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Global Engagement VI

By COL Glen C. Collins and
LTC Michael H. Postma

War gaming activities provide warriors with the opportunity to thoughtfully consider challenges to national, regional and global security. The post-Cold War era, rather than bringing peace and stability to the world arena, has fostered security challenges along the entire spectrum of potential conflict. Recognizing the volatile international environment, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, GEN John J. Jumper directed that a recurring war game be developed to examine the comprehensive application of aerospace power: Global Engagement. The Global Engagement war game series endeavors to highlight the importance of aerospace power to successful Joint warfare operations. To this end, Global Engagement examines the totality of modern warfare on a level playing field.

The objectives of the Global Engagement war game series are fourfold. First, these war games seek to make a direct contribution to maintaining the national security of the United States. Second, the war games seek to accurately portray the aerospace power's contribution to a commander's warfighting objectives. Third, Global Engagement seeks to educate a broad range of current and future decision makers on both maximizing the application of aerospace power and overcoming challenges to the security of the United States. The series highlights aerospace power's contribution to national security, specifically as it relates to executing the national military strategy. Finally, the war games establish an enduring input to the long-range planning process in the Air Force that both informs and educates planners on potential warfighting challenges and the means of conducting future wars.

In November 2002, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force hosted the Global Engagement VI (GE VI) War-game at the Bolger Center for Leadership Development in Potomac, Md. The war game's objective was to

explore the Joint concept of operations against a 2015 robust asymmetric threat using currently programmed force structures. The GE VI scenario was a major theater war level conflict with notional red forces in Southwest Asia. It was conducted at the SECRET RELEASABLE AUS-CAN-GBR classification level.

The game was structured so that two sub-games were conducted simultaneously. Two blue teams fought two independent red teams. Each subgame had its own assessment team while sharing the same control/National Command Authorities and the rest of the world/green cell. Each combined Joint task force blue team worked with a Joint support team. The Joint support teams represented the supporting unified commands and the interagency process. The Army's GE VI objectives were to:

- Demonstrate how networked land forces enable the Joint force to achieve positional advantage and operational dominance.
- Present how new and projected Army command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities support the operational and tactical Joint warfighting.
- Demonstrate the Army's capabilities to conduct precision strike (lethal, nonlethal, kinetic, nonkinetic) from operational and tactical distances to achieve positional advantage.
- Demonstrate the complementary nature of dominant maneuver and precision engagement.
- Demonstrate the contribution of land power to Joint warfighting.

The U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command deployed a team of four Army Space officers led by COL Glen Collins, the Force Development and Integration Center director, to GE VI. The Army Space officers worked closely with the other Service



Space officers to ensure that robust Space play occurred during the war game. Space play objectives included developing offensive and defensive counter-Space concept of operations. The actual Space play focused on the contribution of Space intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (such as Space-based radar), protection of Space assets from the red team's anti-satellite weapons and Space force application.

Blue team A was led by LTG (R) Michael C. Short. Short's plan was developed using a current day mindset to employ the Joint force. He planned to flow forces into the operational theater after sufficient force protection assets were in place to defend blue team A's units as they closed. His forces flow plan depended initially on air assets. They were followed by ground and maritime forces. The overall concept was to conduct an air campaign to set the conditions for operational success and then to introduce ground forces. Blue team A's planning focused on beginning operations when red team A set off certain triggers.

During GE VI's execution, red team A attacked early and was very aggressive. As a result, blue team A lost portions of its Space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets and some of its ability to track the red team's weapons of mass destruction and anti-access systems. This changed blue team A's focus from "knocking down the door" by defeating the enemy anti-access systems to dealing with several high-value systems that the red team was husbanding and hiding. Those high-value systems included the majority of the red team A's anti-access systems that presented targeting and force protection problems for blue team A. This increased the time it took for blue team A to "knock down the door" and delayed the introduction of ground forces. It also delayed achievement of the blue team A's campaign objective of forcing a red team

regime change.

Blue team B was led by LTG (R) Stephen B Croker. Croker's plan was first to place a small blue team B force in the red team B's backyard. Blue team B's forces were arrayed outside the operational theater with key units flowing into the region. The blue team B's forces leveraged in-place force protection capabilities. Once blue team B's forces had closed on the theater, Croker's campaign plan was to simultaneously kick down the red team B's door and seize key lodgments where the red team B least expected it. Blue team B's campaign plan also incorporated a deception plan that had limited success.

During GE VI's execution, blue team B absorbed some strikes from red team B while the blue team B required forces closed on the theater of operations. The red team B used its theater ballistic and cruise missiles as anti-access tools. This created a delay in the blue team B's ability to completely gain theater access. The blue team B's campaign plan to execute decisive operations only when a large Joint force could be sustained inside red team B's country was correspondingly frustrated. Ultimately, achievement of the blue team's campaign goal to cause a regime change in red team B was also delayed.

GE VI provided a great deal of insight on future warfighting capabilities across the Services and identified seams that need to be addressed during the transformation process. New concepts such as the Air Force's Global Strike Task Force, Navy's Sea Power 21, Army's Objective Force and the Marine Corp's Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare were played out in a realistic setting against a future adversary. The GE VI after-action review process was completed in February 2003. The results are posted in the Objective Force collaboration area on the Space Operations Network.