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**The United Nations and the United States:  
Overcoming Obstacles for A Synergistic Future of Peace Operations**

**by**

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**A paper submitted to the Provost, Naval War College, for consideration in the Prize  
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**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily  
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

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**27 May 2010**

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## **Abstract**

### **The United Nations and the United States: Overcoming Obstacles for A Synergistic Future of Peace Operations**

As the world grows more complex, the demand for peace operations will undoubtedly increase. This increase will be coupled with new challenges and complications, requiring extensive resources and expertise. A glance at the conflict-ridden environment in the Middle East and in Africa hints of the great difficulties to come. Peace operations have placed heavy demands on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces and also on United States (US) forces but both entities have, in recent years, operated separately for peace operations. The US, a member of the UN, has chosen to contribute less in the way of personnel and more in the way of financial assistance to UN peace operations. While financial contributions are imperative, future scenarios will require the US, as a global superpower, to send resources beyond monetary ones. Before the US and the Combatant Commanders are faced with augmenting a UN peace operation during a crisis situation, it is important to analyze why the US contribution levels are what they are currently and what could impede future contributions. This paper argues that while it will be essential for the US to assist the UN in future peace operations, the current obstacles must be identified and navigated before recommendations can be effectively implemented.

## **Introduction**

As the world grows more complex, the demand for peace operations will undoubtedly increase. This increase will be coupled with new challenges and complications, requiring extensive resources and expertise. A glance at the conflict-ridden environment in the Middle East and in Africa hints of the great difficulties to come. Peace operations have placed heavy demands on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces and also on United States (US) forces but both entities have, in recent years, operated separately for peace operations. The US, a member of the UN, has chosen to contribute less in the way of personnel and more in the way of financial assistance to UN peace operations.<sup>1</sup> While financial contributions are always imperative, future scenarios will require the US, as a global superpower, to send resources beyond monetary ones. How can the US, within the bounds of US doctrine and law, further contribute to UN peace operations? Research for this question leads to a realization that multiple road blocks exist potentially inhibiting the US from effectively contributing to UN peace operations. Before the US and the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) are faced with augmenting a UN peace operation during a crisis situation, it is important to analyze why the US contribution levels are what they are currently and what could impede future contributions. It will be essential for the US to assist the UN in future peace operations; therefore, the GCCs must identify and navigate current obstacles before recommendations can be effectively implemented.

### **Obstacle #1: Defining the Operations**

Defining peace operations is where the first obstacle, albeit small comparatively speaking, is found. The *2008 UN Doctrine on Peace Operations Principles and Guidelines*

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<sup>1</sup> Holt. *The Origins and Evolution of US Policy towards Peace Operations*. 22

includes the more traditional peacekeeping definition but also includes peacemaking, peace enforcement, conflict prevention, and peace building. According to the UN, peacekeeping is “a technique designed to preserve the peace...where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.”<sup>2</sup> Peacemaking includes “measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement.”<sup>3</sup> Peace enforcement, notably the first in which military force may be used, is “the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures.”<sup>4</sup> Conversely, the US rarely uses the term “peace operations” and, furthermore does not participate in peacekeeping operations at all but rather participates in stability operations or “various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”<sup>5</sup> In the JP 3 – 07, the term “peace operations” was mentioned in one paragraph,<sup>6</sup> in reference to the fact that peace operations are often included in major stability operations. A difference of note is that US doctrine indicates that peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations normally include predominantly combat operations, setting the stage for peace building to succeed.<sup>7</sup> The US Department of Defense (US DOD) seemingly identifies a larger role for military force in peace operations, a vision that is realistic in the current global environment but that is opposed to the doctrinal vision of the UN. The fact that the UN and the US definitions of

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<sup>2</sup> UN Peacekeeping Operations. 18

<sup>3</sup> UN Peacekeeping Operations. 17

<sup>4</sup> UN Peacekeeping Operations. 18

<sup>5</sup> JP 3-07 25 NOV 09

<sup>6</sup> JP 3-07 I-4

<sup>7</sup> JP 3-07.3 17 OCT 07

peace operations and the factors entailed do not neatly marry could cause friction in regards to effective US contributions to UN peace operations if not properly clarified with the command and personnel involved.

### **Obstacle #2: US Reluctance**

Before delving into the more technical obstacles to US contributions to UN peace operations, it is important to consider one of the largest drivers in the US: the American people. Since the Cold War, the US has participated in numerous UN peace operations with varying degrees of success. The outcomes and challenges associated with these operations have shaped the US perspective on current and future peace operations. The general feeling in the 1990s was that peace operations were detrimental to military readiness and the ability of the military to be prepared to defend the nation.<sup>8</sup> The US military was, supposedly, ill suited for peace operations with an “over-taxed, shrinking US military force.”<sup>9</sup> Animosity over the perception that the US military was being asked to get involved in operations outside its scope of ability was pervasive. US involvement and casualties in Somalia reinforced this perception.

In the Somalia peace/humanitarian OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, the US military was used as a band-aid to quickly fix the security situation in order to stabilize the environment enough to get food to the people.<sup>10</sup> The US did not understand, nor was it adequately prepared for, the operation or the unrest that still existed in Somalia. It was not a simple peacekeeping operation; rather, it would more likely be classified as a stability operation, setting the stage for future peace operations. Media coverage of Somalia was

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<sup>8</sup> US GAO. *Peace Operations*.3

<sup>9</sup> Serafina. *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations*

<sup>10</sup> Hoffman. *One Decade Later –Debacle in Somalia*

minimal and the general understanding was that hostilities were complete.<sup>11</sup> When the US endured casualties during this “peace operation,” media coverage spun out of control and people were angered. The US was unwilling to take on more casualties and the government was hesitant to put US soldiers into harms way with mission specifics uncertain. The loss in Somalia was devastating for both the US people and the future relationship between the US and UN peace operations.

A concrete manifestation of the bitterness and anger over the losses and operational challenges in Somalia (and other peace operations) is the Presidential Decision Directive – 25 (PDD – 25) from former US President Clinton. The implications of PDD-25 provide many direct and indirect obstacles to the US increasing contributions to UN peace operations. President Clinton recognized that the mistakes had to be acknowledged and that in order to maintain a decent approval rating, something had to be done to make the future more palatable to the American public. This directive outlined many issues with US forces participating in UN peace operations and made the guidelines incredibly more stringent, allowing for a higher level of scrutiny and encouraging greater caution (and popular buy-in).<sup>12</sup> The American people and Congress would have more insight into and say over any peace operations the US decides to participate in. Allocations of US money, troops and even votes on supporting UN action in peace operations were more tightly controlled. The guidelines specified that the US would not participate in any “open-ended commitments” and would insist on “time frames” for troop withdrawal.<sup>13</sup>

There were many important issues raised by PDD-25, with the majority of the guidelines affecting the overall US allocation of resources to UN peace operations; however,

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<sup>11</sup> Hoffman. *One Decade Later –Debacle in Somalia*

<sup>12</sup> *Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD-25)*

<sup>13</sup> PDD-25



it is specifically the stipulation on Command and Control (C2) that may prove the largest obstacle to increased US contributions to UN peace operations. C2 is defined as “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces” that is “performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and procedures employed by the commander.”<sup>14</sup> Besides being a difficult regulation to plan around, the C2 stipulation creates a split in the unity of command and could create tension within the joint forces participating in the mission. The US maintains that the President will retain and will never relinquish command authority over US forces, a fact that has remained constant since the US Constitution was drafted.<sup>15</sup> This was reiterated in PDD-25 which went on to further say that “if it is to [US] advantage to place US forces under the operational control of a UN commander, the fundamental elements of US command still apply” with “US commanders maintain[ing] the capability to report separately to higher US military authorities.”<sup>16</sup> The President of the US does have the option of placing US forces under operational control (OPCON) of a foreign commander; however, the greater the role the US plays, the less likely the US is going to be willing to put US forces under foreign control.<sup>17</sup> The C2 issue was addressed in the PDD-25 partially as a result of the peacekeeping mission in Somalia as questions remain about who was in charge during the mission and who was issuing orders (and the accuracy of the information on which he was acting). The casualties took the US population by surprise, encouraging President Clinton to take action to assure Americans that US forces are not being squandered.

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<sup>14</sup> JP 1(20 March 2009)

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm>

<sup>16</sup> PDD – 25

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm>

In addition to US hesitation regarding relinquishing control to a foreign commander, the UN membership list leaves the possibility open for the “lead” nation in a peace operation to be a non-US friendly nation or one with which the US has cautious ties. With no standing forces and difficulty “recruiting” personnel for missions, the UN cannot be sure which of its many members will take the lead on specific peace operations, leaving the possibility that peace keeping forces could be placed under any of its members. One hundred and fifteen countries contributed personnel to UN peace operations in March of 2010, with some of the largest numbers being contributed by Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Egypt, and Nigeria.<sup>18</sup> The logistics and politics of this issue are too large to address in the confines of this paper but it is valid to say that the US would not be amenable to placing its forces under some of the contributing nations. Although the US has tried to loosen restraints/constraints on guidelines for peace operations, it is doubtful that the bottom line will be changed in the foreseeable future, leaving the command issue a major hurdle to overcome.

Another aspect that adds to US reluctance to US contributions to UN peace operations is the persistent perception that US military forces are not trained or equipped for such operations. Earlier it was mentioned that the American people thought the US military was ill suited for peace operation missions. The US military was not and is not ill suited rather, it was ill prepared.<sup>19</sup> In the last decade, world events have been a catalyst for change within the US military. There has been a shift in doctrine and a general military acknowledgement that “future operations will regularly include missions to stabilize areas during transitions from war to peace and to assist with reconstruction during these

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<sup>18</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/> accessed 25 APR 2010

<sup>19</sup> Kitfield. *The Peacekeepers*.44

transitions.”<sup>20</sup> Stability operations are now a mission of the US Army and the latest draft of JP 3-07 states “the conduct of stability operations is a core US military mission that the Armed Forces are prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.”<sup>21</sup> This change has not only been in response to past missions but also to world events and to the overall global dynamic. The US military is still training to win wars but is ready to contribute to stabilization efforts because “stabilization is the provision of the security on which stability can be built, thus creating a platform for economic and political progress.”<sup>22</sup>

National Security Presidential Directive – 44 (NSPD-44), issued in December 2005, was an effort to increase coordination of stabilization operations within the US government and to make strides to increase awareness of the importance of such operations. NSPD-44 stated that it intended to “promote the security of the US through improved coordination, planning and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk for, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.”<sup>23</sup> While these changes are positive steps and show that the US military (and the US government) is preparing for future peace operations, it does not completely negate the perception of the American people or, possibly, some negative sentiments lingering within the US military about its role in the fight. These issues pose obstacles (and will continue to do so in the immediate future) to increased US contributions to UN peace operations.

### **Obstacle #3: The UN**

Besides the many factors internal to the US that will oppose increased contributions to UN peace operations, there are also factors within the UN that are problematic. History

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<sup>20</sup> Serafina. *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations*

<sup>21</sup> 3-07 page I-2

<sup>22</sup> 3-07

<sup>23</sup> NSPD – 44

has shown that, although the UN has participated in over 63 peace operations since 1948, peace operations often lack cohesion and include unprepared personnel. The previously mentioned UN reliance on member states to provide C2 and resources leaves the UN open to accepting forces that may be less capable (training and equipment wise) than perhaps US forces. A recent paper claimed that future UN Peace Operations “should be led by a lead nation or a regional organization with established command and control capabilities in order to properly synchronize the operational functions required for sustainable peace.”<sup>24</sup> Struggles within command and lack of unity in member forces can detract from the mission. Additionally, differences in rules of engagement (ROE) possibly create friction between participating forces. A relatively new issue stems from changes in the UN guidance that encourage and demand the “peacekeepers” to take a more combative role when faced with adversity. UN doctrine suggests that its peacekeeping forces are expected to achieve a sustainable peace even when not appropriately resourced or trained. It stipulates that peacekeepers are “authorized to take all necessary measures within its means and capabilities...to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment...”<sup>25</sup> Traditionally, UN peacekeeping forces are un- or lightly armed and are not trained for these mission sets. As the UN struggles to meet personnel and equipment demands, it recognizes that “the challenges that peacekeepers face today are unprecedented in scale, complexity, and risk level. Their engagement includes supporting political dialogue between parties, assisting national Governments to extend State authority, strengthening human rights and the rule of law, advising on security sector reform, supporting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and protecting

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<sup>24</sup> Potter. *The UN Peacekeeping Doctrine and Its Implications for Future US Operations*.1

<sup>25</sup> Blocq. *Western Soldiers and the Protection of Local Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations*

civilians.”<sup>26</sup> All the above stipulations by and guidelines from the UN pose problems for the US because they will shape the environment to which the US is asked to contribute resources. While US training, equipment and personnel are often predictable; the issues mentioned in this section increase the uncertainty and will most likely add to the hesitancy of the US to contribute to future UN peace operations.

### **Counterargument: Why Would the US Increase Contributions Anyway?**

Exploring the obstacles to US assistance in future UN peace operations also reveals that there are valid counterarguments to US involvement in the first place. Those opposed to increasing contributions could easily demand the US DOD focus more internally on the needs of the US and protecting US direct interests before supporting the UN in its peace endeavors.<sup>27</sup> All the headlines reinforce the fact that the US is involved in major conflicts currently and is stretched thin. Financially, the US is slowly recovering from an economic depression and should invest more money into itself to continue encouraging the recovery. Asking the US military to take on increased responsibility would only further tax an already heavily taxed department and place the US military in danger just for ambiguous missions and oftentimes misunderstood reasons with foreign militaries. The US is going to have enough stability operations that it has to participate in without taking on UN peace operations.

Even further, one can make the argument that US presence in UN peace operations would not be any assistance but rather would hinder the operations. The US military does not have the best image in the global arena as it is a military known for its ability to fight, capture, and kill. Foreign public opinion – an obstacle found insurmountable by many – is

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<sup>26</sup> UN Peacekeeping 2009 Overview

<sup>27</sup> Sahadi. *Earthshaking Ways to Fix US Debt*.1

certainly against the US military. The idea persists that because the US military is weapons capable; that it is incapable of working without weapons loaded and is instead trigger-happy. US military men and women participating in UN peace operations may raise the chances of belligerents targeting members of peace operations, specifically those affiliated with the US. Local skepticism and US history may possibly undermine the overall mission.<sup>28</sup> History has shown the US is more apt to act in its best interest and less in an altruistic manner. US presence begs the question what is the ulterior motive in this instance and will the US abandon the operation if the motive is lost? Even sections of PDD 25 indicate that the US admits that peace operations are capable of “enhancing US interests, and exercising influence”<sup>29</sup> in foreign countries. It is a difficult image to shake, especially with so many ambiguities surrounding the current conflicts. In addition, some argue that increased US participation in UN peace operations (and parallel operations) will pose a direct challenge to UN primacy....<sup>30</sup>

### **Increased Contributions Imperative**

While the counterarguments present perhaps compelling points on whether the US should be asked to commit more resources to UN peace operations when there is so much unsettled within the US itself, the fact remains that “United Nations peacekeeping is at a crossroads.” It is in need of “a renewed global partnership with [its] Member States and its partners...[ to secure] active political strategies and political support, ...support for faster deployment, and adequately calibrated and optimally configured human and capital resources...for a more secure world.”<sup>31</sup> The US will be asked, and obligated as a global

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<sup>28</sup> Johnstone. *The US Role in Contemporary Peace Operations*.2

<sup>29</sup> PDD-25

<sup>30</sup> Bellamy, *The West and Contemporary Peace Operations*.43

<sup>31</sup> UN Peacekeeping 2009 Overview

superpower, at some point to increase contributions to UN peace operations. Some of the issues in the counterargument will be reduced with strategic communication – both nationally and internationally – to improve US military image. While the foreign popular image of the US military is not always positive, many foreign governments recognize that the strength and depth of the US military is unsurpassed. In the Bosnian debacle, the US was faced with an operation that was not a peace operation in the traditional sense but was peace enforcement for a failed state. After a difficult mission, the US was drawing down and turning over to the EU, the Bosnian government said, “We in Bosnia hope that more Europe does not mean less US.”<sup>32</sup>

Although the problems the US has internally appear to eclipse the demands of the future UN peace operations, it is impossible to keep the rest of the global environment from affecting the US. The US borders remain porous and isolation is impossible and impractical. The US military is, indeed, stretched thin but has proven itself more than capable of taking on the tasks presented. The US Combatant Commands are finding ways to work smarter, incorporate more civilians and contractors when possible, and make the best possible use of their resources. As for the argument that the military cannot “defend the homeland” if it is taxed more, the military has spent the last decade engaged in conflicts and heavily so but has still managed to come to the assistance of the homeland when necessary.<sup>33</sup> When the US endured Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the US military provided extensive assistance and even recalled units participating in overseas missions in order to defend the homeland.<sup>34</sup> The US

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<sup>32</sup> Pappalardo. *Bosnia Commanders Point Out Peacekeeping Lessons*

<sup>33</sup> The tragedies of September 11, 2001 were, by no means, a failure of the US Department of Defense. It can (and has been) argued that the US Intelligence Community is to blame. The US DOD responded directly and in earnest.

<sup>34</sup> US GAO. Hurricane Katrina. The report does go on to say that there are many lessons to be learned from the massive military response to Hurricane Katrina; however, the lessons learned focus primarily on the lack of

military is adept at using the resources at its disposal to the best of its ability and has learned extensively from past mistakes. It is impossible to guarantee the US military will not have to extend itself and stretch further if increasing contributions to UN peace operations, but the US should remain confident that the best interests of the US will stay first priority. As the world grows smaller and becomes more globalized, it would be narrow-minded to suggest the US military would be able to ignore the plea of the UN and the global society.

### **Obstacles Not Insurmountable: Recommendations to Consider**

The aforementioned obstacles to increased US contributions to UN peace operations will not entirely disappear in the near future; however, with the current global environment there is not time to wait until they do. This is a pivotal point for the US and its commitment or lack of commitment to peace operations, specifically to UN peace operations. Will the US continue its “basic” support or will it become a more vigorous leader?<sup>35</sup>

The previous failures and successes during peace operations have given the US and the UN much to learn from. The fact that both entities have revamped doctrine (or established doctrine) indicates the level of importance placed on future peace operations (and stability operations). There has been an increase of efforts within the US to coordinate USG entities for improved peace/stability operations; however, it is important that the US coordinate overseas as well. The obstacles hindering increased US involvement in UN peace operations individually may seem insurmountable – and present viable issues associated with any future peace operation contributions. Now that these obstacles have been more or less thoroughly discussed, it is possible to begin exploring ways that the US can increase contributions, while navigating through the maze of obstacles. The following are some examples that the US and

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adequate detail in response planning and do not mention a lack of personnel (in fact, there was a glut of personnel but the plans failed to adequately and affectively use the number of personnel provided).

<sup>35</sup> Holt. *The Origins of US Policy towards Peace Operations*.



the US Combatant Commanders can consider when asked to augment future UN peace operations. These recommendations take into account the aforementioned obstacles but the logistics and the specifics entailed within each recommendation are not explored further as they are outside the scope of this paper.

***Increased Intelligence Sharing.*** The US has superior logistics, air support, and satellite information compared to most, if not all, of the UN member nations and already supports select missions.<sup>36</sup> Even if the US cannot supply personnel for missions, the US could assist with communications equipment and intelligence capabilities for specific future UN peace operations, helping provide situational awareness to the operation participants and thereby enable mission success. It would undoubtedly bring up issues about information classification, but even still these issues may be navigable.

***Parallel Command Structure.*** In order to bypass the previously mentioned C2 issues, the US can contribute to the UN peace operations that specifically use a parallel command structure instead of a lead command structure.<sup>37</sup> UN peace operations usually use either the lead nation or the parallel command structure. When the UN is called to participate in operations dealing with peace enforcement/security establishment (operations in which the US may excel), it can opt to use parallel command structure to take advantage of US strengths.

***Increased Assistance with Heavy Lift.*** As one of the only countries with heavy lift, the US can assist future UN peace operations by providing this capability. This is already done in some capacity but there are still many other operations the US could augment.<sup>38</sup> It is understood that with the current conflicts, the US has many of its military heavy lift assets

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<sup>36</sup> Nomikos, *Intelligence requirements for peacekeeping operations*.1

<sup>37</sup> Bellamy, *The West and Contemporary Peace Operations*. 44

<sup>38</sup> Economist. *Call the blue helmets*.2

otherwise engaged and is instead utilizing contractor support for such missions. Sharing these contractor assets more freely could be an option.

***US Integration into more UN Mandated/Endorsed Peace Operations.*** Due, in part, to the increased demand for peace operations, the UN has adopted variations of peace operations like integrated<sup>39</sup> and hybrid<sup>40</sup> missions. These missions may prove to be affected less by the obstacles previously described as they are UN mandated/endorsed missions not UN “commanded” missions and therefore do not entail many of the UN stipulations hindering US participation. The US can participate in hybrid missions because the latitude exists for US forces to be commanded either by national commands or by exclusively Western commands related either to a pivotal state or an organization such as the EU or NATO.<sup>41</sup> Hybrid operations allow for flexibility; the US could decide scope, scale, and timing of its contribution. Hybrids also emphasize the military aspects of peace operations (although perhaps at the cost of social, political, and economic factors)<sup>42</sup>, aspects in which the US is known to excel.<sup>43</sup>

***US State Department.*** Although this paper focuses primarily on the US DOD, it is worth mentioning that the US State Department (US DOS) is the lead US Agency for peace

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<sup>39</sup> Integrated missions = an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or to address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework. (Espen. *Report on Integrated Missions*.3)

<sup>40</sup> A hybrid operation can be defined as a joint multinational and/or multidisciplinary operation, which: is conducted by forces from different organisations or states, each with its own mandate and under the command of its respective mandating authority; involves forces operating under different Status of Forces or Missions Agreements, host nation agreements and rules of engagement; involves forces retaining their own organisation’s identity throughout the operation; involves forces undertaking different functional missions, while providing for coordination of operations, including combat, combat support, combat service support, air support and transport; and aims to achieve common objectives or end states contributing to conflict management and resolution. (Aboagye. *The Hybrid Operation for Darfur*.1)

<sup>41</sup> Bellamy, *The West and Contemporary Peace Operations*. 47

<sup>42</sup> Bellamy, *The West and Contemporary Peace Operations*.46

<sup>43</sup> ***UN integration into US stability operations*** - The US could also involve the UN in its endeavors – the new concepts of hybrid ops, PRTs, integrated missions, etc. instead of perhaps conforming or submitting to UN guidelines – which are just guidelines with no actual ways of implementation.

operations.<sup>44</sup> In response to the 2004 G8 action plan, the US DOS has trained and equipped eighty-one thousand new peacekeepers, in peace support operations and in the use of non-lethal equipment.<sup>45</sup> These personnel are available to assist in future UN peace operations, but, in the current global environment, it is difficult to ascertain whether these peacekeepers are going to be the most effective personnel for future operations. A recommendation to explore relating to this is for the US DOD to assist in the training of the US DOS peacekeeping force. The training would not be intended to make the peacekeepers military per se but to arm them with the tools and skills needed to face the type of operations they will be attempting.

***Provide Shared Doctrine.*** Although the UN has participated in peace operations since 1948, the December 2008 UN peace operations doctrine was the first of its type published. The US military has included peace operations and stability operations in many more joint publications and, based on its after-action protocols, has most likely developed many more lessons learned. The US could share its doctrine with the UN and provide details about specific lessons learned so the UN would not have to make similar mistakes.<sup>46</sup>

***Training of UN Peacekeepers/Member Nations.*** If the US is not able to provide personnel to UN peace operations, it could augment UN peace operations by offering to train UN forces before they are sent on a mission. This offer would be dependent on which nations are participating in the mission, but the US military undeniably grows skills that will be imperative for successful future operations including arms training, military police training, and general operational training that help instill situational awareness and operational security understanding. The US could send military contingents overseas to train forces in

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<sup>44</sup> GPOI.1

<sup>45</sup> GPOI.1

<sup>46</sup> The classification issue may come into play with this recommendation; sharing doctrine may have to occur on a case-by-case basis depending on which country is the lead country for the particular peace operation.

host countries, with an abridged one or two-week crash course in skills specific to the type of mission at hand. A more realistic, but potentially more challenging security-wise, option would be for the US military to welcome foreign representatives to participate in sections of US military training (specific to stability operations). These representatives could then go and educate the rest of the force before the mission. This would obviously present a host of issues including schedule de-confliction, financial allowances, security issues, and ROE differences but could be considered over the alternatives and despite the obstacles.

***Establish a committee or working group.*** In order to more thoroughly explore the full range of options available to the US and the US Combatant Commanders for augmenting future UN peace operations, the establishment of a working group or a committee is recommended. While this is a broad overview of the potential impediments to successful coordination and US augmentation of UN peace operations, it is by no means an all-inclusive paper, and there certainly exist many more nuances to consider when undertaking such operations. Such a committee or working group will be able to evaluate and analyze all lawful options and ensure the US is prepared to the utmost when it is asked to assist.

### **Concluding Remarks**

The future of UN peace operations is unknown, but it is certain that, in order to establish “a better state of peace,”<sup>47</sup> it will be necessary for the US to increase its contributions to such operations. Based on the changing global environment and the fact that “peace keepers” are now being asked to operate in areas where there is hostile unrest, traditional peacekeeping forces and training may not be sufficient to achieve mission success. It is in this case where the UN and the US have the chance to synergize, with the value of the performance of the two together being greater than the sum of the individual parts. Even if

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<sup>47</sup> Liddell Hart

the US could go it alone, the joint military community has realized that success is based on the ability to gain the support of all of the international partners, and the legitimacy of the UN is one way to muster this support.<sup>48</sup> Rather than waiting for the crisis situation to catalyze action in the US, it is imperative to be prepared with all the options, knowing all the obstacles and the limitations before being forced to implement increased contributions to UN peace operations. As the US Institute of Peace admits, “[the] most important skill needed in peace operations remains warfighting”<sup>49</sup>, and the US is capable of “mustering sophisticated and unparalleled resources to respond effectively when it has the political will to do so.”<sup>50</sup> With careful and thorough analysis, the US should stand ready, willing, and able to move synergistically with the UN in the future for a sustainable peace.

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<sup>48</sup> Flavin. *US Doctrine for Peace Operations*. 36

<sup>49</sup> US Institute of Peace Special Report

<sup>50</sup> Holt. *The Origins and Evolution of US Policy Towards Peace Operations*.19

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