

Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration: Conflict Termination in Counterinsurgency

**A Monograph
by
MAJ Patrick J Williams MC RHG/D
British Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

AY 2010

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 15-04-2010		2. REPORT TYPE SAMS Monograph		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) July 2008 – May 2009	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration: Conflict Termination in Counterinsurgency			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Patrick J Williams MC RHG/D, British Army			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) 250 Gibbon Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134			8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT Few insurgencies are resolved by military means alone. Insurgents, by definition, pursue political ends and resolve to accomplish those objectives by means of violence. Today the United States and her Allies are engaged in two distinct Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations, Iraq and Afghanistan. In the case of Iraq, US forces are in the process of handing over the remaining responsibility for nationwide security and stability to the Iraqi government. Afghanistan, presently, does not offer such hope. This paper explores the construct of Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration (AR2) through case studies of three conflicts in Peru, Algeria and Iraq. Each case study examines the roots of conflict, the conduct of the conflict by insurgents and counterinsurgents alike and draws inference from the methods of AR2 used to bring about the termination of conflict. The study concludes with Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration is neither a process nor a prescription for peace and stability. There are no formulae that can be applied to a conflict that can resolve it, but AR2 does offer what the application of violence rarely can; the beginnings of a solution.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Amnesty, Reconciliation, Reintegration, AR2, Peru, Sendaro Luminoso, Algeria, FLN, Iraq, Sunni Awakening, Al Anbar, Conflict Termination					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Stefan J. Banach COL, U.S. Army
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			(U)

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

MAJ Patrick James Williams

Title of Monograph: Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration: Conflict Termination in Counterinsurgency.

This monograph was defended by the degree candidate on 1-April-2010 and approved by the monograph director and reader named below

Approved by:

Dan G. Cox, Ph D

Monograph Director

Michael Hochwart, O, Bundeswehr

Monograph Reader

Stefan Banach, COL, IN,

Director
School of Advanced Military
Studies

Robert F Baumann,Ph.D.

Director
Graduate Degree Programs

Abstract

AMNESTY, RECONCILIATION, REINTEGRATION: CONFLICT TERMINATION IN COUNTERINSURGENCY by MAJ Patrick J Williams, British Army, 47 pages.

Few insurgencies are resolved by military means alone. Insurgents, by definition, pursue political ends and resolve to accomplish those objectives by means of violence. Today the United States and her Allies are engaged in two distinct Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations, Iraq and Afghanistan. In the case of Iraq, US forces are in the process of handing over the remaining responsibility for nationwide security and stability to the Iraqi government. Afghanistan, presently, does not offer such hope. This paper explores the construct of Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration (AR2) through case studies of three conflicts in Peru, Algeria and Iraq. Each case study examines the roots of conflict, the conduct of the conflict by insurgents and counterinsurgents alike and draws inference from the methods of AR2 used to bring about the termination of conflict. The study concludes with Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration is neither a process nor a prescription for peace and stability. There are no formulae that can be applied to a conflict that can resolve it, but AR2 does offer what the application of violence rarely can; the beginnings of a solution.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration.....	2
Methodology and Terms.....	6
DDR vs. AR2.....	9
DDR Case Study: Sierra Leone.....	9
AR2 Case Study: Northern Ireland.....	11
Peru: A Nation Divided.....	15
The Origins of Conflict and Contest.....	15
The Rise of Sendero Luminoso	16
The Failings of the State.....	17
The Fight	18
Defeat and Amnesty	19
Endgame and Reconciliation.....	21
Summary.....	22
Algeria: The Long Road to Reconciliation	25
The End of Empire	26
Revolution and Independence	27
Independence and Internal Strife.....	30
The Descent into Chaos.....	32
National Reconciliation or National Amnesia?.....	34
Summary.....	36
Iraq: The Enemy from Within and Without	38
An Ancient and Divided Land.....	38
The Rise of the Insurgency.....	40
The Path to Progress	41
The Al Anbar Awakening	42
Reintegration or Disintegration	44
Summary.....	46
Conclusion.....	47
Recommendations For Further Study.....	49
BIBLIOGRAPHY	50

Introduction

Few insurgencies are resolved by military means alone. Insurgents, by definition, pursue political ends and resolve to accomplish those objectives by means of violence. Today the United States and her Allies are engaged in two distinct Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations, Iraq and Afghanistan. In the case of Iraq, US forces are in the process of handing over the remaining responsibility for nationwide security and stability to the Iraqi government. Afghanistan, presently, does not offer such hope.

Governments that have waged successful COIN operations have usually had to engage in negotiations with their opponents. Whilst such negotiations are often seen as unpalatable, they are crucial to the eventual resolution of the conflict. Governments do not want to be seen negotiating with ‘terrorists’ or striking a deal with ‘criminals’ or having to accept the politically expedient option. Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration (AR2) can be perceived as just such a compromise. A failure to recognize the complexities of AR2 is a failure to address Thucydides’ three imperatives of conflict: Fear, honor and interest.¹

The insurgency in Afghanistan offers a unique set of problems. A broad Coalition is operating in a land that is culturally unfamiliar and complex. The insurgent varies from individual, untrained hired fighters to hardened transnational terrorist. The terrain makes movement and communications difficult. The political, governmental and security apparatus are wracked with corruption. Under these conditions and after eight years of insurgency the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in partnership with the Coalition must address the issue of AR2 as a means of conflict termination.

In an interview in December 2009, the commander of the International Stabilization and Assistance Force (ISAF), General Stanley A. McChrystal stated that, “Reintegration [of mid and

¹ Robert B. Strassler, ed., *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War*, (New York: The Free Press, 1976), 43

lower level Taliban] is hugely important, incredibly important.”² It is worth noting that he caveated his comments by his explanation that the solution to Afghanistan’s problems is a holistic one requiring numerous and concurrent lines, or as this paper will discuss, loops of effort.

Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration


Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration refers to a series of conditions that need to be met prior to, or concurrent with, the termination of conflict. The concept of AR2 is not new and aspects of AR2 are present in conflict throughout recorded history by both accident and design. Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration can span the spectrum of conflict from Clausewitzian total wars, such as the Second World War and the reconstruction of the Axis Powers and the process of reconciliation following the genocide in Rwanda,³ to small scale conflicts and insurgencies such as the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland.⁴ In essence, AR2 is about compromise: the acceptance that in certain cases victory is not possible solely via the application of violence. Within the context of civil war during the last century, dialogue between adversaries has often been instigated and/or arbitrated by a third party or “honest broker”.⁵ AR2 forms part of this dialogue.

² Trudy Rubins, “Worldview: McChrystal’s Afghan Strategy Attacks on Several Key Fronts,” *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, <http://www.philly.com/inquirer/currents/79150887.html>, (accessed December 14, 2009)

³ Eugina Zorbas, Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda, *African Journal of Legal Studies*, <http://www.africalawinstitute.org/ajls/vol1/no1/zorbas.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2010)

⁴ Major John Clark, “A balanced approach to amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration (NORTHERN IRELAND),” *The Military Review* (January 2008)

⁵ Barbara F. Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement”, *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer, 1997): 335.



(Figure 1) A Conceptual Model of AR2

Compromise assumes a move from opposing ends of a spectrum to a point of mutual agreement. Where that point of agreement or compromise lies on the spectrum is dependent upon the support available to the belligerent parties, the relative strength of their bargaining position and their culturally defined proclivity for the act of compromise. The grey area of such a compromise is shown in Fig 1 and is the arena within which AR2 can take place.

The model is representative of a flow system with valves between negative, neutral and positive and is reflective of Dietrich Dörner's positive and negative feedback loops.⁶ Absolute compromise for both parties would see the eventual disappearance of all positive and negative elements resulting in a purely neutral population and government. Such an idea is fanciful.

⁶ Dietrich Dörner, trans. Rita and Robert Kimber, *The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What Can We Do to Make Them Right*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 90-91

Through the act of Reconciliation and Amnesty, the government and its agents will seek to draw the Negative elements towards neutrality and beyond. Conversely, the insurgents will be pressuring for the point of compromise to rest as close to their stated aim or objectives. By doing this they will make gains through legitimacy whilst hoping to draw increased support from the non-affiliated population.

Dependent upon the circumstance of conflict, there may be an externally appointed or internally invited “honest broker” to enforce a peace agreement or assist the recognized government. If appointed from an external organization such as the United Nations (UN), the “honest broker” might have to establish a transitional government and become part of the AR2 process rather than the arbitrator of it. Alternatively, if a legitimate government requests third party’s assistance, its entry into the conflict is likely to make its potential role as mediator problematic and is likely to become part of the wider issue.

In an article in *The Military Review*, Dr Michael Mosser offers a model of AR2 (see Fig.2) bounded by societal and cultural norms and set within the Venn diagram intersections of Politics, Security and Economics.⁷ Mosser describes this intersection as the “sweet spot” as it represents the inter-relational aspect of the three dimensions of political, economic and security spheres. Receptive growth of any one of these spheres greatly increases the receptivity of the other two spheres hence enlarging the “sweet spot” of AR2. Identifying the conditions that allow this growth to take place is the core subject of this study.

⁷ Michael W. Mosser, “The Armed Reconciler: The Military Role in the Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration Process,” *Military Review*, Vol. VXXXIX (November – December 2007), 14



Figure 2.

AR2 is not an end in itself but rather a means to a lasting end. It is not the result of conflict termination but the beginnings or the foundations of a path to peace. Clausewitz stated that, “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult”⁸. Likewise, the principle of AR2 is straightforward; its practice is not. It has been observed that, “True reconciliation is never cheap, for it is based on forgiveness which is costly”⁹. This simple observation encapsulates the difficulties inherent with AR2 and the reluctance with which it is often pursued.

Martin Van Creveld neatly sums up the conflicting options that confront a government embroiled in a fight with insurgents: deliver a devastating blow far beyond that which the insurgent is expecting or engage in a long game of phlegmatic stoicism aimed at political resolve.¹⁰ The former option, whilst decisive, is not compatible with the actions of a liberal and

⁸ Carl Von Clausewitz, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, “*On War*,” (London: Everyman Library, 1993), 138

⁹ Lord Morrows, On his maiden speech to the British House of Lords in reference to the Northern Ireland Peace Process, *Lords Hansard*, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldhansrd/text/61121-0009.htm>, November 21 2006, quoting Archbishop Desmond Tutu opening remarks as chairperson of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, November 30, 1995 (accessed November 14, 2009)

¹⁰ Martin Van Creveld, “On Counterinsurgency,” quoted in a speech to *The Henry Jackson Society*, (London, February 26, 2008), <http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?pageid=49&id=671>, (accessed November 14, 2009). In his speech, he contrasts the experience of President Asad of Syria and his decision to crush the Muslim Brotherhood at Hama, 1983 and the approach taken by the British Government in fighting a counterinsurgency campaign in Northern Ireland, 1969 – 1996.

democratic, government. The later, offered by Van Creveld, is the only option, other than non-intervention, that a liberal democracy can offer an insurgency, albeit at home or at the invitation of another nation or international body.

The emergence of the information age, of global interconnectivity, of instant news, means that the actions of a government engaged in an insurgency are closely monitored and any excesses exploited by the insurgents and their supporters. Whilst there are still valuable lessons to be learnt from Kitson, Thompson, Galula and Trinquier they operated within a different set of cultural, legal, informational and temporal norms. AR2 does not lessen the cost of an insurgency in terms of blood or treasure but for the counterinsurgent, it offers legitimacy, adherence to the rule of law and the hard-fought moral high ground.

Methodology and Terms

This paper will use three historical examples of AR2; the battle against the Shining Path or *Sendero Luminoso* in Peru, the efforts of the Algerian government to bring about national reconciliation and the circumstances surrounding the Al Anbar or Sunni Awakening in Iraq. In each of these examples, I will examine the environmental, political and military systems that allowed or initiated AR2 and gauge its lasting success. From these observations, I will draw inference for today's conflicts and those of the future and the part that AR2 has to play.

These case studies have been chosen because they offer a broad spectrum of reconciliatory efforts and degrees of success. In each example the threat posed to the governing authority has been internal and the conflict a result of socio-economic or religious tensions. In the words of General Sir Rupert Smith, these "wars amongst the peoples"¹¹ are the wars of our time

¹¹ General Sir Rupert Smith, "*The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*," (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 267

and the future and it is in our interest to understand the complexities of these conflicts and accept that despite these complexities solutions can be found to such conflicts.

Whilst each of these studies share similarities, no two conflicts are the same. Likewise, there are no identical solution templates that can be overlaid on two conflicts no matter the similarities. This study aims to identify the roots of conflict in each case study and examine the conditions that allowed elements of AR2 to prevail. Having identified these conditions conducive to AR2 it will examine how these conditions in other conflicts might be recognized and encouraged in order to bring about the termination of conflict.

Amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration are all broad terms that are open to misinterpretation. The Oxford English Dictionary defines amnesty as, “the act of an authority (as a government) by which pardon is granted to a large group of individuals”.¹² Pursuant to this definition is that in order to grant a pardon or amnesty some form of rule of law must be in existence; without an enforceable rule of law no pardon can be proffered or guaranteed.¹³ The etymological roots of amnesty lie in the Greek word *amnestia* meaning forgetfulness or oblivion.¹⁴ In some circumstances, amnesty can also be linked to the voluntary surrender of weapons, ammunition or equipment such as programs sponsored by law enforcement authorities aimed at the reduction of illegally held weapons.

Reconciliation is defined variously as, “to restore to friendship or harmony; to make consistent or congruous; to cause to submit to or accept something unpleasant and to check (a

¹² Check ed. *The Oxford English Dictionary*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), s.v. “amnesty”.

¹³ In US constitutional law the distinction between Pardon and Amnesty is indistinct. It is generally accepted that Amnesty is granted before a prosecution has been brought and a Pardon thereafter, although in the case of President Ford’s pardoning of Nixon.

¹⁴ Louise Mallinder, “The Role of Amnesties in Conflict Transformation,” School of Law, Queens University, Belfast, March 11, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1375048, p13 (accessed January 20, 2010)

financial account) against another for accuracy”.¹⁵ I have broadened the definition to include the previously described concept of compromise. In her study of reconciliation in Cuba, Holly Ackerman describes the spectrum of reconciliation as follows:

...national reconciliation [is] a process of accommodation and reintegration by a previously divided, unique people. State reconciliation is a process of accommodation and reintegration by a government. State transition is the process of changing the form and/or terms of political domination in a recognized, sovereign country. These processes do not necessarily occur at the same time although they may. In general, reconciliation is a more protracted process than transition. It is frequently associated with individual transformation and local action as well as institutional, collective processes.¹⁶

Reintegration is defined as, “to integrate again into an entity: to restore to unity”.¹⁷

Reintegration assumes a previous connectivity in a socio-cultural environ. In many cases, this may have never been the case and so I will include the term integration. The United Nations, in the context of its Demobilization, Disarming and Reintegration (DDR) Program defines reintegration as follows:

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.¹⁸

DDR and AR2 are often seen as being synonymous. There is a degree of overlap between the processes but the distinction is worth making. Before this study progresses into the three main case studies it will briefly examine two distinct case studies that will highlight the essential differences between DDR and AR2, those of Sierra Leone and Northern Ireland.

¹⁵ Check ed. “*The Oxford English Dictionary*,” s.v. “reconcile”

¹⁶ Holly Ackerman, “National Reconciliation in the Case of Cuba: *Definition and Analysis*,” Papers and Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE), Biltmore Hotel, Coral Gables, Florida, August 12-14, 1999, <http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba9/>, (accessed, March 20, 2010)

¹⁷ Check ed. *The Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. “reintegration”

¹⁸ United Nations, DDR Website <http://www.unddr.org/whatisddr.php>, (accessed, November 29, 2009)

DDR vs. AR2

Demobilization, Disarming and Reintegration is primarily a UN sponsored activity. As a process it seeks to, "... contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin".¹⁹ This program has been used to great effect in a number of conflicts including: Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, 1999), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL, 2003), the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI, 2004), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004), the United Nations Operation in Burundi (UNOB, 2004), and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS, 2005).²⁰ The inference, as Dr Mosser points out, is that DDR is conducted within a permissive environment with agreements from warring parties whereas AR2 seeks to exploit opportunities that exist during ongoing conflict.²¹ In this study, I will use the term AR2 in this context, as an activity and methodology that is applied during conflict as a means of conflict termination. A brief look at two case studies will serve to highlight the differences between DDR and AR2.

DDR Case Study: Sierra Leone

Since its independence from Great Britain in 1961, Sierra Leone slid inexorably into decline and chaos resulting in the outbreak of civil war in 1991. Geologically, Sierra Leone had had bestowed upon it a wealth of mineral deposits such as iron ore, bauxite, titanium ore, gold, diamonds and chromite. In terms of geography and its neighbors, it was less fortunate. Instability under Charles Taylor in Liberia spilled over the border into Sierra Leone fermenting an already volatile situation. Capitalizing on this instability and with the support of Taylor a group called the

¹⁹ *ibid*

²⁰ UN DDR Website

²¹ Mosser, *Military Review*, 15

Revolutionary United Front (RUF) began attacking villages along the Sierra Leone/ Liberia border. This instability was the precursor to a series of military coups, none of which were able to defeat the growing forces of the RUF. Eventually, in 1995 the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) hired a South African Private Military Company (PMC) Executive Outcomes (EO) to secure the country's diamond mines and defeat the RUF.²²

The intervention by EO was a temporary success but problems with the financing of the operation and the resurgence of the RUF further destabilized the country. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established in 1999 but proved unable to prevent agreed ceasefire terms between the RUF and government troops. In June 1999, the United Kingdom sent a Royal Navy Amphibious Task Force and ground troops to enforce the peace (Operation PALLISER). This intervention proved successful at bringing the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone back to the negotiating table and implementing UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1181 (1998).²³ It made the following provisions for DDR:

- Monitor the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants concentrated in secure areas of the country, including monitoring of the role of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the provision of security and in the collection and destruction of arms in those secure areas;
- Assist in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law, including at disarmament and demobilization sites, where security conditions permit;
- Monitor the voluntary disarmament and demobilization of members of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), as security conditions permit.²⁴

The DDR process was targeted at 45,000 combatants including those of the RUF, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and other armed and paramilitary groups. It aimed to disarm all combatants, rearm and retrain some and economically and socially reintegrate all combatants into

²² Deborah D Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 82

²³ United States Department of State, "Background Notes: Sierra Leone." <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm#history> (accessed December 6, 2009)

²⁴ United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1181 (1998)," dated 13 July 1998, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/203/28/PDF/N9820328.pdf?OpenElement>, (accessed December 6, 2009)

a peaceful and stable Sierra Leone.²⁵ The catalysts for agreement were (1) a broadly accepted desire for peace, (2) the threat of further British military intervention, (3) the arms and trade embargo placed upon Liberia, and (4) new leadership of the RUF. According to the UN, “On 18 January 2002, President Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan-Kabbah declared the decade-old civil war ended with the completion of disarmament and demobilization of former RUF and CDF combatants in all 12 districts of the country.”²⁶

In the case of Sierra Leone, the process of DDR was the result of a peace agreement, not a precursor to it. In the next example, I will show how AR2 both led to a peace process and forged a path beyond it.

AR2 Case Study: Northern Ireland

The origins of the conflict in Ireland can be traced back to the 16th Century and the attempts of the English to pacify the Irish. The modern day conflict traces its roots, more immediately, to the civil rights movement of the late 1960s. In August of 1969, the British Army was sent onto the streets of Northern Ireland to restore order following violence between the predominantly ruling Protestant Unionist community and the Catholic Republican minority.²⁷ As violence mounted, factional groups emerged ostensibly to protect their own communities, republicans turned to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Unionists to the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).

²⁵ Dr Stuart Griffin, “*Joint Operations: A Short History*,” (London: Ministry of Defence Publication, 2005), 215

²⁶ UN DDR Website. <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=60#approach> (accessed December 6, 2009)

²⁷ “Unionist” or “Loyalist” refers to the desire to maintain a union with the United Kingdom and loyalty to the British Crown. “Republican” refers to the desire to unite Ulster’s six counties with the Irish Republic or Eire.

The events of January 30th, 1972 or Bloody Sunday during which 14 demonstrators were shot dead by the British Army provided PIRA with the ground for waging war against, in their eyes the Army of Occupation and the British State.²⁸ For the next 30 years, a vicious but low-key conflict ensued pitting Loyalist against Republican and Republican against the British Army and local security forces. The positions of each side were seemingly intractable. The Republicans wanted nothing more than unity with Eire. Unionists refused to be governed by Dublin and as the majority and, adhering to the principle of self-determination; the British Government supported them and publically refused to negotiate with what they saw as terrorists.

Representatives of all sides held elected political office although Republicans refused to take their seats in Parliament instead enacted a campaign of the “Bullet and the Ballot Box”²⁹, a dual-track policy of political engagement and a campaign of terror. As the levels of violence rose during the 1970s repeated efforts at negotiation failed. It was not until the signing in 1985 of the Anglo Irish Agreement that cooperation regarding Northern Ireland was achieved with the Government of the Republic of Ireland. As Margret Thatcher put it:

I started from the need for greater security, which was imperative. If this meant making limited political concession to the South, much as I disliked this kind of bargaining, I had to contemplate it.³⁰

This concession was the precursor to a series of secret discussions between the British Government and PIRA conducted by intermediaries.³¹ These talks have never been officially acknowledged but were crucial in drawing in PIRA and their political party, Sinn Fein to the negotiating table.

²⁸ Museum of Free Derry, “Bloody Sunday and its Aftermath.” <http://www.museumoffreederry.org/history-bloody-reaction.html> (accessed December 12, 2009)

²⁹ International Library of the Communist Left, “Ireland – Sinn Fein: From the Bullet to the Ballot.” <http://www.sinistra.net/lib/upt/comlef/coru/coruibebie.html>. (accessed December 11, 2009)

³⁰ Margaret Thatcher, “*The Downing Street Years*,” (London: Harpers and Collins, 1995), 379

³¹ Ed Moloney, “*The Secret History of the IRA*,” (London: W.W Norton & Company, 2002), 246 -

Concurrent to secret negotiations, political and social pressure was mounting on PIRA to commit to a ceasefire and enter a dialogue for peace. The organization had been the target of sophisticated intelligence operations conducted by the British Army, Police and Intelligence services and had been penetrated by informants at all levels.³² The economic conditions in Northern Ireland were poor, in comparison with the remainder of the UK. For all these reasons negotiations for a lasting peace became inevitable.

The Good Friday or Belfast Agreement was signed on 10th April 1998 and outlined proposals for a devolved government in Northern Ireland, the release of convicted prisoners and the decommissioning of illegally held weapons.

We reaffirm our total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences on political issues, and our opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any political purpose, whether in regard to this agreement or otherwise.³³

This Agreement was founded on the ability to negotiate with a violent opponent whose goals were diametrically opposed to that of the British Government. Similarly, for Sinn Fein and PIRA they entered into negotiations with both of their sworn enemies, the British Government and the Unionists. This agreement did not occur overnight. There were earlier attempts through the Downing Street Declaration and private talks about which the public probably will never know. Yet other factors played a role in the decision by all sides to sit down, talk, compromise and reach an agreement.

These two brief examples highlight the differences between DDR and AR2. In the case of Sierra Leone, DDR was a result of a peace agreement and a requirement for lasting stability and is enacted, supervised and adjudicated by an independent body, in this case the UN. AR2 is a

³² Ed Moloney, "The Steak Knife Affair," *Daily Telegraph*, May 15, 2003. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3591321/The-Steak-Knife-affair-will-be-deeply-wounding-to-the-IRA.html>. (accessed December 12, 2009)

³³ United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and The Republic of Ireland, *The Good Friday Agreement*, Article 4, Annex A, , April 10, 1998, <http://www.nio.gov.uk/agreement.pdf> , (accessed, November 14, 2009)

process that can take place in environments where peace does not exist and is focused upon sowing the seed of reconciliation and can be use in conjunction with Major Combat Operations (MCOs) and Counterinsurgency (COIN).³⁴ In the findings of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Archbishop Desmond Tutu is quoted as saying, "Confession, forgiveness and reconciliation in the lives of nations are not just airy-fairy religious and spiritual things, nebulous and unrealistic. They are the stuff of practical politics."³⁵

The first case study examines the efforts made by the Peruvian government to counter the spread of Marxist ideology and violence perpetrated by the Shining Path movement and how the oppressive and reactionary nature of the government's response undermined their operations. This will be followed by a study of Algeria's recent attempts to reconcile a nation that has been torn apart, first by colonialism and then by secularism and finally by an oppressive military trying to counter a threat of radical Islam. The final case study is an examination of the Sunni Awakening and the split of Sunni tribal militias from Al Qaeda in Iraq and their reconciliation with their hitherto sworn enemy, the United States of America.

³⁴ Mosser, *Military Review*, 15

³⁵ The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Truth: The Road To Reconciliation*, The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume 5, Chapter 9, 351
<http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm>, (accessed, March 16, 2010)

Peru: A Nation Divided

The Origins of Conflict and Contest

In common with its neighbors, Peru has suffered at the hands of Leftist revolutionaries. Since the ascent of Fidel Castro to power in Cuba in 1959, South American governments have been forced to confront the spread of Communism.³⁶ The prevailing socio-economic conditions in Latin America favored disillusion amongst the largely agricultural and indigenous populations. The ruling classes were predominantly white and of Spanish origin. Successive military coups in Latin America had undermined the trust of the military and destabilized the democratic system. Of course, Latin America's comparatively recent problems can be traced back to the colonization of the region by Spanish Conquistadores.

The native inhabitants of Peru are the Incas. The Inca Empire spanned what is now Peru, Bolivia and parts of Ecuador and Chile.³⁷ In comparison to, what is now the remainder of South America; the Inca Empire was the most stable and civilized. The arrival of the Conquistadores at Tumbes in 1528 marked the beginnings of the end of the Inca Empire. The Spanish lust for gold and silver, the proselytizing of Christianity and superior weaponry soon over-powered the Inca leading to the eventual execution of their Sun King, Atahualpa. After begging for his life, he was offered the chance to convert to Christianity. He was baptized and then executed; garroted rather than burnt at the stake. In their book, *The Last of the Incas*, Hyams and Ordish, state with an impending sense of doom, "With him [Atahualpa] died...the independent existence of a noble race".³⁸

³⁶ Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Counterinsurgency Doctrine 1942-1976*, (Washington D.C: Center of Military History, United States Army 2007), 292

³⁷ Carlos A. Loprete, *Los Incas, Iberoamérica: Historia de su Civilización y Cultura*, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), 33

³⁸ Edward Hyams and George Ordish, *The Last of the Incas*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), 254

This history of Peru is important. It highlights the sense of loss of the indigenous peoples of modern-day Latin America and underscores the perceived loss of their cultural inheritance as well as demonstrating the historical legacy of violence and terror. It was with these feelings of disenfranchisement, a destabilized and dysfunctional democracy and crushing poverty that the Shining Path, or *Sendero Luminoso*,³⁹ forged their Marxist agenda upon Peru.

The Rise of Sendero Luminoso

The Shining Path was the brainchild of a philosophy professor at San Cristóbal of Huamanga University, Abimael Guzman, in the 1960s. His ideas of Marxism and Maoism were reinforced by visits to the People's Republic of China. Maoist theory formed the ideological foundations of the Shining Path. Its aim was, with the use of violence, to overthrow the Peruvian government, destroy the instruments of State and replace them with a communist peasant revolutionary regime.⁴⁰

Guzman was an active member of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) in the 1960s and his position as a lecturer and his abundant charisma made for a loyal group of followers. He had been active in organizing communist cells prior to his expulsion from the Party in 1970⁴¹ and used this experience and his support base to mobilize, indoctrinate and train followers before sending them back into the mainly indigenous communities in the Peruvian hinterland. The base of support for Sendero grew through the recruitment of teachers, social workers and public servants and by capitalizing on the disillusionment of the rural peasantry and the Indian slums of Lima. Guzman was employing, in part, Mao's theory of revolution that concentrates on the

³⁹ The terms *Shining Path*, *Sendero Luminoso* and simply *Sendero* are all interchangeable for the purposes of this study.

⁴⁰ Wayne Lucero, "The Rise and Fall of Shining Path," Council on Hemispheric Affairs, <http://www.coha.org/the-rise-and-fall-of-shining-path/> (accessed, March 9, 2010)

⁴¹ LTC R. Dewitt, "The Rise and Development of Sendero Luminoso in Peru," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 27 1992, 10, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA249429&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed December 18, 2009)

agrarian as the basis for the conduct of the People's War in order to, "install a dictatorship of the proletariat".⁴²

17 May 1980 saw Sendero Luminoso's first act of terror, a symbolic attack of a rural polling station and the destruction of all the ballots of the first democratic election to be held in 12 years. The attack received little attention in the Peruvian media but their organization had made the crucial move from a purely political and ideological entity to a guerilla movement. Over the next few years, the ferocity and audacity of their attacks increased dramatically as did their base of support and the areas of territory they controlled, in particular the Andean hinterland, filling the void left by the absence of central government control.⁴³

The Failings of the State

Failing governments breed social, political and economic discontent presenting fertile grounds for an insurgency. It was exactly this environment that the military government of Peru had engendered from 1968 – 1980. Its span of control was centered upon the coast and valleys that encompassed the industrially and agriculturally most productive regions. In these areas the middle classes and elite held sway entirely removed from the impoverished interior.

The military in Peru, like its neighbors', see their role at the arbiter of national politics and will intervene when internal security is threatened.⁴⁴ The military had come to power in 1968 with the country on the verge of economic collapse. Most of what Peru produced was exported and the major companies operating in the country were foreign owned. In particular, the mining companies were seen as exploiting indigenous labor with poor working conditions and pay,

⁴²ibid, 11

⁴³ Lucero, "The Rise and Fall of the Shining Path"

⁴⁴ Russell W. Switzer, Jr., Sendero Luminoso and Peruvian Counterinsurgency, A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College, May 2007, 13 <http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-01242007-200500/unrestricted/russswitzerthesis.pdf> (accessed December 18, 2009)

giving rise to the power of trade unions and the growing appeal of Marxism. The military government, or junta, tried to gain popularity by nationalizing some of the large international corporations, which proved a highly popular move. This popularity was temporary and the Junta was unable to raise sufficient funds to, as Switzer states, “adequately address the needs of the Peruvian people in general and the poverty-stricken peasants in particular”.⁴⁵

The Fight

As Sendero started their campaign, Peru was in a perilous state economically, its military was neither configured nor trained to fight an insurgency and its police forces had suffered from years of underinvestment. Sendero, on the other hand, had spent 10 years shaping its operational environment and support base. Guzman (or self-styled Presidente Gonzalo) provided continual and inspirational leadership to the organization. Their attacks were small-scale to begin with targeting landowners for assassination. The subsequent redistribution of the land to the peasants proved very popular and support for Sendero continued to grow.

Initially, the military was unable to reach the more remote Sierra region, where Sendero held sway. The inability to project power into the Peruvian interior effectively undermined the government and the military. The combination of a weak economy and the growing external pressures to combat the trade and cultivation of illegal narcotics⁴⁶, namely coca and the fact that the Peruvian armed forces were not trained for the subtle nuances required of counterinsurgency meant that Sendero was confronted head on. Punitive government strikes on Sendero strongholds and neutral areas produced a backlash of support for the insurgency and the frequent disregard for judicial due process and human rights further undermined the government’s position.

⁴⁵ *ibid*, p15

⁴⁶ Wayne Lucero, “The Rise and Fall of Shining Path”

The election of Alberto Fujimori on a platform of economic reform and security, unforgettably termed *Fujishock*, in 1990 brought economic stability to Peru for the first time in a decade. The measures imposed were harsh but necessary in order to stem hyperinflation and regain entry to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In an effort to bring security to the country, increasingly draconian methods were applied against anti-government forces including assassination, the widespread use of torture and disappearances.⁴⁷ Dissatisfied with the progress he was making with the Peruvian Legislature, Fujimori mounted his own *coup d'état* in 1992 disbanding Congress and dismantling the judicial system and granting himself unprecedented powers to combat Shining Path. In was later, this same year that Guzman was captured thus leaving Sendero without its leader. Unlike other terrorist organizations, Shining Path had never been built of a cellular system. The loss of its leader was the first signs of defeat for Sendero.

The loss of Guzman caused the fractionalization of Sendero. Having inexplicably begun to target moderate left-wingers and trade union officials in 1990 and under increasing pressure from government forces their base of general support began to falter. The very support it relied upon from the population was being eroded by their increased radicalization and incoherent strategy.⁴⁸ Furthermore, their reliance on the coca trade as a means of financing continued to undermine any legitimacy they had created.

Defeat and Amnesty

The punitive methods employed by Fujimori to combat Shining Path were predicated on death or capture.⁴⁹ There was little effort to reason with Sendero's leadership and there was little

⁴⁷Amnesty International, "Peru: Truth and Reconciliation Commission – a first step towards a country without injustice," August 2004 <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR46/003/2004> (accessed Jan 02, 2010)

⁴⁸Waynee Lucero, "The Rise and Fall of Shining Path"

⁴⁹Charles Lane, "Superman Meets Shining Path: Story of a CIA Success," *The Washington Post*, December 7, 2000

space for agreement, their ends being diametrically opposed to each other. Only in an autocracy, such as Fujimori had created for himself, would such methods be possible. The real obstacle to long-term stability and peace and any hope of reconciliation was Fujimori himself.

Fujimori did make limited efforts to offer amnesty to insurgents and claimed that Guzman was calling for a surrendering of arms and negotiation. Whilst the call for amnesty was genuine and had a noticeable impact on insurgent activity, the idea that Guzman was calling for negotiation was simply propaganda.⁵⁰ Where Fujimori's plans for amnesty unraveled was that amnesty could only be granted for Sendero fighters who provided information, whereas a *carte blanche* amnesty was handed to those involved in the government backed death squad (or *Colina*). Fujimori justified his actions thus:

"It was part of a concept to pacify Peru. There was a climate in which people were beginning to feel peace, and I felt it was necessary to seek a political solution after 14 or 15 years of internal war".⁵¹

Fujimori has since been found guilty of being complicit in the death squads ranged against the Shining Path as well as abusing the power of the executive and is serving a 25-year prison term. Despite, his conviction he remains a powerful figure in Peruvian politics and is largely credited with the destruction of the Shining Path.⁵²

The rise and initial successes of Sendero was symptomatic and illustrative of the broader inequalities of Peruvian society. Sendero might well have been effectively defeated following the capture of Guzman but a societal fracture remained. Until a solution could be found to reconcile the nation as a whole, conflict and tension would remain. This solution was to be found in a return to democracy and accountable government and the establishment of a Truth and

⁵⁰ Switzer, p69

⁵¹ Monte Hayes, Peru's Fujimori Defends Amnesty, Miami Herald, December 20, 2007
http://www.thehrf.org/news/122007_MH.pdf (accessed January 4, 2010)

⁵² BBC News, "Fujimori Gets Lengthy Jail Term," April 7, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7986951.stm> (accessed, January 4, 2010)

Reconciliation Commission to act as an impartial arbiter of crimes committed by insurgents and government forces alike.

Endgame and Reconciliation

Fujimori was impeached by the Peruvian Congress, November 22, 2000 being declared “morally unfit” to govern after an election marred by controversy and government attempts at disrupting and discrediting the opposition. An interim government was established under the control of Valentín Paniagua, the head of Congress, until presidential elections could be held in July 2001. Alejandro Toledo, who came from humble origins and an economist by training, had been a prominent opponent to Fujimori won the election promising transparent government, relief of the poor and economic stability. In his opposition to Fujimori, he had united the often-disparate Peruvian political parties. As such, the unity he created was a first step in national reconciliation; the second step was the creation and support of the *Comisión de la Verdad y de la Reconciliación* (CVR). The CVR responsibilities were described as follows:

The Commission of Truth and Reconciliation Commission is created as the body responsible for clarifying the process, the events and responsibilities, not just the performer but also those who ordered or tolerated, and in turn to provide insights that affirm peace and reconciliation among all Peruvians.⁵³

The CVR heard evidence from over 16,000 individuals as well as calling upon the institutions of the State to testify in public. It was tasked with examining the actions of all belligerents and to apportion blame for the estimated 70,000 deaths that occurred between 1980 and 2000. Furthermore, it was responsible for identifying the conditions that led to and exacerbated the socio-economic tensions.⁵⁴ After three years of testimony, the CVR produced a

⁵³ The Republic of Peru, “The Final Report of the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission*,” <http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/pagina01.php> (accessed, November 16, 2009)

⁵⁴ *ibid*

comprehensive 9-volume report to President Toledo and his Prime Minister. He described it as follows:

It was a harrowing document, and it was of unquestionable historic importance not only for country but also for the entire world. It revealed, for the first time the structural causes of a merciless violence that led to more than 70,000 deaths or disappearances at the hands of subversive organizations or state agents who acted without regard to our legal institutions.⁵⁵

The document is extraordinary in its candid commentary and in its conclusion states:

The CVR understands that reconciliation must occur at the personal and family level, in social organizations and in the recasting of the relationship between the State and society in its entirety. These three levels should be oriented toward an overarching goal: building a country that is positively recognized as multiethnic, pluri-cultural, and multilingual. That recognition is the basis for overcoming the discriminatory practices underlying the multiple discords in the history of our Republic.⁵⁶

The real legacy for the Commission is that its findings have been generally accepted. Individuals from the Armed Forces and insurgent groups identified as committing atrocities have been tried and jailed. As mentioned, Fujimori, despite fleeing to Japan is now languishing in a Peruvian jail as is Guzman. Reparations have been recommended for the poor and previously dispossessed and a renewed emphasis placed upon education. The Commission created a narrative of the conflict upon which lessons could be drawn, blame apportioned and act as a benchmark of reconciliation in the history of Peru; as Toledo articulated, "...to turn to my fellow citizens and say with absolute conviction, in the name of the State: "Forgive, and never again!"."⁵⁷

Summary

The case of Peru and the Shining Path demonstrates many of the difficult circumstances surrounding internal civil conflict and insurgencies. Despite, the oppressive measures imposed by

⁵⁵ Alejandro Toledo, "Healing the Past, Protecting the Future," *Americas Quarterly*, 2009, 51

⁵⁶ The Republic of Peru, "The Final Report of CVR, General Conclusions," Article 171

⁵⁷ Toledo, *Americas Quarterly*, 52

all governments between 1980 and 2000 to tackle the Shining Path, a permanent stability and recognition of the State's failings would not have been possible without the work of the CVR. This highlights the issue at the center of defeating an insurgency that unless you remove the causes of conflict you are likely to prolong, exacerbate or postpone the underlying causes of conflict.⁵⁸

The findings of the CVR were fascinating. Without any form of amnesty but a heavy emphasis upon justice and reconciliation has produced seemingly lasting effects. In this case, reconciliation had to be aimed at the Peruvian people reconciling them to a government and to each other. The legacies of history, colonialism, racism, a failing economy and social exclusion all gave rise to conflict and fractures within Peruvian society. The CVR identified these legacies and made recommendations about how these might be rectified.

It was clear from the nature of the campaign mounted by the Shining Path and their devotion to their leader, Guzman that while he was free there could be no negotiation, no reconciliation. That said, despite his capture the Shining Path continued to operate for another eight years and continue to a much lesser extent today. Truth and reconciliation will not resolve every conflict or placate all insurgents but in this case, it was used as a means to identify, articulate and find recourse for the underlying causes of conflict in Peru.

Peru and the Shining Path provide an example of how an insurgency arises; of how when it is countered with little understanding and much brutality by security forces it results in the further undermining of a distrusted institution and gives succor to an already failing economy. It further demonstrates the necessity for fairly elected and representative government that can enable a process of reconciliation to take place. The amnesties of Fujimori lacked any legitimacy because they ignored the role of State agents in the death and torture of civilians. If amnesty and

⁵⁸ United States Army, "*FM 3.24 Counterinsurgency*," (Washington D.C.:Headquarters Department of the Army, December 15, 2006), 1-1

reconciliation are to be sought or granted it is imperative that an impartial commission establishes the bounds within which agreements can be made. Tangential to this is that for reconciliation and amnesty to be offered to any party the government must be in a commanding position. In the case of Peru, Toledo's government was elected after a series of fraudulent attempts from Fujimori to remain in power and, even though, his electoral majority was small the fact that he won in a fairly contested election gave him the legitimacy to rule and won general support for the work of the CVR.

This case study exemplifies the conditions that are required for reconciliation to be initiated and how amnesty, when applied, must be done so equitably. The process must have a driving force, in this case the government, as well as an impartial body to mediate or adjudicate among parties. It must further be understood that reconciliation is merely a beginning to establishing an enduring stability and reintegration of the disparate elements of a society.

Algeria: The Long Road to Reconciliation

Algeria, as a distinct political entity, is a comparatively recent creation emerging in the last 400 years. The region's peoples comprise both Arabs and Berbers whose history extends well beyond the creation of Algeria and the arrival of Islam. The Berbers are the original inhabitants of the area and have been subject to a series of foreign conquests starting with the Phoenicians and Carthaginians around 1200 B.C followed by the arrival of the Romans after the destruction of Carthage in 146 A.D. The Romans in turn gave way to the Vandals followed by the Byzantines who were ultimately defeated by Arab invaders who brought with them their new and powerful faith, Islam.⁵⁹

In more recent times, Algeria has been ruled by French colonists. In 1830, simmering tensions between the French King, Charles X and the Algerian ruler, Khodja Hussein resulted in a punitive raid and subsequent occupation of Algiers. Algeria had been part of the Ottoman Empire since 1516 and had become a pirate haven, its coastline was better known as the Barbary Coast. Charles justified the expedition as follows, "...the resounding redress that I hope to obtain in satisfying the honour of France will with the Almighty help turn to the profit of Christendom."⁶⁰ In essence, he was punishing the Ottoman's acquiescence of piracy, taking advantage of their weakness, proselytizing Christianity and, of course, hoping to exploit the mythical wealth of the country. It is at this point that competing narratives diverge. The French remained in Algeria for another 132 years and depending upon the competing factions within both French and Algerian society, the national narratives emphasize either economic development and prosperity or oppression and subjugation with a myriad of positions in between.

⁵⁹ John P. Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*, (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1986), 6

⁶⁰ Martin Evans and John Phillips, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 2

The End of Empire

The end of the Second World War brought with it a fundamental change in the world system. Colonialism had run its path. The idea of the inherent right to national “Self-Determination” had been enshrined in the United Nations Charter⁶¹ and thus both the British and French Empires began their inexorable decline. The British Empire, upon which the sun was said never to set⁶², was bankrupt and exhausted after the war making handing back the Empire to its inhabitants an act of economic imperative as much as a moral one. David Gordon describes the French predicament as follows:

France had been beaten and liberated once and was no longer in a position to behave as a major power. Indo-China, the Levant and then Morocco and Tunisia had rejected or were challenging France’s tutelage, and the Communist world was aspiring and abetting this repudiation of the West. Algeria, although considered as part of metropolitan France, was as vulnerable to as any Arab state to the siren calls of independence.⁶³

Algeria found itself torn between two worlds, of modern France and that of its Muslim Arab-Berber past. The scene was set for revolution.

The injustices of colonialism were clear to Algeria nationalists; 11% of the active working population (the colonials or *colons*) held 42% of all industrial jobs; 90% of industrial and economic activity was in European hands; 1 in 10 Muslim children went to school and of the working indigenous male population 98% were illiterate.⁶⁴ At first, the dispute was not about secularism versus Islam, although discriminatory voting practices heavily favored non-Muslims, but nationalism. In common with other revolutions the Algerian one needed a spark to ignite the

⁶¹ United Nations, “United Nations Charter, Chapter 1: *Purposes and Principals*,” Article 1, para 2, signed June 26, 1945, San Francisco, CA

⁶² George Macartney, “*An Account of Ireland in 1773 by a Late Chief Secretary of that Kingdom, 1773*”, 55.; cited in Kevin Kenny, “*Ireland and the British Empire*.” (London: Oxford University Press, 2006), 72

⁶³ David C. Gordon, “*The Passing of French Algeria*,” (London: Oxford University Press, 1966),

50

⁶⁴ *ibid*, p51

flames. This was provided at Sétif May 8, 1945. Demonstrations had been planned across Algeria by the recently formed *Association des Amis of Manifeste et de la Liberté* (AML) that aimed to use the end of the war in Europe as an assertion of separate national identity by linking the defeat of Fascism to the end of colonialism.⁶⁵ The demonstration quickly turned violent and spread across the country. Over the course of the next five days 103 French settlers were killed and hundreds more injured by demonstrators and marauding gangs. Faced with such instability, the French reaction was ferocious, martial law was declared, the AML dissolved and its leaders arrested and the army was given *carte blanche* to suppress the rebellion. The French estimate that between 1,020 to 1,300 were killed by the security forces in the aftermath of the protests. Algerian Nationalists have put the total at nearer 45,000.⁶⁶ Whatever the real numbers were there would be no turning back for either the Nationalists or the French.

Revolution and Independence

The Sétif massacres further catalyzed the process of disengagement and radicalization amongst Algerian separatists.⁶⁷ The formation of the Arab League, March 22, 1945, gave added weight to the calls for independence. Article 2 of the League's declaration stated:

The purpose of the League is to draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate their political activities with the aim of realizing a close collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.⁶⁸

French attempts at regaining its authority were aimed at suppressing overt calls for nationalism and imprisoning Muslim leaders. Limited reforms tried to rebalance the political

⁶⁵ Evens and Philips, 51

⁶⁶ *ibid*, p52

⁶⁷ Entlis, 50

⁶⁸ The Arab League, "Pact of the League of Arab States," March 22, 1945, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arableag.asp#1, (accessed, March 10, 2010)

structure in Algeria and broadening the franchise allowing more Muslims to vote, abandoning the segregation of education and accepting Arabic as an official language alongside French.⁶⁹ That said, the notion that Algeria would be allowed to cede from the homeland was considered an anathema to the French government. According to the Prime Minister, M. Mendès-France, “It is inconceivable that Algeria should secede from Metropolitan France.... France will never, no Parliament, no Government will ever, yield on this basic principle. Algeria is France, and not a foreign country under our protection”.⁷⁰

The formation of the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) on November 1, 1954 marked the start of the war with France. The FLN had acted as a uniting force for the disparate elements of opposition. Yet despite a series of coordinated attacks launched by the armed wing of FLN, *Armée de Libération Nationale* (ALN), the French reaction was one of annoyance and disdain, followed swiftly by violent retribution.⁷¹ These initial setbacks served to galvanize the response of uncommitted Muslims to the cause of independence.

The FLN soon began to swell its ranks and extend its support. The ALN began attacking French nationals and the émigrés or *Pied Noir* as well as any Algerians thought to be supportive of the Government in a targeted terrorist campaign. The ALN at first operated in isolated areas in the vast Algeria interior and could use the bordering Tunisia and Morocco as supportive safe havens. The French government aware of the unpopularity of a losing war in Indo China was keen not to be seen to be starting another war much closer to home. The build-up of French forces was slow but increasingly determined. A campaign of urban security combined with ‘flying columns’ of strike forces had a significant impact on the ALN and its ability to move and operate

⁶⁹ Evans and Philips, 53

⁷⁰ David Galula, “*Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958*,” (Washington D.C.: The Rand Corporation, 1963), 10

⁷¹ Entlis, 53

freely. As a result, the ALN switched to urban terrorism and harnessing disaffected Algerian youth. These attacks were widely popular amongst the Algerian population and were seen a righteous retribution for the abuses of the French. The ALN viewed these attacks as active encouragement for the *Pied Noir* to chose between the “coffin or a suitcase”.⁷²

This concerted campaign of terror forced the French government to react with all their available forces. Algeria’s borders were sealed and a huge influx of Army and Foreign Legion units effectively locked down the entire country. The Military were given control of Algiers and mounted a decisive operation to root out FLN activists and sympathizers in the city. The operation was a decisive victory for the French. They succeeded in crushing the last remaining resistance within the city but their widespread use of torture ensured the victory was a pyrrhic one. Reaction to the Battle of Algiers and in particular the conduct of the French military authorities broadened international support for the FLN and caused a crisis of morale in the French Army.⁷³ For the FLN, the battle ensured that their war could not be won from within Algeria and that they would have to look to their large and well organized but dislocated army sheltering in Tunisia and Morocco. The FLN was now split between the remnants inside Algeria who were subject to increasing pressure of the French security forces and those political and military elements outside of Algeria in Tunis and Cairo who were open to diplomatic overtures from Arab governments.

Whatever the success of the military operations French President, Charles De Gaulle, knew that a lasting peace in both Algeria and at home was only to be found in a political solution. In a broadcast September 16, 1959, he outlined three possible solutions for the Algerian problem. The first was complete secession, which he prophesized would open the floodgates to chaos and

⁷² Galula, 15

⁷³ Entelis, 52

Communist dictatorships. The second was the complete enfranchisement of the Algerian people within the French Republic. His preferred choice was a self-governing Algeria with close ties to France.⁷⁴ Implicit in his speech was the Algerian right to self-determination and an acknowledgement that even those who had fought the government would be entitled to play a role in the future of Algeria. Many in the French Army were furious at this perceived capitulation and plotted to assassinate De Gaulle forming the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS).⁷⁵

The negotiations with the FLN did not go as smoothly as De Gaulle had imagined stalling over the inclusion of the Saharan portion of Algeria where oil had recently been discovered. However, a ceasefire was eventually brokered March 18, 1962 and a subsequent referendum in both France and Algeria overwhelmingly accepted the right of Algeria to be independent. On July 3, this was realized and Algeria became an independent nation. Evans and Phillips credit the success of the FLN to their solitary and unwavering goal of Algerian independence and France's failings to divisions within the government and military about how the war should be fought, to what ends and by what means. The apparent unity of the FLN was ephemeral at best. Underneath the united front were a myriad of conflicting agenda and disputing parties that would pave the way for continued violence in that troubled land.

Independence and Internal Strife

In the wake of the struggle for independence came the contest for power and authority. The exodus of almost all the professionally qualified people that came with independence left Algeria with little hope of any positive and long-term economic sustainability. Those competing for power were split three ways; the provisional government, the remainder of the indigenous

⁷⁴ Evans and Phillips, 62

⁷⁵ One such attempt was fictionalized by Fredrick Forsyth in his novel, *The Day of the Jackal*

Algerian local command districts or *Wilaya* and the external army of the ALN. At stake were issues of ideology, wartime misdemeanors, ethnic and clan ties and loyalties to specific leaders. Following the first post-independence FLN conference the country's first leader was decided upon. Ben Bella, a popular revolutionary leader was selected and with the support of the ALN Chief of Staff, Colonel Houari Bourmediene established his authority and set about addressing the nation's severe economic plight.⁷⁶

Ben Bella's economic policies were socialist in nature but muddled and without effect. He nationalized industry and farming in an effort to stem unemployment but these measures had little impact. He held the deep belief that by simply transferring the means of production to the people he could send the country on the road to recovery and with the FLN acting as a revolutionary vanguard he could reconcile Marxism and Islam.⁷⁷ In bid to consolidate his hold on power in light of increasing unpopularity he consolidated the position of president with Commander in Chief of the Army and the FLN as the sole political party. Further discontent from the Berber population and an attempt at mitigating the power of the Army by aligning himself with Leftist Unions eventually spelt the end of Ben Bella's Presidency. With some degree of inevitability and a good deal of relief, the Army took control of the government in May 1965 suspending the constitution and for the first time in its short history brought some stability to Algeria.

For the next 13 years Bourmediene's military government concentrated their efforts on economic reforms, in particular the development of the petro-chemical industry as well as instigating a socialist reform agenda that included the election of government representatives,

⁷⁶ Entelis, 59

⁷⁷ William H. Lewis, "Algeria: The Cycle of Reciprocal Fear," *African Studies Bulletin*, Vol. 12, No. 3, December 1969, 327, www.jstor.org/stable/523211, (accessed March 20, 2010)

including women. His lasting impact upon Algeria was the stabilization of the National leadership and the consolidation of government control of the economy.⁷⁸ His sudden death in 1978 sparked a huge national outpouring of grief as the country united in the loss of their savior. At least this is how the collective memory recalls the events in light of the internal strife, division and bloodshed that was to come in the next 25 years.

The Descent into Chaos

What became known as Black October had its origins in the declining gas and petroleum markets of the mid-1980s. The outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq in 1980 had seen a flooding of oil and gas onto the international markets seriously reducing the price of both products. This hit Algeria very hard and despite desperate attempts by President Chadli to regulate the market and borrow heavily the economy spiraled inexorably downwards. Unemployment had reached an all-time high and the burgeoning Algerian youth, little enamored by tales of their parents revolution and resistance, were without hope and restive. After weeks of tension on the streets of Algiers rioting broke out on October 5, 1988.

The protests centered upon the gap between the privileged elites and the working classes, the lack of staple food and impoverished living conditions. However, the undertones suggested there was more at play than just poverty. The riots were about the failure of the government to capitalize upon the success of the 1970s: of the position in which Algeria, once the toast of the non-aligned world and was now poverty-stricken.⁷⁹ Furthermore, the Army, once seen as the protectors of the people and the vanguard of the revolution had fired on its own people. This seriously undermined their position as guarantor of authority.

⁷⁸ *ibid*, 63

⁷⁹ Evans and Phillips, 104

The riots had the effect of forcing Chadli's hand in bringing about electoral reform. Black October had also had the impact of mobilizing other groups within Algeria that hitherto had been marginalized. In particular, there was growing Islamic resentment at the endemic corruption of the State. Alexis de Tocqueville echoed the predicament in which the Algerian government was about to find itself, describing the French Revolution he stated, "The most dangerous moment for a bad government is usually when it begins to reform itself".⁸⁰ Chadli's electoral reforms were aimed at placating the public whilst reinforcing the FLN's dominance of the Algerian political landscape. The results were not what he had envisioned.

In the first round of elections for the national legislative, the recently formed *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS) won twice as many votes as the ruling FLN. Whilst the FIS did not receive an outright majority the government was not ready to accept the democratic verdict and swiftly suspended the National People's Assembly and declared a state of emergency. President Chadli was forced to resign and the military once again took control of the country. Their fear, with a degree of irony, was that an Islamic party would be unable to uphold democratic principles citing the incompatibility of Islam and democracy.⁸¹

The military crackdown on Islamic political groups following the elections led to a decade of violence, reminiscent of the revolution. Islamic groups, convinced that democratic recourse was no longer an option conducted a ruthless terrorist campaign against the military government and abroad. Hugh Roberts dismisses the notion of the FIS and other Islamic groups

⁸⁰ Alexis de Tocqueville, "The Old Regime and the Revolution," cited in Evans and Phillips, "Algeria: The Anger of the Dispossessed," 143

⁸¹ Rachid Tlemçani, "Algeria Under Bouteflika: Civil Strife and National Reconciliation," *Carnegie Papers*, No. 7, February, 2008, 3
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec7_tlemcani_algeria_final.pdf, (accessed, March 4, 2010)

wanting to establish an Islamic Theocracy as nonsense and without regional precedence.⁸² The FIS did want the imposition of Islamic Law but also supported the democratic process. Other Islamic splinter groups were not quite so broadminded and pursued a radical and fundamentalist agenda. This impasse was to color the next ten years of violence.

National Reconciliation or National Amnesia?

The military government, under Mohamed Boudiaf, a founding member of the FLN, did try to pursue peace talks with the disparate Islamic opposition, and even allowed a degree of political pluralism and controlled elections. They pursued a dual track policy of negotiations with armed groups while, at the same time trying to crush them militarily. This was a divisive strategy and pitted the *Eradicateurs*, those that strove to destroy the Islamic opposition against the *Conciliateurs*, who believed in a political dialogue and the necessity of national reconciliation.⁸³ An eventual truce was agreed to in 1997 with some of the Islamic parties but it was not until the uncontested election of Houari Bouteflika in April 1999 that a chance of a lasting peace could be realized.

Bouteflika had been elected on a platform of reconciliation and a determination to address the hitherto publically unspoken issue of civilian casualties resulting from the decade of violence. He stated, "I am determined to make peace and I'm prepared to die for it".⁸⁴ The uncontested nature of his election guaranteed his success but also undermined his legitimacy that he sought to bolster by immediately implementing a peace plan and having it endorsed by a referendum. The results were overwhelmingly and probably artificially supportive but

⁸² Hugh Roberts, "Algeria's Ruinous Impasse and the Honourable Way Out," *International Affairs*, Vol. 2, April, 1995, 71, No.2, 260

⁸³ Tlemçani, 5

⁸⁴ *ibid*, 6

nonetheless gave him the presidential legitimacy he required for his program of national reconciliation.

The peace plan or Civil Harmony Laws granted amnesty to insurgents who fully disclosed their past and had not committed serious crimes. Those who had committed murder and rape would receive reduced sentences. In addition to this amnesty, he granted full amnesty or *grace amnistiante* to a list of insurgent groups who had agreed to lay down their arms.⁸⁵ In reality, there were few insurgents imprisoned and the list of insurgent groups granted amnesty was never publically disclosed.

The next issue that confronted Bouteflika was that of the Disappeared; those that had gone missing with no trace as a result of the conflict. He was determined to avoid the subject but internal and diplomatic pressure ensured that he had to act. A commission was established to investigate but not pass judgment or lay blame for the disappearances. The findings of the commission were, again, never made public although Bouteflika acknowledged that the State must bear responsibility of the actions of its security forces and that they might have acted unlawfully but a determined obscurantism ensured that few details were uncovered. Genuine measure or reconciliation were seen with the release of many FIS prisoners and the Algerian population overwhelming supported Bouteflika's Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation.

Over the course of Bouteflika's reconciliatory moves, the outside world was changing. The attacks by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, changed the way in which Islamic extremism was viewed. Algeria became a key ally of the United States in its self-declared War on Terror. This support to the US polarized Islamic opinion in Algeria; the more moderate were keen to distance themselves from Al Qaeda; the more extreme to align themselves and join the calls for a

⁸⁵ *ibid*, 7

unified Caliphate. For Bouteflika, the support given to the US was a step on the ladder of international legitimacy and further consolidation of his position.

Summary

Bouteflika's legacy is a moderately stable Algeria, with a functioning economy that holds its place on the international stage. This is no mean feat for a country that descended into chaos in 1988 and that arguably had roots dating back to the 1950s and beyond. His reconciliatory strategy was not the only efforts at national reconciliation but have so far been the most successful. The Algerian case study provides a fascinating insight into a country with a brutal colonial past that unified and fought for its independence; was torn by post-independence rivalry and incompetence; accepted military dictatorship as the answer to stability; declined economically and having lost its revolutionary zeal descended once more into an orgy of violence, bloodshed and division. Bouteflika's reconciliatory methods may not seem acceptable when compared against other reconciliation programs but given the convoluted and impassioned rivalries in Algeria he had probably implemented the best and only strategy possible; amnesty by amnesia.

Rachid Tlemçani would disagree. He argues, with some conviction, that given the haste of the amnesties and reconciliation and the lack of transparency that has accompanied the process that Bouteflika is unlikely to succeed in the long-term. He states that there will be no true reconciliation without truth and that attempts to pacify the families of victims of the conflict with money rather than information will make turning the historical page nearly impossible.⁸⁶

Within this case study, there have been a number of reconciliatory efforts that have been successful. The example of Charles de Gaulle attempting to reconcile the national interests of

⁸⁶ Tlemçani, p 15

France with that of his militant military and the acceptance that a negotiated settlement with the FLN would provide the only lasting hope of peace and stability. Conversely, there was the example of wartime unity of the FLN that proved so cohesive in the war with France yet could not endure the ensuing peace and would still be a cause of division today. If any success can be attributed to Bouteflika it was his ability to restore a limited democracy, limit the power of the military and bring about an end to the cycle of violence that has ravaged Algeria for decades.

Iraq: The Enemy from Within and Without

An Ancient and Divided Land

Like Peru and Algeria, Iraq too is a nation split between cultures and religions, it is founded upon arbitrary borders imposed by former colonial masters and it too has seen recent and catastrophic bloodshed. Modern day Iraq rests upon the ancient land of Mesopotamia, itself awash with a history of violence and bloodshed. Quite apart from bloodshed Mesopotamia holds significance in Christian and Islamic religious narratives and as the birthplace of Babylon.⁸⁷

The nation of Iraq came about following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. The British were granted a Mandate over the country under the terms of the newly established League of Nations installing a Prime Minister in 1921 and establishing Prince Faisal bin Husain al-Hashemi as the first King of Iraq. What this mandate ignored, through either accident or design, is the ethnic and cultural diversity that existed within Iraq's newly formed borders.⁸⁸

Iraq is composed ethnically of Arabs (75-80%) and Kurds (15-20%), and in religious terms Shia (60-65%) and Sunni (32-37%) branches of Islam.⁸⁹ Such a cursory glance at Iraq's population statistics gives no real clue as to the complexity of the polity or its interaction with its neighbors. Although Shia form the majority in terms of religious beliefs and practices it does not follow that they are a united entity. Similarly, whilst the Kurds form perhaps the most united entity they are far from the most powerful political force and ethnically they are spread across Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Armenia and Syria but wish for their own nation and still suffer from disputes

⁸⁷ Global Security, "The Military History of Babylon," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/babylon.htm>, (accessed, January 5, 2010)

⁸⁸ Charles Tripp, "A History of Iraq," (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1-2

⁸⁹ CIA World Fact Book, "Iraq," (Last updated March 4, 2010) <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>, (accessed, March 10, 2010)

regarding Nationalism and the formation of a Kurdish State.⁹⁰ Historically, in Iraq, the minority Sunni have held sway through the days of the short-lived monarchy (1921 – 1958), the similarly brief republic (1958-1968) and the eventual ascent of the Ba’ath party to power on the late 1960s.⁹¹

In order to maintain a semblance of control over such disparate elements and competing factions Iraq’s rulers have traditionally had to resort to strong-armed politics to reinforce their chosen narrative for Iraq’s destiny. Charles Tripp, in his *History of Iraq* puts it as follows, “Iraq’s history has been a powerful tendency for politics to be seen mainly as a way of disciplining the population to ensure conformity of the rulers’ visions of social order.”⁹²

Since coming to power in 1968 the Ba’ath Party managed to keep a tight grip upon the Iraqi population until the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Along the way there had been minor rebellions from both the Kurds in the north and the Shia in the south east as well as an 8-year war with Iran (1980-88) a conflict over Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in 1990-1991 with, seemingly, the rest of the world and yet Saddam remained in power. These few examples alone are testimony to the hold that he exhibited over his country and its peoples. His removal from power and the failure to adequately fill the resulting power vacuum resulted in a multi-front battle for power, a complex insurgency and renewed calls for Kurdish independence that allowed Iraqi’s neighbors the chance to interfere. This was all, of course, as part of and the background to an insurgency being fought against the United States and its allies. It is not the purpose of this study to examine the road to war 2003 but to consider the conditions that led to the reconciliation of elements of the Sunni Militia against the threat posed by Al Qaeda in Iraq.

⁹⁰ Editorial, “Who are the Kurds?” *The Washington Post*, 1999, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/feb99/kurdprofile.htm>, (assessed, March 10, 2010)

⁹¹ Tripp, xi-xii

⁹² *ibid*, 2

The Rise of the Insurgency

The rapid advance upon Baghdad in March and April 2003 was thought by many to be the precursor to a quick and relatively, bloodless victory for the United States and her allies. The Iraqi army disintegrated when pressure was applied. There was resistance from elements that were traditionally more loyal to Saddam's regime, notably the Iraqi Republican Guard, motivated Ba'athists and the Fedayeen. The Fedayeen, in particular, showed grim determination in conducting a guerilla campaign against Coalition forces in urban areas. Although lightly armed they caused considerable delay to operations and what, at the time, were deemed allied rear areas and supply routes.⁹³

The removal of all Ba'ath Party members from positions of authority, the failure to capture Saddam Hussein and the complete disbanding of the Iraqi Army and Police left a vacuum of power and authority over a nation that hitherto had been ruled with an iron fist. The numbers of the Coalition forces deployed Iraq in April 2003 stood at around 100,000 and would rise in the next few months to 140,000.⁹⁴ Considering the population of Iraq, of approximately 28 million,⁹⁵ the troop to population ratio was woefully inadequate to ensure security and law and order even in the major cities let alone more remote regions. This gap in security and authority was exploited by a variety of parties that would soon comprise the insurgency.

In a paper by Dr Wm. J. Olsen, Iraqi insurgency was divided into five differing elements; the Sunni insurgencies, the tribal insurgency, combat militias, radical groups and criminal gangs. Within each of these elements there were subdivisions and their grouping by a collective by no

⁹³ Sharron Otterman, "What is the Fedayeen Saddam?", *Council on Foreign Relations Paper*, March 31, 2003, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/7698/iraq.html>, (accessed, January 12, 2010)

⁹⁴ Council for Foreign Relations, "US Ground Forces End Strength," <http://www.cfr.org/publication/7698/iraq.html>, (accessed, March 10, 2010)

⁹⁵ CIA World Factbook, "Iraq"

means meant a unity in purpose.⁹⁶ Perhaps the only unifying purpose was the removal of the United States and her allies from Iraqi soil. Confronted by such complexity the Coalition found itself in a large-scale counterinsurgency battle that was to be fought concurrent to rebuilding a nation with little support from the broader international community.

The Path to Progress

It was evident from the early conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom that what counterinsurgency doctrine existed was outdated, unsuited to the present circumstance and little understood by commanders at all levels.⁹⁷ The harbingers of change were Lieutenants General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army and James F. Amos, U.S. Marine Corps. Petraeus was the commander of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth and had recently returned from Iraq as the commander of the 101st Airborne Division. The cumulative efforts of CAC and the U.S. Marine Corps produced Field Manual 3.24 (FM 3.24) in December 2006. The work was founded upon historical examples taken from amongst others the U.S. experience in Vietnam, the British experience in Malaya and French experiences of Indochina and Algeria. Historical example was wedded to modern and recent experience and gave the U.S. Army a common playbook.

Doctrine alone will not change armies. With doctrine came experience and the influence of commanders willing to embrace a fresh approach to the insurgency. Petraeus was such a commander. Assuming command of Multinational Forces – Iraq (MNF-I) he set about implementing a new strategy based upon a surge of troop numbers, targeted operations against

⁹⁶ Wm. J. Olsen, “Iraq and Global Insurgency: Dein Bien Phu or Khe Sanh?”, published in “Warfare in the Age of Non-State Actor: Implications for the U.S. Army,” eds. Kendall D. Gott and Michael G. Brooks, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Combat Studies Institute Press, December 2007), 302-303

⁹⁷ John A. Nagl, “The Evolution and Importance of Army/ Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency,” forward to, “*The U.S. Army Marine Corps Counter Insurgency Field Manual*,” (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), xiii

insurgent strongholds and increased mentoring and development of Iraq's own security forces. This meant partnering with Iraqi forces at the local level, leveraging the influence of local leaders, exploiting the differences and hostilities between insurgent groups and bringing palpable security to districts mired in sectarian and criminal violence. In order to achieve this a process of reconciliation and reintegration would be required. In an interview, Petraeus articulated his reconciliation strategy as follows:

...you have to really understand the local situation and you have to identify the reconcilables and the irreconcilables, to try to reintegrate the reconcilables into being part of solution rather than continuing part of the problem and then kill, capture or run off the irreconcilables.⁹⁸

The Al Anbar Awakening

Perhaps the most prescient example of reconciliation and reintegration was the so-called Sunni Awakening in Al Anbar Province, Western Iraq. Al Anbar had been, for some time, a lawless area that stretched from the western edges of Baghdad to the borders of Jordan and Syria. Then in the vacuum resulting in the toppling of Saddam's regime tribal sheikhs assumed the only tenable positions of authority. This authority was in direct competition with that of US forces in the area undermining the Sheikhs and their traditional base of power. Allied to this base of power was Al Qaeda in Iraq. In Anbar, in particular, Al Qaeda joined with the tribal sheikhs to fight the US occupiers providing the finance, expertise and training whilst the Sheikhs provided 90% of the fighters.⁹⁹

⁹⁸Deborah Haynes, "General David Petraeus: full transcript of interview with The Times," The Times, January 25, 2010, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7000774.ece>, (accessed, March 10, 2010)

⁹⁹ John A. McCary, "The Al Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives," *The Washington Quarterly*, January 2009, p45 http://www.twq.com/09winter/docs/09jan_McCary.pdf, (accessed, March 4, 2010)

The relationship between Al Qaeda and the Sheikhs continued as long as there was a perceived mutual interest. Initially this interest centered upon the Christian ‘Crusader’ Americans and the Shia, with Iranian support, trying to control the nascent Iraqi government. As McCray describes it, the pitch was simple: “We are Sunni. You are Sunni. The Americans and Iranians are helping the Shia let’s fight them together.”¹⁰⁰ As soon as mutual interest converged towards competition, the relationship began to falter. Al Qaeda was adept at harnessing criminality in order to fund their cause. This took the form of smuggling, kidnap and ransom and extortion. This completion soon began to reduce the Sheikhs ability to generate revenue and thus dispense fealty to their followers and those of other tribes. This system ensured stability amongst tribes and bestowed power and authority upon individual Sheikhs. Coupled with the growing realization that US forces were not going to remain in Iraq and a number of punitive assassinations by Al Qaeda against prominent tribal leaders, Sheikh Abd al Sittar Abu Reesha approached US forces and began negotiating a cooperative deal. He later described the arrangement thus, “Sheikh Abd al Sittar Abu Reesha, once said, “Our American friends had not understood us when they came. They were proud, stubborn people and so were we. They worked with the opportunists, now they have turned to the tribes, and this is as it should be.”¹⁰¹ Another, unidentified Sheik reinforced this comment: “If you help me get rid of those who mean me harm, then you’re obviously my friend. If you fight along with me and shed your blood, you’re my brother.”¹⁰²

The awakening, in 2007, was a rare success developing rapidly against the backdrop of mounting Iraqi and US casualties and continuing mayhem throughout the country. Only the year

¹⁰⁰ McCary, p43, quoting David Kilcullen, “Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,” *Small Wars Journal* (August 29, 2007), <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt>.

¹⁰¹ McCary, p46

¹⁰² Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams and Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler (Eds.), “Anbar Awakening, Volume 1, American Perspectives, U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-9,” (Quantico: U.S. Marine Corps Press, 2009), 1

before Marine Officers had thought that the US had “lost” Anbar politically.¹⁰³ It showed how circumstances in an insurgency are inherently unpredictable and, harking back to Clausewitz, dependent upon friction, chance and interaction. It capitalized upon the financial resources of the US directing funding for local projects and security through the Sheikhs and the tribal system reinforcing the authority of the Sheikhs. Furthermore, the resource that was hampering US efforts to defeat Al Qaeda was actionable intelligence. With access to the tribal system came cultural understanding, local knowledge and immediate recognition of outsiders all of which was used to capture and kill Al Qaeda operatives.¹⁰⁴

Despite these successes, not all parties welcomed the Awakening. The Iraqi government, itself, in a perilous state was concerned with the power, money and arms given to the Sheikhs and their followers, effectively creating a third security forces, albeit one beyond the control of central government. Many skeptics assumed that the process would only serve to fractionalize further Iraq’s society and subvert all authority to the Sheikhs.

Reintegration or Disintegration

The lasting legacy of the Al Anbar Awakening was the creation of the Sons of Iraq. This was an expansion upon the idea of local and collective defense protecting local and collective interests but still relied upon the Sunni as a counter to Al Qaeda. The idea in the US mind was that the Sons of Iraq should be integrated into Iraq’s predominantly Shia security forces. Thus far,

¹⁰³ Thomas Ricks, “Situation Called Dire in West Iraq,” *Washington Post*, September 11, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/10/AR2006091001204.html>, (accessed, March 4, 2010)

¹⁰⁴ McCary, p47

this has not happened in any substantial numbers.¹⁰⁵ Further electoral disappointments are likely to enflame the Sunni population and reopen recent wounds and fissures.

The reintegration of Sunnis into the Iraqi government and security forces is proving to be difficult and the more obstacles encountered or thrown up the less the likelihood of a lasting peace and a homogenous Iraq founded upon Iraqi Nationalism and to sectarianism. The Sons of Iraq went a long way to crush Al Qaeda in Iraq, something that the US could not have done alone but now pose a real threat to the long-term security of the country. A former Marine Officer, Gabriel Ledeen describes the joint and reciprocal nature of the scheme:

Through adaptive tactics, burgeoning local support, and increasingly effective Iraqi forces, we were able to damage their operations and separate them from the population. In their desperation insurgents turned against the population, and thereby gave the tribal sheiks the final push they needed to stand with us against the terrorists.¹⁰⁶

As the US embraced reconciliation and reintegration interestingly, Al Qaeda entirely failed to do likewise. As a result, it failed to understand and integrate into the Iraqi tribal system, as it had done in Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan, by marrying fighters to Sheikhs daughters led to their being ostracized eventually by the Sunni tribes.¹⁰⁷ The US harnessed the power of the power of the tribe and thus striking a huge blow to Al Qaeda in Iraq and worldwide, but at what cost?

¹⁰⁵ Associated Press, "Iraq's Sunnis Bracing For Chaos After Election," *New York Times*, March 2 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/03/02/world/AP-ML-Iraq-The-Sunni-Vote.html?scp=1&sq=sons%20of%20iraq&st=cse>, (accessed, March 13, 2010)

¹⁰⁶ Gabriel Ledeen, "(Re-) Creating Anbar's Awakening," *The Huffington Post*, March 27, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gabriel-ledeen/re--creating-anbars-awake_b_179589.html, (accessed, March 4, 2010)

¹⁰⁷ David Kilcullen, "Anatomy of a Tribe," *Small Wars Journal*, August 27, 2007, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt/>, (accessed, February 20, 2010)

Summary

The US plan for Reconciliation and Reintegration was one that was produced by chance circumstances outside of their control, that being the friction between the tribes in Anbar and Al Qaeda. Having seized this opportunity and being encouraged within the command climate produced by Petraeus and U.S. Marine ground commanders the Awakening began. Its success spread and within two years the Sons of Iraq was a large and increasingly unwieldy organization that posed an existential threat to the State. It is worrying that the very force that gave credit to the US operations in Iraq and seemingly steered the course for a lasting peace and stability could be the very force that undermines the future stability of the country. Among the many lessons to be learnt from this example are that a fractured enemy makes for a potential friend and that short-term gains might result in longer-term bloodshed. In a depressing summary in *Foreign Affairs*, Steven Simon writes:

The problem is that this strategy to reduce violence is not linked to any sustainable plan for building a viable Iraqi state. If anything, it has made such an outcome less likely, by stoking the revanchist fantasies of Sunni Arab tribes and pitting them against the central government and against one another. In other words, the recent short-term gains have come at the expense of the long-term goal of a stable, unitary Iraq.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ Steven Simon, "The Price of the Surge," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June, 2008, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63398/steven-simon/the-price-of-the-surge>, (accessed, March 4, 2010)

Conclusion

The case studies of Peru, Algeria and Iraq share a number of similarities. In each, the conflict described was an internal one, albeit in some examples with external actors. These were wars among the people rather than between nations. In this sense, the study has been necessarily restrictive. What is more telling is that in each of the conflicts the three elements encapsulated by Dr Mosser in his AR2 model (Figure 2) have been present and critical to the eventual conflict termination. Furthermore, the elements in each case have been bounded within the socio-cultural workings of the nation state. In each example, a faltering economy has created conditions for an insurgency to arise and the conditions that insurgents have been able to feed from in terms of support and recruiting. Political exclusion, similarly gave rise to conflict and only the eventual implementation of an inclusive political system has brought about lasting peace. Underlining the security sphere is the notion of trust. Without the trust of the population security forces cannot guarantee internal security. This trust is undermined by brutality, corruption and incompetence. Until these issues are addressed, it is likely that the security situation will worsen and stymie the efforts of political and economic reform.

In each of the studies different elements of AR2 were more prevalent than others. In the case of Peru, Amnesty did not really play a part in the eventual resolution of conflict. The fact that this concept was applied equally to both insurgent and the security forces highlights the need for equality when dealing with violations of human rights. Bouteflika's reconciliation by amnesia ignores most of the commonly held beliefs concerning national reconciliation and amnesty but in the interests of his nation's stability hopes to forget the past and move on. The Sunni Awakening showed how there can be reconciliation and amnesty without much thought been given to the reintegration of the Sons of Iraq and moreover how the policies and actions of an external actor may not coalesce with those of the host nation. In this example, political and military expediency

on behalf of the United States was met with suspicion and fear from the predominantly Shia government of Iraq. Despite these misgivings, Iraq is more stable and less violent than it was before the awakening in Al Anbar province.

The most striking findings of this study are that modern day conflict rarely results in an outright victory for either belligerent party. The recommendations of past COIN theorists such as David Galula are not without merit but ignore the aspect of the use of mass media and the impact of globalization. Gone are the days where entire populations can be displaced, thousands forcibly interned and insurgents completely isolated from their support.¹⁰⁹ Governments need to provide more nuanced solutions to conflict lest they be isolated internationally.

Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration is neither a process nor a prescription for peace and stability. There are no formulae that can be applied to a conflict that can resolve it, but AR2 does offer what the application of violence rarely can; the beginnings of a solution. Neither is AR2 a linear progression. It is a process that once started it must not be allowed to stop. There is usually a time limit imposed upon amnesty but the reintegration of a particular ethnicity or grouping and their reconciliation amongst previously conflicting peoples is an ongoing progress and evolving dialogue that must be encouraged to develop. In this sense AR2 cannot simply form lines of effort within an ongoing operation but must be reflective of Dörner's positive feedback loops, success engenders further success and yet be cognizant of the reverse and of negative feedback loops.¹¹⁰

The ongoing conflict in Afghanistan exhibits many of the conditions that we have seen that encourages and gives succor to an insurgency; a weak system of corrupt government at the national and local levels; a poorly led and equipped security force mired in corruption with no

¹⁰⁹ David Galula, "*Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*," (St Petersburg, FL: Hailing Publishing, 2005), 107-135

¹¹⁰ Dörner, 90-91

real functioning judiciary and an economy that has little hope of supporting itself in the long-term. This conflict will not be won by military action alone. It will be won by the first side that can, as in the cases of Peru, Algeria and Iraq, prove that it can offer an enduring sense of security, provide transparent political representation and a means of economic sustainability. Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration will not provide the solutions to these issues but they may, if used judiciously, provide a start point from which a lasting peace can be built.

Recommendations For Further Study

This paper has been a brief examination of the application of Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration across three divergent case studies. The case of Algeria is probably the most interesting given its turbulent history and continuing violence. It is too soon for the effects of Bouteflika's strategy of amnesia to be fully realized. However, this particular course of action may offer a greater degree of success in situations where immediate and genuine reconciliation is seemingly neither possible or likely. There would be merit in further study of Algeria's progress towards national reconciliation and to examine the applicability of this strategy to other intractable conflicts.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ackerman, Holly, "National Reconciliation in the Case of Cuba: Definition and Analysis," Papers and Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE), Biltmore Hotel, Coral Gables, Florida, August 12-14, 1999, <http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba9/> (accessed March 20, 2010).
- Amnesty International, "Peru: Truth and Reconciliation Commission – a first step towards a country without injustice," August 2004
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR46/003/2004> (accessed January 2, 2010).
- Associated Press, "Iraq's Sunnis Bracing For Chaos After Election," *New York Times*, March 2 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/03/02/world/AP-ML-Iraq-The-Sunni-Vote.html?scp=1&sq=sons%20of%20iraq&st=cse> (accessed March 13, 2010).
- Avant, Deborah D. "*The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*," (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- BBC News, "Fujimori Gets Lengthy Jail Term," April 7, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7986951.stm> (accessed January 4, 2010).
- Birtle, Andrew J., "*U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Counterinsurgency Doctrine 1942-1976*," (Washington D.C: Center of Military History, United States Army 2007).
- Check, ed. *The Oxford English Dictionary*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008).
- CIA World Fact Book, "Iraq," (Last updated March 4, 2010)
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>, (accessed March 10, 2010).
- Clark, Major John, "A balanced approach to amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration (NORTHERN IRELAND)." *The Military Review* (January 2008).
- Clausewitz, Carl Von, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, "*On War*," (London: Everyman Library, 1993).
- Council for Foreign Relations, "US Ground Forces End Strength,"
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/7698/iraq.html>, (accessed March 10, 2010).
- Dewitt, LTC R., "The Rise and Development of Sendero Luminoso in Peru," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 27 1992, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA249429&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed December 18, 2009).
- Dörner, Dietrich, trans. Rita and Robert Kimber, "*The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What Can We Do to Make Them Right*," (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996).
- Editorial, "Who are the Kurds?" *The Washington Post*, 1999,
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/feb99/kurdprofile.htm> (accessed March 10, 2010).

- Entelis, John P. “*Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*,” (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1986).
- Evans, Martin and Phillips, John, “*Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed*,” (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
- Galula, David “*Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*,” (St Petersburg, FL: Hailing Publishing, 2005).
- Galula, David, “*Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958*,” (Washington D.C.: The Rand Corporation, 1963).
- Global Security, “The Military History of Babylon,”
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/babylon.htm> (accessed January 5, 2010).
- Gordon, David C., “*The Passing of French Algeria*,” (London: Oxford University Press, 1966).
- Gott, Kendall D. and Brooks, Michael G. (eds.), “*Warfare in the Age of Non-State Actor: Implications for the U.S. Army*,” (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Combat Studies Institute Press, December 2007).
- Griffin, Dr Stuart, “*Joint Operations: A Short History*,” (London: Ministry of Defence Publication, 2005)
- Hayes, Monte, “Peru's Fujimori Defends Amnesty,” *Miami Herald*, December 20, 2007
http://www.thehrf.org/news/122007_MH.pdf (accessed January 4, 2010).
- Haynes, Deborah, “General David Petraeus: full transcript of interview with The Times,” *The Times*, January 25, 2010,
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7000774.ece> (accessed March 10, 2010).
- Hyams, Edward and Ordish, George, “*The Last of the Incas*,” (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963).
- International Library of the Communist Left, “Ireland – Sinn Fein: From the Bullet to the Ballot.”
<http://www.sinistra.net/lib/upt/comlef/coru/coruibebie.html> (accessed December 11, 2009).
- Kenny, Kevin, “*Ireland and the British Empire*.” (London: Oxford University Press, 2006).
- Kilcullen, David, “Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,” *Small Wars Journal* (August 29, 2007),
<http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt> (accessed February 20, 2010).
- Lane, Charles, “Superman Meets Shining Path: Story of a CIA Success,” *The Washington Post*, December 7, 2000.
- Ledeem, Gabriel, “(Re-) Creating Anbar’s Awakening,” *The Huffington Post*, March 27, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gabriel-ledeen/re--creating-anbars-awake_b_179589.html (accessed March 4, 2010).

- Lewis, William H., "Algeria: The Cycle of Reciprocal Fear," *African Studies Bulletin*, Vol. 12, No. 3, December 1969, www.jstor.org/stable/523211 (accessed March 20, 2010).
- Loprete, Carlos A., "*Los Incas, Iberoamérica: Historia de su Civilización y Cultura*," (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995).
- Lords Hansard, , Lord Morrows, On his maiden speech to the British House of Lords in reference to the Northern Ireland Peace Process
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldhansrd/text/61121-0009.htm>
(accessed November 14, 2009).
- Lucero, Wayne, "The Rise and Fall of Shining Path," Council on Hemispheric Affairs,
<http://www.coha.org/the-rise-and-fall-of-shining-path/> (accessed March 9, 2010).
- Mallinder, Louise "The Role of Amnesties in Conflict Transformation," School of Law, Queens University, Belfast, March 11, 2009
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1375048 (accessed January 20, 2010).
- Martin "On Counterinsurgency," speech to *The Henry Jackson Society*, (London, February 26, 2008), <http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?pageid=49&id=671>.
- McCary, John A., "The Al Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives," *The Washington Quarterly*, January 2009, http://www.twq.com/09winter/docs/09jan_McCary.pdf
(accessed March 4, 2010).
- McWilliams, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. and Wheeler, Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis P. (eds.), "*Anbar Awakening, Volume 1, American Perspectives, U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-9*," (Quantico: U.S. Marine Corps Press, 2009).
- Moloney, Ed "*The Secret History of the IRA*,"(London: W.W Norton & Company, 2002).
- Moloney, Ed "The Steak Knife Affair," *Daily Telegraph*, May 15, 2003.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3591321/The-Steak-Knife-affair-will-be-deeply-wounding-to-the-IRA.html> (accessed December 12, 2009).
- Mosser, Michael W., "The Armed Reconciler: The Military Role in the Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration Process," *Military Review*, Vol. VXXXIX (November – December 2007).
- Museum of Free Derry, "Bloody Sunday and its Aftermath."
<http://www.museumoffreederry.org/history-bloody-reaction.html> (accessed December 12, 2009).
- Nagl, John A. "The Evolution and Importance of Army/ Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency," forward to, "*The U.S. Army Marine Corps Counter Insurgency Field Manual*," (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
- Otterman, Sharron, "What is the Fedayeen Saddam?," *Council on Foreign Relations Paper*, March 31, 2003, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/7698/iraq.html> (accessed January 12, 2010).

- Republic of South Africa, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "Truth: *The Road To Reconciliation*," The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm> (accessed March 16, 2010).
- Ricks, Thomas "Situation Called Dire in West Iraq," *Washington Post*, September 11, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/10/AR2006091001204.html> (accessed March 4, 2010).
- Roberts, Hugh, "Algeria's Ruinous Impasse and the Honourable Way Out," *International Affairs*, Vol. 2, April, 1995.
- Rubins, Trudy. "Worldview: McChrystal's Afghan Strategy Attacks on Several Key Fronts." *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 13, 2009, <http://www.philly.com/inquirer/currents/79150887.html> (accessed December 14, 2009).
- Simon, Steven, "The Price of the Surge," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June, 2008. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63398/steven-simon/the-price-of-the-surge> (accessed March 4, 2010).
- Smith, General Sir Rupert "*The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*," (London: Allen Lane, 2005).
- Strassler, Robert, ed. *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*. New York: The Free Press, 1976.
- Switzer, Russell W. Jr., "*Sendero Luminoso and Peruvian Counterinsurgency*," A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College, May 2007 <http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-01242007-200500/unrestricted/russwswitzerthesis.pdf> (accessed December 18, 2009).
- Thatcher, Margaret "*The Downing Street Years*," (London: Harpers and Collins, 1995).
- The Arab League, "Pact of the League of Arab States," March 22, 1945, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arableag.asp#1 (accessed March 10, 2010).
- The Republic of Peru, "The Final Report of the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission*," <http://www.everdad.org.pe/ingles/pagina01.php> (accessed November 16, 2009).
- Tlemçani, Rachid, "Algeria Under Bouteflika: Civil Strife and National Reconciliation," *Carnegie Papers*, No. 7, February, 2008. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec7_tlemceni_algeria_final.pdf (accessed March 4, 2010).
- Toledo, Alejandro "Healing the Past, Protecting the Future," *Americas Quarterly*, 2009.
- Tripp, Charles, "*A History of Iraq*," (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
- Turabian, Kate L. *A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*. 7th ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
- United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and The Republic of Ireland, *The Good Friday Agreement*, Article 4, Annex A, , April 10, 1998, <http://www.nio.gov.uk/agreement.pdf> (accessed November 14, 2009).

- United Nations DDR Website. <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=60#approach> (accessed December 6, 2009).
- United Nations, “United Nations Charter, Chapter 1: *Purposes and Principals*,” June 26, 1945, San Francisco, CA.
- United Nations, “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1181 (1998),” dated 13 July 1998, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/203/28/PDF/N9820328.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed December 6, 2009).
- United States Army, “*FM 3.24 Counterinsurgency*,” (Washington D.C.:Headquarters Department of the Army, December 15, 2006).
- United States Department of State, “Background Notes: Sierra Leone.” <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm#history> (accessed December 6, 2009).
- Walter, Barbara F., “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement”, *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer, 1997).
- Zorbas Eugina, Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda, *African Journal of Legal Studies*, <http://www.africalawinstitute.org/ajls/vol1/no1/zorbas.pdf> (accessed January 12, 2010).