Presidential Decisionmaking and Use of Force: Case Study Grenada

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The 1983 military intervention in Grenada was quickly followed by a flurry of articles and studies analyzing its various features and dimensions. Presidential actions under the War Powers Act, the legitimacy of the intervention under international law, media relations, foreign policy implications, and the performance of the military were all exhaustively analyzed and criticized. Yet the processes at the presidential level that ultimately led to the decision to use military force in Grenada remain largely unexplored. Though much remains unknown, enough time has passed to allow us to probe this angle with some degree of historical detachment. Operation Urgent Fury serves as an excellent case study of one administration’s response to a crisis. What can the Grenada experience teach us about presidential decisionmaking and use of force at such critical times?

First, was Grenada a “crisis” at all? Some have questioned whether the events surrounding the murder of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop were only a pretext for a military intervention, already planned and rehearsed. A careful review of the events leading to President Reagan’s “Go” memorandum of 23 October 1983 suggests that while a predisposition to oppose further communist expansion in Latin America was undeniably present, real fears for the safety of American citizens prompted the US response. Certainly the Grenada intervention was no Cuban missile crisis, but the elements of perceived danger to Americans, direct Cuban and Soviet involvement, and an already strained and tense superpower relationship created an explosive mixture—particularly when interpreted by an ideologically committed administration determined to avoid the imprimatur of weakness which had crippled its predecessor.

Approaches to crisis management and to the broader processes of foreign and national security policymaking in the Reagan presidency were built.

Summer 1991
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upon the successes and failures of preceding administrations. As each incoming President does, President Reagan revised the national security process to fit his particular philosophy and operating method in light of past events.

**National Security in the Reagan Administration**

Ronald Reagan and his senior aides came to power determined to reduce the profile of the National Security Adviser and reassert presidential control of foreign policy and national security affairs. From the beginning, the Reagan Administration strove to balance commitment to “cabinet government” with centralized policy guidance and control, looking to the National Security Council staff primarily for policy facilitation and coordination.4 The stature of the office of the National Security Adviser5 was downgraded to reflect this shift in philosophy. Stripped of cabinet-level rank, the NSA was ostentatiously moved into offices in the White House basement and instructed to operate behind the scenes.6 At least some senior NSC staffers saw their role as preserving the President’s freedom to make decisions and control the policy process against attempts by other institutional actors, chiefly the State Department, to force their views on the Administration and on the policy process itself.7

By 1983 two National Security Advisers, Richard Allen and William P. Clark, had come and gone. The third, Robert C. “Bud” MacFarlane, emerged as a compromise replacement,8 coming to the job from his position as the NSC deputy after previous service with the State Department. Though outwardly committed to the cabinet government approach and to serving as mediator and honest broker for resolving conflict between State and Defense,9 in practice MacFarlane often sided with Secretary of State George Shultz in policy disputes.10 Clearly he did not relish an independent role, for himself or the NSC staff, as a lead agency in formulating policy.

In the first Reagan term, friction between National Security Advisers and senior White House aides contributed to the departure of both Allen and Clark.11 Significantly, Clark’s departure occurred in mid-October 1983—leaving a newly installed MacFarlane to cope with the emerging crisis in Grenada. While the clash of bureaucratic interests undoubtedly played a role, as foreign policy perspectives occasionally collided with domestic and political considerations, concerns for personal prestige and control of access to the President were also important components of the decision setting surrounding the President.12

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Captain Richard D. Hooker, Jr., entered the Army in 1975 as a rifleman in the 82d Airborne Division. After graduation from the US Military Academy in 1981, he rejoined the 82d as an infantry lieutenant and participated in Operation Urgent Fury. Captain Hooker subsequently commanded Company C (Pathfinder/Airborne), 509th Parachute Infantry. He holds master’s and doctoral degrees in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia, and is currently assigned to the Department of Social Sciences at West Point.
In the Reagan White House, a separate formal structure existed for crisis planning and control, reflecting the need for greater responsiveness and tighter White House control in crisis situations. While an interagency approach was retained, crisis planning groups were headed by senior White House officials. The Vice President headed the Special Situation Group providing direct, high-level policy guidance, recommendations, and options as the crisis unfolded. Below the Special Situation Group, a Crisis Pre-Planning Group headed by the Deputy National Security Adviser (in 1983, Vice Admiral John Poindexter) functioned to support the SSG with information, analysis, and supervisory assistance. For both groups, key figures routinely represented the State Department, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and NSC staff.

The success of Marxist revolutionary groups in Latin America weighed on the Reagan Administration heavily. Cuba was boldly providing major troop contingents abroad in Angola and supporting local Marxist insurrections closer to home. The collapse of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in July 1979 came four months after a successful Marxist coup in Grenada, led by the charismatic leader of the New JEWEL movement, Maurice Bishop. In both cases, the new regimes moved swiftly to establish close ties with Cuba and the USSR, while quickly silencing political opposition. A robust and dangerous Marxist insurgency in El Salvador, its prospects now improved with support from Nicaragua, complicated an already complex and worsening regional picture.

Subsequent Reagan Administration actions toward Grenada cannot be fully understood without taking into account these important factors. President Reagan took office determined to reverse the pattern of American failures in foreign policy, beginning close to home in the Western Hemisphere.

The Reagan Administration continued and intensified the Carter “destabilization and denial” policy of economic isolation directed against Grenada, Nicaragua, and Cuba. Military exercises in the Caribbean were stepped up, including the massive 1982 Ocean Venture exercise. US influence in the International Monetary Fund, the Caribbean Development Bank, and the European Economic Community was exerted to deny the Bishop regime external funds for development, while the State Department refused to establish normal diplomatic relations with Grenada.

By mid-1983 the Grenadan economy was in a shambles. Mounting opposition to the socialist regime, fueled by economic collapse and the imprisonment without trial of prominent business and political leaders, began to generate severe internal pressures. In September, radical Marxist elements within the New JEWEL movement, headed by army commander Hudson Austin and Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, moved to strip Bishop of power by demanding a power-sharing arrangement leaving Coard in control of the party apparatus. In the political struggle that ensued, Bishop and a number of his supporters were seized and placed under house arrest.
The Crisis Unfolds

Officials in the State Department and NSC monitored the rapidly deteriorating situation in Grenada, mindful that several hundred American medical students were on the island. Langhorne A. Motley, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, later told the House Armed Services Committee that interagency groups met beginning on 13 October and that the State Department had already begun coordination with the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs for evacuation of US nationals as early as the 14th. On 19 October, the US Embassy in Barbados reported that Maurice Bishop and a number of supporters had been killed on orders from the Revolutionary Military Council, headed by Hudson Austin.

Interestingly, a State Department meeting was held on the morning of the 19th (several hours before news of the killings reached Washington) to discuss a military rescue of the American medical students, a meeting held without the knowledge or participation of NSC staffers. Motley testified that from the 17th on, planning was conducted in an interagency forum “with representatives from all relevant agencies participating on a daily basis.” This is contradicted by Constantine Menges, a senior NSC staffer at the time with responsibility for Latin America. According to Menges, NSC representatives were deliberately excluded from these meetings at least through the 19th, when formal crisis mechanisms came into play and formal control of events shifted to the White House. Even then, a lack of enthusiasm from the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs, combined with State Department monopoly of information coming out of Grenada, gave Secretary Shultz and other senior State Department officials the strongest voice in shaping the debate.

Events moved quickly. By nightfall on the 19th a number of significant actions had taken place which would directly influence the ultimate decision to respond militarily. Attempts by officials in Barbados to assess the situation in Grenada in person failed when their aircraft was turned back. Owing to the absence of any human intelligence sources on the island with a direct channel to the US government, Ambassador Milan Bish in Barbados was forced to rely on sketchy information as he attempted to monitor and analyze a confused situation. State Department officials were dismayed to discover that despite the series of large-scale military exercises and an Administration focus on Grenada since 1979, no specific contingency planning or intelligence preparation had been conducted for Grenada.

Based on Bish’s judgment that events on Grenada placed US citizens there in “imminent danger,” an urgent meeting of the Crisis Pre-Planning Group was held on the morning of the 20th, followed later in the afternoon by a meeting of the Special Situation Group. Officials present at this meeting, chaired by Vice President Bush, recall that a spirit of consensus prevailed in favor of a military response, given the circumstances involved. Pointed
analogies to the Iran hostage crisis were drawn in this meeting, perhaps heightened by reports that Revolutionary Military Council radicals had publicly threatened to seize American hostages several years before. Even at this early stage in the crisis, discussion centered on replacing the RMC as well as securing the safety of the students. Vice President Bush directed that full-scale contingency planning proceed for a military takeover of the island, and he secured presidential approval for the diversion to Grenada of a US Marine Task Force bound for Lebanon.

Much has been made of appeals for help from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and from Sir Paul Scoon, Governor General and titular Head of State for Grenada. Though requests for joint military intervention in Grenada were received from the OECS on the 21st, State Department officials in Bridgetown were in close contact with Prime Minister J.M.G.M. Adams of Barbados on the 20th. Ambassador Bish was present at the meeting that resulted in the formal request and, along with Jamaican Prime Minister Edward Seaga, strongly urged wavering OECS representatives to move for US military intervention. In fact, the formal request for US help may have been drafted not in Barbados but in Washington. Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica, the head of the OECS, was present in Washington on the 20th and may also have met with State Department officials.

Scoon’s personal appeal to the Prime Minister of Barbados sought help in “stabilizing” conditions with an international peace-keeping force. It was passed to the United States on the 24th, although Scoon had not asked for American military assistance or recommended a rescue mission. OECS concerns for conditions on Grenada were undoubtedly genuine, but it now seems clear that the State Department was heavily involved in framing and shaping the formal request for assistance which emerged. A formal meeting of the National Security Council convened on the morning of the 22d to consider the OECS request, with President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, and National Security Adviser MacFarlane participating by secure speaker phone from Augusta, Georgia. By now contingency planning was well along, though DOD continued to express some reservations. At the conclusion of the meeting, President Reagan issued a definitive decision to proceed with the military rescue and takeover of the island. A National Security Decision Directive to that effect was issued by mid-afternoon to the State Department, DOD, and the Central Intelligence Agency, alerting them for military operations in Grenada. H-hour was set for first light, Tuesday morning the 25th of October, subject to receipt of a final NSDD order from the President directing the operation to commence.

So far as open sources reveal, senior White House aides did not play a leading role in the process leading to the NSDD of 22 October. While they presumably conferred with the President on the subject (probably to discuss domestic political implications), they do not appear to have participated in the
daily crisis planning sessions. Whatever their influence may have been on the foreign policy process under normal circumstances, as the crisis in Grenada developed they remained background players in what was apparently a State Department show. Given the President’s stated desire to centralize control of crisis management in the White House, one might have expected the inner circle and the NSC staff to have dominated the decisionmaking process, with important input from the Pentagon and Central Intelligence Agency. In this case, the State Department retained its early initiative by feeding the Oval Office with data processed by foreign service personnel and embassy staff in Barbados, and through Shultz’s close contact with the President throughout the decision period.

At 2:27 A.M., Sunday morning the 23d of October, the President was awakened by MacFarlane and informed that the Marine compound near Beirut International Airport had been attacked by a terrorist car bomb and that “many” US marines had been killed. Some sources cite the Beirut bombing as the catalyst that sparked the American invasion of Grenada two days later.

Although failure, or even success with high casualties, might have crippled the Reagan Administration politically, the President remained determined. Reports by a CIA operative inserted on the island confirmed State Department information that “no one knows who is in charge” and reinforced the President in the belief that a chaotic, uncontrolled situation continued to exist which threatened the American students. While the Beirut bombing undoubtedly contributed to the crisis atmosphere and may have created an attendant desire for a countervailing political response, the evidence does not support the view that Grenada was the Administration’s answer to Beirut.

Back in Washington on the evening of the 23d, MacFarlane briefed President Reagan on the status of planning for the operation, provided an intelligence update, and submitted a finalized NSDD for the President’s signature. Although military operations commenced some 30 hours later with the first of a number of special operations missions on the island, the presidential decisionmaking process culminating in the final decision to deploy combat forces ended when the President signed this document. It is interesting to note that President Reagan did not brief the Attorney General or senior congressional leaders prior to making the final decision to invade Grenada. Operational control of military operations effectively passed to the Joint Chiefs at this point, although the White House closely monitored events from the White House situation room. Presidential focus now shifted to more prosaic matters such as preparing for meetings with the media and Congress and coping with the expected fallout from the Soviet Union and other indignant Marxist and third world states, to say nothing of offended allies. The formal crisis management system continued to function, but the real decisions now lay in the fields of domestic politics and more conventional international diplomacy.
Discussion

Intervention in Grenada was not a self-contained, isolated response to a one-time, unforeseen crisis. Viewed against a backdrop of rising regional tension, strained superpower relations, and recent foreign policy failures, the ultimate decision to launch a military response should not have been the thunderclap surprise it proved to be. Yet despite heightened scrutiny afforded Grenada following the Bishop coup and a series of military exercises in the Caribbean, both the intelligence and defense communities found themselves ill-prepared to take a leading role in shaping the developing crisis and the Administration’s response to it.

By default the State Department, with an important agenda of its own for Latin America, moved to fill the void. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and JCS Chairman General John Vessey demurred at first, not because they opposed armed intervention in principle but because of the extreme haste with which the operation was mounted. It is worth noting that failure in Grenada would not have harmed the bureaucratic interests of the State Department as seriously as those of the President and the Department of Defense. This may explain in part the unrestrained advocacy of senior State Department officials in pushing for an immediate intervention using overwhelming force, rather than the more modest evacuation of US nationals initially favored by defense officials.

A soldier of the 82d Airborne Division poses with grateful US medical students liberated in Operation Urgent Fury.
Grenada demonstrated once again that congressional input into short-fused crisis decisionmaking remains largely symbolic. As in previous crises, congressional leaders were informed only after the important decisions had already been taken. For short-term uses of force which characterize crisis response, extra-Executive actors continue to be by-standers in the decision-making process. Even within the White House itself, important figures such as the Attorney General, the Press Secretary, and the head of the Office of Congressional Liaison appear not to have been consulted.

Was Grenada a “can’t lose” decision, as some have argued? Clearly the elimination of the Revolutionary Military Council was a foregone conclusion once US military forces were committed. Had any of a number of plausible events taken place, however, the decision to push ahead with Urgent Fury in the aftermath of the Beirut bombing could have been a political disaster of the first order. For example, had Cuban or Grenadan military forces moved rapidly to seize the American medical students, the Administration could have found itself in the embarrassing position of having to withdraw in exchange for the students’ safety.43 “Horizontal escalation” in the form of Soviet or Cuban countermoves elsewhere—against Guantanamo Bay or in El Salvador, for example—could have expanded the crisis far beyond its initial compass and complicated the international situation greatly. Nor was the chance of heavy American casualties as remote as is commonly assumed. Several of the 23 C130 transport aircraft used in the airborne assault of Point Salines airport were holed by a 23mm antiaircraft weapon,44 and only a courageous decision to descend to 500 feet (the minimum jump altitude for the assaulting Rangers) averted the probable loss of several of the aircraft, each filled with over 60 troops.45

It is doubtful whether these contingencies were fully explored in the crisis pre-planning stages, simply because precise information about enemy military dispositions on the island was lacking. In the event, “fortune favored the brave” and major casualties were avoided. The lack of human intelligence on Grenada as the crisis developed and the lack of advanced military contingency planning placed both students and rescuers at risk, in view of the extreme secrecy and short preparation time which characterized the operation. Given the Administration’s focus on Grenada, the absence of this information remains something of a mystery.46 State Department advocacy of military operations appears not to have been affected by these considerations, which fall outside normal foreign service expertise.

During the abortive Bay of Pigs operation in 1961, the Central Intelligence Agency dominated the decision process, with the Departments of State and Defense playing secondary roles due to the CIA’s monopoly of information about the operation.47 Because of that operation’s covert nature, other governmental agencies found themselves unable to independently assess its chances for success, thus insuring that the CIA perspective carried a stamp of authority. In the
Chronology to Invasion—October 1983:

13th: Grenadan Prime Minister Maurice Bishop is placed under house arrest following his return from a state visit to Eastern Europe and Cuba. US State Department conducts informal interagency meeting to begin planning for possible evacuation of US nationals.

14th: Revolutionary Military Council refuses to meet with Cuban ambassador. US State Department initiates coordination with Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs.

15th: Conditions on Grenada deteriorate as street demonstrations demanding Bishop's release erupt. Informal interagency coordination continues. US Ambassador Milan Bish meets with Prime Minister J.M.G.M. Adams of Barbados to discuss possible rescue of Bishop.

17th: In a formal interagency meeting, US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger recommends that "serious thought" be given to an evacuation of US nationals from Grenada. USMC amphibious group departs Norfolk for Lebanon.

18th: Street demonstrations continue in Grenada.

19th: Maurice Bishop and approximately 50 supporters are killed by soldiers of the People's Revolutionary Army, acting on orders from the RMC. Embassy personnel in Barbados are denied permission to enter Grenada. Shoot-on-sight curfew is imposed. Ambassador Bish reports that US citizens on the island may be in "imminent danger." Secretary Shultz meets with President Reagan to recommend military takeover of Grenada.

20th: A.M.: Crisis Pre-Planning Group meets. P.M.: Special Situation Group meets. Vice President Bush directs full-scale contingency planning to proceed for rescue of US nationals and replacement of RMC. President Reagan approves diversion of USMC task force to eastern Caribbean. Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica meets with US State Department officials. Ambassador Bish attends meeting of OECs in Barbados and urges that a formal request for joint military action be sent to Washington.


22d: Full NSC meets via teleconference. President Reagan issues NSDD alerting military forces for operations in Grenada. US diplomatic personnel enter Grenada to assess situation.

23d: President Reagan is notified of Beirut bombing and returns to Washington. US sources on Grenada report "no one is in charge" and that RMC leaders are stalling for time in order to impede orderly evacuation via commercial aircraft. Joint Task Force 120 is activated at Norfolk under Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, Commander 2d Fleet. President Reagan signs NSDD ordering commencement of military operations.


25th: Joint airborne and amphibious landings begin at dawn.

same way, the State Department in a sense both created and sold its recommended response to the Grenada crisis by controlling and interpreting the information that reached the President, without meaningful, independent assessments by other members of the foreign policy and national security community.48

While the decision to intervene was both courageous and ultimately successful, its mode of implementation might well have secured a different result. The weaknesses and dangers inherent in it should have been discussed and resolved as part of the formal process. Instead, powerful bureaucratic dynamics heavily tampered with the decisionmaking process, relegating important formal crisis planning steps to lesser officials.

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In his book on presidential decision-making, Alexander George makes the trenchant observation that ready agreement between the President and his advisers on the nature of a problem and a response to it pose special dangers. In the Grenada case, overreliance on a single channel of information, evaluation of a recommended course of action by a single advocate, and the absence of a senior, independent figure commissioned to rigorously explore and critique response options may all have flawed the decision-making processes that led to the decision to use force.

Clearly the President, the ultimate decisionmaker, participated in the few critical decisions necessary to prepare and mount the rescue attempt. His detachment from the details of the process, however, stands in sharp contrast to the intimate involvement of John Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis or Jimmy Carter during the Iran rescue mission. President Reagan's well-publicized hands-off management style during the Grenada crisis preserved institutional maneuver room for the major actors involved, but it failed to provoke the crisis management system into providing the rigorous and critical debate needed to insure that all feasible options were addressed and explored.

The overriding importance of a President's personality and operating style continue to emerge in crisis after crisis. Grenada was certainly no exception. Formal crisis management groups may meet in continuous session, but once senior officials sit down in the presence of the President, normative predispositions based on background and personality and an inclination to close ranks behind the emerging consensus tend to dominate. In the Grenada crisis, President Reagan appears to have accepted each recommendation for action without critical comment.

Conclusions

What were the key ingredients of the presidential decision to use force in Grenada? The presidential personality, State Department control of information and analysis, the reduced role of the NSC and its new National Security Adviser, and the ideological coloration of the Reagan Administration were important components. The potential response of adversaries, both at the point of confrontation and elsewhere, was considered but dismissed. The perceived threat to the safety of the American medical students and the opportunity to remove a Marxist regime in the Western Hemisphere were the catalysts that impelled action.

In future crises, as in Grenada, the influences of personality and monopoly of information (and the power of interpretation conferred by it) may well continue to dominate the formal structures instituted to process and refine information for effective and informed crisis response by the President. Particularly when time is short and the pressure for action mounts, objective and rational analysis from several perspectives should inhere as an integral
part of crisis response decisionmaking. The lesson of Urgent Fury is that structure is not enough. The President, or a senior assistant chartered to do so, must provoke the system to fulfill its organizational purpose in the face of institutional opposition from competing agencies or personalities. Success in Grenada may have obscured its importance, but the lesson remains.

NOTES

5. Formally referred to as the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
9. “[The President] rejected the idea that the NSC system should dominate the policy process. [He] feels that cabinet departments and agencies . . . should play the lead role in policy development.” MacFarlane, in Hoxie, p. 265.
10. Shultz’s modest, self-effacing style is largely responsible for his reputation as a conciliatory, team player when in fact he emerged as the greatest single influence on foreign policy in the Reagan Administration. See Bock and Clarke, p. 165; Menges, pp. 62 and 95; and Mulcahy, p. 296.
11. Mulcahy, p. 291. It is interesting to note that the NSC staff was initially placed under the direct control of presidential counselor Ed Meese, principally a domestic policy adviser with a limited background in foreign, defense, or national security affairs.
12. Ibid.
13. Alexander Haig had bitterly contested the decision to have the Vice President chair the Special Situation Group in 1981. His defeat reflected determination by the President and senior White House staff to retain personal control in crisis situations and contributed to Haig’s loss of prestige and eventual resignation. Mulcahy, p. 289.
20. Ocean Venture 1982 involved 45,000 troops, 60 naval vessels, and 350 aircraft and was followed by the reopening of the Key West Naval Station for the purpose of enhancing command and control of US forces operating in the Caribbean. Payne, p. 60.
21. Schoenhals and Melanson, p. 64.
22. Ibid., p. 139.
23. Constantine Menges, Special Assistant to the President for Latin American Affairs at the NSC, has claimed credit for submitting a plan calling for “protection for US citizens and restoration of democracy on Grenada through action by an international, legal, collective security force” as early as 13 October
1983—six days before Bishop’s assassination. Clark’s departure, however, delayed the submission of Menges’s proposal to MacFarlane until the 18th. Menges, p. 64.

24. There was no US Embassy in Grenada.

25. Menges, p. 66.


28. Schoenhals and Melanson, p. 140.

29. Shultz spoke with President Reagan directly on, or soon after, the 19th to recommend a military takeover.

(Ibid.) Perhaps because he was new to the job, MacFarlane deferred to Shultz and eschewed a leading role in crisis development despite the NSC’s structural dominance over the crisis management process.


32. Menges, p. 60.

33. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, founded in June 1981, included Antigua, St. Lucia, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, and St. Vincent. These members plus the much larger states of Jamaica, Trinidad, and Belize constitute the Caribbean Commonwealth.

34. Although Scoon signed a letter requesting intervention by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, the letter was in fact drafted in the State Department and transmitted to Scoon for signature and delivery to Prime Minister Adams of Barbados. The letter was dated 24 October, but Scoon did not sign until 26 October (two days after the invasion). Scoon almost certainly did not request American intervention until prompted by State Department officials after the fact. Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co.), p. 114.

35. Schoenhals and Melanson, p. 143.

36. Motley, p. 4.

37. To maintain normal appearances, the President flew to Augusta to participate in an already-scheduled golf tournament.

38. “The main impetus for a large-scale military operation came from State Department diplomats, while the Defense Department and JCS were urging delay, further study, and restraint.” Michael Rubner, “The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution and the Invasion of Grenada,” Political Science Quarterly, 100 (Winter 1985-1986), 635.

39. Ibid.

40. The Attorney General would bear the responsibility of defending the President against charges that he failed to comply with the reporting provisions of the War Powers Act. Apparently he was not consulted prior to transmission of the final “Go” message, nor was the congressional leadership allowed to participate in any way in the deliberations leading to the final decision. Menges, pp. 82-83.

41. Ibid., pp. 84-88.


43. Several hundred students were not rescued until the afternoon of the second day, leaving plenty of time for local Marxist forces to seize them and open negotiations for their release.


45. The decision was taken by Lieutenant Colonel Wesley Taylor, commander of the 1st Ranger Battalion, while in flight over the Point Salines drop zone.

46. Compartmentalization for operational security reasons undoubtedly degraded the decision process. Detailed intelligence on Cuban and Grenadan dispositions was available from DIA and US Caribbean Command but apparently was not used, according to a DIA representative with operational responsibilities in the area then.


48. Senior Administration officials contacted in the course of this study were (perhaps understandably) reluctant to shed light on the interagency dealings surrounding this incident. Former Secretary of Defense Weinberger referred the author to his memoirs, which contain almost no detailed account of the decision process resulting in a military response in Grenada. See Fighting For Peace: Seven Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990). Former Secretary of State Shultz declined to respond to the author’s request for information, citing lack of access to relevant documents. Former National Security Adviser Robert MacFarlane and former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Langhorne Motley did not respond to written requests.


50. Ibid., pp. 129-32.