Standing Joint Task Forces:

Resourcing Relics

A Monograph
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**Abstract**

The Standing Joint Task Force today serves as an enduring organization of the national security environment. Of the numerous Standing Joint Task Forces operational around the world, this paper examines two whose missions support defense of the homeland. The United States Northern Command subordinate Army component command, U.S. Army North supervises these organizations: JTF-North and JTF Civil Support. The primary purpose for writing about these two organizations is to understand their unique mission, evaluate the cost of their sustainment, and to present options that may improve their effectiveness and ensure they meet the challenges of the 21st Century.

The standard answer to a national security challenge in the 1980s and 1990s was to create a Standing Joint Task Force. This monograph challenges America to reexamine the roles, functions, and missions of the current Standing Joint Task Forces and develop alternative solutions that decrease costs, increase effectiveness, and place responsibility upon the whole of government and not solely on the Department of Defense.

**Subject Terms**

Standing Joint Task Force, Homeland Defense, JTF-North, JTF Civil Support, National Security, U.S. Army,
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Abstract

STANDING JOINT TASK FORCES: RESOURCING RELICS by MAJ John M. Bushman, U.S. Army, 51 pages.

The Standing Joint Task Force today serves as an enduring organization of the national security environment. Of the numerous Standing Joint Task Forces operational around the world, this paper examines two whose missions support defense of the homeland. The United States Northern Command subordinate Army component command, U.S. Army North supervises these organizations: JTF-North and JTF Civil Support. The primary purpose for writing about these two organizations is to understand their unique mission, evaluate the cost of their sustainment, and to present options that may improve their effectiveness and ensure they meet the challenges of the 21st Century.

The methodology consists of analyzing the historical background behind the rise to the Standing Joint Task Force concept. This historical review provides context and supports the follow on discussion of the phenomenon behind these organizations’ existence. The paper includes a case study comparison of JTF-North and JTF Civil Support, which shows the enduring cost to the U.S. Army to support these organizations. The evaluation of these two organizations highlights distinct advantages and disadvantages of current Department of Defense practices, and provides other options that may lower costs to the Army in the future while still addressing the nation’s security needs.

The standard answer to a national security challenge in the 1980s and 1990s was to create a Standing Joint Task Force. This monograph challenges America to reexamine the roles, functions, and missions of the current Standing Joint Task Forces and develop alternative solutions that decrease costs, increase effectiveness, and place responsibility upon the whole of government and not solely on the Department of Defense.
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Pia Fidelis!
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# Acronyms

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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARNORTH</td>
<td>U.S. Army North</td>
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<td>ARSTRUC</td>
<td>Army Structure</td>
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<td>CONARC</td>
<td>U.S. Continental Army Command</td>
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<td>CCMRF</td>
<td>CBRNE Consequence Management Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographical Combatant Command</td>
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<td>Goldwater-Nichols Act</td>
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<td>JDAL</td>
<td>Joint Duty Assignment Listing</td>
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<td>JOPP</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning Process</td>
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<td>Joint Table of Distribution</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
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<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
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<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<td>SASC</td>
<td>Senate Armed Service Committee</td>
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<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SJTF</td>
<td>Standing Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAA</td>
<td>Total Army Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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Introduction

Two Standing Joint Task Forces (SJTFs) operate in the Northern Command (NORTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). Their permanency requires sustained resources in terms of doctrine, organizational structure, training, material solutions, educational opportunities, personnel, and facilities. The U.S. Army serves as the primary force provider for all these requirements. This adds strain to an Army supporting overseas contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and meeting the operational requirements associated with these two NORTHCOM SJTFs and several others in various parts of the world. The existence of NORTHCOM subordinate SJTFs places increased demand on the U.S. Army and their establishment adds inefficiency to an already cumbersome Department of Defense (DOD) bureaucracy.

The environmental complexities associated with the fall of the Soviet Union and the attacks of 9/11 signaled to the United States the need to devote specific attention, detailed planning, and leadership to homeland security and defense. One method the DOD employed to strengthen joint operations while still addressing potential demands was to create Joint Task Forces. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recognized the permanency of certain Joint Task Forces and re-designated them Standing Joint Task Forces (SJTFs), intending to “achieve significantly greater military capability at lower total personnel level.”¹ Today, every Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) operates at least one SJTF.

A JTF must exist for five years or greater to be considered a SJTF. This illustrates a commitment beyond semi-permanency (later defined in the “SJTF Phenomenon” section of this monograph) and satisfies the two key components required for long-term existence. First, the fact that a SJTF survives at least one QDR proves the SJTF provides a capability to address an

existential threat to the United States. Second, the SJTF mission must receive acceptance for at least one presidential term. Responding to national level issues like narcotics or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) demonstrates the magnitude of political sensitivity behind the SJTFs. Survival beyond an initiating presidential administration reinforces perceptions that permanency of the JTF is justified.

This analysis of the NORTHCOM SJTFs utilizes open source articles, government reports, monographs, and interviews with active duty and civilian members of NORTHCOM’s two primary SJTFs (JTF Civil Support and JTF-North) to assess the cost of maintaining these organizations and determine whether the benefit justifies the cost. These sources address the legislation issues, history, resource provisions (funding, staffing, equipping, and training), GCC support requirements for the NORTHCOM SJTFs, and their respective roles and missions. This evidence demonstrates the impact on the U.S. Army and identifies the implications associated with supporting them.

The second section traces the background of SJTFs by investigating the last 60 years of defense policy, presidential decisions, and the events that shaped strategy and the need for Standing Joint Task Forces. This section discusses previous defense joint task forces and the issues they faced. The recognition that the past is prologue is fundamental for understanding SJTFs and examining the implications they have for the Army and DOD.

The third section examines the “SJTF Phenomenon,” and the unique challenges SJTFs pose for the U.S. Army. This deconstruction of the “SJTF Phenomenon” provides definitional

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understanding of JTF, JFHQ, and SJTFs, identifies the factors that affect SJTFs, and formally introduces the question: What is the problem with today’s SJTFs?

The fourth section highlights the significant responsibilities and pitfalls for SJTFs through a case study comparison of JTF-North and JTF Civil Support. This case study analyzes the two organizations’ histories, locations, missions, organizational structures, major stakeholders, and costs to the Army. This research design identifies SJTF inefficiencies and redundancies through comparative analysis of the case study data.

The final section summarizes the conclusions of the first four sections and provides recommendations for the future Standing Joint Task Force. It synthesizes the foregoing material to reveal several noteworthy discoveries from the research process. Finally, this section suggests topics of further study that have bearing on Standing Joint Task Forces.

All content of this monograph relies on two significant assumptions. The first assumption is that for the foreseeable future the U.S. armed forces will continue to organize, equip, and train Standing Joint Task Forces to meet the challenges faced by the nation. Congress’ continued support of the SJTF concept to address defense related tensions at home and abroad as an acceptable approach to these demands illustrates this assumption. The second assumption is that other DOD SJTFs possess traits and challenges similar to the NORTHCOM SJTFs examined in this work.
Background

Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements in all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one regardless of service.  

- President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958

These words from President Eisenhower’s April 3, 1958 address to Congress made a compelling argument for defense reorganization, and also served as the nexus of the SJTF concept. Eisenhower delivered this speech in the aftermath of the release of a Rockefeller Brothers Fund study titled *International Security: The Military Aspect. Report of Panel II of the Special Studies Project*. The study summarized the problems the United States expected to encounter in the 1960s, including total war confrontation, limited war, and non-overt aggression. Based on these anticipated threats, the study recommended considerable changes to the military, specifically in the areas of command and administration. One of the recommendations that the Eisenhower administration seized upon aimed to “correct the inefficiency and duplication of effort growing out of interservice rivalry.” Many of the same inefficiencies and duplication of efforts due to interservice rivalry persist today, and markedly so in SJTFs. The central problem

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5 Ibid. 175.
Eisenhower identified was what we now refer to as “jointness” – getting the services to cooperate in a unified manner to address the challenges facing the nation.  

The history and rise in prominence of the SJTF concept is rooted in failed military missions, high visibility commissions, damaging reports on service parochialism, and government intervention and legislation. As with most nations’ militaries, a long history of force structure, manning, and organizational decisions contributes to the nature of the modern U.S. Army. In the context of this study, the history of the U.S. Army’s evolution in the face of emerging threats has resulted in the perception of an increased need for SJTFs. In many ways, the Army’s response to these events serves as prologue for understanding the background of SJTFs.

For many years, the Army retained the responsibility for the testing and replacing of failed organizations, concepts, and strategies, and this remains a major component of its culture and history. Today, that responsibility belongs to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). TRADOC is vested with the authority and responsibility to “develop the Army’s Soldier and Civilian leaders and designs, develops and integrates capabilities, concepts and doctrine in order to build a campaign-capable expeditionary Army in support of joint warfighting commanders.” In the post World War II period, the U.S Army had no TRADOC-like organization, and by the mid-1950s, this responsibility rested with U.S. Continental Army

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6 Even though the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act (Title 10, US Code [USC], Sections 151-155) directed actions to remove the institutional barriers to jointness, a definitive definition for jointness still defies the nation. Seth Cropsey notes that “Goldwater-Nichols mandated jointness by structural reforms; General Powell sees jointness as interservice teamwork; Senator Nunn hopes jointness will be a mechanism for eliminating what he considers to be redundant roles and missions.” Seth Cropsey, “The Limits of Jointness,” Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1993), 72. Today, there remains no definition for jointness. The closest term, “Joint,” “connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.” JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, April 2001, as amended through 19 August 2009), 281.


8 Ibid.
Command (CONARC). In this role the organization found itself responsible for conducting tests, experiments, and fielding new concepts, organizations, doctrine and tactics for future combat operations. The American policy critics and media began to portray the Army as slow to react to its environment and even slower to adapt because of the large size of its bureaucracy.

The DOD response was to establish Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs), intended to counter Soviet pressures and challenges around the world, particularly in Southeast Asia, where allied countries proved unable to bear the expense of effective defense forces. Though commonly viewed as Army centric, MAAGs included members of all the services during their existence. Therefore, the MAAG was the first true joint task force established by the secretary of defense (SECDEF). The Army provided military assistance to the MAAG in the form of equipment (i.e., tanks, artillery, and helicopters), and soft goods, “not necessarily military in nature” like clothing, barracks construction, and petroleum products. Although forward thinking, the MAAG did not yield success in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. The politics, funding disputes, and commitment of resources to the MAAG led many military and political leaders to recognize the diminishing returns on the military services’ investment in support of the organization. The importance of the MAAG as a counter to Soviet influence did not provide sufficient justification to secure enduring support to sustain the organization, and the Army refocused its efforts on conventional forces and organizations in the post Vietnam period. During

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9 CSI Report, #14, Sixty Years of Reorganizing for Combat: A Historical Trend Analysis, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1999), 28.


its existence, the MAAG generally functioned as a joint task force devised for a specific mission, for a set duration of time, and empowered with certain authorities as delegated by the SECDEF.\textsuperscript{13}

The MAAGs suffered from a culture of Service parochialism and independence, which denied the DOD the unity of effort required to execute operations during the Cold War. This failure to yield the necessary unity of effort effectively ended the program. However, a byproduct of the MAAG experiment was increasing interest in the concept of “jointness,” which continued to resonate with political leaders and defense analysts interested in reducing military expenditures. This joint concept materialized and achieved permanency in the form of SJTFs through the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA). The DOD developed a new awareness of the importance of jointness largely because of the MAAG concept, but it was not until the passage of the GNA in 1986 that some JTFs began to assume permanence as SJTFs.

In response to the deficiencies exhibited in the MAAGs, the failed Iranian Hostage rescue, and unsynchronized operations in Grenada, Congress took measures to ensure future unity of command and cooperation among the services. The impetus for this sweeping action by Congress stemmed from the Holloway Commission findings on Operation Eagle Claw (the Iranian Hostage rescue):

> An existing JTF organization, even with a small staff and only cadre units assigned, would have provided an organizational framework of professional expertise around which a larger tailored force organization could quickly coalesce.\textsuperscript{14}


The Holloway Commission Report on the failures of Operation Eagle Claw to rescue the hostages in Iran in April 1980 led Congress to unite behind an effort to legislate DOD reform, which appeared at the time to lack unity of effort, rendering it incapable of unified action in defense of the nation. The report exposed many DOD shortcomings that led to the failure of the operation; foremost being the apparent inability to plan, prepare, and execute a joint operation among the services. This investigative panel, chaired by Admiral James Holloway, led to widespread improvements within the special operations community, and to the December 1980 creation of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the first DOD authorized and congressionally funded SJTF.\(^{15}\) DOD delegated this SJTF the authority “to ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct joint special operations exercises and training, and develop joint special operations tactics.”\(^{16}\) This initial special operations-centric initiative improved the services’ ability to work together in a small segment of the armed forces, but it did not translate into widespread acceptance of SJTFs or increase interservice operational cooperation at large. That would require Congress’ continued debate with the military services and eventual support for legislation that enabled the creation of SJTFs to address the nation’s problem situations both at home and abroad.

To force interservice cooperation, the GNA legislated a power shift from the various service chiefs to the chairman, of the joint chiefs of staff.\(^{17}\) Empowerment of joint operations at the expense of the services seemed reasonable in the late 1980s. U.S. Government officials and DOD leadership viewed subsequent military deployments, including support of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Panama Invasion, JTF Los Angeles, and JTF Andrew, as successful


joint operations conducted by effective JTFs. However, critics of these joint task force
operations noted their short duration, leading them to question whether they required dedicated
headquarters to provide command and control. In addition, these JTF-led missions arguably did
not encounter a determined foe nor did they consume large amounts of military resources. In spite
of these perceived shortcomings, the DOD increasingly relied upon JTFs to meet modern
challenges to national security.

In his article, “Congress and the Politics of Military Reform,” Daniel Wirls attempts to
explain the rational for the GNA, also known as the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. He
notes that military reform was really “a struggle between Congress and the executive over
defense policy.” By the early 1980s, the National Security Act of 1947 was not meeting the
demands of the nation, and new legislation, such as Eisenhower’s DOD Reorganization Act of
1958, had not fully addressed the problems within the DOD. Introduced by President Eisenhower,
the approved Congressional legislation to curb wasteful duplication and to reduce inter-service
rivalry proved unsuccessful. Although it strengthened the powers vested with the SECDEF, it was
not enough legally to tip the balance of power within the Pentagon in favor of the civilian
leadership technically in charge.

By 1983, twenty-five years later, Congress recognized the need for change in how the
services managed joint operations. History had proven the need to strengthen “jointness,” and to
eliminate service rivalries and parochialism. The various failed military operations in response to
events like the seizure of the USS Pueblo (1968), the Mayaguez capture (1975), and the invasion

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18 In this case, successful joint operations and JTFs embody the following definition, in that “all
mission goals were met by the JTF’s military operation with either no significant follow-on operations or
the JTF turned over operations to one or more organizations to continue working the problem.” Stewart,
George, Scott M. Fabbri, and Adam B. Siegel, JTF Operations since 1983, (Alexandria, VA: Center for
Naval Analyses, 1994), 16-17.
19 Daniel Wirls, “Congress and the Politics of Military Reform,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol.17,
Issue 4, (Summer 91), 487-512.
of Grenada (1983) demonstrated ineptness on the part of the DOD. These events revealed the failure of the services to cooperate in support of the nation’s goals. As Senator Sam Nunn explained when discussing the Grenada invasion:

> A close look at the Grenada operation can only lead to the conclusion that, despite our victory and success, despite the performance of the individual troops who fought bravely, the U.S. armed forces have serious problems conducting joint operations. We were lucky in Grenada; we may not be so fortunate next time.

Reformers like Nunn sought hard evidence to push for the needed change within the Department of Defense. Less than two years later, a report assembled by the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) titled, “Defense Organization: The Need for Change,” commonly referred to as the ‘Locher Report’ provided the necessary details required for change and served as the foundation for the GNA.

James R. Locher III was the principle author of the above report for the SASC in October of 1985. The report identified sixteen problem areas and offered almost one hundred recommendations. Among the issues mentioned in the study were the poor performance of the JCS in their advisory role to the President and SECDEF, confused operating channels and chains of command among the various echelons, weakened unified commanders, unrealistic plans, interoperability concerns, and inconsistent doctrine. At nearly the same time, President Reagan appointed the Packard Commission to explore similar defense reform proposals. The fundamental issues being addressed by these two governmental investigations into the conduct of the DOD can

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be summarized when, “the majority of citizens are not sure what a tank or bomber should cost, but they do know that a toilet seat should not cost over $700 and that a claw hammer should not cost $435.” What the reports led to was the increased public outrage and Congressional mandate to pass legislation to change the dynamics of the DOD. In many ways, the GNA was to become the greatest legislation passed since the National Security Act of 1947.

Public Law (P.L.) 99-433 (the GNA) is the writ that truly cements the concept of the SJTF. The act itself is very clear regarding the reorganization:

To reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department of Defense, to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense, to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and ensure that the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that responsibility, to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning, to provide for more efficient use of defense resources, to improve joint officer management policies, otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

The reorganization led to stronger geographical combatant commands, which now directed strategy and could recommend solutions to solve the security problems that confronted the nation. P.L. 99-433 set forth eight policy objectives intended strengthening the inter-service unity of effort:

1) To reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in DOD.

2) Improve military advice provided the President National Security Council and Secretary of Defense.

3) Place responsibility on combatant commanders for accomplishment of missions assigned to the combatant commands.

4) Provide authority to the CINC's commensurate with their responsibility.

5) Increase attention to the formulation of strategy and contingency planning.

6) Provide more efficiency in using defense resources.

7) Improve joint officer management policies.

8) Enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of DOD.

In the late 1980s, the world began to change and the tasks assigned to the GCCs began to appear more complex. To fulfill their responsibilities in programs like the war on drugs and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) consequence management, GCCs recognized that they required specialized knowledge not organic to their respective headquarters. In addition, they recognized that a single service could not solve these complex problems alone. The most feasible solution in the aftermath of the passage of the GNA was the creation of JTFs, because it seemed to the GCCs to be the most implementable solution at the time, and it was the only course of action supported within the Unified Command Plan (UCP). Since the UCP is an executive document signed by the President, it serves as one of the primary means to enhance integration of joint military capabilities. In its role, the UCP addresses the internal “military concerns about

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26 In 1993, U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations defines CINC as a commander-in-chief typically associated with unified command. This unified command consists of a broad, continuing mission under a single commander (CINC) and composed of significant assigned components of two or more services. Today, the term Combatant Commander (CCDR) replaces CINC and geographical combatant command (GCC) can be used in place of unified command. GCC is a newer term that illustrates the prominence of geography in delineating CCDRs areas of responsibility. The use of the term does not fully replace the term of unified command. U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993) and Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2009).

changing environments, threats, force structure, [and] organization.”

The inherent flexibility within the unified command structure has enabled GCCs to create SJTFs to address the evolving U.S. national security needs. It firmly placed responsibility on all the services for the staffing and operating of these new organizations. The history of the adoption of the SJTF model informs the analysis of how this task force construct affects the U.S. Army.

**The SJTF Phenomenon**

For the purposes of this examination, “The SJTF phenomenon” refers to the permanence given to a joint organization created to counter a new perceived threat or meet an immediate national security requirement. Therefore, the enduring nature of these SJTFs is both the phenomenon and the central problem they create for the U.S. Army and DOD. This section’s title highlights that a phenomenon is an observable occurrence. In the case of SJTFs in the NORTHCOM AOR, there are two comparable phenomena present: JTF-North and JTF-Civil Support. This section seeks to identify the various characteristics of SJTFs that make them a problem for the U.S. Army and for DOD. Other SJTFs provide examples to illustrate the relevant factors and clarify the problem. The identification of the adverse effects their enduring nature creates will assist in the development of future solution options.

As addressed in section one, a JTF must exist for five years or more to qualify as “Standing.” To analyze the SJTF phenomenon requires revisiting the definition to determine what the term Standing Joint Task Force actually means. No two SJTFs are alike, and the following review of the doctrinal definitions that relate to the issue of SJTFs substantiates this.

Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* provides the doctrinal interpretation of several variations of the JTF, and its baseline definition:

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A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF.\textsuperscript{29}

This definition supports several high profile events within the homeland such as the 2005 Hurricane Katrina, which resulted in the formation of JTF-Katrina, and activities dealing with riots in Los Angeles in 1992, which yielded the creation of JTF-Los Angeles to bring security to parts of the city. These JTF activities illustrate the establishment of an organization for a set period and for a specific action.\textsuperscript{30} The relatively short duration and limited mission of these JTFs mean the services can easily support and quickly execute these ad hoc JTF missions by allocating existing forces to meet the operational requirement. This is not the case with long-term or ill-defined missions, which is what Standing Joint Task Forces address.

Another variant is the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), defined in JP 1-02 as:

A staff organization operating under a flag officer providing a combatant commander with a full-time, trained joint command and control element integrated into the combatant commander’s staff whose focus is on contingency and crisis action planning. Also called SJFHQ.\textsuperscript{31}

This definition encompasses several JTFs similar to those mentioned above, and others that conducted high profile operations. An example is the Standing Joint Force Headquarters-National Capitol Region (SJFHQ-NCR) which led the activities in support of the presidential inauguration events in January 2009.

A third form is the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Force (Core Element) (SJFHQ-CE) which doctrine defines as:

The SJFHQ (CE) is a full-time, joint, cross-functional C2 element within a geographic combatant command staff. This element is fully integrated into the


\textsuperscript{31} JP 1-02, \textit{Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms}, 517.
combatant command’s planning and operations processes. The SJFHQ (CE) is
staffed during peacetime to provide a core element of trained personnel that may
serve as both a nucleus of key functional and C2 expertise and a foundation on
which to build, through augmentation, the joint C2 capability for specific mission
areas.32

This type of JTF is habitually resident within the geographical combatant command (GCC). The
uniqueness of this SJFHQ-CE is its size, capabilities, and trained personnel who are intimately
familiar with the roles, functions, and processes of the GCC.

A final variant and the one most similar in nature to those identified in this paper is the
semi-permanent joint task force, defined as:

A joint task force that has been assigned an expanded or follow-on mission and
will continue to conduct these operations in a specified area for an undetermined
period of time.33

In everyday language, much like in joint doctrine, semi-permanency means continuing to exist for
an indeterminate period. The sustained funding of SJTFs by various political administrations
demonstrates this characteristic.34 For the purposes of this paper, Standing Joint Task Force
remains defined as:

A joint task force with an assigned mission that exists for a period of more than
five years.

Though not recognized within Joint or Army doctrine, the above definition encompasses the
reality of these organizations, instead of the de facto concept of semi permanency. The problem
with the military definition is the aspect of “undetermined period of time.” Though not a point
directly relevant to this analysis, this does beg the question, at what point does semi-permanency
become enduring or permanent, and who decides this?

II-2
33 JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 492.
34Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2009, “Definition of Endure” http://www.merriam-
GCC commanders, their organizations, and their subordinate SJTFs face the problem of supporting the needs of the nation given the resource constrained post-9/11 environment. The Army is the nation’s major land power and as such provides the majority of forces to support Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq) and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). The services constantly reassess the requirements associated with both conflicts. The impact of enduring SJTF requirements adds to the strain already caused by resourcing ongoing overseas contingency operations, which affect the Army in a variety of ways. The following analysis will demonstrate the Army suffers the greatest impact in the following areas: SJTF termination criteria, facilities, mission sets, organizational structure, and stakeholders. These combined factors result in the overall impact of the SJTF phenomenon and the resulting level of required Army support.

The primary factor of the SJTF phenomenon is the lack of discernable termination criteria in the development of these entities. Initially, these SJTFs stand up in periods of crisis with little DOD deliberation on the impacts of their creation or the potentially evolving nature of their mission. The need for military response outweighs time and the opportunity to analyze the mission and its requirements fully. By contrast, analysis of doctrine shows the exact opposite appears true for inactivating or terminating an SJTF operation. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*,notes, “termination is discussed first among the elements of operational design because effective planning cannot occur without a clear understanding of the end state and the conditions that must exist to end military operations.” Termination criteria’s primacy among the operational design elements, means in theory JTFs should never take on a semi-permanent role.

JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters* explains that the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) “underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the range of military

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operations.”36 This process embeds the elements of operational design within JOPP execution. This foundation in the JOPP confirms that termination criteria should be a key element considered in the formation of a JTF and its transition to an SJTF. In reality, doctrine specifies the importance of termination criteria, but SJTFs still exist, lacking clear termination criteria due to their open-ended mission sets. In short, the primary factor in the SJTF phenomenon is that establishing authorities rarely develop clear termination criteria when forming SJTFs.

A second factor associated with SJTFs is the consistently evolving nature of their missions. In 1992, the SECDEF established JTF-Full Accounting to focus on achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing because of the Vietnam War. With nearly 2,000 US service members still missing in action from Vietnam, the DOD in 2003 merged JTF-Full Accounting with the US Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii, creating the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command.37 This new entity now focuses on accounting for American service members from all the nations’ conflicts, not just Vietnam. This merger demonstrates the evolution of the mission sets from specific focus on Vietnam, to a new one focused on all of America’s conflicts. Another example of evolving mission sets is JTF 160. Initially created to assist with the mass migration of refugees from Haiti and Cuba dating from 1992-1996. Their mission focused on housing and processing nearly 40,000 migrants awaiting repatriation or parole to the United States.38 This JTF reactivated in December 2001 to oversee the detainees captured in operations supporting the overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Almost a year later, in November 2002, DOD assigned JTF160 the new mission of operating the detention facility at Guantanamo, Cuba, and constructing additional detainee camps on the site, renaming

the organization JTF Guantanamo (GTMO). SJTFs and the GCCs continuously assess and reassess their existing missions and roles. The SJTF mission statement provides the relevancy and justification for their continued operation. As these cases demonstrate, missions often evolve through either narrowing or enlarging the responsibilities of the SJTF. This evolution is usually the result of national security demands, the need for continuity and efficiency, or priority for relationship sustainment. The phenomenon is the evolutionary nature of the SJTF and their complementary ability to shift and adapt to new missions.

A third factor of the SJTF is their location and facilities. The buildup of JTF Bravo at Soto Cano Airbase in Honduras in 1984 highlights the importance of this factor. The proximity of Soto Cano Airbase enabled JTF Bravo to conduct “intelligence gathering missions against both the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgents in El Salvador.” The facilities and presence of JTF Bravo also enabled the US government to send a message about American commitments to support Anti-Communist regimes. The threat, stakeholders, and strategy of forward presence all drive the determination of location. The Honduran government’s requests for assistance provided a necessary part of the equation in enabling JTF Bravo. This is also true of JTF Global Network Operations (GNO), which resides at Ft. Meade, MD. Its proximity to Washington, D.C. and the Pentagon facilitates its ability to direct the operation and defense of the Global Information Grid and security of DOD networks. The proximity to other major stakeholders, like Defense Information Systems Agency, National Security Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation is another reason for JTF GNO’s location. The use of Army facilities at Ft. Meade protects the activities of JTF GNO from

39 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
active espionage and terrorism. This factor of location typically finds SJTFs positioned at the crossroads of a national security problem at home or abroad. Though proximity is a key aspect, another key is the size and available space at the nearest military facility. The space afforded by Army facilities and their locations to the problems and stakeholders serve as the logic for the placement of SJTFs. As with the JTF GNO example, the Army becomes the primary bill payer, responsible for the security of the SJTF and maintenance of the post infrastructure, which supports the SJTF.

The fourth SJTF factor deals with its organizational structure. Doctrine, like JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters* provides a blueprint, but in general, JTFs “take many forms and sizes as they are employed across the range of military operations.”43 The SJTF organization, staffing, and command relationships vary based on the mission, the environment, and stakeholder involvement. No SJTF looks or operates exactly like any other. JTF GNO notes in their unit fact sheet that their organization is authorized 136 personnel.44 By contrast, JTF Bravo comprises approximately 500-600 personnel from various services.45 Various SJTF organizations share similarities in the composition or function of their command groups and corresponding joint staff sections.46 Additionally, SJTFs routinely have liaison officers from the various stakeholders with whom they collaborate in the accomplishment of their missions. The difference in the various SJTF organizational structures illustrates limitations in each organization’s capability. SJTFs may be capable of conducting continuous operations, deploying, and serving as a combined

46 Joint Staff functions being J-1 Manpower and Personnel staff section, J-2 Intelligence staff section, J-3 Operations staff section, J-4 Logistics staff section, J-5 Plans staff section, J-6 Communications System staff section, J-7 Engineering staff section, J-8 Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment staff section, and J-9 Civil-Military Operations staff section. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), III-10.
headquarters, and yet some SJTFs cannot do any of these tasks. A variation of the SJTF organizational structure is the formation of combined headquarters like CJTF-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). The CJTF-HOA organization consists of nearly 2,000 service members, international partners, and contractors. The sheer number and variety contributes to the element of the SJTF phenomenon related to the varying annual costs of supporting SJTFs that the individual services must bear. Of these varying costs, the manning burden is the most pressing concern for the Army.

The GNA’s joint officer manning provisions require a designated number of Army officers to serve in joint duty assignments. This provision primarily affects Army field grade officers in the ranks of Major to Colonel. However, Army officers assigned to SJTFs reflect joint requirements that are not part of the Total Army Analysis (TAA). The TAA “is the acknowledged and proven mechanism for explaining and defending Army force structure.” What results from this two-phase process is the release of the Army structure (ARSTRUC) message, which serves as the historical record of the final decisions made during the TAA process. This message records the sizes of the active, guard and reserve components of the Army. It explains the direction and areas of the Army that will see growth and reduction in the coming years. It highlights the capabilities needed within the Army and its global personnel distribution. It typically depicts transformation or conversion of units, as well as basing and realignment moves. Additionally, the ARSTRUC message directs the Army’s major commands “to make appropriate adjustments to

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their force structure…during the next command plan.” 50 The Army relies on the historical accounting of what the Army provided in past years to SJTFs. If the enduring Army requirement to the SJTF is fifty people, those fifty people represent fifty vacancies in the Army force structure. The authorization for the Army to backfill these vacancies does not exist. Presently, the joint duty assignment listing (JDAL) has “approximately 3,200 billets for Army Majors through Colonels.” 51 This nearly four percent of the total Army officer end strength highlights the impact of joint staffing requirement on the Army Service and impact of the SJTF organizational structure phenomenon on the Service as well.

The fifth and final SJTF factor is the role stakeholders play in the organization. Stakeholders help shape the debate on termination criteria, mission, location, and organizational structure. This final area may be the most influential aspect of a SJTF. The challenge with stakeholders for SJTFs is twofold. First, the SJTF must understand its stakeholder’s motivations, agendas, and interests. Second, the SJTF must then leverage that understanding of the stakeholder in a way that improves its ability to accomplish its mission. The relationship of SJTFs with their stakeholders is not always mutually beneficial, like the case of JTF Bravo. The intelligence sharing between the SJTF and the Honduran government enhances the relationship through increased cooperation. On the other hand, JTF GTMO operations must address and at times appease many stakeholders with different interests and priorities: these include the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF), Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT), Office of Military Commissions, and Office for the Administrative Review of Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC). 52 This diversity of

50 Ibid., 57.
51 Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, 20.
stakeholders in the JTF GTMO operation places stress on the SJTF to satisfy demands beyond the military scope of the mission. The demands of the stakeholders can also evolve the mission and change the termination criteria for the SJTF. Sometimes the significance and influence of the stakeholders outweighs the advice and expertise of the professional military commander of the SJTF. If this is the case, the SJTF continues operations due to the desires of the stakeholders and validates the importance of sustaining relationships. The Army and DOD must recognize the political sensitivities involved in the efforts of stakeholders surrounding SJTF activities. This stakeholder factor brings risk and reward to the SJTF, but the SJTF must ensure the reward outweighs the risk.

An area deliberately not addressed here is funding. This is a concern to all services, and the Army is no exception. The Army’s baseline responsibilities are to pay the salaries, relocation costs, and housing rents or mortgages for Army personnel assigned to SJTF organizations. The logistical and administrative costs associated with operating SJTFs are the burden of a single Service for a specified AOR as designated by the SECDEF. Department of Defense Directive 5100.3 provides the guidance for the Secretaries of the Military Departments.\textsuperscript{53} In the case of NORTHCOM and the subordinate SJTFs that reside in its AOR, the U.S. Air Force serves as the military department executing this funding support role.\textsuperscript{54} However, the Army provides the funding for the two SJTFs (JTF Bravo and JTF GTMO) in the SOUTHCOM AOR. The logic for assigning the funding responsibilities appears to align with traditional roles and missions around the world. The Army also has funding responsibility for Europe and Korea.\textsuperscript{55} Though important, funding requirements and obligations are challenging to quantify and exceed the scope of this analysis.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
The integrated threads of the five factors (termination criteria, mission, location, organizational structure, and stakeholders) of the SJTF phenomenon provide insight into their impacts on the Army. The identification of the five key SJTF areas will assist in the development of future solution options. The next section examines these aspects in further detail, focusing on the NORTHCOM SJTFs: JTF-North and JTF Civil Support.

**Case Studies**

This section provides a case study analysis of two standing joint task forces (JTF-North and JTF Civil Support) to illustrate their impact on the U.S. Army. Since October 2008, these two organizations have served under the operational control (OPCON) of their higher headquarters, US Army North based at Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas. Analysis of these two organizations’ termination criteria, location, mission, organizational structure, major stakeholders, and scale of Army support incurred provides the necessary details for future conclusions. This analysis also provides delineation of the benefits and drawbacks of the standing joint task force.

**JTF Civil Support**

October 2009 marked the tenth anniversary of JTF Civil Support. In its relatively short life, the organization has yet to confront the kind of WMD event for which DOD created it to respond. Former Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., then serving as the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Joint forces Command created JTF Civil Support to provide military support to civil authorities in the aftermath of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high yield explosive (CBRNE) incident. Since its creation on October 1, 1999, JTF Civil Support remains a unique, “one-of-a-

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kind” organization, primarily focused on consequence management and always prepared to respond when directed by the Secretary of Defense.57

This unique SJTF does not appear to have clearly articulated termination criteria. The current threat analysis, which combines the fears of WMD proliferation and the enemies’ search to develop ways to employ CBRNE munitions, feed the existence of JTF Civil Support. Under the current conditions, development of termination criteria to conclude JTF Civil Support is highly unlikely. This inability to determine termination criteria weighs heavily on the Army as SJTF resourcing requirements continue to grow and the mission evolves. The lack of termination criteria leads to the exploration of the second factor: the mission of JTF Civil Support.

JTF Civil Support’s mission statement (2009) reads:

JTF Civil Support anticipates, plans and integrates USNORTHCOM Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Consequence Management operations. When directed, JTF Civil Support commands and controls designated DOD forces to assist Federal, state, local and tribal partners in saving lives, preventing further injury, and providing temporary critical support to enable community recovery.58

This seems to contrast greatly with the organization’s mission statement from 1999, which emphasized when the organization would deploy, in what capacity, and for what ends:

On order the JTF deploys to vicinity of a WMD incident site in support of the Lead Federal Agency, establishes command and control of designated DOD forces and provides military assistance to civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, and provide temporary critical life support. On order conduct transition operations and re-deploy. 59

This comparison of JTF Civil Support mission statements provides clear evidence of the SJTF evolving mission and the organizations adjusting and adapting to the changing environment. No

57 LTC Angela Barzo, *JTF-CS Command Brief*, (Lecture, DOD Defense Support to Civilian Authorities Course, Fort Monroe, VA, October 8, 2009), slide 32.


one can argue that the strategic environmental conditions and threats have changed since 9/11, but the wording of the present-day mission depicts an organization focused less on deploying than on anticipating WMD events and providing interagency C2 should an event occur. In his testimony before the SASC on March 11, 2010, General Renuart, the NORTHCOM commander, noted that JTF Civil Support “plans and integrates DOD support to the designated primary agency for domestic CBRNE consequence management operations.”

The third factor of location stands out mostly due to JTF Civil Support’s proximity to Washington, D.C. JTF Civil Support is a tenant of Fort Monroe, Virginia a mere three hour drive or 40 minute flight to the nation’s capital. The logic for the nearness to Washington, D.C. is the likelihood of the capital being a target for CBRNE attack. Additionally, its proximity to U.S. Atlantic Command and subsequently Joint Forces Command (the previous higher headquarters) also had bearing on the SJTF location. Fort Monroe is a U.S. Army installation that serves a number of functions, but is primarily the home to the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure report recommended closure of Fort Monroe and the Army has until 2011 to achieve compliance with federal law. It is likely that JTF Civil Support will relocate with the majority of Fort Monroe tenants to Joint Base Langley-Eustis. This move will place JTF Civil Support on an installation managed by the Department of the United States Air Force. The benefit of this move is that the Army will no longer be responsible for the building infrastructure or security of JTF Civil Support.

The JTF Civil Support organizational structure is consistent with most joint U.S. military hierarchies. It contains a command group and the necessary joint staff sections required within a _____________________________


headquarters. Like other SJTFs, the organizational structure form and function were determined through analysis of the expected requirements and roles JTF Civil Support must fulfill. The current Joint Table of Distribution for JTF Civil Support provides for 138 personnel, both military and government service civilians.62

Figure 1 depicts only the headquarters organizational structure and not the specific service requirements. The JTF Civil Support organization consists of approximately 193 Joint officers,

62 Mrs. Susan Pruitt, JTF Civil Support, e-mail message to author, April 5, 2010.

contractors, and Air Force civilians. Figure 2 illustrates the U.S. Army obligations within JTF Civil Support, the 21 personnel, from Major General to Staff Sergeant is in accordance with its requirements listed within the current Joint Duty Assignment Listing (JDAL). The Army contingent at JTF Civil Support represents 15% of the organizational staffing. Of these 21 Army personnel, only 11 are Army active duty. Additionally, JTF Civil Support organization is responsible for the training and oversight of the CBRNE CM Response Force (CCMRF).

<table>
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<th>2010 JTF Civil Support Army Strength</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td><strong>Enlisted/Grades</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>CSM/E9</td>
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*Figure 2: 2010 JTF Civil Support Army Strength*

According to a September 2, 2009 “Stand-To!” news report the U.S. Army recognizes its growing responsibility to provide “two CCMRFs (10.1 and 10.2) able to respond to near simultaneous incidents, each with three task forces, Task Force Operations, Task Force Aviation and Task Force Medical” by October 1, 2009. Though augmented by certain designated joint enablers, the CCMRF at roughly 4,700 personnel is predominately an Army entity with the core element of Task Force Operations comprised of an Army Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB). This function is currently being performed by the 4th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade located at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. This organization serves as the deployable force that provides a DOD initial consequence management response. This is primarily an Army responsibility because it is a ground-based mission. In November 2009, under the operational control of ARNORTH, the

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64 Mrs. Susan Pruitt, JTF Civil Support, e-mail message to author, April 5, 2010.


CCMRF conducted its first major deployment training exercise called VIBRANT RESPONSE at Camp Atterbury, Indiana. The use of this Army facility for training the CCMRF organizations for consequence management may indicate the limitations of other combat training center facilities as well as increased future financial costs for the Army to sustain this facility. What the CCMRF highlights is the growing resource demands on the Army of support to the SJTF in areas beyond organization structure, but also the areas of training and facilities.

In the execution of its duties and responsibilities, JTF Civil Support performs tactical level operations that benefit a number of stakeholders, both civilian and governmental. In its current capacity, JTF Civil Support works closely with all agencies associated with CBRNE consequence management through scenario based training events, which serve to stress cooperation and synchronization among the various governmental and civilian agencies. Relationships exist with the Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and Center for Disease Control, as well as with state and city officials. The foundation for these relationships is the sharing of information to serve the needs of the America people in times of great crisis. The pressures of these stakeholders on JTF Civil Support appear great primarily due to their limited capacity to surge capabilities to a disaster zone. For many of the stakeholders, the backup plan for CBRNE consequence management is JTF Civil Support, which emphasizes a relationship that may not be mutually beneficial.

The scale of U.S. Army support to JTF Civil Support has varied from year to year throughout the organization’s history. The impact to the US Army is in three main areas: physical

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facilities, Army brigades for the CCMRF mission, and joint manning requirements. However, joint basing will alleviate the Army of responsibility for providing facilities to JTF Civil Support in the coming year. The real alarm signal is the recent growth in the CCMRF mission and required force structure, which is a force capability now vetted through the Total Army Analysis process.

**JTF-North**

In a ceremony conducted in September 2004, Joint Task Force-Six was officially renamed JTF-North by the SECDEF. Originally established in November 1989, JTF-North served as a planning and coordinating operational headquarters to support local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies in counterdrug operations in the southwest border region of the United States.\(^{69}\) Created in the aftermath of GNA, in a DOD clamoring for jointness, JTF-North, like JTF Civil Support, consists of inter-service participation in a primarily ground based mission.

Like JTF Civil Support, JTF-North does not have defined termination criteria. The original impetus for this SJTF was the war on drugs. The challenge of this war was the difficulty of planning for its conclusion. How and when will JTF-North know it has won the war on drugs became the constant dilemma for the SJTF. The inability to develop some sort of termination criteria sustains the existence of the organization and assists in the changing nature of the second factor. The evolution of the mission sets the SJTF performs.

The 2009 JTF-North mission reads:

> Joint Task force North provides military support to law enforcement agencies, conducts theater security cooperation as directed, and facilitates interagency synchronization within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility in order to anticipate, detect, deter, prevent, and defeat transnational threats to the homeland.\(^{70}\)


In similar fashion to JTF Civil Support, JTF-North adjusted its mission statement to emphasize its post-9/11 priorities. In 2003, the JTF-6 (now JTF-North) mission statement read:

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\text{JTF-6 synchronizes and integrates Department of Defense operational, training and intelligence support to domestic law enforcement agency counterdrug efforts in the continental U.S. to reduce the availability of illegal drugs in the United States and when directed, provides operational, training, and intelligence support to domestic agencies’ efforts in combating terrorism.}^{71}\]

The organization’s early focus on counter drug operations is now conspicuously absent in the 2009 mission statement. Noteworthy is the move to terminology more closely associated with combating terrorism. General Renuart’s 2010 testimony before the SASC supports the evolutionary nature of SJTFs, in that “[JTF-North] provides military support to Federal law enforcement agencies to assist in the identification and interdiction of transnational threats within and along the approaches to the United States.” \(^{72}\) This factor of evolving mission helps sustain the continued existence of JTF-North.

The third factor of location places JTF-North operations at Biggs Army Airfield in El Paso, Texas. An installation operated and administered by the U.S. Army, in which Biggs Army Airfield resides within the larger Fort Bliss community. The benefit for JTF-North is the installation’s proximity to the United States border with Mexico and El Paso’s sister city across the border, Juarez. In the last year, Juarez has become the scene of major drug cartel infighting and violence. In the past the organization’s location along the southwest border made sense. Now, however JTF-North has responsibility for the northern border, bringing into question its current disposition in El Paso. Future debate may center on whether centrally relocating JTF-North will benefit national security and our ability to identify and interdict threats along the approaches.


The organization structure for JTF-North illustrates the novelty of its mission in supporting law enforcement agencies highlighted by the coordinating relationships with the Drug Enforcement Agency, U.S. Border Patrol and National Guard Bureau. Similar to JTF Civil Support in numbers, (Figure 4) the JTF-North organization consists of approximately 198 personnel comprised of sailors, soldiers, marines, and airmen, both active and reservist, as well as civilian and contractor. To date, the U.S. Army has assigned 57 personnel to the JTF-North organization in the ranks of Brigadier General to Private First Class.\textsuperscript{73} Figure 3 illustrates the demands on the Army for field grade officers and non-commissioned officers serving in joint billets. Of the 39 total officers, approximately 77\% are field grade officers, when chief warrant officers assigned to JTF-North are included as well.

<table>
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<th>Officers/Grades</th>
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<th>LTC/O5</th>
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<tr>
<td>Enlisted/Grades</td>
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<td>MSG/E8</td>
<td>SFC/E7</td>
<td>SSG/E6</td>
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<td>SPC/E4</td>
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The US Army provides approximately 29\% of the total JTF-North personnel requirements. Since 2005, the U.S. Army has consistently filled 91\% of their authorized billets in accordance with the Joint Table of Distribution document supporting JTF-North.\textsuperscript{75} Of interest, JTF-North’s assigned strength of 198 is 130\% over their authorization document (which specifies 152 personnel). This is largely due to contract and military reserve Manning which is routinely not reflected within the Joint Table of Distribution. The higher staffing numbers provides support to a recent manpower survey of the organization which validated 222 manpower requirements.

\textsuperscript{73} MAJ Jason Brown, JTF North, e-mail message to author, January 20, 2010.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
There is no other force structure tied to this SJTF. The limited staffing of the organization brings into question its relative capability to sustain 24/7 operations or to manage another operation beyond the current mission. This provides the impression that JTF-North lacks flexibility or is truly a singular focused organization. The Army forces that support the efforts of JTF-North and law enforcement agencies are volunteers and primarily meeting yearly training obligations associated with their mission essential task list (METL). This is interesting for two reasons. First, the DOD’s top priority is the defense of the homeland yet it is allocating only those units willing to volunteer to meet annual training requirements. The second item is that the DOD allows untrained units to support real world sensitive missions that influence the national security of the nation. Though moot points in the confines of this study, these outlier insights do add emphasis to the SJTF phenomenon. As for the organizational structure, JTF-North continues to reshape its form through manpower surveys which validate the manpower requirements and tasks. This growing factor continues to drive the existence of the SJTF.

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76 Details of JTF-North manning provided by LTC Cynthia Dillard, JTF-North J1 through conversations and questions between author and MAJ Jason Brown, JTF-North Chief of Plans, during NORTHCOM panel planning 11-14 January 2010 in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
The overriding uniqueness of JTF-North is the relationships with its law enforcement stakeholders. According to JTF-North’s command brief, the stakeholders sustain a mutually beneficial relationship. For one, JTF-North acknowledges its 20 years of support to law enforcement missions, which contribute directly to national security. The value to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) is that DOD assistance brings unique capabilities, intelligence assets and analysis, and increased operational reach. The value to the DOD stakeholders is that for some units, like engineers and intelligence organizations there is nearly a 90% METL.

correlation with their support to LEAs. It also increases the readiness of National Guard and reservist units who experience a real-world mission environment. Law Enforcement stakeholders include the following: Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Border Patrol, U.S. Coast Guard, Immigration Customs Enforcement, Department of Justice (DOJ), Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These LEA stakeholders turn to DOD to bridge the gaps in their recognized lack of capacity to perform certain tasks. DOD stakeholders are those military units, active, guard and reserve that can benefit from volunteering to support JTF-North operations. In some ways, the numbers of stakeholders associated with JTF-North is a problem. They each bring different agendas and interests with JTF-North leveraging the relationships in ways that enhance national security. This constant challenge is more difficult due to the political sensitivities associated with many of the stakeholders listed.

The scale of Army support is considerably less than the current commitment to JTF Civil Support. JTF-North, in recent years, is supporting approximately 10% of the requests filed by LEAs for DOD support in operations, intelligence, engineering, and training. Of the 585 requests submitted to JTF-North in 2009, military units completed 61 requests. Of these 61 support missions in fiscal year 2009, U.S. Army active, guard or reserve units completed 27 or 44% of all requests from LEAs. Figure 5 illustrates the total requests received from LEAs since 2005, as well as the number completed by the JTF-North organization, and the number completed by Army units. The last column highlights the percentage of completed missions by Army units of the total completed requests.
Overseas contingency operations and other events preclude more JTF-North support to the mission. The use of an Army installation, Biggs Army Airfield does not currently place undue strain on the Army community that resides at Fort Bliss. In this case, JTF-North’s counterdrug mission and proximity to the border, to Juarez, and to those it supports is a major benefit that requires no additional Army resources, other than facilities. The operational support that JTF-North receives from Army units throughout the year remains limited, yet in the big picture appears to be win-win for all parties involved when the SJTF provides support to the LEAs.

Overall, there appear to be some benefits for the U.S. Army associated with JTF Civil Support and JTF-North organizations. First, from a budgetary perspective, the U.S. Army provides very little to the overall operation and maintenance of these organizations. In fact, the United States Air Force, according to DOD Directive 5100.3, serves as the supporting command for U.S. Northern Command and all subordinate joint commands. In this regards, the U.S. Air Force is responsible for the programming and “budget to fund, without reimbursement, the administrative and logistic support required by the supported joint headquarters to perform their assigned missions effectively.”

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78 MAJ Jason Brown, JTF North, e-mail message to author, January 20, 2010.
Second, there are tactical benefits associated with these two SJTFs. These advantages are most prominent in the following areas: organizational structure (command and control), relationships with stakeholders and interoperability. These standing headquarters now make command and control of the organization, staff, and subordinates seamless without worries of building ad hoc or temporary relationships to meet mission demands. The permanency of the organization and staff enables the JTF to “reduce the fog and friction in the joint commander’s headquarters during the initial stages of a crisis… [and] react quicker and make decisions faster because it is a well-practiced team.”80 It is impossible to measure the investment efforts in cultivating and establishing relationships with the various Federal, state and local LEA stakeholders. In a trend that resonates beyond the existence of the NORTHCOM SJTFs, their [SJTFs] overall “familiarity with the governments, economies, languages, and customs of an area can be invaluable in determining the best COAs for a region and the potential reactions to them.”81 Finally, these headquarters meet the intent of the GNA, as they illustrate the success of inter-service interoperability every day. The use of joint doctrine, computers to facilitate information dissemination among the services, and SOPs assist interoperability in these 24/7 operational headquarters make these SJTFs the pride of the DOD.

Last, there is a benefit in that the U.S. government is conducting an economy of force effort regarding the threats these two SJTFs counter. The limited resources allocated to these two organizations illustrate their priority in a time of two major overseas contingency operations. If anything, the problems JTF-North and JTF Civil Support address greatly mitigate major vulnerabilities in defense to the homeland. The values they bring to their areas of concern are very significant.

However, the costs to the Army exceed the benefits in both case studies analyzed. The shifting nature of SJTF mission sets creates the most significant cost. While the events of 9/11 transformed the world, the relevancy of the original missions that led to the creation of these two JTFs has not diminished. The importance of JTF-North and JTF Civil Support missions requires no further justification, although the matter of funding and the integration of these formerly independent organizations NORTHCOM remain problematic. The concern is the amount of shift evident in the mission statements seen today, when compared to earlier versions. These comparisons demonstrate the evolving nature of mission sets that now seem to address the transnational counter terrorism threat. This demonstrates adaptability on the part of the military, but also denies the DOD the opportunity to stand down the organization. These SJTFs existence also enable stakeholders to delay their development of the necessary capacity that could create the conditions to end DOD support to these missions. The failure of stakeholders to develop the necessary capacity explains the evolutionary nature of the mission sets of the SJTFs.

The second issue is the continuously rotating organizational structure or units that support these two STJFs. The fact is the CCMRF mission and responsibility continues to rotate among designated Army brigade level units. This one-year rotational commitment does not enhance or sustain relationships with those stakeholders the CCMRF would assist in a consequence management situation. This situation seems compounded in the examination of JTF-North. This SJTF and its ability to perform its mission is totally dependent on volunteer units among the services. Most support appears to come from organizations attempting to fulfill their yearly training requirements for their respective service. Therefore, what JTF-North receives are untrained organizations performing real world missions in support of LEAs and national security, in order to meet their service training obligations. This sub-optimized solution makes very little sense and in reality would seem to jeopardize national security, not enhance it.

The third drawback is the lack of termination criteria for these two SJTFs, yielding an unintended, or at least undesirable, semi-permanency to these organizations. Currently, the
enduring nature of the missions that JTF-North and JTF Civil Support conduct appears to be growing, along with the correlating resource demands required to support homeland defense. In the article “Standing Down a Joint Task Force,” author Scott Hines notes the myriad challenges of with attempting to shut down a SJTF, based on his experience with JTF Bravo in Honduras. He explains, “if DOD wants to exercise a degree of autonomy in choosing when to stand up JTFs, it must act responsibly by standing them down. To avoid the bureaucratic inertia arising in the case of JTF Bravo, standing down JTFs should be just as methodical a process as standing them up.”

This describes the dilemma of the third drawback, which is the need to define the termination criteria for these two SJTFs missions.

The final drawback deals with tactical employment. There is no flexibility internal to these two SJTFs because they support a singular prescriptive mission. A couple of significant shortfalls are apparent. First, neither is capable of performing two dissimilar missions simultaneously, for instance heading a hurricane humanitarian relief operation and providing support to LEAs along the southwest border. Second, their manning does not provide convincing evidence that the organizations can perform 24/7 operations without significant augmentation from other organizations or agencies.

This case study comparison has highlighted the SJTFs termination criteria, mission, organizational structure, stakeholders, and the scale of Army support to these two SJTFs. In addition, this section illustrated some of the benefits and disadvantages derived from the analysis of these two organizations. The next section will interpret these insights further and offer future options on the way ahead for the NORTHCOM subordinate SJTFs.

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Conclusion

JTF North and JTF Civil Support provide solutions to what are arguably long-term and complex problems confronting the United States. The uncertainties of the environment, when coupled with the ever-changing nature of the threats confronting the nation, require new solutions. The developed solution must account for DOD’s “whole-of-government” approach. Though parochialism still permeates the military services, its influence on decisions has waned in the last 20 years as evidenced by the role of the SJTFs.

This study emphasizes the impact to just one particular Service, the U.S. Army, by outlining the cost to the Army associated with continued support of these two SJTFs. Unequivocally, the missions assigned these two organizations are unique, yet SJTFs still appear to be sub-optimal joint solutions to address the perceived vulnerabilities to the nation. Steven Canby noted, “the unintended consequences of unbounded jointness may be a force that is less effective, more costly, and not fully capable of intimate joint operations even if flexibility and predictability are not problems.”

The impact to the U.S. Army may appear minimal when considering whether to activate an SJTF. However, because SJTFs lack clear termination criteria, decision makers must account for the environmental constraints (primarily ongoing operations in places like Iraq and Afghanistan), and the annually increasing costs in facilities and staffing. Further, formation of SJTFs usually leads to an ever-evolving mission, which is unsurprising given their lack of clear termination criteria. To solve this problem, DOD must honestly evaluate these realities with respect to the creation of SJTFs. Responding to a natural disaster is one type of JTF mission, but responding to the War on drugs is another type, which is enduring and

amorphous, with no clear, attainable end state, and perhaps better accomplished by a permanent organization (i.e. an existing combatant command).

This study focused on the cost to the U.S. Army of SJTFs because it is the primary force provider both for many SJTFs, and for ongoing operations in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. The staffing costs associated with maintaining SJTFs affect the Army to a larger degree than the other services. The demands for resources among the GCCs, implementation of theater security cooperation plans, and crisis response operations like the recent JTF-Haiti operation illustrate the challenges faced not just by the U.S. Army, but also by all the services. Nevertheless, given the degree of its operational tempo and personnel commitments to its many worldwide missions, the Army serves as the best barometer for identifying the stress among all the services.

Several SJTFs continue to exist and operate with no termination criteria or with no end state. Organizations like JTF-Bravo, CJTF-Horn of Africa, JTF-Global Network Operations, and JTF-GTMO continue to operate via a joint table of distribution and threat concerns within their respective GCCs. The reality for the U.S Army will be increased demands for manning, resources, and facilities in the future. SJTFs remain a viable solution since the services share the burden, but DOD should not be view them as long-term solutions for the complex problems facing the United States in the national security realm.

As with most complex problems, potential solutions to improve the national security situation do exist. These potential solutions may increase the efficacy of these SJTFs, not just for the Army or DOD, but also for the nation. The examination of the two organizations in the case study provides insights into future viable options. This conclusion offers recommendations specific to each SJTF, many of which do not solely benefit the U.S. Army. In some instances, the proposed options lower manning requirements, but lead to a corresponding increase in risks to national security.

There are a number of future options regarding JTF-North. First, DOD could transform the organization from its current form into Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-North. A useful
model for this transformation exists in the current JIATF-West and JIATF-South organizations. JIATF-West, for example clarifies the counterdrug and training role of its organization, as well as their other activities.

JIATF West’s mission is to conduct activities to detect, disrupt and dismantle drug-related transnational threats in Asia and the Pacific by providing interagency intelligence fusion, supporting U.S. law enforcement, and developing partner nation capacity in order to protect U.S. security interests at home and abroad. To accomplish this mission, JIATF West provides U.S. and foreign law enforcement with fused interagency information and intelligence analysis, and with counterdrug training and infrastructure development support.84

Application of the JIATF model could mirror the current arrangement of JIATF-South under SOUTHCOM. In “JIATF-South: Blueprint for success,” Richard Yeatman he notes several of the benefits associated with this structure. The primary benefit is the level of integration evident within the JIATF. Yeatman explains, “interagency personnel are fully integrated within the command structure and serve in key leadership positions.”85 The fact that interagency partners are not sitting in liaison positions at JIATF-South proves that this is what the future should hold for JTF-North. The JIATF model “maximizes existing interagency relationships and [the] operational and intelligence functions already in place” which benefits JTF-North and their stakeholders.86 The primary drawback with the JIATF model is that these organizations are still DOD commands, which “cannot conduct law enforcement operations.”87 This conundrum persists for JTF-North today.

A second option, which may be more appealing to the DOD, is to transfer JTF-North, its mission, staff, and facilities to Department of Homeland Security. In all fairness, JTF-North is

87 Ibid., 27.
little more than a brokerage house, serving as an intermediary between LEAs and military units requiring training. The analogy of a brokerage house is fitting, as JTF-North essentially pairs up LEA demands with DOD capabilities. Arguably, DHS should provide this service, not DOD. The enduring commitment would be the need for Army liaison officers to serve as the communication link between the LEAs and Army organizations willing to work for JTF-North. The primary benefit to the DOD is elimination of the need to pay for a non-deployable headquarters, reduction in JDAL billets, and the transfer of a mission to a secretarial cabinet department that has the authority to conduct law enforcement in the homeland. The disadvantage of this option is the possible perception that DOD has abandoned a 20-year effort in counterdrug operations. However, the JTF-North capability and mission would remain viable; it would merely shift from DOD to reside under DHS.

Future options for JTF Civil Support are more difficult to identify. JTF Civil Support’s legacy is capacity-driven due to the inability of stakeholders to meet CBRNE consequence management demands. The CBRNE consequence management capacity of other governmental agencies is so limited that very few options exist outside DOD resources. Yet, like JTF-North, options still exist within the DOD environment.

The primary option is to transform JTF Civil Support into the Joint Center of Excellence for Consequence Management. Paradigms do exist in the joint community, like the Joint Unmanned Aircraft System Center of Excellence at Nellis Air force Base. What this would mean for the JTF Civil Support organization is an end to its role as a command and control organization for consequence management. In this option, ARNORTH assumes responsibility for the CCMRF training and resource oversight, since the Army provides the majority of the units in the organization. NORTHCOM provides overall command and control for CBRNE and all other hazards. This means the full responsibility for conducting consequence management and supervising the employment of the CCMRF resides with NORTHCOM. The U.S. Army, like
other services view the development of centers of excellence as instrumental to its organization’s long-term success. Since no joint definition exists, the Army defines a center of excellence as:

designated by HQDA and is an organization that creates the highest standards of achievement in an assigned sphere of expertise by generating synergy through effective and efficient combination and integration of functions while reinforcing unique requirements and capabilities. 88

This choice may seem untenable for JTF Civil Support, but there is an underlying logic to it. As the CCMRF mission matures, ARNORTH as the land command component for homeland defense can provide the CCMRF the necessary training oversight, while NORTHCOM assumes a greater role in planning for all national level hazard response, including CBRNE. These actions would end the current role exercised by JTF Civil Support. In this manner, DOD could institutionalize the expertise of JTF Civil Support without burdening it with the current demands of performing oversight for operational and training missions.

A Joint Center of Excellence for Civil Support would be integral to the future joint community of practice for consequence management. It would be instrumental in forging the long-term strategy for consequence management. For example, it could sponsor consequence management research with graduate education programs and scientific community partners. A Joint Center of Excellence for Consequence Management would also encourage greater participation and investment from the commercial sector beyond those of the defense industry.

The options addressed for these SJTFs are potential future solutions, not just for the U.S. Army, but also for the entire DOD. SJTFs require a heavy commitment of resources at their creation, but DOD must acknowledge the continued drain they create on DOD resources, represented by the five factors on which this study focuses. In such conditions, the military services must continue to analyze and reassess their participation in SJTFs.

While SJTFs are today’s current solution to address the threats engaging the nation, the U.S. must remain ahead of its enemies by blending old and new concepts, organizations, and resources to address the security challenges of the Twenty-first Century environment. Our pursuit of technology, weapon systems, and operational adaptability should also include a focus on developing more effective and efficient organizations. SJTFs bridged the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries, but now it is time for a new concept of how we achieve greater efficacy within the whole-of-government approach the nation demands.
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