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Professional Military Education for Navy Operational Leaders

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

Professional Military Education for Navy Operational Leaders

The Navy, once the leader in joint operations, has fallen behind the other services in providing adequate professional military education to ensure proper representation in all joint endeavors. Since the 2002 Year of Education and Training, the Navy has implemented a variety of requirements to bring the Navy's professional military education in line with the other services and with the *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development*. These requirements are not being enforced, putting naval officers at a disadvantage in joint operations, especially joint planning staffs and in operational command. Requirements of operational command are such that education plays a key role in developing skills to meet those requirements, both for the operational commander and his staff. Professional military education provides the basis on which a naval officer begins learning critical thinking skills and fostering self-education for joint operations and future operational command. The current state of Navy professional military education programs does not allow for sufficient time to properly analyze military history and gain the skills needed to succeed in a joint environment. The U.S. Navy needs to enforce current PME requirements and guidelines, realign officer progression to include professional military education at all levels of development, and make professional military education a sought after duty assignment, improving naval officers' knowledge and skill to perform in a joint environment and ultimately succeeding in operational command.

Introduction

By the end of the Second World War, Navy leaders routinely commanded the largest combined military forces the world had ever seen, due to their service and joint expertise cultivated through an emphasis on professional military education. Between the First and Second World Wars, they spent dedicated time studying politics and strategy, thinking about future wars, and analyzing lessons learned from previous ones. The Naval War College in the interwar years was a key naval institution, sponsoring war games and facilitating operational and strategic thinking for nearly all naval operational leaders, including Admirals Nimitz, Halsey, King, Spruance, and Kincaid. Their time spent at the war college was so important to many of the naval commanders that, during the height of the war, they argued “naval officers must begin to train early to understand and eventually command joint operations.”¹ Even the Navy’s personnel manual called for each officer to have “a thorough grounding in the principles and methods of naval strategy and tactics and of joint operations.”² It has only been in the recent past, beginning in the Cold War era, that attendance at service colleges was seen as something for which naval officers did not have time, due to high operational tempo and a focus on learning how to employ new technologies.³

The Navy’s cultural shift from the importance of joint operations to the importance of tactical prowess on individual platforms caused naval officers to fall behind their counterparts in the other services in terms of joint operations knowledge and experience. A comparison of flag and general officers shows that all Army and Air Force general officers have completed two service colleges whereas only 33 percent of Navy flag officers have completed any service college.⁴ This gap in professional military education of naval officers is increasingly evident on joint staffs and planning cells across the military. Because other services’ officers learn about

the planning process from the start of their careers, they have a distinct advantage over Navy officers, who may be exposed to some tactical planning within the first five years of service, but do not learn the intricate details of the joint planning process until serving on a numbered fleet or equivalent operational level staff.⁵ The lack of exposure to the joint planning process sidelines them when serving on a joint staff, minimizing their input and potentially degrading the overall plan.

The Navy in the late 1990s and early 2000s recognized it was behind the other services in graduate education and joint professional military education. The Graduate Education Review Board (GERB) held in May 2002, found the Navy had a serious mismatch between the stated goals of graduate education as proposed by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and reality.⁶ As a result of that conference, some changes were made in Navy graduate and joint education processes, including additional oversight for war college assignment.⁷ These requirements still exist; however, adherence to the guidance has slipped from where it was in 2002, specifically in the area of detailing. Though detailers still fill 100 percent of the seats at Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) and Naval War College (NWC), those filling the billets may not be the “best and brightest”. The detailers have operational billets to fill, which demand the highest caliber personnel to ensure mission success, pushing education billets to a lower priority.⁸

The Navy began another series of reforms to professional military education in 2006, beginning with a program of online courses to teach the enlisted sailors and junior officers the basics of professional military education and joint operations.⁹ The Naval War College (NWC) and Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) updated their curricula to meet the requirements of the *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development*, and the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) course was added to the PME continuum to provide training for senior

officers preparing to assume operational command. Despite these efforts, the Navy culturally does not recognize the importance and impact of education on the officer corps. In April 2010, the CNO released a message granting additional time for unrestricted line officers (URL) who have been selected for command to complete their JPME Phase I.¹⁰ The message confirms the importance of JPME, but it also highlights the fact that there is no standardized plan for naval officers to complete their JPME requirements. Officers who are selected for command are the top performers in each of their own communities, yet the Navy does not have adequate ability to educate all these officers at military PME institutions, ensuring that they build the skills important not only for command at sea, but also for future operational leaders and all joint endeavors.

The Navy must make a fundamental shift in the attitude towards educational assignments and reward superior academic performance as well as operational performance. Failure to do so will cause it to continue to fall behind the other services in joint planning, potentially marginalizing the Navy in future conflicts. The Navy needs to institutionalize professional military education as part of its culture, to enforce current JPME requirements and guidelines, and to realign officer progression to include professional military education at all levels of development. This realignment will better prepare U.S. Navy officers for joint assignments and future operational leadership roles.

Operational Command Requirements

There are many characteristics that go into being an operational leader: experience, education, character, personal integrity, and courage to name a few. Dr. Milan Vego defines operational leadership as “those levels of command responsible for accomplishing, through the application of operational art, strategic objectives assigned by the national or alliance/coalition leadership.”¹¹

He points out that there have been numerous excellent tactical leaders who failed as operational commanders because of their inability to see the situation in the broader view required to accomplish operational and strategic objectives.¹² Operational command by its nature is a joint command.

In today's environment of evolving threats and crises, operational leaders and their staffs must be prepared to face a variety of challenges. Navy operational commanders are often involved in enforcing exclusion zones, hosting military talks leading to crisis resolution, conducting humanitarian aid missions, and executing theater security cooperation missions to build lasting partnerships with other nations—all tasks that involve critical thinking, quick decision making, and close coordination with multinational groups, other U.S. government agencies, and non-government agencies. They must make quick and timely decisions with little information in uncertain and unfamiliar situations, applying their own experience, knowledge, and previously studied lessons of the past to choose the correct action.¹³ An operational leader needs a firm grasp of the culture and society where they operate, as well as other characteristics affecting how a potential enemy will react. Leaders must have “a *range of experience* to draw upon, as well as having key *intellectual attributes* (such as flexibility and critical thinking skills) that facilitate rapid and well-informed decision making.”¹⁴ These requirements are things the officer going to operational command should be developing throughout his/her career: experience through various command and staff assignments as well as critical thinking skills and study of historical cases through formal and self-education.

In a typical Navy career, officers do not reach operational command until they become numbered fleet commanders or joint force commanders. There are few, if any, opportunities for officers to gain operational perspective in their careers prior to assignment as a joint force

commander.¹⁵ Some experience for operational command is gained through working on fleet staffs and from other key jobs leading up to command. However, once in the position, there is not time for a “break in” period. The commander must be fully functioning, able to make critical operational decisions upon taking command. To be ready for those critical decisions, Navy officers must build up their knowledge outside the traditional Navy goal of command at sea. To achieve this, the Navy needs to shift from a heavy technical education to one including the social sciences and strategy.¹⁶ This shift can be accomplished through resident graduate and JPME courses.

It has been argued that so few Navy officers go on to operational command that it does not make sense to require all of them to get joint education.¹⁷ However, as the range of military operation expands, naval leaders must be ready for missions from humanitarian aid and disaster relief to traditional state-on-state conflicts.¹⁸ More Navy officers are serving in non-traditional assignments, and interagency, joint, and multinational operations are becoming more important than ever for the Navy to meet the goals of the CNO’s naval strategy.¹⁹ Working on a joint staff, naval officers require skills in critical thinking for planning operations. Though these officers do not have the same range of experience as their commander, they too need education to refine their critical thinking skills prior to staff assignment.

The requirements on today’s operational commanders and staffs demand officers who have a combination of the right character, experience, education, and training to execute successful missions. The most successful operational leaders integrate cultural knowledge with creativity and innovation through the application of their own experiences and the education they received throughout their careers. The right education, to include self-education, is the critical

element in developing critical thinking skills required for making difficult decisions in the current operational environment.

Professional Military Education for the Operational Commander

Professional military education provides historic context and develops critical thinking skills, fostering the tools necessary to make important decisions in ambiguous informational environments or unfamiliar situations. It also provides an officer with a breadth of knowledge, allowing for more effective exchanges with civilians in government and non-government agencies.²⁰ The better educated an operational commander is, the better he/she understands the bigger picture.²¹ A good operational leader is able to link the overall strategic vision with the operational objectives by means of tactical actions. That ability comes from experience gained over time and applied through the study of military history, through self-education, critical thinking skills, and creative ideas.

In an address to the Naval War College (NWC), General James Mattis, Commander, U.S. Joint Force Command (JFCOM) emphasized the importance of dedicated military education in a resident course, as well as the importance of military leaders being students of military history. “Nothing is new under the sun,” he commented, and every new situation an operational leader faces can be referenced to military history for a similar situation.²² An operational commander and his staff, having a firm grounding in military history, learn from past mistakes, derive critical lessons from them, and then apply them to current and future situations.²³

However, the lessons of military history cannot be fully appreciated by studying them in a college course alone. Naval leaders benefit from formal education focused on military history and critical thinking skills, but they must also develop their own self-education.²⁴ Self-education comes from the application of concepts learned in a formal environment to historical events. It is

marked by the continuous hunger for knowledge, and is a common characteristic for many great operational commanders, who demonstrate a lifelong desire to study history and the art of war.²⁵ Self-education is a critical factor in an operational commander's development, melding his/her own experiences with history's lessons to produce a refined "internal compass" which can aid in making vital decisions.

Not only does professional military education foster the study of military history and develop self-education, it also provides the means to shape and mature critical thinking skills, essential to rapid decision making on situations where not all facts are known. General George Marshall observed that even with an excellent education, "leaders must be prepared to deal with changes and unexpected difficulties, and conditioned so that their mental processes are not paralyzed when confronted with the unusual."²⁶ One way to prepare for unexpected difficulties is through critical thinking. Even in today's high tech world, there is no substitute for the ability of the commander to look at a situation and make a decision, not based on a computer calculation or model, but based on instincts and previous experiences, the internal compass which a commander builds and refines throughout his/her career.

The commander's ability to think "outside the box" and come up with a creative solution is generated through critical thinking skills and decision making abilities, which do not come from a single exposure or single educational course. Professional educators know students need repeated exposure to complex concepts in order to reach a full understanding.²⁷ This idea of repeated exposure was echoed by former professor and department head at National War College, Dr. Janet Breslin-Smith, in recent testimony before Congress: "I believe an officer needs the experience of repeated scenarios and the discipline of thought that comes from the use of strategic frameworks to guide analysis. The pressure to respond to attack, to act, to 'do

something' in crisis, is so great that only a disciplined education, ... can prepare an officer to 'stand there' and think through the problem, seeing the pitfalls and recommending the best course of action."²⁸ Navy leaders should be exposed to joint and professional military education topics from their initial officer accession source through each rank, providing the repetition necessary for building excellence in joint operations.

It has been argued those officers who go to operational command are chosen because they are especially talented and pursued education on their own.²⁹ It is more important for the Navy to focus on the technical aspects of serving at sea on ships and aircraft and strive for the ultimate Navy goal: command at sea.³⁰ Command at sea is the goal of every unrestricted line officer whether of a ship, a squadron, or even a carrier strike group, but, these are all at the tactical level of war. By asserting the only priority is technical education which leads to command at sea, the Navy's ability to provide enough of the right personnel as joint planners and operational commanders is severely limited.

Professional military education provides the key for naval leaders to develop critical thinking and decision making skills for future use as joint planners and operational commanders. It allows them to better relate and interact with their peers in the military, in U.S. governmental and non-governmental agencies, as well as with international partners. Education supplies the ways and means for operational leaders to meet their objectives and communicate the operational vision.³¹

Professional Military Education in the U.S. Navy

Unlike the Navy leaders of the Second World War who promoted joint operations, the generation of leaders beginning in the Cold War emphasized mastering the tactical employment of new technologies, causing a shift in Navy culture which esteems performance within one's

community above all.³² This shift, which was designed to be a temporary change for fighting the Soviet threat, has become permanent.³³ It also explains why today's Navy does not value professional military education. First, the Navy's key component, ships and aircraft at sea, operate almost solely on the tactical level. As a result of the Cold War, there is a requirement from the start of an officer's career to be the technical expert on his/her platform, a learning period that takes upwards of the first eight to ten years of service to master. Second, the Navy's culture views sea duty as the highest priority, the environment in which an officer is most rigorously challenged and gains experience.³⁴ The only way to succeed and advance is through "superior performance at sea," meaning in an operational (sea duty) assignment. This attitude lessens the desire of officers to pursue their education, except to meet the minimum requirement for advancement to the next pay grade or career milestone. Finally, the level of performance at a war college is not recognized in the officer's fitness report, giving minimal incentive to attend a war college. All these factors contribute to the cultural expectation that an officer's career should be dedicated to his/her own platform and community, leaving little time and no incentive to pursue professional military education beyond the minimum requirements.

Recognizing the deficiency in graduate education and the importance of JPME to an officer's career, the Navy enacted multiple changes to improve the graduate and professional military education systems. In addition to the reforms put in place by the Graduate Education Review Board, the Navy instituted Primary Professional Military Education (PPME) online courses, designed to provide different levels of professional military education to Navy personnel in 2006.³⁵ Another change was the 2006 realignment of courses at the Naval War College (NWC) and Naval Post Graduate School (NPS), aimed at fulfilling the *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development* (JOD) requirements for fully qualified joint O-6 level officers who

are skilled war fighters and also strategic critical thinkers.³⁶ Finally, to provide for senior level PME, the Navy added the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) course for senior leaders (O-7, O-8) preparing for operational command. This course is designed “to prepare future Maritime Component Commanders to plan and execute complex maritime operations.”³⁷ All of these new programs were part of the Navy’s recovery from years of neglect of professional military education beginning in the Cold War era. Unfortunately, these new programs have not yet changed the Navy’s opposing stance toward professional military education.

First, the Primary PME online courses are not officially required by any official Navy directive, unless the member is slated to attend the Naval War College, nor are they mentioned as optional courses for Navy general military training (GMT). According to Prof. Walt Wildemann at the Naval War College, College of Distant Education, there is no official requirement to take the online PME courses, though they have over 30,000 people enrolled.³⁸ (See Appendix A for a breakdown of the enrollment for the online courses, including the reserve component and Navy civilians.) Though not officially mandated, these courses are part of the Navy PME Continuum, requiring completion of the introduction and basic courses prior to an officer’s commissioning and the primary PME course within the first two to three years of commissioned service. (See Appendix B for the current Navy PME Continuum.) The courses provide an introduction to capabilities the other services and government agencies offer, and should be mandatory training for all officers as a foundation for their joint knowledge.

Next, the Naval War College (NWC) and Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) redesigned their courses to meet the JOD requirements, but they will only succeed in creating more fully qualified joint officers if the right officers are assigned to those institutions. Attendance should

be prioritized to accommodate the maximum number of unrestricted line officers (URL) before staff corps officers, because future operational commanders will come from the URL officers. Career timing should also be adjusted to ensure the right officers attend war college at the right time. The JOD made JPME a key educational activity for officers beginning at lieutenant commander and major.³⁹ By starting an officer's education early in a career, he/she fosters those critical thinking skills and desire for self-education throughout that career, constructing a framework on which to build future operational plans.⁴⁰

Finally, the JFMCC course filled the void of senior officer PME, but at only five days long, there is little if any time for critical analysis of military history and reflection on historical lessons learned. Rather, it is a time for the course mentors (retired three and four star flag officers) to share their own experiences in operational command with the students. As part of the Navy PME Continuum, the course lacks the rigor of other programs. It will not teach an officer to be an operational commander, nor is it a solution if the student is not adequately prepared for operational command through his/her previous experience and education.

The Navy has implemented various programs to promote graduate education and JPME, but those programs have not gained traction against the cultural opposition to education. It will take time and support from senior Navy leaders to ensure PME programs are fully established and enforced, so Navy officers can receive the education necessary to succeed in joint planning staffs and in operational command.

Resident vs. Distance Learning

Many Navy officers believe they are “too busy to learn”—to attend a resident program to complete their JPME.⁴¹ They would rather complete a distance education course offered by one of the U. S. military PME institutions, so they can remain in their competitive, career-enhancing

job while still getting the “check in the block” for JPME.⁴² The argument has also been made that war colleges are a waste of government funds and should be closed.⁴³ A better argument may be they should all transition to distance learning programs only, saving time and money. Though Distance Education is one means of completing JPME, it does not provide the rigor, the interaction, or same level of learning that occurs at a residence course. There are several reasons for this.

First, an officer taking JPME through Distance Education does not devote all his/her daily work time to JPME. Because he/she has an assigned billet, the only time for JPME learning is after working hours. “Even in peacetime environments, leaders with unit responsibilities have scant time for other pursuits; in the current high-tempo situation, it is unrealistic to expect that leaders will be able to get such time [as needed to pursue distance education].”⁴⁴ Officers in a Distance Education program do not have the same amount of time devoted to education as resident students have.

Second, a resident program not only provides dedicated time for study, but also teaches the students how to self-educate. Unlike the education most officers received through their commissioning sources, war colleges provide graduate level education, in which the main venue for learning is the seminar.⁴⁵ In seminar, the students are not simply asked to describe their readings from the night before (“the what”). They are expected to read and understand the material presented in the nightly assignments and come to class prepared to discuss the underlying themes (“the why”) from the readings. This process fosters self-education and critical thought, building a foundation for life-long learning.

Third, there are different levels of participation and rigor available in the Distance Education courses. These levels range from self-study using a CD-ROM to weekly class

seminars moderated by service school professors. Some examples are the Air Command and Staff College Distance Learning self-study program⁴⁶ and the Naval War College Fleet Seminar Program.⁴⁷ Regardless of the version of distance learning, however, it is impossible to emulate the daily interaction officers have when attending a PME residence course.

Finally, and perhaps more important than the daily interaction with students from other services, there is the interaction with international officers that students experience in a residence PME course. More than one flag officer has commented that the friendships made during the resident course at the Naval War College remain true today and allow the leaders of various navy's to interact on a professional and personnel level, improving coalition relationships and enabling countries to work together more closely. This interaction can build lifetime friendships and expose officers to their counterparts in other navies with whom they will be working in future multinational and coalition task forces.

The key to understanding why resident war college programs are not popular begins in how officers are detailed to the school. Some officers are sent to the war college because they need to complete a master's degree and JPME Phase I prior to promotion and selection boards convening. The detailers are required to fill 100 percent of the billets, which means sometimes selected officers do not fit the desired student model.⁴⁸ In the Surface Warfare Community, the detailers even advertise when war college seats are available and have to convince officers to attend.⁴⁹ One way to make war colleges more desirable is to make superior performance at a war college equivalent to superior performance in an operational assignment. Recognition of good performance at a war college needs to be documented in an officer's fitness report, but more importantly, that fitness report needs to be "observed" and those officers ranked against their

graduating peers, to reward the top graduates and offer additional motivation to those students who view the war college as a year off.

Another important factor in war college attendance is career timing. The *PERS-41 Quarterly* Newsletter highlights the fact that only in some cases will officers have the time in their careers to attend a resident course for JPME.⁵⁰ More often than not, an officer's JPME Phase I and II requirements are met through on the job training in a joint tour. For Navy officers who have served in a joint tour, they can self nominate to receive certification for both JPME Phase I/II and as a Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) based on their experience.⁵¹ This method of attaining JPME Phase I and II gives credit to officers who were assigned joint billets, and it provides an expedient solution to the requirement that all officers must complete JPME Phase I and II. However, these qualifications do not provide some crucial tools, specifically a dedicated education program to develop critical thinking and decision making skills, needed to prepare naval officers for joint operations and future operational command.

Resident war college programs provide a more rigorous and full educational experience than distance learning programs. In order to make resident programs more desirable, the Navy should value JPME more than just a "check in the block" qualification. Dedicated time spent in resident programs provides a better level of education and self-education for students. The officers attending resident programs should be recognized for superior performance, just as they are in operational (sea duty) billets. Navy officer career progression needs to be adapted to allow time for officers to attend a war college in a resident program, thereby receiving the full benefits of that education and sharing past experiences with their classmates. Full time residence education starting at the lieutenant commander level will allow officers to begin developing

critical thinking skills, and subsequent tours at the war college will further reinforce those skills essential for future operational command.

Conclusions

Operational commanders and their staffs must be built around a core of officers who have the right combination of character, experience, education, and training to successfully execute missions and complete objectives. Professional military education, including self-education, provides an important piece of the development of those officers, refining the critical thinking skills needed for making quick decisions in a complex operating environment.

Professional military education aids all naval officers in becoming better executors of the current maritime strategy. It also begins the process of education needed to develop critical thinking skills and foster self-education, essential tools that operational commanders and staffs need in unfamiliar situations, to assist in making critical decisions. Because Navy officers are filling non-traditional roles, the need for knowledge and experience in joint planning will only grow with time.

Since 2002, the Navy has put an increased emphasis on JPME through graduate education. There have been numerous initiatives updating the PME process to ensure the “best and brightest” officers are detailed to the war colleges and to start professional military education at the officer accession level. However, the focus the “Year of Education and Training” brought in 2002 has faded in the face of the two wars, budget constraints, and other priorities. The initiatives were not implemented or enforced. The Navy still maintains a cultural bias against educational opportunities, preferring experience and time spent at sea. This mindset will continue to put naval officers on the periphery of joint planning, reducing their experience for future assignments on joint staffs and as joint commanders. Experience for operational

command comes from the experience of being on an operational level staff, and specifically from being a key participant in that planning, not just an observer.

As part of the PME reforms, the Navy urged officers who did not have time to attend war college to complete JPME through distance learning programs. Distance learning programs have a variety of instruction methods, but none match the rigor or provide the interaction of a resident program. Therefore, though the distance learning program meets the need to have every naval officer complete JPME, resident PME programs are the only ones who can teach the critical skills needed by naval leaders for joint operations from staff duty to operational command.

Education and critical thinking skills remain the key for operational commanders and staffs achieving operational objectives. As requirements for creative solutions to military problems increase, it is more important for operational commanders and staffs to use those abilities gained through higher education and reflection on military history. Coalition partnerships are the standard way to operate in the range of military operations. Operational leaders must understand their counterpart's culture and how it affects their physical and military abilities to fight, as well as how the interaction may affect future coalitions and political partnerships. Understanding these subtleties requires a skilled officer who has personal experience interacting with other cultures; but who is also a lifelong learner and can take lessons from other military leaders in the past for potential solutions in the future.

Recommendations

The Navy needs to reform its current PME plan to include PME at every officer development level, beginning with a basic introduction at the officer's accession sources, and at every major career milestone along the way to operational command. This plan is already broadly defined in the Navy PME Continuum, and the online program is already in place for those junior officers to

use to learn the basics of joint operations. Now, the continuum needs to be enforced and the online program completion required. Not only will this introduce officers to joint operations, but it will also make them more knowledgeable of how they fit into the larger picture when their commands participate in joint operations.

In revising the PME plan, the Navy must remove the idea that “superior performance at sea” is the only means of advancement. It must recognize that educational development is the key to continued success at sea and future success in all joint operations. The Navy needs to make education a priority, both in manning fill priorities and in promotion and selection boards. By recruiting the best officers to attend the war college and making attendance an exclusive group, the prestige associated with attending the war college will increase and spark competition for war college seats. Competition for war college seats will, in turn, recruit more top performing officers and give incentive to those who attend to excel in their studies. The Navy should recognize students who excel in their courses, giving ranked fitness reports and rewarding superior performance in education.

Time needs to be programmed into an officer’s career to allow him/her to advance his/her education in a rigorous learning environment, rather than simply completing another “check in the block” on their way to their next operational (sea duty) assignment. This recommendation will be difficult to accomplish due to the overwhelming number of requirements placed on naval officers during their careers.

Navy leadership, especially those senior officers who are advocates for education, should instill the sense of importance education brings to the Navy’s culture, and how education leads to success in the future, both in the Navy and in the joint environment. To ensure JPME and graduate education continue to receive the correct emphasis and help reinforce the change in

Navy culture, the CNO should have personal involvement in the war colleges, and chair the Graduate Education Review Board annually to ensure the current policies are valid and executed.

The Navy must develop a serious dedication to professional military education, improving naval officers' knowledge in joint operations and ultimately developing officers who will succeed in operational command. These changes are not aberrations from the Navy ideal of command at sea, but rather a continuation of the Navy's long tradition of joint operations.

Notes

1. James Stavridis and Mark Hagerott, "The Heart of an Officer: Joint, Interagency, and International Operations and Navy Career Development," *Naval War College Review* 62, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 31.
2. U.S. Navy, *Bureau of Personnel Manual* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), quoted in James Stavridis and Mark Hagerott, "The Heart of an Officer: Joint, Interagency, and International Operations and Navy Career Development," *Naval War College Review* 62, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 31.
3. Milan Vego, "There's No Place Like Newport," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 136, no. 2 (February 2010): 39. See also, Chapter 1.3 "The History of Navy Planning" in Naval Warfare Publication 5-01 for a general description of how Navy planning evolved from the intense joint operational plans of the Second World War to the tactical focus of the Cold War period.
4. *Ibid.*, 38.
5. U.S. Navy, *Navy Planning Process*, Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 5-01 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, January 2007) 1-4. In Section 1-2, the NPP describes the history of naval planning and reason that naval planning and education toward that planning fell off beginning in the Cold War era. For more information on the history of naval planning, see NWP 5-01, Jan 2007. Hereafter referred to as NWP 5-01.
6. Graduate Education Review Board, "Transforming Graduate and Professional Military Education," Power-point, 8 May 2002, Slide 10, 12, 13, 14, 23. NAVADMIN 177/99 states that "every URL [unrestricted line officer], RL [restricted line officer], and Staff Corps officer [will be provided] the opportunity to attain both a relevant graduate education degree and appropriate Professional Military Education ... as a normal part of their career."
7. *Ibid.*, Slide 60. The following were specific changes from the GERB findings: Fleet Type Commanders (TYCOMs) were required to brief the quantity and quality of officers sent to Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) and Naval War College (NWC), the top 50 percent of NWC graduates would be hand detailed to critical staff and joint jobs, and detailers were required to fill 100 percent of NPS and NWC quotas beginning in FY03.
8. *Ibid.*, Slide 12.
9. Navy Knowledge Online, "E-Learning Pages," https://ile-lms.nko.navy.mil/main_app.asp?main=app (accessed 21 March 2010).
10. The previous guidance required JPME I to be complete prior to screening for commander command. The new guidance allows those chosen for command at sea to have additional time to complete their JPME I, between when they are selected for command until they assume command, a timeline which ranges on average from two to three years. Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Administration, message 161934Z APR 10, 16 April 2010.
11. Milan Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice* (2007; repr., Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College Press, 2009,) X-5.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Henry A. Leonard, J. Michael Polich, Jeffery D. Peterson, Ronald E. Sortor, and S. Craig Moore, *Something old, something new: Army leader development in a dynamic environment*, RAND Report MG-281-A (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006,) 93. Timely decision making is also recognized as a key tenet of command and control in Joint Publication 1-0.
14. *Ibid.*, 5.

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15. Milan Vego, "Military History and the Study of Operational Art," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 57, no. 2 (2nd Quarter 2010) 129.
 16. Stavridis, "The Heart of an Officer: Joint, Interagency, and International Operations and Navy Career Development," 31.
 17. W. J. Holland, "In My View," *Naval War College Review* 63, no. 1 (Winter 2010) 170.
 18. Stavridis, "The Heart of an Officer: Joint, Interagency, and International Operations and Navy Career Development," 28. Chief of Naval Operations, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, October 2007): 2-3.
 19. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, 3.
 20. Leonard, *Something old, something new: Army leader development in a dynamic environment*, 97.
 21. Vego, "Military History and the Study of Operational Art," 127.
 22. Gen James Mattis, "An Address" (Lecture, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 25 March 2010,) used with permission.
 23. Vego, "Military History and the Study of Operational Art," 125.
 24. Ibid., 127.
 25. Robert H. Scales, "Too Busy To Learn," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 136, no. 2 (February 2010) 32.
 26. Leonard, *Something old, something new: Army leader development in a dynamic environment*, 14.
 27. Leonard, *Something old, something new: Army leader development in a dynamic environment*, 95.
 28. Janet Breslin-Smith, "Testimony," House, *Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Twenty Years after the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel: Hearing before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 20 May 2009, 56.
 29. Holland, "In My View," 170.
 30. Ibid., 169-170.
 31. Clarence Neason Jr, "Operational Leadership—What is it?" (research paper, FT Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 21 May 1998) 29. Available as Defense Technical Information Center Report (DTIC) ADA357894.
 32. NWP 5-01, 1-3.
 33. Stavridis, "The Heart of an Officer: Joint, Interagency, and International Operations and Navy Career Development," 32.
 34. In fact the U.S. military in general places a great deal of value on operational experience as the mark of a proven leader. Leonard, *Something old, something new: Army leader development in a dynamic environment*, 8.
 35. Navy Knowledge Online, "E-Learning Pages," https://ile-lms.nko.navy.mil/main_app.asp?main=app (accessed 21 March 2010).
 36. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development* (Washington, DC: CJCS, November 2005), 3.
 37. Naval War College, "JFMCC Course Description," <http://www.usnwc.edu/Academics/Flag-And-General-Officer-Courses/Joint-Force-Maritime-Component-Commander.aspx>. (accessed 28 March 2010).

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38. Walt Wildemann, e-mail message to author, 23 March 2010. Used with permission. The Primary PME Officer Course (CWO4-O-4) is a requirement for all Navy officers attending NWC to complete prior to reporting to NWC. That requirement is detailed in the officer's Permanent Change of Station orders and a certificate of completion must be presented to the Dean of Students office within two weeks of arrival at NWC. For information on the requirements for Navy general military training (GMT), see the FY10/FY11 GMT Message, NAVADMIN 098/10. This message lists the mandatory required training for all Navy personnel in 2010. There is no mention or requirement to complete the online NKO PME training. NAVADMIN 098/10 was accessed via the Navy Knowledge Online Website, <https://wwwa.nko.navy.mil/portal/personaldevelopment/home/gmt>. (accessed 01 April 2010).
39. *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development*, 5.
40. Vego, "Military History and the Study of Operational Art," 124.
41. Scales, "Too Busy To Learn," 31.
42. The Navy's culture offers/believes/supports that an officer must be in a key competitive billet to reach the next milestone promotion. A fitness report is an annual report that ranks each pay grade group of officers at a command from best to worst. The best ranking on a fitness report is an Early Promote (EP). That means that the reporting senior officer believes that officer who receives an EP is ready to assume the next rank or higher level of responsibility now. These rankings are critical for statutory promotion (promotion to the next rank), as well as selection for the next major career milestone (selection for command at sea).
- 43 Tom Ricks, "The War colleges are weighed on Gen. Bob Scales's balance—and found wanting," *Foreign Policy* http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/02/02/the_war_colleges_are_weighed_in_gen_scales_balance_and_found_wanting (accessed 18 April 2010).
44. Leonard, *Something old, something new: Army leader development in a dynamic environment*, 96.
- 45 Williamson Murray, "Grading the War Colleges," *The National Interest*, (Winter 1986/7): 13-14.
46. The Air Command and Staff College's Distance Learning Program can be completed in a seminar group or self-paced and is based on what the individual learns from the course materials provided. The course is broken into seven sections, and the student must pass a multiple choice exam at the end of each section, with a minimum score of 70. There are four of written assignments also due throughout the course, corresponding to each section, and the written assignments are graded on a pass/fail basis. The course must be completed within 18 months of enrollment. For more information see the Air Command and Staff College Distance Learning Version 5.1 Student Guide, available at <http://wwwacsc.au.af.mil/distance-learning.asp> (accessed 18 Apr 2010.)
47. The Naval War College offers a different distance learning program. NWC's program offers three types of opportunities for JPME Phase I completion: CD-ROM correspondence course, Web-enabled course, and the Fleet Seminar course. The CD-ROM course is a self-study, self-paced course that must be completed in 12 months, requiring the students to complete a variety of essays, multiple choice tests, and/or point papers for each block of study. The Web-enabled course requires the students to complete the same work as the CD-ROM course, but they also must participate in group discussions through an online utility program, Blackboard. The course length for web enabled is 15-18 months. Finally, the Fleet Seminar Program uses weekly

seminars run over the normal school year to complete not only JPME Phase I, but also a graduate degree from the NWC. These seminars, unlike the CD-ROM or Web-enabled courses are conducted at a graduate level, thus allowing a graduate degree to be awarded upon successful completion of the course. <http://www.usnwc.edu/Academics/College-of-Distance-Education/Fleet-Seminar.aspx> (accessed 25Mar2010.)

48. Graduate Education Review Board, Slide 60.

49 Navy Personnel Command, "War College Opportunities," *PERS-41 Quarterly Newsletter* 1, no. 2, (2nd Quarter, FY2010): 7.

50. Navy Personnel Command, "JPME Phase II," *PERS-41 Quarterly Newsletter* 1, no. 2, (2nd Quarter, FY2010): 5.


51 Navy Personnel Command, "Joint Self-Nomination Clarification," *PERS-41 Quarterly Newsletter* 1, no. 2, (2nd Quarter, FY2010): 3. There is a complex process the officer must go through to self-nominate to receive credit for a joint tour and to qualify for certification of JPME Phase I or the Joint Qualified Officer. These qualifications are determined among all services at a joint level, rather than service by service. For more information on self-nomination as a Joint Qualified Officer, see the Navy Personnel Command Website, under Joint Officer, accessed via <https://www.npc.navy.mil/Officer/JointOfficer/JQS+Self+Nomination.htm>. (accessed 18 April 2010.)

Appendix A

PME Course Summary Sheet (25 Mar 2010)		
Total PME Enrollment		39,802
Total PME Graduates		5,170
Community Summaries		
Officer Enrollments (CWO2-O6):		6,827
Officer Graduates (CWO2-O6):		1,022
Enlisted Enrollments (E1-E9):		32,615
Enlisted Graduates (E1-E9):		4,095
Civilian Enrollments (All):		360
Civilian Graduates (All):		53
Officer Primary PME Course		
Total Enrolled (E1-O6 & CIV):		9,156
Total Graduates (E1-O6 & CIV):		1,249
<u>Officers</u>		
Total Enrolled (CWO2-O6):		6,827
Total Graduates:		1,022
<u>Enlisted</u>		
Total Enrolled (E1-E9):		2,161
Total Graduates:		195
<u>Civilian</u>		
Total Enrolled:		168
Total Graduates:		32
Enlisted Primary PME Course		
<u>Enlisted</u>		
Total Enrolled (E1-E9):		8,905
Total Graduates:		1,067
<u>Civilian</u>		
Total Enrolled:		80
Total Graduates:		11
Enlisted Basic PME Course		
<u>Enlisted</u>		
Total Enrolled (E1-E9):		12,310
Total Graduates:		1,134
<u>Civilian</u>		
Total Enrolled:		76
Total Graduates:		5

Enlisted Introductory PME Course		
<u>Enlisted</u>		
Total Enrolled (E1-E9):		9,239
Total Graduates:		1,699
<u>Civilian</u>		-
Total Enrolled:		36
Total Graduates:		5
* Population count based on combined AC/RC personnel as of 30SEP09		
* The number of course graduates reflects the number of graduates that are currently		
in DEERS with the same status they had when they completed the course.		

Appendix B



3

The Navy's PME Continuum 2009 (reprinted from "Statement of Rear Admiral J. P. Wisecup, U.S. Navy President of the U.S. Naval War College before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee War College Hearing", 04 JUN 2009)

This continuum encompasses all the PME requirements for both officers and enlisted. The goal is to begin the introduction and basic levels of PME before an officer's commissioning, followed up by the Primary PME completed during the first two to three years of service. This plan also gives flexibility for completing JPME Phase I in either a resident or non-resident course.

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