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Sandals on the Ground: Why the Awakening, not the Surge, was Decisive in Iraq

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether or not it was the Awakening movement or the surge of troops that has proven to be the most decisive factor in the recent operational and strategic successes in Operation Iraqi Freedom. This is a relevant discussion because the lessons learned in how and why the violence in Iraq escalated and then subsided may also apply, in general terms, to the war in Afghanistan, where there has recently been a troop surge similar to the one in Iraq. The background of the paper focuses on identifying the critical aspects of the “human dimension” of the operational factor of space in Iraq that made it difficult for planners to predict and suppress the insurgency. These factors are the sectarian/religious divides, tribal affiliations, and the complex security elements that held Iraq together prior to the 2003 invasion. Next, the paper analyses the relative effectiveness of both the Awakening movement and the troop surge in restoring “balance” back to Iraqi society. This paper explains why the Awakening movement, not the surge, was decisive in bringing about stability in Iraq, and closes with recommendations on how these lessons may apply to the war in Afghanistan.

INTRODUCTION

President George Bush announced a new strategy for Iraq in 2007 that was to become known as the “surge”. This strategy entailed deploying 20,000 additional troops to Iraq to help quell the civil war between Sunni and Shia that Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) helped instigate by blowing up the Golden Mosque in Samarra in February 2006. Many people credit the surge with the dramatic downturn in violence in Iraq, which has allowed President Obama to shift the effort of focus to Afghanistan, where there is another surge of 30,000 troops underway. This raises the following questions: Is the surge in Iraq responsible for the reduction of violence? If so, will the surge in Afghanistan have the same results? The surge may be only part of the success story for Iraq. The Awakening movement, which began when Sunni tribal leaders allied with U.S. forces against AQI in western Iraq and spread throughout the country, played a decisive role in stopping the self-destruction of Iraq and has been more effective than the introduction of surge forces. This paper will look at the background of the region and do an analysis of operational factors in order to support this thesis.

BACKGROUND

Three general “human dimension” dynamics defined Iraq prior to the U.S. invasion and are still present today. They are the sectarian (religious) differences, tribal associations, and security organizations. While there are differences between the three major ethnic groups of the Sunni, Shia and Kurds, ethnicity by itself is not a defining characteristic of Iraqi society.¹ Ethnicity is an important dynamic that shapes the “human dimension” and no operational analysis is complete without outlining these sectarian differences.

The Kurds in Northern Iraq have generally been an autonomous sector of Iraqi society, able to handle their own affairs and essentially their own nation.² While they are a significant aspect of the space and they are very important to the political relationship with Turkey, they do not factor into Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as much as the differences between the Shia and Sunni sectors of society.³

In Iraq, the population breakdown is 60% Shia and 20% Sunni.⁴ After World War I, the British installed a Sunni as king. In 1920, the Shia (along with Iraqi Sunni and Kurds) revolted against this non-Iraqi government. The government crushed the rebellion and marginalized the Shia. Because of this, and their inherent belief in the supremacy of their faith over secularism, the Shia developed strong internal community identities and followed their clerics. These clerics became powerful entities as a result because of the “financial support and legitimacy” they gained from their followers. The Shia sects developed a degree of independence based on their separation from the governmental structure. Saddam saw the Shia’s political gains and financial power as a threat to his regime. Aside from religious persecution, in 1980 he assumed control of all Shia religious funds and shrines.




Figure 1: Iraq Ethnic Breakdown

The Sunni had been the ruling class of Iraq since World War I, despite being in the minority. The Sunni were the primary beneficiaries of government services and revenue, and were more closely tied to the government. It was, therefore, in their best interest to maintain their status-quo. As a result the Sunni have developed a well-founded paranoia and fear of what would happen should the Shia rise to power.⁵

The next major dynamic in the “human dimension” of Iraqi space were the tribes. The tribes have always been important to Iraq, particularly in the rural areas outside of Baghdad and the major cities. Tribes maintained a “semblance of balance and order through a system of tribal hierarchy and norms of solidarity and vengeance that discouraged crime and violence in their lands.”⁶ The British recognized this during their occupation of Iraq in World War I, and established the *Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation* in 1916. As nomadic tribes settled into a more feudal lifestyle; they developed closer ties to the cities, as the tribes oversaw farms that provided food for the cities. As these ties with the ruling elites solidified, the tribes became more politicized as they vied for more benefits and prestige within the country.⁷

This situation began to change for the worse as a result of Iraq’s war with Iran, followed almost immediately by their invasion of Kuwait and crippling economic sanctions. These factors dramatically influenced the “human dimension” by weakening Saddam’s ability to maintain the level of government support he had provided for the Sunnis. Saddam was forced to grant more autonomy to the Iraqi tribes.⁸ The Sunni tribal leaders, similar to the Shia clerics, developed their own identities separate from Saddam’s regime.⁹

The last and perhaps most influential dynamic was the need for multiple types of security forces to maintain order. The Iraqi security apparatus had a much larger effect on the daily lives of their citizens than police do in western law societies. Rather than form broad political consensus to legitimize transfers of power between governments throughout history, Iraqi leaders often “turned to armed security forces to cow the rest of Iraq into obedience.”¹⁰ The Iraqi people learned to equate “stability” with having a strong security force present in their daily lives. While this may seem incompatible with democracy by western standards, the factor of force has been closely intertwined with the “human dimension” of space in Iraq for several generations and is an essential element of Iraqi society.

Saddam believed that the biggest threat to his regime was not the US military but an internal coup. This belief was shaped by 80 years of turbulent Iraqi political history, which was punctuated by multiple coups and coups attempts.¹¹ He established a multitude of secret police groups whose purpose was to suppress potential uprisings and disperse military power so that it was less likely for it to be consolidated against him. He infiltrated the regular army with loyalists, and created the Republican Guard to protect the regime from uprisings of both the regular army and population.¹² He used these forces to maintain his grip on power through “merciless repression of all dissent.”¹³

After a series of failed rebellions and subsequent weakening of the government in 1991, Saddam created several “private armies”: the *Saddam Fedayeen*, the *Al Quds Army*, and the *Ba'ath militia*. The main impetus for forming these armies was to defeat internal uprisings rather than defend against external invasions. Saddam trained, manned and

equipped these armies at the expense of the regular conventional army, demonstrating that Saddam feared internal rebellion more than external invasion.¹⁴

Almost immediately after the invasion, the balance began to shift in the Iraqi “human dimension” of space. Elements of society once subordinate to Saddam were able to act decisively on their own because of the power they had gained during the waning years of the regime.¹⁵ Local elements began to manage essential services, including law and order. This led to conflict as Shia groups quickly rushed to fill the power vacuum. Sunni were left to fend for themselves. They were fearful of Shia reprisals and disenfranchised further by the Coalition’s de’ba’athification policy.¹⁶ Sunni turned to outside help: they allied with the Sunni group Al Qaida (which became Al Qaida in Iraq- AQI).

The Sunni, backed by their new AQI allies were able to maintain a shaky status-quo within their communities by waging insurgency against the American ‘occupiers’ and Shia governmental forces. The Sunnis believed that they could create enough American casualties to drive them out of the war and then overthrow the Shia government.¹⁷ However, by allying with AQI they had ceded a measure of their tribal autonomy to another brutal, repressive organization, not unlike the power formerly held by Saddam. AQI also imposed extremist Islamic law on the Sunni, which created strife within the less radical Sunni tribes. They raped and forced tribal women into marriages against their or their tribal leaders’ will and repressed and executed any opposition to their will.¹⁸

Analysis

Operations are not governed by application of U.S. military force alone. In order to understand operational success in Iraq, one must look at all the operational factors of time, space and force. Time and force are complex operational factors and require in-depth

understanding as well but this paper will focus on the human factor of space as a tool to analyze the cause of operational success in Iraq. Space is a bit broader. It not only includes physical space, such as the terrain and the climate, but also the “human dimension” of internal politics, culture, and government.¹⁹

The “human dimension” of space in Iraq was a twisted web of competing religious and tribal identities held together by multiple levels of security force. Saddam held absolute control of his country through empowering the Sunni’s, the tribal leaders, and the loyal members of a vast security network. Removing Saddam addressed what planners identified as the Center of Gravity,²⁰ but they did not adequately consider the effects that decapitation would have on the rest of that nation. The assumption that Iraq would transition from regime change relatively fast and painlessly was not based on a careful analysis of the factor of space. Planners failed to recognize the extremely complex dynamics of the “human dimension” of the factor space. Therefore, they did not adequately identify that the risk the transition between Saddam and the “next government” would include a transformation into an insurgency that eventually threatened to plunge the entire nation into a brutal, sectarian civil war.²¹

Before the war Iraq consisted of ethnically divided space held together by a complicated web of centralized and local force.²² The factors of space and force were in tenuous balance, and were the only way that Saddam was able to maintain his hold on power. Virtually overnight the U.S. destroyed, eliminated or dissolved the Iraqi military, militia organizations such as the Saddam *Fedayeen*, and the Ba’ath party, which was not only instrumental in running the everyday functions of the central government but a key organization in maintaining control within the minority Sunni population.²³ There was no

plan to address this immediately, and as a result the nation slowly began to self-destruct.²⁴ Restoring the balance between centralized and local control that had existed prior to the U.S. invasion is course of action that encompasses not only the strengths of U.S. military capabilities, but also the opportunities for stability embodied in the Iraqi “human dimension” of space.

The term, “Anti-Iraqi Forces”, or AIF, used extensively during the early part of the war, exemplified the U.S. failure to truly understand the complex dynamics of the “human dimension” of the factor of space in Iraq.²⁵ When coalition forces transitioned to large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), they lost a great opportunity to interact with the population and gain a semblance of situational awareness about what was happening in Iraq. By looking at insurgents as all AIF, the coalition missed important developments leading up to the AQI’s bombing of the Shia Golden Mosque in Samarra in 2006. This attack sparked sectarian violence which has been labeled a civil war that could have undermined the entire coalition effort in Iraq. Moderate Shia leaders were unable to restrain radical elements from retaliating against the Sunni. The result was a year-long war that all but destroyed the Sunni militarily; there was no longer any hope amongst Sunni of overthrowing the Shia and regaining power.²⁶ Ironically, it was this attack against the Shia that eventually caused the Sunni to turn against AQI.²⁷

The situation in 2006 was very dire in Iraq, particularly for the Sunni, who had seen their world collapse over the course of three years. AQI had disenfranchised the Sunni and had inadvertently led to their near defeat at the hands of the Shia.²⁸ In order for the Sunni to survive, tribal leaders had to make a choice: continue to ally themselves with AQI in a fruitless, losing war against the Shia, or ally themselves with the government and coalition

forces to help them defeat AQI and protect their Sunni tribes from destruction. The Sunni chose the latter, and the result was coined as the “Anbar Awakening.”²⁹

Al Anbar was considered a lost province prior to 2007. In 2007, Coalition planners determined that Al Anbar was the only of the 18 provinces in Iraq that would not be ready for any transition to Iraqi control. AQI and Sunni insurgents had too great a hold on the province. By March 2008 General Petraeus reported that Al Anbar would be ready for transition as soon as June of that year (see figure 2).³⁰ This dramatic turn-around was the result of the U.S. military “learning the tribal game,”³¹ and discovering how to navigate the intricacies of the complex social environment. Al Anbar was simply too big and the population too spread out to have the limited number of units centrally located on big forward operating bases (FOBs) to commute to their areas of operation. U.S. units had to spread out amongst the population and leverage local tribal leaders in order to maintain control.³² This solution was similar to the one that Saddam had adopted with the tribes when the power of his central government was in decline. However, this type of (U.S.) partnering with (Iraqi) militia groups was unauthorized by higher levels because of the overall strategy of ‘standing off’ and letting the Iraqi’s handle their own matters.³³




Figure 2: 2007 and 2008 Security Transition Assessments

This approach by U.S. forces was an opportunity for Sunni tribal leaders fighting for survival. While the Americans may not have had a perfect map of the “human dimension”, they had realized that Iraqis themselves had that map. The Iraqis could navigate the complexity of their society far better than any American.³⁴ While their methods may not have been what American would necessarily adopt, they were effective because they embraced the nature of Iraq’s tribal culture.

General Petraeus quickly recognized the significance of this movement in Al Anbar,³⁵ and “throwing in with the Awakening was the swiftest decision he made after taking command.”³⁶ This decision enabled coalition units to hire local security militias, later dubbed the “Sons of Iraq” (SOI), to help get more ‘boots on the ground’ to maintain security. This movement quickly spread to other parts of Iraq including Baghdad which was in the midst of the sectarian war. In Baghdad, it was the multitude of individual Sunni and Shia neighborhoods that served as the basic “puzzle pieces” of the intricate social mosaic.³⁷ Soon after “throwing in” with the Awakening, General Petraeus told coalition leadership in Baghdad that “tribal engagement and local reconciliation work! Encourage it!”³⁸

Eventually, the pressure of the SOI, the Iraqi government, and the coalition forced extremist Shia militia groups to agree to a cease-fire and contribute to the Awakening movement. However, while this strategy crossed sectarian lines, the majority of SOI were still Sunni, and integrating them into the security establishment was disconcerting to Iraqi leadership. The Prime Minister acknowledged that the Sunni Awakening was important, but it should be confined to Al Anbar, thus keeping Shia Baghdad ‘secure’ from excessive Sunni influence. It took a major effort of coalition leadership to convince the government to fully

embrace the Awakening and allow SOI to form and operate in Baghdad. The result of this was an increase in security presence on the streets of Iraq far greater than that provided by the 30,000 Soldier surge ordered by President Bush in 2007. In a 2008 radio interview, General Petraeus highlighted the contribution of the indigenous forces of the Awakening:

Now we could hold them because we have sufficient forces to do that, with the addition U.S. forces, additional Iraqi army and police and their surge over the course of 2007 it was probably three times ours. Our leaders and troopers had something to do with it.”³⁹

The President made the decision to surge 30,000 U.S. troops to Iraq based on information gained before the Awakening had been realized. The general consensus at the time of the surge decision was that the situation in Iraq was seriously deteriorating. As far as the President and the strategic planners knew, the will of the Iraqi people was as it had been in 2004, when “neither Sunnis nor Shiites wanted to be “protected” by Americans. The additional surge of forces was seen as a “desperate act with little hope of success” with ability to possibly “limit the violence but not alter the underlying attitudes causing the violence.”⁴⁰

However, as important as the Awakening movement was in shaping the operational environment in Iraq, there are three additional explanations that may lessen the relative importance of the Awakening. The main counter contends that success in Iraq was based on the surge of U.S. military forces, and that this enabled Awakening movements which would not have been successful except for the surge. A related argument focuses on the “civilian surge” of State Department and other agencies that created favorable economic and social conditions which have been responsible for the overall turn around in security in Iraq. Finally, there is an argument that downplays both the Awakening Movement and the surge and looks at any improvement in Iraq as only temporary gains made in a lost cause.

The first counter-argument can be gleaned from the radio interview previously cited with General Petraeus. He noted that had it not been for the flexibility and initiative of leaders on the ground, many of the gains made during the Awakening would not have occurred.⁴¹ U.S. commanders forged relationships with tribal leaders, many of who had been involved in insurgent activity, on their own based on local conditions of the “human dimension” of their space. Also, the effectiveness of U.S. forces was higher in 2006-7 because many leaders and soldiers had had one or two previous tours, and they were building ‘institutional knowledge’ on how to deal with the complex “human dimension.” This, coupled with the introduction of Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*,⁴² laid the groundwork for the subsequent gains in 2008 and 2009.⁴³

Even though, as General Petraeus pointed out, the Iraqi’s provided a substantive surge of their own to support the U.S. surge, Iraqi forces still needed significant support to be effective. A big part of the surge included deploying additional U.S. command and control capabilities, complete with robust staff elements and high-tech ISR capabilities, that were absolutely critical in consolidating gains in Al Anbar and winning the battle in Baghdad.⁴⁴ This helped enable the Iraqi security force to make significant contributions to defeating insurgent groups. For example, the Iraqi Army victory over Sadr’s Shia militia groups in Basra points to the importance of the surge over the Awakening. While this battle was victorious and ultimately helped lead to the cease-fire with Sadr’s militia, it would not have been possible without significant U.S. support.⁴⁵

Aside from the additional military support, the other dynamic that the surge brought to Iraq was a large civilian inter-agency presence, whose goal was to help energize the reconstruction effort which had not made any significant progress. The integration of trained

civilian personnel was a key facet in turning Iraq around. Physical security, provided by military forces, was only a part of the equation to fix Iraq. In the long term, it is the “sociological security” provided by reconstruction efforts that may have a longer term pay-off. As U.S. and Iraqi units suppressed the violence, the new ‘civilian surge’ team ensured that “more than any year since the 2003 invasion, 2008 produced a gradual and persistent transition to Iraqi leadership in reconstruction and security.”⁴⁶ Thus, it was neither the Awakening nor the military surge, but recognition by U.S. leadership of the complex relationships inherent in the Iraqi problem and a commitment by the U.S. to dedicate adequate military *and civilian* resources.

However, despite the military surge and dynamic U.S. leaders, and despite the impressive civilian surge in reconstruction efforts, General Petraeus testified to Congress in his 2008 report on *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* that the integration of the SOI to help secure local communities had been one of the most significant developments in Iraq.⁴⁷

There is another argument that goes a step farther than just diminishing the importance of the Awakening movement. LTG (R) William Odom testified to congress in 2008 that the “surge is prolonging instability, not creating conditions for unity.” He further questioned progress with relation to the Awakening by questioning the motives of the Sunni elements, and warning that the security situation was in fact worse because of the “proliferation of armed groups under local military chiefs who follow a proliferating number of political leaders.”⁴⁸ During the same set of hearings, Dr Stephen Biddle (*Roger Hertog Senior Fellow for Defense Policy, Council on Foreign Relations*)⁴⁹ warned that the spread of violent power to numerous groups runs the risk of creating a “weak central government unable to monopolize on violence.”⁵⁰ Peter Galbraith echoed these concerns in his book,

Unintended Consequences when he contended that Awakening was a “ready-made vehicle for Sunni Arab states”⁵¹ to intervene in Iraq’s civil war. The U.S. irresponsibly picked sides in the civil conflict by choosing to back the Sunni militia at the expense of the elected majority Shia government. This move, according to Galbraith, was made at the “expense of national unity.”⁵² The U.S. also undermined national unity by creating unstable conditions in Iraq that “polarized the nation” and broke-up the balance that had existed between Sunni and Shia.⁵³ The surge strategy was intended not to fix the ethnic problems, but to pave the way for Iraq to train their Army and police forces to take over security responsibilities. However, since “Iraqi security forces tend to be much more sectarian than the rest of the country,”⁵⁴ the U.S. was a party to not only backing a Sunni militia movement but also allowing Iraq to build an ethnically-divided security apparatus that would ensure future sectarian strife and guarantee a weak Iraqi government. Additionally, it would be near impossible for the Iraqi government to successfully integrate the SOIs into the government.⁵⁵

At the time of this writing the ultimate results of the 2010 elections are unknown. The fact remains that Iraq has held a national-level election without being derailed by violence. This casts the above argument against both the value of the surge and Awakening in a doubtful light. Had the ethnic balance been as upset by U.S. actions as proponents of this argument contended, then it is unlike that Iraq would have lasted through the election period. This election was also done with U.S. troop numbers down significantly from the 2008 period. In 2008, there were nearly 157,000 troops in Iraq.⁵⁶ The Pentagon reported in February 2010 that troop levels were down below 100,000 for the first time since 2003.⁵⁷ Additionally, had there been this unsurpassable sectarian wall, it would not have been

possible for the Iraqi government to successfully integrate the majority of SOI into the regular government security apparatus, which they have done.⁵⁸

Table 1. Average Monthly Boots On the Ground in Afghanistan and Iraq: FY2002-FY2012

Reported FY02-FY08, Estimated FY09-FY12, Rounded to Hundreds

Fiscal Year/Country	Afghanistan	Iraq	Total	Percentage Change		
				Annual	Since FY2003	Since FY2006
FY2002	5,200	0	5,200	NA	NA	NA
FY2003	10,400	67,700	78,100	1402%	NA	NA
FY2004	15,200	130,600	145,800	87%	87%	NA
FY2005	19,100	143,800	162,900	12%	109%	NA
FY2006	20,400	141,100	161,500	-1%	107%	NA
FY2007	23,700	148,300	172,000	7%	120%	NA
FY2008	30,100	157,800	187,900	9%	141%	NA
FY2009	30,700	135,600	166,300	-1%	139%	-1%
FY2010	63,500	88,300	151,800	-19%	94%	-19%
FY2011	63,500	42,800	106,200	-30%	36%	-43%
FY2012	63,500	4,100	67,500	-36%	-14%	-64%

Sources: Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Boots on the Ground," monthly reports; White House, "Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq" Speech by President Obama at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 27, 2009; <http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/iraqi>; White House, "Statement by the President on Afghanistan," February 17, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Afghanistan; Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Boots on the Ground Reports."

Notes: CRS calculations of monthly averages for FY2002-FY2008, and estimates for FY2009-FY2012 based on Table A-1 in Appendix A.

Figure 3: Average Troop Levels

Perhaps the most striking piece of evidence that points out the importance of the Awakening movement comes not from U.S. or Iraqi leadership, but from AQI. The phrase "the enemy gets a vote" applies to measuring the effectiveness of friendly operations as much as it applies to the fact that advisories will use all of their capabilities to defeat friendly plans. A captured AQI letter, written in 2007, after the surge had begun, explains the importance that AQI gave to the Awakening movement. The letter stated:

"The Islamic State of Iraq is faced with an extraordinary crisis, especially in al-Anbar... The renegades (SOI) and Americans started launching their attacks to destroy us... We lost cities, and afterwards villages, and the desert became a dangerous refuge. We got away from people and found ourselves in a wasteland desert... Some (Sunni insurgent allies) were killed and some arrested, but the majority betrayed us and joined the awakening." The leader of one 300-member

battalion deserted just before the awakening movement was organized, he wrote. Afterward, the unit's strength declined to only two fighters, both of whom were captured while the rest joined citizen security groups aligned against al Qaeda."⁵⁹

This evidence of the power of the Awakening movement is the main reason that that General Petraeus was able to revise the bleak assessment of Al Anbar province. It is also the reason that he was able to shift the majority of the two Brigade Combat Teams to Baghdad that were originally slated to deploy to Al Anbar as part of the surge. Only two battalions ended up deploying to Al Anbar as part of the surge.⁶⁰

CONCLUSION

The Awakening movement was the critical factor that allowed the coalition forces to 'turn the corner' in Iraq. This movement was shaped by the initiative and creative tactical and operational thinking of commanders on the ground, but it could not have taken place without the Iraqi "human dimension" of space already existing. Saddam set the conditions for the different tribes to be generally self-sufficient and to take matters into their own hands. The fact that this movement began in the area of operations with the lowest level of U.S. forces demonstrates that it was not dependant on a 'surge' of forces. What was required was a 'surge' of ingenuity. This included leaders defying their higher headquarters instructions based on their 'up close and personal' assessments of the factor of space within their areas. The quality of effort generated by 'doing the right thing' tactically and operationally was more important than having a 'surge' of forces.

The insurgency was born because U.S. leaders failed to conduct a proper assessment of the "human dimension" of Iraqi space.⁶¹ The insurgency was suppressed because U.S. leaders allowed the Iraqis to "awaken" and begin the process of taking charge of their own destiny. While U.S. leaders must be credited for helping to identify when the conditions for

the Awakening movement blossomed, it cannot be said that the U.S. led the decisive operation. The captured AQI letter clearly pointed out that it was the Iraqi forces that they were concerned with, not the U.S. forces arriving during the surge. The proliferation of multiple security militias may not look like a U.S. solution to stability, but it mirrors the ‘balance’ of the Iraqi “human dimension” of space and force that had been in place prior to the collapse of Saddam’s regime. The Awakening movement played a decisive role in stopping the self-destruction of Iraq and has been more effective than the introduction of surge forces because it was a critical step in restoring an appropriate level of Iraqi ‘balance’ to their complex society. Thus, it was the number of “sandals” worn by Iraqi militia forces on the ground that were more important than the 30,000 additional U.S. sets of “boots on the ground” that turned the Iraqi War around.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The evidence presented on the complex “human dimension” factors of Iraqi space, and the subsequent discussions on the merits and drawbacks of the Awakening and surge further emphasize the complexity of the issue and the importance of developing U.S. capabilities and strategies for ‘getting it right’ without having to wait six years into an operation. The U.S. must be able to carefully balance the factors of space and force, understanding that time is not on their side. Planners must also have an in-depth understanding of those factors prior to beginning operations, and have a grasp of what affect their operations will have on the complex dynamics, particularly the factor of the “human dimension” of space.

During Vietnam, U.S. military leaders used various tactics and operational approaches. The Marines developed a concept very similar in nature to the COIN tactics

eventually adopted in Iraq, where small units imbed with the population to provide security and to gain a better appreciation of the “human dimension.”⁶² The Army generally failed to adopt its tactics of massed conventional battles to suit the war that it was fighting; they violated Clausewitz’s maxim of “not mistaking the nature of the war.”⁶³ After the war, the army developed “light infantry divisions” whose task was to be able to fight both insurgency and conventional warfare. The Army chose to “stretch limited resources over seemingly unlimited requirements”⁶⁴ rather than develop a force capable of focusing on large-scale insurgency.

Even with such a COIN-tailored force, the U.S. needs also to adopt “systemic changes in doctrine, organizational mind-set, and institutional ethos” to wage successful COIN warfare.⁶⁵ The mind-set of leaders in Iraq whom embraced the Sunni tribal leaders against the guidance of their military superiors, which was later endorsed by General Petraeus, is an example of the type of wide-scale change in institutional ethos that needs to take place.

General Petraeus rightly credited his subordinate military leaders with identifying and fostering the success of the Awakening movement in Iraq.⁶⁶ The Awakening was the “supported” movement, with the U.S. in a “supporting” role. These two distinctions- that success was enabled from the bottom-up and not due to an operational or strategic plan, and that the U.S., with all of its invested blood and treasure is relegated to a supporting role- are significant mind-set and ethos changes.

While Iraq and Afghanistan are two completely different situations, the U.S. should apply the same approach to the problem. Strategic and operational leaders must provide a framework that enables subordinates to act upon the factors of the “human dimension” of

space in their local areas. The same high-level leaders must be flexible enough to identify the local “small victories” and leverage them together to consolidate success as General Petraeus did with the Awakening movement in Iraq. If the US adopts these basic suggestions, then the ultimate question remains: will the recent surge work in Afghanistan? If the surge is accompanied by an awakening-type movement, as was the case in Iraq, the surge of troops will defiantly help to shape the “human dimension” allowing an Afghan awakening to achieve victory. A recent *New York Times* article (25 April 2010) provides some evidence that there are indications that this is the operational framework that US forces in Afghanistan are currently adopting.⁶⁷

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NOTES

¹ “Although sectarian tension is a reality in Iraq, it is not a defining characteristic....At the individual and social level, sectarianism did not and still does not define Iraq and sectarian hatred is not a general phenomenon, even though many armed groups are driven by an animosity that targets anyone on their way...Yet beneath these grand sectarian definitions, many other issues divided Iraq’s groups, from tribal-urban conflict to class and the personal ambitions of manipulative leaders.” Peter J. Munson, *Iraq in Transition* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc, 2009), 24

² Kurdistan is not part of Iraq’s civil war, but it is also not really part of Iraq. With its own army and flag, airports and airline, Kurdistan functions like the independent state it almost is. The Iraqi army has not been on Kurdistan’s territory since 1996 and is effectively prohibited from being there” Peter W. Galbraith, *Unintended Consequences* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 39-40

³ This fractured relationship within Islam formed over 1500 years ago during a power struggle between Muslims who were split over how to properly select “the rightful successor of Mohammad.” The Sunni generally favored a more secular method of choosing their leader, while the Shia felt that the successor should be a “direct descendent” of Mohammad.. “The split between Shia and Sunni arose in the mid-seventh century from a dispute over the rightful successor of the Prophet Mohammad” Generally, the Sunni believed that they should follow a “community consensus” of religious elders to determine the successor, while the Shia believed that they should follow an “infallible Imam” who is a “direct descendant” of Ali. This evolved over the centuries, and the Sunni gravitated towards more worldly secularism based on their community consensus focus, and the Shia remained wedded to their more spiritual focus. In the end, 90% of the world Muslim population became Sunni with 10% becoming Shia. Munson, 85

⁴ See Figure 1

⁵ “The Sunni fear a Shia hegemony in which they are relegated to second-class status, dependant on what the Shia agree to grant them. With that loss of power there would be a loss of resources, and less access to jobs, education, and commerce.” Rend Al-Rahim Francke, *Special Report- Political Progress During the Surge in Iraq*. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 2007), 8

⁶ Munson, 42-3

⁷ Munson, 42-3

⁸ “As government control weakened and services to the public declined, the tribes filled the gap in terms of protection, administration, and charities.” Munson, 44

⁹ “Saddam’s tribal policies were to have important implications in the new Iraq. First, a segment of Sunni society came to link its identity with political power due to the prevalence of tribalism within the regime. Second, the rise of tribalism within the periphery created tribal leaders who held state-like powers and were in no mood to relinquish them to the coalition. Finally, emphasis on tribes and tribal honor produced an impetus for vengeance and a mechanism for enforcement against collaboration with the Coalition.” Munson, 45

¹⁰ Munson, 25

¹¹ “The first Ba’ath attempt to seize power in 1960 ended in “the hammer blow of a military coup.” Eight years later, the Ba’ath party initiated their own military coup to seize power from the Iraqi government. Learning from these lessons, Saddam set out to ensure that his regime would not be threatened by a coup.” Kevin M. Woods, *Iraqi Perspectives Project* (Norfolk, VA: Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 2006), vii

¹² Woods, vii,

¹³ Woods, 5

¹⁴ Woods, 48

¹⁵ “Iraq’s tribes, mosques, and other local institutions began providing what the occupiers and the central government could not... Once the central government vanished, they flourished like weeds...Even with the formation of a permanent Iraqi government, tribes, mosques and other local groups have continued to act in areas where the government is simply unable.” Munson, 70

¹⁶ Munson, 118-120

¹⁷ Various Sunni insurgent groups formed and fought alongside AQI throughout the war. “Among the Sunnis, a variety of groups have been identified. They are united only in the sense of having what have been called “negative” goals in opposition to U.S. presence; in seeking some return to the former status quo in which the Sunni minority have exercised power since the Ottoman period; or expressing a simple nationalist reaction to defeat.3 Some are clearly restorationist groups drawn from the former regime, the Baa’th Party, the paramilitary

Fida'iyin, and the Republican Guard. Some are anti-Saddam nationalist groups with no desire to see Saddam restored but resentful of U.S. and Western presence; others are Islamist groups, some members of which have been trained overseas or are foreign nationals, the latter including Syrians, Saudis, Yemenis, and Sudanese. Some activities have been the work of criminals or criminal organizations, large numbers of criminals being released at the end of the war and some certainly hiring themselves out for attacks on U.S. and Coalition forces". Ian F.W. Beckett, *Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical Perspective*. Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB592.pdf> (assessed 07 April 2009)

¹⁸ Several members of the National Security Council visited Iraq in October of 2006 and interviewed a number of Soldiers and leaders. In one interview, a group of Marines told described AQI's oppressive behavior against the Sunni: "Those assholes break the fingers of any farmer they catch smoking. When they want sex, they "marry" the good looking women of the tribes." Francis West, *The Strongest Tribe* (New York, NY: Random House, 2008), 199

¹⁹ "The factor of space encompasses not only the physical environment and weather/climate but also the so-called "human-space." Among other things, the human-space includes such elements as the political system and nature of government, population size and density, economic activity, transportation, trade, ideologies, ethnicity, religions, social structure and traditions, culture, and technology. All these and other elements of the human-space increasingly influence planning, preparation, and execution of a campaign or major operation. Obviously, the human factors play a much larger role in land warfare than in naval and air warfare. However, no operational commander can safely ignore the human factor on either side of a conflict. To enhance success in combat, the operational commanders and their staffs must properly evaluate both the human and physical elements of the factor of space. Today, human space plays an increasingly critical role in the post hostilities phase of a campaign, insurgency and counterinsurgency, and other operations short of high-intensity war." Milan Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare Theory and Practice* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2009), III-7

²⁰ The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, (Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1), GL-7

²¹ While it can be argued that U.S. military planners could not have been expected to anticipate the emergence of an insurgency any more than they could have foreseen the widespread disorders, looting, and random violence that followed the fall of Baghdad, that is precisely the nub of the problem. The fact that military planners apparently didn't consider the possibility that sustained and organized resistance could gather momentum and transform itself into an insurgency reflects a pathology that has long afflicted governments and militaries everywhere: the failure not only to recognize the incipient conditions for insurgency, but also to ignore its nascent manifestations and arrest its growth before it is able to gain initial traction and in turn momentum. Bruce Hoffman, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq*. Occasional Paper Series (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2004), http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2005/RAND_OP127.pdf (assessed 07 April 2010), 3

²²"Unable to maintain his crushing centralized rule, Saddam turned to tribes, key businessmen, security officials, criminal gangs; even to religious leaders for legitimacy and control of Iraq's periphery... The power of these societal groups grew within a mafia-like network of crime, corruption, and violence." Munson, 3

²³ West, 6-9

²⁴ In addition to lacking policy guidance about post-war roles and responsibilities, these operational level planning efforts lacked insight into key aspects of the current state of affairs in Iraq. For example, planning assumed that Iraqis, in particular law enforcement personnel, would be available and willing to resume some civic duties on the "day after." Catherine Dale, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress*. CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C. Congressional Research Service, 2004) www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34387.pdf (assessed 07 April 2010), 39

²⁵ "Had we better defined the enemy in late 2003 and early 2004, we defiantly could have done a better job of fighting them." Munson, 113

²⁶"In a head to head fight, the Sunnis had been beaten by the Shite militias that they had assumed they could dominate." U.S. Congress. House. *A Continuing Dialogue: Post-Surge Alternatives for Iraq (Part 1 and 2)*. Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 2008, 119

²⁷ “Also necessary - but also insufficient - was al Qaeda's brutality toward Sunni co-religionists, and especially, the Sunnis' defeat in 2006's sectarian warfare in Baghdad following the Samarra mosque bombing in 2/06. Before the mosque bombing, Sunnis believed they were the stronger side, and that only American support for a weak Shiite puppet regime stood between them and a return to power. Hence their strategy turned on driving the Americans out through a combination of casualties and general chaos. When al Qaeda in **Iraq** bombed the Samarra mosque, however, a collection of Shiite militias that had mostly been standing on the sidelines, defending their own population bases - and especially the Mahdi Army - entered the war en masse and on the offensive. The result was a year long sectarian slugfest in the capital in which the Sunnis got a technicolor view of exactly what a true one-on-one battle with the Shiite rivals would look like (we didn't have the troop strength at the time to prevent this battle, so the Sunnis and Shiites got to fight it out with relatively modest interference from US or Iraqi government forces). To their shock, they lost - badly. Sunnis were pushed almost all the way out of the city in spite of their (and AQI's) best efforts to the contrary. As a result, it became clear to them that if the Americans left and they really were pitted against the Shia alone, the result would be defeat and possible mass violence against them, not victory as they had previously assumed. This gave them a powerful incentive to seek a negotiated deal while they still could - and the result was the Sunni Awakening movement and its progeny. But this wasn't enough. Sunnis had tried turning on AQI before, and AQI's signature brutality had always driving them back into the fold via violent counterattack.” Stephen Biddle and Thomas Ricks, “The Gamble: Did the Surge Work?” Washington Post, 09 February 2009. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2009/02/05/DI2009020502774.html> (assessed 07 April 2010)

²⁸ “the mistake made by our al-Qaeda in Iraq enemies, whose extraordinary brutality has alienated their co-religionists, in the form of more secular insurgent groups.” U.S. Congress. House. *A Continuing Dialogue: Post-Surge Alternatives for Iraq (Part 1 and 2)*. Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 2008, 114

²⁹ “When al Qaeda in Iraq bombed the Samarra mosque, however, a collection of Shiite militias that had mostly been standing on the sidelines, defending their own population bases - and especially the Mahdi Army - entered the war en masse and on the offensive. The result was a year long sectarian slugfest in the capital in which the Sunnis got a Technicolor view of exactly what a true one-on-one battle with the Shiite rivals would look like (we didn't have the troop strength at the time to prevent this battle, so the Sunnis and Shiites got to fight it out with relatively modest interference from US or Iraqi government forces). To their shock, they lost - badly. Sunnis were pushed almost all the way out of the city in spite of their (and AQI's) best efforts to the contrary. As a result, it became clear to them that if the Americans left and they really were pitted against the Shia alone, the result would be defeat and possible mass violence against them, not victory as they had previously assumed. This gave them a powerful incentive to seek a negotiated deal while they still could - and the result was the Sunni Awakening movement and its progeny.” Stephen Biddle and Thomas Ricks, “The Gamble: Did the Surge Work?” Washington Post, 09 February 2009. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2009/02/05/DI2009020502774.html> (assessed 07 April 2010)

³⁰ Chart found in insert between pages 172 and 173 of *The Strongest Tribe*, by Bing West. West, 172

³¹ West, 186

³² “Plop a battalion down. Spread out the companies,” (COL, USMC, CDR RCT-7) Crowe said. “Recruit police, protect the people, take a census, make arrests. We understand counter-insurgency theory.” West, 177

³³ Many units in Al Anbar worked with local Sheiks on their own, despite the contrary guidance issued by the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) division-level headquarters. When the MEF staff learned of such actions, they sent “stiff messages stressing the Marine units....could not associate with “unauthorized militia-type groups.” The top level hadn't decided how to deal with the Awakening. It should be connected somehow to a government in Baghdad” West, 213

³⁴ “Tribal ties are important to all Iraqis, but most especially to those in rural areas like Anbar, where these traditions govern politics, social relations and business - including smuggling and highway robbery. Having grasped this and built their own relationships with the tribes, US commanders now have friends and sources of information in a region where once they were despised outsiders subjected to daily attacks. Hais, however, feels his new friends still have a lot to learn about how to win a war in the closed communities and harsh landscapes of western Iraq. “The Americans don't know the terrorists like we do. A very dangerous terrorist was freed by the Americans and our police captured him,” he said. “We asked him during the investigation: ‘Why did the Americans release you, you are very dangerous?’ He said: ‘I told them just two lies and they believed me and they set me free,’” Hais recounted. “We knew him very well, and he couldn't deny it. We told him ‘You killed

this person and that satisfaction. "There's no way to cure them, they have to be killed." Hais says he can now field 15,000 armed fighters, most of them now nominally in the police but still under his orders. How many of these were once in the resistance, fighting the Americans? "Fifty percent and maybe more," he said. And why did they change sides? "Because of the behavior of Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda did not distinguish between the innocent and the guilty. They killed the resistance, they killed sheikhs, they killed everyone. These fighters would make powerful allies for the US, if only they are used properly," he argued. Hais says he dreams not only of peace but of rebuilding Anbar's shattered cities with nightclubs, hotels and international trade. "We'll make Ramadi the Dubai of Iraq," he said, a twinkle in his eye. "I believe in development. I am very liberal, extremely liberal." Daily Star, "Iraqi tribal leader prescribes death for insurgents." on 17 May 2007. In CENTCOM Foreign Media Perceptions, 17 May 2007.

https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/FB_S20070521667704?searchKey=651773&rpp=10&index=91

³⁵ In Ramadi, IED attacks dropped 50%, and small arms attacks dropped by 40% in the first six months of the Awakening West, 244

³⁶ West, 245

³⁷ Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How this Ends* (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2008), 251

³⁸ Robinson, 251

³⁹ "But clearly, the fact that the Sunni Arab population turned against al-Qaida was a very important factor in this. So again, that is undeniable, but I would argue that, first of all, that our And then that, more importantly, that our leaders and troopers capitalized on it.... In other words, we then...as there were all of a sudden Sunni Arabs willing to volunteer to fight against al-Qaida, not just no longer support them or no longer turn a blind eye to them, but now they are willing to fight to help secure their community. All of a sudden it was possible to clear Ramadi and then hold it.... We've always been good at clearing areas." General David H. Petraeus, USA, interviewed by Bill Bennett, *Bill Bennett's Morning in America*, 15 February 2008

⁴⁰ West, 223

⁴¹ General David H. Petraeus, USA, interviewed by Bill Bennett, *Bill Bennett's Morning in America*, 15 February 2008.

⁴² "Published at the end of 2006, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24* was the most academically influential field manual in military history." West, 120

⁴³ "Finally, as many practitioners on the ground have pointed out, by the time of the surge, force leaders, staff, commanders, and troops in the field typically brought significant previous Iraq experience to the mission. Most leaders and commanders have served at least one previous tour in Iraq, and their familiarity with Iraqi governing structures, basic laws, and customs, is markedly greater than the limited knowledge the first coalition teams brought to Iraq. Leaders also point out that they have had time to absorb the lessons from their earlier tours, including absorbing the 2006 COIN manual that captured lessons from recent operational experience". Catherine Dale, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress*. CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C. Congressional Research Service, 2004) www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34387.pdf (assessed 07 April 2010), P140

⁴⁴ Robinson, 105

⁴⁵ "U.S. military officials report that without substantial assistance from the coalition, the operation would have been in jeopardy. As one senior U.S. commander explained it, Prime Minister Maliki had staked his reputation on the operation—if the operation failed, the government might collapse, so, he added, "We made sure that it would be successful. Coalition support included the advice and support of embedded transition teams, air strikes, and air lift. According to coalition officials, while many of the ISF performed competently, some—as widely reported—did not. One newly formed Iraq Army brigade, the 52nd, which had no combat experience, seemingly collapsed under the pressure. In April 2008, the GoI noted that more than 1,000 members of the ISF had laid down their weapons during the fight. Accordingly, some 500 Iraqi Army Soldiers, and 421 members of the Iraqi Police in Basra, were fired." Catherine Dale, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress*. CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C. Congressional Research Service, 2004) www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34387.pdf (assessed 07 April 2010), P 78

⁴⁶ "The civilian surge force quickly helped compile "facebook" style databases, compiling detailed information about the Iraqi "human dimension" that had previously not been accomplished with any sort of efficiency. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams that came with the surge were numerous enough to allow them to be imbedded within the Brigade Combat Teams, rather than be centrally controlled due to their scarcity. This shift

in the dynamic of US forces on the ground by giving US commanders the means to truly manage both security and reconstruction efforts as the “landlord” of their areas of operation. Iraqis were also more willing to work openly with the civilian elements. For example, Sistani “issued a carefully worked fatwa permitting Shia to work with USAID implementing partners, but not the coalition military.” This allowed Shia to ‘legally’ find employment and help in the reconstruction effort without being targeted by other Shia factions for working with the ‘occupying coalition forces.’ Stuart W. Brown, *Hard Lessons- The Iraq Reconstruction Experience* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009), P 309-316

⁴⁷ Report to Congress, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, 2008, iii

⁴⁸ U.S. Congress. Senate. *Iraq after the Surge*. Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 2008, 11-12

⁴⁹ Dr. Biddle is the “award-winning author of *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*. Former associate professor and Elihu Root chair of military studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. Current work examines U.S. defense policy and strategy”. See “Council on Foreign Relations”, <http://www.cfr.org/bios/2603/> (Assessed 07 APR 10) for more background information on Dr. Biddle.

⁵⁰ U.S. Congress. Senate. *Iraq after the Surge*. Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 2008, 122

⁵¹ Galbraith, 133

⁵² Galbraith, 133

⁵³ Galbraith, 25

⁵⁴ Galbraith, 35-6

⁵⁵ “Outside observers expressed concerns that the SoI movement might create an alternative—and a potential future challenge—to the national government’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, by empowering new forces that may or may not support the central government in the future. “At worst,” one observer commented, “it will perpetuate a fractured and fractious Iraq.” Catherine Dale, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress*. CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C. Congressional Research Service, 2004) www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34387.pdf (assessed 07 April 2010), 124

⁵⁶ See Table 3. Amy Belasco, “Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues”, Congressional Research Service, 02 JUL 09

⁵⁷ “The number of American troops in Iraq has dropped below 100,000 for the first time since the 2003 U.S. - led invasion in a clear signal the United States is wrapping up its nearly seven-year war to meet a deadline for leaving the country, the U.S. military said yesterday.” Chelsea Carter, “U.S. Troop Levels in Iraq are not at lowest since 2003.” Philadelphia Inquirer, 17 February 2010.

http://www.philly.com/inquirer/world_us/20100217_U_S__troop_levels_in_Iraq_are_at_lowest_since_2003.html (assessed 27 MAR 10)

⁵⁸ “As of mid-March 2009, according to MNC-I, there were 81,773 SoIs under GoI control, and approximately 10,000 SoIs remaining under coalition control.⁶³⁹ The GoI’s stated intent remained the integration of 20% of the former SoIs into jobs with the ISF. Since the GoI began to assume responsibility for the SoIs on October 1, 2008, approximately 5,000 SoIs had transitioned to permanent employment with the Iraqi police, and 500 to jobs with the Iraqi Army. For the rest of the SoIs, the GoI’s stated intent remained to secure them civilian jobs, an effort spearheaded by IFCNR. Several GoI civilian ministries had indicated their readiness to create jobs for some former SoIs—including 10,000 positions at the Ministry of Education, and 3,000 positions at the Ministry of Health.” Catherine Dale, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress*. CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C. Congressional Research Service, 2004) www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34387.pdf (assessed 07 April 2010), 124

⁵⁹ Fred W. Baker, “Captured al Qaeda Documents Detail Shift in Support” American Forces Press Service, 10 February 2008 <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=48920> (assessed 27 April 2010)

⁶⁰ 2x BCTs (about 6 combat battalions) were originally planned to deploy to Al Anbar during the Surge. Robinson, 32-3

⁶¹ Robinson, 3

⁶² Andrew Krepinovich describes Combat Action Platoons, (CAPs) in great detail in his book, *The Army in Vietnam*. They were generally very effective, but not employed on a scale great enough to have a significant effect on the war effort. Andrew F Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 172

⁶³ Carl von Clausewitz, *On war* (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 88-89

⁶⁴ Krepinovich, 274-5

⁶⁵“Judging from the U.S. military’s experiences in Iraq, the answer is at best far from clear and at worst that they cannot. The problem in fact may be more one involving systemic changes in doctrine, organizational mind-set, and institutional ethos than mere additional training opportunities—no matter how detailed or extensive.” Bruce Hoffman, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq*. Occasional Paper Series (Santa Monica, CA. Rand Corporation, 2004), http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2005/RAND_OP127.pdf (assessed 07 April 2010), 54

⁶⁶ Catherine Dale, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress*. CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C. Congressional Research Service, 2004) www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34387.pdf (assessed 07 April 2010), 140

⁶⁷ “The plan has echoes of the troop “surge” in Iraq, when additional American forces were sent to attack the insurgents who were operating in the belts outside the Iraqi capital, planning attacks, constructing roadside bombs and launching assaults. Other similarities to Iraq include the plans to woo local tribal leaders in and around Kandahar, similar to the way soldiers and Marines in Anbar Province courted the tribal Sunni sheiks in Iraq to fight insurgents. The United States and its allies in the Afghan government will try to unite local tribal leaders in and around Kandahar to turn in Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters. As in Iraq, officials said, the strategy will include monetary incentives in the form of economic development money for local leaders and tribal officials who support the government’s security efforts.” Thom Shanker, Helene Cooper and Richard A. Opiel, Jr, “Elite U.S. Units Step Up Drive In Kandahar Before Attack,” *New York Times*, 26 April 2010 <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/world/asia/26kandahar.html> (assessed 27 April 2010)