Making the Case for Multinational Military Doctrine

By JAY M. VITTORI

Significant global commitments, a dwindling overseas presence, and shrinking force levels suggest the United States will conduct most future operations in cooperation with its allies, friends, and coalition partners. Thus there is a need for multinational military doctrine. This article weighs two aspects of efforts to develop standard procedures. First, it looks at how existing joint doctrine deals with multinational issues. Second, it examines our experience in producing viable doctrine in an international context, with a focus on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

After the demise of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, military planners and doctrine developers shifted emphasis from superpower confrontation to regional instabilities. Since 1989 the United States has mounted major operations in Panama, Kuwait, Somalia, Turkey, Haiti, and Bosnia. Although not all can be classified as combined or multinational, each required some interface between our forces and those of other nations. Drawdowns coupled with global commitments have reinforced the demand for doctrine that can address cooperation not only among the Armed Forces but among allies and coalition partners. The joint doctrine development process has yielded more than 75 joint publications since 1991. Less well known, however, is the effort to standardize guidance for multinational military operations (MNOs).

The Boiler Plate

Joint doctrine began to concentrate on multinational activities in 1993. Joint Pub 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures (approved August 1993), was the first document to...
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contain a multinational preface which stated that it set forth

doctrine to cover the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations as well as the doctrinal basis for U.S. military involvement in multinational and interagency operations.

All subsequent publications, except for a few which appeared in late 1993, included that statement. It clearly indicates that joint doctrine should address pertinent multinational issues.

Of 56 volumes approved with this preface, 25 have specific sections dealing with MNOs. Some are exemplary, such as Joint Pubs 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations; 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations; 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations; 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense; 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare; and 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs. Three-quarters of all publications have substantive statements about multinational operations.

There seems to be an increase in the percentage approved with MNO content (see figure 1). While the total number for 1997 appears alarming, only three volumes were approved by mid-year. The proportion with substantive statements is growing, with 83 percent of the joint pubs approved in 1996 attempting to satisfy the requirements of the preface.

Unfortunately there is a flip side. A quarter of the total—some 15 titles—have no reference to MNO. Included are several key doctrine volumes produced in recent years: Joint Pubs 3-01.4, JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense; 3-01.1, Aerospace Defense of North America; 3-17, JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations; and 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.

While it may be argued that these topical areas do not warrant distinct multinational sections, it is difficult to believe any associated operations or functions will not interface with foreign partners. Also included on this list is the approved publication on interdiction, Joint Pub 3-03. Considering that interdiction efforts in the Gulf War, Turkey, and Bosnia all involved multinational forces, the publication’s lack of MNO doctrine is disconcerting. Discussion of it is scant in numerous other volumes. Of 51 studied, 28 had fewer than five substantive statements. Overall, statistics indicate that progress is ongoing, but many publications fall short of the preface requirement.

Development of the most significant publication on MNO, Joint Pub 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, began in 1994. The program directive called for addressing MNO as part of alliances, coalitions, and ad hoc arrangements and for including organizational structures, planning, and execution. The major audience for this tome is joint force commanders, component commanders, and the staffs which plan and execute MNO.

Writing was initiated at a conference hosted by the primary review authority, the National Defense University (NDU). Two drafts followed, the first written by NDU and the second by the Joint Warfighting Center. The subsequent coordination not only included the required reviewers but also service chiefs and combatant commanders. The few contentious issues included command and control of forces—foreign control of U.S. forces and airlift assets. But Joint Pub 3-16 has not fared well during final coordination. It appears the Air Force, Marine Corps, and possibly Navy will not concur. In the case of the Air Force the concern is over a section on space operations that was added.

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since the preliminary draft. The Navy and Marines dispute wording on relations among joint force commanders, airspace control authority, and area air defense commanders. None of the issues relate to multinational matters; rather, they replay age-old turf battles among the services.

When published Joint Pub 3-16 will be an "above-the-line publication." This refers to the distinction in the joint doctrine hierarchy between key doctrinal publications and subordinate supporting doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures publications listed below them. Joint Pub 3-16 tackles several issues. The most valuable doctrine relates to command and control (chapter II) which addresses the degree of control foreign commanders may exercise over U.S. forces, the role of multinational force commanders, and intricacies of multinational command and control structures. Another useful section is a commander's checklist for MNO (appendix A). However, it contains little groundbreaking information. For instance, the section entitled "Types of Multinational Operations" features a list that includes war and all military operations other than war. Moreover, the tenets of multinational cooperation are nothing more than common sense terms such as respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, and patience. Overall, Joint Pub 3-16 fulfills the requirements of the program directive and should be useful for commanders.

Do We Need More?

The multinational preface and program directive for Joint Pub 3-16 appear to be in conflict. If all joint doctrine is to provide a basis for U.S. military involvement in multinational operations, is there need for a separate tome on MNO? One may argue that there is nothing in Joint Pub 3-16 that cannot be parceled to other volumes. On the other hand, not all live up to their prefaces and thus leave gaps to be bridged in such volumes as Joint Pub 3-16. A compromise would allow it to exist until key MNO issues can be fully addressed by applicable publications.

Another problem has surfaced. The project proposal for Joint Pub 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations, won approval after heated debate among the services and commands. The argument centered on the alleged need for developing a separate specialized multinational logistics publication versus addressing the subject through revisions to existing joint logistics publications. The program directive for Joint Pub 4-08 declares that it "will describe the unique logistical aspects associated with multinational operations to include planning, coordination, execution, command and control, and deconfliction of logistics requirements." This notion is not a far cry from the multinational preface. Unfortunately, approval of Joint Pub 4-08 could establish a precedent for separate multinational doctrine and possibly spawn multinational publications on topics such as public affairs, meteorology, or intermodal containers. Thus it might behoove the Joint Staff through the Directorate of Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7)—particularly the joint doctrine working party—to reconsider Joint Pub 4-08.

U.S.-Ratified Procedures

Multinational doctrine also is developed through formal alliances, bilateral arrangements, and multilateral organizations. Some may be surprised to learn that such doctrine may take priority over approved joint doctrine. As stipulated within the multinational preface: Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (coalition or alliance) military command should follow multinational doctrines and guidance ratified by the United States.

For instance, if the United States participates in a NATO operation, it will do so in accordance with U.S.-ratified NATO procedures. Doctrine development with allies and coalition partners is a complicated process warranting close scrutiny and attention. In almost all cases, strategic movement will require integration with the movement, organizations, and capabilities of allies in international military organizations and/or coalition partners.

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doctrine. The international system primarily depends upon the services to take the lead. The Directorate for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7) is tasked only with monitoring doctrinal standardization and interoperability efforts and serving as the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for non-material, multinational operational activities save for those issues related to intelligence, special operations, security assistance, and command, control, communications, and computers.

Included in that instruction is guidance for U.S. involvement with multinational military doctrine development. Each service has a structure to manage standardization. For example, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs oversees the standardization program through its International Plans and Policy Division though most working party expertise for NATO doctrine is tasked through U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The Navy has transferred most of its doctrine-related tasksing for the international military standardization program from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Warfare Development Command. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, supervises standardization while the Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Center coordinates participation by that service. The Secretary of the Air Force has assigned responsibility for such matters to the Departmental Standardization Office which, in turn, delegates them to the Air Force International Standardization Office. Among myriad duties this office assigns senior representatives to working parties and panels and also monitors the doctrine ratification process.

NATO, the largest developer and user of multinational doctrine, has a complex process. Its various standardization bodies include the NATO Standardization Office, Conference of National Armaments Directors, NATO C3 Board, Senior NATO Logisticians Conference, and Military Agency for Standardization (figure 2).

The Military Committee is responsible for military standardization policy and the Military Agency for Standardization executes it. The latter has four boards—three service (army, naval, and air) and one joint to manage standardization in their areas of responsibility. The U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force have board representatives permanently assigned to NATO headquarters.

Working groups serve as focal points for assigned functional areas. The United States has at least one representative on each. More encompassing working groups require more delegates.

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**Figure 2. Selected NATO Standardization Activities**

In most scenarios, the combatant commander will be working with multinational forces in the prosecution of a conflict or military operations other than war. As such, it is imperative that full consideration be given to multinational concerns.

—Joint Pub 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense
For instance, the Interservice Air Operations Working Group has six to ten American delegation members, to include representatives from the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and various contractors. For the most part the services, not joint agencies, control U.S. involvement with NATO working groups.

It is through working groups that most standardization agreements (STANAGs) and allied publications (APs) are developed and approved. NATO currently has nearly 1,300 STANAGs and more than 350 APs. Few would qualify as doctrinal because they are procedural-level directives. STANAGs and APs are developed from study drafts, prepared by a custodial nation, and reviewed by member nations and commands. Members have the option to ratify the doctrine and may do so with reservations—stated qualifications describing the parts of the STANAG which a government chooses to implement either with or without limitations. When a sufficient number of nations have recommended ratification (usually eight), the STANAG is ratified.

Outside NATO, multinational military doctrine is developed through bilateral agreements and multinational organizations. Bilateral accords range from basic arrangements to encompassing bodies of doctrine like that developed for the Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command. A designated Joint Staff OPR works bilateral military agreements and coordinates with the services and unified commands. Numerous multinational organizations develop doctrine. Normally efforts are functionally organized and involve common national interests. For example, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States constitute the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC) and a naval counterpart (AUSCANNZUKUS), while the American, British, Canadian, Australian (ABCA) Armies Organization focuses on issues of interoperability among land forces. These organizations have established working parties which develop agreements and standards through processes similar to those used by NATO.

Through ratification members are able to implement publications or agreements by ensuring national procedures are aligned. For instance, when the United States subscribed to NATO ATP-56, Air to Air Refuelling, the Alliance expected our Armed Forces to incorporate the procedures in applicable publications. While it appears that ratified, internationally developed doctrine drives
our doctrine for related subjects, it frequently works the other way. CJCS Instruction 2700.01 asserts, “Once approved, joint doctrine provides the initial national position for multinational doctrine development.” Therefore, U.S. representatives must ensure that “entering arguments” for any new or revised doctrine are in accordance with established joint doctrine.

The Air Force has taken this a step farther in Air Force Policy Directive 60-1, Operations and Resources Standardization:

“The Air Force will not support the adoption of or ratify any standard that conflicts with national, international, or U.S. military practices, unless a peculiar military operational requirement exists, or a civil standard is unacceptable for military use. U.S. joint publications will be the basis of U.S. positions for developing, ratifying and implementing (international military standardization) agreements.”

While not codified as such by all services, this concept is the standard goal for U.S. working party delegates. Most allies understand this view yet may not agree. Our closest partners tend to study our doctrine, accept its strong points, and adeptly provide compromises for contentious areas.

The Backdoor Approach

If working party delegates and multinational doctrine reviewers carry out their prescribed duties, internationally developed doctrine should align with U.S. joint doctrine. Where conflicts arise delegates can propose changes. If differences are not resolved the United States could evoke nonratiﬁcation or reservations. With regard to recent improvements to NATO, ASCC, and ABCA publications, it appears that delegates and doctrine reviewers are fulﬁlling their responsibilities. Despite some infighting the services have cooperated in international doctrine forums. Delegations usually base discussions on established joint doctrine. Nonetheless problems exist, most relating to interservice squabbles and the lack of a strong central function to resolve such matters.

National Security Strategy Core Values: To enhance our security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and win. To bolster America’s economic prosperity. To promote democracy abroad.

One problem area stems from the policy allowing a service to apply its doctrine when no applicable joint doctrine exists or when single service issues are involved in multinational doctrine. While practical, this practice sometimes leads to “backdooring,” whereby a service is able to garner international concurrence on doctrinal concepts still under review in the United States and, in turn, use such agreement as leverage to gain approval for joint use at home. Another problem is that not all working parties have participants from every service. It is thus incumbent on the representing service to update other services on key issues. Poorly coordinated working party activities could result in another service not seeing a project until the ratification phase. With a central U.S. joint agency overseeing doctrine development efforts of major working parties, this backdoor approach could be reduced and all of the services would be better informed.

There is another major aspect of service involvement. A designated lead service or agency (often the former) is responsible for directing U.S. ratification. This is a questionable delegation of authority that can lead to difﬁculties. For instance, services may propose U.S. reservations in the ratification phase. While these recommendations should reﬂect established joint doctrine, there may be occasions where a joint precedent does not exist. Services may therefore have to fall back on their own doctrine. The complexity increases when a recommended reservation is disputed by one service. Based on CJCSI 2700.01, the lead service or agency should attempt to reach a resolution. Failing that the issue is forwarded to the Joint Staff for action. Most likely a representative of the Directorate of Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7) will serve as OPR for doctrinal matters. The process would be more efﬁcient if a designated joint agency was in control of ratification from the outset. Ratification is a national issue and should not be relegated to any one service.

Still another problem is distributing agreements and publications. Internationally developed doctrine tends to trickle down to the lowest levels. Unlike joint doctrine, it is distributed mostly by a pull down system: the user must request the item from a distribution ofﬁce. A document cannot be obtained unless customers are aware of it. Thus it is imperative for working party...
delegates to pass on the status of new or revised doctrine to users. Unclassified NATO STANAGs, ASCC air standards, and ABCA agreements are available through a single DOD point—the Defense Printing Office (DPO). Classified products and NATO APs must be ordered through service publication distribution systems. These distributors rely on timely receipt of new publications. Generally, this is a problem for NATO publications. An awkward system requires the doctrine custodian to pass new Alliance material, in turn, to the appropriate NATO board, the national representatives to that board, and national service/agency publications distribution systems.

Centralizing functions could eradicate some distribution problems. Ideally, the custodian should be able to send the document to a single U.S. distribution point responsible for notifying customers of its availability. Also, a single distribution agency eliminates each service maintaining the same publications. Under the current process, for example, Air Force publication distribution offices hold various land, naval, and amphibious operations publications in much the same way as other service centers maintain air-related documents. If DPO maintained classified documents and NATO APs, it would relieve the services of this responsibility by providing one-stop shopping for all internationally developed military doctrine.

By far the most critical problem area is the implementation process, the agreement made by a nation during ratification to enforce agreements by a given date. This may require a lead service or agency to introduce changes to a designated national doctrine. The ratified publication itself may be the implementing document, which usually occurs when there is no approved national doctrine. There is no established system to ensure that ratified agreements are properly implemented. If DPO maintained classified documents and NATO APs, the services would be responsible for maintaining the same publications. If DPO maintained classified documents and NATO APs, it would relieve the services of this responsibility by providing one-stop shopping for all internationally developed military doctrine.

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Internationally, U.S. doctrine developers have effectively represented their interests in the course of developing key military doctrine publications and agreements. Progress notwithstanding, some areas require attention, most relating to overall control. The lead service or agency appears to have too much responsibility. There should be one agency to control implementation, ratification, and distribution of internationally developed doctrine. As the single organization designated to monitor doctrinal standardization activities, the Directorate for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff, appears to be a logical choice.

The United States has made progress in incorporating MNO concerns into its joint doctrine. EXTERNALLY, U.S. doctrine developers have effectively represented their interests in the course of developing key military doctrine publications and agreements. Progress notwithstanding, some areas require attention, most relating to overall control. The lead service or agency appears to have too much responsibility. There should be one agency to control implementation, ratification, and distribution of internationally developed doctrine. As the single organization designated to monitor doctrinal standardization activities, the Directorate for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff, appears to be a logical choice.

**NOTES**

1 Multinational as applied to military doctrine is a relatively new term originated by a Pentagon staff officer who found it more appropriate than the universally accepted combined.

2 See final draft of program directive for Joint Pub 4-08, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations, Joint Staff Action J-7A 00892-96 (April 10, 1997).


4 Air Force Policy Directive 60-1, Operations and Resources Standardization, p. 3.

5 The Navy has a sophisticated push system which automatically distributes documents to designated users. The Air Force relies on a pull/push system which forces users to first establish their requirements before being placed on automatic distribution.

6 Government agencies or contractors may obtain copies of unclassified NATO, ASCC, and ABCA agreements and standards by calling DPO at (215) 687-2179 or DSN 442-2179/2667 or via FAX at (215) 697-2978 or DSN 442-2978.