

Communication in Leadership Redux

**A Monograph
by
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14. ABSTRACT Communicating official messages to soldiers within the United States Army is an endeavor that leaders at every level have conducted since the inception of the organization. Army doctrine links communication to leadership via the terminological reliance on influence. Communication is sometimes labeled as propaganda due to an underlying intent to influence. Leadership, just like propaganda, is founded upon the art and science of influencing people. The technical issues of how to effectively communicate messages have changed primarily by way of the means available at any given time of the Army's history. Secondary considerations, such as how to counter competing messages, are evident in the communication planning and decision making of the past and present. This monograph compares methods of communicating official messages from the leadership of the Department of the Army to soldiers within the United States Army. The analysis focuses on the time period between the years spanning World War II through the Eisenhower Presidency. Additional data is presented from either Allied or enemy examples in World War II or the United States in the intermediate years to aid in discussion as applicable to contemporary methods and modes of communication. The problems faced by leaders and planners within the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army have remained relatively consistent over the years, changing mainly in terms of the quantity and speed of information that soldiers must process and prioritize in competition for official message space. Military doctrine has adapted over time to incorporate the integration of propaganda, influence, and communication within the foundations of leadership. Regardless of the medium used or audience targeted, successful leaders often use enduring principles of communication that transcend the evolution of technology. As a result, military leaders continue to adapt to the evolving environment by using every means available to communicate with soldiers.					
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Abstract

COMMUNICATION IN LEADERSHIP REDUX by Major Ken Smith, U.S. Army, 59 pages.

Communicating official messages to soldiers within the United States Army is an endeavor that leaders at every level have conducted since the inception of the organization. Army doctrine links communication to leadership via the terminological reliance on influence. Communication is sometimes labeled as propaganda due to an underlying intent to influence. Leadership, just like propaganda, is founded upon the art and science of influencing people. The technical issues of how to effectively communicate messages have changed primarily by way of the means available at any given time of the Army's history. Secondary considerations, such as how to counter competing messages, are evident in the communication planning and decision making of the past and present. This monograph compares methods of communicating official messages from the leadership of the Department of the Army to soldiers within the United States Army. The analysis focuses on the time period between the years spanning World War II through the Eisenhower Presidency. Additional data is presented from either Allied or enemy examples in World War II or the United States in the intermediate years to aid in discussion as applicable to contemporary methods and modes of communication. The problems faced by leaders and planners within the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army have remained relatively consistent over the years, changing mainly in terms of the quantity and speed of information that soldiers must process and prioritize in competition for official message space. Military doctrine has adapted over time to incorporate the integration of influence and communication within the foundations of leadership. Regardless of the medium used or audience targeted, successful leaders often use enduring principles of communication that transcend the evolution of technology. As a result, military leaders continue to adapt to the evolving environment by using every means available to communicate with soldiers.

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Introduction

The purpose of this study is to determine what principles of commercial advertising are applicable to the military problem of arousing, controlling, molding and directing the minds of soldiers to attain a desired military end.

Major D.S. Lenzner, 1934

The above statement of purpose is extracted from the individual research of a United States Army officer attending the Army's Command and General Staff School over seventy-five years ago. In Major Lenzner's "The Application of the Principles of Commercial Advertising to the Problem of Leadership," he described a realization that the science of psychology permeates both commercial and non-commercial applications. While the United States Army does not sell a product, we are immersed in the relentless pursuit to "influence human minds."¹ Three quarters of a century later, we find that many of the lessons learned by our military predecessors in the subjects of human behavior and communication theory mirror the discussions and independent self-realizations of concepts re-learned by contemporary military leaders and students of military science. As a result, we find ourselves pondering a query in the twenty-first century that is surprisingly similar to Major Lenzner's individual research question prior to World War II. How does the United States Army effectively communicate official messages to its soldiers?

Message campaigns as part of a holistic communications plan designed to inform and influence United States Army soldiers for strategic ends have historically been an integral part of preparing and maintaining the force.² While the manner in which information was passed to soldiers has changed with technological advances, and while the data presented to soldiers has

¹ D.S. Lenzner, "The Application of the Principles of Commercial Advertising to the Problem of Leadership," (personal research monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff School, 1934), 12. Lenzner cites the Encyclopedia Americana of 1929. A review of historical research conducted by our predecessors provides surprising similarities to the contemporary resurgence in discussions over the role of communication and the inevitable transfer of commercial marketing concepts into military operations.

² U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 6-22 Army Leadership* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2006), 12-8. Also addressed in previous versions of Army leadership manuals such as, Headquarters Department of the Army, *Field Manual 22-100 Military Leadership* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 31 July 1990), 5.

evolved with changes in society, many of the intended effects of the message efforts have remained relatively constant. The methods of conveying official messages to U.S. soldiers have maintained their relevance through the consistent efforts to influence support for the mission, support for the force, and support for the nation. In future conflicts, where action or inaction can have immediate effects due to the speed of information combined with global connectivity, the ability to effectively communicate with our soldiers to influence decisions and actions that best support objectives at every level of war will continue to increase in importance.

Throughout time, military leaders harnessed and wielded the full spectrum of available assets toward common goals and message themes. From World War II to the present, this monograph covers enduring qualities of military leadership in three sections by embracing the concept of communication as an inherent part of leadership, identifying the medium of choice that best conveys the message the soldier, and summarizing enduring principles of communication as related to leadership.

The time period from World War II to the Eisenhower Presidency provides a contrast with the modern environment because of the comparative power that the United States government wielded over the media combined with the relative lack of competing messages that soldiers of the period had to filter.³ The power over media in yesteryear can be viewed in terms of two primary factors—relative sparseness of media combined with greater governmental control. For example, The Federal Communications Act of 1934 mandated the provision of free airtime for public service broadcasts. As a result, government-produced programming designed to influence public opinion filled a majority of the space between commercial broadcasts during

³ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Recording by General Eisenhower for Broadcast on the Army Hour, September 3, 1944,” Dwight D. Eisenhower: Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-52, Principle File, Box No. 192. In a time when the government had greater control and ownership of the nation’s media, much of the government’s ability to control the airwaves stemmed from a lack of commercial infrastructure and competition. Examples of the government’s greater influence abound in the programs developed and used to transmit messages. *The Army Hour*, which aired on Sunday afternoons during World War II and had an audience of over 3,000,000. NBC provided the broadcast facilities and paid the costs of \$3500 per week and the military supplied the cast, wardrobe, and special effects. Also see (Time, “Radio: The Army Hour”, April 5, 1943) for additional information on *The Army Hour*.

World War II.⁴ Even with the relaxing of some censorship controls, the period was seen as the peak of military-media cooperation.”⁵

A primer in communication as an inherent part of leadership will provide baseline information for those new to military doctrine. A review of the relationship of influence in leadership and communication explains how the application of influence and persuasion can sometimes be interpreted as propaganda even though propaganda is inherently what the military leader does not do. Personal journals, archived documents, and secondary source analyses of historical examples from World War II through the Eisenhower presidency describe ways that the American soldier was influenced by the Army, Department of Defense, or Presidential communication. Additional contrast between the sometimes perceived idealistic years of World War II and the contemporary environment provides perspectives on how to communicate official messages effectively to the soldier.⁶ Examples of how the President, Department of Defense, or the Army influenced soldiers regardless of the chosen medium are then presented while also examining modern communication media. The final section on enduring principles of communication provides closure through a rediscovery of select themes that transcend theories of communication, leadership, marketing, and other social sciences as leaders hone their ability to communicate to soldiers or any other audience. In the end, regardless of new means made available by the evolution of technologies, United States Army leaders continue to use every asset at their disposal to communicate messages to soldiers.

⁴ Gerd Horten, *Radio Goes to War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 43.

⁵ Loren B. Thompson, *Defense Beat: The Dilemmas of Defense Coverage* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 150.

⁶ Studs Terkel. *"The Good War": An Oral History of World War Two* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984). A compilation of primary source interviews spanning the many actors involved in World War II shows different perspectives on a war that has been glamorized as a conflict between good and evil.

Propaganda, Communication and Leadership

—Propaganda is a bit like pornography—hard to define but most people think they will know it when they see it.”⁷ It can be argued, while eschewing potentially perceived negative political or legal ramifications of accepting the proposal, that all activities involving the intent to influence soldiers or any other audience are really one form or another of propaganda.

Propaganda is defined by the United States Army, the United States Department of Defense, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as:

Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.⁸

Using this definition for a simple and potentially spurious form of analysis, we see that the soldiers that make up the Army fit the doctrinal classification of “any group.” The messages that the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army transmits to its soldiers, regardless of the medium, fit the category of “any form of communication.” The reasons that the chain of command and other military leaders and planners communicate with soldiers are to “benefit” the organization, and the organization exists to “support” the objectives of the United States. Whether the intent of the message being communicated is to raise morale, build esprit de corps, garner support for policy, or merely to give orders requiring execution, the fact that it is “designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior” qualifies these internal

⁷ Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, *Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits, and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 49. This quote is based upon Justice Potter Stewart’s logic for not dwelling on the definition for pornography in an effort to make progress in *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).

⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 1-02 Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, September 2004), 1-152. Also in Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-53 Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, 05 September 2003 and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions AAP-6* (English and French), 2009, 2-P-10. This is comparable to some of the most widely accepted definitions as apparent in Richard Weiner, *Webster’s New World Dictionary of Media and Communication* (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1990), 377. The definition provided by Weiner states that propaganda is “communications—including written works, speeches, and other forms—intended to influence public opinion.”

communication strategies to be labeled as propaganda. However, this fallacious association of leadership with propaganda is not represented within the Army values.⁹ Therefore, the influence function conducted as part of military leadership is not and should never be misconstrued as propaganda.

—An Army leader.....inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals.”¹⁰ The communication component of leadership is the basis of influence and is explained in doctrine that “through words and personal example, leaders communicate purpose, direction, and motivation.”¹¹ The complete integration of communication within the philosophy of leadership is evident as the core competency of ‘leading’ is further deconstructed in doctrinal publications such as *Army Leadership*.

Army doctrine devotes entire chapters to subcomponents of leadership. One of these subcomponents is ‘leading.’ Doctrine further identifies four competencies that comprise ‘leading’ and presents them as; “leads others,” “extends influence beyond the chain of command,” “leads by example,” and “communicates.”¹² Analysis of these four competencies of ‘leading’ provides additional evidence of the synergy between leadership, communication, and influence.

⁹ —“Living the Army Values,” GoArmy.com, http://www.goarmy.com/life/living_the_army_values (accessed 12 April 2010). The Army values (loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, personal courage) provide the common foundation for each of the Army’s soldiers and leaders. Specifically, the value of integrity prescribes doing what is “right legally and morally.” Specifically, soldiers and leaders “do nothing that deceives others.” Therefore, the influence function conducted as part of military leadership is not and should never be misconstrued as propaganda.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 6-22 Army Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2006), 1-1. By definition, a leader is “anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals.” Leading is influencing.

¹¹ Ibid., 1-2. Influencing is the aggregate of all actions and messages (everything a leader does) to get others to do whatever is required. Actions are even more important than words.

¹² Ibid., 7-3.

—Leads others” focuses on the concept of influence as a leader interacts with both soldiers and Army civilians within the organization.¹³ —Extends influence beyond the chain of command” requires the military leader to communicate effectively to multiple audiences external to the unit inside and outside of the government. —Leads by example” embraces the power of action as one of the most effective methods of communication. Behaviors that are counter to Army values or policy potentially undermine any other efforts of communication. And —Communicates” focuses on the combination of skills required to convey information, develop mutual understanding, and create unity of effort toward organizational goals.¹⁴

It is through leadership’s relationship with and reliance on the ability to communicate effectively that the tie between leadership and the relentless pursuit to —influence human minds” exists. The act of influencing others in itself is not bad. The intent to influence is merely a requirement toward achieving organizational or national goals. In spite of the clear place that influence has within leadership in accordance with doctrine, less desirable connotations of the many nuances of influencing others exists. It is from these negative perceptions that attempts to influence others may be falsely labeled as propaganda even when propaganda is not a doctrinal part of Army leadership.

Critics of propaganda are practically enamored with the negative aspects of how information can be selectively chosen for transmission or retention. Likewise, the Army does not use propaganda as a function of leadership for this same reason. The soldier’s, much like the public’s, lack of appetite for partial truth is almost as great as its disdain for lies. In contrast, advocates of propaganda argue that the differentiation between propaganda and any other form of

¹³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 6-22 Army Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2006), 7-3.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

communication intended to influence relies on “post hoc” analysis.¹⁵ The message is construed as propaganda if the attempt to persuade fails while successful attempts to influence are perceived as informative.¹⁶ History is replete with examples of communication efforts that failed due to a lack of confidence in the source.

In World War II, Hitler’s reluctance to admit bad news led to frequent incidences where the German citizens caught the High Command in multiple acts of withholding significant portions of the truth.¹⁷ As a result, both soldiers and civilians of Germany favored United States and British news sources such as the British Broadcasting Corporation.¹⁸ In contrast, General Dwight D. Eisenhower understood how trust and credibility was created and maintained through telling both the good and the bad to the American people and soldiers. During a luncheon Eisenhower organized on August 15, 1942 with heads of radio, press, military public relations officers, and the senior editor of the *Stars and Stripes*, he removed some of the existing censorship rules. And while Ike only addressed the American public in his dialogue at the luncheon, the policy of disclosure meant that the soldiers who received information from civilian media sources were also privy to the good and bad.¹⁹ In addition, even when falsehoods were an operational necessity, the Supreme Allied Commander carefully weighed the alternatives to deceiving his own troops.

Operational requirements sometimes mandate decisions to deliberately deceive the enemy or even our own soldiers. While the necessity of successful military deception will require

¹⁵ Scot Macdonald, *Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First Century Altered Images and Deception Operations* (London: Routledge, 2007), 32.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Michael Balfour, *Propaganda in War: 1939-1945* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 429-430.

¹⁸ Miles Hudson and John Stanier, *War and the Media* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 305. A reputation for truth transcended national boundaries. “Goebbels’ propaganda machine was believed by nobody.”

¹⁹ Harry C. Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 59.

similar actions for as long as man wages war, the specifics of whom in the organization should be deceived or merely uninformed (i.e. unwitting actor) will always mandate caution.²⁰ As part of Operation TORCH in World War II, ‘Solo Two’ of the military deception plan was designed to mislead our own troops in the event that any leaks occurred that could jeopardize the mission. In the end, Ike supported a recommendation from General Clark on August 16, 1942 to inform commanders down to the regimental level of the actual objectives.²¹ Contemporary doctrine acknowledges the continued requirement to balance witting and unwitting actors in the planning and execution of military deception. However, just as in Eisenhower’s time, the minimization of falsehoods during the deception plan minimizes the potential risk of compromise.²²

Communication targeting members of the military has indirect effects on the domestic audience both internal and external to the U.S. Government just as communication targeting the American public affects the soldier. Military members can affect public opinion both through their interactions with the civilian populace and through their simultaneous status as citizens.²³ So, by extension, any efforts to influence and not merely inform the soldier may be construed as propaganda targeting the domestic population. Even when the immediate goal is to provide information, the underlying intent to support the organization in keeping with the national objectives qualifies the communication efforts to be labeled as propaganda in accordance with the definition.

²⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-13 Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, November 2003), 4-8. An unwitting actor “is an individual participating in the conduct of a military deception operation without personal knowledge of the facts of the deception.”

²¹ Harry C. Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 60.

²² U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-13 Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, November 2003), 4-8.

²³ Michael Balfour, *Propaganda in War: 1939-1945* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 445.

A more cynical perspective could be that information campaigns count as propaganda because all conveyances of fact are propaganda. The reason that all conveyances of fact are propaganda is because human beings are involved in the communication process. The transmittal of even a potentially simple message involving fact can never truly be objective as long as humans must select what information is transmitted.²⁴ Humans inherently transfer subjectivity to seemingly objective collations of fact, even when organized in simple chronological order. Regardless of the medium or message, the signal must always cross at least one human being in the role of a filter. It is this subjectivity that causes some social scientists to write entire tomes involving topics like ~~the~~ fictions of factual representation.”²⁵ Information for transmission is selected based on perceptions of importance defined by a myriad of factors, such as self interest, individual cultural identities, and requirements of the organization, group dynamics, and so forth. All communication becomes propaganda because it all serves the ultimate purposes of benefitting either the self (i.e. the transmitter of the message), our immediate group (i.e. the Army), or our higher organization (i.e. the Department of Defense and the United States) and its objectives. It is the existence of these different cognitive lenses combined with varying interests that lead back to selective inclusion of truths or falsehoods as one of the most commonly perceived criticisms of propaganda. However, most importantly, Army doctrine on leadership does not include or associate propaganda with the inherent requirements to communicate and influence the human minds of the organization.

The ability to communicate and influence others is a necessary and vital enabler for a leader’s employment of other national powers. Army leaders have a full array of communication

²⁴ Ibid., 431. In Joseph Goebbels’ private discussion with friends, he shows his insights into perspective and humans as a filter. See also the —Foundations of Design” block of instruction at the United States Army School of Advanced Military Studies.

²⁵ Hayden White, *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 121-134. Hayden authors many books addressing the inherent subjectivity transferred to the seemingly objective collation of facts, even when organized in simple chronological order.

tools available as long as the terms, concepts, regulations, or legal restrictions are understood.²⁶ Strategies for communication were once wielded more openly on a national scale and leveraged in ways similar to how the British Ministry of Morale focused on the psychological fitness of the people or how Britain created a Home Publicity Sub-Committee to develop objectives and garner support in 1938.²⁷ More precisely, the British government embarked on a strategy of counterpropaganda prior to World War II in response to the rapid expansion of Germany's propaganda machine.

In the ongoing Global War on Terrorism, if we are truly intent on fighting and winning the total war on ideas, then we must, in a sense, "wage total peace" by "linging to bear every asset of our personal and national lives."²⁸ These words borrowed from the January 1958 State of the Union address and put into a contemporary context retain their applicability for any endeavor purporting to achieve a global goal. While President Eisenhower was talking about countering

²⁶ In addition to doctrine, Army leaders must be knowledgeable of U.S. Code and constraints contained within the Budget of the United States Government. Sources include: Office of Management and Budget, "Budget of the United States Government: Appendix Fiscal Year 2011," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy11/appendix.html> (accessed 22 March 2010) Section 8001 of General Provisions of the Department of Defense budget requires Congressional approval of "publicity or propaganda." U.S. Code is located at: U.S. Government Printing Office, "GPO Access: United States Code Main Page," 2006. <http://frwebgate6.access.gpo.gov> (accessed 22 March 2010) Other useful sources on the restricted use of propaganda and analysis of perceived domestic restrictions are Matt Armstrong, "Smith-Mundt Act: Facts, Myths, and Recommendations," MountainRunner, <http://mountainrunner.us/smith-mundt.html> (accessed 06 November 2009) and the interagency symposium on the Smith-Mundt Act held in January of 2009, summarized in "The Report on the Smith-Mundt Symposium of January 13, 2009," <http://armstrongsig.com/events/smith-mundt> (accessed 16 January 2010) Contrary to popular arguments, neither the original U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (i.e. The Smith-Mundt Act) nor follow-on amendments reference constraints on military or Department of Defense information operations. The amendment of 1972 only pertained to information intended for foreign audiences. Another often cited restriction pertains to the Zorinsky Amendment in 1985. Senator Edward Zorinsky sponsored the amendment to ban domestic activities of the United States Information Agency. The most frequently used quotes were taken out of context from his verbal presentation of the amendment and are not representative of the actual amendment contained within US Code. The Smith-Mundt Act only restricts the State Department and the United States Information Agency.

²⁷ Ian McLaine, *Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II* (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1979), 18-19. The British effort to mobilize an entire nation for total war prior to the start of World War II deserves credit for foresight. It also demonstrates the level of resolve required to wage war beyond a limited military commitment.

²⁸ Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 347.

and defeating the spread of communism, the relevance of the statement holds true as we counter any extreme ideology.

Getting a consistent message to an audience cannot function as a process wholly contained within the military organization, Department of Defense, or any single manifestation of the U.S. Government. Bureaucratic boundaries between government agencies and even between functions within organizations prevent synergy and keep the nation from realizing its full potential. However, we do not wish to live in “self-imposed totalitarianism” in exchange for greater assurance that our messages will be accepted and result in desired effects.²⁹ Part of our strength as a fighting force, nation, and culture is our celebration and pride in our differences and our freedom to be different.

We must remain cognizant that the holistic nature of a genuine national strategy supported with effective communication could be misconstrued as a repeat of previous failed experiments of society (i.e. communism). In the before mentioned January 1958 State of Union address, President Eisenhower described characteristics of communism and the Soviet threat in detail where “every human activity is pressed into service as a weapon of expansion. . . . trade, economic development, military power, arts, science, education, the whole world of ideas—all are harnessed to this same chariot of expansion.”³⁰

Application of influence by the strategic leader transcends pure military bounds and organizations.³¹ The military, as an extension of a nation’s power, educates and grooms leaders capable of planning campaigns that, by necessity, employ the complete spectrum of national

²⁹ Noam Chomsky, *Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda* (Westfield: Open Media, 1991), 21.

³⁰ President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union. January 9, 1958.

³¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 6-22 Army Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2006), 3-7. The strategic level of leadership extends beyond the Department of the Army through the Department of Defense. Strategic leaders plan and lead operations involving multiple military services and both government and non-government organizations.

powers.³² As a result, messages from senior military leaders are sometimes blurred with political commentary via commercial media.

From a legal perspective, a military leader is bound through restrictions such as those imposed on “publicity and propaganda” by Title VII Section 8001 of the Department of Defense portion of the annual budget.³³ However, some levels of communications targeting the domestic audience are required to sustain the force (e.g. recruiting and public support). Strategic leaders demonstrate their knowledge of legal boundaries by coordinating with Congress to maximize the effective communication capability of the organization. In the absence of any Congressionally-approved “publicity or propaganda,” ideological rifts among audiences can widen as a result of mixed messages contrary to organizational and National objectives.

The full capabilities of the nation to manage domestic public opinion did not begin to be realized until the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. His radio broadcasted fireside chats combined with logos, posters, rallies, and parades to create a holistic communication machine unmatched by prior administrations. The combined efforts of the U.S. government were united with a common goal of publicizing President Roosevelt’s New Deal.³⁴

As these examples from the previous century demonstrated, sometimes getting coordinated and consistent messages to the soldier or any audience involves the moral and political courage to accept and fully leverage all aspects of communication to change public

³² U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 1-02 Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, September 2004), 1-148. Army doctrine describes the projection of national power in terms of diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic capabilities. This use of terminology is consistent throughout the Department of Defense except for the replacement of “political” with “diplomatic.”

³³ U.S. Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government: Appendix Fiscal Year 2011* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010), 324. <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy11/appendix.html> (accessed 22 March 2010). Title VII Section 8001. “No part of any appropriation contained in this Act shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes not authorized by the Congress.”

³⁴ Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 11.

perception and an organizations image. In World War II, the need to heavily augment the civilian and government non-combatant forces with female employees required targeting of domestic audiences with messages to change the public image of women.³⁵ In comparison, contemporary military recruiting campaigns have focused on changing the public image of the military. As an all volunteer force, we compete with civilian employers for some of the most physically and mentally fit individuals within the labor pool. Management of the Army's brand and image sets the conditions for attraction of recruits and the pre-formed expectations new soldiers bring with them into the organization.

The process of influencing the soldier begins at home, on the civilian front before a soldier enters service. Therefore, influencing the soldier begins with the domestic populace. After World War II, the U.S. Information Agency portrayed Americans as —human beings who worked, played, and lived their lives in ways that international audiences could relate to.”³⁶ While U.S. law restricts the United States Information Agency in its transmission of messages to the domestic audience, the Department of Defense or any other military department is able to conduct publicity or even propaganda when approved by Congress.³⁷ As a result, targeting a soldier indirectly, a demographic of prospective soldiers directly, or their key influencers with official messages is another valid form of communication most often conducted through commercial advertisement designed for recruitment purposes.

³⁵ Leila J. Rupp, *Mobilizing Women for War: German and American Propaganda 1939-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 155.

³⁶ Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 257.

³⁷ U.S. Government Printing Office, —GPO Access: United States Code Main Page,” 2006. <http://frwebgate6.access.gpo.gov> (accessed 22 March 2010). There is no reference to restrictions on the Army's or any sub-department of the Department of Defense's transmission of information to the domestic audience within U.S. Code. For example, the restrictions specified by US Code —shall not apply to public affairs and other information dissemination functions of the Secretary of State.” Title 22 Chapter 74 Subchapter III Part C Section 6552 only restricts funding for public diplomacy conducted by the State Department. See reference note 26 and 33 for budgetary constraints at <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget> (accessed 22 March 2010). —No part of any appropriation contained in this Act shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes not authorized by the Congress.”

The transformation of a civilian into a soldier is a vital task that the military must not fail.³⁸ The United States Army has continually adapted its advertising campaign to keep pace with the changing environment. The U.S. soldier is shown as a representation of civilian population that has ascended toward a higher purpose of self-improvement, self-sacrifice, and contribution to the organization, the family, the community, and the nation. Before entering service, prospective soldiers see the military as a means of achieving their personal aspirations. The soldiers we attract are based on the messages communicated to the civilian populace through word and deed.

Communicating with the soldier sometimes involves an indirect path via the family and communities on the domestic front. During the Korean War, U.S. soldiers were sometimes inflicted with a sense of loneliness and perceived isolation stemming from a notion that friends, families, and communities in the States were not informed of what they were doing nor why. As a result, the Army's Home Town News Center was established in Kansas City, Missouri in July of 1951. The News Center provided lines of communication from service members deployed in Korea to their local media outlets.⁴⁰ Establishment of facilities and processes to transmit messages to the civilian populace increased service member morale through the secondary effects of showing that the Army cared and through the knowledge that the American people (e.g. family and friends) were informed of applicable events involving the soldier on a micro level. The Home Town News Center of the 1950s evolved into today's program of soldier and unit-initiated Hometown News Releases.

The strategies developed in the Army for communicating with our soldiers in the last century continue their application as part of internal systems for rapid information dissemination,

³⁸ Jami A. Fullerton and Alice G. Kendrick, *Advertising's War on Terrorism: The Story of the State Department's Shared Values Initiative* (Spokane: Marquette Books, 2006), 66.

⁴⁰ Korean War Educator, "Home Town News Center," http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topics/homefront/p_home_town_news_center.htm (accessed 16 NOV 09).

shaping operations to prepare personnel for future actions, rumor control, countering adversarial information, and countering the increasing quantity of competing information. The competing information in the environment consists of all other signals, regardless of the medium, that competes with the communicated messages intended for the soldier. Competing information comes from multiple sources such as the twenty-four-hour news cycle, internet, new media, social media, mobile communication devices, and the global interconnectivity that these and other factors represent. It is this competition for message space that not only passively competes with official messages, but can also actively prevent understanding or support for organizational or National goals.

Measures to get the aims and efforts of the United States understood by the masses (i.e. soldiers) are merely one aspect of communication within the Army as part of a campaign similar to the British home publicity efforts of World War II.⁴¹ This same objective is apparent within an Army-specific micro-level in the 21st century while educating soldiers on policies and goals presented in such forms as the U.S. National Security Strategy, the U.S. Military Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and unified combatant command strategies. How we implement our soldier's formal and informal education relies heavily on our ability to effectively communicate organizational and National goals and policies.

Effective communication can influence soldier support for the whole of the Army, the Department of Defense and other agencies of government just as communication at the direct leader level can aid in creating consensus for tactical level objectives.⁴² A universal and eternal quality of an effective leader is married to the concept of being an effective communicator. A partial contributing factor for Eisenhower's success in World War II, and a reason that many of

⁴¹ Ian McLaine, *Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II* (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1979), 18-19.

⁴² U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 6-22 Army Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2006), 3-7. The direct level of leadership is the daily face-to-face communication experienced most often by the soldier.

his troops garnered such high levels of admiration, was his ability to speak the language of his soldiers by demonstrating that he understood the current issues soldiers were facing.⁴³ A preparatory step of communicating to an audience involves knowing some basic information about communication habits (e.g. information sources). Specifically, we must determine the soldier's or any demographic's preferred medium of communication in order to begin our comparison of how we communicated then (i.e. World War II) and now.

⁴³ Harry C. Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 858. Captain Butcher writes that General Eisenhower “[knew] their problems” (i.e. the soldiers primary concerns or issues).

Communication in Any Medium

In our efforts to get the message to the soldier, it is necessary to assess where the soldier seeks information. For this analysis, we go beyond the communication within the direct level of leadership as defined in Army doctrine and focus outside the prescribed flow of information transmitted primarily face-to-face via verbal or written orders within the organization.⁴⁴

The personal journal of Henry Giles as Weapons Sergeant of 2nd Platoon, Company A, 291st Combat Engineer Battalion provides insight into some of the common sources for information that a soldier relied on in the European theater during World War II. In addition, the diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher provides a similar perspective at a macro level during his three-year assignment as the Naval aide to General Eisenhower from 1942 to 1945. A third journal shows a brief look within the Pacific theater from the eyes of Corporal Sy M. Kahn who served in the 244th Port Company, 495th Port Battalion of the Army Transportation Corps. These three references represent a minimal sampling of soldiers' journals available for further research.

A soldier's personal journal, while potentially anecdotal, provides direct testimony of the means used to maintain individual situational awareness. Within these personal testimonies, we discover that the metaphorical crutches service members relied on in World War II to support any information needs beyond direct verbal or written messages received from the chain of command consisted of print media, radio, and film. Additional modes of communication beyond these three will be addressed in later sections describing modern sources and implications for future communication to the force.

⁴⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 6-22 Army Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2006), 3-7. Actual boundaries between audiences and effects are not as concrete as doctrinal categorizations of conceptual levels. However, the levels of leadership (i.e. direct, organizational, and strategic) provide a parallel means of understanding desired effects in relation to similar categorizations such as the levels of war (i.e. tactical, operational, and strategic).

Print and Radio

On June 6, 1944, General Eisenhower released his message via both print and radio from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force to the soldiers, sailors, airmen of the force, and the world, saying —we will accept nothing less than full victory.”⁴⁵ Print media goes beyond the regular direct verbal or written instructions routinely given to soldiers. For example, during the final preparations to enter France post-D-Day, an Army pamphlet dictating rules of behavior and local French customs was distributed to the soldiers.⁴⁶ Print media also includes articles of doctrine or indoctrination deemed necessary for training. Official documents, published by government printing departments such as the Infantry Journal, were directed specifically toward perceptions of doubt among the soldier ranks. In *The German Soldier* and other titles in a series of small books from the Infantry Journal Inc., the authors use photographs paired with narration to describe the enemy as a defeatable but skilled and determined adversary that our soldiers must kill or be killed.⁴⁷

Soldiers in World War II were capable of and receptive to processing multiple signals from both official and unofficial data sources. In addition to these verbal or written forms of guidance, soldiers were cognizant of their environment through a multitude of other sources. The United States soldier of yesteryear displayed much of the same hunger for information, be it radio, print, film, or direct observation of the surroundings as contemporary service members. Depending on the leadership style of the chain of command, the individual soldier could sometimes feel isolated from what is going on around him and why. A soldier in World War II turned to external sources of information to fill this vacuum. Contemporary soldiers are no

⁴⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Order of the Day, June 6, 1944.

⁴⁶ Edited by Janice Holt Giles, *The G.I. Journal of Sergeant Giles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 26.

⁴⁷ Arthur Goodfriend, *The German Soldier* (Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal Inc., 1944), 78 and 96.

different. They will search for information to fill an information gap and to augment data on hand. History is replete with archived samples of how senior military leaders transmitted clear and concise direct messages via print and radio. However, good leaders at every level both then and now draw information from a host of sources.

Soldiers supplemented information from their units and chain of command with local newspapers and radio. Military leaders, commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of every rank listened to the radio (e.g. the British Broadcasting Corporation in Europe) whenever able. Radio, when not jammed by either side, was a common means of gaining greater situational awareness and passing what down time a soldier had during World War II. For example, after electrical power was established, Charles R. Bond, the Vice Squadron Commander of the American Volunteer Group most commonly known as the Flying Tigers, was able to setup his radio for attempted receipt of stateside signals.⁴⁸ When they could not get the radio, they subsisted on print media.

On August 16, 1944, Sergeant Giles writes that they (i.e. himself and the soldiers in his unit) would —ever know anything if it wasn't for the [*Stars and Stripes*]. It's our Bible."⁴⁹ The *Stars and Stripes* newspaper has been in continuous print since 1942 and, while being a military publication, operates without censorship under the same United States Constitution First Amendment rights as civilian counterparts.⁵⁰ The *Stars and Stripes* was not the only government sanctioned publication during World War II. *Yank* magazine, which was printed from 1942 to

⁴⁸ Charles R. Bond and Terry Anderson, *A Flying Tiger's Diary* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1984), 182.

⁴⁹ Edited by Janice Holt Giles, *The G.I. Journal of Sergeant Giles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 76.

⁵⁰ *Stars and Stripes*, "About Stars and Stripes," website, <http://www.stripes.com/webpages.asp?id=97#history> (accessed on 10 NOV 09). In addition to its first amendment protection, the Stars and Stripes is partially subsidized by the U.S. government via Department of Defense service members and paid distribution to contingency areas, and assisted distribution in other overseas locations in accordance with Department of Defense Directive 5122.11. However, the Stars and Stripes still covers the remainder of operating costs from advertising and subscription revenues.

1945, was designed from the bottom up as a source of information for enlisted soldiers and written by the enlisted personnel that comprised the magazine staff. In addition, its included photographs of pinup girls, soldier-related cartoons and soldier-penned stories led to a distribution size of over two-million copies.⁵¹

We will limit further discussion to the *Stars and Stripes* since *Yank* ceased publication at the end of World War II. In addition, as the western theater was split into the European and North African theaters, General Eisenhower had decided to economize the use of paper, printing facilities and manpower for the distribution of only one paper to front line soldiers in Europe. The *Stars and Stripes* was the Supreme Allied Commander's choice. Soldiers in other theaters still had access to the *Yank*, but there was a demonstrated preference by military leaders that translated into the associated survival and demise of the respective papers in the over sixty years since.⁵² Today, the *Stars and Stripes* claims to have over 350,000 readers and hosts free electronic copies of current and archived daily papers online.⁵³

On May 7, 1944, in reference to the impending Allied attack on mainland Europe, a soldier that tracked the newspaper reports on the war's progress, wrote in his journal that the *Stars and Stripes* had —been plugging it for weeks.”⁵⁴ In addition to *Stars and Stripes* or local British papers, soldiers received information from newspapers back in the States.⁵⁵ In fact, how much the material presented in these publications permeated the soldiers' lives was evident in

⁵¹ Renita Foster, “*Yank* Magazine Energized Soldiers, Reminding Them of the Reasons for Fighting,” The Official U.S. Army Homepage, <http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/08/20/26343-yank-magazine-energized-soldiers-reminding-them-of-the-reasons-for-fighting> , August 20, 2009. (accessed 10 NOV 09).

⁵² Harry C. Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 437.

⁵³ Stars and Stripes, “About Stars and Stripes,” website, <http://www.stripes.com/webpages.asp?id=97#history> (accessed on 10 NOV 09).

⁵⁴ Edited by Janice Holt Giles, *The G.I. Journal of Sergeant Giles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 2.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.

even the casual references to printed cartoons and other political satire distributed in the *Stars and Stripes*.⁵⁶ The soldier in combat in World War II maintained a rudimentary form of global connectivity through the snail's pace of the postal system and the theater-centric editions of the military newspapers combined with sporadic copies of domestic news from the home front. Even the aide of the Supreme Allied Commander supplemented his intelligence with reports from media sources like the *New York Herald Tribune* and the *Stars and Stripes*.⁵⁷ Captain Butcher, as the Naval aide to General Eisenhower, also cites the *Stars and Stripes* as additional confirmation that Operation VERITABLE had begun with the Canadian attack in Holland.⁵⁸

In contrast to Sergeant Giles or Captain Butcher, it appears that Corporal Sy M. Kahn experienced a relative media blackout during the war in the Pacific compared to Europe. Kahn's diary did not contain references to the *Stars and Stripes*, no radio equivalent of the British Broadcasting Corporation, and no entries describing other news sources forwarded by family or friends via the infrequent mail received while island-hopping toward Japan. Kahn's primary sources of information were his chain of command and frequent rumors distributed among soldiers. The lack of access to information magnified the fear and monotony of his mission demonstrated by the chosen title for his diary as *Between Tedium and Terror*.⁵⁹ Kahn's failure to receive or mention the *Stars and Stripes* in his diary is because the paper was not distributed in the Pacific theater until the end of Kahn's tour in 1945.⁶⁰ Part of the disparity of information

⁵⁶ Ibid., 39.

⁵⁷ Harry C. Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 752.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 756.

⁵⁹ Sy M. Kahn, *Between Tedium and Terror: A Soldier's World War II Diary, 1943-45* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993), xix-348.

⁶⁰ Stars and Stripes, —About Stars and Stripes," website, <http://www.stripes.com/webpages.asp?id=97#history> (accessed on 10 NOV 09). Also, while the Stars and Stripes was not distributed in the Pacific Theater until 1945, other publications were. The India-Burma-China Theater Newspaper *IBC Roundup* provided reprinted and original articles from the Pacific, European, and domestic sources.

described by Corporal Kahn's diary within the Pacific theater of World War II can be attributed to Kahn's physical location as part of the 2000-mile island-hopping campaign toward Japan.

After World War II, and the associated cancellation of *Yank* magazine, senior leaders identified and filled the requirement for an official magazine of the United States Army. The resultant publication has been in print for over fifty-three years under three different names. The magazine began as the *Army Information Digest* in 1946, created through the efforts of Colonel John D. Kenderline, the same public affairs officer that resurrected the *Stars and Stripes* from its initial retirement in 1919.⁶¹ The intent of the magazine was to provide a monthly publication as an official means of transmitting information to service members. The magazine operated under the name of the *Army Information Digest* until June 1966 when its name changed to *Army Digest*. The format of the monthly publication remained relatively unchanged from its initial creation as a simple black and white print devoid of pictures or graphics until its first name change.

Shortly after becoming the *Army Digest*, a new managing editor by the name of Mr. Samuel J. Ziskind changed much of both content and form of the monthly publication. Mr. Ziskind, also touted by the Army's public affairs community as the "founding father" of the Army's "troop information" program, revised the printed product from its infancy that began as a plain black and white print job with limited distribution and transformed it into a matured four-color publication that targeted the younger soldiers in the ranks. Eventually, the *Army Digest* became the more well-known *Soldiers* magazine under Mr. Ziskind's supervision in 1972.⁶²

The efforts of Colonel Kenderline and Mr. Ziskind are examples of the continual progress military leaders made in upgrading print media.⁶³ They incorporated new technologies to

⁶¹ U.S. Army Official Website, "Public Affairs Hall of Fame: 2000," <http://www.army.mil/institution/armypublicaffairs/hof/2000> (accessed 15 NOV 09).

⁶² U.S. Army Official Website, "Public Affairs Hall of Fame: 2002," <http://www.army.mil/institution/armypublicaffairs/hof/2002> (accessed 15 NOV 09).

⁶³ Additional modern examples are the *Army Times* and *The NCO Journal* with many others available online via digital content.

improve the visual impact of the message and improved their medium's ability to compete with comparable civilian counterparts. However, just as static pictures can trump the power of words, moving pictures provide a tool for even greater potential message effects.

Film: *Why We [Fought]* and *Why We Fight Now*

Noam Chomsky describes the importance of communication designed to influence as a required form of communication needed to transform the people from a naturally pacifistic state to a mindset capable of both participating in and desiring war. The population of the United States was perceived as being mainly pacifist either prior to or at the onset of each of our Nation's major conflicts.⁶⁴ The book *On Killing* by David Grossman provides a similar assessment of the indoctrination required to increase a soldier's aptitude to kill, supported by case studies, comparisons of ammunition fired, casualties inflicted, and oral histories. Grossman focuses much of his thesis on the inherent nature of humans to avoid killing or violence against their own kind.⁶⁵ However, both Chomsky and Grossman marginalize the historic record that shows the willingness for American citizens to join the military's ranks when their way of life was perceived to be threatened. A specific example was how the U.S. government harnessed the U.S. citizens' desire for revenge after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor to aid in expanding the war to Europe across two simultaneous theaters.

The *Why We Fight* films created by Frank Capra after the post-Pearl Harbor (not to be confused with Eugene Jarecki's 2005 *Why We Fight*) were a direct result of media researchers' efforts to assist the U.S. government in finding ways to use mass media to create the desire to

⁶⁴ Noam Chomsky, *Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda* (Westfield: Open Media, 1991), 8.

⁶⁵ David A. Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1995).

enlist and fight the enemy.⁶⁶ The Chief of Staff of the Army at the time, General George C. Marshall, commissioned the films as part of the rapid training program for new recruits prior to combat. The reason the films were required were to address low soldier morale frequently reported, especially among troops deploying for combat in Europe. With the Japanese responsible for attacks in Hawaii, the common fighting man did not know or care why it was important to fight the Germans.⁶⁷

After the first half-decade of fighting since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the United States Army Special Forces Command produced a video reminiscent of the *Why We Fight* series of 1942. The result was the *Why We Fight Now* video of 2008.⁶⁸ While it does not cover the grand scale of the 1942 series, and while it is geared toward special forces as opposed to the Army as a whole, 2008's *Why We Fight Now* accurately provides the specifics of purpose and explanation of why special forces are capable of mission accomplishment. The message that we get to the U.S. soldier, therefore, provides answers to the essential question, —why? in order to influence behavior. The desired behavior consists of support for the mission, support for the unit, and support for national policies. However, factors unique to the contemporary environment modify the specifics of how messages are transmitted to soldiers. New technologies abound today that provide communication opportunities unavailable in World War II.

⁶⁶ Jami A. Fullerton and Alice G. Kendrick, *Advertising's War on Terrorism: The Story of the State Department's Shared Values Initiative* (Spokane: Marquette Books, 2006), 66.

⁶⁷ William Allen White to White House adviser Lowell Mellett (September 1942), retrieved from <http://history.acusd.edu/gen/filmnotes/whywefight.html> (accessed 21 October 2009). For more information, see the complete William Allen White's collection in the Library of Congress and William Allen White Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. Lowell Mellett's collection is in the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, National Union Catalog of Manuscripts Collections entry number (NUCMC 65-52).

⁶⁸ Why We Fight Now website, *Why We Fight Now: The Global War on Terror*, <http://www.whywefightnow.com/download/index.htm> (accessed 18 NOV 09).

Modern Media

History is replete with technological advances pioneered by the military through the necessities of war. The first radio signals transmitted directly from the beachhead after D-Day to New York was a global first for low-powered radio signals.⁶⁹ However, no advance spearheaded by the military has had a greater global impact on communications than the internet. We will skip the description of what the internet is and delve directly into how the United States Army is leveraging it to communicate with its soldiers.

The United States Army has continued to lead the other military services in implementation of innovative programs to enhance internal communication within the organization and effectively get official messages to the soldier. One of the most beneficial initiatives occurred by way of exploiting the global connectivity of the internet.

The Army developed its official website portal called Army Knowledge Online in 1999, ahead of the other services.⁷⁰ Army Knowledge Online is modeled after civilian predecessors such as America Online and Prodigy in its packaging of organizational and global information and communication into a single online digital source.⁷¹ The expanded use of the internet has had the greatest impact in reaching the soldier in the past ten years. Evidence of the Army Knowledge Online's rate of usage is apparent by the over 1 million logins per day reached on

⁶⁹ Harry C. Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 691.

⁷⁰ Gina Grey, Army News Service, —"AKO/DKO Exceeds Million Logins in Single Day," March 2, 2009, The Official Homepage of the United States Army, <http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/03/02/17648-akodko-exceeds-million-logins-in-single-day> (accessed 15 NOV 09).

⁷¹ Media Awareness Network, —"Use of the Internet (1995 Statistics)," December 1995, http://www.media-awareness.ca/english/resources/research_documents/statistics/internet/use_of_internet.cfm (accessed 12 April 2010). While the U.S. Army apparently lagged behind commercial counterparts (e.g. America Online and Prodigy), the fact that the greatest increase in internet usage did not occur in mainstream America or until the late 1990s demonstrates that the U.S. Army kept pace and adapted to new communication technologies at a similar rate as its soldiers and non-military audiences. 9.5 million Americans used the internet in December 1995 compared to 66 million in 1998 and 83 million in 1999. The development and launching of Army Knowledge Online corresponds to the domestic internet explosion.

February 23, 2009 and the 1 billionth login achieved in September of 2008.⁷² Army policy mandating use of the Army Knowledge Online website ensured proliferation of use for the Army's official information and internal communication portal. As a result, the contemporary soldier has global access to official message traffic and can likewise be located and reached by the cyber lines of communication created by the web portal. Army Knowledge Online's level of connectivity is likely to increase as the Army is already looking ahead to the next generation of its official web portal to support both the 2 million current members and an expanded membership of 2.5 million with a host of enhanced services (e.g. mobile media, video, and blogs).⁷³

In spite of the effectiveness of Army Knowledge Online as a common repository for work-related data, a mode of digital collaboration, a source of official electronic mail, and as a means for administrative self-service, the contemporary soldier faces a dilemma quite different from the fighting man of 70 years ago or any other time in history. The modern warrior in our nation's Army, while possessing the same thirst for information touted by Eisenhower and Baron von Steuben, is more likely to drown in the pool of available data. The internet contains more than 1600 official and unofficial United States Army websites.⁷⁴ These websites often lack commonality of format, differ in priorities, and are sometimes unknown outside of a small audience circle. They can even contradict each other in the information transmitted by not sharing a common format or cohesive message. Because of this, many stories, images, and messages are never seen or shared.

⁷² Gina Grey, Army News Service, —AKO/DKO Exceeds Million Logins in Single Day”, March 2, 2009, [www.army.mil](http://www.army.mil/news/2009/03/02/17648-akodko-exceeds-million-logins-in-single-day/) The Official Homepage of the United States Army, <http://www.army.mil/news/2009/03/02/17648-akodko-exceeds-million-logins-in-single-day/> (accessed 15 NOV 09).

⁷³ Jason Miller, Federal News Radio, —Army Pushes Forward with AKO/DKO Despite No Mandated Use by DoD,” April 28, 2009, <http://www.federalnewsradio.com/index.php?nid=35&sid=1662316> (accessed 16 NOV 09).

⁷⁴ The Official Homepage of the United States Army, —CORE: Communicate for Effect,” <http://www.army.mil/create/content/core.html> (accessed 16 NOV 09).

Part of the Department of the Army's continued effort and progress to adapt and keep pace with the changing environment has actually exacerbated the challenge for today's warrior. The soldier of today, while able to access information almost instantaneously from around the world, cannot find or read all of the information presented amongst all of these print sources. As of November 2009, there are over 141 Army newspapers and magazines listed by the Department of the Army.⁷⁵ These 141 publications combine with the 1600 websites to create a virtual avalanche of information. Unlike the handful of printed materials available in World War II that the soldier of seventy years ago used to supplement information provided by superiors, the plethora of publications transforms the previous problem of information supply to a challenge of information management. Questions of what information is selected for publication and who selects the information for publication become the topics of discussion during periodic reviews of the organization's effectiveness at communicating with its soldiers.

Even more applicable in the contemporary environment is the increased competition for the soldier's attention. A soldier in World War II divided his attention among direct leadership messages (e.g. face-to-face communication), news print, radio, and the occasional film. However, the modern soldier: flips through hundreds of television channels (local, cable, satellite, and streaming); surfs the internet; reads multiple emails; receives instant updates on his cellular phone, Blackberry, iPhone, Droid, laptop, netbook, or other mobile device; listens to the radio (local amplitude modulated, local frequency modulated, analog, high definition, and satellite); reads newsprint; and ponders the validity of the latest blog, tweet, or other new media construct. Even a single medium such as broadcast television has rapidly transcended international borders due to the effective globalization inherent as boundaries between phase alternate line (PAL),

⁷⁵ The Official Website of the United States Army, —Newspapers,” <http://www.army.mil/newspapers> (accessed 20 NOV 09).

séquentiel couleur à mémoire (SECAM), and National Television System Committee (NTSC) formats were negated by the switch from analog to digital transmissions.⁷⁶

While not every member of the military stayed current with events or read official publications in World War II, similar errors in judgment can amplify tensions in the contemporary environment.⁷⁷ This type of ignorance, depicted in personal journals from World War II and maybe expected during an earlier period of our nation's history, is compounded in modern formations by the myriad of before-mentioned competing signals that a soldier must filter and process.

To aid soldiers in wading through the waves of information, today's Army has streamlined many administrative functions into online self-service sites. The Army Publishing Directorate put the plethora of documents inherent in a large bureaucracy and required for accomplishment of a multitude of tasks across a broad range of fields into a location that is globally accessible by the soldier. Links to administrative information include Army Directives, Army Regulations, Department of the Army Circulars, Department of the Army General Orders, Department of the Army Letterhead and Instructions, Department of the Army Memorandums, Headquarters Department of the Army Letters, the Manual for Courts-Martial, and Department of the Army Pamphlets. Technical and Equipment categories include; technical manuals, hand receipts, lubrication orders, modification work orders, and technical bulletins. Doctrine and Training categories include; the Army Training and Evaluation Program, common table of allowances, field manuals, graphic training aids, mission training plans, officer foundation standards, supply bulletins, soldiers' manuals and trainers' guides, *Soldier's Manuals of Common*

⁷⁶ Philip M. Taylor, *Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945* (London, Routledge, 1997), 86. The three primary standards for analog television transmission became obsolete as signals were digitized, allowing for a standard format to reach a global audience.

⁷⁷ Edited by Janice Holt Giles, *The G.I. Journal of Sergeant Giles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 335. In the journal entry for April 13, 1945, Sergeant Giles reiterates that ~~some of the~~ boys don't ever look at a paper, [*Stars and Stripes*] or any other—and ~~—~~have no idea what goes on back home."

Tasks, soldier training publications, and training circulars. Dedicated sub-categories for fields such as Engineering and Medical fields are even included to increase accessibility.⁷⁸

The United States Army is also actively pursuing dynamic training options via the internet in addition to semi-conventional websites that mostly mirror non-virtual departmental organizational charts, contact rosters, or electronic versions of static printed material. ATTP WIKI is the Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures pilot program as part of the Army's new milSuite concept. MilSuite uses Army equivalents of civilian applications to achieve its primary objectives of "locating information, sharing knowledge, and connecting people." MilSuite sets out to meet these three goals via its sub-applications; milWiki, milBlog, and milBook. These military oriented web-based tools are intended to replicate the profound success of their civilian models (e.g. Wikipedia, Facebook, Twitter and other new media applications).⁷⁹ Army leaders transmit information through these new lines of communication while simultaneously relying on the civilian precursors.

The Army has experienced success in reaching soldiers over the years through its continual adaptation to new technologies. The military equivalents of social media discussed above are tools that have both a potential to increase the flow of communication or drown soldiers in additional message streams. However, other recent Army efforts to embrace a popular medium have shown a greater ability to incite the interest of audiences internal and external to the military organization. The *America's Army* video game represents an example of a successful Department of the Army advertising campaign with organizational, domestic, and global message

⁷⁸ The Army Publishing Directorate website, <http://www.apd.army.mil> (accessed 15 NOV 09).

⁷⁹ The United States Army's milSuite website, https://gft.kc.us.army.mil/login/login.fcc?TYPE=33554433&REALMOID=06-caa33dab-d443-101f-914d-84a74d100cb3&GUID=&SMAUTHREASON=0&METHOD=GET&SMAGENTNAME=-SM-L99OvIABrMGwg%2buI4FOdzgU187iHR%2bzbbPH6uSSoB4cDgkRxMwbCkh5kGMfPRDtx&TARGET=-SM-https%3a%2f%2fwiki%2eke%2eus%2earmy%2emil%2fwiki%2fPortal%3aArmy_Doctrine (accessed 19 NOV 09).

effects.⁸⁰ Through development and distribution of *America's Army*, military leaders demonstrate understanding that one of the best ways to influence an audience is to combine elements of entertainment with other themes of education and persuasion.⁸¹

Changes to how the Army communicates with soldiers over the years have kept relatively close pace with technological advancement. Differences between World War II and contemporary communication challenges consist primarily of the increased importance of information management and the global reach that communication technology has provided for soldiers of every rank.⁸² Just as the over 1600 Army internet websites flood the environment; a virtual landslide of information transmitted by way of other media muddies the metaphorical waters. Regardless of which medium is utilized, application of some of the following enduring principles of communication can increase message effectiveness.

⁸⁰ Go Army, "America's Army 3", http://www.goarmy.com/downloads/americas_army.jsp (accessed 22 March 2010). The video game is not just a game. It is a recruiting and advertising tool that has reached a global audience, to include soldiers. <http://www.americasarmy.com/aa/about/makingof.php> *America's Army* "has exceeded all expectations by placing Soldiering front and center within popular culture and showcasing the roles training, teamwork and technology play in the Army." There are over 8.8 million registered players and 40% of players are outside the United States.

⁸¹ Scot Macdonald, *Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First Century Altered Images and Deception Operations* (London: Routledge, 2007), 32.

⁸² Philip M. Taylor, *Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945* (London: Routledge, 1997), 9. Technology provides the means to create constructs such as the Global Information Infrastructure in which soldiers, "—amilies and friends...transcend the barriers of time and distance."

Enduring Principles of Communication

At the beginning of this monograph, we rediscovered the applicability of advertising concepts for increasing the effectiveness of communication with our soldiers. In the years since Major Lenzner's time, in spite of fighting another world war and a dozen other conflicts of varying scales, we find that many of the advertising and marketing concepts still apply. In addition, we continue to refine the art and science of leadership and communication within our ranks. The following sections combine the best of lessons learned and re-learned from World War II with today into principles of communicating with soldiers that have not gone out of style with the passing of the previous century.

Importance of Advertising and Non-kinetic Action

Some of our nation's highest ranking military and civilian leaders understand the necessity to continuously adapt in order to keep pace with the increasing level of global information in direct competition with official messages intended for military members.⁸³ While the importance of non-kinetic actions have increased, the value of knowledge and communication in any type of ideological warfare is another lesson relearned we are transmitting to our soldiers.

Five billion dollars spent on today's tanks, guns, and battleships will make far less difference in achieving ultimate victory over communism than five billion dollars appropriated for ideological warfare.⁸⁴

⁸³ United States Department of the Army Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command, *TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 The Army Capstone Document: Operational Adaptability: Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict* (Fort Monroe: Training and Doctrine Command, 21 December 2009), 6. Unlike the false assumptions of the 1990s, we cannot rely solely on an ability to develop "leapfrog"-type technological advancements. We must continuously adapt as the enemy will continually adapt to target the perceived weaknesses of the United States. The Army demonstrates a constant propensity to wield new concepts of communication, marketing, and advertising just as it continues to advance along a technological path.

⁸⁴ Edited by John Boardman Whitton, *Propaganda and the Cold War* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1963), 54. George Gallup used the sum of five billion in 1963, which equates to roughly thirty-five billion in 2009 dollars.

These words are as true today as they were when spoken half a century ago. In last year's "Bullets and Blogs: New Media and the Warfighter," Deirdre Collings and Rafal Rohozinski emphasized the increased importance in embracing new media as a means of mitigating the risk of potential information vacuums that the enemy will occupy and dominate if left unopposed.⁸⁵ Common communication strategies relying primarily on countering enemy propaganda risk failure as they concede the initiative. The most successful strategies involve a consistent act of engagement for effective establishment and sustainment of legitimacy and credibility that will dilute enemy signals while setting conditions for reception of new friendly messages.⁸⁶

The Department of Defense and the Department of the Army continue to adapt and embrace new media as part of the strategy to ensure this engagement with audiences, including the modern soldier, in the contemporary operating environment. Just as we cannot allow a vacuum to form that can be exploited by the enemy, we cannot afford to be idle and concede the information space to external distracters that compete for our soldiers' attention and time. Army leaders are leveraging every tool available, from official advertising campaigns communicated via sites such as GoArmy.com to crossover opportunities into other markets as available.

Contrary to Noam Chomsky's belief that "the message makes what [we] have to say interesting, not the medium," the necessity to elevate the message above the other signal noise in the environment requires more creative thinking and approaches.⁸⁷ One area in which the medium is just as important as the message is in the field of marketing and advertising.

⁸⁵ Deirdre Collings and Rafal Rohozinski, "Bullets and Blogs: New Media and the Warfighter," Center for Strategic Leadership, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, January 2008, 32.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁸⁷ Robert F. Barsky, *The Chomsky Effect* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 192. While Chomsky appears quite outspoken, negative, and cynical about a number of important and sometimes seemingly mundane issues (i.e. the importance of sports in U.S. society), he also comes across at times as merely desiring to press metaphorical buttons to create emotional responses in people and more lively discourse.

Advertisement geared toward attraction of future soldiers is relevant to discussion of communication within the Army because preconceived biases and the basic mindset of the recruit is formed prior to initial entry into the military. And while the primary audience for recruitment messages are not soldiers already serving, potential negative secondary and tertiary effects exist if soldiers perceive that an advertising campaign is either detrimental to the organization or contradicts the realities of military life.

The potential return for advertising dollar spent is not lost on contemporary leaders. For example, the U.S. Army's annual expenditure ranged between \$295 million in 2003 and \$234 million in 2009 (\$394 million including Army Reserve and National Guard) to meet recruiting goals and grow the organization to over 547,000 active soldiers, 205,000 reserve soldiers, and 358,000 Army National Guard soldiers.⁸⁸ However, improving the effectiveness of the Army advertising campaign is not limited to a simple increase in funding. The Army also revamped what it purchased for each advertising dollar spent as represented in such successes as the *America's Army* videogame.⁸⁹

Sports advertising is another area that has received greater attention this century as the Army consistently refined the focus of its message channels. In 2004, Army advertising in sports consisted of \$40 million of its \$212 million budget. However, the General Accounting Office concluded in 2003 that the Department of Defense, not just the Army, does not adequately

⁸⁸ United States General Accounting Office, "Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates," February 2010, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/fy2011_OM_Overview.pdf (accessed 16 February 2010). The active Army spent \$234 million on advertising in 2009.

⁸⁹ GameFly Media, "America's Army Report," Shacknews, 03 November 2005, <http://www.shacknews.com/onearticle.x/39369> (accessed 22 March 2010). COL Casey Wardynski uses "cost per person hour" as a metric for the effectiveness of *America's Army* as a marketing tool: How much does it cost to put the Army's brand in front of someone for one hour? The game delivers a cost per person hour of 10 cents, versus \$5 to \$8 for [television]. Even more telling, 20 percent of entering cadets at West Point have already played *America's Army*, and from 20 to 40 percent of new Army recruits have played it as well."

measure advertising's effectiveness in recruiting.⁹⁰ While acknowledging the myriad of other complex variables that may affect the motivations of citizens to become soldiers, especially while at war, the basic metric of effective advertising continues to be marketing cost per soldier recruited and percentage of the recruitment goal met. The United States Army recruited 70,045 active duty soldiers in 2009 while spending \$234 million at an average cost per recruit of \$3340.⁹¹

Advertisements targeted toward any demographic are also received by today's soldier and communicate strategic and organizational messages, regardless of the challenges in measuring effectiveness and the return for the dollar. The messages can aid in establishing the organizations reputation, invoke specific ideas and emotions with both positive and negative associations, and have future bearing on both soldier retention and recruitment. Organizational and strategic leaders make continued efforts to sustain and improve the reputation of the Army (i.e. the Army —brand") through communication with soldiers.

Ownership and Branding

Effectively getting our messages to soldiers and ensuring that the messages create the desired results requires leaders to take "emotional ownership" of the military brand by cultivating the relationship between the organization and the soldier.⁹² Research on motivation provides evidence that soldiers or any member of an institution are more productive if they —an take pride

⁹⁰ United States General Accounting Office, "Military Recruiting: DoD Needs to Establish Objectives and Measures to Better Evaluate Advertising's Effectiveness", September 2003, 16, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031005.pdf> (accessed 02 December 2009). The findings clarify that it is a lack of information rather than effort that hinders measurement.

⁹¹ Defense Link, "FY 2009 Active Duty Recruiting Stats (End Fiscal 2009)," <http://prhome.defense.gov/docs/FY%202009%20Active%20Duty%20Recruiting%20Stats.pdf> (accessed 23 March 2010). The United States Army recruited 108% (70,045) of its goal (65,000). Dividing 70,045 into the \$234 million spent in 2009 for advertising yields an average advertising cost of \$3340 per recruit.

⁹² Jami A. Fullerton and Alice G. Kendrick, *Advertising's War on Terrorism: The Story of the State Department's Shared Values Initiative*, Marquette Books, Spokane, 2006, 22. Between 1992 and 1997, Charlotte Beers, while working as CEO for Ogilvy and Mather after being named Chairman of the American Association of Advertising Agencies, created an approach to advertising known as "brand stewardship," where she honed the "art of creating, building and energizing profitable brands."

in...the known integrity of their organization.”⁹³ Branding is a marketing-specific concept that retains its relevance by making a resurgence throughout the military community as leaders struggle with the complexities of public opinion and the organizational image during contemporary operations such as counterinsurgency. This same type of branding can facilitate communication through its ability to grab the attention of the audience in spite of competing information.

One area where the Army brand can transcend most geographic boundaries and reach multiple demographics is on the internet. The Army has embraced branding by formal implementation of a branding toolkit that facilitates creation of independent websites with the look and feel of the Army’s [official] homepage.”⁹⁴ It is this particular “look and feel” that becomes associated with the reputation of the U.S. Army as perceived through the experiences of various audience demographics to form the Army brand.” The American Marketing Association defines a brand as:

A customer experience represented by a collection of images and ideas; often, it refers to a symbol such as a name, logo, slogan, and design scheme. Brand recognition and other reactions are created by the accumulation of experiences with the specific product or service, both directly relating to its use, and through the influence of advertising, design, and media commentary.⁹⁵

The Army is represented throughout the internet via over 1600 associated websites combined with the proliferation of the *America’s Army* online game and the addition of social media experiences. However, this robust conglomeration of messages may fail to employ one of the principles of war necessary for effective communication—mass.⁹⁶ While the metaphor of a

⁹³ John W. Gardner, *On Leadership* (New York, The Free Press, 1990), 185.

⁹⁴ Official United States Army Website Design Page, <http://www.army.mil/create/designer> (accessed 20 NOV 09).

⁹⁵ American Marketing Association Marketingpower Website, “Resource Library: Dictionary,” http://www.marketingpower.com/_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=B#branding (accessed 20 NOV 09).

⁹⁶ Mari K. Eder, “Forward Strategic Communication,” *Military Review* (July-August 2007): 61-70. The possibility exists that a standard message will not possess the mass for maximum effect since many of the websites are independently created without a standard design.

direct-fire weapon system does not accurately represent actual communication transmittal or reception, the ability to mass a cohesive message is analogous to massing of fires with which most soldiers can relate.⁹⁷ The aggregate of each individual message combines to form portions of the story of the Army received by audiences internal and external to the organization. More importantly, it is the iterative process of telling and retelling pieces of the Army story through the actions and words of operations that form the basis of the organization's reputation.

Telling the Story of America [and the Army]

President Eisenhower gave specific orders for members of the United States Information Agency to increase their efforts in "telling the story of America."¹⁰⁰ The President's directive in 1953, while aimed at an agency focused on foreign audiences, is similar to the guidance provided to a small group of contemporary military and interagency planners at the United States Army's School of Advanced Military Studies in 2009. While using instruction on communication as both an academic enabler to teach a portion of the course curriculum and as a means toward accomplishing specific operational requirements, students of Seminar 2, graduating in May of 2010, are simultaneously framing the environment while developing practical methods to increase the effectiveness of telling the individual soldier's portion of the Army story.

Telling the Army story develops part of the foundation of our organization. We begin by an informal process of peer review and expand outside of the Army to other government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the civilian populace. The story has no tolerance for falsehood and leverages the differences among soldiers as a reflection of U.S. society to put a

⁹⁷ Multiple Authors, United States Army Advanced Military Studies Program, Seminar 2, Design Practica I-III, November 2009 to March 2010. In the first practical exercise of the academic year on the Army's art of design, the students of Seminar 2 AMSP-010-1 selected the metaphor of a direct-fire weapon system to aid in understanding the perceived cultural misconceptions of communication strategies.

¹⁰⁰ Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 254. The United States Information Agency was formed to transmit messages of public diplomacy to foreign audiences to counter competing ideologies such as communism.

human face on an organization sometimes perceived to eschew individuality. At the same time, the Army story also shows where the common man has taken an additional developmental step from his civilian contemporaries on the path of both self-improvement and advancement while serving a greater good.

Telling our Army story is relevant to communication with soldiers because periods of reflection on individual experiences and the associated communication of these experiences are part of the mentoring and training process for junior soldiers. The war stories told to subordinates shape their development and mold the lens through which they will process and filter future messages.

Personal Responsibility for Self and Organization

One of the most important messages that can ever be transmitted to the soldier involves the concept of responsibility. This is not just responsibility as an individual or for an individual's assigned position, and it is not even limited to just the responsibility for all subordinates and actions of the organization. General Dwight D. Eisenhower exemplified this message the day prior to launching Operation Overlord. If D-Day would have failed, Ike accepted full responsibility in advance by preparing his now famous written note that —~~ay~~ blame or fault attache[d] to the attempt [was his] alone.”¹⁰¹ It is a leader's willingness to —~~own~~ it all” that is contagious, spreading rapidly and permeating an organization with the much needed and sometimes lacking quality of personal ownership. A leader that lives by this example increases his legitimacy and effectiveness at communicating with subordinates.

¹⁰¹ Alan Axelrod, *Eisenhower on Leadership: Ike's Enduring Lessons in Total Victory Management* (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 2006), 209.

The Importance of a Purpose and Intent

The military leader “provide[s] purpose, direction, and motivation” for individual soldiers and the organization.¹⁰² An additional leadership quality involves the nuances of leading an organization composed of intelligent members. Our Nation’s military is a direct reflection of civilian society in many ways. General Eisenhower used an example from the American Revolution where Baron von Steuben “explained in a letter to a friend that in Europe you tell a soldier to do thus, and he does it; and that in America it is necessary to tell him why he does it.”¹⁰³

“Purpose gives subordinates the reason to act in order to achieve a desired outcome.”¹⁰⁴ In Eisenhower’s *Crusade in Europe* he further explains how garnering a belief and understanding for the cause can rival the importance of unit esprit de corps or discipline. This argument is counter to the other notion that soldiers fight for more basic needs, such as “pride in a unit, respect for the opinion of comrades, and blind devotion to an immediate leader.”¹⁰⁵ By providing the soldier a purpose and intent, we take the guesswork out of identifying what he is fighting for. The purpose and intent also provides the soldier a foundation for creative thought and improvisation when required in complex adaptive environments.

¹⁰² U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 6-22 Army Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2006), 1-2.

¹⁰³ Alan Axelrod, *Eisenhower on Leadership: Ike’s Enduring Lessons in Total Victory Management* (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 2006), 41. Also referenced in Donald T. Phillips, *The Founding Fathers on Leadership*, Warner Books, New York, 1997, 121. The anecdote is also quoted as “the genius of this nation is... you say to your soldier, ‘Do this,’ and he does it, but I am obliged to say, ‘This is the reason why you ought to do that,’ and he does it.”

¹⁰⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 6-22 Army Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2006), 1-2.

¹⁰⁵ Alan Axelrod, *Eisenhower on Leadership: Ike’s Enduring Lessons in Total Victory Management* (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 2006), 41.

Some Audiences Prefer Action

A continuing challenge for leaders at every level is countering or explaining potentially false or negative information that a soldier may acquire from the various external independent sources available then or now. Throughout World War II, shortcomings of the replacement depot system led to soldier frustration as public news sources reported on topics like the shortage of replacement personnel.¹⁰⁶ The replacement depot system was the way that the Army executed its policy of reintegrating the recovered wounded back into the force. Recovering and newly healed soldiers were left pondering the apparent lack of urgency to return them to their units.¹⁰⁷ In addition, commercial media coverage combined with soldier-to-soldier gossip created an environment where the term ‘replacement’ connoted the negative prospect of filling ‘dead men’s shoes.’¹⁰⁸

At the same time that shortages were reported, General Eisenhower announced in the *Stars and Stripes* on August 26, 1944 that Paris would be utilized as an area for rest and recuperation for the Allied Forces.¹⁰⁹ The messages of the civilian media gained momentum as the military’s perceived lack of positive action became the transmitted signal received by some soldiers. Personnel on the ground were frustrated as Paris became backlogged with both

¹⁰⁶ Edited by Janice Holt Giles, *The G.I. Journal of Sergeant Giles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 131. Soldiers wounded in action and evacuated from their units entered a queue for assignment in accordance with submitted unit requirements and availability of transport assets. Sergeant Giles’ journal does not address the rest of the story provided by official after action reviews and studies such as *Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211 The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army* of 1954 (i.e. classification of combat personnel was conducted according to word-of-mouth information provided by the recovering wounded until personnel records from England were moved to the replacement depots in mainland Europe).

¹⁰⁷ Edited by Janice Holt Giles, *The G.I. Journal of Sergeant Giles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 133.

¹⁰⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211 The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, August 1954), 459-460. Efforts to remove the negative connotations of being a replacement soldier included changing references of ‘replacement’ to ‘reinforcement’ in applicable organizational names and message traffic.

¹⁰⁹ Edited by Janice Holt Giles, *The G.I. Journal of Sergeant Giles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 83.

recovering replacements and refreshed soldiers competing for assets to return to their original units on the front line while media sources reported shortages. Soldiers wanted to return to their units and fight, but the message received implied that they were not a priority.

During post-war interviews, General Omar Bradley stated that the replacement system —worked as well as could be expected.”¹¹⁰ In contrast, analysis conducted during the 1953 review of American military replacement activities through World War II provided macro-level validation of anecdotal evidence provided in soldiers’ personal journals.¹¹¹ In this example, the possibility exists that no manner of communication other than an immediate ride back to the unit would have satisfied the soldiers. The most effective message to communicate in such a scenario may be to simply acknowledge the hardship until action is feasible.

Indirect Messages and Action: More than Words

Just as Churchill did —not believe in winning a war with one’s mouth,” effectively getting the message to soldiers involves more action and example than words.¹¹² Soldiers interpret actions and derive meaning from actions even in the absence of a deliberate message. For example, military and civilian leaders were understandably tightlipped in World War II about when the D-Day invasion would happen. But soldiers accurately perceived that the time of invasion was close when letters to families began to be opened and resealed by censorship personnel around May 4, 1944.¹¹³ Combined with the training drills and unit preparations,

¹¹⁰ Office of Personnel Assignment, —Report of Committee on Organization,” (Fort Benning: Headquarters Department of the Army, June 1946), 11. General Omar Bradley was responding to interview questions regarding the effectiveness of the personnel replacement system in World War II Europe.

¹¹¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211 The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, August 1954), 460-463.

¹¹² Michael Balfour, *Propaganda in War: 1939-1945* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 437.

¹¹³ Edited by Janice Holt Giles, *The G.I. Journal of Sergeant Giles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 14.

confirmation from the home front that soldiers' letters had not been received since May 18th as England was sealed off provided more evidence toward the plans of the senior leadership.¹¹⁴

Soldiers in World War II could be just as cynical and untrusting of government information as today. In the days following D-Day, large differences in casualty numbers and prisoners were announced between the *Stars and Stripes* and the British Broadcasting Corporation retransmissions of German claims. While soldiers can understandably choose to not believe the enemy, the fact that they did not —how that [they could] believe our propaganda, either” shows a healthy measure of skepticism and desire to know the truth.¹¹⁵

Modern confidence in the press has fallen at an almost constant rate from 1973 to 2002.¹¹⁶ A similar decrease in levels of confidence in television was recorded among respondents during this same period of time.¹¹⁷ As a result, information presented through the media cannot be expected to single-handedly change behavior in society. It must be followed by action and a demonstrated validity of the message.¹¹⁸ The synergy of message and action (word and deed) is the best active defense against environmental tensions that can manifest in complex adaptive environments and interfere with message traffic to the soldier. An example of one of these tensions exists in the form of commercial media.

¹¹⁴ Edited by Janice Holt Giles, *The G.I. Journal of Sergeant Giles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 17.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.

¹¹⁶ The Editors of New Strategist Publications, *American Attitudes: What Americans Think About the Issues that Shape Their Lives, 4th Edition* (Ithaca: New Strategist Publications, 2005), 23. In 1973, 14.7% of respondents 18 or older claimed to have “hardly any” confidence in the press. This number has steadily increased to 41.9% having “hardly any” confidence in the press.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹¹⁸ Mamoun Fandy, *(Un)civil War of Words* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 143. Fandy uses cultural understanding and observations to describe how trust is built through interpersonal communication and cannot be developed solely by media injection.

Suppressive Capability of Truth as the Best Message

Concerns that the media may publish information potentially detrimental to the war effort existed in World War II. On June 22, 1944 the *Stars and Stripes* carried reprinted Nazi propaganda suggesting that the Germans might cease rocket attacks on Britain if the Allies halted bombing operations.¹¹⁹ In addition, concern over how the soldier is portrayed or characterized in print is not a recent development. General Patton threatened to prohibit distribution of the *Stars and Stripes* in the Third Army area due to objections over how soldiers were drawn in cartoons. However, not even “Old Blood and Guts” could completely silence the media nor deny his soldiers access to a crucial source of both morale and supplemental information that enhanced their situational awareness.¹²⁰ Silencing the media is even less of an option in the contemporary environment. A strategy of consistent engagement can minimize the potential message vacuum and best transmit the Army’s message to all audiences, including soldiers.

The media has always been a catalyst for either discovering potential tensions in the system or amplifying existing tensions and forcing immediate action. On August 19, 1944, regarding command reorganization in the European theater, deliberate decisions were made with sound logic among each of the Allied commanders for how the hierarchy would be defined on the ground. Despite a smooth transition internally, the press falsely interpreted and published the reorganization as a demotion for Montgomery and a promotion for Bradley. Less than five months later, the media implied a demotion for Bradley as additional divisions were organized under Montgomery’s command when Allied forces were split into two fronts on mainland Europe.¹²¹ Eisenhower found himself frustrated by the War Department’s perceived acceptance

¹¹⁹ Harry C. Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 591.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 773-774.

¹²¹ *C.B.I. Roundup*, “Split in Allied Front Shifts Command,” January 11, 1945, 2. Found within “Control of Theater Newspaper: C.B.I. Roundup.” *Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library*. January 11, 1945. <http://cgsc.cdmhost.com> (accessed January 16, 2010). The CBI Roundup was the theater newspaper for the China-Burma-India region. A reprinted article from the Army News Service in Paris provides rebuttal to the claim that the reorganization of forces was a form of demotion for General Bradley.

of published inaccuracies due to a lack of a rebuttal published by the Army's public relations officers back in the States.¹²²

Even with the military integrated on the staffs of media organizations during World War II, potentially detrimental messages were sometimes transmitted to the soldier via commercial sources. Another example was the hardships endured by frontline troops transported in open vehicles exposed to the elements while German civilians were transported via covered conveyances in relative comfort. The editorial director of *Stars and Stripes* at the time, MAJ Goodfriend, alienated himself from some of his military counterparts and superiors when he wrote and published the story.¹²³ However, while the Army leadership was forced into crisis action mode, the overall intent of Eisenhower's desire to tell the good and bad was met.

Effective leadership requires consistency in word and deed regardless of the audience or the tool of transmission. The suppressive nature of a strong reputation for truth can aid in defusing crisis sometimes exacerbated by the media. Leaders can mitigate some of the inherent risks through education and understanding that the commercial media is both an audience demographic and a tool for reaching others. However, the media is just one of many actors that the Army engages. Multiple variables within the system, internal and external, maintain the capability to create tension in the environment. Therefore, effective communication mandates simultaneous employment of every asset along multiple lines of effort toward an array of audiences. When all else fails, doctrine can provide a grounding rod for leadership communication through a reminder that “truth is the best [form of communication to influence or persuade]” the soldier.¹²⁴

¹²² Harry C. Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 648.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 690.

¹²⁴ Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-53 Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, 05 September 2003, I-3.

Conclusion

The contemporary military environment is awash with publications and discussions regarding the perceived uniqueness of the current complex adaptive environment. However, much of how military leaders communicate with and influence soldiers have remained relatively unchanged since World War II. In spite of new communication technologies, the methods of conveying official messages to U.S. soldiers, while evolving over time with parallel societal and technological changes, have maintained relevance through their consistent efforts to influence support for the nation, support for the force, and support for the mission. Even the integration of commercial advertising and marketing concepts within military endeavors fails to qualify as a revolutionary conception. The greatest difference between the two eras involves the level of information management and the global reach that new communication technologies provide soldiers of every rank.

From World War II to the present, military leaders have demonstrated the use of communication's influence function as an integral part of leadership. Army doctrine links communication to leadership via the terminological reliance on influence. Leadership, just like communication, is founded upon the art and science of influencing people. This fact is neither good nor bad. It just is and does not require a value judgment. Sometimes getting the message to the soldier or any audience involves the moral and political courage to accept and fully leverage the ability of communication to change public perception and an organization's image.

Military leaders have not become fixated on any particular medium for communicating official messages. Leaders have exploited every asset at their disposal to bring all capabilities to bear. Military leaders (then and now) in positions at every level of leadership (direct, organizational, and strategic) within the Department of the Army and Department of Defense proactively seek and utilize every new technology to aid in their ability to communicate with internal and external audiences. Our predecessors' aptitude for learning and adaptation is a testament to the American war fighter since the birth of the nation.

Soldiers demonstrated a timeless propensity for seeking information in World War II that mirrors their contemporary counterparts. They inquired beyond the immediate information provided by their chain of command via direct leadership and actively sought sources to fill gaps in their perceived situational awareness. Military leaders can leverage this potential by minimizing any signal vacuums created by a lack of message or action. Knowledge of what medium is in favor will aid in maximizing message receipt.

The broad operational approach of how the Department of the Army communicates with soldiers today possesses many parallels to how leaders conducted communication seventy years ago. Military leaders and planners strive to use every asset available to mass the official message through synergistic and complementary themes that are consistent with policy. Direct communication in the form of verbal and printed material, radio, television, internet, traditional media, new media, and everything in between are eligible for use to increase the effectiveness of message transmissions, receipt, and intended translations.

Present-day leaders and planners continue the proud tradition of the past through adaptation and exploitation of advances in technology and by modification of novel methods that have proven successful in the civilian sector. At the beginning of this monograph, we asked how the United States Army effectively communicates official messages to its soldiers. Army leaders train and apply the inherent aspects of communication to influence and persuade through an institutionalized system of doctrine and training integral to leadership. Army leaders "wage total peace" through the consistent use of every communication asset (i.e. medium) available to mass the official message via synergistic and complementary themes that are consistent with policy. Even when the results are not perfect, Army leaders generally follow an array of enduring principles of communication that allow soldiers and the organization to maintain contact, continue to engage, accept the bad with the good, and complete the objective. In the end, regardless of new means made available by the evolution of technologies, United States Army leaders continue to use every asset at their disposal to communicate messages to soldiers as part of our relentless pursuit to —influence human minds."

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