Getting To The Fight; The First Operational Task

CSC 2000

SUBJECT AREA Logistics

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Executive Summary

Title: GETTING TO THE FIGHT; THE FIRST OPERATIONAL TASK

Author: Lieutenant Colonel R. Marc Parsons, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: Although the Marine Corps has made great progress within the FDP&E process, deficiencies remain that will challenge their ability to comply with Joint Vision 2010 guidance related to FDP&E.

Discussion: The FDP&E process has evolved significantly since the beginning of the 20th century. The requirement for interoperability within a joint and combined environment has made this process even more challenging as we push into the next century. Goldwater-Nichols provided an organizational framework that will continue to influence and shape planning and execution in the future.

This paper focuses on the Marine Corps' readiness within the FDP&E process. Ties to DoD-wide readiness are provided to highlight guidance received from the Joint Staff and to compare the Marine Corps' progress with other services. Sources used for this paper include internal and external studies, Marine Corps doctrine and publications, Joint Staff doctrine and publications, official message traffic, briefings, lecture notes, and periodical articles.

DoD and the Marine Corps have realized that deficiencies within the FDP&E process exist. The Joint Staff commissioned the Deployment Planning Special Action Group (DPSAG) to review the process and provide recommendations for improvement. The Marine Corps also initiated a plan for improvement by utilizing the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to review their procedures and provide recommendations for change. DPSAG and CNA both provided valuable recommendations that would influence doctrine, organization, training, and equipment issues related to FDP&E. DoD and the Marine Corps have reviewed these recommendations and have made some institutional changes that should improve their efforts within FDP&E related issues.

Four years have passed since the initial reviews and the FDP&E process remains an inefficient process. The Marine Corps has made progress in many areas, but some basic issues have slowed progress. Doctrine and Automated Information Systems challenges continue to be the most difficult issues to overcome; without resolution in these areas, further progress will be hampered. Joint Vision 2010 has "raised the bar" in the FDP&E

process and has provided some challenges that require significant improvement in interoperability.

Conclusions or Recommendations: The Marine Corps' FDP&E process remains inefficient and requires significant doctrinal and equipment enhancements if they intend to comply with the guidance contained in Joint Vision 2010.

Preface

This paper will examine the process for Force Deployment Planning and Execution (FDP&E) and how it relates within the joint environment and at the MEF and MSC level. This paper is attempted because of a history of inefficient staff action while preparing for exercises and operations that resulted in confusing and ineffective effort when the deployments were executed. I will attempt to detail where the Marine Corps requires improvement and what they have done to improve that process. Several studies have been done in the past to identify weaknesses within the planning process. I will compare those findings to actions taken to improve the process.

This paper could not have been possible without the assistance of Lieutenant Colonel Al Luckey, the Marine Corps' Embarkation Officer (LPO-3). LtCol Luckey has been very forthright and honest throughout the process and his passion for the improvement of the process is clearly evident. My only desire is that this paper provide some insight into "fixing the problem," that readers view it in such a light, and that they do not take offense to a blunt portrayal of staff functioning difficulties. While this paper discusses Marine Corps challenges in improving the FDP&E process, it has been noticed that the Marine Corps is ahead of other services in many FDP&E-related issues.

Chapter 1

A History of Deployment Planning

1. Strategic Mobility: The capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in support of national strategy.[1]

2. Deployment: …the relocation of forces and materiel to desired areas of operations. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas…[2]

3. "Those who will employ our forces will plan for and execute deployment of our forces…"

— General A. M. Gray, 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps

The process by which the Department of Defense can rapidly deploy and sustain forces is clearly a key to national readiness. It is a process that has evolved significantly since the emergence of joint warfighting doctrine. Over the past two decades commanders, planners, operators, and logisticians have struggled to define staff functional responsibilities with regard to Force Deployment Planning and Execution (FDP&E). Attention should focus on refining and improving those relationships so to improve our ability to respond to a crisis. This paper provides research of those friction

[1] Joint Publication 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Terminology Database as of 10 June 1998. (Ft Monroe, VA: Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center. 1998). p. 428
[2] Joint Publication 1-02.

points in the deployment process that require improvement, and will hopefully provide some insight into how the Marine Corps can define staff functions, incorporate training and technology, and improve the process.

The Marine Corps has also encountered significant challenges while moving toward compatibility within information systems and in the growth of a community of trained deployment planners. These challenges emerge as the Corps attempts to maintain professional competence within an environment of technological progress that provides vast amounts of information at a high rate of speed; as well as leaps in capability, which must be assimilated into established business processes. While the payoffs, in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, can be significant, they must work through the sometime painful process of establishing new rules.

"The Early Years"

War Department General Staff

In 1910, the War Department reorganized the General Staff. With this reorganization, the responsibility for war planning fell under the War College Division (WCD). Two groups within the WCD, the War Plans Committee and student planning committees at the War College, prepared national defense plans. The crucial detailed planning was often relegated to the student committees. Their first test came during the United States' contingency operations in Mexico in 1912. There were several problems associated with the plan, but most significantly was that they had planned to employ a force larger than was available in the entire country. The War Department directed the President of the War College to immediately revise the plan. The plan was eventually

modified to account for the forces available.[3] This was one of the first examples of planning to deploy a very large force outside of the United States.

After World War I, the services agreed to establish (actually reestablish; it did not work the first time) the Joint Army and Navy Board, referred to as the Joint Board. This was designed to be a planning board but it did not have any legal authority and could only make recommendations. It did provide some guidance in its 1935 publication, *Joint Action Board of the Army and Navy*, for anticipated unified operations during World War II, but it had very little influence in the war. The Joint Board was disbanded in 1947.[4]

National Security Act of 1947

The joint strategic planning system currently used began to formalize in 1947. The National Security Act of 1947 established the positions and duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Specifically, they were charged with "to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces." This was a formidable task considering that the staff was comprised of approximately 100 officers. They were authorized to double the staff to 210 officers in 1949 but they continued to plan for contingencies in a very unsystematic manner. It was not until 1952 that the Joint Staff laid the groundwork for the present planning system.

JCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 48 directed the annual preparation of long-, mid-, and short-range strategic plans. The Joint Long Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE) was intended to project anticipated global conditions and match national policy and

[3] John A. Hixson, "War Planning by the War College," *Vignettes of Military History, Vol. II*, US Army Military History Research Collection, Office of Military History, Army War College, 1976
[4] Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, 1997, (Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces Staff College, 1997), 2-8.

military strategy; its focus was on the out-years of 5 through 10. The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) was the mid-range plan. This plan began to develop the relationship between established war plans and the effect they had on budgets, available personnel, and mobilization issues; the JSOP focused on the out-year window of years 3 through 7. The last plan was the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and it dealt with short-term issues. This plan guided the immediate employment of forces and the expansion of US and allied forces during the first 48 months of general war.

This system of strategic planning proved to be far more difficult than expected. By the beginning of 1955, only one plan had been completed, the JSCP, and it was 3 months behind schedule. The overwhelming level of detail and the extensive coordination required for these plans was far too much for the staff to accommodate. The progress was further hindered by disagreements between the services concerning strategic concepts and the intended employment of their services.[5]

Joint strategic deployment and employment planning remained a contentious issue for the next 30 years. The involvement in operations such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, the Iranian hostage rescue, and Grenada displayed the ongoing difficulties in coordinating joint and combined operations. It was not until 1986 that an additional reorganization of the Department of Defense (DOD) began to correct these problems.

[5] Kenneth W. Condit, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy," *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. VI*, Joint Staff Historical Office, 1992.

Goldwater-Nichols' Impact

The Chairman vs. The Service Chiefs

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 brought great change to the operational functioning within DOD. The first major change was the establishment of relationships between the President, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the Service Chiefs. The Chairman was to have oversight responsibility of the services and the respective service chiefs were to pass their recommendations and concerns to the President via the Chairman and SecDef. The Chairman had no command authority over the services but was their principal advocate to the National Command Authority (NCA).[6] This created a big change in where the power and influence resided within the military. This was the beginning of a decline in the influence that service chiefs had previously exercised in operational issues, and in their access to the President.

Combatant Commanders Become the Warfighters

The Chairman was also the link between the President and the Combatant Commanders, who were also formally established by this important act. The most significant change provided by this section was the assignment of forces to the combatant commanders. All forces, with a few exceptions, were to be assigned to a unified or specified combatant command. These forces would then fall under the command of the combatant commander for the purpose of strategic planning in support of potential contingencies within the combatant commanders geographic or functional area of

[6] Title 10, US Code, Chapter 5, Section 151

responsibility.[7] The Secretary of Defense became responsible for the "effectiveness and efficiency" of this planning, as directed by Goldwater-Nichols.[8]

Impact on the Services

The Goldwater-Nichols Act took the service chiefs out of the operational chain of command. Their role was reduced to training and equipping forces to be ready to be employed operationally by a combatant commander. The overarching issue now became that the services needed to focus on training, organizing, and equipping their forces to be deployed and employed in a joint environment. The purpose of this paper is to show how the Marine Corps has progressed, within the joint environment, in their techniques and procedures in the FDP&E process.

[7] Title 10, US Code, Chapter 6, Sections 161, 162, 164.
[8] Title 10, US Code

Chapter 2

Deployment Planning Special Action Group (DPSAG)

"Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act, logistics brings the troops to this point."

Jomini, Précis de l' Art de Guerre, 1838

The DPSAG convened in 1996, per CJCS guidance, in order to review the joint deployment process and was directed to develop a functional process improvement strategy. The composition of this committee included representatives from all CINC's, all service headquarters, and representatives from service operational commands down to the MARFOR-equivalent level (one of the USMC representatives was Mr. Bill Clark). Their research and findings were extensive. The product of their efforts was a two-volume series that detailed the common deficiencies among the services and then provided an economic analysis related to process improvement.

The level of detail of their review is beyond the scope of this paper but I will extract some relevant findings that support other research in this paper. However, the recommendations of the group revealed significant challenges and deficiencies within the FDP&E process.

The Deployment Process

It was the general consensus that the services do not follow current documented processes. Doctrine and procedures across the services were found to be very different. Those involved in the process were unfamiliar with service procedures and lacked adequate training to properly function within the joint FDP&E environment. Contributing to these inefficiencies were information systems that were service-oriented and lacked inoperability capabilities. In many cases it was found that the deploying unit was not doing the planning; a higher headquarters was doing it for them and was unaware of actual requirements. A common thread was that the services all desired more directive guidance from the Joint Staff so that they can build supporting doctrine to ensure interoperability.[9]

"Deployment is a Logistics Function"

It appeared that other services were fighting the same battle as the Marine Corps about who was responsible for deployment planning. Operators appear to be very involved in planning the deployment for real world contingency operations but not in peacetime exercises. There also appeared to be a lack of education and training among the services for commanders and operators in the proper procedures for planning deployment operations. Improvement had been seen since Operations Desert Shield/Storm, but continued improvement is still badly needed.

Deployment Discipline

The poor discipline exhibited by all of the services can be attributed to a general lack of understanding of the FDP&E process. This was noted across the services and at

[9] DPSAG Report, 9 July 96, 3-2.

all levels. As we have seen in many of the other problems already stated, it was found that the discipline problem could be traced back to insufficient doctrine and procedures. There is a need for the Unified Combatant Commanders to be the real enforcers of the process. Concurrent with that, CJCS must also provide equally direct guidance to the service chiefs.

Inefficient Use of Lift Assets

The inefficient use of lift assets has been one of the common threads to all exercises and operations. Accurate forecasting of lift requirements ensures efficient use of available assets.

Examples of poor use of assets are easy to find in any contingency. During Desert Shield the examples were countless. Blatant examples were requirements to lift equipment that was no longer in the inventory and lifting units that no longer existed.[10] TRANSCOM would deploy aircraft to APOE's where the unit was not near ready to move or multiple aircraft would arrive and the unit's lift requirement ultimately only required less than one aircraft. The penalty, or loss, in these scenarios was that other units, who were ready to move, remained at their home station waiting for airlift to arrive.

Inaccurate Requirements Data

Projecting accurate requirements data for deployment purposes is a common difficulty for all services. Historical examples show huge discrepancies between projected requirements and the actual amount of personnel, equipment, and cargo requiring lift to an operation or exercise. All services expressed the desire to perform better in this area so to improve efficiency and ITV. Education in this area seemed to be

[10] DPSAG Report, 9 July 96, A-3.

a common deficiency and there is a strong desire among the services to standardize joint training and for a joint agency to assume the lead in this area and publish doctrine for training. It was noted in this area that the Marine Corps was the only service that validates TPFDD data at the deploying unit level.[11]

TPFDD Changes

After TPFDD's are validated, changes to that data can cause great confusion and can affect the transportation of all units involved. In most cases, changes after validation are in direct violation of guidance passed by the CINC that require coordination prior to the altering of TPFDD data.

During Operations RESTORE HOPE and VIGILANT WARRIOR, numerous changes to the TPFDD's occurred after validation and during the scheduling phase. The result of these uncoordinated efforts was the inefficient application of airlift assets. The inefficiencies in Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR resulted in a loss of $1.5 million dollars in airlift potential.[12]

Summary

This was a quick overview of this study but I felt that their findings are very similar to those in the Marine Corps study that follows in the next chapter and that it was not necessary to "beat a dead horse." It is important, however, to see the common disconnects that the Marine Corps and the other services are experiencing. Deployment planning is crucial to successful employment operations and these areas require attention at all levels.

[11] DPSAG Report, 9 July 96, 3-3.
[12] DPSAG Report, 9 July 96, A-4.

Chapter 3

CNA Takes a Look

> *Be audacious and cunning in your plans, firm and persevering in their execution, and determined to find a glorious end.*
>
> — Clausewitz, *Principles of War (1812)*

Over the past decade, the importance and necessity for forces to "get to the fight" has been complicated by dwindling resources in budgets, transportation, personnel, and the increased number of personnel based in the Continental United States (CONUS). The operational tempo of Small Scale Contingencies (SSC), humanitarian relief efforts, and Military Operations other than War (MOOTW) has also increased which compounds the problem significantly. The Marine Corps, and DOD as a whole, have taken steps over the last few years to review joint and internal FDP&E processes. These reviews have yielded many great recommendations and have also revealed some interoperability problems that require aggressive and immediate action. Reviewing the entire DOD FDP&E process was a two-part study conducted by the U. S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).[13] For the Marine Corps, the main analysis was conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis by request of the Commanders of Marine Forces Pacific and

[13] *Force Deployment Planning and Execution Process… A Case for Change*, Deployment Planning Special Action Group (DPSAG), USTRANSCOM (JTCC), 9 July 1996.

Atlantic (COMMARFORPAC and COMMARFORLANT) and the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC).[14]

In the current joint-oriented environment, with almost all Marine forces allocated to combatant commanders, it is critical that Marine Corps "trains and equips" the Corps to properly plan for the deployment and employment of forces in support of the CINC's. For that reason the Marine Corps sought assistance to fix the problems that had developed in their planning for these contingencies. It became apparent in the last decade that the Navy-Marine Corps team will no longer be called upon by the NCA to execute missions unilaterally; taskings from the NCA, even small-scale low-intensity operations, will most likely be joint in nature. The time had come for the Marine Corps to learn how to properly plan for force deployment in a joint environment.

A Search for Improvement

In 1997 the Marine Corps chartered CNA to conduct an in-depth analysis of the ability to plan for the deployment and employment of forces: If the Marine Corps intended to be the "force of choice," it must address and correct the underlying causes of their deficiencies.

CNA employed a four-part approach to the analysis. First they reviewed current doctrine and interviewed over 100 subject matter experts (SME's). Next they reviewed the FDP&E process and focused on what went wrong and why it went wrong. From there they identified key problem areas and conducted detailed analyses to uncover

[14] Mark Geis and others, *Fixing how the Marine Corps gets to the fight, Vols. I & II,* Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, June 1997

potential improvements. The final step was to incorporate all their findings and submit recommendations for improving the FDP&E process.[15]

Training and Education

The training and education of those who execute is crucial to the success of any organization. The source of FDP&E inefficiencies was found in the ability to properly train enlisted and officer planners. The deficiencies that were noted revealed that, aside from a small cadre of "duty experts," operators do not really understand the process. Marines do not really understand the FDP&E process. This was not due to any lack of effort; it was noted that operators and planners, at all levels, worked hard and truly believed in the purpose behind their efforts.

Primary reasons for these gaps in knowledge contributing to the inefficiencies were, first, that FDP&E is a necessarily complex process: defining, timing, and quantifying the movement of a force requires a number of detailed data elements. Secondly, the manner in which FDP&E was taught in the past did little to assist Marines in rounding their education of the process.

Management of Training

The training effort supporting FDP&E lacked adequate centralized management. The Marine Corps identified this deficiency, and in 1995, began to provide FDP&E training within some schools.[16] In 1998, the Marine Corps University (MCU) was tasked by ROC 27 to integrate and incorporate FDP&E into the curriculum of MCU schools.[17] This effort has proven to be difficult due to the complexity of the subject, a lack of clear

[15] Geis and others, 1.
[16] Geis and others, 18.

and authoritative publications, and a relatively low level of proficiency and interest within the Marine Corps regarding FDP&E issues.

The training effort also appeared to be fragmented as the analysis reviewed training at various Marine Corps and joint schools. Training at various levels was being conducted at Marine Corps, Air Force, and civilian institutions. This training was focused primarily on the systems, but not on the understanding of the process. There was no central or formal "school house" which taught the systems and the process.

Another deficiency noted was that the FDP&E process was not exercised during routine deployments and training exercises. This approach results in inadequately trained Marines who are then not prepared for their planning duties during actual operations and deployment of forces.

Personnel Management

In order for the Marine Corps to advance to the "next level" of planning within the joint environment, CNA recommended the growth of a new Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and the accurate placement of trained individuals within the warfighting headquarters throughout the Marine Corps. In response to that, a cadre of "experts" was established and a requirement was formulated to build this new group of MAGTF Staff Planners. Deficiencies in the Corps' abilities and capabilities in FDP&E were attributed to a shortage of trained and experienced personnel. The Marine Corps established specific MOS's for this requirement; initially the 9919 MOS for enlisted personnel and 9909 for officers. These MOS's were intended to be additional MOS's and the Marine

[17] Marine Corps Master Plan, Required Operational Capability 27, R27.11, 1998, p 3-41. See Appendix A for detailed information on ROC 27.

Corps was the first service to create an FDP&E MOS.[18] These MOS's have since been changed to 0502 for officers (additional MOS only) and 0511 for enlisted planners (primary MOS).

Building the Expertise

The development of the Enlisted MAGTF Staff Planner MOS has initially enjoyed great success; approximately 137 personnel have been trained, compared to the overall requirement of 231 billets.[19] However, the building of the officer community proves to be challenging. Planners throughout the force were questioned about this process and there were some perceptions that revealed the successes and failures of the program.

"Kiss of Death"

There is a perception within the planning community, specifically with the officers, that once they are qualified within the MOS that they become a defacto "specialist," and not a generalist; and thus become someone that is not competitive for promotion and advancement. This syndrome has been referred to as the " kiss of death" syndrome. CNA reviewed historical manpower data in an attempt to validate this perception. With the low density of officers that had attained this qualification, validating this concern was very difficult. CNA tracked the advancement of 78 officers who currently held the additional MOS and found that of the 46 who have been considered for promotion, only 16 have been selected for promotion. CNA's study said that there is some evidence that officers were not getting promoted at the same rate as their peers.[20] The selection rate was actually 28.7%, which is significantly lower than the normal rates, which typically

[18] Geis and others, 24.
[19] HQMC (LPO-3) Action Brief dated 29 June 1999.
[20] Geis and others, 26.

range from 45% (Col) to 65% (LtCol), depending on which rank we are discussing. Figure 1 details a more complete analysis of the promotion status of MOS 0502. There appears to be more than "*some*" evidence that the perceptions of these officers hold validity.

Figure 1: Promotion Analysis for MOS 0502



Source: Geis and others, p. 27.

Doctrine

Compounding the challenges of a necessarily complex process and inadequate training is the fact that FDP&E doctrine, policy, and procedures are insufficient, unclear, and outdated. The *Marine Corps Planners Manual* (MCO P3000.18) is intended to be the source document for all issues related to this process. This document should delineate command and staff responsibilities, procedures for automated information

systems (AIS), and detailed procedures for conducting deployment planning; however, to date, the manual has not been rewritten, as directed.[21]

Contributing to the deficiencies in doctrine is the lack of FDP&E doctrine from the Joint Staff. There are three joint publications that address FDP&E and should be the foundation for the services to establish supporting doctrine.[22] These publications are neither detailed nor directive in nature. These publications discuss the process in a very general nature and offer little guidance on how planning is to be conducted below the service component level. One publication discusses requirements for exchanging Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) between supported and supporting components and that it will be accomplished "*in accordance with service guidance and procedures.*"[23] This implies that the services have the latitude to create their own doctrine and procedures relating to FDP&E, which can create problems with interoperability. This impact of this type of guidance can be seen in future sections where computer hardware and software problems are discussed.

Who Owns the Process?

Another major challenge with doctrine, in the joint arena and internal to the Marine Corps, is that there is no clear "end-to-end" owner of the process. The process requires the involvement of operators, logisticians and planners. The process requires an operational lead, so that it will complement and support the employment plan for the forces.

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[21] ROC 27, R27.8.
[22] The joint FDP&E publications are: JP 5-03.1, *JOPES Vol.1*; JP 5-03.11, *JOPES Vol. I Supplement*; and CJCS Manual 3122.02, *Manual for TPFDD Development and Deployment Execution*.
[23] Joint Pub 5-03.1, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Planning Policies and Procedures*.

It is an Operational Process

Effective and involved leadership of the operations staff in developing a plan for deployment and employment of forces is critical to success of the plan. There has been a widely accepted misconception that responsibility for FDP&E lies with the logisticians.[24] FDP&E is an operational issue that ties together deployment, employment, and redeployment of forces. This does not differ from amphibious doctrine. The Landing Plan is an operational document prepared by the G/S-3, to meet operational objectives, and with assistance from other staff sections. The same concept applies to FDP&E: a TPFDD is a strategic level Landing Plan.

Comment [RMP1]: Check footnote

Contributing to confusion over staff relationships is the lack of guidance on how MSC staffs and below should organize their FDP&E efforts. It is somewhat clearer at the MEF level and above because General and Joint Staffs have a G/J-5 section that is responsible for all future plans. The problem is more pronounced at the MSC commands level and below, in that they do not have a G/J-5. FDP&E is often viewed, at this level, as a transportation issue vice an operational issue. There is no existing doctrine that explicitly details staff functional relationships with regard to FDP&E.

The CNA study made an attempt to clarify this by providing a recommended staff "spheres of influence" matrix. This is a good departure point, but it too falls short of drawing distinct lines and assigning specific responsibility to staff sections. It also becomes unclear when it discusses how some functions change in the transition form peacetime to wartime; peacetime functions should, to the maximum extent possible, resemble functions performed in war.

[24] Geis, and others.

Table 1: Proposed delineation of responsibility for FDP&E-related functions

Function	Operators (G-3)	Logisticians (G-4)	Planners (G-5)
Act as office of primary responsibility (OPR) for FDP&E	***L***	S	S
Act as OPR for FDP&E-related systems		S	***L***
Manage & monitor budgets		***L***	
Monitor GCCS Newsgroups	S		***L***
Activate CAT & deployment support agencies	***L***	***L***	
Coordinate with responsible agencies	***L***	***L***	***L***
Develop and analyze COA's	***L***	S	S
Develop concept of operations	***L***	S	S
Establish liaisons	***L***	***L***	***L***
Publish LOI and planning guidance	S		***L***
Develop and maintain deployment data		S	***L***
Identify force and sustainment requirements	***L***	***L***	S
Task organize & assign forces	***L***		S
Time phase forces & sustainment	***L***	***L***	S
Analyze deployment flow	***L***	S	S
Assess transportation feasibility		***L***	
Source forces & sustainment	***L***	***L***	
Resolve shortfalls	***L***	S	S
Conduct airlift/sealift load planning		***L***	
Identify transportation/lift requirements		***L***	
Schedule organic aircraft & lift		***L***	
Refine & tailor deployment data	***L***	S	S
Validate data & TPFDD	***L***	S	S
Enforce procedural compliance	***L***		***L***
Monitor movement & maintain ITV	***L***	***L***	

"***L***" denotes lead responsibility, while "S" denotes supporting responsibility
Source: Geis and others, p. 53

Centralized Authority

Up to this point, the focus has been on staff section responsibility within the operating forces. The same argument is also true at the service headquarters level. In the Marine Corps, FDP&E sub-functions are spread throughout HQMC and MARCORSYSCOM with very little oversight from any specific staff section. Plans, Policies & Operations (PP&O) is currently assigned the responsibility, by the Marine Corps Master Plan[25], to control and supervise the program. PP&O has the responsibility of publishing the new or updated *Marine Corps Planners Manual* but to date has not

[25] MCMP, ROC 27, "Lead Organization: PP&O," p. 3-41.

done so.[26]/[27] The current version was published in 1993. Since it was published, there have been many changes in the techniques and procedures by which forces are deployed. New policy and doctrine is long overdue and absolutely necessary. The content of the order is very detailed. It clearly assigns staff section responsibilities during the employment phase but no mention is made of assignments of responsibilities during the deployment-planning phase. Minutes of the LOG AIS Working Group and Embark/CCO/SMO conferences over the past two years have highlighted the impact and need for revision of the manual, to include specifically identifying staff section responsibilities. With the lack of guidance, duties of staff sections differ in commands throughout the Marine Corps and, thus have contributed to inefficiencies in planning and execution.[28]

Contributing to the apparent lack of ownership was the impact of Goldwater-Nichols. This act transferred many of the FDP&E responsibilities from the service headquarters to the CINC's. After that occurred, some confusion developed at the service level concerning what they were actually responsible for. Despite that confusion, the service Headquarters, and PP&O, as the FDP&E process owner, must provide "train, organize and equip" oversight so that supporting systems, doctrine, and training are synchronized to support joint operational requirements.

[26] ROC 27, R27.8.
[27] *Marine Corps Planners Manual, MCO P3000.18,* (Washington, DC: HQ US Marine Corps), 7-6
[28] CMC WASHINGTON DC//LPO// message. Subject: "Minutes of 5th Annual Embarkation & Strategic Mobility Officer Conference." 230148Z December 99.

Automated Information Systems

Today's joint operating environment is complex and requires interoperability among all the services and commands involved in a deployment. Coupled with that have been tremendous advancements in information systems technology. The Marine Corps has experienced difficulties within FDP&E information systems due to a variety of reasons. One of the basic challenges was fielding of a wide range of software applications without any centralized control, and with no central authority to ensure interoperability. Also, we have seen applications, such as MAGTF II, fielded prematurely which resulted in a process that was not user-friendly, and subsequently reducing user confidence in the system. And lastly, there were difficulties encountered because some software was not compatible with the hardware resident at the regimental and battalion level.

All of the problems listed above created quite a bit of confusion in the operating forces and there were local efforts to remedy the issues through commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) purchases. Although these efforts were well intentioned, this merely compounded the problem. The overarching problem with all of this was that it was not done within the Combat Development Process (CDP). By not using the CDP, these systems did not get a full requirements review, there was no life cycle management, and there were no integrated logistics support benefits. Individual units would only receive the support that was listed in the contract with the commercial vendor. Units will then be forced to use Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds for requirements outside the parameters of the contract.[29]

The Marine Corps' current family of systems supporting the Marine Corps is MAGTF II. It is an application as used as the Marine Corps' feeder to JOPES. This is an

operational planning system; note that it is an "operational" not a "logistics" planning system. It is used at the MSC level and above. Battalions and regiments input unit data into MAGTF II via the MDSS II unit data base system. The MAGTF II system was fielded in 1991. This system was developed under the cognizance of HQMC (I&L) and was in response to a logistical requirement to track assets and equipment.[30] Unfortunately, this system was fielded prematurely and yielded a host of problems. At that point in time, the system was not designed to be interoperable with other services nor with other Marine Corps systems. While it was designed to feed JOPES, it had difficulty connecting with other joint systems emerging such as GTN, which caused problems with intransit visibility (ITV). Software development, at that time, was not viewed as an acquisition activity, thus there was little thought given to life cycle management, coordination of software fielding, and training of the rapidity of technical advances. Version 4.0 of MAGTF II was designed to correct the limitations of initial versions and it was distributed to the field. After fielding the new version, the next problem was that many units did not have hardware that was compatible with the software. So the penalty for not using the CDP process impacted the operating forces again as they were required to buy more capable hardware systems.

Procedural Discipline

Procedural discipline describes the timely and accurate input of validated planning data into our various operational planning systems and tools. This is an area that requires significant improvement by Marine Corps planners despite the fact that they have done

[29] Luckey, 29 Dec 99.

better than the other services; the Marine Corps has been described as "the best of the bad."[31] This problem may present a picture doctrine is being disregarded. However, as discussed earlier, doctrine within the FDP&E process is not explicit so Marines are doing the best that they can based on the minimal guidance provided. There are situations where problems are created because of an inability to accurately plan for deployment of units. Below I will discuss some of the areas of concern.

Incomplete and Inaccurate Data

In crisis action planning, detailed planning of the phasing of forces depends greatly on the instructions provided in the TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI). There have been cases where a higher headquarters has either provided incomplete or late guidance, which made it extremely difficult for subordinate units to plan properly. An example is the Special Purpose MAGTF that deployed to Liberia that received little guidance on Unit Line Number (ULN) structure and late access to the Planned ID# (PID). This caused the deployment planning to be extremely confusing.[32]

One of the most common problems in all movements is the inaccurate and incomplete data input in MDSS II. The complete family of operational planning systems creates transportation requirements that are passed to the U. S. Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) for support. The result is either too little or the wrong type of lift, which equates to inefficient use of scarce transportation assets and increased costs, or loss of time. Loss of time significantly affects force closure and mission accomplishment. Some of this can be attributed to units using "notional data" known as type unit characteristics (TUCHA) data. TUCHA data allows a planner to enter a type of unit into

[30] Geis and others, 40.
[31] Luckey, 29 Dec 99.

MAGTF II; the system then automatically creates a set of transportation requirements based on what that type of unit should need based on Tables of Organization (T/O) and Tables of Equipment (T/E) data. The TUCHA function is designed to create a template and then the unit is responsible for modifying the data to accurately reflect their requirements based on actual personnel and equipment on hand. This is a great timesaving function but it must be followed up with the required modifications.[33]

TPFDD Violations

Some common problems occur when units violate TPFDD procedures. Building off-line TPFDD's create the obvious problem that no other units have visibility of it; most importantly; TRANSCOM cannot see it so they are unaware of a transportation requirement. The use of non-JOPES-generated lift also creates some potentially costly mistakes. Historical examples of this were in Operations Restore Hope and Joint Endeavor.[34] In these cases, units sought out and used transportation assets outside of the JOPES system. Clearly a unit should not do this but the real problem occurs when they do not delete their requirements in JOPES and then TRANSCOM sends transportation assets to move units that have already moved; this sounds like common sense but it happens more often than most people would like to believe. On a similar note, there are many units that change TPFDD requirements late or they do not change them at all and arrive at the Port of Embarkation (POE) with more or less personnel and equipment than they put into the TPFDD.

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[32] Geis and others, 60.
[33] Bill Clark, "Force Deployment Planning and Execution", lectures presented at the USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 11-14 January 2000.
[34] Geis and others, 61.

All of the problems described in the preceding paragraphs about the TPFDD process are issues that most officers have encountered and simply ignore because they think that is "the price of doing business." The underlying important and operational issues to the CINC or JTF commander are that assets are being used inefficiently, they lose ITV of their assets, and that the forces are phased incorrectly to support the employment plan.

Reserves

Integration of the Maine Corps Reserve into the planning is critical to successfully sourcing requirements for fighting a dual-Major Theater War (MTW). There has been quite a bit of uncertainty in the last decade related to reserve integration planning; specifically, how do we do this and who will do it? There is no question about "if" we will do it; we maintain a fairly robust reserve because we advertise to Congress that they are absolutely required for contingency planning. Therefore, it is a "use it or lose it" political situation. In reality, we do need the services of the reserves because we have pushed some critical capabilities, mostly logistics functions, into the reserve structure that will be needed in contingencies.

So, the question first comes down to who will effect the FDP&E planning for the approximately 90 reserve units that are included in OPLANS. At the time of the CNA study, Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) was doing this. The problem with this is that the majority of the planning burden fell on the Inspector-Instructor (I-I) Staffs and the small nucleus of active duty personnel at the MARFORRES Headquarters. In addition to the lack of personnel to accomplish the task, was the geographic separation of company, battalion, regimental/group, MSC, and Force headquarters. This is especially true within 4th FSSG, which possesses some of our most critical capabilities, where

battalions are spread across the entire country. This geographic separation makes it extremely difficult to accomplish detailed validation and confirmation meetings, especially when dealing with documents that are classified. The proposal by CNA was to have the gaining command assume responsibility for the programming of reserve forces in the TPFDD, which would relieve the cumbersome reserve structure from this awkward task.[35]

[35] Geis and others, 71.

Chapter 4

Checking Progress

"Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort"

- Dwight D. Eisenhower

The previous chapters were an analysis of studies of the FDP&E process within the Marine Corps and DOD. The next step is to review the progress over the last few years based on the recommendations of these studies. The following summary will be presented in a DOTES (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Equipment, and Systems) framework to properly organize the various issues.

Doctrine

Within the Marine Corps there is an effort to rewrite the Planners Manual by PP&O. However, it is in very rough form at this point. It is anticipated that it will be a long time until a decent draft is published. The new manual, when published, is to be called the USMC Operations & Deployment Manual (OPSDEPMAN). From the joint perspective, doctrine has recently been published. Joint Pub 3-35 starts the introduction by stating *"Deployment and redeployment is an operational imperative planned and executed by*

the supported commander."[36] The publication further provides detailed guidance concerning all phases within an operation. This is clearly a step in the right direction and should give valuable guidance to the CINC's and Service Chiefs. It would be the hope of all involved that the writer of the OPSDEPMAN is closely following the guidance of Joint Pub 3-35 so that we do not end up right back where we started.

Other supporting Marine Corps publications are being considered such as MCRP's and MCWP's covering Strategic Mobility and RSOI. Any embarkation publications will not be seen for a long time and they are not the ones that will fill the void in doctrine within FDP&E.

Organization

PP&O has been assigned as the FDP&E process owner; however, there has been some reorganization within PP&O to accomplish this tasking but nothing significant. Manning problems, high turnover rates, and heavy workloads have affected their ability to focus on this issue properly.

Personnel Management of the force deployment planning MOS's has improved. As stated earlier, the enlisted MOS 0511 has been made into a primary MOS. The MOS is still under strength but we are able to now place these Marines down to the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) level. The officer MOS 0502 remains a secondary MOS and is heavy in field grade officers. The fear of becoming specialized and uncompetitive for promotion continues to make this assignment unattractive for many officers.

[36] Joint Publication 3-35. Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations. (Washington, DC: Joint Staff. 7 September 1999).

Training and Education

On the joint level, progress has been made in establishing an organization as the focal point for developing joint training in FDP&E. The Joint Deployment Training Center (JDTC) at Fort Eustis, VA has assumed this responsibility and has also been chartered to write the doctrine in this area.[37]

The Marine Corps has established their FDP&E School at the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group (EWTG) at Little Creek, VA. EWTG will be the focal point in the future for training our deployment planners.

Equipment & Systems

The Marine Corps formally established the program manager at Systems Command in May 1998 for our information management systems in the logistics community.[38] They will now have centralized acquisition and life cycle management now that it is within the CDP. There are several issues to be addressed but at least the process is where it belongs and the operating forces will benefit greatly from this.

The other emerging issue within this category is DOD's efforts to improve interoperability within the FDP&E community. There is a development effort ongoing to standardize unit data base management systems throughout the services. The Army is the lead agent in this project. Their proposal is to use TC-AIMS II and they are currently working on the system. The Marine Corps was concerned about TC-AIMS II ability to incorporate unit movements, traffic management, and theater distribution requirements.[39]

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[37] US Army Joint Deployment Training Center (JDTC), *Intermediate Level Deployment Training Syllabus, (CD-ROM, interactive, version 1.0),* (Fort Eustis, VA: US Army JDTC, September 1999).
[38] Geis, July 98.
[39] CMC WASHINGTON DC//L// message to Sec Def, subject: "Recommendation to TC-AIMS II CMB on Unit Integrating Unit Move and ITO/TMO Functionality," 301216Z March 1999.

The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) has used the Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures (MILSTAMP) for years to manage requirements for moving personnel and cargo to and from POE's and POD's. The current version of TC-AIMS II is MILSTAMP-centric as opposed to JOPES-centric which creates operational security concerns which creates data element inconsistencies. In general it does not provide unit movement features that support functionality and interface capabilities within current USMC legacy systems. HQMC (I&L) has stated that they are fully committed to the development of TC-AIMS II provided that it meets service and joint requirements, meets service qualification/operational testing (SQT/OT), and satisfies the needs of the warfighter. The Marine Corps has offered assistance to DOD to improve the system, but until an improved system is developed, they are not supportive of the current version (Ver 3.01) of TC-AIMS II. Specifically they have stated, *"… we will not field software that in any way encumbers our operating forces, jeopardizes our FDP&E or negatively impacts on mission accomplishment."*[40]

[40] CMC WASHINGTON DC//L// message to Joint Staff Washington DC, subject: *"Transportation Coordinators Automated Information for Movement Systems II (TCAIMS II) Assessment,"* 060148Z January 2000.

Chapter 5

Summary

> *"Since 16 January our personnel strength [in theater] has increased by 71,800 and now stands at 525,920. I am concerned that 20 percent of that increase was not in the TPFDD."*[41]
>
> - General Norman Schwarzkopf, Operation Desert Storm -

This paper has reviewed the Marine Corps' readiness, past and present, within the FDP&E process. During the last decade there have been many changes within this process based on lessons learned from joint operations and exercises. Many changes have also been dictated by the advancement in information systems technology. However, the basic tenet of the process remains the same: deployment planning must be integrally tied to, and should be part of, employment planning… it should be a seamless process. Despite the progress that has been made, a need remains to correct some deficiencies and improve the process.

Struggling with Structural Functionality

Many of the inefficiencies experienced by DOD and in the commercial sector are byproducts of the structure of the organization. The military, and most businesses, is organized vertically in functional "stove pipes." It is the common technique to pool individuals with similar knowledge and strengths into related staff sections. However,

[41] General Norman Schwarzkopf, undated statement.

the efficiency required in most organizations requires a workflow that moves in a horizontal manner across the organization. The unintended consequence of a vertical organization is that seams are created that ultimately invites inefficiency.[42]

Figure 2: Organizational Effectiveness



Source: "The Case for a Process Owner"

The answer to this challenge is not to reorganize the present structure. Techniques are currently in use within staffs to counter this obstacle. The increased utilization of Operational Planning Teams (OPT) and Joint Planning Groups (JPG) should create more efficient staff action that should increase efficiency in all areas, but more specifically in the FDP&E process.

Joint Vision 2010

> *"The changing threat requires that logistics be flexible, mobile, integrated, compatible, and precise in targeting support to the point of need."* … OSD Strategic Logistics Plan.

[42] Joint Deployment Process Improvement, "The Case for a Process Owner," Joint Staff White Paper, 8 Aug 97, p. 5-6.

Joint Vision 2010 maps a course for improved efficiency throughout DOD. Within this vision are some aggressive concepts for logistics. The development and execution of "focused logistics" is paramount for the success of Operational Maneuver from the Sea and DOD's ability to respond to any crisis. Integral to this initiative is an in depth review of all systems and processes relating to FDP&E. The Chairman has stated that a requirement for JV 2010 is for planners is to input and validate a TPFDD, within 72 hours, for 7 days of airlift and 30 days of sealift. With that challenge made, JCS has undertaken a detailed review of improving business practices, establishing a process owner for FDP&E, and publishing more specific FDP&E guidance; and with all of this, they have recognized that better horizontal integration of organizations is necessary for success of JV 2010.

Figure 3: Facilitating Horizontal Integration



Source: Joint Staff (J-4) "Focused Logistics"

Doctrine is the main obstacle to all the services at this point. Most doctrine from the Joint Staff is fairly general and non-directive because the CJCS wants to give the CINC's

the latitude to lead their commands as they best see fit. In the business of FDP&E, much like legal affairs or fiscal policy, guidance must be explicit and directive in nature to ensure interoperability and efficiency.

Likewise, within HQMC, they must clearly establish an end-to-end process owner and that they will be the sole source of policy and doctrine relating to FDP&E. PP&O has selected for this and their challenging task lies before them. They will not have the luxury of establishing a robust FDP&E staff so a standing working group, meeting regularly, could assist PP&O in drafting updated doctrine for FDP&E (horizontal effort). A complete rewrite of the Planners Manual is not necessarily required. The manual has some great doctrinal guidance for employment planning. Modifying this document to include deployment planning within the employment planning will satisfy the requirement. A great source for PP&O to address deployment planning is MARFORLANT's deployment planning order; this was written under the cognizance of Mr. Bill Clark, one of the best-known FDP&E experts within the Marine Corps.

Training of MAGTF planners appears to be on track at EWTGLant. This should remain the Marine Corps' "school house" for FDP&E. Their close proximity to the JDTC should provide for some great interface and exchanges of information. There location is also advantageous now that the Joint Forces Command has assumed the training and doctrine missions for the Joint Staff. I believe that we need to continue to force FDP&E training into our MOS producing schools and our PME institutions. This is not a subject matter that is popular with students but their exposure to it is invaluable. The Command and Staff College's one-week FDP&E training this year caused quite a bit of frustration for the students. However, they all will take away an appreciation for the

complexity and importance of the process; that helps to create an awareness of the process in the operating forces, which is much needed.

Information systems management will continue to be a challenge in all MOS's and functional areas. Leaders must ensure that they enforce the discipline of the combat development process. Straying outside of the process can reduce interoperability and will result in inefficient use of O&M funding. The temptation is always to try to locally improve upon software applications but we must resist that and maintain the integrity of the system.

Finally, the future battalion and squadron commanders of the Marine Corps must ensure that their staffs are fully integrated and engaged when planning for the deployment and employment of forces. Training and disciplining of staffs within this process will ensure a high level of deployment readiness, which will increase the ability to rapidly move forces. Timely force closure may be the deciding factor in the overall success of the assigned mission. As General Al Gray so clearly and concisely stated, ***"those who will employ our forces will plan for and execute deployment of our forces…"***

Appendix A

Required Operational Capability 27

3.3.27 Force Deployment Planning and Execution

ROC 27: Enhanced capabilities to deploy, sustain, redeploy, and regenerate forces by strategic air and sealift.
Develop enhanced FDP&E systems, procedures, and training.
Enhance readiness by integrating FDP&E into exercise plans and schedules.

Implementing Actions:

R27.1 Establish FDP&E ownership.
R27.2 Develop a campaign plan for FDP&E.
R27.3 Establish a FDP&E Executive Steering Council (ESC).
R27.4 Establish FDP&E Information Technology (IT) Systems/Support Plan.
R27.5 Manage training, billets, and assignments of MAGTF Plans and Operations Officers.
R27.6 Provide career progression management of the MAGTF Enlisted Planner MOS.
R27.7 Establish an 05xx MOS to provide career progression of the MAGTF Enlisted Planners and Plans Officers.
R27.8 Rewrite and revise the Planners Manual (MCO P3000.18) and rename it the Operations and Deployment Manual.
R27.9 Develop standardized staff section responsibility guidelines for FDP&E Marines.
R27.10 Establish FDP&E single site school for MOS, IT, and billet training.
R27.11 Integrate and incorporate FDP&E into the curriculum of MCU schools.
R27.12 Provide interactive (CD ROM) instruction/training in the FDP&E process.
R27.13 Integrate FDP&E procedures, training and education into exercises.
R27.14 Reorganize/enlarge the National Plans Branch, Plans Division.
R27.15 Incorporate FDP&E measures into MCCRES standards/checklists.
R27.16 Write a FDP&E related course of instruction for distance learning through MCI.

Lead Organization: PP&O

Themes:

1. PP&O is responsible for the FDP&E functional area, and takes all appropriate steps for the control and supervision of the program.

Findings:

1. GCCS suites and personnel MOS (9909/9919) are not clearly defined within ROC. A layout of site timelines and personnel planning would improve the understanding of the USMC implementation of GCCS.

Current Status: Yellow: PP&O has a comprehensive plan of attack.

Glossary

AIS	Automated Information Systems
CDP	Combat Development Process
CINC	Commander in Chief
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CNA	Center for Naval Analyses
COMMARFORLANT	Commander, Marine Forces, Atlantic
COMMARFORPAC	Commander, Marine Forces, Pacific
COMMARFORRES	Commander, Marine Forces, Reserve
CONUS	Continental United States
COTS	Commercial, Off-the-Shelf
DOD	Department of Defense
DOTES	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Equipment, and Systems
EWTGLant	Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic
FDP&E	Force Deployment Planning & Execution
FSSG	Force Service Support Group
HQMC	Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps
I&I Staff	Inspector-Instructor Staff
I&L	Installations & Logistics
ITV	Intransit Visibility
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDTC	Joint Deployment Planning Center
JLRSE	Joint Long Range Strategic Estimate
JOPES	Joint Operational Planning and Execution System
JPEC	Joint Planning and Execution Community
JRSOI	Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
LOI	Letter of Instruction
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MARCORSYSCOM	Marine Corps Systems Command
MCCDC	Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCU	Marine Corps University
MDSS II	MAGTF Deployment Support System II
MILSTAMP	Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures
MOOTW	Military Operations other than War
MOP	Memorandum of Policy
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty

MRC	Major Regional Conflict
MSC	Major Subordinate Command
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
NCA	National Command Authority
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OPLAN	Operational Plan in Complete Format
OPSDEPMAN	Operations and Deployment Manual
POD	Port of Debarkation
POE	Port of Embarkation
PP&O	Plans, Policies & Operations
ROC	Required Operational Capability
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SSC	Small Scale Contingencies
TC-AIMS II	Transportation Coordinators Automated Information for Movement Systems II
T/E	Table of Equipment
T/O	Table of Organization
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TUCHA	Type Unit Characteristics File
ULN	Unit Line Number
USTRANSCOM	U. S. Transportation Command
WCD	War College Division

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