

# HANDBOOK

No. 10-41

May 10



## Assessment and Measures of Effectiveness in Stability Ops

*Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*



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


### Foreword

Accurate assessment and usable measures of effectiveness are essential to success in stability operations. Improving the ability of a host nation (HN) government to deliver services expected by its populace is necessary to enhance the stability of a society, maintain the legitimacy of its HN government, and to allow the HN government to “out administer” local insurgency groups. Correctly identifying what the local population expects from its HN government is fundamental to developing plans and operations that will build HN government capacity, social stability, and undermine threats to the HN government and civilian populace like social instability or violent insurgency. The daunting tasks of identifying and crafting responses to the causes and consequences of weak or failed states require organized and methodical programs with accurate, measureable and verifiable results. In recent and current operations, the U.S. military and its interagency partners have been required to manage substantially increased levels of assistance to assist and ensure success of legitimate governments. In this complex environment, companies, battalions, brigade combat teams, divisions, and corps will perform assessments and collect data. Assessment framework allows for a common operational picture shared by U.S. military and government departments and agencies in the area of operations (AO). Knowing the fundamentals and purpose of assessments is key to providing quality products to assist campaign planning and support decision making. Listed below are some key points for success:

- Know the AO, the people, and their customs.
- Determine the perceptions of the local populace and understand how to influence those perceptions.
- Know the history, government, and economic challenges.
- Know the causes of instability.
- Know or develop the plan to correct these causes and prevent their return.
- Know how to measure effectiveness, analyze results, and adjust plans if necessary.

- Know how to collect and organize data.
- Understanding by military leaders is not enough—everyone needs to understand. Military leaders need to use a framework, a system, processes, and structures to enact this understanding.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'T. J. Murphy', is positioned above the printed name.

THOMAS JOSEPH MURPHY  
COL, FA

Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned

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## **Chapter 1**

### **Assessment in Stability Operations**

“This is a political as well as a military war . . . the ultimate goal is to regain the loyalty and cooperation of the people. It is abundantly clear that all political, military, economic, and security (police) programs must be integrated in order to attain any kind of success.”

—General William C. Westmoreland, Commander,  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV),  
MACV Directive 525-4, 17 September 1965

#### **The Necessity of Assessment**


Today’s adversary is a dynamic, adaptive foe who operates within a complex interconnected operational environment (OE). In recent and current operations the United States (U.S.) and coalition partners combated global terrorism in a number of regions. Stability operations are a key component of the U.S. national strategy to defeat terrorism. Within the U.S. government, the complex nature of stability operations resulted in the increased level of cooperation between the Department of Defense (DOD) and other U.S. government agencies. The goals of stability operations are stated in DOD Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, 16 September 2009:

4.d The Department shall assist other U.S. government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, and international governmental organizations in planning and executing reconstruction and stabilization efforts, to include:

- (1) Disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former belligerents into civil society.
- (2) Rehabilitating former belligerents and units into legitimate security forces.
- (3) Strengthening governance and the rule of law.
- (4) Fostering economic stability and development.

#### **The Purpose of Assessment in Stability Operations**

The process of assessment and measuring effectiveness of military operations, capacity building programs, and other actions is crucial in identifying and implementing the necessary adjustments to meet intermediate and long term goals in stability operations. As time passes and operations, programs, actions, and activities become effective, local institutional and societal capacity will increase and the drivers of conflict and instability will be reduced, meeting the goal of passing the lead to local authorities (see Figure 1-1).



**Figure 1-1. Example of stability operations assessment**

The fusion of traditional military operations and capacity building programs of U.S. government agencies like the U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development are required to meet the challenges of restoring and enhancing stability in troubled areas and regions. Accurate and timely assessment of military operations and the actions of U.S. government departments and agencies are vital to the success of stability operations.

DoDI 3000.05, 16 September 2009, states the following:

4.a Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the DOD shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. The DOD shall be prepared to:

- (1) Conduct stability operations activities throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including combat and noncombat environments. The magnitude of stability operations missions may range from small-scale, short-duration to large-scale, long-duration.



## **MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS**

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(2) Support stability operations activities led by other U.S. government departments or agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as “U.S. government agencies”), foreign governments and security forces, international governmental organizations, or when otherwise directed.

(3) Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations. In such circumstances, DOD will operate within U.S. government and, as appropriate, international structures for managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the deployment and utilization of the appropriate civilian capabilities.


Since most stabilization operations occur in less developed countries, there will always be a long list of needs and wants like schools, roads, health care, etc. in an area of operations (AO).

Given the chronic shortage of U.S. government personnel and resources, effective stability operations require an ability to identify and prioritize local sources of instability and stability.

The focus is on the perceptions of the local populace, what those perceptions are, and how to positively influence those perceptions. Stability operations require prioritization based on progress in diminishing the sources of instability or building on sources of stability.

For example, if U.S. government personnel believe access to information about Western culture will undercut insurgent recruiting and provide a village with an Internet café, but the village elders tell the U.S. personnel they want more water—the village is not being efficiently or effectively stabilized. By ignoring the village elders, U.S. government personnel undermine the legitimacy of the village elders within their own population, and undermine the elders’ ability to maintain some semblance of order, thereby contributing to the instability. Access to information about the rest of the world via the Internet café may create a rising tide of expectations that cannot be met by the village elders or the host nation government. There may be disputes over access to the Internet café or excessive use of it by some villagers at the expense of others. Again, the U.S. government’s desire to make things better and to share technology with others can lead to more, not less instability. Understanding the causal relationship between needs, wants, and stability is crucial, and in some cases are directly related, and in others they are not.

**The Role of Assessment in the Operations Process**



**Figure 1-2. Assessment changes as a situation evolves**

Assessment supports the operations process by charting progress and changes in an evolving situation (see Figure 1-2).

Assessment allows for the determination of the impact of events as they relate to overall mission accomplishment. Assessment provides data points and trends for judgments about progress in designated mission areas. In turn, it helps the commander determine where adjustments must be made to future operations.

Assessment assists the commander and his staff keep pace with an evolving situation. Assessment in the commander's decision cycle assists in understanding a changing environment and in focusing the staff to support critical decisions and actions.

**Types of Assessment**

Traditionally in military operations, combat assessment focuses on the results of military action. Combat assessment uses image intelligence and signals intelligence to determine the enemy’s rate of attrition. In stability operations, this is explained through the complexities of operations and political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time (PMESII-PT) systems. The two basic types of assessment in stability operations are task assessment and effects assessment.

Task assessment:

Measures of performance (MOPs) are based on task assessment. Simply put, a task assessment is how well were tasks accomplished. Task assessment measures whether the organization performed its required tasks to the necessary standard. Agencies, organizations, and military units will usually perform a task assessment to ensure work is performed to standard and/or contractual obligations. Task assessment has an effect on effects assessment as tasks not performed to standard will have a negative impact on effects (see Figure 1-3).

**Task Assessment**

***“Are We Doing Things Right?”***


<u>Characteristics</u>	<u>Example</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>•Based on MOPs</li><li>•Measures task accomplishment</li><li>•Normally assessed by task organization</li></ul>	<p>Task: Install additional power relay station on electrical grid</p> <p>MOP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>•Is the relay station installed?</li><li>•Is it operational?</li></ul>

Figure 1-3. Task assessment

Effects assessment:

Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are based on effects assessment. Effects assessment is defined as the process of determining whether an action, program, or campaign is productive and persuasive and achieve desired results in stability operations. There are several visualization tools that can be used as a basis of assessment. These tools: PMESII-PT; and mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) are illustrated in Figure 1-4.

In the Army planning process, one of the six mission variables in METT-TC is civil considerations. Civil considerations tactical planning concentrates on an in-depth analysis of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). However, at both the tactical and operational levels, PMESII-PT provides a basis for looking at the OE.



**Figure 1-4. Operational and mission variables**

Effects assessment assesses those desired effects required to affect the adversary's behavior and capability to conduct and/or continue operations and/or actions. Effects assessment is a much broader, more in-depth, and overarching analysis of the adversary, situation, and friendly actions than traditionally seen in combat assessment (see Figure 1-5).

Rarely are military operations conducted in uninhabited areas. ASCOPE is a memory aid to organize civil considerations in Army planning. ASCOPE helps to categorize the man-made infrastructure, civilian institutions, attitudes, and activities of the civilian population and their leaders.

**MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS**

<i>Area</i>	<i>Structure</i>	<i>Capabilities</i>	<i>Organizations</i>	<i>People</i>	<i>Events</i>
Tribe	Cemeteries	Waste Water Sewer	Tribal	Cell Phones	Weddings
Families/Clans	Religious Shrines	Potable Water	Families/Clans	Political Speeches	Birthdays
Ethnic Enclaves	Houses of Worship	Electrical	Religious Organizations	Meetings	Religious Gatherings
Religious Enclaves	Bars/ Tea Shops	Trash Collection and Disposal	Ethnic Organizations	Media/TV/Radio	Funerals
Economic Districts	Social Gathering Places	Medial Services	Unions	Newspapers/ Magazines	Major Religious Events
Smuggling Routes	Print Shops	Police Public Safety	Community Organizations	Visual, Graffiti / Signs	Anniversaries
National Boundaries	Internet Cafes	Markets and Consumer Goods	Militia Units	Rallies / Demonstrations	Holidays
Social Classes	Television	Employment and Commerce	Illicit Organizations	Restaurants	Harvests
Political Districts	Radio Stations	Crime and Justice	Gangs	Door to Door	Town or Provincial Government Meetings
Military Districts	Hospitals	Basic Needs	Insurgent Groups Business Organizations	Internet	Elections
School Districts	Banks	Public Health	Police Organizations	Markets	Sporting Events
Road System	Dams	Jobs and Employment	Police Organizations	Sports	
Water Sources	Bridges	Religion	Nomads	Religious Gatherings	
Water Coverage	Police Stations	Refugees and Displaced Persons	Refugees and Displaced Persons	Parks / Town Squares	
Water Districts	Gas Stations	Political Voice	Government Agencies	Family Gatherings	
Construction Sites	Military/ Police Barracks	Civil Rights and Individual Rights	Volunteer Groups	Lines for Purchasing Gasoline	
Gang Territory	Courthouses Jails		Inter Governmental Organizations	Bars/ Tea Shops	
Safe Areas Sanctuaries	Oil and Gas Pipelines		Political Organizations	Food lines	
Trade Routes	Water Pumping Stations		Contractors	Job Lines	
Power Grids	Water Lines		Non Government Organizations		
	Power Lines				
	Power Plants				

**Figure 1-5. ASCOPE matrix example**

The results of effects assessment must be organized and measured so progress can be tracked and trends and patterns determined over time (see Figure 1-6).

<b>Effects Assessment</b>	
<b><i>“Are We Doing the Right Things?”</i></b>	
<p><b><u>Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Based on measures of effectiveness (MOEs)</li> <li>•Measures effects attainment                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ May be subjective</li> <li>➤ Trends and patterns</li> <li>➤ Addresses all lines of operation/effort</li> </ul> </li> <li>•Assessed at the tactical and operational levels</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Example</u></b></p> <p><b>Effect: Country X establishes security in Region Y</b></p> <p><b>MOE:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Increase/decrease in violent demonstrations</li> <li>•Increase/decrease in insurgency activities</li> <li>•Increase/decrease in anti-U.S. rhetoric from leadership</li> </ul>

Figure 1-6. Effects assessment

It is important not to confuse task assessment (MOP) and effects assessment (MOE). The MOP is what the unit or agency does. The MOE is a measure of the effect the action has. Too often, effect and output are used interchangeably. However, they measure very different things. MOE indicators measure the effectiveness of activities against a predetermined objective. MOE indicators are crucial for determining the success or failure of stability programming. Well-devised MOEs and MOPs help commanders and their staffs understand the links between tasks, end state, and lines of effort. MOEs and MOPs have four common characteristics listed below:

- Standards should be measurable. MOEs and MOPs require qualitative or quantitative standards or metrics that can be used to measure them.
- Measurements should be distinct and discrete. MOEs and MOPs must measure a distinct aspect of the operation. Excessive numbers of MOEs or MOPs become unmanageable and risk the cost of collection efforts outweigh the value and benefit of assessment. The key is visualizing the goal and identifying the simplest and most accurate indicator of it.

## **MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS**

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- Measurements should be relevant. MOEs and MOPs must be relevant to tactical, operational, and strategic objectives or the desired end state.
- Measurements should be responsive. MOEs and MOPs must identify changes quickly and accurately enough to allow commanders to respond quickly and effectively.

The three elements of effects assessment are listed below:

- Effective effects assessment should ask “What happened?” This is the analysis of the collected data, and observations of MOEs. The data is collected and organized into presentable forms and formats. Trends and patterns are identified.
- Effective effects assessment should ask “So what? Did it make a difference in the OE.” This phase determines whether the stated goals are being met.
- Effective effects assessment should ask “What do we need to do?” Options include:
  - Continue current operations, actions, and programs if they are successful.
  - Reprioritize operations, actions, programs, or resources. Make adjustments to current operations or programs to increase goal attainment or enhance success.
  - Redirect operations, actions, programs or resources. Are major changes needed to meet goals (see Figure 1-7)?




Figure 1-7. Assessment



For example, if the lack of support for the police is identified as the biggest source of instability in your AO, the stabilization objective would be to increase support for the police. MOE indicators could include improved public perception of the police, the population providing more actionable information to the police, and increased police interaction with the population. With MOEs, outcome—not output—is the only measure of success. Figure 1-8 contrasts the difference between the task and effects assessments.

<b>Effects Assessment vs. Task Assessment</b>	
<b><u>Effects Assessment</u></b>	<b><u>Task Assessment</u></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Conducted at all levels</li><li>• Informs planning</li><li>• Based on MOE</li><li>• Answers the questions: Where we are? (Effects) Are we doing the right things?</li><li>• Assesses effect attainment</li><li>• Task assessment has an indirect impact on effects assessment</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Conducted at all levels</li><li>• Informs planning</li><li>• Based on MOP</li><li>• Answers the questions: How did we do? (Tasks) Are we doing things right?</li><li>• Assesses accomplishment of tasks</li></ul>

Figure 1-8. Effects versus task assessment

The entire process from the input of MOEs and MOPs is illustrated in Figure 1-9.




Figure 1-9. The assessment process

The deficiency analysis is conducted when goals and objectives are not being met. The deficiency analysis is used if the task assessment and effects assessment indicate failure of units doing things right (MOP), or are not doing the right things (MOE). The deficiency analysis will illustrate what is wrong and provide input during the plan refinement stage.

The next step is a recommendation for refinement of the plan based on the conclusions of the deficiency analysis. This recommendation will also consider if the current forces available have the required capability the adjusted plan will call for. If not, other courses of action or a request for additional forces may be necessary.

**Note:** Objectives and effects are illustrated in the sample stabilization matrix in Appendix B.

## Chapter 2

### Assessment Support to Military Planning

#### The Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning Framework

Assessment must be built into military planning and decision making in stability operations. A method to integrate assessment into operational and tactical planning is to include the tactical conflict assessment and planning framework (TCAPF) from Appendix C, of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) *Principles for Reconstruction* in Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations*.

Successful stability operations are predicated on (1) identifying and reducing the causes of instability and (2) reestablishing or building community and state capacity to diminish, manage, or prevent them in the future. To increase the effectiveness of stability operations, USAID created the TCAPF. The TCAPF was designed to assist commanders and their staffs identify the causes of instability, develop activities to diminish or mitigate them, and evaluate the effectiveness of the activities in fostering stability in a tactical-level (brigade, battalion, or company) area of operations (AO). The TCAPF should be used to create local stabilization plans and provide data for the interagency conflict assessment framework (ICAF), which has a strategic- and operational-level (country, regional) focus.

It is important to note, that while the TCAPF may appear to be a distinct process from the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and the eventual operation plan or operation order, but the TCAPF is merely the socio-political input to the decision making process. It provides input current intelligence methods/processes do not produce, and should thus be seen as an important component of the MDMP because the TCAPF supports MDMP.




Figure 2-1

### Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework Support to the Military Decisionmaking Process

The TCAPF supports the MDMP by providing what constitutes a mechanism for the commander and his staff to see how their plan is achieving goals, objectives, and end state. The TCAPF can also help identify causes of instability and place possible solutions against these causes.

The TCAPF will also help determine the measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and organize data into understandable formats to measure success. The TCAPF can also do the same with measures of performance (MOPs).

The TCAPF will measure the impact of programs and actions to assist the planners by recommending required changes.

To be effective, the TCAPF methodology must be integrated into staff processes. If it is only an “add-on,” it will not be effective. The TCAPF has been successfully used in various theaters to identify, prioritize, and target the causes of instability in a measurable and immediately accessible way. Since it makes maximum use of assets in the field and measures the effectiveness of activities over time and

across multiple unit rotations, it is an important tool for conducting stabilization operations.

The TCAPF is an assessment tool based on the following theory:

Perceptions of the population cause actions that instigate instability and foster insurgency. By carefully targeting the real causes of instability, perceptions of the population can be positively affected.

### **The Causes of the Insurgency**

Revolutionary situations may result from regime changes, external interventions, or grievances carefully nurtured and manipulated by unscrupulous leaders. Sometimes societies are most prone to unrest when the situation begins to improve and people's expectations rise. For example, when major combat operations conclude people may have unrealistic expectations of the U.S.' capability to improve their lives. The resulting discontent can fuel unrest and insurgency. At such times, the influences of globalization and the international media may create a sense of relative deprivation contributing to increased discontent as well. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, para 1-11, accepts that for an insurgency to exist, there must first be a grievance or injustice felt among the people with the insurgent exploiting this perceived grievance by presenting himself as the viable solution to the population's needs. The people therefore have to choose between trusting the government and trusting the insurgent. If the people have more trust in the insurgent, the insurgency will persist.

### **Identifying the Cause—Theory**

It is important to understand the difference between symptoms and causes of instability. Quick impact projects and the like are presently initiated in response to the wants or needs of the people. This equates to satisfying a popular but potentially superficial request which may build consent but not tackle the cause of instability. For example, the people ask for a school. Based on this, under current practice, the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) would construct a school to meet this need. However, the want for a school is only a symptom of instability; the cause is the local government has not effectively met the needs of the people by providing an effective education system. The priority of action, in this example, would therefore be to build government effectiveness so that it can deliver an education program that satisfies the people. This way the cause is tackled using a symptom as a backdrop.

### **Identifying the Cause—Practice**

To identify the causes of instability, the TCAPF asks the people to explain their grievances and then prioritize them. This is accomplished by asking very simple but standard questions to the people across the AO. All the responses are tracked and logged in a database so opinions can be grouped and quantified clearly. This way, the greatest grievances can be easily picked out and addressed first, generating a focused plan for targeted action using kinetic and nonkinetic effects to resolve the grievances of the people. The TCAPF is a method of steering the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.

### How to Measure Effect

The TCAPF continually asks the people the same basic four questions so, over time, the changing opinion of the population can be tracked, compared, measured, and displayed. By not being subjective, the results of the questioning cannot be altered by those who ask questions or analyze results. Thus a longer-term narrative of the people is created that should ease situational awareness of new troops into theater and provide continuity of analysis and action.

Collectors must understand the importance of the TCAPF to the accomplishment of their mission and should know the basic tenets and outline of the program.

The TCAPF will provide the baseline and metric for stability within their AO. The TCAPF is the agreed upon metric for assessing stabilization and will be used to determine if progress has been made within a region. Activity and projects do not translate into progress unless it is verified through the TCAPF assessments.

The TCAPF process will help identify the geographic regions and root causes of instability in the AO. When executed properly, the TCAPF process will graphically represent potential areas of instability. Follow-up questioning will identify key symptoms that should lead to root causes. Addressing those root causes is the basis for improving the stability of that region or segment of the population.

The TCAPF should not require a major change in the activities and processes that are currently in place, but provide clarity and focus to them ensuring that instability and conflict are addressed. **Note:** The TCAPF questionnaire and sample TCAPF spreadsheet are found in Appendix A.

### The Provincial Reconstruction Team Maturity Model

The PRT program is a U.S.-led, civil-military effort to improve the capabilities of provincial and local governments to govern effectively and deliver essential services. Another term for PRT is the forward advanced civilian team. The PRT program provides integrated and multidisciplinary teams of U.S. and coalition personnel to teach, coach, and mentor provincial and local government officials in core competencies of governance and economic development. The PRT will conduct assessments in these areas and will track progress in their maturity models (see Appendix A).

The PRTs and embedded PRTs (ePRTs) comprise personnel and subject matter experts from the Department of State, USAID, other U.S. government departments and agencies, the U.S. military, native born expatriates, contractors, and local nationals.

The ePRTs are embedded with brigade combat teams (BCTs) and are responsible for providing advice, expertise, and program management to support the local COIN strategy devised with their BCT.

In the assessment process, the BCT and PRT must closely coordinate their collection and reporting efforts to gather and portray useful and consistent information.

## **The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework**

The ICAF is a U.S. government interagency process; only military organizations at the highest levels will participate in the ICAF. Assessments and collections done by subordinate military units may be incorporated into the ICAF process.

The ICAF is a strategic-level process that draws on existing conflict assessment procedures like the TCAPF, used by U.S. government departments and agencies as well as international and nongovernmental organizations. The ICAF organizes all these assessments into a common framework. This framework is used by all U.S. government departments and agencies to gain a common understanding of the country or region, and to conduct and coordinate planning.

The ICAF does not duplicate or replace existing department or agency assessment process. It brings together individual assessments and data.

U.S. government departments and agencies are able to use the ICAF to leverage and share knowledge gained from their individual assessments and establish a common interagency perspective on individual countries or entire regions.

## **Applying the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework**

The ICAF is the first step in the interagency planning process by informing and clarifying U.S. government goals. The ICAF provides an informational framework for the design of programs and adjustment of activities and resource allocation.

The ICAF supports the interagency planning process by determining which agency or department initiates and participates in an assessment, time and place of the assessment, type and application of the products needed, and the level of classification.

The ICAF is a flexible and scalable interagency tool for use in:

- Steady-state engagement and conflict prevention planning.
- U.S. government reconstruction and stabilization contingency planning.
- U.S. government reconstruction and stabilization crises response planning.

The TCAPF has been successfully used in various theaters to identify, prioritize, and target the causes of instability in a measurable and immediately accessible way. Since it makes maximum use of assets in the field and measures the effectiveness of activities over time and across multiple unit rotations, it is an important tool for conducting stabilization operations.





Chapter 3

Organize and Prepare for Assessments

“Commanders and staffs also develop a standard or baseline against which they compare measures and trends.”

—Field Manual Interim 5-0.1, *The Operations Process*

Commanders and staffs must plan, organize, and prepare to conduct assessments as a part of operations. The assessment/tactical conflict assessment and planning framework timeline illustrates how the assessment process supports the deployment/transfer of authority timeline (see Figure 3-1). The assessment process builds on the success of the previous unit and clearly establishes a new baseline for the next unit.




Figure 3-1

## The Assessment Cell

Organizing and training an assessment cell is critical to a successful assessment process. Mission requirements and available staff resources will determine assessment cell membership.

At division and above, the cell is staffed with available resources. At brigade combat team and battalion levels, the assessment cell is not normally present; instead, an assessment working group (AWG) exists comprised from the intelligence, operations, and civil affairs staffs. Figure 3-2 is a template for corps and division assessment cell membership.

The assessment cell fuses data to provide assessment analysis, assessment summaries, and recommendations on how to achieve desired effects and associated operational considerations. The assessment cell supports planning on all event horizons (long-, mid-, and short-range plans).

The assessment cell produces a draft initial assessment and baseline of the operational environment (OE) for cross-functional vetting in the AWG.




Figure 3-2. Assessment cell membership

### The Assessment Working Group

The AWG is normally constituted at the division or corps level. Figure 3-3 is an assessment cell membership template. The AWG supports cross-functional planning and assessment across the staff. It supports planning teams by reviewing and refining desired and undesired effects developed by the staff planners and developing MOEs, MOE indicators, and assessment criteria in support of those effects (objectives). The AWG periodically validates existing effects hierarchy, and supports assessment by integrating internal and external inputs into a coherent holistic assessment of the OE. The staff lead for the AWG is the assessment cell chief. The AWG has the following characteristics:

- The AWG is cross functional across the staff.
- The AWG develops, refines, and validates effects metrics for plans and operations.
- The AWG provides integrated assessment to the commander for directing planning efforts.

Assessment products include an integrated joint task force-wide assessment of the OE for commander decision-making and guidance for staff planning efforts. Planning considerations include the following:

- Validation of desired/undesired effects and supporting MOEs and MOE indicators.
- Assessment criteria for inclusion in the campaign plan/order.

<h2>Assessment Working Group Membership</h2>	
<b>Staff lead:</b> Assessment chief	
<b>Core Membership</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>•Assessment cell core</li><li>•Intelligence representative (collection and ISR)</li><li>•Operations representative</li><li>•Logistics representative</li><li>•Plans representative</li><li>•Communications strategy/information operations/ public affairs representative/civil affairs representative/civil-military operations representative</li><li>•Iraqi Army representatives</li><li>•Coalition/ host nation LNOs</li><li>•Component representatives/LNOs</li><li>•System of systems analysis (if part of headquarters)</li></ul>	<b>Supporting Membership (as required):</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>•Command, control, communications, and computer systems (J-6)</li><li>•Force, structure, resources, and assessment (J-8)</li><li>•Joint Interagency Coordination Group</li><li>•Political advisor</li><li>•Key leader engagement cell</li><li>•Staff judge advocate</li><li>•Provost marshal's office</li><li>•Other departments/agencies</li><li>•Combatant commander</li></ul>
	<b>Insight: Membership will be based on mission requirements and available staff resources</b>

Figure 3-3. AWG membership



Chapter 4

Execute Assessments




Figure 4-1

The Importance of Collectors

Assessment is a bottom-up process. Collectors at the squad and platoon level gather and organize ground-truth data (see Figure 4-1). Human terrain teams (HTTs), psychological operations teams, civil affairs teams, and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) will contribute helpful ground-truth data also. Battalions and brigade combat teams (BCTs) organize, analyze, and present assessment data to provide accurate and timely input to the planning process.

Patrols and key leader engagements provide opportunities to gather information with assessment tools like the tactical conflict assessment and planning framework (TCAPF) questionnaire. This information is consolidated and collated at the company level and forwarded for further consolidation in the TCAPF basic assessment and analysis at higher headquarters.

Battalion and BCT staff elements provide assessment updates in their specialty.

Example:

Civil affairs staff officer for civil-military operations, engineer for infrastructure, and so on.

The particular staff element integrates information from coalition partners, nongovernmental organizations, and interagency partners.

The deputy commander drives the integration process.

Measure of performance (MOP) criteria are maintained by staff elements and reported in battlefield updates.

Staff leads refine information requirements and input through a collection management plan which deconflicts collectors and has a specific task and purpose.

Impacts are measured by periodic assessment (monthly or quarterly) and are presented to the commander by analysts for plan refinement.

Collectors must understand the importance of their role and how they fit into the overall TCAPF process. The collector is responsible for assessing, identifying the causes of instability and conflict, and implementing an activity (as depicted on the TCAPF wheel diagram). These are three critical steps in the overall 10-step process.

These steps must be integrated into the overall planning (military decisionmaking process or Marine Corps planning process) and execution processes of the unit. TCAPF should not be a separate process or program. It is a way of ensuring we are focused on what is most important for stabilization.

Information is gathered from all segments of the population and at various levels versus relying on just government officials or key leaders. The collector's initial input serves as a baseline which is used to measure improvement. Because it is the population's perspective and not a personal assessment, a shift in the metric will not be seen every time a unit rotates (there is a tendency to want to show progress over each tour). Ideally, the outgoing unit's assessment becomes the incoming unit's baseline.

Input is gathered through the mechanism of a the TCAPF questionnaire. This questionnaire was developed over time and the words were carefully chosen to get the best unbiased responses, so it is important to ask them in exactly the manner which they were intended. Input from the questionnaire will be collected at the company level and entered into a TCAPF database. The database will be used by the analyst to and may result in follow up interviews or more targeted questioning.

Collectors are a cornerstone of an assessment program. The quality of input will greatly affect the analysis of instability and conflict in the area of operations (AO) and subsequently, the design and planning of the programs that are put in

## MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

place to address the root causes. Platoon, squad and team leaders must be trained to successfully interact with the local population and gather accurate data using TCAPF tools. TCAPF is a bottom-up assessment process that gets to the ground truth from the population's perspective.

Collectors must be trained to execute the following steps:

- Establish a rapport with the individuals chosen for interview.
- Gather information from government officials and the local population.
- Understand the local situation.
- Create a baseline.
- Monitor impact over time.

Collectors can be trained using the TCAPF questionnaire. This is a standardized questionnaire designed for use at the tactical level to facilitate discussions with locals to identify the causes of instability and conflict in an AO. Each answer creates a data point the staff can use to statistically measure local perceptions of the causes of instability and conflict. The four key questions on the TCAPF questionnaire are:

- "Have there been changes in the village population in the last year?"
- "What are the most important problems facing the village?"
- "Who do you believe can solve your problems?"
- "What should be done first to help the village?"


Interviews should be conducted with the following:

- Key informants.
- Traditional leaders (tribal and religious).
- Government officials to include police and army.
- Leading merchants.
- School headmasters/mistresses.
- Clinic director.
- Women.

**Note:** When conducting interviews, triangulate the information obtained.

Interviewing basics include the following:

- Listen.
- Ask questions.
- Identify interviewee's agenda.
- Realize that interviewers can negatively affect responses.
- Interview should be conducted in a secure, covered area allowing Soldiers conducting the interview to remove body armor, helmet, and ballistic glasses before addressing the interviewee.
- Interpreters should be from the same ethnic group as the interviewees and should be employed in pairs if possible.
- Rehearse with interpreters/interviewers.



**Figure 4-2**

### **Assessment Data**

Assessment data (MOPs and MOEs) and survey data are directly used in updating staff estimates and provide the commander with updated information. This provides a clear common operating picture of the AO and the status of programs and activities.

Correlation of TCAPF data is determined by a primary point of contact on the unit staff. Analysis is maintained in the running staff estimate.




The data feeds into the planning process for all planning horizons and is also used to keep higher headquarters (HQ) informed of changes and the status of the AO.

**Assessment at company/troop level**

At company level, the major assessment actions using the TCAPF are:

- Designated patrols interact with the local population and get the ground truth by collecting survey data, MOP data, and MOE data.
- The company also collates, formats, and quality controls survey data to send to the battalion HQ. Quality control is very important as the TCAPF is a bottom-up assessment process that gets to the ground truth from the population’s perspective.
- The company also evaluates and tracks MOP data. The company forwards MOP and MOE data to the battalion.
- The company proposes activities based on survey data and requests additional resources as required.



**Figure 4-3**

**Assessment at battalion/squadron level**

- At battalion level, the major assessment actions using the TCAPF are:
- The battalion HQ collates, formats, and quality controls survey data to send to the BCT HQ. The battalion also provides a basic analysis of its area, proposed activities, and resource requests to the BCT.
- The battalion also evaluates and tracks MOP and MOE data, and forwards MOP and MOE data to the BCT.
- The battalion validates proposed activities and resource requests as required. Requests are sent to the BCT as required. Activities and resource requests within the authority and capacity of the battalion may be approved by the battalion commander (see Figure 4-4).





Figure 4-4

**Assessment at BCT level**

At BCT level, the major assessment actions are:

- The BCT HQ coordinates with PRTs to produce an analysis of the AO.
- The BCT HQ sets collection priorities for the HTT and incorporates HTT collections into the BCT’s analysis.
- The BCT HQ consolidates and forwards MOP and MOE data.
- The BCT HQ approves activity and resource requests and codifies these approvals in the planning/orders process. (see Figure 4-5).



**Figure 4-5**

**Assessment at division level**

At division level, the major assessment actions are:

- The division HQ consolidates and endorses the analysis of the AO.
- The division HQ sets allocates for the HTT.
- The division HQ consolidates, evaluates, and forwards MOP and MOE data.
- The division HQ approves activity and resource requests and codifies these approvals in the planning/orders process. Denied requests are returned through the BCT to the originating HQ (see Figure 4-6).




Figure 4-6

## Chapter 5

### Best Practices and Insights

#### Collector Best Practices

Activities or projects are only products that foster a process to change behavior or perceptions. Measure of effect indicators identify whether change has occurred or is occurring.

The local population is the best source for ideas to measure impact because they know “what change looks like” and it’s their perception that counts!

Good indicators show how close you are to convincing people their life will be better under the government rather than anti-government forces.

Good deeds are not the same as effectively targeted stabilization programming. Take away the anti-government forces talking points.

Each brigade combat team should have a civil affairs (CA) company supporting them, consisting of five CA teams and a headquarters element. CA teams are trained in civil reconnaissance and cross-cultural communications. Consider using them to conduct tactical conflict assessment and planning framework (TCAPF) data collection/collation and to train designated infantry platoons to conduct TCAPF data collection.

Positive collection techniques include the following:

- Respond to priority issues of the local population.
- Focus on cross-cutting issues as they are usually the bottleneck (corruption can affect political, economic, and security lines of operation).
- Identify and support key actors early to set the stage for later collaboration.

Collection practices to avoid include the following:

- Think “if you do good things, good things will happen.”
- Think “something is better than nothing.”
- “Americanize” the activity.
- Focus on quantity over quality of activities.
- Over survey—this can create expectations that you and the host nation government cannot meet, and reinforce instability and conflict.

TCAPF lessons/best practices include the following:

- The TCAPF can identify the causes of instability in a measurable and immediately accessible way.
- The TCAPF is a significance improvement on current targeting practice.
- The TCAPF is more than a development targeting tool. It has wide utility as it can direct the prosecution of a counterinsurgency campaign whilst remaining flexible enough to foster stabilization at the local level.
- The TCAPF links directly into the provincial reconstruction team's logical frameworks and can therefore feed/shape development of integrated stabilization plans.
- The TCAPF makes maximum use of patrols to provide intelligence and does not demand a significant staff effort to work well.
- For maximum effectiveness, collectors must be trained.

### **Assessment Working Group Meeting Best Practices**

Before the meeting:

- Identify the membership.
- Prepare an agenda and send it well in advance to the committee members.
  - Identify for each agenda item inputs required and outputs.
  - Identify lead for each item.
  - Identify whether it is for information, for discussion, or for decision.
- Identify and promulgate dates, times, and locations of meetings.
- Obtain information about the status of the tasks that have been assigned from members who cannot attend.
- Arrive early, set up the meeting room, and arrange handout materials.

At the beginning of the meeting:

- Start on time; conduct a roll call.
- Review agenda.
- Set clear time limits.
- Assign a note taker.
- Review taskings from the last assessment working group (part of agenda).

During the meeting:

- Take minutes and identify attendees (should be accomplished by the note taker).
- Identify taskings—include names (points of contact), dates, and expected products.
- Close the meeting on time (schedule micro-meetings if necessary).
- Don't politic or pontificate, use data.

After the meeting:

- Prepare the products/tools for the next commander's assessment/decision venue.
- Follow up on action items (coordinate with other staff members as required).

### **Working With Interpreters, Best Practices**

The use of interpreters is an integral and critical part of the information collection effort. Use of an interpreter is time consuming and potentially confusing. Proper use and control of an interpreter is a skill that must be learned and practiced to maximize the potential of collection.

Perhaps the most important guideline to remember is an interpreter is essentially your mouthpiece; he or she says what you say, but in a different language. This sounds simple, but for those who have never worked with interpreters, problems can quickly develop.

Upon meeting an interpreter, it is important to assess their proficiency in English. An interpreter with a firm grasp of English and the terminology that may be encountered is necessary.

The following are several useful tips for working with an interpreter:

- Placement:
  - When standing, the interpreter should stand just behind you and to the side.
  - When sitting, the interpreter should sit right beside you but not between you and the individual.
  - Body language and tone:
    - \* Have the interpreter translate your message in the tone you are speaking.
    - \* Ensure the interpreter avoids making gestures.

- Delivery:
  - Talk directly to the person with whom you are speaking, not the interpreter.
  - Speak as you would in a normal conversation, not the third person. Do not say, “Tell him . . . .” Rather say, “I understand that you . . . .” and instruct the interpreter to translate as such.
  - Speak clearly; avoid acronyms or slang and break sentences uniformly to facilitate translation.
  - Some interpreters will begin to translate while you are still speaking. This is frustrating for some people. If so, discuss the preference of translation with the interpreter.
  - The most important principle to obey while using an interpreter is to remember that you control the conversation, not the interpreter.
  
- Security:
  - Beware of foreign intelligence services speaking to your interpreter.
  - Always assume the worst.
  - Avoid careless talk.
  - Avoid giving away personal details.
  - Avoid becoming emotionally involved.
  - Use the interpreter checklist for patrolling:
    - \* Tell the interpreter exactly what you want translated. The interpreter should translate all conversation between you and the individual.
    - \* Do not discuss information requirements to include commander’s critical information requirements, friendly force information requirements, and priority intelligence requirements with the interpreter.
    - \* Brief the interpreter on actions to take in the event of actions at the halt or contact.
  
- Tell the interpreter what you expect of him, and how you want him to do it.






Figure 5-1



## Appendix A

### **Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning Framework Tool Kit**

The tactical conflict assessment planning framework (TCAPF) tool kit on the following pages assists units in implementing the TCAPF methodology. It consists of the basic four question questionnaire; progresses through the advanced questionnaire cards A through D; the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure (PMESII) matrix; collection planner; prioritization matrix; sample TCAPF spreadsheet; and stability matrix. This tool kit is the basis for a successful assessment program. A numeric scale is provided for many answers to assist in recording the degree of the responses. This scale (higher is better) is used to provide a numeric measure for responses and highlight problem areas.

The first page of the tool kit is the basic four question questionnaire. It is simple to fill out and easy to use. It should be checked for completeness by the collector and supervisor. Handle these documents with care and do not share them with unauthorized personnel.

Card A is the advanced assessment questionnaire dealing with governance. This questionnaire measures how much trust is in national and local institutions such as national government, provincial government, local government, civil courts, criminal courts, police, army, coalition forces, tribal leaders, religious leaders, local social service organizations, and news media.

Card B is the advanced assessment questionnaire dealing with security. This questionnaire captures the population's perspective on the security situation. It is important to follow the directions on every heading, especially question 5—"Whom do you think can effectively address the threats you identified." Follow up questions may be needed to determine the strength of the answer.

Card C is the advanced assessment questionnaire for rule of law. It will provide a measure of how the population perceived its judicial system. It also measures the perceived fairness and corruption of the judicial and law enforcement systems.

Card D is the advanced assessment questionnaire for essential services. This card measures what services are available to the population and which services are most needed. This card can be tailored to specific situations and the operational environment. Rural villages and cities have different needs and priorities.

Card E is the advanced assessment questionnaire for livelihoods. This measures the economic reality of the population. It also measures the perception of whether some groups are financially better off than others.

TCAPF Questionnaire: 4 Questions			
Critical Information - Complete ALL Parts			
<b>Date</b>		<b>Interviewer/Unit</b>	
<b>Subject Name/Gender</b>		<b>District</b>	
<b>Occupation</b>		<b>Village</b>	
<b>Tribe</b>		<b>Location (Grid)</b>	
<b>Age (Check 1)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> "Fighting age"	<b>Population</b>	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Old (gray hair)		

Question 1: Have there been changes in the village population in the last year? (Check 1)					
Increased	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>(Go to 1a)</i>	Decreased	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>(Go to 1a)</i>	No Change	<input type="checkbox"/>
				Don't Know	<input type="checkbox"/>
				No Comment	<input type="checkbox"/>

Question 1a: Reason for change in population?

Question 2: What is the most important problem facing the village?

Question 3: Who do you believe can solve your problems?

Question 4: What should be done first to help the village? (1 Answer Only)

ALWAYS ASK "WHY?"

Figure A-1. TACPF questionnaire

## MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

**Advanced Assessment Questionnaire Card A: Governance**

Province:			Date:		
District:			GPS Reference:		
Village:			Interviewee:		
Interpreter Name:			Profession:		
Interviewer Name:			Title:		

1. Does the government have the capability and capacity to perform basic government functions (security, imposing order, reduce violence, and adjudicate disputes.)\*

Always	Most of the time	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	I don't know [DO NOT READ]
5	4	3	2	1	9

2. How much do residents of this village trust each of the following institutions? [READ OPTIONS; PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF ANSWER]

	Not at all	Just a little	Somewhat	A lot	I don't know [DO NOT READ]
A. National Government	0	1	2	3	9
B. Provincial Government	0	1	2	3	9
C. Local Government	0	1	2	3	9
D. Civil courts	0	1	2	3	9
E. Criminal courts	0	1	2	3	9
F. ANP	0	1	2	3	9
G. ANA	0	1	2	3	9
H. Coalition forces	0	1	2	3	9
I. Tribal leaders	0	1	2	3	9
J. Religious leaders	0	1	2	3	9
K. Local social service organizations	0	1	2	3	9
L. Radio broadcasts	0	1	2	3	9
M. Newspapers	0	1	2	3	9
N. Television reports	0	1	2	3	9

Ask "WHY" for institutions trusted "not at all."

3. How often do residents of the village express their grievances to local government authorities? [READ OPTIONS]

<input type="checkbox"/> (3) Always	<input type="checkbox"/> (2) Often	<input type="checkbox"/> (1) Rarely	<input type="checkbox"/> (0) Never	<input type="checkbox"/> (9) I don't know [DO NOT READ]
-------------------------------------	------------------------------------	-------------------------------------	------------------------------------	---

4. Does the government undertake regular community consultations?

Always	Most of the time	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	I don't know [DO NOT READ]
5	4	3	2	1	9

5. Do you support the local government?

Always	Most of the time	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	I don't know [DO NOT READ]
5	4	3	2	1	9

6. Does the local government conduct its affairs in a transparent and accountable manner?

Always	Most of the time	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	I don't know [DO NOT READ]
5	4	3	2	1	9

7. Is the government more effective than it was one year ago? [READ OPTIONS]

<input type="checkbox"/> (3) More Effective	<input type="checkbox"/> (2) Same	<input type="checkbox"/> (1) Less Effective	<input type="checkbox"/> (9) I don't know
---	-----------------------------------	---	---

8. WHY?

**Figure A-2. Advanced assessment questionnaire card A**

# CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

### Advanced Assessment Questionnaire Card B: Security

Province:		Date:	
District:		GPS Reference:	
Village:		Interviewee:	
Interpreter Name:		Profession:	
Interviewer Name:		Title:	

1. How is the security situation in this village? *[READ OPTIONS]*

<input type="checkbox"/> (1) Extremely Dangerous	<input type="checkbox"/> (2) Dangerous	<input type="checkbox"/> (3) Neither dangerous nor secure	<input type="checkbox"/> (4) Secure	<input type="checkbox"/> (5) Extremely secure	<input type="checkbox"/> (9) I don't know
--	--	---	-------------------------------------	---	---

2. Who is responsible for security in this village? *[READ OPTIONS AND ADD \*OR IF THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL GROUP, PLEASE IDENTIFY\*]*

	Yes	No	I don't know <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>	Not Identified <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>
A. ANP	2	1	9	999
B. ANA	2	1	9	999
C. Coalition Forces	2	1	9	999
D. Other (1 <sup>st</sup> Response):	2	1	9	999
E. Other (2 <sup>nd</sup> Response):	2	1	9	999
F. Other (3 <sup>rd</sup> Response):	2	1	9	999

3. What are the biggest fears of village residents concerning their own personal safety and security of their families? *[READ OPTIONS. IF OTHER, WHAT?; IF MORE THAN 1 ANSWER, ASK THEM TO PRIORITIZE.]*

	1 <sup>st</sup> Response <i>(26A)</i>	2 <sup>nd</sup> Response <i>(26B)</i>	3 <sup>rd</sup> Response <i>(26C)</i>
Random violence against individuals	1	1	1
Targeted violence against individuals	2	2	2
Robbery	3	3	3
Hijacking	4	4	4
Extortion	5	5	5
Kidnapping	6	6	6
Terrorist attacks	7	7	7
Nothing / No problem	0		
Other (1 <sup>st</sup> response):			
Other (2 <sup>nd</sup> response):			
Other (3 <sup>rd</sup> response):			
No further reply <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>		990	990
Don't know <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>	999		990

4. How often are local security forces able to effectively address the threats you identified? *[READ ONLY THE OPTIONS STATED FOR QUESTION 3; IF ANSWER IS NOTHING, NO FURTHER REPLY OR DON'T KNOW, SKIP TO Q. 6]*

	Always	Often	Rarely	Never	I don't know	Not Identified
A. Random violence against individuals	3	2	1	0	9	999
B. Targeted violence against individuals	3	2	1	0	9	999
C. Robbery	3	2	1	0	9	999
D. Hijacking	3	2	1	0	9	999
E. Extortion	3	2	1	0	9	999
F. Kidnapping	3	2	1	0	9	999
G. Terrorist attacks	3	2	1	0	9	999
H. Other (1 <sup>st</sup> response):	3	2	1	0	9	999
I. Other (2 <sup>nd</sup> response):	3	2	1	0	9	999
J. Other (3 <sup>rd</sup> response):	3	2	1	0	9	999

5. Whom do you think can effectively address the threats you identified? *[PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF ANSWER]*

	Not at all	Just a little	Somewhat	A lot	I don't know <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>
A. National Government	0	1	2	3	9
B. Provincial Government	0	1	2	3	9
C. Local government	0	1	2	3	9
D. The courts	0	1	2	3	9
E. ANP	0	1	2	3	9
F. ANA	0	1	2	3	9
G. International forces	0	1	2	3	9
H. Tribal leaders	0	1	2	3	9
I. Religious leaders	0	1	2	3	9
J. Local social service organizations	0	1	2	3	9

6. Are the residents of this village more or less safe than they were one year ago? *[READ OPTIONS]*

<input type="checkbox"/> (3) More Safe	<input type="checkbox"/> (2) Same	<input type="checkbox"/> (1) Less Safe	<input type="checkbox"/> (9) I don't know
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7. WHY?

**Figure A-3. Advanced assessment questionnaire card B**

**MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS**

**Advanced Assessment Questionnaire Card C: Rule of Law**

Province:		Date:	
District:		GPS Reference:	
Village:		Interviewee:	
Interpreter Name:		Profession:	
Interviewer Name:		Title:	

1. If you were the victim of a crime, to whom would you report it?

	Yes	No	I don't know [DO NOT READ]
A. National Government	0	1	9
B. Provincial Government	0	1	9
C. Local government	0	1	9
D. The courts	0	1	9
E. ANP	0	1	9
F. ANA	0	1	9
G. International forces	0	1	9
H. Tribal leaders	0	1	9
I. Religious leaders	0	1	9
J. Local social service organizations	0	1	9

2. How effectively do you believe your crime would be investigated and resolved?

<input type="checkbox"/> (3) Very Effectively	<input type="checkbox"/> (2) Neither effectively or ineffectively	<input type="checkbox"/> (1) Ineffectively	<input type="checkbox"/> (9) I don't know
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3. If you had an economic/property disputes, where would you take it to be resolved?

	Yes	No	I don't know [DO NOT READ]
A. National Government	0	1	9
B. Provincial Government	0	1	9
C. Local government	0	1	9
D. The courts	0	1	9
E. ANP	0	1	9
F. ANA	0	1	9
G. International forces	0	1	9
H. Tribal leaders	0	1	9
I. Religious leaders	0	1	9
J. Local social service organizations	0	1	9
K. Other (LIST)	0	1	9

4. Is misconduct among government officials investigated and punished?

Always	Most of the time	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	I don't know [DO NOT READ]
5	4	3	2	1	9

**Figure A-4. Advanced assessment questionnaire card C**

# CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

### Advanced Assessment Questionnaire Card D: Basic Services

Province:	Date:
District:	GPS Reference:
Village:	Interviewer:
Interpreter Name:	Profession:
Interviewer Name:	Title:

1. To what degree are the following basic services are available to residents of the village: *[READ OPTIONS]*

	Always	Most of the time	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	I don't know <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>
A. Primary schools	5	4	3	2	1	9
B. Secondary/Vocational schools	5	4	3	2	1	9
C. Health care	5	4	3	2	1	9
D. Medicine	5	4	3	2	1	9
E. Housing	5	4	3	2	1	9
F. Power	5	4	3	2	1	9
G. Potable water	5	4	3	2	1	9
H. Sanitation	5	4	3	2	1	9
I. Garbage collection	5	4	3	2	1	9
J. Roads for vehicles	5	4	3	2	1	9

2. Which of the following basic services are most urgently needed by residents of this village? You can include other services you think should be provided by the government that I do not mention. *[READ OPTIONS; PROBE FOR THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT SHOULD RESPONDENT LIST MORE THAN THREE]*

	1 <sup>st</sup> Service (20A)	2 <sup>nd</sup> Service (20B)	3 <sup>rd</sup> Service (20C)
A. Primary schools	1	1	1
B. Secondary/Vocational schools	2	2	2
C. Health care	3	3	3
D. Medicine	4	4	4
E. Housing	5	5	5
F. Power	6	6	6
G. Potable water	7	7	7
H. Sanitation	8	8	8
I. Garbage collection	9	9	9
J. Roads for vehicles	10	10	10
Other:			
Other:			
Other:			
None	0	0	0
No further reply <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>		990	990
I don't know <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>	999		

3. Of the services provided by the government, are they provided equally to all residents?

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (2)	<input type="checkbox"/> No (1)	<input type="checkbox"/> I don't know (9) <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>
----------------------------------	---------------------------------	--

4. If not, which group of people is provided the least or no services by the government? *[DO NOT READ OPTIONS; PROBE RESPONDENT BUT DO NOT FORCE RESPONDENT TO GIVE AN ANSWER]*

	1 <sup>st</sup> Response (22A)	2 <sup>nd</sup> Response (22B)	3 <sup>rd</sup> Response (23C)
1 <sup>st</sup> response:			
2 <sup>nd</sup> response:			
3 <sup>rd</sup> response:			
No group identified <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>	0		
No further reply <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>		990	990
Don't know <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>	999		

27. Why?

**Figure A-5. Advanced assessment questionnaire card D**



## MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

**Advanced Assessment Questionnaire Card E: Livelihoods**

Province:		Date:	
District:		GPS Reference:	
Village:		Interviewee:	
Interpreter Name:		Profession:	
Interviewer Name:		Title:	

1. Can residents of this village access sufficient food for their families *[READ OPTIONS]*

<input type="checkbox"/> (5) Always	<input type="checkbox"/> (4) Most of the time	<input type="checkbox"/> (3) Sometimes	<input type="checkbox"/> (2) Rarely	<input type="checkbox"/> (1) Never	<input type="checkbox"/> (9) I don't know <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>
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2. How do households pay for the basic necessities (e.g. food, housing, electricity, medical care)? *[READ OPTIONS AND ADD "OR ANOTHER WAY?"]*

	1 <sup>st</sup> Service (18A)	2 <sup>nd</sup> Service (18B)	3 <sup>rd</sup> Service (18C)
Earn money through regular employment	1	1	1
Earn money through odd jobs	2	2	2
Receive money from the government	3	3	3
Sell personal items from their home	4	4	4
Gifts from relatives	5	5	5
Borrow money	6	6	6
Other:			
Other:			
Other:			
No further reply <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>		990	990
I don't know <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>	999		

5. What percentage of the able working population is unemployed? *[READ OPTIONS]*

<input type="checkbox"/> (5) 0-20%	<input type="checkbox"/> (4) 21-40%	<input type="checkbox"/> (3) 41-60%	<input type="checkbox"/> (2) 61-80%	<input type="checkbox"/> (1) 81-100%	<input type="checkbox"/> (9) I don't know <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>
------------------------------------	-------------------------------------	-------------------------------------	-------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	--

6. Are some groups financially better off than others?

<input type="checkbox"/> (2) Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> (1) No	<input type="checkbox"/> (9) I don't know <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>
----------------------------------	---------------------------------	--

7. If yes, please identify the groups: *[DO NOT READ OPTIONS; PROBE RESPONDENT BUT DO NOT FORCE RESPONDENT TO GIVE AN ANSWER]*

	1 <sup>st</sup> Response (22A)	2 <sup>nd</sup> Response (22B)	3 <sup>rd</sup> Response (22C)
1 <sup>st</sup> response:			
2 <sup>nd</sup> response:			
3 <sup>rd</sup> response:			
No group identified	0		
No further reply		990	990
Don't know	999		

**Figure A-6. Advanced assessment questionnaire card E**

Description	Factors	Relevance
<b>Political/Governance</b> - Political actors, agendas, government capability, capacity, etc.		
<b>Military/Security</b> - Capabilities in the area of operations (equipment, mission, resource constraints, etc.)		
<b>Economic</b> - Individuals/groups related to production, distribution, and consumption (trade, development, finance, institutional capabilities, geography, and regulation)		
<b>Social</b> - Networks, status, and norms (demographics, tribes, religion, migration trends, urbanization, living standards, literacy/education level, etc.)		
<b>Infrastructure</b> - Basic facilities, services, and installations		
<b>Information</b> - Individuals, organizations, and systems which collect, process, disseminate, and/or act on information (media and telecommunications)		
<b>Physical environment</b>		
<b>Time</b>		

**Figure A-7. Political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure-physical environment, time (PMSEII-PT) matrix**

For Army planning, the suffix PT (physical environment, time) can be added to this matrix form to create the PMESII-PT framework. This tool helps commanders and staffs analyze the operational environment.

**MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS**

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<p>How will the operational environment (security, politics, economics, and infrastructure) impact how information is gathered?</p>	<p>List the constraints, restraints, and limitations in the physical area.</p>
<p>How will the cultural environment (tribe, clan religion, language, etc.) impact how information is gathered?</p>	<p>List cultural considerations that affect collection.</p>
<p>Who will be engaged?</p>	<p>List the key leaders or segments of the population that are the focus of the collection effort.</p>
<p>How will they be engaged?</p>	<p>What methods or techniques will be used to collect information?</p>
<p>Who will engage them?</p>	<p>Designate the collector(s) for the effort.</p>
<p>How many people will be engaged? Where?</p>	<p>Designate the sample size and location.</p>
<p>How frequently will they be engaged?</p>	<p>Plan for follow-up collection efforts to validate information and detect changes or trends.</p>

**Figure A-8. Sample TACPF collection planner**

This sample TACPF collection planner is helpful to companies and battalions in organizing their collection efforts. The information in the right-hand column is entered by the unit. The information in the left-hand column can be adjusted by the unit to suit the situation. After collection, this planner should be used to check the TACPF questionnaires to ensure they were collected in accordance with the collection plan.

Grievances (Instability)	Events	Key Actors (Means and Motivations)
What is the grievance? Always ask "why?"	Specific events or situations that support the grievance	Who or what is responsible for this?  What is the motivation?

**Figure A-9 Sources of instability matrix**

The sources of instability chart lists the population’s grievances (sources of instability) as discovered in the TCAPF questionnaire and assessment process. This information is used to fill out the TCAPF prioritization matrix.

Sources of Instability	Priority
<b>List of grievances that are causes of instability</b>	<b>Numeric priority</b>

**Figure A-10. TACPF prioritization matrix**

The priority matrix lists the identified causes of instability and conflict gathered through collection and analyzed. Causes are listed and assigned a priority. This matrix can be used at the tactical level and higher echelons. This matrix is helpful in targeting the most important causes of instability and conflict.

**MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS**

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
		Province	Date	Why	Major Problems	Institutions of Trust	
1							
2							
3	1	Kandahar	15-Jan-07	Taliban Raids	Lack of paid work opportunities	Courts	
4	2	Oruzgan	15-Jan-07		Access to health care	Municipal/Local Government	
5	3	Nimruz	15-Jan-07	No Jobs	Limited Essential Services	Courts	
6	4	Daykondi	16-Jan-07	Security	Limited Essential Services	Religious leaders	
7	5	Zabol	17-Jan-07	No road	Lack of shelter	Local Police	
8	6	Daykondi	17-Jan-07		Access To Education	Provincial Government	
9	7	Helmand	18-Jan-07	Schools	Access To Education	Local Government	
10	8	Nimruz	18-Jan-07	Schools	Access To Education	Courts	
11	9	Helmand	18-Jan-07	Lack Of Paid Work	Lack Of Paid Work	Local Police	
12	10	Zabol	19-Jan-07		Lack Of Shelter	National Army	
13	11	Nimruz	19-Jan-07		Limited Essential Services	International Forces	
14	12	Helmand	20-Jan-07	Access To Health Care	Limited Essential Services	Tribal leaders	
15	13	Zabol	21-Jan-07		Limited Essential Services	Religious leaders	
16	14	Helmand	21-Jan-07		Lack Of Shelter	National Army	
17	15	Daykondi	21-Jan-07	Security	Access To Education	National Government	
18	16	Kandahar	21-Jan-07		Access To Health Care	Religious leaders	

**Figure A-11. Sample TACPF spreadsheet**

This sample spreadsheet used to compile TACPF questionnaire data. This aid can be used to organize data for further analysis. This spreadsheet can be tailored to individual unit needs. For example, village names can be substituted for province names. There is no set format for this spreadsheet and it can be locally created by the unit.

Grievance	Causes (Perception)	Causes (Systemic)	Objective	Impact Indicators	Impact Indicator Data Sources	Activities	Output Indicators	Output Indicator Data Sources
The National Police (NP) are corrupt and ineffective	Failure to respect the rule of law Failure enforce the law	Training, corruption, and compensation.	Decrease corruption if it exists Improved public perception	Improved public cooperation More interaction with the public Public provide more actionable intelligence to the NP	Surveys Decrease in illegal checkpoints Increased NP presence in formerly limited-presence areas	Combined coalition/NP operations Interviews with NP officers at all levels Evaluate NP officer compensation Information operations campaign	TCAPF responses Joint patrols Corrupt NP officers removed NP officer compensation received on time	Surveys TCAPF responses Patrol reports Assessments
*TCAPF surveys	*TCAPF surveys	Task assignment	Objectives	*MOE	Effects		* MOP	* Task accomplishment

Figure A-12. Stability matrix

The stability matrix and program activities should form the basis for the stabilization plan. The plan should target the least stable areas and ensure instability does not spread.

The stabilization plan should be nested with the higher headquarters plan and include tactical details on how stabilization activities will be implemented and synchronized.

The causes of instability and conflict are gathered in the assessment process using the TCAPF as a tool.

The TCAPF data should also be collated at the next higher level to develop and/or validate stability assessments at the sub regional, regional, and national levels.

The assessment process supports the stability matrix by providing quality input and supporting its usefulness as a planning/tracking tool.

**Note:** The notes marked by an asterisk (\*) at the bottom of the matrix assist in understanding the relationship between the stability matrix and measures of effectiveness with affects attainment and measures of performance with task accomplishment.

Resiliencies (Stability)	Events	Key Actors (Means and Motivations)
What strengths can be built on to foster stability?	What specific events support this strength?	Who or what is responsible for this?  What is the motivation?

**Figure A-13. Sources of stability matrix**

The sources of stability matrix lists strengths that can potentially be built on to foster stability as discovered in the TCAPF questionnaire and assessment process.





## **Appendix B**

### **Provincial Reconstruction Team Maturity Model**

#### **Lines of Activity**

Each provincial reconstruction team (PRT) assesses its province in five areas or lines of activity (LOAs). The LOAs include the following: governance, political development, economic development, political reconciliation, and rule of law. The five LOAs and key objectives are derived from the joint campaign plan and mission plan that the PRTs/embedded PRTs are tasked to assess:

- Governance. Assist in the development of sub-national governments that are self-sufficient, transparent, accountable, and capable of identifying, prioritizing, and servicing the needs of their citizens.
- Political development. Promote the development of an engaged local population and effective political parties, institutions, representatives, and officials that respect rights of individuals and groups, promote pluralism, and peacefully transfer power.
- Reconciliation. Assist conflicting parties resolve their differences by engaging in direct and peaceful dialogue to identify and pursue shared aims and interests.
- Economic. Help sub-national governments and the private sector to establish and implement broad-based and comprehensive economic development strategies that promote equitable and sustainable growth.
- Rule of law. Enhance the quality of justice enjoyed by the populace by improving the accountability, effectiveness, and consistency of services administered by policing, corrections, judicial and other legal institutions.
- Security is the responsibility of the relevant military units operational within the each province.

#### **Maturity Model Assessment**

This section describes how to use the maturity model to make an assessment of the provincial council or other institution together with worked examples and blank templates that can be copied and used.

#### **The model**

The maturity model is an internationally recognized tool for assessing the progress of major change management programs. The assessment will be completed by reading generic statements (provided as appendices to this handbook) and making an objective assessment of where the local government organization best fits the descriptions.

For example, when considering the development of governance it is decided the statement “Provincial Distribution System delivered on an ad-hoc and limited basis” best fits the description of the delivery of services. If so, place an X in the box marked “Beginning.” Continue making assessments throughout all of the key objectives.

GOVERNANCE					
Maturity Model		DEVELOPMENT		Provincial Assessment	
ELEMENTS	BEGINNING	DEVELOPING	SUSTAINABLE	PERFORMING	SELF-RELIANCE
Delivery of Essential Services	Provincial Distribution System (PDS) delivered on an ad-hoc and limited basis.	PDS works, but generally only when pressure is brought to bear through crisis planning.	PDS plans are in place, but some deliveries are missed or incorrectly delivered.	PDS planning and delivery considerably improved.	PDS deliveries are regular and timely.
X ←Improvement→ X					

Figure B-1. An example of a maturity model assessment statement (Beginning)

Referring to Figure B-2, if the best description that fits the legal institution is, “Traditional systems support legal process through legal institutions with occasional intervention” then place an X in the “Sustainable” box as shown. Importantly, provide some concise statement of evidence to support the assessment—in this case supporting the improvement in performance from “Developing” to “Sustainable.” Note that the red X is the previous rating and the green X is the current one. This can be added on a separate sheet attached to the maturity model.

Maturity Model		RULE OF LAW DEVELOPMENT		Provincial Assessment	
		DEVELOPING	SUSTAINABLE	PERFORMING	SELF-RELIANCE
Legal Inst	Traditional systems support legal process through legal institutions with occasional intervention.	Legal institutions begin to develop and traditional systems begin to grow in scrupability. X →	Traditional systems support legal process through legal institutions with occasional intervention. X	Traditional systems actively supporting the legal processes and institutions with infrequent intervention.	Traditional systems fully compatible and do no negatively impact rule of law.
	No legal institutions (e.g., civil, criminal, etc.).	Legal institutions operating but have limited effect and the population does not trust. X →	Legal institutions are open and operating semi-effectively with growing public trust. X	Legal institutions are open and operating, but have difficulty training and maintaining staff.	Legal institutions open, fully operational, staffed, and trusted.

Figure B-2

## MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

In Figure B-2, three of four areas have shown improvement (three of the areas are the completed assessments for the component elements of the maturity model can be used as a basis to adjust the PRT's work plans).

Maturity Model		GOVERNANCE				Provincial Assessment
Governance	Beginning	Developing	Sustainable	Performing	Self-Reliance	
<b>Delivery of Essential Services</b>	Provincial Distribution System delivered on an ad-hoc and limited basis	Provincial Distribution System works but generally only when pressure is brought to bear through crisis planning.	Provincial Distribution System plans are in place, but some deliveries are missed or incorrectly delivered.	Provincial Distribution System planning and delivery considerable improved.	Provincial Distribution System deliveries are regular and timely.	
	Fuel delivery is ad-hoc. Delivered on a limited infrequent basis, unlawful bribes are charged	Fuel delivery plans being developed and delivery meets essential needs	Fuel ("petrol") delivery planning in place but wide retail distribution is inconsistent.	Fuel delivery meets most requirements with occasional shortages.	There is more of a "just in time" approach to fuel deliveries.	
<b>Budget Execution</b>	Sewage, Water, Electricity and Trans (SWET) infrastructure improvements are ad-hoc and based on short term priorities. Services delivered, but not by responsible body	Sewage, Water, Electricity and Trans (SWET) infrastructure improvement projects are being delivered but without O&M provision and alignment to wider strategic planning and programmes.	SWET infrastructure improvements planned, but still not viewed as long term programmes. O&M budgeted but not well executed.	SWET infrastructure improvements planned, and aligned to the Provincial Strategy. O&M budgeted now starting to deliver long term effect.	SWET infrastructure improvements based on programmes rather than projects and aligned to Provincial strategies. O&M fully budgeted and delivered.	
	Provincial budget approved but minimal commitment and disbursement	Provincial budget approved with substantially better commitment and disbursement.	Provincial budget approved, committed and disbursed, but not integrated with Line DGs and GOI.	Provincial budget approved, committed and disbursed. Starting to integrate with Line DGs and GOI.	Provincial budget cycle actively managed with annual funds committed and disbursed with FY.	
<b>Functions and processes</b>	High level PC and Governor in place, but limited or no staffing structures to support them. Individual power outweighs position's authority	High level PC and Governor in place, sub-committees established but do not all regularly and staff being recruited. Skill level needs improving	PC and Governor effectiveness is personality dependant, the civil service staff structures developed and in place, but ill trained and non-effective.	PC and Governor working together, the civil service staff structures in place, training delivered, effectiveness improving, but staff retention not good.	PC and Governor leading a properly resourced, trained and effective civil service staff.	
	Strategic planning developed, but immature and not aligned to budget or development Programmes, or PRDC	Strategic planning developed, but immature and not aligned to budget or development Programmes	Strategic planning refined and influencing project lists, but not formally linked to budget	Strategic planning starts to capture and define Programme and budget requirements at Provincial and sub-provincial level.	Provincial and lower level budgets aligned to strategy which is reviewed annually.	
<b>Transparency</b>	No visibility of decision making process	Decisions generally made out of committee, although efforts being taken to be more inclusive.	There is visibility of decisions, but limited consultation.	Greater level of transparency and open decision making, but Provincial decisions still not fully consulted at lower levels.	Decisions and actions are consulted and visible between Provincial and Municipal governments and their population as a whole.	
	Municipal structures do not exist.	Municipal and district councils sitting, but not very effective.	Municipal structures gaining effectiveness within their areas, but struggling to work with Provincial level officials.	Municipal and district councils fully representing their constituencies	Municipal structures aligned and integrated to provincial government	
<b>Vertical and horizontal integration</b>	National and sub-national government poorly integrated, i.e. do not communicate	Improved level of National and sub-National engagement still not yet built on trust.	National and Sub-national Government are partially integrated, but very dependent upon personality within each structure	National and sub-National Government integrated on key issues, trust is building but still requires constant cajoling.	National and sub-national government integrated, communicating, but improvements still required.	
	Provincial Government and DGs do not consult and often work counter to each other.	Provincial Government and DGs understand the need to consult but have tensions prevent effective working	Provincial Government and DGs meet regularly, but still not working well together, sharing information and aligning plans.	Provincial Government and DGs meeting, aligning plans but not full effective.	Provincial Government and DGs working together, sharing information and aligning plans.	

**Figure B-3. An example of the maturity model for the governance LOA**

Maturity Model		<b>POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT</b>			Provincial Assessment
Political Development	Beginning	Developing	Sustainable	Performing	Self-Reliance
<b>Engaged local population</b>	Almost no participation in political process	Participation in the political process still limited although starting to show signs of increase.	Increasing participation in political process although mainly through active political party members.	Participation in the political process positive and starting to be conducted by general public	Majority participation in political process
<b>Effective Political parties</b>	Non-existent civil society	Nascent civil society	Civil society being established, but not widely based across the population.	Open and engaged members of the public as part of civil society.	Active and engaged civil society
<b>Individual freedoms</b>	No political process and parties; hundreds of political parties that resemble a social club with no political position/ideology	Political process is limited with parties developing positions, use violence via militias to attract membership, intimidate rivals and influence community	consolidation of political parties, some political ideology, continued reliance on militias, creation of social support branches and charities	Political parties becoming more and more effective, although still not properly defining a broad range of aims and objectives.	effective multiple parties with clear aims and platforms
<b>Representation</b>	Political parties sanction use of violence	Political parties neither not necessarily supporting violence, but neither denouncing it.	Political parties opening denouncing violence, but still covertly supporting militia activity.	Political parties attempt to operate without use of violence	Political parties eschew use of force
<b>Peaceful transfer of power</b>	Inability to exercise freedoms without repercussions	Limited freedoms	Extremism reducing, but still some limit to overall freedoms.	Population generally feels confident to express themselves, but still occurrences of intimidation.	Full (Essential) freedoms within the law
<b>Representation</b>	Individuals discouraged to express freedoms	Individuals feel unable to express views and opinions because of intimidation.	Individual's expression of freedom tolerated	Individuals starting to openly express opinion and feel comfortable with it.	Individuals encouraged to express freedoms
<b>Representation</b>	Grossly disproportionate	Limited Representation	Representation being better distributed.	Improvement in representation	Proportionally representative. Provincial govt in govt offices.
<b>Representation</b>	No political themes discussed	Some political themes discussed	Certain subjects are clearly avoided and glossed over.	Wider and more open discussion of political subjects	PC in civil service Major political themes represented/addressed (provincially)
<b>Peaceful transfer of power</b>	Significant violence during transfer of power	Violence limited to centres of local Government during transfer of power.	Violence limited to rioting rather than anything more substantial during transfer of power.	Minor rioting during transfer of power	No violence associated with transfer of power
<b>Peaceful transfer of power</b>	Rejection of incoming elected officials	Newly elected officials having great resistance when they start to take office.	Conditional limited support of incoming elected officials	Elected officials supported, but meeting some resistance	Acceptance and support of incoming elected officials

Figure B-4. An example of the maturity model for the political development LOA

**MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS**

<u>Maturity Model</u>		<b>ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT</b>			<u>Provincial Assessment</u>
<u>Economic Development</u>	Beginning	Developing	Sustainable	Performing	Self-Reliance
<b>Comms Infrastructure</b>	Deteriorated transport and other comms networks	Transport and other communication networks begin extended and improving logistic and other functions.	Limited/Ad Hoc transport and other comms networks	Transport networks developed and improving between main population centres and communication networks	Developed and accessible transport and other comms networks
<b>Private Sector Growth</b>	No clear and functional supply chain supporting the private sector Limited access to retail goods and services	The supply chain only works for specific sectors, but is still inconsistent. Shops tend to open and close as security situation or violence	Ad Hoc and limited supply chain (some supply chains working but not many) Shops open/limited goods on the shelves.	Supply chain generally working for most sectors, although severe interruptions frequently Shops and goods available but limited selection and not widely	Functional supply chain delivering goods and services Increasing number of shops open and stocked and
<b>Industry and State Owned Enterprises</b>	No industrial Capacity or SOEs not open	Industrial capacity including SOE's starting to be re-established, but not really driving the economy.	SOEs revitalised, limited production, but operating at a loss.	Industrial and SOE's capacity increasing. Productions levels and markets being generated.	Operational industry, steady production and markets being established.
<b>Employment</b>	High unemployment rates NO VOTECH Training	Short term job opportunities created VOTECH tech training established, but limited take-up.	Enduring jobs being starting to be created. VOTECH training filling short term employment strategies	Enduring jobs being generated and a start of a downward trend VOTECH Training strating to deliver and seen as a good way to gain skills and gain	Enduring job market aligned to decreasing unemployment. VOTECH training tied to employment market
<b>Banking</b>	Limited or non-existent retail banking	State banks opening but only one or two in major centres.	State bank branches opening widely Private sector banks opening	State bank and retail banking branches open with the people starting to trust and use them.	State and retail banks operating Savings and checking available
	Limited business access to credit	Business credit only available to a mimum of businesses.	Micro-finance increasingly available	Credit and Micro-Finance available but repayment and collateral condition still remain	Business credit systems in place and working

**Figure B-5. An example of the maturity model for the economic development LOA**

<u>Maturity Model</u>		<b>POLITICAL RECONCILIATION</b>				<u>Provincial Assessment</u>
<b>Political Reconciliation</b>	<b>Beginning</b>	<b>Developing</b>	<b>Sustainable</b>	<b>Performing</b>	<b>Self-Reliance</b>	
<b>Resolve differences between conflicting parties</b>	Establish the view that reconciliation with friends is not what Iraqis need to do, they need to reconcile with their enemies	Ensure GoI seen as representative of both sides, despite Sunni boycott of election	GoI take (and make) decisions and policies that cross the sectarian divide, and IO emphasize this.	Sunni engage fully in governance of Iraq	Differences are not seen as Sunni vs Shia.	
<b>Establish a genuine desire to reconcile through peaceful dialogue</b>	Create, through current and emerging examples, a desire to establish security and economic sustainability via reconciliation	Generate discussion forums amongst Key Actors (Tribal Sheikhs) that give rise to formation of combined Shia/Sunni tribal councils	Combined Tribal councils work together to put interests of the local Iraq above the interest of the local Shia or Sunni	Combined Tribal Councils provide non-sectarian governance at sub-provincial (local) level	Establish long-term security and economic sustainability	
<b>Sectarian enclave communities move toward mixed, and reconciled Shia/Sunni communities</b>	Create a desire to live in harmony	Facilitate methods of returning IDPs to original neighborhoods	Produce strong IO on small successes of returned IDPs emphasizing the security and economic benefits	Desire to return to own neighborhood and ability to return, so strong that inertia and momentum create own initiatives without GoI/CF involvement	Establish an environment that allows Sunni and Shia to live side by side, thus replacing Sectarian enclaves with mixed communities	

Figure B-6. An example of the maturity model for the political reconciliation LOA

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<b>Maturity Model</b>		<b>RULE OF LAW</b>			<b>Provincial Assessment</b>
<b>Rule of Law</b>	<b>Beginning</b>	<b>Developing</b>	<b>Sustainable</b>	<b>Performing</b>	<b>Self-Reliance</b>
<b>Legal Institutions</b>	Tribal rules	A recognition that due process of law and legal institution has primacy, but local Sheikhs still	Tribal leaders support legal process through legal institutions but will intervene in	Tribal leaders actively supporting the legal processes and institutions and very rarely	Tribal leaders do not interfere in or negatively influence operations
	No legal institutions	Legal institutions operating but has limited effect and the population has not trust.	Legal institutions open and operating semi-effectively	Legal institutions open and operating, but has difficulty training and maintaining staff.	Legal institutions open, fully operational and staffed
<b>Iraqi Police</b>	Corrupt police biased ethnically	Local police chief actively attempting to purge corrupt	Police apply laws majority of time and fewer instances of	Internal police systems routing out bad and corrupt officers.	Increasing respect by the police for all citizens freedoms
	IP controlled by militia, criminals	IP still controlled by militia and with criminal links, but do maintain an element of law and order.	IP no longer openly hosts illegal entities but still influenced by personnel and tribal connections and subject to some	IP selection processes preventing known militia members joining.	A professional IP free of external influences.
<b>Judges</b>	Judges targeted and assassinated	Incidents of Judges being targeted reducing	Judges working but still under sway of tribal, gov't influences	Judges increasingly demonstrating independent	Independent and effective judges
	Judges not applying the law and are subject to intimidation	Judges openly rejecting intimidation and starting to apply	Judges applying Iraq laws in majority of cases	Judges correctly applying the law, but still some sectarian or	Judges with full ownership of Iraq laws and public credibility.
<b>Courts</b>	Courts are not convening	Courts are convening and trials being held in to totally ah hoc manner and without due	Courts convening, trials established and scheduled, but not being held on a steady basis	Courts convene and trials planned in and are being held, but subject a long backlog	Courts convening, trials progressing in orderly manner
	Grievances are not addressed, grieving parties are targeted or turned away	Grievances are being heard, but nothing is really happening as a result.	Grievances are heard and occasionally are addressed.	Grievances are addressed in majority of cases, rare instances of ethnic based	Grievances are held in a just manner and in proper order.
<b>Prisons, Corrections</b>	No proper facilities and no admission accountability	Facilities being built and prepared, but not yet staffed and operational	Prison facilities starting to open, although internal process and lack of staff prevent them being	Operational and organized prison facilities with above rudimentary record keeping	Well run prisons with advanced non-comptible record keeping.
	No respect for basic human rights	Clear rules and regulation established for treatment of prisoners, although not always	Basic human rights are generally respected but based on individual guards' principles	Treatment of prisoners showing signs of improvement	Prisons that meet acceptable standards on human rights for treatment of prisoners.

**Figure B-7. An example of the maturity model for the rule of law LOA**

After a PRT assesses its provinces for all five LOAs, it summarizes the results in an overview chart called the behavior statement (see Figure B-8).

Assessments for both the maturity model and the behavior statement fall within five capacity levels: beginning, developing, sustainable, performing, and self-reliant.

The assessments provide brief comments about each objective that describe how the province is performing and highlighting any resource issues that would enable the objective to be moved towards self-reliance or major blockers to achieving an upward trend.

<b>Maturity</b>	<b>Beginning</b>	<b>Developing</b>	<b>Sustainable</b>	<b>Performing</b>	<b>Self-reliant</b>
<b>Objective</b>					
<b>Governance</b>	X				
<b>Political Development</b>	X				
<b>Political Reconciliation</b>	X				
<b>Economic Development</b>	X				
<b>Rule of Law</b>	X				

**Figure B-8. An example of a provincial assessment behavior statement**






Figure B-9. A sample of a PRT assessment cycle calendar as of a specific date (DD MM YY)

(Note: Depending on information requirements and other factors, the PRT may have a different assessment reporting cycle from the reporting cycle of the military unit in the operational area.)



## Appendix C

### Internet Resources and Research Techniques

#### Internet Resources

Listed here are Web sites that can be accessed on the Internet to provide background and understanding on governments, leaders, infrastructure, and regions. Research of the operational area and its populations and infrastructure are necessary in understanding the problems that cause instability. The following unclassified resources are available online:

##### The *World Factbook*

- The *World Factbook* provides information on the history, people, government, economy, geography, communications, transportation, military, and transnational issues for 266 world entities. Its reference tab includes: maps of the major world regions as well as flags of the world, a physical map of the world, a political map of the world, and a map of the standard time zones of the world.
- The Web site is <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>>.

##### World leaders

- The Central Intelligence Agency publishes and updates the online directory of chiefs of state and cabinet members of foreign governments regularly. The directory is intended to be used primarily as a reference aid and includes as many governments of the world as is considered practical; some of them are not officially recognized by the United States (U.S.).
- Governments are listed in alphabetical order according to the most commonly used version of each country's name. The spelling of the personal names in this directory follows transliteration systems generally agreed upon by U.S. government agencies except in the cases in which officials have stated a preference for alternate spellings of their names.
- The Web site is <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/index.html>>.

##### U.S. State Department

- *Country Information* and *Background Notes* publications include facts about the land, people, history, government, political conditions, economy, and foreign relations of almost 200 countries and dependencies. It is possible to get the latest information from e-mail updates available from this Web site.
- The Web site is <<http://www.state.gov/countries/>>.

### United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

- USAID plays a vital role in promoting U.S. national security, foreign policy, and the fight against terrorism. It does so by addressing poverty fueled by lack of economic opportunity, one of the root causes of violence today. As stated in the President's National Security Strategy, USAID's work in development joins diplomacy and defense as one of three key pieces of the nation's foreign policy apparatus. USAID promotes peace and stability by fostering economic growth, protecting human health, providing emergency humanitarian assistance, and enhancing democracy in developing countries. These efforts to improve the lives of millions of people worldwide represent U.S. values and advances U.S. interests for peace and prosperity. USAID mission press releases provide insight and updates for USAID activities in countries and regions.
- USAID's Web site is <<http://www.usaid.gov/press/missions/>>.

### Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC)

- The JWAC is a premier science and engineering institution tasked with solving complex challenges for the nation's warfighters. The JWAC uses social and physical science techniques and engineering expertise to assist warfighters in support of national security. The JWAC coordinates directly with the staffs of all unified commands, combatant commands, Department of Defense elements, military services, and other government departments and agencies to protect the U.S. and help the nation's armed forces accomplish their missions.
- The JWAC can be reached through military channels or at <[www.jwac.mil](http://www.jwac.mil)>.

### Economic reports about countries worldwide

- The Web site for the U.S. Department of State, Economics and Energy is <<http://www.state.gov/e/>>.
- U.S. government online bookstore.
  - Locate and order publications (books, maps, serials, videos, CD-ROMs, and subscriptions) available for sale through the superintendent of documents, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO). GPO Access is a service that provides free electronic access to a wealth of important information products produced by the Federal government.
  - The Web site is <<http://bookstore.gpo.gov/index.jsp>>.

- Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP).
  - The FDLP desktop serves as a centralized resource for disseminating U.S. government information to the American public through libraries across the nation. Stay up-to-date with the latest innovations and progress of the program and utilize various tools to enhance public services.
  - The Web site is <<http://www.fdlp.gov/>>.
- Other commercial companies may be helpful such as *U.S. Economy and News*, *New York Times* Economic News, CNN Money Economy, *Moody's Economy*, Economic News by the BBC, and *The Economist's* Economic Intelligence Unit.

### **Internet Research Techniques and Procedures**

Plan research by using the following steps:

- Use mission and specific information requirements to determine objective and search terms.
- Record all search terms for future reference and follow up research.
- Collaborate with other analysts to determine information sources.
- Select search tools and sources that will satisfy the objective.
- Comply with any legal restrictions.
- Determine operations and computer security measures.
- Have a plan to prevent any spillage of classified or sensitive material to unclassified documents.

Conduct search using the following:

- Search using keywords.
- Search in natural language.
- Use commercial search engines and map programs as appropriate.

Refine the search by the following means:

- Compare the relevance of the results to the objective and indicators.
- Compare the accuracy of the results and to search parameters (key words, phrase, date or date range, language, and format).
- Compare results from different search engines to identify missing or incomplete information (for example, the results of one search has news articles and the other does not).
- Modify keywords/search terms as required.
- Search within results (to save time and effort).
- Search by field.
- Search cached and archived pages.
- Truncate suffixes from the uniform resource locator; this will bring up the home or main page and access to other pages on the site.

Recording results should include the following:

- Record results for the search. Print relevant material for a back-up file.
- Bookmark Web pages for further research and access.
- Save and organize content.
- Download files for access and archiving.
- Record citations for use in completed products.
- Identify intellectual property.

Assess results in the following way:

- Evaluate source reliability.
- Evaluate information accuracy.

Important considerations include the following:

- Searching the Internet can compromise operations security (OPSEC) by leaving “footprints” on visited sites. Searches should be coordinated with the OPSEC plan.
- Internet sites can compromise computer and network security by downloading malicious software.
- Search engines vary in how they search and display results.

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- Search engine results build only an index of Internet sites and files.
- Save research for information sharing with other U.S. government departments and agencies, coalition partners, or deploying units.

Sources of cultural knowledge include:

- The Center for Intercultural Learning, Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <[http://www.intercultures.ca/cil-cai/intercultural\\_issues-en.asp?lvl=8&ISO=AF&SubjectID=2](http://www.intercultures.ca/cil-cai/intercultural_issues-en.asp?lvl=8&ISO=AF&SubjectID=2)>.
- The Library of Congress Country Studies, <<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html>>.
- The University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, <<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/>>.





## Appendix D

### Key Terms

Acronym or term	Definition
ASCOPE	<p>Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events</p> <p>These are the six civil considerations in Army planning.</p>
actions	<p>An activity that enables a mission or function to be accomplished</p>
AO	<p>Area of Operations</p>
country team	<p>Country teams in embassies are made up of key figures from the Department of State and other agencies who work under the direction of the ambassador and meet regularly to share information and coordinate their actions. The mission includes not only Department of State and Foreign Service personnel, but also the representatives of all other United States (U.S.) agencies which have programs or activities (in the country). Depending on embassy size and the nature of U.S. interests in a country, each country team may be configured differently—and some may include more than 40 agencies.</p>
CA	<p>Civil Affairs</p> <p><b>Note:</b> Each brigade combat team (BCT) normally has a 32-man CA company directly supporting it with five 4-man CA teams trained in civil reconnaissance, cross cultural communications, and the use of interpreters. The remaining 12 Soldiers support the teams, the BCT civil affairs staff officer, and assist with civil information management and, if established, the civil-military operations center operations.</p>
CALL	<p>Center for Army Lessons Learned</p>

Acronym or term	Definition
DIME	<p>Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic</p> <p>Actions on political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information–physical environment and time (PMESII–PT) systems attain desired effects and achieve objectives.</p>
effect	<p>The physical and/or behavioral state of a PMESII–PT system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect.</p>
ePRT	<p>Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams</p> <p>Embedded provincial reconstruction teams are embedded with BCTs and are responsible for providing advice, expertise, and program management to support the local counterinsurgency strategy devised with their BCT.</p>
HNG	<p>Host Nation Government</p>
HTT	<p>Human Terrain Teams</p> <p>HTTs consist of five to nine personnel deployed to support field commanders. HTTs fill the socio-cultural knowledge gap in the commander’s operational environment and interpret key events in his AO.</p>
ICAF	<p>Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework</p> <p>The ICAF is a strategic and regional level assessment tool used to give U.S. government departments and agencies a common picture using input across the inter agency spectrum.</p>
maturity model	<p>The maturity model is an internationally recognized tool for assessing the progress of major change management programs. Specifically, it covers governance, political development, economic development, political reconciliation, and rule of law.</p>

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<b>Acronym or term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
METT-TC	<p>Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support available–time available and civil considerations</p> <p>These are considered mission variables within the Army’s tactical planning framework.</p>
MOE	<p>Measure of Effectiveness</p> <p>MOE is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior or capability that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.</p>
MOP	<p>Measure of Performance</p> <p>MOP is a criterion used to measure if a task is performed to a necessary standard. A MOP measures output, that is, were actions done correctly.</p>
objective	<p>A clearly defined and attainable goal towards which every operation is directed.</p>
PMESII-PT	<p>Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information–Physical Environment and Time</p>
PRT	<p>Provincial Reconstruction Team</p> <p>The PRT program is a U.S.-led, civil-military effort to improve the capabilities of provincial and local governments to govern effectively and deliver essential services. Also see ePRT.</p>
stability operations	<p>Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of a national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (Joint Publication 3-0, <i>Joint Operations</i>).</p>

<b>Acronym or term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
SWET	Sewage, Water, Electricity, [and] Trash  SWET are several essential services tracked in the PRT maturity model.
tactical stability matrix	The tactical stability matrix tracks and organizes activities and should form the basis for the stabilization plan.
TCAPF	Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning Framework  The TCAPF is an assessment tool used across U.S. government departments and agencies.
task	An event or action that causes systemic change.

## Appendix E

### References

Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I*.

Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Military Affairs, *Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework*, 10 March 2008.

USAID Office of Military Affairs, *Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework Collectors Training*, 1 September 2009.

USAID Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning Framework Tool Kit.

Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 07-34, *Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook*.

SIGIR-09-013, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams' Performance Measurement Process Has Improved*, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 29 January 2009.

*Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, United States Institute of Peace Press, November 2009, <[http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/PKSOI\\_Publications.cfm](http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/PKSOI_Publications.cfm)>.



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
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