as to the second phase of UNMIH, when U.S. forces turned over the operation entirely to a Canadian-led UN force.

4. See chapter 2 in this publication.


6. See chapter 2 in this publication.

7. Ibid.


9. Robert Pastor, a member of the Carter team, recounted the story that Biamby fled with Cedras and that the U.S. team had to make contact with Mrs. Cedras to get the general to reinitiate
negotiations so that the U.S. team could conclude terms successfully. Interview with Robert Pastor by John T. Fishel, September 1995.

10. The Ton ton Macoutes, a Creole phrase meaning bogeyman, were the secret police of the Duvalier regimes.

11. See chapter 3 in this publication. It should be remembered that the 10th Mountain Division was also the ARFOR of UNITAF under its previous commander, then-Major General Steven Arnold, and had a wholly different experience than it had had in UNOSOM II.

12. Ibid.


14. Ibid.

15. TACON (tactical control) means that the force commander can assign missions to a unit within the terms of reference agreed upon at the governmental level but cannot task organize the unit.

16. For a more complete description of this case, see chapter 3.

17. UNSCR 940, July 31, 1994, paragraph 8.


21. Ibid.

22. Greenawald Interview.
23. Ibid. Colonel Greenawald speculated that the reason had to do with the traditional UN reluctance to get too close to any national force, thereby identifying itself as a mere extension of the foreign policy of that nation.

24. Interviews with U.S. officer involved with the training of the UNMIH staff by John T. Fishel, spring 1995. Interview with Dr. Bryant Freeman, director, Haitian Studies Institute, University of Kansas, and a member of MICIVIH and of General Kinzer’s staff at various times, by John T. Fishel, 1995.


26. Interview with Canadian CivPol officer by John T. Fishel, January 1996. CivPol is the part of UNMIH that is responsible for the day-to-day supervision of the HNP.


29. Fulton Interview.


31. In 1997, the executive protection service was found to have been engaged in extralegal political violence that prompted the U.S.-imposed retraining.
Uphold Democracy: A Comparative Summary and Conclusion

Walter E. Kretchik

The United States possesses a long and contentious history of military involvement in the affairs of Caribbean republics. From the late 1890s to the mid-1930s, many of these episodes took the form of active intervention, America's so-called "Banana Wars." During this period, U.S. military commanders roamed the tropics, landed troops, occupied countries, and quieted political turbulence in an effort to maintain order and stability. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt justified this behavior in his famous "corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, arrogating to the United States the responsibility for policing the Caribbean region. TR's successors, while at times using other justifications, pursued interventionist policies very similar to Roosevelt's. One such case was the U.S. intervention in Haiti, ordered by President Woodrow Wilson in 1915.

Strategic Situational Awareness

To some observers today, the use of the military instrument in Haiti from 1915 to 1934 seems quite similar to Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994. In both instances, U.S. forces operated to establish order and stability. But the two operations differ significantly in why and how the United States conducted them. While, as chapter 1 reflects, the intervention by U.S. Marines in 1915 aimed at restoring order to an unstable Haiti, the reasons for undertaking such a difficult endeavor were directly linked to American security. In short, the operation sought, in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine, to keep Germany from enhancing its position in the Caribbean. This is not to say that other, nonstrategic considerations did not accompany this overarching concern. On a more personal level, for example, certain U.S. political leaders and Marine Corps officers at the time perceived a role for American forces as the fatherly protectors of a juvenile Haitian society that was susceptible to European dependency. (Inherent in this paternalistic mission, of course, were feelings of White superiority that ultimately caused Haiti's self-appointed benefactors to distance..."
inactivated as part of the early 1990s force drawdown mentioned earlier in this chapter. The 9th Regiment, now an independent or separate brigade, was seeking missions to avoid being caught in the drawdown itself. The leaders of I Corps, the senior headquarters at Fort Lewis, saw the MOG mission as an ideal way to give the 9th Regiment a real mission within its capabilities. Trenda noted that McMillian's lack of Spanish proved to be detrimental and led to his removal as the MOG commander later on. Trenda, in a separate comment to this author, identified McMillian as a hyper individual who had trouble relaxing and getting some sleep. According to Trenda, McMillian drove himself and his staff to the point of exhaustion, thus his removal from the team was more due to McMillian's personality than his lacking Spanish.

91. Trenda Interview.


93. Bonham Interview, 32.

94. In this publication, for the sake of consistency, the plan will also be called OPLAN 2375.

95. Interview with Major David Stahl by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Dietrich, Center of Military History, 1994, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.


themselves from the country’s population, elite and poor alike.) Still, in absence of the German question, it is doubtful that Wilson would have deployed the Marines. Once in Haiti, they set up an occupation government as the vehicle for creating order and stability. The legacy of that government and the occupation as a whole continues even today to affect Haitian views of Americans.

Neither a strategic threat from Europe nor a misplaced sense of paternalism prompted the U.S. action in Haiti in 1994. Rather, that “intervention” was motivated, on one level, by the moral and humanitarian outrage generated by a predatory regime that, having recently deposed a democratically elected president, showed few qualms about brutalizing its own people, many of whom fled by boat to the United States. In the interests of democracy and human rights, both the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations condemned the Haitian junta led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras and enacted economic sanctions designed to pressure his government into capitulation. Unfortunately, these regional and international measures, despite the intentions behind them, tended to hurt the Haitian people more than the government, causing even more Haitians to flee the country.

While President George Bush struggled with the plight of the “Boat People,” it was his successor, Bill Clinton, who felt the full brunt of their impact on domestic politics. His decision to intervene in Haiti can only be understood fully with reference to these internal considerations. To begin with, the president could not ignore the political pressure generated by the congressional Black Caucus, whose members were heartily criticizing his failure to implement pre-election promises to ease restrictions on Haitian immigration. Furthermore, as long as the restrictions were in effect, the president needed to find a suitable means for locating and processing the mounting wave of “Boat People.” Adding to these domestic pressures was the USS Harlan County debacle in Port-au-Prince harbor, where in October 1993 a group of drunken Haitian thugs from the FRAPH appeared to humiliate the United States (as well as the UN) by running off a U.S. flag-carrying naval vessel. Under the circumstances, a strong U.S. response to the Haitian crisis was one course of action that offered Clinton a way to extract himself from a delicate political situation. A strong response, in turn, could count on multinational support, given the concerns voiced by the OAS and UN. It is not inconceivable that future peace operations might also become a means to solve complex U.S. domestic political concerns through an international venue.
Just as there are differences as to why U.S. troops entered Haiti in 1915 and 1994, so, too, is there a clear difference as to how they were employed. The source of this difference can be found in the circumstances and assumptions underlying the use of military power in each case. In 1915, U.S. Marines responded to an urgent appeal to Washington from the American ambassador in Haiti. There was little time to formulate a detailed plan or to derive, in today's terminology, a clear "end state"; rather, the Marines simply landed and, after establishing a position of dominance, tried to determine what needed to be done. In contrast, planning for what became the U.S. "intervention" in 1994 began several years in advance as an effort to be prepared for a noncombatant evacuation operation. Later, in the months preceding Uphold Democracy, planners shifted their focus to an invasion of Haiti and included in their plans a deadline for extracting U.S. troops. Unlike the 1915 operation, which had no apparent exit strategy, the 1994 operation was envisioned to last anywhere from a few weeks to possibly six months, depending on the achievement of specific objectives. In short, an exit plan was central to U.S. thinking from the start. There would be no twenty-year occupation or U.S.-controlled government as in the first intervention, but a turnover of peace operations to the United Nations once American forces had established stability in Haiti. Civilian and military decision makers in the United States simply assumed that there would be considerable domestic pressure for a quick handover to the UN and that the American people would want their men and women in uniform "home by Christmas," or by some similarly arbitrary deadline.

Concerns about the fickleness of public support for American military operations abroad limited what the U.S. government could realistically hope to accomplish in Haiti during Uphold Democracy. Ideally, peace operations should avoid specific exit deadlines, since success or failure then becomes a condition of an operation's duration rather than its attainment of critical objectives. That said, however, no U.S. politician can reasonably be expected to support a long-term occupation of a foreign country. In the case of Uphold Democracy, plans linked exit deadlines to achievements; in reality, the issue of when the troops were coming home generated more public discussion than what they were accomplishing. This meant, as Don Schulz notes, halfway efforts that led to halfway, ineffective, and counterproductive results.3

Whether the focus is on 1915 or 1994, the decision to apply the military instrument of power and the policy for employing it originate
within the civilian-led sectors of the American government, specifically within the Executive Branch. In this context, one aspect of the strategic planning for Uphold Democracy deserves mention: for the first time in a peace operation, U.S. government officials produced a tangible interagency plan that set forth America's political-military policy in the crisis. The plan was not perfect. It was, for one thing, tilted in favor of military concerns, largely because of the predominant role the Department of Defense and USACOM played in drafting it. It was also in no way comparable to the joint OPLANs nor well integrated with them. Still, despite these qualifications, the interagency plan provides the best example to date of cooperation between top-level political and military actors anticipating a peace operation.

**Operational Aspects**

In 1915, U.S. President Wilson used military force in Haiti in response to an immediate crisis, then figured out, much later, how to use that force to bring stability to the country. In contrast, the U.S. National Command Authority in 1994 planned and envisioned from the start how it would use military power operationally in Haiti. Initially, the policy makers of the Interagency Working Group and the appropriate U.S. military headquarters planned for a UN-sanctioned invasion and hostile takeover of the country. Labeled as a forcible-entry option, U.S. forces under OPLAN 2370 were to destroy key points of the Haitian infrastructure with aerial gunfire and conduct airborne insertions, raids, and air assaults to seize control of critical nodes. Those Haitian FAD'H and military police who resisted would be killed or captured. The unilateral American invasion force, consisting primarily of the 82d Airborne Division, Special Operations Forces, and U.S. Marines, expected first to engage in combat, after which it would make the transition to peace operations. As it turned out, U.S. troops came perilously close to having to shoot their way into Haiti. If the Carter Team's negotiations with the junta had not aborted, the insertion of the American invasion force, the OPLAN 2370 variant, would have resulted in at least brief combat and the potential loss of American and Haitian lives. Today, emerging U.S. Army doctrine cautions that a peace operation may, in fact, begin with short-lived offensive or defensive combat operations, during or after which stability and other noncombat operations in support of national objectives commence.4

The Marine invasion force in 1915 landed quickly in Haiti, quelled local disturbances, and eventually garrisoned the country. The leathernecks operated as a large security force within the cities, but as
noted in chapter 1, they also patrolled the countryside to put down Caco uprisings and to keep the peace. Once they had stabilized Haiti, the Marines reverted to occupation and mundane garrison duties, contributing to the administration, security, and internal development of the country, while U.S. government officials interacted with Haitian authorities. The Marines continued in support of U.S. policies toward Haiti until 1934 when, after nearly twenty years, the occupation ended.

American troops arriving in Haiti in 1994 confronted a highly uncertain and ambiguous situation. As a result of the Carter negotiations, combat operations to gain entry into the country and to topple the Cedras regime became unnecessary. Instead, U.S. armed forces found themselves trying to restore to office a democratically elected leader, while cooperating with the very government that had ousted him in the first place, a government that Washington had branded as illegitimate. That situation led initially to confusion for Haitians and U.S. forces alike and brought home the need for flexibility and adaptation. Plans for Operation Uphold Democracy had been based on three options: a forcible or hostile entry, an uncertain entry, and a permissive entry. To deal with the situation that American troops actually confronted in Haiti, the U.S. commander ordered that the plans based on these options be modified, a tasking met in a timely way by planners working the issue. Staff officers who find themselves planning future peace operations should take heed of this example and be prepared to make last-minute mission adjustments of more than minor proportions.

As shown in chapters 2 and 3, Uphold Democracy revealed that the National Security Council and its IWG carry a great responsibility, not only in planning but also in executing peace operations. Yet many of the Executive Branch departments and other agencies that made up the NSC had little to no experience in conducting such operations. In Uphold Democracy, for example, the U.S. Departments of Justice and State failed to assemble the International Police Monitors called for in the political-military plan to supervise the newly formed Haitian Interim Public Security Force. That task fell, by default, to DOD and USACOM. Only last-minute heroics by members of the JCS and the USACOM J5, in close coordination with Department of State and government contractors, salvaged the effort to create a credible Haitian security force, an imperative political objective.

After military operations had secured Haiti, many nongovernmental agencies and private volunteer organizations lagged in their support of essential U.S. government programs and policies. Further hindering
these programs, U.S. Army, Marines, and Special Operations Forces were forbidden, after they had secured Haiti, to assist in upgrading the country’s infrastructure beyond what U.S. military necessity demanded. Colonel Jim Dubik noted that he could only construct one bridge—for military use—over a swollen stream, despite the local population’s demand and need for two others. Lacking support of the necessary civilian agencies, U.S. Army commanders, attempting to help the Haitian people, soon became masters of creating military justifications for what, in reality, was nation assistance. This experience should be instructive for military planners who, in anticipating the fog and friction of a forthcoming peace operation, need to consider that civilian organizations will not always arrive in a timely fashion and that commanders might have to take certain creative measures to further the achievement of known political objectives.

Uphold Democracy introduced U.S. forces into a culture vastly different from their own. Yet, in planning for the Haiti operation, the Army, in general, had little appreciation of Haitian history and culture. Few planners knew anything about Haiti, other than its basic geography. In a combat operation, where overwhelming firepower achieves objectives, sensitivity for the local population’s culture and traditions clearly is not a top priority. In a peace operation such as Uphold Democracy, however, knowledge of how a people think and act, and how they might react to military intervention arguably becomes paramount. The U.S. military culture, in general, focuses on training warriors to use fire and maneuver and tends to resist the notion of cultural awareness. When Lieutenant Colonel Tom Adams, an instructor at Fort Leavenworth, asked Dr. Bryant Freeman, a noteworthy Haitian expert from the University of Kansas, to provide his expertise to help train UNMIH, Freeman gladly volunteered. At least one U.S. officer, however, stated that he did not appreciate having to listen to anyone who did not wear a uniform. Freeman eventually overcame such narrow-minded rebuffs and went on to become a valued adviser to Major General Joseph Kinzer, Commander, UNMIH.

There is a certain amount of U.S. political and military operational arrogance in Uphold Democracy that bears mentioning. Chapter 3 reflects upon U.S. participation in Haiti with CARICOM, a unit formed to bring a multinational presence to what had theretofore been a unilateral American operation. As Fishel notes in chapter 4, the United States in peace operations tends to request the assistance of other nations’ forces to demonstrate that American actions are multinational and not unilateral. Yet CARICOM, a force that could have provided a
wealth of intelligence and experience specific to the Caribbean area, did little more than perform routine mission tasks. It was not part of the forced-entry option and did not share the initial risks as part of JTF 180 and JTF 190. CARICOM, in a way, was snubbed, appearing to be on the receiving end of U.S.-procured equipment, without sharing the same hazards as the rest of the force. While CARICOM was clearly an ad hoc unit of varied training levels, multinational forces should share the same risks as U.S. forces in the interest of coalition cohesion.

**Tactical Observations**

In the 1915 occupation, most enlisted Marines and NCOs went about their daily business without a great amount of interaction with the Haitian people. Indeed, the majority of Marines who served in Haiti knew the locals only from hunting them down as Cacos, training them as gendarmes, or observing them on a daily basis as they walked the streets. Marine officers were more likely than the enlisted men to meet and befriend Haitians, yet even this interaction was inhibited by racial views then prominent in American society. As a consequence of the language barrier and American social taboos, Marines, in general, could spend a multiyear tour in Haiti without even speaking to a Haitian.

The way in which the Haitian people were engaged by U.S. forces during Uphold Democracy poses possibly the greatest controversy of that operation. The 10th Mountain Division’s modus operandi in Haiti adopted a radically different approach from the Joint Special Operations Task Force, or JSOTF, toward tactical mission accomplishment and dealing with the local population. While U.S. Army Special Forces moved freely throughout the country and mingled with the people (except in the capital), the 10th Mountain in Port-au-Prince, by and large, remained a secluded force. Some argue that this was the consequence of a “Somalia syndrome,” referring to the psychological disposition that the division supposedly acquired as a result of its experience in that African country. According to this thesis, the 10th Mountain Division behaved timidly in Haiti because of the casualties it had received in its bitter experience with mobs and gangs in Somalia. The nexus between Somalia and Haiti was made explicit by Lieutenant Colonel Randall P. Munch of the 10th Mountain Division, who observed during Uphold Democracy, “I think it should be noted that a lot of these [10th Mountain] officers and non-commissioned officers are Somalia veterans. Very often we have fallen back to the same tactics and techniques that we used in Somalia.”
To gain a better understanding of whether or not the 10th Mountain Division was suffering from a Somalia syndrome, one should examine OPLAN 2380 and the ramifications it entailed. During the planning phase of the Haiti operation, USACOM, on the orders of the NCA and JCS, directed the 10th Mountain to prepare an OPLAN for a permissive situation in which the Haitian junta and the FAd'H-police would be in control of the country with the intent and capability of cooperating with JTF 190. The division was also to train for the scenario set forth in the plan. What 10th Mountain produced was a plan that anticipated a permissive or an uncertain environment. USACOM had not directed the division to plan for the latter scenario, in which host government forces, whether opposed or receptive to JTF 190, did not have total effective control of the territory and population. Yet, as written, OPLAN 2380 required 10th Mountain to train for two distinct missions, one permissive and one uncertain. In effect, by writing a plan that included the possibility of an uncertain environment, the division stood to duplicate what JTF 180 was supposedly preparing under OPLAN 2375.

As it turned out, the 10th Mountain Division did not train for the two environments simultaneously. Rather, it concentrated on the uncertain scenario and emphasized training for combat. Colonel Andrew Berdy, Commander, 1 BCT, spent a great deal of time putting his rifle platoons and squads through day and night live-fire exercises to improve their marksmanship and small-unit tactics—a training method more reflective of an uncertain, rather than a permissive, situation. It could be assumed that, since the 10th Mountain Division was also part of OPLAN 2370, or the hostile option, Berdy was simply training his unit for that contingency. But as he himself conceded, that was not the case:

> We were not privy to 2370; that was a compartmented plan. And, consequently, we did not know who was going to be on the ground. I will tell you that if it had come off, I would be very uncomfortable, and that's putting it lightly... now I'm sure at the eleventh hour, maybe it would have been made known to us, but that's bull sh*t. You don't do that; you don't risk that. Now if they're concerned about OPSEC [operational security], then have trusted agents. There wasn't even any of that. If there was, it was at the Division level. But clearly, the operator on the ground, and the 1st Brigade Combat Team, needed to have someone who was read in on that, and I didn't have that.

If the 1 BCT's emphasis on training for an uncertain environment was not derived from OPLAN 2370, the question remains as to whether
it was driven by the Somalia experience. Yet, as Colonel Thomas Miller, JTF 190, J3, indicated, "[I]f anything, it's [a] lesson learned from Somalia that you never drop your guard. That you treat every single operation you do as a combat operation."\(^{12}\)

The preparation for combat by the 10th Mountain did prepare the division for the mission it ultimately executed under OPORD 2380 Plus, a mission that assumed uncertain Haitian conditions. Yet OPORD 2380 Plus did not reflect Haiti’s political realities. The junta and the FAd’H were very much in total control of the country on September 20, 1994. Therefore, the actual situation, as defined by U.S. joint doctrine, was in fact permissive. However, both JTF 180 and JTF 190 did not believe that the junta or the FAd’H would willingly cooperate; therefore, JTF 180 chose to label 2380 Plus as uncertain. It appears, then, that the 10th Mountain Division and its higher headquarters at XVIII Airborne Corps either misinterpreted or did not fully understand U.S. joint doctrine definitions of permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. In essence, U.S. forces did not know the junta’s intentions and therefore expected the worst case, which doctrinally meant a hostile environment.

For these reasons, 10th Mountain Division soldiers arrived in Haiti prepared for combat or a hostile situation, as demonstrated by their expectation of having to “take down” or secure Port-au-Prince airport. Colonel Berdy noted that, when he arrived at the airfield, he was surprised to discover U.S. Special Forces securing the terminal building—one of his designated objectives.\(^{13}\) Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division further reflected a combat posture when they moved to the Light Industrial Complex, where they stacked sandbags, wore combat helmets and Kevlar body armor, and adopted a “bunker mentality.” Despite the mission to secure Haiti, the 1st BCT (which occupied Port-au-Prince) spent most of the first two weeks patrolling the streets only during daylight. During the night, the reduced or nonexistent U.S. military presence and the absence of policemen enabled thugs in the capital to prey upon the Haitian people. Combat posture or not, the above actions at least demonstrate that the 10th Mountain Division was extremely cautious and uncertain in how it undertook its initial mission in the Haitian capital.

There was, as discussed in chapter 3, another side of the division’s method of operation. In Cap Haitien, where Colonel James Dubik’s 2d BCT operated, the situation was handled much differently from that in the capital. U.S. soldiers in Cap Haitien, although again dressed in combat gear, worked aggressively among the Haitian people and
established their presence, as called for in the operational plan. Dubik personally coordinated with local Haitian officials and authorities to explain, in detail, everything from what the U.S. military was doing in Haiti to what constituted democracy. As Dubik put it, "I had to conduct a civics lesson everyday." As one Special Forces officer observed, the 10th Mountain Division in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien were in two different worlds.

One possible explanation other than the Somalia syndrome for the different approaches taken by 10th Mountain Division elements in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien is that the threat to U.S. forces in the capital was greater. Yet, as noted by a key officer within the military intelligence brigade in support of the 10th Mountain Division, the threat to U.S. forces was fairly consistent across Haiti. Although there were instances of U.S. troops being attacked by Haitians, those rare cases tended to be acts of random violence. Another explanation for the different operating procedures was put forth by several officers from the 10th Mountain Division staff, who raised the issue of the command climate within the division. The command group, an organization headed by the division commander and his staff, was located in Port-au-Prince, primarily within the Light Industrial Complex, and tended to prescribe, supervise closely, and enforce strictly all military operations in Port-au-Prince, to include force protection and U.S.-Haitian interaction. Numerous 10th Mountain Division officers and enlisted men observed certain command group members castigating soldiers who exhibited the slightest variance from the force protection policy and ordering, on at least one occasion, U.S. soldiers to avoid engaging the local populace. Under these conditions, people like Major Len Gaddis, the civil affairs officer and thus the individual charged with establishing solid relations with the local populace, were hard-pressed to accomplish their doctrinal role. As Gaddis put it:

I was one of the few people who could actually get out into the streets and talk to the people. To do that I almost had to sneak out [of the perimeter] to do my job because my office was on the LIC where Haitians could not access [enter] it. Security was paramount. I knew more about what the people were thinking by getting around than the command group did, which was unfortunate. They could have done what I did but they wouldn't walk around.

While the above evidence does not fully explain why two separate headquarters operated so differently in Haiti, it does indicate that
command presence and location influenced military actions. In fact, one 10th Mountain Division officer went so far as to assert that the division's method of operation varied by location simply because the "division commander was in Port-au-Prince and Dubik was in Cap Haitien." To some, that appeared to be the crux of the matter.

Did a Somalia syndrome exist? If it did, it might have derived from nothing more than the transfer of military experience from one peace operation to another. Yet that perception does not explain how two 10th Mountain Division BCTs, each composed of 40 percent Somalia veterans, operated so differently in Haiti. Further, did the Somalia experience influence key leaders and their decision making? What was the effect of the Mogadishu debacle in political guidance, campaign design, tactical actions, or in shaping force protection levels? Those questions remain unanswered but certainly warrant further investigation for the benefit of future peace operations.

Regardless of the possible baggage carried out of Somalia, the incongruities in mission posture between the 10th Mountain Division and the Special Operations Forces was clearly evident to the Haitian community. To some members of the Haitian elite, the 10th Mountain's aloofness in Port-au-Prince was somewhat reminiscent of another U.S. occupation, almost eighty years earlier. Other Haitians who had lived in the United States protested that they saw nothing democratic in the 10th Mountain Division's behavior in the capital. Those Haitians observed American soldiers consciously distancing themselves from the Haitian people and therefore losing an opportunity to uphold U.S. democratic principles. While some Haitians knew from experience that the U.S. Army does not wander American cities conducting patrols and weapon sweeps on a daily basis, that nuance was lost upon the uneducated masses in the capital. To some unknowing Haitians, the 1 BCT might be acting exactly like it routinely did in New York. By failing to patrol at night, the 10th also appeared much like the FAD'H's military police, whom they had replaced. Once 1 BCT, 10th Mountain Division, began to conduct night patrols, its change in operational method further confused the Haitian people. Moreover, the image of U.S. soldiers handing out food, visiting schools, and holding children—all while wearing Kevlar helmets and body armor—presented a schizophrenic appearance that served unwittingly to undermine U.S. national strategic objectives.

The 10th Mountain Division's paradoxical approach to operations in Port-au-Prince seems to have originated with the strong emphasis placed upon force protection. To the 10th Mountain Division

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leadership, force protection not only drove the mission, it almost became the mission. The potential for American casualties was foremost in the minds of some key division leaders. Colonel Miller pointed out that, "most of our fights today are categorized successful by the number of bodies; the number of dead Americans. If there had been an enemy fighting [in Haiti] we would have lost some people, and then I don't know what the folks above us would define as successful. I think you'd have a whole different picture."22

The 10th Mountain Division leadership, in an effort to avoid combat casualties, chose to intimidate the Haitian population—the same populace that it was meant to provide with safety and security. Miller explained the 10th Mountain Division rationale this way:

[P]eacekeeping/peace enforcement does not mean anything for a rifle squad leader; it means a lot to me; [to] the Commanding General, but it means nothing to a rifle squad leader. He is going out on the street in a combat operation, because of the potential for hostility, force protection is always going to remain paramount. [T]he way to ensure force protection for them [U.S. soldiers], is through overwhelming combat force. We have it so you should use it, because we've got good leaders that can constrain the use of that and understand how to apply it. [T]he peoples of nations like Haiti [then] understand that you mean business...23

In essence, some members of the 10th Mountain Division leadership saw Uphold Democracy as a tactical combat mission in every sense, except for the physical application of continuous violence through firepower. The view that Uphold Democracy was a combat operation drove how the division protected itself. That posture not only intimidated the Haitians, as expected, it also threatened to unravel the entire idea of upholding democracy. The Haitians, many of whom had preconceived expectations of their American "liberators," now felt betrayed due to a command-directed, physical barrier between themselves and the U.S. soldiers, who represented Americans and their democratic values. Despite a relaxation of that separation over time, the 10th Mountain Division had caused many Haitians to question what American democracy is all about.24

In contrast to the 10th Mountain Division, the Special Forces community, and especially Brigadier General Richard W. Potter, Jr., won a hard fight to avoid Kevlar protection and bunkers. Although well armed, SF soldiers carried their weapons in a manner that was not obviously threatening. In doing so, the Special Forces moved freely
among the Haitian people, who appreciated and respected the more open, albeit risky, posture. Force protection, to Colonel Marc Boyatt, of 3d Special Forces Group, became "hearing what the people needed and getting it for them, especially electrical power, food, and other necessities." The notion of hearing what the populace was saying, or gathering "street rhythms" as Lieutenant General Shelton put it, served the U.S. Special Forces community in Haiti well.26

While different methods of operation generated some friction between the two types of forces, that contention should not be overstated. Some officers in Haiti perceived no serious discord between the 10th Mountain Division and the Special Forces soldiers. Colonel Miller noted that any differences between those units was merely a matter of properly aligning objectives.27 Brigadier General Potter also indicated that, although there was an initial misunderstanding on the part of conventional commanders as to the capabilities and modus operandi of Special Operations Forces, the relationship between SOF and the 10th Mountain Division was, on the whole, good.28 Still, the overall experience in Haiti would indicate that SOF was much more mission adaptive and attuned to the needs of the people than most conventional forces.

The replacement of Meade's 10th Mountain Division by Major General George Fisher's 25th Infantry Division remains, at this point, controversial. Members of the FORSCOM staff describe the unit rotation as a planned event, based largely upon the 10th Mountain Division's operational tempo, changing Haitian election dates, and the impending transition of control of the operation from U.S. forces to the United Nations Mission in Haiti.29 Others, however, suggest that the 25th Infantry Division replaced the 10th Mountain Division not only for the above rationale but also to alleviate the strained relationship between the 10th Mountain commander and the Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps.30 Regardless, neither OPLAN 2370, 2380, 2375, or OPORD 2380 Plus had mentioned the 10th Mountain Division transitioning to the 25th Infantry Division. While it is not unusual to have one division accept mission handover from another, it is curious that the 25th Infantry Division was never involved in the initial mission planning.31

What, then, can we conclude from Uphold Democracy and the U.S. Army's experience in Haiti? Above all, proximity guarantees that Haiti will remain a centerpiece for U.S. political concerns. As Dr. Bryant Freeman notes, Haiti always will be an American problem.32 We can also deduce that Haiti, despite being a permanent American concern, is
not much better off now than it was before Uphold Democracy. Haiti
remains an extremely poor country with a rigid class structure. Despite
U.S. government claims of democratic success in Haiti, only 5 percent
of the country’s registered voters participated in the March 1997
elections. The low voter turnout could indicate that Haitians are
dubious in their belief that democracy has been upheld and taken root.
Furthermore, after two U.S. military interventions this century, the
Haitian masses are not better educated or trained to be self-sufficient. It
appears that U.S. military forces have had little impact in changing
Haitian attitudes and the established social order.

Militarily, Uphold Democracy can be viewed as both a success and a
failure. To some, the U.S. Army was successful because the junta left,
Aristide returned to the presidency, the FAd’H was disarmed, and the
Haitian Police was vetted and retrained. In effect, the U.S. Army did a
fairly good job of accomplishing the operational goals of establishing a
secure and, at least temporarily, stable environment. The Army,
however, failed to engage the Haitian population and influence lasting
change. While the Haitians must eventually change themselves, U.S.
conventional forces in Port-au-Prince failed to act as role models for
affecting that change. Aside from what it did and did not do in Haiti, the
U.S. Army will continue to be an active player, along with other U.S.
agencies, in future peace operations. The Army has the experience and
resources that many of the civilian agencies do not possess. They, in
turn, have valuable competencies and legal obligations that are
essential to the success of military operations. Continued and improved
interagency cooperation is therefore essential to the success of future
peace operations.

While the U.S. military took the lead in Uphold Democracy, that
might not be the case in the future. As the military downsizes, certain
members of the interagency might find themselves in command of a
peace operation, with the U.S. Army only in a supporting role. Uphold
Democracy at least can serve as an example of what happens when the
Army, various government and nongovernment agencies, and private
volunteer organizations are called upon to participate in a peace
operation.

Uphold Democracy generated one major controversy concerning the
appropriate force protection posture to assume in a peace operation. If
the 10th Mountain Division leadership in Port-au-Prince was correct in
believing that peace operations at the squad and platoon level required
little more than combat techniques and activities, then that sends a clear
message concerning how a conventional force participates in a peace
operation.
operation. On the other hand, if the SOF community was right, then that sends quite a different signal. What is clear is that, in future peace operations, both types of forces need to examine the nature of the conflict, appropriate missions, the necessary posture for force protection, and the way in which these considerations work to support or undermine U.S. political objectives.

Whether or not the Haitians will benefit from the latest intervention remains to be seen. The U.S. Army "intervasion" force in 1994, unlike the U.S. Marines in 1915, departed after six months, having handed the mission over to UNMIH. Similar to the 1915 occupation, the 1994 operation left a secure environment, as well as a partially repaired infrastructure. But in both cases, the Marines and the Army failed to train or educate the Haitians adequately in maintaining the country's stability and infrastructure. Nonetheless, both the Marine and Army operations created a legacy for the future. As with the Marines in 1925, the Army's involvement in Operation Uphold Democracy forged Haitian opinions of Americans by and large more favorable than ones left behind in 1934. Regardless of what Uphold Democracy did or did not do, the U.S. Army helped to create a Haitian viewpoint of America that will shape political relations between the two countries in the future.
Notes

Chapter 5


5. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, March 23, 1994, defines each of the situations in the following manner. A hostile environment is an operational environment in which hostile forces have control and the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. An uncertain environment is defined as an operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended areas of operations. A permissive environment is an operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control and the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. Key to all three environments is that the local government and its forces either control or fail to control their country.

Oral History Project (HOHP). Dr. Freeman is the director of the Institute of Haitian Studies, University of Kansas. He has authored over sixteen books on Haiti, written the only Haitian Creole-English dictionary in existence, and has lived and traveled in Haiti over the last thirty years.

7. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Randall P. Munch by Major Christopher Clark, 44th Military History Detachment, 1995, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

8. According to joint doctrine, a permissive situation means that the host country military and law enforcement agencies are in control and have the intent and capability to assist operations that an outside unit intends to conduct. See Joint Pub 1-02, 275.

9. Ibid.


11. Interview with Colonel Andrew Berdy by Major Tom Ziek, October 9, 1994, Bowen Field, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

12. Interview with Colonel Thomas Miller by Major Christopher Clark, 44th Military History Detachment, date unknown, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.


16. Interview with U.S. Army Military Intelligence officer by Walter E. Kretchik, April 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

17. Interviews and conversations with numerous officers by Walter E. Kretchik, November 1996–May 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP. According to numerous field grade officers from the 10th Mountain Division, both Major General David Meade, the division commander, and Brigadier General George Close, the
assistant division commander, exhibited leadership styles that were "trying." One officer witnessed a "screaming fit" by the division commander that was directed at two MPs who had temporarily removed their body armor while laboring in the sweltering 100 degree heat. A logistics officer saw a similar instance and remarked that "the entire chain of command just stood there and took it. Later, we wondered about it, was this leadership by screaming?" Lieutenant Colonel George Steuber, a key leader within Task Force Mountain, related that Brigadier General Close was a hard, but usually fair, individual. Steuber related that Close was also prone to rages where he would lose control of himself in front of subordinates to include throwing his helmet. According to Steuber, who personally was involved in one such instance, Close had earned his nickname "Danger Close," a term usually identified with firing artillery or using air strikes near or upon ones own position. Steuber also noted that Meade would treat his subordinates in a like fashion, but that Close would sometimes apologize afterwards.

18. Interviews with U.S. Army Special Forces and Civil Affairs officer by Walter E. Kretchik, February–April, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP. An example of directed nonengagement was Brigadier General Close's orders to Special Forces soldiers on the first day of the operation to not talk with Haitians through the fence at Port-au-Prince airport. According to one eye-witness, Close ordered him and several others away from the fence, thereby denying them access to the people. Although political considerations were possibly at stake as the junta and the FAd'H were cooperating with U.S. forces, SF soldiers were unaware that they could not meet and engage in conversation with the populace, normally a typical SF mission. Many SF soldiers later ignored the directive as it was in direct conflict with the orders they received through Special Operations Forces command channels.


22. Miller Interview.

23. Ibid.

24. Conversations with numerous Haitian scholars by Walter E. Kretchik and Bob Baumann, November 1996, Montrois, Haiti. The conversations were with native Haitian scholars who had eye-witness experiences with U.S. troops. One Haitian described American soldiers as “sterile” in their approach toward Haitians. Another Haitian believed that the Americans did not interact with the population out of contempt, the same contempt that her father told her the U.S. Marines of the 1920s felt toward him. These comments, and others, indicate that the 10th Mountain Division did not present a totally positive image with the populace.

Some observers noted that certain members of the XVIII Airborne Corps were frustrated with the 10th Mountain Division’s initial operating methods in Haiti. To some XVIII Airborne staff officers, conservative decisions were overriding the accomplishment of political objectives. Major Tony Ladouceur, Shelton’s personal translator, noted that Shelton stayed in Haiti a lot longer than he had planned because of concerns over 10th Mountain Division’s operations. Ladouceur noted that Shelton voiced several concerns with Meade over operational command decisions, particularly over population engagement, and had personally tried to rectify the situation on several occasions without effect. Ladouceur’s comments to the author were that Shelton remained in Haiti simply because he was not comfortable with how the 10th Mountain Division was conducting itself. He therefore stayed beyond his expected departure time to ensure that the division did what it was supposed to do.

26. Conversations with U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers by Walter E. Kretchik, November 1996–February 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP. The Special Forces soldiers mentioned that Lieutenant General Shelton told his subordinates to really understand “street rhythms” to know what was happening on the streets of Haiti.

27. Miller Interview.

28. Interview with Brigadier General Richard Potter by Major Christopher Clark, 44th Military History Detachment, October 23, 1994, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

29. Conversations with members of the FORSCOM staff by Walter E. Kretchik, November 1996 and April 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.


31. Lieutenant General Shelton, upon his return to Ft. Bragg, was promoted to general and given command of the U.S. Special Operations Command. Major General Meade retired.

32. Freeman Interview.
Appendix A

Historical Chronology of Haiti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1492</td>
<td>Before this time, no recorded history exists, and very little is known about the Indian inhabitants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Dec 1492</td>
<td>Columbus discovers the island and names it La Isla Espanola, the island of Hispaniola.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Century</td>
<td>Native Arawak Indians are slaughtered and enslaved by the Spanish. Disease kills those that escape.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1644</td>
<td>French pirates based in the Cayman Islands use the west end of Hispaniola as a safe haven and outpost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French establish Part-de-Paix in the northwestern part of the island. The French West India Company takes possession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1697</td>
<td>By the Treaty of Rijswijk, the western one-third of the island is ceded to France by Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The French rename the western portion of Hispaniola, Saint Domingue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Century</td>
<td>By the end of this century, the island achieves a high degree of economic prosperity as a trading center.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Aug 1791</td>
<td>Stimulated by the French Revolution, slaves in Hispaniola stage a rebellion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1791–1801</td>
<td>The island is in utter chaos as the result of the slave rebellion. Pierre Dominique Tossaint Louverture, a black military leader, finally restores order in 1800.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1794</td>
<td>Slavery is abolished in Hispaniola.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1795</td>
<td>In the Treaty of Basel, Spain cedes the rest of the island to France.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 May 1800  Toussaint becomes governor general of Hispaniola. His success arouses the suspicion of Napoleon.

1800–1803  French domination of Haiti unravels as General Charles-Victor-Emmanuel Leclerc, Napoleon's brother-in-law, with a force of 25,000 men, lands in Haiti and occupies the seaports. He eventually is forced by the savage nature of the guerrilla war and disease to offer amnesty to Toussaint. During negotiations, Toussaint is treacherously seized and imprisoned in France. Fighting begins again against the French, with the Haitian guerrilla army under the new leadership of Jacques Dessalines and Henry Christophe. General Leclerc dies of yellow fever, leaving the French army weak and demoralized. The French army of Haiti is defeated by the black army in 1802.

7 Apr 1803  Toussaint dies of yellow fever in France.

9 Nov 1803  Viscount de Rochambeau surrenders the remainder of the French army of Haiti.

18 Nov 1803  France signs an armistice, withdrawing from the island, but maintains a presence until 1809.

1 Jan 1804  The entire island is declared independent, with its original Arawak Indian name of Haiti (Hayti).

8 Oct 1804  Dessalines declares himself Emperor Jacques I and begins a general massacre of all remaining whites.

17 Oct 1806  Dessalines is assassinated.

1806–20  The power struggle divides Haiti between Henry Christophe in the north and Alexandre Sabes Pétion in the south. Pétion dies in 1818. Christophe kills himself during a mutiny in 1820.

1808–9  A revolt, with British support, occurs in Santo Domingo to overthrow the French-speaking black domination of this Spanish area.
1814  Spanish control of Santo Domingo is restored.
1820  Jean-Pierre Boyer succeeds Christophe as president.
1822  Boyer leads Haiti in an invasion and conquest of Santo Domingo less than a year after it became independent of Spain. He unites the island under one government.
1825  France recognizes Haitian independence.
1833  Britain recognizes Haiti.
1843  Boyer is overthrown.
1843–89  Thirteen successive revolutions occur in Haiti, with fourteen leaders assassinated or overthrown during the period.
1847  Emperor Faustin-Elie Soulouque leads an extremely repressive government and declares himself president for life.
1861  Fear of Haiti results in a Spanish annexation of the Dominican Republic.
1862  The United States recognizes Haiti.
1908–15  Seven coup d'états occur during this period, laying a foundation for anarchy inspired by the political elite and their use of the Cacos as an irregular force to topple regimes not viewed as favorable.
28 Jul 1915  The United States intervenes in Haiti by landing a force of U.S. Marines. The primary stated objective of the intervention is to restore public order. The occupation of Haiti continues until the Marine Corps is withdrawn on August 1, 1934.
1 Feb 1916  Admiral William B. Caperton announces that all military and police duties will be performed by the U.S. Marine-trained Gendarmerie d’Haiti. The U.S. expeditionary force will act in a supporting role.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1915-16</td>
<td>The First Caco War begins after the intervention, and the U.S. selects Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave as the president of Haiti. The Caco (Haitian peasants) revolt when their choice (Dr. Rosalvo Bobo) is not selected. The coup is prevented by the U.S. presence. Nationalism adds to a growing revolutionary fervor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-20</td>
<td>The second Caco War erupts when Charlemagne Massena Peralte, a former general in the Haitian Army and a supporter of Dr. Bobo, is imprisoned by Dartiguenave. Peralte escapes from prison and declares himself to be general in chief of the revolution. On October 31, 1919, Peralte is killed in a daring raid by the U.S. Marines. Benoit Batraville, a former police chief of Mirebalais, takes over as leader of the revolution. On April 4, 1920, he kills an American Marine prisoner and cannibalizes him in an effort to turn the momentum of the war. Batraville is killed forty-five days later when U.S. Marines overrun his encampment. The war ends with his death.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1930</td>
<td>The Haitian National Assembly elects Stenio Joseph Vincent president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1935</td>
<td>A plebiscite extends Vincent’s term as president to 1941 and lays the foundation for future elections to be decided by popular vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1937</td>
<td>A border dispute breaks out between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. An American inspired reconciliation treaty leads to a settlement of the dispute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Students and workers strike and hold violent protests in opposition to President Elie Lescot, Vincent’s successor in 1941. Three military officers seize power and establish Dumarsais Estime as president.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1950
Estime tries to extend his term and is ousted by the military. Colonel Paul E. Magloire is elected president in a plebiscite.

1950–86
All political power in Haiti rests with the Duvalier family.

Dec 1956
The Army forces Magloire to resign after he attempts to extend his term.

Sep 1957
Unrest exists within the country following Magloire’s resignation, and Francois (“Papa Doc”) Duvalier is elected president. He promises to return political and economic power to the black masses.

Jul 1958
“Papa Doc” Duvalier survives a coup attempt and begins organizing a private military force that becomes known as the Tontons Macoutes.

1964
Firmly in control of Haiti, Duvalier has himself elected as president for life. He dies in 1971.

1971
Francois Duvalier designates his son Jean-Claude (“Baby Doc”) Duvalier as his successor.

1985–86
High unemployment, poor living conditions, and lack of political freedom lead to a series of popular uprisings that the Tonton Macoutes cannot put down. “Baby Doc” flees Haiti with U.S. assistance, going into exile in France.

1986
A military junta takes control of the government and promises free elections in January 1988. The junta is led by Lieutenant General Henri Namphy. The election is fraudulent, Namphy overthrows the new president, and is himself overthrown.

17 Sept 1988
Lieutenant General Prosper Avril is installed as president. He survives coup attempts in 1989 and 1990.

1990
Avril is forced to resign, and power is handed over to an interim government led by Supreme Court Justice Ertha Pascal-Trouillot.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 Dec 1990</td>
<td>The first fully free elections are held in Haiti. A leftist Roman Catholic Priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, wins the election in a landslide. His party also wins a plurality in the parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Feb 1991</td>
<td>President Aristide takes office and appoints Lieutenant General Cedras commander in chief of the army. The reorganization of the army is announced immediately.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Sep 1991</td>
<td>A coup unseats Aristide. Cedras takes over as the head of the junta that includes Brigadier General Philippe Biamby, chief of staff of the army, and Lieutenant Colonel Michel Francois, chief of police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Oct 1991</td>
<td>The Organization of American States imposes a trade embargo on Haiti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jan 1992</td>
<td>The number of Haitians fleeing the country and picked up at sea reaches 14,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb 1992</td>
<td>The Bush Administration begins forcibly repatriating Haitian boat people not eligible for political asylum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Apr 1992</td>
<td>The OAS approves a resolution to “tighten and broaden” economic sanctions after the Supreme Court of Haiti declares the Washington Protocol null and void.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May 1992</td>
<td>President Bush signs an executive order requiring the Coast Guard to repatriate all Haitian boat people without allowing them to apply for asylum. The flood of refugees slows to a trickle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan–Feb 1993</td>
<td>President Clinton decides to continue former President Bush’s policy of repatriating Haitian boat people.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mid-Apr 1993  Cedras rejects the proposals of Dante Caputo, UN/OAS special envoy, under which key military figures will step down and a “consensus” government will be formed. This government would prepare the way for Aristide’s return and reinstatement.

17 Jun 1993  The UN Security Council imposes an oil and arms embargo on Haiti. The country’s foreign assets are frozen.

3 Jul 1993  Aristide and Cedras sign the ten-point Governors Island Accord brokered by UN/OAS mediator Dante Caputo. The accord provides for Aristide to return by October 30, 1993, the early retirement of Cedras and other military leaders, and the lifting of UN and OAS sanctions.

Aug 1993  Aristide names Robert Malval as interim prime minister. He is charged with smoothing the way for Aristide’s return.

27 Aug 1993  Based on the Governors Island Accord, the UN Security Council suspends sanctions on Haiti.

6 Oct 1993  The USS Harlan County, carrying 200 U.S. and UN troops, sets sail for Haiti on a mission to train and professionalize the army and police of Haiti.

8 Oct 1993  Haitian Army-backed toughs prevent the USS Harlan County from docking; Cedras reneges on promises made at Governors Island, refusing to resign and permit the return of Aristide.

13 Oct 1993  The UN Security Council reimposes suspended sanctions on oil and arms.

14 Oct 1993  Gunmen fatally shoots transition prime minister Robert Malval’s justice minister, Guy Malary, outside his office in Port-au-Prince. The rest of the Malval cabinet goes into hiding.

15 Oct 1993  The deadline for Cedras to resign, set at Governors Island, is ignored. The U.S. begins naval blockade with dispatch of warships.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 Oct 1993</td>
<td>The UN Security Council authorizes military force, including a naval blockade, to enforce the sanctions. Other countries join the naval blockade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1993</td>
<td>Prime Minister Malval resigns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May 1994</td>
<td>The UN Security Council gives the Haitian military ruler fifteen days to leave the country. The warning includes the threat to remove him by force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 May 1994</td>
<td>The Security Council approves tighter sanctions, including banning travel by Haitian military leaders, their families, and their supporters and banning all commerce to and from Haiti except food, medicine, cooking oil, and journalistic supplies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 May 1994</td>
<td>The junta installs Supreme Court Justice Emile Jonassaint, 81, as provisional president of Haiti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jun 1994</td>
<td>President Clinton announces more sanctions against the Haitian government, including the cessation of commercial air traffic from the United States and the banning of financial transactions between the countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jun 1994</td>
<td>In response to the tightening of sanctions, the junta declares a state of emergency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Jul 1994</td>
<td>Up to 150 Haitian refugees die when their boat capsizes less than a half-mile from the coast of Haiti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Jul 1994</td>
<td>Overwhelmed by thousands of boat people, the United States changes its policy, barring thousands of Haitians from the United States, who are subsequently detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Other Haitians are diverted to “safe havens” in other Caribbean countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Jul 1994</td>
<td>Washington sends 2,000 U.S. Marines to waters off Haiti and states that U.S. forces have been practicing for an invasion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
31 Jul 1994  UN Security Council Resolution 940 allows for the “application of all necessary means to restore democracy in Haiti.” This enables a military intervention by the United States. Reacting to the resolution, the military junta declares a state of siege.

29 Aug 1994  Father Jean-Marie Vincent, a prominent Catholic priest loyal to Aristide, is gunned down in Port-au-Prince.

30 Aug 1994  UN Secretary General Butros Butros-Ghali acknowledges the failure of the UN’s efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Haitian crisis.

7 Sep 1994  CJCS briefs President Clinton and his advisers on three-phase operational plan for Haiti.

8 Sep 1994  CJCS sends alert order to CINCUSACOM to begin execution planning for Operation Uphold Democracy.

10 Sep 1994  Joint Staff Response Cell is activated in National Military Command Center (NMCC).

11 Sep 1994  Joint Staff Response Cell is activated in National Military Command Center (NMCC).

Senior government officials join senior joint staff officers from Pentagon and USACOM at “walk through” of day-by-day scenarios of detailed actions to be taken during the invasion and its aftermath. Dress rehearsals take place at National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
12 Sep 1994  Department of Defense officials begin to brief members of Congress on Operation Uphold Democracy.

USS America unloads organic aircraft to make room for U.S. Army soldiers and equipment.

14 Sep 1994  USS Eisenhower also unloads aircraft to make room for troops of the 10th Mountain Division (Light) and their helicopters.


17 Sep 1994  Carter-Nunn-Powell delegation—with Major General Jared Bates, U.S. Army, representing the Joint Staff—depart for Haiti to discuss how and when the junta will resign and depart and how U.S. forces will enter Haiti.

18 Sep 1994  President Clinton signs the execute order for Operation Uphold Democracy.

Former President Carter’s delegation sends back agreement with junta that allows for peaceful landing of the U.S. task force.

CINCUSACOM initiates recall of the assault force.

CJCS sends message canceling original D-day/H-hour at one minute after midnight on September 19, 1994.

19 Sep 1994  CJCS sends execute order authorizing unopposed landing by 10th Mountain Division (Light) and other elements of the MNF.

Lead elements and two battalions of 10th Mountain Division arrive in Haiti. Major General David Meade, U.S. Army division commander, and Lieutenant General Henry Shelton, MNF
commander, land. First C-5 aircraft land at Port-au-Prince.

21 Sep 1994

CINCUSACOM estimates that a total of 14,900 troops will be in Haiti by September 25, 1994.

Soon after Haitians are murdered in front of U.S. troops, the JCS changes the rules of engagement (ROE) to authorize senior U.S. commanders on scene in Haiti to intervene to prevent Haitian military or police from committing acts that threaten innocent lives.

22 Sep 1994

CINCUSACOM sends FRAGO calling upon MNF to conduct operations to protect U.S. citizens and representatives of the UN; coordinate operations with interagency organizations, international organizations, and the legitimate government of Haiti; professionalize the Haitian Army and Police; and assist in providing humanitarian assistance.

23 Sep 1994

Part of 1,000 U.S. MPs charged with preventing abuses by Haitian Police and to patrol streets in Port-au-Prince.

24 Sep 1994

Secretary of Defense and CJCS visit in Haiti.

Firefight between U.S. Marines and Haitian Police and attachés in Cap Haitien. One U.S. Navy interpreter is wounded; ten armed Haitians are killed.

Some 10,000 protesters surround Haitian military headquarters at Gonaive. U.S. Army troops disarm, detain, or evacuate individuals. Two attachés are detained for their own protection and turned over to the Haitian Army.

25 Sep 1994

Shelton and Cedras arrive at Cap Haitien to tour and assess the situation.

26 Sep 1994

Special Marine Air/Ground Task Force will not be redeployed from Cap Haitien until October 2, 1994. They were to be relieved earlier by troops of the 10th Mountain Division (Light).
CINCUSACOM calls up two light armored companies from 82d Airborne Division for show of force in Port-au-Prince during large pro-Aristide demonstration to be held on September 30, 1994, third anniversary of the coup that overthrew Aristide.

29 Sep 1994

Following return to Port-au-Prince of Mayor Evans Paul, anti-Aristide supporters throw a grenade into a pro-Aristide crowd, killing sixteen and wounding forty-one. U.S. MPs arrest eleven suspects.

30 Sep 1994

Pro-Aristide demonstration occurs in Port-au-Prince participated in by up to 30,000. Snipers shoot five demonstrators.

2 Oct 1994

**MNF troops in Haiti peak at 20,931. CINCUSACOM is given a force ceiling of 21,000 troops.**

Police Director Kelly and 124 International Police Monitors arrive. First elements of Caribbean Command (CARICOM) also arrive.

Special Marine Air/Ground Task Force leaves Cap Haitien to become reserve on USS Wasp.

3 Oct 1994

U.S. Army sergeant shot by Haitian firing over a wall in Les Cayes. Although wounded in the abdomen, the sergeant returns fire before being evacuated.

MNF begins operations against paramilitary Front for the Progress and Advancement of Haiti in Port-au-Prince, Les Cayes, and Cap Haitien. Many FRAPH headquarters are raided and arms confiscated.

4 Oct 1994

Police chief of Port-au-Prince, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Michel Francois, member of junta, flees to the Dominican Republic.
10 Oct 1994 Two other members of the junta announce resignations: Cedras and Philippe Biamby, chief of staff.


13 Oct 1994 Cedras and Biamby leave for Dominican Republic.

15 Oct 1994 President Jean-Bertrand Aristide returns to Haiti.

16 Oct 1994 Ambassador Swing and Senator Dodd meet for the first time with President Aristide after his return to Haiti.

18 Oct 1994 USACOM proposes a force structure for the 6,000-person UN Mission in Haiti to CJTF 180, including mission and task analysis, concept of operations, and a strawman for U.S. contributions to the UNMIH.

19 Oct 1994 UN officials reassert their position that U.S. forces must disarm the paramilitary gunmen opposed to Aristide before the UN peacekeepers will replace American troops.

President Aristide signs a $15 million agreement with the U.S. Agency for International Development that fixes the price of gas at $3.00 per gallon, doubling the price prior to the embargo. Meanwhile, the first tanker since the embargo delivers 150,000 barrels of gasoline, kerosene, and diesel fuel to Port-au-Prince for a three-week supply. With the delivery of commercial fuel, Operation Lightswitch begins to phase out.

USACOM continues plans to contract logistics support for operations in Haiti to a commercial contractor, Brown and Root.

20 Oct 1994 During a news briefing at the Pentagon, Admiral Miller reaffirms that the U.S. mission in Haiti is
not to disarm the civilian population but rather to “set conditions for civil order.”

After training in Puerto Rico, the first of 400 Multinational Forces from Bangladesh arrive in Haiti.

21 Oct 1994
The Haitian Senate passes a bill outlawing paramilitary groups in Haiti.

24 Oct 1994
The training of vetted FAD’H members begins at Camp d’Application under the direction of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program.

The CJCS direct CINCUSACOM to prepare a commander’s concept for transition from MNF operations in Haiti to the UN Mission in Haiti, which would be presented during an interagency workshop scheduled for November 3.

Effective 242200Z, USACOM directs redeployment of CJTF 180 and transfer of MNF operational control to CJTF 190.

25 Oct 1994
More than 1,200 U.S. Special Forces troops continue to operate out of twenty-seven towns and cities in Haiti in efforts to keep Haitian paramilitary groups on the run.

Lieutenant General Shelton and JTF 180 staff redeploy to CONUS; Major General Meade assumes command of JTF 190-MNF.

27 Oct 1994
Major General Meade meets with President Aristide to brief him on MNF operations.

Due to delays in preparing the election process, Haitian officials predict the December elections will be rescheduled for January 1995.

Training for Haitian Police, under the supervision of U.S. and Canadian forces, continues for 353 Haitian military. The next class is scheduled to begin on October 31.
29 Oct 1994  President Aristide orders the dismissal of all the section chiefs or civilian and local police in Haiti’s provinces.


3 Nov 1994  Lieutenant Colonel Claudel Josephat, commander of Haiti’s northern district, surrenders to U.S. forces in Port-au-Prince. He had resigned after U.S. Marines killed ten Haitian soldiers in a firefight in Cap Haitien on September 24 and was allegedly connected with a resistance movement against U.S. troops.

5 Nov 1994  Haiti’s parliament approves President Aristide’s choice for prime minister, Smarck Michel, who selects his cabinet for approval before the lower house.

6 Nov 1994  President Clinton approves plans to withdraw 6,000 U.S. troops from Haiti by December 1, leaving 9,000 troops to be phased down in the following months until 3,000 will be ready to serve as the U.S. contingent of the UN Mission in Haiti Multinational Forces.

8 Nov 1994  After a vote of confidence from parliament, Prime Minister Michel and his seventeen cabinet members take office at the National Palace in Port-au-Prince.

MNF troops provide security for President Aristide’s visit and address the first two classes of FADH students at Camp d’Application.

9 Nov 1994  Accompanied by Ambassador Swing and Major General Meade, President Aristide visits Cap Haitien under heavy security, provided by U.S. forces, to deliver his message of reconciliation.
15 Nov 1994
During a visit with President Aristide, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali nominates Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder, U.S. Army Commander, U.S. Army Forces in Europe, to head the UN Mission in Haiti. He, too, agrees with General Sheehan that it is too soon to replace U.S. forces with UN peacekeepers. Note: Schroeder's name was later withdrawn and Major General Kinzer is nominated to command the UNMIH.

The death toll from Tropical Storm Gordon, which hits Haiti over the weekend, rises to over one hundred. U.S. forces provide rescue and clean-up operations.

17 Nov 1994
President Aristide nominates Brigadier General Bernardin Poisson to FAd'H commander in chief, replacing the interim commander, Major General Jean-Claude Duperval.

U.S. Army officials relate plans to relieve the 10th Mountain Division with the 25th Infantry Division (Light) from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

18 Nov 1994
Haiti celebrates Armed Forces Day, but some of President Aristide's backers question the need for a standing army.

20 Nov 1994
Brigadier General Poisson begins reorganizing the General Staff and High Command of the Haitian Army.

25 Nov 1994
The Civil Affairs Ministerial Adviser Teams continue to provide support to the various Haitian ministries of finance, education, and interior.

26 Nov 1994
CMNF Haiti issues orders to drawdown forces in Haiti to 6,000 by December 15.

The government of Haiti sends representatives to talk to the remaining Haitian migrants in GTMO. Since the return of President Aristide on October
15, a total of 15,199 Haitians have been voluntarily repatriated to Port-au-Prince.

27 Nov 1994Secretary of Defense Perry rejects President Aristide's request to disarm Haitian terrorists and disloyal soldiers.

29 Nov 1994Haiti's Prime Minister, Smarck Michel, announces that the general elections scheduled for December will not be held for at least fourteen to twenty-two weeks.

30 Nov 1994President Aristide refers to the Haitian Army as "a cancer" that he wants to cure rather than cut out, which indicates his continued efforts to reform instead of abolish the army.

At the end of November, MNF Haiti reports it has collected a total of 14,943 weapons; 1,720 Haitians have graduated from the IPSF course at Camp d'Application; and 8,670 U.S. military personnel remain in Haiti.

1 Dec 1994President Clinton announces he will seek an additional $25 billion in defense spending in the next six years and $2 billion to fund contingency operations, as in Haiti.

After CJCS approves the planning, USACOM directs drawdown of U.S. forces in Haiti to 6,000 by December 15.

2 Dec 1994U.S. Embassy officials in Haiti confirm progress in stabilizing the Haitian government, including the appointment of a new supreme court, the separation of police and army units, and the reorganization of the forces.

MNF troops in Port-au-Prince conduct Operation Street Sweep to check for illegal weapons.

5 Dec 1994U.S. and UN officials meet at the Blair House in Washington to discuss the transition of U.S. forces
under the MNF to the UN Mission in Haiti forces. UN representatives seek further delays until numerous details involving security, logistics, selection of a UN commander, and other matters have been resolved.

6 Dec 1994 USACOM announces the planned rotation of U.S. forces assigned to MNF that will employ units from the 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to replace the 10th Mountain Division forces. The 25th's commander, Major General George A. Fisher, is scheduled to relieve General Meade as the MNF commander.

7 Dec 1994 In a press interview, SECDEF Perry indicates that the successful turnover of Haiti operations from U.S. to UN forces will not be complete until March 1995.

8 Dec 1994 Haiti’s Senate agrees to President Aristide’s proposals for a Provisional Electoral Council to initiate procedures for holding elections. President Aristide signs the decree.


13 Dec 1994 In Port-au-Prince, President Aristide calls on public support to prosecute those who have been involved in human rights violations, including army leaders, and announces plans to reduce the FAd‘H to a small corps of 1,500.

17 Dec 1994 The last class of vetted FAd‘H members graduates from the six-day course taught by U.S., French, and Canadian police instructors at Camp d’Application for a total of 2,960 graduates.

21 Dec 1994 Almost 1,000 former FAd‘H members protest at the Port-au-Prince headquarters, demanding pension refunds after the Haitian government reduces the army’s strength to 1,500.
The government of Haiti announces the appointment of the last of nine members of the Provisional Electoral Council, which opens the way for Haiti to begin the election process for legislative, municipal, and local elections; President Aristide also appoints the head of the Commission of Justice and Truth.

22 Dec 1994

Ambassador Swing meets with President Aristide to review Administration of Justice projects in Haiti, including training courses for judicial personnel and improvements in the national penitentiary.

26 Dec 1994

Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council announces its officers and planned passage of an electoral law in parliament, followed by the logistics of preparing for national and local elections.

28 Dec 1994

Although President Aristide has urged reconciliation following the demonstrations at the FAd'H headquarters, his supporters march in Port-au-Prince and demand the abolition of the Haitian Army.

After conferring with President Aristide, U.S. State Department officials advise the remaining Haitian migrants at GTMO that they have until January 5, 1995, to register for voluntary repatriation or be repatriated involuntarily without any cash incentives.

1995

2 Jan

During his Founding Fathers Day speech, President Aristide urges armed opposition members to turn in their illegal weapons. Since September, MNF troops have collected more than 15,000 weapons from the Haitians, either by the cash-for-weapons program or ongoing Street Sweep operations.

4 Jan

MNF Haiti commander, General Meade, declares that a "secure and safe environment" exists in Haiti, which is one of the requirements needed in
transitioning from U.S. to UN forces. CINCUSACOM concurs with this estimate.

7 Jan

President Aristide issues a decree on military and police issues, including the promotion of Brigadier General Pierre Cherubin, establishment of three commissions for restructuring the new armed forces, and relocation of the FAd'H headquarters, vacated for the newly created Ministry of Women’s Affairs.

10 Jan

René van Rooyen, UNHCR representative to the United States, criticizes the Clinton administration for not adhering to the international standards for screening Haitian migrants in GTMO as asylum seekers, but DOS disagrees with this assessment.

11 Jan

Haiti’s Provisional Electoral Council sends a draft electoral law to President Aristide for review.

12 Jan

The first death of an MNF U.S. soldier by hostile fire in Haiti occurs at a checkpoint in Gonaives. Sergeant First Class Gregory Cardott is killed in action, and a second soldier, Staff Sergeant Tommy Davis, is wounded.

14 Jan

Major General George A. Fisher, U.S. Army, Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, assumes command of MNF Haiti from Major General David Meade, U.S. Army, Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division.

UN officials announce the nomination of Major General Joseph W. Kinzer, Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Fifth Army, to command UNMIH forces. UN Security Council anticipates passing a resolution that Haiti has attained a “stable and secure environment” to begin the sixty-day process of turning the operation over from the MNF to the UNMIH forces.

16 Jan

Haiti’s prime minister, Smarck Michel, presents the draft electoral law to parliament.
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali notifies the Security Council that the United States and eighteen other nations have volunteered military components for the UNMIH.

17 Jan
President Aristide officially dismisses the remainder of Haiti's army and creates a border patrol of 1,500 former FAd'H members.

SECDEF Perry pronounces Haiti "safe and secure" for turnover to the UNMIH forces, which will replace the MNF by March 31, 1995.

19 Jan
The government of Haiti assumes responsibility for distributing fuel oil for power plants previously run by the MNF as Operation Light Switch, but continues to require assistance in deliveries to outlying provinces to prevent blackouts.

President Aristide meets with Major General Fisher, MNF Haiti commander, and agrees to add 400 FAd'H personnel for the six-day IPSF course for an end strength of 3,400.

23 Jan
U.S. Ambassador Madeleine Albright proposes a UN Security Council resolution that will allow UNMIH forces to assume peace-keeping operations in Haiti from MNF Haiti by March 31.

24 Jan
Haiti's Justice Minister, Ernst Malbranche, resigns his position, and President Aristide nominates Jean Joseph Exume to replace him.

26 Jan
Joint Special Operations Task Force Haiti turns operations over to the U.S. Army Special Operations Task Force.

27 Jan
UN Security Council members finalize a draft of the UNMIH renewal resolution scheduled for adoption on January 30.
30 Jan
UN Security Council passes UNSCR 975 to transfer the Haitian peacekeeping mission from the MNF to the UNMIH effective March 31.

Haiti's Chamber of Deputies passes the electoral law and sends it to the Senate but adds provisions for all candidates to have a high school diploma and excludes clergy from public office unless they have been retired for at least one year.

31 Jan
At a meeting in Paris, the World Bank and international agencies from twenty donor nations pledge a $660 million reconstruction package and another $240 million in military assistance for Haiti's economic recovery over the next fifteen months.

The first four-month police training course begins at the Police Academy, Camp d'Application, for 262 of the 375 applicants.

MNF troops continue to conduct Operation Lightning Sweep to collect unauthorized weapons at various military and police posts.

1 Feb
Haitian Prime Minister Smarck Michel announces that parliamentary elections will be held on April 28, provided that all the procedures are approved in parliament.

4 Feb
After modifying amendments inserted by the deputies, the Haitian Senate sends the Electoral Law for President Aristide's approval before all elected officials' terms expire on the fourth.

10 Feb
Haiti election officials announce legislative and local elections will be held in late May or early June.

11 Feb
Armed Haitians attack the police station in Limbe after U.S. troops pull out. Three Haitian IPSF members are missing. Authorities later confirm the IPSF commander's death.
14 Feb President Aristide confirms the electoral law will be published within twenty-four hours; it will be effective forty-eight hours following its publication.

15 Feb An Argentine IMP in Petionville is shot; the first time an IPM has been injured since the arrival of the MNF.

23 Mar Court-martial of Captain Lawrence Rockwood is announced for violation of orders in regard to his unauthorized visit to the Haitian National Prison in Port-au-Prince on September 30, 1994.

31 Mar Ceremony marks hand over of MNF presence in Haiti from United States to UNMIII.

Note: this is an edited version of the working chronology prepared by Dr. William McClintock, Command Historian, USACOM, using sources that are either unclassified or in the public domain. It was completed on February 17, 1995.
APPENDIX B,

PAGES 227-236,

ARE UNAVAILABLE
## Appendix C

### U.S. Military Linguists, Haiti, 1994–1995

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1 This list does not include interpreters organic to organizations, only those attached and includes 190 Army Reserve and National Guard interpreters mobilized in September 1994 and USAF, USMC, and USN interpreters attached to support U.S. Army operations during Operation Uphold Democracy. An additional 107 civilians were contracted for by DOD through the BDM Corporation. These contract interpreters served in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
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Appendix D

Governors Island Accord*

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FOR: LA00585 ROUTINE - UNCLASSIFIED - WIRE SERVICE - 6093 CHARACTERS
EZ02: 0320042 JUL 93 FM REUTERS UNCLASSIFIED SUBJ: HAITI-TALKS-TEXT 07-03 0640
EZ05: BC-haiti-talks-text

TEXT OF HAITI PACT ISSUED BY UNITED NATIONS:
UNITED NATIONS, JULY 3 (REUTERS) — FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE
AGREEMENT DRAWN UP BY U.N. MEDIATOR DANTE CAPUTO ON RESTORING
DEMOCRACY TO HAITI ISSUED BY THE UNITED NATIONS.

IT WAS SUBMITTED FOR SIGNATURE TO HAITI MILITARY COMMANDER
RAOUL CEDRAS AND EXILED PRESIDENT JEAN-BERTRAND ARISTIDE. CEDRAS
SIGNED THE AGREEMENT BUT ARISTIDE DELAYED APPROVAL LATE
SATURDAY IN ANTICIPATION OF A LETTER FROM THE UNITED NATIONS ON
DETAILS IN THE PACT.

AGREEMENT OF GOVERNORS ISLAND
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI, JEAN-BERTRAND ARISTIDE,
AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF HAITI,
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL RAOUL CEDRAS, HAVE AGREED THAT THE FOLLOWING
ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THE HAITIAN
CRISIS. EACH OF THEM HAS AGREED TO TAKE, WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS
POWERS, ALL THE NECESSARY MEASURES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THESE ARRANGEMENTS. FURTHERMORE, THEY BOTH IN ANY CASE EXPRESS
THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS AND
PLEDGE TO COOPERATE IN IMPLEMENTING THEM.

1. ORGANISATION, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND
THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS), OF A POLITICAL DIALOGUE
BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES REPRESENTED IN THE
PARLIAMENT, WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, IN ORDER TO:
A) AGREE TO A POLITICAL TRUCE AND PROMOTE A SOCIAL PACT TO
CREATE THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO ENSURE A PEACEFUL TRANSITION;
B) REACH AN AGREEMENT ON THE PROCEDURE FOR ENABLING THE
HAITIAN PARLIAMENT TO RESUME ITS NORMAL FUNCTIONING;
C) REACH AN AGREEMENT ENABLING THE PARLIAMENT TO CONFIRM THE
PRIME MINISTER AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE, AND
D) REACH AN AGREEMENT PERMITTING THE ADOPTION OF THE LAWS
NECESSARY FOR ENSURING THE TRANSITION.

2. NOMINATION OF A PRIME MINISTER BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC.
3. CONFIRMATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE LEGALLY
RECONSTITUTED PARLIAMENT AND HIS ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE IN HAITI.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
UNCLASSIFIED
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* Accurate representation of original text on file with U.S. Army archives at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

5. IMPLEMENTATION, FOLLOWING THE AGREEMENTS WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION:
   A) TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT;
   B) ASSISTANCE FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REFORM;
   C) ASSISTANCE FOR MODERNISING THE ARMED FORCES OF HAITI AND ESTABLISHING A NEW POLICE FORCE WITH THE PRESENCE OF UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL IN THESE FIELDS.

6. AN AMNESTY GRANTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ARTICLE 147 OF THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OTHER INSTRUMENTS WHICH MAY BE ADOPTED BY THE PARLIAMENT ON THIS QUESTION.

7. ADOPTION OF A LAW ESTABLISHING THE NEW POLICE FORCE APPOINTMENT, WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF HAITI, WHO SHALL APPOINT THE MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL STAFF, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION.


10. VERIFICATION BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANISATION OF THE AMERICAN STATES OF FULFILMENT OF ALL THE FOREGOING COMMITMENTS.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AGREE THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS CONSTITUTE A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THE HAITIAN CRISIS AND THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THEY PLEDGE TO COOPERATE FULLY IN THE PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO A STABLE AND LASTING DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IN WHICH ALL HAITIAN CITIZENS WILL BE ABLE TO LIVE IN A CLIMATE OF FREEDOM, JUSTICE, SECURITY AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

(END TEXT)

REUTERS
REUTERS2/06 07-03
NNNN
Appendix E

Text of U.S.-Haiti Agreement, September 18, 1994*

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18 (Reuters) — Following is the text of the agreement reached today in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, between the United States and the ruling junta in Haiti:

THE PURPOSE of this agreement is to foster peace in Haiti, to avoid violence and bloodshed, to promote freedom and democracy and to forge a sustained and mutually beneficial relationship between the governments, people and institutions of Haiti and the United States.

TO IMPLEMENT this agreement, the Haitian military and police forces will work in close cooperation with the U.S. military mission. This cooperation, conducted with mutual respect, will last during the transitional period required for insuring vital institutions of the country.

IN ORDER to personally contribute to the success of this agreement, certain military officers of the Haitian armed forces are willing to consent to an early and honorable retirement in accordance with U.N. Resolutions 917 and 940 when a general amnesty will be voted into law by the Haitian Parliament, or Oct. 15, 1994, whichever is earlier. The parties to this agreement pledge to work with the Haitian Parliament to expedite this action. Their successors will be named according to the Haitian Constitution and existing military law.

THE MILITARY activities of the U.S. military mission will be coordinated with the Haitian military high command.

THE ECONOMIC embargo and the economic sanctions will be lifted without delay in accordance with relevant U.N. resolutions and the need of the Haitian people will [be] met as quickly as possible.

THE FORTHCOMING legislative elections will be held in a free and democratic manner.

IT IS UNDERSTOOD that the above agreement is conditioned on the approval of the civilian Governments of the United States and Haiti.

* This article appeared in the New York Times.
## Appendix F

### Haiti’s Rulers Since Independence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Rulers</strong></th>
<th><strong>Ruled</strong></th>
<th><strong>Fate</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Jean-Jacques Dessalines</td>
<td>1804–6</td>
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<td>*Henri Christophe</td>
<td>1807–20</td>
<td>suicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandre Pétion</td>
<td>1807–18</td>
<td>died of illness</td>
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<td>Jean-Pierre Boyer</td>
<td>1818–43</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Herard</td>
<td>1843–44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippe Guerrier</td>
<td>1844–45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jean-Louis Pierrot</td>
<td>1845–46</td>
<td>unknown</td>
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<td>Jean-Baptiste Riche</td>
<td>1846–47</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faustin Soulouque</td>
<td>1847–59</td>
<td>fled to Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabre Geffrard</td>
<td>1859–67</td>
<td>fled to Jamaica</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sylvain Saenave</td>
<td>1867–69</td>
<td>executed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nissage Saget</td>
<td>1870–74</td>
<td>retired</td>
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<td>Michel Domingue</td>
<td>1874–76</td>
<td>fled to Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boisrond Canal</td>
<td>1876–79</td>
<td>fled to Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Felicite Salomon</td>
<td>1879–88</td>
<td>fled to France</td>
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<tr>
<td>F. Florvil Hyppolite</td>
<td>1889–96</td>
<td>apoplexy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tiresias Simon Sam</td>
<td>1896–1902</td>
<td>fled</td>
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<td>Nord Alexis</td>
<td>1902–8</td>
<td>fled to Jamaica</td>
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<td>Antoine Simon</td>
<td>1908–11</td>
<td>fled to Jamaica</td>
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<td>M. Cincinnatus Leconte</td>
<td>1911–12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tancrede Auguste</td>
<td>1912–13</td>
<td>poisoned</td>
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<td>Michel Oreste</td>
<td>1913–14</td>
<td>fled to Jamaica</td>
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<td>Oreste Zamor</td>
<td>1914</td>
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<tr>
<td>J. Davilmar Theodore</td>
<td>1914–15</td>
<td>fled</td>
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<td>J. Vibrun Guillaume Sam</td>
<td>1915</td>
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<td><strong>American occupation</strong></td>
<td><strong>1915–34</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Stenio Vincent</td>
<td>1930–41</td>
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*King of Northern Haiti.*
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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Event</th>
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<td>Elie Lescot</td>
<td>1941-46</td>
<td>fled to Florida</td>
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<td>Dumarsais Estime</td>
<td>1946-50</td>
<td>overthrown</td>
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<td>Paul Magloire</td>
<td>1950-56</td>
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<td>J. Nemours Pierre-Louis</td>
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<td>Daniel Fignole</td>
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<td>1957-71</td>
<td>died of illness</td>
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<td>Jean-Claude Duvalier</td>
<td>1971-86</td>
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<td>Leslie Manigat</td>
<td>1988</td>
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<td>Henri Namphy</td>
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<td>fled</td>
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<td>Prosper Avril</td>
<td>1988-90</td>
<td>taken hostage</td>
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<td>Etha Pascal-Trouillot</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>fled to America</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jean-Bertrand Aristide</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>ousted by coup</td>
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<td>Cedras Junta</td>
<td>1991-94</td>
<td>exiled</td>
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<td><strong>American MNF “intervasion”</strong></td>
<td><strong>1994-95</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jean-Bertrand Aristide</td>
<td>1994-96</td>
<td>served term</td>
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Appendix G

Rules of Engagement, Haiti

COMBINED JTF HAITI

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) CARD 1

9 September 1994

Nothing in the ROE limits your right to use necessary force to defend yourself, your fellow servicemembers, your unit, other JTF personnel, key facilities, and property designated by your commander.

1. Repel hostile acts with necessary force, including deadly force. Use only the amount of force needed to protect lives/property and accomplish the mission. Engage targets with observed, direct, deliberately aimed fire.

2. Do not hesitate to respond with force against hostile acts and signs of hostile intent.

3. You may use necessary force to stop, disarm, and detain members of the Haitian military, police, other armed persons, or other persons committing hostile acts or showing hostile intent. Stop and detain other persons who interfere with your mission. Evacuate detainees to a designated location for release to proper authorities. Treat all detainees humanely.

4. When a tactical situation permits, you should give a challenge before using deadly force. Challenge by:
   a. Shouting in English: “U.S., STOP OR I WILL FIRE!”
   b. Shouting in Creole: “U.S., KANPE’ OUBIEN MAP TIRE’!”
      Phonetic: “U.S., kaHnpey cobbEH(u) Mahp ItEErey!”
   c. Fire warning shots into the air.

5. Treat all persons with dignity and respect.

6. Do not take private property without your commanders permission.

7. Remember: No force has been declared hostile, including the Haitian Army and police. Use of deadly force must be based on hostile acts or clear indicators of hostile intent.
PEACETIME RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) IN EFFECT DURING CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI

NOTHING IN THESE ROE LIMITS YOUR OBLIGATION TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE ACTION TO DEFEND YOURSELF AND YOUR UNIT.

1. NO FORCES HAVE BEEN DECLARED HOSTILE. OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS (RAIDS, ASSAULTS, ETC) REQUIRE CJTF 180 APPROVAL.

2. TREAT ALL PERSONS WITH DIGNITY AND RESPECT.

3. USE ALL NECESSARY FORCE, UP TO AND INCLUDING DEADLY FORCE, TO DEFEND US FORCES, US CITIZENS, OR DESIGNATED FOREIGN NATIONALS AGAINST AN ATTACK OR THREAT OF IMMINENT ATTACK. WHEN DEADLY FORCE IS EMPLOYED, ENGAGE TARGETS WITH OBSERVED DELIBERATELY AIMED FIRE.

4. MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY, POLICE OR OTHER ARMED PERSONS MAY BE STOPPED, DETAINED, AND IF NECESSARY, DISARMED IF THEY APPEAR TO THREATEN ESSENTIAL CIVIC ORDER.

5. CIVILIANS MAY BE STOPPED IF THEY APPEAR TO BE A THREAT TO US FORCES, PROTECTED PERSONS, KEY FACILITIES, OR PROPERTY DESIGNATED MISSION-ESSENTIAL BY CJTF 180. IF DETERMINED TO BE A THREAT, THEY MAY BE FURTHER DETAINED; IF NOT, THEY WILL BE RELEASED.

6. NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONAL FORCE IS AUTHORIZED TO CONTROL DISTURBANCES AND DISPERSE CROWDS THREATENING ESSENTIAL CIVIC ORDER.

7. PERSONS OBSERVED COMMITTING SERIOUS CRIMINAL ACTS WILL BE DETAINED USING MINIMAL FORCE NECESSARY UP TO AND INCLUDING DEADLY FORCE. SERIOUS CRIMINAL ACTS INCLUDE HOMICIDE, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, RAPE, ARSON AND ROBBERY. NON-LETHAL FORCE IS AUTHORIZED TO DETAIN PERSONS OBSERVED COMMITTING BURGLARY OR LARCENY. RELEASE PERSONS SUSPECTED OF SERIOUS CRIMINAL ACTS TO HAITIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS/OTHER APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

8. CIVILIAN VEHICLES MAY BE STOPPED AND THEIR OCCUPANTS IDENTITIES CHECKED FOR SECURITY PURPOSES. IF A CIVILIAN VEHICLE DOES NOT STOP ON ORDER AND IS APPROACHING A CHECK POINT OR SECURITY PERIMETER, YOU MAY FIRE TO DISABLE THE VEHICLE.

9. DO NOT ENTER THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM CINCUSSACOM.

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10. DEADLY FORCE IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DISARM HAITIANS, ENFORCE CURFEWS, OR STOP LOOTING, UNLESS THOSE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED ENGAGE IN HOSTILE ACTS OR DEMONSTRATE HOSTILE INTENT.

11. POSSESSION OF A WEAPON IN PUBLIC BY ANY INDIVIDUAL DOES NOT, BY ITSELF, CONSTITUTE A HOSTILE ACT OR DEMONSTRATE HOSTILE INTENT.

12. US FORCES ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO GRANT POLITICAL ASYLUM. TEMPORARY REFUGE WILL BE GRANTED ONLY IF NECESSARY TO PROTECT HUMAN LIFE.

13. RESPECT DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL, RESIDENCIES, FACILITIES AND PROPERTY. DO NOT ENTER DIPLOMATIC RESIDENCES/FACILITIES UNLESS INVITED BY APPROPRIATE DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS OR APPROVED BY CINCUSACOM.

EFFECTIVE DATE, 21 SEPT 94
Glossary

A
ADVON advanced echelon
AFB air force base
AJFP adaptive joint force packaging
A POD aerial port of debarkation
ARFOR Army Forces
ATO air tasking order

B
BCT brigade combat team
BDU battle dress uniform

C
CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned
CAP crisis-action planning
CARICOM Caribbean Command
CEP Civilian Election Project
C5 multinational staff section for strategic plans and policy
CINC commander in chief
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CINCCOM Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command
CINCLANTFLT Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
Civil Police civilian police
CJCS chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
CMO Civil Military Operations
CMOC Civil Military Operation Center
COMJTF 180 Commander, JTF 180
CONPLAN contingency plan or operation plan in concept format
CONUS continental United States
CPA Chairman's Program Assessment
C3 combined current operations staff section
C3I command, control, communications, and intelligence

D
DCSPER Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
DOD Department of Defense
DZ drop zone
<table>
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<td>Armed Forces of Haiti</td>
<td>G3 operations officer</td>
<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program</td>
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<td>FOB</td>
<td>forward operational base</td>
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<td>International Police Monitors</td>
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<td>Interim Public Security Force</td>
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<td>fragmentary order</td>
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<td>ISB</td>
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<td>FRAPH</td>
<td>Revolutionary Front for Haitian Advancement and Progress</td>
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<td>Interagency Working Group</td>
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<td>strategic plans and policy section of joint staff</td>
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<td>joint forces air component commander</td>
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<td>joint operations area</td>
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<td>Joint Operations Planning and Execution System</td>
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<td>Joint Psychological Operations Task Force</td>
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<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>marine expeditionary unit</td>
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