

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: ACHIEVING BALANCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT WANES

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**AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES:
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ABSTRACT

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The ability of Afghanistan to provide its own security is the essential task to ensure successful development as a sovereign nation. As presently agreed through the London Accords, the growth of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to 171,600 soldiers and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to 134,000 police by the end of 2011 is an incorrect balance. To establish and sustain a security environment in the near future, the ANA should be developed to 188,000 soldiers and the ANP should be limited to 117,600 police by the end of 2011. Essential factors affecting the balance include: training capacity; organizational effectiveness and public perceptions of the ANA and the ANP; and the financial costs of manning and equipping the forces. Additional factors include the regional and domestic political environment, social dynamics within Afghanistan, and the impact of corruption within the government and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The international community and Afghanistan must readjust their efforts to balance the force structure between the ANA and the ANP by properly manning, training, and equipping the ANSF to achieve a better balance of capability to win the current counterinsurgency and provide lasting security for Afghanistan.

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: ACHIEVING BALANCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT WANES

The essential tasks of any central government are the security of its people, the provision of justice, and securing the opportunity for economic development. During a counterinsurgency, all three elements must be addressed simultaneously. While insurgents have a wide variety of motivations to engage in an insurgency, the governments they oppose have but one motivation and objective: the retention of political power. The government's manner of achieving that objective is based in part on the character of the government. Historically, totalitarian governments have tended toward massive force and excessive violence to suppress insurgencies. On the other hand, representative governments generally focus on reducing violence by using minimal force narrowly targeted against the insurgents. The intermediate objective of these representative governments is to move quickly from violent counterinsurgency into non-violent conflict resolution through a political process.

A representative government more easily achieves its counterinsurgency (COIN) security objective through employment of the correct quantity and mix of security forces. Determining and developing the optimum supportable mix of army and police forces is the challenge confronting the nascent representative government of Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, the current security force development plan forwarded through the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board (JCMB) and reaffirmed at the London Conference in January 2010 is to increase the size of the Afghan National Army (ANA) from its current strength of 112,800 soldiers to 171,600 and the Afghan National Police (ANP) from its current strength of 102,100 police to 134,000 by the end of 2011.¹ This

paper argues that this manpower distribution is imbalanced for the immediate and near future. The optimum balance to establish sustainable internal security in Afghanistan by the end of 2011 would be achieved by training a larger Army while simultaneously training and developing a smaller, but more professional, Afghan National Police force. The correct manpower distribution at the end of 2011 would be a force structure of 188,000 ANA and 117,600 ANP. To achieve this force structure balance while continuing necessary security tasks, the mission sets of both the ANA and the ANP must be appropriately adjusted. This paper argues the border security mission and structure of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) must be substantially refocused to the international points of entry to Afghanistan, and the principal agency for the protection of the territorial integrity of Afghanistan be constituted in the ANA.

Operational Challenges

Afghanistan is engaged in a typical modern counterinsurgency – a young government attempting to establish centralized control and provide services for a disparate population while opposed by an armed and violent insurgent force. Along with this counterinsurgency comes the additional challenge of having counterinsurgency forces too few and ill-prepared to provide essential security for a widely distributed and non-homogeneous population. Without sufficient indigenous security force development, the fledgling Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) will remain dependent on foreign support to conduct and sustain offensive counterinsurgency operations. This could cause the duration of the counterinsurgency effort to be unnecessarily extended, which would work against the GIROA.

The exhaustion strategy being pursued by the Taliban is summarized in the often quoted saying “Western forces may have the watches, but we have the time.”² The

outright loss of the present fight against this insurgent force with a potentially greater staying power is a very real possibility. Without a clear demonstration of support from the general population for the central government in Kabul, counterinsurgency efforts will ultimately fail because the international community will not continue to support a government or a population which will not commit itself to tangible and sustained improvement.

Although there are risks inherent in operations with security forces which are too few, having too many security forces presents many challenges as well. The direct economic cost to a developing nation of maintaining large security forces is significant, as are the indirect non-economic costs. These indirect costs include the redirection to the security forces of talented human capital which could be used effectively in other sectors of the government or the private economy. Additionally, once the counterinsurgency (COIN) fight is won, the reintegration of a large number of battle-hardened warriors into an underdeveloped civil society could sew the seeds of economic disruption and future insurgency. Historically, forty percent of post-insurgency countries resume conflict within a decade. In this regard, non-indigenous peacekeepers and robust domestic economic growth have proven more critical than political reform in preventing a return to conflict.³

The imbalance of the current plan for the development of the ANA and the ANP coupled with GIRoA's reliance on foreign security forces, presents several risks. Principally, the legitimacy of the Afghan government is at risk. Classically, the government should be the only entity entrusted by the population with the legitimate use of force. Over-dependence on foreign forces and reliance on local non-government

forces to provide essential security hampers perceptions of government legitimacy. The use of non-governmental forces creates a potential for the mutation of those forces into illegally armed groups (IAGs). Unfortunately, the Afghan government relied on just such groups for local enforcement of civil order in the past, which gives those groups the appearance of authority. However, to GIRoA's credit, these groups are now being reduced through the Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups program (DIAG).⁴

The structural imbalance of forces between the ANA and the ANP potentially creates the unintended consequence of strengthening the insurgency. Although, the ANA now enjoys a greater public perception of competency and legitimacy than does the ANP, the ANP have enjoyed a significant improvement in perception of the public in the past three years, with a vast majority of Afghans viewing the ANP as a competent force.⁵ This improvement in image, while a great success, still leaves the ANP lagging behind the ANA in overall Afghan public perception. Continuing the improvement of public opinion of both the ANA and ANP will strengthen the central government. There is a clear need to continue to enhance the public image of the ANP by improving its training and professionalism, since greater public confidence in the ANP would ultimately aid in providing long-term stability within the Afghan community.

Any unintended strengthening of the insurgency due to Afghan public perception also produces cascading effects in other areas. First, the forces and length of time required to defeat the insurgency will both increase. Secondly, the opportunity for Afghan economic development will be delayed or diminished by the diversion of limited national and international manpower and resources to military operations instead of economic development. Having inserted themselves into the local culture and created

alliances with traditional leaders, the insurgents can exploit a popular backlash against government intervention and increase local support for the insurgent agenda. This backlash is often the result of excessive or non-judicial government use of force resulting in non-combatant deaths, or government actions resulting in the death or capture of an insurgent who has become an accepted member of the community. David Kilcullen coined the term —Accidental Guerilla” to describe the unintended effects of kinetic counterinsurgency operations actually driving an otherwise unsympathetic local population to side with the insurgency.⁶

Narcotic trafficking provides key financial support to the insurgency and the livelihood of many local populations. Counterinsurgency operations have an economic impact on local communities. Without a suitable replacement for narco-based livelihood, government counter-narcotics and COIN operations could easily trigger Kilcullen’s accidental guerrilla syndrome. Although recent polling indicates that sixty five percent of Afghans do not support the production of opium, twenty five percent will continue to grow poppies unless they have a viable agricultural or economic substitute.⁷ Significant efforts through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are being made to substitute an economically viable cash crop while simultaneously eliminating narcotics as a key economic driver.⁸

Corruption in all Afghan government agencies, including the security forces, imposes additional costs on the government. Corruption is the deliberate use of official position for personal financial gain. Within Afghan culture, there is a tolerance for a certain level of corruption, often referred to as —~~an~~-fisted corruption.”⁹ This corruption is usually based on societal position, and is tolerated so long as expectations of

corresponding service or support are met. One accepted example is the collection of minor “fees” at local agency offices by government workers who need the money just to make ends meet. On the other hand, the collection of illegal transit “taxes” by police at impromptu roadside checkpoints is seen as abusive “~~to~~“fisted” corruption.¹⁰

Force Mix and Balance

Doctrinal Approaches. There are doctrinal and arithmetic means to calculate the notionally optimum police-army ratio for effective COIN. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine includes planning factors of relative force ratios with respect to population size.¹¹ Since counterinsurgency, as defined by doctrine, is primarily a law enforcement operation, logic would indicate that the size of police forces would necessarily be larger than that of the army.

Contrary to U.S. Army doctrine, a study conducted in 2009 by Center for Army Analysis (CAA) found that the correct balance of forces required to reduce the level of violence in a counterinsurgency are better calculated based on the violence of the insurgency (as expressed in the number of government forces killed) than on the size of the indigenous population. The greater number of government forces killed, the more violent and effective the insurgency and thus a greater counterinsurgency force is required. The CAA study also concluded: “~~the~~ determinants of police force size are many, with police-to-population ratios generally higher as wealth, population density, and political repression increase.” However, the relative ratio between army and police forces cannot be directly calculated: “War cannot be solved through equations. All that analysis can hope to do is provide useful insight and advice to leaders who are grappling with the complexity of real-world decisions.” Decisions on force structure

require professional judgment and insight – and local knowledge gained through experience.¹²

Assessing Afghan National Security Force Balance. Within the counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan, the ANP have suffered appreciably greater losses than the ANA. ANP losses since 2001 are three to five times greater than those of the ANA during the same time period.¹³ There are a number of reasons for this. The most significant reason is the misuse of the ANP to engage insurgents not in a police role, but as paramilitary infantry-like forces in a direct-combat role. Essentially, the ANP are involved in persistent low intensity conflict which far exceeds their ability to conduct high intensity policing – the task for which they have supposedly been trained and equipped to perform.¹⁴ The second major contributor to ANP losses is the lack of proper equipment given their mission and tactical environment, to include vehicles, radios, and weapons. The insurgents are equipped with crew-served weapons, rocket propelled grenades, mortars, improvised explosive devices (IED), and other highly-lethal, overmatching capabilities. This problem is not commonly faced by police forces in the rest of the world and thus international efforts to train and equip the ANP fail to consistently build ANP units capable of achieving COIN success in Afghanistan. A large portion of the ANP losses are suffered in the ABP, manning tiny remote border stations without a backup, reserve forces, or even direct communications with the next station. Further losses of this nature may be prevented by employing the ANA in border defense missions and focusing the ABP on missions controlling Afghanistan's international entry and exit points.

For Afghanistan, calculations relative to force structure and balance must also rely on an assessment of the strategic situation of the South Asia region, the current and anticipated future threats to Afghanistan, and Afghanistan's regional role. Moreover, achieving the correct balance of forces between the ANA and the ANP requires the consideration of a number of complex interactions within Afghan society bounded by current economic and political realities. Afghanistan is struggling to become a modern state while burdened with a war-ravaged economy and, after thirty years of combat, a war-weary population. It suffers from seventy percent illiteracy, and has never had a strong, durable and successful central government.¹⁵ Although significant economic potential exists in the long term, the economic base to sustain significant central government along with significant security forces will not be developed by the end of 2011.¹⁶ International political will to support the emergence of a modern Afghanistan will likely fluctuate and will probably decrease over time as donor nations face their own economic and political challenges.

Within the current ANSF growth plan published by the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan / Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (NTM-A / CSTC-A), the target objectives for the ANA are 134,000 soldiers by October 2010 and 171,600 soldiers by October 2011. Similarly, the target goals for the ANP are 109,000 police by October 2010 and 134,000 police by October 2011. This force balance of 171,600 ANA and 134,000 ANP by 2011 presents the fundamental imbalance and provides the wrong focus for the next eighteen months of force development. Critically, the strategic outcome of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan will be determined in those eighteen months – although the fighting will undoubtedly continue much longer.

The Afghan National Army. The ANA is responsible for protecting Afghanistan's territorial integrity, upholding and protecting the Constitution, defending national and Islamic values, and establishing a favorable environment for public welfare and progress.¹⁷ The ANA is presently structured with six corps ranging in size from 7,700 to 18,400 soldiers. The ANA intends to field a seventh corps of 6,800 soldiers in the summer of 2010. These seven corps, plus a commando brigade of 7,400 soldiers, will provide 89,200 soldiers in infantry-centric formations which are the essential combat power of the ANA.¹⁸ The remaining growth will occur in non-combat support, headquarters, administrative, and student/transient positions.

The principal combat unit of the ANA is the Kandak, roughly equivalent in size to a U.S. light infantry battalion. The Kandak is composed of either three or four infantry companies, with each company containing 500 soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers. There are currently eighty Kandaks fielded, with another thirty to be fielded by October 2010 under the current plan. In addition, there are fifteen brigade-level headquarters to be fielded in the same time frame. If built per the current plan, there will be seventy two infantry Kandaks, thirteen combat support Kandaks, twenty one combat service support Kandaks, and nineteen other units organized into twenty two brigades and twenty two general support units by October 2010.

The Afghan National Police. The ANP is organized and controlled by the Ministry of the Interior (MoI). The Afghan National Police

is primarily responsible to maintain civil order and law enforcement. The Police will work with the people to actively combat crime and disorder (including terrorism and illegal armed activity); prevent the cultivation, production and smuggling of narcotics; and fight corruption. The Police ensure the sovereignty of the State and protect its borders.¹⁹

The ANP is composed of a number of organizations subordinate to the Mol working in cooperation to achieve the overall policing mission. These organizations are the Afghan Civil Police (ACP) also referred to as the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) also known as the Afghan Gendarmerie (AG), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), the Afghan Anti Crime Police (AACP), and the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF).²⁰ As of 24 January 2010, the planned operating strength by October 2010 for the ANP will be 109,000.²¹

Manpower. To achieve these force structure goals, the ANA and ANP are relying on the same manpower pool. No formal census of Afghanistan has been completed since the 1979 Soviet invasion.²² While the size of the total military and police eligible manpower pool is therefore not precisely known, there are a number of recent estimations. The CIA Factbook on Afghanistan indicates there are roughly six million males and five million females within the security forces age demographic.²³ Assuming these demographic estimates are correct, and excluding females, the ANA will require roughly three percent of the eligible male population and the ANP will require two percent of that same eligible population. Ideal candidates for either force are: physically fit, literate, between the ages of seventeen and thirty five, with no (or limited) criminal record or ties to criminal or insurgent organizations, which further limits the available manpower. Together, this five percent of the eligible male population is a quantity that can be recruited and sustained without an adverse impact on the labor pool necessary to support economic development.

Unfortunately, within the security forces eligible population, the literacy rate is roughly forty eight percent.²⁴ This presents a significant challenge between the needs

of the ANA and the ANP. Arguably, the ANP has a greater need for general literacy in their daily law enforcement activities in support of the criminal justice system. The necessity to complete reports, take complaints, and understand the law requires a greater degree of literacy than the immediate need for literacy in an infantry-centric military force. Recruiting efforts should take these literacy requirements into consideration. Literacy training programs are essential to both the success of the ANA and ANP, but the focus should be on providing the ANP with a more literate initial recruit pool.

There is an additional demographic challenge when attempting to simultaneously meet the needs of both the ANA and the ANP. The ANA is mandated to reflect an ethnic composition similar to that of the national population in order to meet political objectives and to be reflective of the general population as the legitimate armed force of the Afghan nation.²⁵ This ethnic distribution objective presents a challenge when considering the ANA's diverse geographic areas of operation. Theoretically, the ANA could be expected to operate throughout the entire country, although, for practicality, the ANA is essentially geographically fixed. In contrast, police work is almost always local with the majority of the ANP policing in their native community. There is a logical benefit to having a local police force, but there are also detractors as well.²⁶ While local knowledge of the population and geography is often beneficial, personal relationships (familial, political, economic) may be exploited both by the criminal and the police officer. These informal relationships impose significant drawbacks to effective policing because they encourage corruption and often substitute personal loyalties for *ex officio* professional conduct.

While the ANA continues to meet aggregate recruiting goals for total numbers of soldiers, there is a critical shortage of volunteers from the Pashtun communities of southern Afghanistan.²⁷ This critical shortfall will not be met before the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF's) announced 2010 spring and summer offensives in the Kandahar region. However, efforts must continue to achieve ethnic composition objective for the long-term benefit of permanently basing ANA units in the southern regions.

The Training Base

The most important requirement and, unfortunately, among the greatest challenges facing the Afghan government and the international community, is the need to increase the throughput of the ANSF training base and the quality and depth of the training it provides. Without proper training, the ANSF will be ineffective and potentially counterproductive. The majority of training for both the ANA and the ANP is conducted by international forces through the NTM-A. The principal reason for this is the lack of institutional training capacity at a centralized national level. Training capacity at the national level existed prior to the Soviet invasion of 1979, but was never reestablished following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.

As currently manned, the ANA has 4,000 soldiers filling 5,300 dedicated institutional training positions. The ANP has over 200 police officers permanently assigned as police trainers. The majority of police trainers are provided by contractors as well as the international community through bi-lateral agreements.²⁸ In contrast, the international community, through both the NTM-A and multiple bi-lateral agreements, have 1,100 trainers filling 700 authorized positions training the ANA and 149 trainers filling 600 authorized positions training the ANP.²⁹ ANA training is conducted at several

centralized locations, including the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTTC), six Regional Basic Warfighter Training (RBWT) locations, the Afghan Defense University (ADU), the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA), the Kabul Military High School (KMHS), and the Consolidated Fielding Center (CFC). The ANP training infrastructure consists of the Afghan National Police Academy (ANPA) in Kabul and twenty six regional training facilities throughout Afghanistan. In these regional facilities, ACP training is conducted at nine locations, ANCOP / AG training is conducted in eight locations, ABP training is conducted at five locations, and there are ten training sustainment sites.

Recommendation

Rebalancing the Afghan National Security Forces. This paper's proposed rebalancing of the ANSF would result in a force structure of 188,000 soldiers in the ANA and 117,600 police in the ANP by the end of 2011 (see charts below). This rebalancing would result in an absolute growth of 65,220 soldiers in the ANA and 15,400 police in the ANP from the April 2010 composition.³⁰ However, the relative growth of the ANA vice the October 2010 planned strength of 134,000 is 54,000 and that of the ANP is 8,600. To effectively achieve these goals, the force structure must be grown logically and in the correct capability areas. For the next eighteen months, the fielding of infantry-centric formations in the ANA should continue to be the focus of capability development. On the other hand, the growth of the ANP should be focused on the ACP, and the ABP should be greatly reduced in force structure, based on a realignment of the border mission between the ANP and the ANA.

The Afghan National Army. The focus of growing the ANA should be the reconnaissance and security structure required to assume the border security mission

from the ABP. This paper recommends the growth of the ANA by 16,400 soldiers over the current NTM-A training plan. The development and deployment of five “Border Guard Brigades” assigned to those ANA corps adjacent to Afghanistan’s international borders would account for the majority of the proposed growth.³¹ These five brigades would be trained and equipped to perform military security missions along the Afghan border as part of their parent ANA corps.

The Afghan Border Police. The current command and control (C2) of border security between the ABP and the ANA is unwieldy and results in a lack of flexibility to provide security in border regions in a very dynamic environment and threat. To simplify command and control and to provide border security in the current high threat environment, certain border security functions (exclusive of the international air and ground entry points into and out of Afghanistan) should be reassigned from the ANP to the ANA. The intent of this realignment of responsibilities and forces is to enhance command and control, focus unit training, apply the properly trained force to the appropriate mission set, and improve the utilization of limited resources to achieve national objectives.

The ABP is structured with fifty two companies of roughly 18,000 personnel, to provide security and customs enforcement along the entire border of Afghanistan to a depth of fifty kilometers. The character of the ABP is one of a paramilitary organization, with both law enforcement and national defense duties. Current plans call for the growth of the ABP to a force of 28,200 personnel by October 2011. With the overall proposed reduction of the ANP, the ABP would absorb a 22,400 man reduction in strength along with a realignment of their mission to focus on designated border crossing points and

international entry points. The new design of the ABP would consist of 5,800 police focused on five of the eight specific missions currently assigned to the ABP:

- Control entry and exit of individuals at borders and international airports and ensure personnel have correct documentation
- Ensure the security of international airports and border crossing points
- Prevent all types of smuggling (weapons, ammunition, goods, drugs, historical artifacts, humans, etc.)
- Control the entry and exit of refugees and emigrants
- Cooperate with neighboring countries' police in accordance with agreed treaties³²

The reduction of 22,400 positions in the ABP would also give GIRoA the opportunity to select the highest performers and least corrupt officials to remain in the reduced ABP.

The 22,400 spaces taken from the ABP should be moved to the ANA and converted to partially establish the new Border Guard Brigade structure. These brigades would be aligned within the Corps, with responsibility for the border security assigned to the Corps Commander. Border Guard Brigades would be specifically trained and organized with a reconnaissance and security focus. The border guard brigade would assume responsibilities for the following tasks, outside the international entry points for which the ABP would retain control:

- Safeguard the national boundaries against external aggression
- Deter and counter insurgency and criminal activities within the Border Security Zone
- Take immediate action against incursions at the border

- Control the entry and exit of refugees and emigrants (limited to diverting those crossing the border at unauthorized crossing points to the authorized Border Crossing Points)
- Cooperate with neighboring countries' police in accordance with agreed treaties (ANP would also do this)³³

By aligning border security under the Corps commander, border incursions and violations can be met with sufficient coordinated force without complications of coordination between two independent agencies.

The Afghan Civil Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police / Afghan Gendarmerie, and Special Police forces. With the restructuring of the ABP and the reduction in the mission set, additional force structure increases in the other sections of the ANP will be possible. The greatest gain will be in the ACP/AUP by increasing their force structure from 69,600 to 74,600. This increase of 5,000 spaces will focus the policing mission where it will have the most impact – at the local level, where the ACP's daily interaction with the public is one of the most visible elements of the central government. Within the structure modification, an additional 600 special police would also be added to deal with corruption and narco-trafficking. Finally, it would be possible to form an additional 400-officer ANCOP / AG battalion to increase the flexibility of the Focused District Development (FDD) program.³⁴ A realignment of the ANP enablers to support these forces would be required, but would not result in an increase from their planned level of 16,000 personnel.

	2010 Targets	2011 Targets	Proposed	Remarks
ANA Total	134,000	171,600	188,000	
Combat Forces	93,544	121,578	137,978	Principally the Infantry Kandaks
ANA Air Corps	5,616	7,122	7,122	
Institutional Forces	24,989	29,393	29,393	These forces include headquarters, training base permanent personnel

Table 1. Planned and Recommended ANA Force Structure

	2010 Targets	2011 Targets	Proposed	Remarks
ANP Total	109,000	134,000	117,600	
ACP/AUP	62,297	69,600	74,600	
ABP	22,734	28,200	5,800	
ANCOP/AG	10,139	18,200		
ANP Special Police Forces	2,100	2,000		These police include the Afghan Anti-Corruption Police, Forensic Investigations, Counter Narcotics, Police Intelligence, Major Crimes Task Force, Counter-Terrorism, and Criminal Investigation police
ANP Enablers	11,725	16,000	16,000	Administrative personnel, instructors, supervisors, logistical support

Table 2. Planned and Recommended ANP Force Structure

Adjusting the Training Base. The immediate need to improve the training of the ANP is to expand the quality of the training base. There are six basic police courses, five leader training programs, nine specialized training programs and ten short or minor miscellaneous training programs. There are five national training contributors from the European Union (EU) and NATO. The current ANP training capacity for all programs is 13,200 students per year. Of this capacity, 1,700 training seats are dedicated to

training the ABP. With the recommended change in force structure of the ABP, this capacity could be significantly reduced to roughly 500 or less per year. For 2011, the anticipated training capacity for all programs will be 15,600 students. However, this training capacity is insufficient to address the root training problem within the ANP: attrition.

A review published in October 2009 by NTM-A indicated there was an excessive turnover rate within the ANP.³⁵ One of the leading factors was the poor and confusing training. Multiple training approaches taken by the EU and NATO trainers, the change in program leadership from the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to CSTC-A, the implementation of the FDD, and the different approaches used by police mentoring and training teams are all contributing factors to this confusion. Since the MoI has no training command, NTM-A is working a program toward a national level police training command, the Afghan National Police Training General Command (ANPTGC), with initial operating capability in September 2010 and full operational capability in 2011.³⁶ Until this command is established, the difficult task of developing unity of effort will continue to fall on the Combined Training Advisory Group – Police (CTAG-P) of NTM-A. The CTAG-P in itself is a young organization, established in October 2009. The development of the ANPTGC should be the priority effort of the MoI with respect to improving the ANP.

The expansion of the training base to meet the proposed objective of fielding 188,000 ANA soldiers is a significant, but not insurmountable, task. The present throughput of the Basic Warfighter Training (BWT) is 70,000 soldiers per year. The international community, through agreement of past commitments for both the Crisis

Establishment (CE) and Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), clearly expressed the political will to accomplish the ANA and the ANP training mission.³⁷ Furthermore, with the increased retention rate in the ANA and the experience gained in combat operations, there is a greater indigenous training force available from within the ANA which could be used to significantly expand the ANA's institutional training. Afghans training Afghans is the ultimate solution to a sustained and stable ANA in the future. As reaffirmed in the London Conference, NATO nations and other members of the international community must take immediate actions to fill the CJSOR and other commitments for the training of the ANA.³⁸

The physical limitations of the training facilities have yet to be reached – the shortcoming in training ANA soldiers is the size of the training cadre. Currently, the CJSOR for ANA training positions is filled at less than thirty percent of identified requirements.³⁹ By meeting these requirements, NATO would then advance the problem to one of physical infrastructure for the fielded Kandaks. The current throughput of the BWT courses increased from 40,000 per year in 2009 to 70,000 per year in 2010. However, the remainder of the professional development courses for the ANA, while often operating at capacity based on cadre strength, are not meeting the professional development needs of the ANA overall.⁴⁰

The current fill of the CJSOR for NTM-A is twenty six percent of the identified and agreed requirement. Approximately 1,700 training positions identified by the Commander of NTM-A and agreed by the NATO Defense Ministers remain vacant. An additional 814 personnel are required to completely man the NTM-A and CSTC-A headquarters positions not directly tied to the training mission. Without the commitment

of these additional personnel, meeting the October 2010 objective of producing 134,000 trained ANA soldiers will be difficult. Moreover, without these additional trainers and advisors, the proposed objective of this paper of fielding 188,000 trained and ready ANA soldiers by 2011 is almost certainly impossible. There is an option for the United States to “surge” troops to fill the CJSOR, but that is the least desirable method to meet NATO’s commitment to their Afghan partner.

The current NATO training concept for the ANA is “Accelerate, then Grow.”⁴¹ The focus is on accelerating the momentum of growth of the infantry Kandaks at the expense of “enablers” – combat support and combat service support organizations – within the ANA. Another part of the NATO approach is adopting the recommendation of a former commander of the Regional Corps Advisory Command-Central, Colonel Jeff Haynes, in terms of force structure. Haynes recommended that rather than growing the ANA with additional Kandaks, a better approach would be to grow the existing Kandaks by adding a company to each.⁴² This would enable future ANA operational success by resourcing existing senior leaders, rather than attempting to grow senior leaders overnight. They and their staff must be developed over time. It is much easier to identify, select, and train personnel with identified leadership potential to become part of a company level leadership team. NATO leaders within the ANSF training programs believe that most, if not all, Kandak commanders and staffs would be able to successfully absorb an additional company within existing Kandak headquarters and support structures.

Advantages

The proposed rebalancing of the force ratio between the ANA and ANP presents a number of benefits. First, it remains within the human capital requirements of the

current plan – roughly five percent of the eligible male population. Secondly, it capitalizes on the existing training capacity within the ANA and ANP training base. This balance allows greater training depth for the ANP, with an ability to focus on the most important element of the ANP – the Afghan Civilian Police. This increased training level would result in a more capable, yet smaller, police force interacting with the local population. Eventually, this will positively impact public perception and trust of the ANP and thereby accelerate the pace of growth of the rule of law in Afghan society. Third, rebalancing works in accordance with the popular perceptions of the Afghan people by growing an institution they believe in, the ANA, and strengthening an institution they perceive as weak and corrupt, the ANP. Fourth, the dramatic reduction in the ABP will also result in a dramatic reduction in the corruption encountered by travelers of all nationalities transiting the international frontiers of Afghanistan. By achieving success in these areas simultaneously, there will be a compounding effect – a reverse “accidental guerilla” phenomenon.

Disadvantages

The greatest obstacle to this proposal is the transfer of the bulk of the border security mission to the ANA and the requisite force structure and training development for this mission set. Culturally, the border security mission may be perceived by ANA leadership as a police function, rather than an appropriate mission of the ANA. To be successful, this will place significant pressure on the civilian and military leadership to change. The second greatest challenge is overcoming the disunity of command in the training of the ANP. Establishing the training command within the MoI will be a difficult task. The third greatest challenge is the equipping component of the “Train, Equip, Advise” approach. Afghanistan is totally reliant on donor nations for the modern

equipment. Current efforts to equip and arm the present agreed ANA structure are behind schedule, and equipping the ANP structure is significantly behind schedule. Additional fixed infrastructure to house, train, and maintain the larger ANA structure will be required. The ANA will not be able to simply occupy and utilize existing ABP border infrastructure because it is ill-suited for military operations.

Implementation

President Obama announced a change in US strategy in Afghanistan in December 2009. After that announcement, the first opportunity for the international community to react favorably to the upcoming changes in the US approach through realignment of ANSF force goals and integrated international troop commitments was the January 2010 London Conference. Unfortunately, the international response fell short of both US expectations and Afghan requirements.

Since January, the government of the Netherlands has collapsed over the issue of continued Dutch support for troop commitments in Afghanistan.⁴³ Similar challenges to the governments of troop contributing nations are likely to adversely affect the mission in Afghanistan. If, as expected, international support for the mission in Afghanistan wanes, it is imperative that the international community act now, in concert with GIRoA, to more rapidly grow a balanced, competent, and professional security force for Afghanistan. The first step in this process would be the endorsement of the changes in force structure goals, mission sets, and training capacity advocated in this paper. If adopted and adequately supported, these changes will provide Afghanistan and its people a significantly greater chance to achieve sustained stability and economic growth – the acknowledged keystones to effective counterinsurgency.

GLOSSARY

AACP	Afghan Anti-Corruption Police
ABP	Afghan Border Police
ACP	Afghan Civil Police – formerly the AUP
ADU	Afghan Defense University
AG	Afghan Gendarmerie
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANCOP	Afghan National Civil Order Police – precursor to the AG
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANPA	Afghan National Police Academy
ANPTGC	Afghan National Police Training General Command
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AUP	Afghan Uniformed Police – precursor to the ACP
BWT	Basic Warfighter Training
C2	Command and Control
CAA	Center for Army Analysis, United States Army
CE	Crisis Establishment
CFC	Consolidated Fielding Center
CJSOR	Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
CTAG-P	Combined Training Advisory Group – Police
DIAG	Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups
EU	European Union
FDD	Focused District Development
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IAG	Illegally Armed Groups
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JCMB	Joint Coordination Monitoring Board
KMHS	Kabul Military High School
KMTC	Kabul Military Training Center
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMAA	National Military Academy of Afghanistan
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan
RBWT	Regional Basic Warfighting Training
RFF	Request for Forces
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Endnotes

¹ NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan / Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan, “Command Update,” briefing slides with speaker notes, Kabul, Afghanistan, April 8, 2010, slide 8. Further reference to NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan / Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan will be abbreviated NTM-A / CSTC-A.

² Anand K. Sahay, “Remember the Kabuliwallaha?,” February 9, 2008, http://www.tehelka.com/story_main37.asp?filename=Ne090208remember_the.asp (accessed April 17, 2010).

³ Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2007). Cited in *A Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict Countries*, U.S. Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C., January 2009), VII.

⁴ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Office of National Security Council. *National Security Policy*. Kabul, Afghanistan: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2009-2010, pg 6.

⁵ ABC News, BBC, and ARD, “ABC News-BBC-ARD National Survey of Afghanistan,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_01_10_afghanpoll.pdf (accessed 17 April 2010).

⁶ David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla, Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009 (electronic version for Sony Reader device), pg 131-133.

⁷ ABC News, BBC, and ARD, “ABC News-BBC-ARD National Survey of Afghanistan,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_01_10_afghanpoll.pdf (accessed 17 April 2010).

⁸ USAID, “Agriculture Sector Profile,” Fall 2009, linked from the USAID Afghanistan webpage at “Programs”, <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Program.19.aspx> (accessed April 19, 2010).

⁹ Lewis G. Irwin, “Reforming the Afghan National Police,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 52 (1st Quarter 2009): 72. “Added to this challenging mix was the fact that corruption is an entrenched feature of Afghan culture, where “one-fisted” corruption—or theft perpetrated to feed one’s family or tribe—is viewed as just another routine feature of life.”

¹⁰ Ernst Leonardo and Dr. Lawrence Robertson, *Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 1 March 2009), 8.

¹¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, December 15, 2006), pg 1-13

¹² Steven M. Goode, “A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency,” *Parameters* XXXIX, no 4 (Winter 2009-2010): 45; 56.

¹³ International Crisis Group, “Reforming Afghanistan’s Police,” August 30, 2007, Asia Report Number 138, pg 14, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/138_reforming_afghanistan_s_police.ashx (accessed April 19, 2010).

¹⁴ John Sullivan and Adam Elkus, "Toward Operational Art for Policing," July 24, 2009, <http://www.groupintel.com/2009/07/24/toward-operational-art-for-policing/> (accessed April 17, 2010). High intensity policing is described as "a constellation of complex problems such as counterterrorism, transnational organized crime, and gangs."

¹⁵ NTM-A / CSTC-A "The Strategic Main Effort," briefing slides version 3, Kabul, Afghanistan, March 21, 2010, slide 5.

¹⁶ USAID, "Economic Growth," Fall 2009, linked from the USAID Afghanistan webpage at "Programs", <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Program.22.aspx> (accessed April 19, 2010).

¹⁷ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Interior, Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy. "Afghan National Police Strategy." Kabul, Afghanistan: Islam Republic of Afghanistan, January 2010, page 13.

¹⁸ The Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAAC) will have another 5,600 soldiers organized in three air wings and four air operations detachments. The institutional ANA will consist of 3,400 Ministry of Defense / General Staff personnel, 22,200 soldiers serving on intermediate staffs, and 1,550 soldiers serving in sustaining institutions. The final 12,000 soldiers of the 134,000 targeted force structure of October 2010 are trainees, transients, holdovers, and students.

¹⁹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Interior, Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy. "Afghan National Police Strategy." Kabul, Afghanistan: Islam Republic of Afghanistan, January 2010, page 11.

²⁰ Ibid, page 23.

²¹ NTM – A / CSTC – A , "ANSF Force Structure Growth," briefing slides, Kabul, Afghanistan, January 24, 2010. The total is broken down within the major police organizations as follows: the ACP structure is 62,297, the ANCOP structure is 10,139, the ABP structure is 22,734, the AACCP structure is 2,105. There is also a structure for 11,725 "enablers" to complete the total end-strength of the ANP.

²² CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> (accessed April 19, 2010).

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ NTM – A / CSTC – A , "The Strategic Main Effort," briefing slides version 3, Kabul, Afghanistan, March 21, 2010, slide 5.

²⁵ Walter Pincus, "To Bolster Afghan Ranks, U.S. Encourages Ethnic Balance, Pay Raises," <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/22/AR2010022204509.html> (accessed April 19, 2010).

²⁶ "Rich Contextual Understanding Quick Look: Afghan National Versus Local Police," linked from Pakistan Afghanistan Coordination Cell (PACC) website, <http://community.apan.org/pacc/m/mediagallery/11112.aspx> (accessed April 19, 2010).

²⁷ Walter Pincus, "To Bolster Afghan Ranks, U.S. Encourages Ethnic Balance, Pay Raises," <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/22/AR2010022204509.html> (accessed April 19, 2010).

²⁸ NTM-A / CSTC-A –ANP Training Programs," briefing slides, November 28, 2009, slide 9. Coalition training sites: German Police Training Center at Mazar-e-Sharif; German Police Training Center in Feyzabad; German Police Training Center in Konduz; Turkish Police Training Center in Wardak Province; Czech Republic Police Training Center, Logar Province; United Kingdom Police Training Center in Helmand Province; Netherlands TSS in Tarin Kwot, Uruzgan Province.

²⁹ Combined Training Advisory Group – Police (CTAG-P), NTM-A, Brigadier General Carmelo Burgio, briefing slides on the CTAG-P, Kabul, Afghanistan, March 22, 2010, slide 15.

³⁰ NTM – A / CSTC – A, –NTM-A Command Brief," briefing slides, Kabul, Afghanistan, January 24, 2010.

³¹ The term Border Guards Brigade is the invention of the author. No such formation currently exists in the ANSF.

³² Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Interior, Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy. "Afghan National Police Strategy." Kabul, Afghanistan: Islam Republic of Afghanistan, January 2010, pg 26-27.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ –Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act," June 2009, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/1230_June%20AD2009Final.pdf. Focused District Development (FDD) is a comprehensive program divided into six phases for assessing, training, and validating district AUP units. The program began in late 2007. Each phase includes units between seven and 11 AUP units. Fifty-two police districts out of a total of 365 districts in Afghanistan are currently enrolled in the Focused District Development (FDD) program. To date, selection of FDD districts has focused on districts in the south and east, near the Ring Road.

³⁵ –Rich Contextual Understand Quick Look: ANSF Retention Paper," linked from Pakistan Afghanistan Coordination Cell (PACC) website, <http://community.apan.org/pacc/m/mediagallery/1820.aspx> (accessed April 19, 2010).

³⁶ NTM-A / CSTC-A –ANP Training Center Overview," briefing slides, March 18, 2010, slide 17.

³⁷ From NATO publication AAP-6 (2010), Crisis Establishment is a table setting out the authorized redistribution of manpower and augmentation of personnel for a unit, formation or headquarters under crisis conditions. The Combined Joint Statement of Requirements is the NATO equivalent of the U.S. Request for Forces (RFF) document whereby forces and capabilities required for a particular operation are defined for the purposes of resourcing.

³⁸ London Conference Communique, January 28, 2010, <http://afghanistan.hmg.gov.uk/en/conference/communique/> (accessed April 19, 2010).

³⁹ NTM – A / CSTC – A, “NTM-A Command Brief,” briefing slides, Kabul, Afghanistan, January 24, 2010.

⁴⁰ NTM-A / CSTC – A, “Weekly Training Status Slides” briefing slides, April 9, 2010, MAJ Michael Herrera, e-mail to author, April 13, 2010.

⁴¹ NTM – A / CSTC – A, “Growth of the ANSF,” briefing slides – version 4, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 20, 2009.

⁴² Haynes, Jeff. “Reforming the Afghan National Army (ANA).” *Foreign Policy Research Institute*. November 2009. www.fpri.org/enotes/200911.haynes.reformingafghannationalarmy.html (accessed January 18, 2010).

⁴³ David Batty and agencies, “Dutch Government Collapses After Labour Withdrawal from Coalition,” February 20, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/20/dutch-coalition-collapse-afghanistan> (accessed April 17, 2010).

