

Army National Guard and Civil Support Operations

Closing the Interagency Gap at the Local Level

A Monograph

By

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Abstract

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS: Closing the Interagency Gap at the Local Level, by MAJ John D. Herrera, ARNG, 60 pages.

Currently, an interagency gap exists between local civil authorities and tactical military forces preparing for and conducting all phases of domestic civil support operations. The gap exists for two primary reasons: (1) military forces operate in a supporting role during domestic civil support operations, resulting in fewer allocated resources as compared to combat operations where the military is normally in the lead, and (2) military and civil authorities take significantly different approaches towards disaster response. Civil authorities follow the bottom-up, locally driven National Response Framework which relies upon specific local training and capacity to meet the basic needs of the local community. The military on the other hand follows a hierarchical, top-down, regional approach dependent on baseline or core competency training and delivering capacity better suited for offense, defense, and stability operations. This monograph recommends nine domestic civil support planning themes to close the gap and improve civil military relations by integrating military forces, specifically the National Guard, at the local level. By partnering with local civil authorities throughout the year, military first responders, especially the Army National Guard, will have a better understanding of the joint operational environment during all phases of domestic civil support operations. With a better understanding of the joint operational environment, commanders and planners can then take relevant actions consistent with the long term objectives of local civilian leaders and communities. The National Guard, as the military's designated first responder in domestic civil support operations, must become a stronger partner at the local level and a key member of local civil emergency management teams on an ongoing basis, not only during disaster response. Local civil military relations are dramatically improved when military forces partner with local civil authorities during all phases of domestic civil support operations.

To improve domestic civil support operations and civil military relations at the local level, three things must occur to close the interagency gap: (1) military commanders and planners, especially those in the National Guard, must prioritize domestic civil support preparation at the local level, (2) operational and tactical military organizations must decrease their current reliance on core competency training and non-domestic experiences and increase interagency, domestic civil support specific training at the tactical level, and (3) the Department of Defense must view domestic civil support operations from a long term, local partnership perspective.

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Introduction

*Effective training is the cornerstone of operational success. Through training, Soldiers, leaders, and units achieve the tactical and technical competence that builds confidence and allows them to conduct successful operations across the spectrum of conflict. The Army trains its forces using training doctrine that sustains their expeditionary and campaign excellence. This same training prepares Soldiers to create stable environments. Achieving this competence requires specific, dedicated training on offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support tasks. The Army trains Soldiers and units daily in individual and collective tasks under challenging, realistic conditions.*¹

Field Manual 3.0
Operations

Hurricane Katrina began as a Tropical Depression 12 on Tuesday, 23 August 2005. By Friday, 26 August, Hurricane Katrina had grown into a Category 3 storm and it was getting stronger by the hour. In the face of dire warnings, both state and Federal officials began implementing their emergency plans. Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco declared a state of emergency on Friday, 26 August, and activated 2,000 National Guard Soldiers. The Governor of Mississippi, Haley Barbour, followed suit later that afternoon when he declared a state of emergency and authorized the call up of the National Guard. The next day, governor Blanco mobilized 2,000 more Louisiana National Guard Soldiers and Airmen, initiated the state's evacuation plan, and asked President George W. Bush to declare a federal state of emergency in Louisiana. Based on experience, emergency management officials in Louisiana and Mississippi expressed confidence that they were prepared. Hurricane Katrina made landfall near Buras, Louisiana, at 0610 hours central daylight time (CDT) on Monday, 29 August 2005.

On September 1, the media began asking questions concerning the military response. Why was there not a massive National Guard presence visible? Why had the military taken so long to deliver basic commodities such as food, water, ice, gasoline, and medicine? Where was

¹ U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0 (FM 3-0), *Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 2008), 1-20 to 1-21.

the cavalry and why has it taken them so long to get here?² These questions certainly captured the attention of national leaders, both civilian and military, for several weeks, months, and years following the disaster.

In preparation for and reaction to the hurricane, the United States Northern Command established Joint Task Force *Katrina* at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, to act as the Active component's on-scene command headquarters. Ultimately, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 3 territories sent approximately 50,000 National Guard personnel to provide support to the people affected by the storm. Approximately 22,000 Regular Active-Duty personnel eventually assisted with relief-and-recovery operations in Mississippi and Louisiana. These men and women were instrumental in the rescue-and-relief mission, often using their own initiative and resources in the chaotic aftermath of the storm. Unlike offensive, defensive, and stability operations, the military is undertrained and under resourced in domestic civil support, specifically at the tactical level. This paper defines the tactical level of domestic civil support as tasks conducted at the local level, primarily by brigade and below units in direct support of local civil authorities, with the purpose to restore stability to the local community. Domestic civil military relations need improvement at the local level to ensure successful civil support operations at the tactical level.

According to US Military Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, *Civil Support*, civil support operations are divided into three broad categories: (1) domestic emergencies, (2) designated law enforcement support, and (3) other activities.³ This paper will focus primarily on domestic emergencies, with a few references made to the other categories in order to highlight a particular training or partnering aspect of civil military relations. Military commanders and responsible Department of Defense (DOD) civilians may, under certain conditions, provide support based on

² James A. Wombwell, Occasional Paper 29, *Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster*, (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2009), 1-6.

³ U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-28 (JP 3-28), *Civil Support* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 14 September 2007), x.

immediate response authority in order to save lives, prevent suffering, and mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. DOD support and/or assistance in restoring public health and services, and civil order may include augmentation of local first responders and equipment. It may include law enforcement support, continuity of operations/continuity of government measures to restore essential government services, protect public health and safety, and provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses, and individuals. Responses occur under the primary jurisdiction of the affected state and local government, and the Federal government provides assistance when required.

The DOD organizational construct to support the Homeland Security (HS) mission, “through its warfighting and civil support missions, is characterized by: prepare, detect, prevent, defend, respond and recover. While DOD’s focus is on preparation and response, DOD may provide critical support to US civil authorities in all areas of this framework.”⁴ The five associated civil support operational phases are: (1) Shaping, (2) Staging, (3) Deployment, (4) Civil Support Operations, and (5) Transition.⁵

President George W. Bush emphasized the importance of preparation in a speech given at Jackson Square, New Orleans, Louisiana, on September 15, 2005:

This government will learn the lessons of Hurricane Katrina. We are going to review every action and make necessary changes so that we are better prepared for any challenge of nature, or act of evil men, that could threaten our people⁶

There is no shortage of strategic and operational doctrine, policy, and literature concerning civil support operations and related strategic and operational training recommendations. The recommendation presented in this paper is that the military needs to conduct more preparation during the shaping phase of civil support operations. Specifically, the

⁴ Ibid., I-4.

⁵ Ibid., III-12.

⁶ Ibid., I-1.

National Guard must require and resource additional tactical training between military first responders and local civil authorities in order to be successful during all phases of civil support operations. The military should prepare and resource for civil support operations to the same extent that it prepares for and resources the other elements of full spectrum operations. Resourcing would require a cost analysis beyond the scope of this paper; costs would be shared at all jurisdictional levels.

Historical Experience

Since the Army established posts throughout the country, it was one of the few Federal departments with a national presence, plus the Army's purchasing and transportation system enabled it to respond relatively quickly during times of crisis. Consequently, during the last three decades of the 19th century, Soldiers provided assistance at least 17 times when floods, fires, droughts, insect plagues, disease, and tornados struck the nation.

Driven mainly by reimbursement concerns, the War Department put limitations on Active-Duty support during disaster. As a result, the National Guard took on an increased role. In 1950, Congress passed the first of several laws that sought to establish a Federal disaster relief bureaucracy. The Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950 provided for an automatic Federal response and authorized a new agency to coordinate Federal relief efforts. The Nation's emergency response bureaucracy continued to evolve throughout the next few decades. "By the late 1970s, more than 100 Federal agencies were involved in some aspect of disaster response."⁷

The Army has a long and rich tradition of providing support to American citizens in time of need. Even when there was no clear doctrine applicable to this mission, Soldiers used their core competencies and skills to perform a wide range of missions that brought relief to their fellow Americans. One by-product of the skill and compassion Soldiers have displayed during

⁷ James A. Wombwell, Occasional Paper 29, *Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster*, (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2009), 12-13.

these types of missions is that Americans have come to expect that, if the situation is dire, the Army will step in and help.⁸

Certain key factors and assumptions need review in light of the current operational environment of persistent conflict. The biggest assumption is that the Army, specifically the National Guard (NG), will be available to respond immediately and adequately. The National Guard is no longer a strategic reserve, but utilized as an integral component of the operational force. As such, it has had to prioritize preparation for overseas combat at the partial expense of preparation for domestic civil support operations, namely disaster response. There exists a collection of planning themes relevant to domestic civil support operations. These planning themes provide a basis for identifying and recommending necessary changes towards improving tactical domestic civil support operations and civil military relations at the local level. These themes have been gleaned from a review of the Army's response during the Hurricane Katrina disaster and a consideration of current full spectrum operations, which include aspects relevant to domestic civil support. A subsequent section will discuss the nine planning themes in greater detail, which are: (1) readiness, (2) security, (3) partnership, (4) understanding, (5) unity of effort, (6) capacity, (7) support status, (8) planning effort, and (9) media.

Organization of the Paper

This work references joint and US Army doctrine and US Department of Homeland Security response and incident management policies and directives. The next section presents applicable military doctrine and civilian policies and directives related to domestic civil support operations and emergency response. By combining doctrinal guidance and the historical context of Hurricane Katrina disaster response operations, all stakeholders, military and civilian, are able to identify critical requirements and resources key to preparing for and conducting civil support operations in a variety of contemporary operational environments.

⁸ Ibid., 16.

Following the doctrinal review and presentation of the nine domestic civil support planning themes, specific examples of the different phases of civil support operations conducted during the military's response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster beginning in August 2005 are presented. The section focuses on tactical and operational vignettes which include specific historical information about local domestic civil support operations and civil military relations in New Orleans, Louisiana, in August and September 2005. A collection of analytical questions will provide an additional perspective to drive a detailed discussion about each vignette in order to identify potential gaps in preparation and conduct of domestic civil support operations. Linkages are made between current military doctrine, civilian emergency response policies, and the nine planning themes presented in this paper to tactical training recommendations.

Following the vignettes and tactical training recommendations to improve domestic civil support operations, a framework is provided to improve domestic civil support based on the nine planning themes along with specific recommendations to close the interagency gap at the local level. This paper concludes by presenting contextual and application considerations of the nine domestic civil support planning themes and areas of further analysis.

The following questions will help frame the analysis of the military's disaster response to Hurricane Katrina. Each question is designed to highlight key aspects of the disaster response environment and current similar operations. The analytical questions are:

What was the military's readiness and support status?

What was the civilian-military relationship?

What was the influence of the media?

What was the role of non-local actors?

What was the current status of the civil support infrastructure?

What was the impact of social dynamics?

Disconnected Civilian and Military Guidance and Nine Recommended Domestic Civil Support Planning Themes

Despite the US military's rich history of providing domestic disaster response and the sheer volume of doctrine and guidance concerning current combat operations, there is surprisingly very little military doctrine specifically targeted at domestic civil support operations. Military civil support doctrinal publications, of which there are few, are focused at the operational level. This approach to domestic civil support does not align well with the primarily local (tactical equivalent) civilian tiered response framework. This paper defines the tactical level of domestic civil support as tasks conducted at the local level, primarily by brigade and below units in direct support of local civil authorities, to restore stability to the local community. "Doctrine serves the military's needs best when it is applied creatively by technically and tactically competent commanders and planners who are historically informed."⁹ This chapter will review military doctrine and civilian policy concerned with disaster preparedness and response (Joint Publication (JP) 3.0: *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, JP 3-28: *Civil Support*, Field Manual (FM) 3.0: *Operations*, FM 3-28 (Draft Version 6): *Civil Support Operations*, TRADOC PAM 525-3-0: *The Army Capstone Concept*, and the National Response Framework). This chapter will assess how doctrine and policy apply to local civil military relationships and interagency prioritization at the tactical level. This doctrinal review sets a foundation for understanding the relationship between three essential elements that shape the domestic civil support operational environment. These elements are *preparedness* (skills required by military forces at the tactical level to support civil authorities in meeting immediate and short term objectives following a disaster), *response capacity* (a clear assessment of where to focus initial military resources through unity of effort based on an interagency understanding of key local objectives), and *recovery criteria* (those

⁹ LTC David P. Cavaleri, Occasional Paper 7, *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations*, (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2005), 7.

criteria that define the end of the military response phase and define when sufficient civil capacity exists to sustain further recovery without military assistance). In the next section, the three elements can be found at various places throughout both civilian and military guidance.

A Bottom-Up Approach: The National Response Framework

*State and local governments are closest to those impacted by incidents, and have always had the lead in response and recovery. The role of the State government in response is to supplement local efforts before, during, and after incidents.*¹⁰

National Response Framework

The National Response Framework (NRF) “is a guide to how the Nation conducts all-hazards response. It is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities across the Nation. It describes specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents that range from the serious but purely local, to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters.”¹¹ The NRF is required by, and integrates under, a larger *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (NSHS) that serves to guide, organize, and unify our Nation’s homeland security efforts. The intended audiences of the NRF are senior elected and appointed leaders, such as federal department or agency heads, state governors, mayors, tribal leaders, and city or county officials who have a responsibility to provide for effective response. One of the challenges to effective response is the relatively high turnover and short tenure among elected and appointed officials responsible for response at all levels. “Effective response hinges upon well-trained leaders and responders who have invested in response preparedness, developed engaged partnerships, and are able to achieve shared objectives.”¹²

¹⁰ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 5.

¹¹ Ibid., 1.

¹² Ibid., 2.

As part of preparedness, each governmental level plays a prominent role in developing capabilities needed to respond to incidents. This includes developing plans, conducting assessments and exercises, providing and directing resources and capabilities, and gathering lessons learned. Even when a community is overwhelmed by an incident, there is still a core, sovereign responsibility to be exercised at the local level, with unique response obligations to coordinate with State, Federal, and private-sector support teams. Each organization or level of government therefore has a legal obligation and moral imperative to fund and execute its own core emergency management responsibilities before emergencies occur.

Local police, fire, emergency medical services, public health and medical providers, emergency management, public works, environmental response professionals, and others in the community are often the first to detect a threat or hazard, or respond to an incident. Most states have significant resources of their own, including state emergency management and homeland security agencies, state police, health and transportation agencies, incident management teams, specialized teams, state National Guard Joint Force Headquarters, and State Defense Forces.

Response doctrine is comprised of five key principles.




Figure 1: Response doctrine¹³

¹³ Ibid., 8.

Engaged partnerships are essential to preparedness. Effective response activities begin with a host of preparedness activities conducted well in advance of an incident. Preparedness involves a combination of planning, resources, training, exercising, and organizing to build, sustain, and improve operational capabilities. Preparedness is the process of identifying the personnel, training, and equipment needed for a wide range of potential incidents, and developing jurisdiction-specific plans for delivering capabilities when needed for an incident. Preparedness activities should be coordinated among all involved agencies within the jurisdiction, as well as across jurisdictions.

Tiered response, a basic premise of the NRF, enforces the operational reality that incidents begin and end locally, and most are wholly managed at the local level and supported by additional capabilities when needed. It is not necessary that each level be overwhelmed prior to requesting resources from another level. Local leaders and emergency managers prepare their communities to manage incidents locally by providing strategic guidance and resources during preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. Emergency management, including preparation and training for effective response, is a core obligation of local leaders.

Scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities. The NRF is grounded in doctrine that demands a tested inventory of common organizational structures and capabilities for diverse operations while simultaneously facilitating interoperability and improving operational coordination.

Unity of effort through unified command. Effective unified command is indispensable to response activities and requires a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each participating organization. The Incident Command System (ICS) provides a structure to enable agencies with different legal, jurisdictional, and functional responsibilities to coordinate, plan, and interact effectively on the scene. Each participating agency maintains its own authority, responsibility, and accountability. “The Department of Defense (DOD) is a full partner in the Federal response to domestic incidents, and its response is fully coordinated through the

mechanisms of the NRF. The ICS “unified command” concept is distinct from the military chain of command use of this term. And, as such, military forces do not operate under the command of the Incident Commander or under the unified command structure.”¹⁴

Readiness to act. Effective response requires readiness to act balanced with an understanding of risk. To save lives and protect property and the environment, decisive action on scene is often required of responders. Although some risk may be unavoidable, first responders can effectively anticipate and manage risk through proper training and planning. Command is responsible for establishing immediate priorities for the safety of not only the public, but the responders and other emergency workers involved in the response.

A Top-down Approach: Military Civil Support Operations

The Army’s operational concept is full spectrum operations.




Figure 2: Full Spectrum Operations – the Army’s operational concept¹⁵

Civil support is Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities.¹⁶ Civil support includes

¹⁴ Ibid., 11.

¹⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 2008), 3-1.

operations that address the consequences of natural or man-made disasters, accidents, terrorist attacks, and incidents in the United States and its territories. Joint doctrine identifies five phases for a civil support operation. Figure 3 illustrates both the Joint and NRF phases. A brief description of each phase follows.




Figure 3: Joint phases of disaster response¹⁷

Phase I, Shaping. Shaping is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. Actions in this phase include interagency coordination, exercises, and PA outreach. Shaping activities continue through all phases.

Phase II, Staging. Phase II begins with the identification of a potential civil support mission, or when directed to provide civil support by the Secretary of Defense. Actions in this phase include identifying force capabilities for response and placing them on increased alert, identifying materials and supplies (rations, medical items, tents, cots, etc.) for response and

¹⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 12 April 2001, as amended through 27 March 2010).

¹⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-28 (FM 3-28) (Revised Final Draft Version 6), *Civil Support Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 23 November 2009), 3-13.

preposition, coordinating with other government agencies (OGA) for mutually supporting response, and coordinating with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) elements to ensure DOD unity of effort. The Staging Phase ends with the issuance of a prepare-to-deploy order.

Phase III, Deployment. Phase III begins with response force deployment. However, force deployment can occur at any phase, except phase I (Shaping). Forces are phased into and out of the joint operations area (JOA) based on: (1) requirements to meet federal agency requests for federal assistance, (2) the changing operational focus (crisis response to stabilization, then to sustainment operations), and (3) as specialized capability requirements are identified. The deployment ends when response forces are ready to conduct operations in the joint operations area (JOA).

Phase IV, Civil Support Operations. Phase IV begins when the civil support response commences. This phase includes the rapid employment of DOD capabilities in support of civil authorities. There will be considerable overlap between this phase and the previous deployment phase as units arrive in the operational area and begin providing support. Phase IV ends when supported emergency support functions (ESF) no longer require DOD support.

Phase V, Transition. This final phase begins when DOD support to ESFs is no longer required. The transition phase ends when DOD response forces begin redeployment and are transferred back to their respective parent organizations.

The five primary civil support tasks are: (1) Provide support in response to disaster, (2) support civil law enforcement, (3) provide other support as directed, (4) support chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive consequence management, and (5) provide support during a pandemic. The first three are currently specified in FM 3-0 and the last two are additions recommended in FM 3-28 (Revised Final Draft Version 6).




Figure 4: Army civil support tasks with examples¹⁸

The Army National Guard is usually the first military force to respond on behalf of state authorities. In this capacity, it functions under authority of Title 32, U.S. Code, or while serving on state active duty. Civil support operations are always in support of state and federal agencies. Army forces coordinate and synchronize their efforts closely with them. State National Guard contingency planners consider several factors when preparing for potential disasters. Some factors are common to Army unit planning, but several are unique to the National Guard. They include (1) proximity of the unit to the disaster, (2) deployed personnel and equipment, and (3) distribution of tactical units.¹⁹ Other considerations include deploying troops from outside the affected area and jurisdiction issues arising from a disaster occurring along state or international borders.

Interagency success is measured by the success of civilian officials in carrying out their responsibilities. Civil support helps government officials meet their responsibilities to the public, ultimately without assistance from military forces. Applying the combined arms concept constructively - merging leadership, information, functions, and supporting systems – multiplies the effectiveness and the efficiency of Army capabilities in civil support. “Combined arms operations are familiar to Army forces. Training and exchange of liaison at every level are

¹⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-28 (Revised Final Draft Version 6), *Civil Support Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 23 November 2009), 1-8.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 3-5.

necessary for successful unified action.”²⁰ Along those same lines, mutual support is that support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.²¹ In Army doctrine, mutual support is a planning consideration related to force disposition, not a command relationship.

Domestic Civil Support Planning Themes

The author’s methodology combined analysis of Hurricane Katrina disaster response operations with emerging doctrine contained in FM 3-28 (Draft): *Civil Support Operations* and FM 7-0: *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, and current policy found in the National Response Framework (NRF) to develop a list of nine planning themes of particular value to domestic civil support operations planners and commanders. This paper offers the following nine civil support operations planning themes for consideration:

1. Readiness. Effective response requires balancing a readiness to act and an understanding of risk. A forward-leaning posture is imperative for incidents that have the potential to expand rapidly in size, scope, or complexity, and for no-notice incidents. Acting swiftly and effectively requires clear, focused communication and the processes to support it.²² DOD’s focus for civil support missions is to prepare, as much as possible, prior to an incident occurring, and when practical, stage assets to facilitate a rapid response. Preparedness actions include conducting interagency coordination, training and rehearsals, and information operations during the shaping

²⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, February 2008), 4.9.

²¹ U.S. Department of Defense, JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 12 April 2001, as amended through 27 March 2010).

²² U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security 2008), 11.

operational phase. Shaping activities continue through all phases.²³ Preparedness involves a combination of planning, resources, training, exercising, and organizing to build, sustain, and improve operational capabilities. Preparedness is the process of identifying the personnel, training, and equipment needed for a wide range of potential incidents, and developing jurisdiction-specific plans for delivering capabilities when needed for an incident. Preparedness activities should be coordinated among all involved agencies within the jurisdiction, as well as across jurisdictions.²⁴

2. Security. Even without the threat of attacks by terrorists, a disaster area is a dangerous place. Domestic law enforcement missions differ substantially from similar stability tasks associated with civil security and civil control in other nations. Except in extreme emergencies, the rights of citizens take precedence, and military forces supporting law enforcement typically have less authority to enforce the law. When circumstances dictate, the Governor of that state may call up National Guard forces to assist local and state law officers.²⁵ Standing rules for the use of force (SRUF) prescribe graduated levels of force used against citizens in a domestic environment, based upon the citizen's behavior and threat posture.²⁶
3. Partnership. Partnership is different from commitment. Typically, commitment is associated with operations that are larger in scope and longer in duration in conduct and execution. Engaged partnerships are essential to preparedness. Leaders at all

²³ U.S. Department of Defense, JP 3-28, *Civil Support* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 14 September 2007), III-13.

²⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 9.

²⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-28 (Revised Final Draft Version 6), *Civil Support Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 23 November 2009), 6-1.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 3-20.

levels must communicate and actively support engaged partnerships by developing shared goals and aligning capabilities so that no one is overwhelmed in times of crisis. Layered, mutually supporting capabilities at the Federal, State, tribal, and local levels allow for planning together in times of calm and responding together effectively in times of need. Engaged partnership includes ongoing communication of incident activity among all partners to the NRF, and shared situational awareness for a more rapid response. Military commanders need to remain sensitive to the fact that they are temporary help until local, state, and federal authorities resume normal roles. Soldiers should remember that local leaders confront the suffering of their families, friends, and neighbors. For them, this is not a mission; it is their community.²⁷

4. Understanding. This complex theme demands continuous and dedicated application. FM 3.0 states that understanding is fundamental to battle command. It is essential to the commander's ability to establish the situation's context. Understanding becomes the basis of the commander's visualization. Numerous factors determine the commander's depth of understanding. These include the commander's education, intellect, experience, and perception. Maintaining understanding is a dynamic ability; a commander's situational understanding changes as an operation progresses.

²⁸ Understanding the domestic environment begins with an appreciation of the operational environment. Three factors shape this analysis, they are: (1) structure of the United States under the U.S. Constitution, (2) the relationship of the military to civilian government at every level within the United States, and (3) the capacity of government at every level within the U.S. to respond to situations within the 50 states

²⁷ Ibid., 1-12.

²⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, February 2008), 5-4.

and the U.S. possessions and territories.²⁹ Assessment of the situation is a key to building situational awareness through coordination with supported and supporting agencies, other military forces, volunteer organizations, and contacts with the media. Although it may not be battle command as FM 3-0 defines it, the chaos surrounding a disaster poses challenges found in combat situations. Prior planning and exercises are invaluable, but disasters never occur exactly as anticipated. Initial assessment is vital towards building upon understanding developed during the shaping, preparation phase.³⁰

5. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort is achieved through unified command. Effective unified command is indispensable to response activities and requires a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each participating organization.³¹ In civil support operations, the military works for the civilian agency. The command of military forces remains within military channels, but missions begin as requests for assistance from the supported civilian authorities. One of the biggest mistakes that tactical commanders may make is to assume that they need to take charge upon arrival at the scene of an incident. Military forces operating freely within civilian jurisdictions risk upsetting the balance between civilian authority and the private sector. While a commander may view sidestepping local authority as a faster means of accomplishing the mission, long-term recovery may be negatively affected.³² Success requires unity of effort, which respects the chain of command of each

²⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-28 (Revised Final Draft Version 6), *Civil Support Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 23 November 2009), 1-1.

³⁰ Ibid., 3-14 to 3-15.

³¹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 10.

³² U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-28 (Revised Final Draft Version 6), *Civil Support Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 23 November 2009), 1-11.

participating organization while harnessing seamless coordination across jurisdictions in support of common objectives. FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, defines unity of effort as coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, even if the forces are not necessarily part of the same command structure.³³ Within domestic civil support operations, military forces operate in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental environment with emphasis on unity of effort. All responding agencies and organizations support the unified command without giving up individual agency authorities, responsibilities or accountability.³⁴ The sheer complexity of the domestic civil support operational environment and the nature of unified action create situations where the commander does not directly control all organizations in the operational area. Overall, commanders cooperate, negotiate, and build consensus to achieve unity of effort. Unity of effort relies on relationships built upon trust gained over time.

6. Capacity. Incidents must be managed at the lowest jurisdictional level and supported by additional capabilities when needed. All levels should be prepared to respond, anticipating resources that may be required. As incidents change in size, scope, and complexity, the response must adapt to meet requirements. The number, type, and sources of resources must be able to expand rapidly to meet needs associated with a given incident. The NRF's disciplined and coordinated process can provide for a rapid surge of resources from all levels of government, appropriately scaled to need.³⁵

³³ U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 6-0 (FM 6-0), *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2003), 2-7.

³⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-28 (Revised Final Draft Version 6), *Civil Support Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 23 November 2009), 2-3.

³⁵ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 10.

Each level of government maintains enough capability to carry out its legal responsibilities specified by law. Each has some reserve capacity to deal with situations out of the ordinary that occur within its jurisdiction. Only when the situation exceeds the capacity of that level of government does the next higher level of government intervene to provide support. The key players in this tiered response are local government, tribal government, state and territorial government, and the federal government. Acting at all levels, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and the private sector work closely with government in response to emergency.³⁶

Military forces are not organized or equipped to operate efficiently within the domestic environment, although they may be the most effective means of response early in an emergency. For example, a sapper engineer unit can remove enough debris to clear emergency routes, but a commercial construction company can usually do the job better, faster, and more cheaply when they arrive. In addition, they contribute to the economic recovery by putting local businesses and people back to work.³⁷

7. Support Status. DOD's ability to deploy supplies anywhere at any time and by any means ensures the effectiveness of disaster relief operations. Disaster response operations cannot succeed without sustainment. All disaster response operations depend on logistic and transportation capabilities. Major disasters render local capabilities dysfunctional. Commanders and units coordinate with their civilian counterparts at the local level.³⁸ The key is to conduct preparation and coordination

³⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-28 (Revised Final Draft Version 6), *Civil Support Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 23 November 2009), 1-2.

³⁷ Ibid., 1-12.

³⁸ Ibid., 3-22.

during Phase I, Shaping, where trusted relationships can be formed prior to a disaster response. The majority of missions given to Army forces in a disaster will stress the sustainment warfighting function. FM 3.0 defines the sustainment warfighting function as the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. The endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment. Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. In domestic civil support operations, the military's primary focus is not so much meeting its own sustainment needs, but instead meeting the needs of civil authorities whose own sustainment structures have been overwhelmed. Each civil support operational phase provides various levels and means of support to civil authorities. Efforts to rapidly improve civilian capabilities take on increased importance during Phase IV; Civil Support Operations. This phase includes rapid employment of DOD capabilities in support of civil authorities. As mentioned earlier, Phase IV ends when the supported Emergency Support Functions (ESF), a mechanism to group capabilities and resources into the functions that are most likely needed during actual or potential incidents where coordinated federal response is required, no longer require DOD support. The 15 ESFs are:

- Transportation,
- Communications,
- Public works and engineering,
- Firefighting,
- Emergency management,
- Mass care, housing, and human services,
- Resource support,
- Public health and services,
- Urban search and rescue,

- Oil and hazardous materials response,
- Agriculture and natural resources,
- Energy,
- Public safety,
- Long-term community recovery,
- External affairs.

Mission success will hinge upon the unit's ability to maintain its own Soldiers and operational equipment while simultaneously delivering personnel, medical support, basic life saving and sustaining supplies, and equipment.

8. Planning Effort. Planning for low-probability, high-consequence, scenarios is a Federal focus and complements a State, tribal, and local focus on more likely and frequently experienced smaller-scale events. Planning provides three principal benefits: (1) it allows jurisdictions to influence the course of events in an emergency by determining in advance the actions, policies, and processes that will be followed; (2) it guides other preparedness activities; and (3) it contributes to unity of effort by providing a common blueprint for activity in the event of an emergency. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) serve as a foundation for planning, resource management, capability development, public education, and training and exercises.³⁹ In planning for domestic civil support, support planners face ambiguities about how to prepare for and predict types of contingencies military forces will confront. US military forces are organized with personnel and equipment to perform specific functions, but also to support their own units.⁴⁰ Planning across the full

³⁹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 71-74.

⁴⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, JP 3-28, *Civil Support* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 14 September 2007), IV-1.

spectrum of operations is an inherent responsibility of every commander and leader of every level of government. Planning is specifically associated with two of the ESFs: (1) emergency management and (2) public safety and security. Civil support planning considerations include environmental considerations, force protection, duration and scope, facility requirements, and operations.⁴¹ FM 3-28 (Draft Version 6) makes available planning checklists by staff section to assist with initial planning and informing the military decision-making process.

9. Media. Modern news reporting provides valuable information to citizens before, during, and after a civil disaster or other civil support event. The news media are a key, independent asset that can assist or impede civil support. Local news organizations are interested in all phases of the actual disaster since they may have long-range, home-town concerns.⁴² Commanders and planners must conduct effective information operations to harness the instant, global access available through media to bolster various aspects of the other planning themes towards achieving the primary goals of saving lives, alleviating suffering, and protecting property. It is also important to showcase successes as they occur.⁴³ In the National Incident Management System (NIMS), public information refers to flexible processes, procedures, and systems used by incident managers to communicate timely, accurate, and accessible information about an incident to the public, responders, and additional stakeholders. In a large, multiagency incident response, the NIMS public information system includes a public information officer, a joint

⁴¹ Ibid., III-13.

⁴² U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-28 (Revised Final Draft Version 6), *Civil Support Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 23 November 2009), K-1-K-2.

⁴³ LTC David P. Cavaleri, Occasional Paper 7, *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations*, (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2005), 15.

information system, and a joint information center.⁴⁴ Media and community relations are captured in emergency support function #15 – External Affairs; however, leaders plan and conduct both internal and external information operations. Commanders, leaders, and Soldiers play a key role in information operations. “The actions of Soldiers on the ground communicate far more powerfully than other media.”⁴⁵

The previous overview of military civil support doctrine and civilian guidance identifies similarities and differences in preparing for and executing disaster response operations. To achieve effective integration of complementary interagency capabilities based on policy guidance and the commander’s concept of the operation, “leaders must possess broad knowledge to place military efforts in context and must be comfortable serving on civil military teams.”⁴⁶ Figure 3 showed where the both approaches overlap in time and effort. The major difference between the two broad approaches is the priority given at the local level, especially during preparation, or Phase I; Shaping. Civil authorities begin their planning and preparation efforts at the local (tactical equivalent) level whereas military doctrine is primarily focused at immediate response capacity at the operational (regional or state equivalent) level. These tensions will be addressed in more detail in subsequent sections. The nine planning themes provide a means of bringing these two approaches together during all phases of domestic civil support. The next section discusses the military’s response during the Hurricane Katrina disaster, particularly looking at events in Louisiana through the various lenses of the analytical questions presented in the first section of this paper.

⁴⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-28 (Revised Final Draft Version 6), *Civil Support Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 23 November 2009), 2-5.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 4-13

⁴⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Pamphlet 525-3-0 (TRADOC PAM 525-3-0), *The Army Capstone Concept, Operational Adaptability: Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict 2016-2028*, (Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, 21 December 2009), 22.

Military Response to the Hurricane Katrina Disaster

Units plan and prepare for offense, defense, and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan months before conducting large-scale operations. Commanders link training and resource requirements to these planned activities and future combat operations. Military leaders and civil authorities correctly assume these operations are of long duration and have the potential of lasting years into the future. This long term mind set and commitment guides decisions across all agencies and at all levels while exercising all instruments of national power.

In contrast, planning and preparation for civil support operations is not a specific training and resourcing priority for the military, especially the active component, at the tactical level. Offense, defense, and stability combat operations take precedence over civil support operations, particularly given the contemporary operational environment. The Army National Guard is the military's first responder when it comes to civil support operations. The federal government funds National Guard forces almost entirely. When not in a federal status, the National Guard chain of command begins with the governor and the adjutant general of the respective state or territory. This unique constitutional status causes friction between the National Guard's planning, training and resourcing priorities at a time when the National Guard has taken on larger responsibilities as an operational force conducting full spectrum operations outside of the United States.

“Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophic domestic emergency that, in its deaths and destruction, had many of the possible characteristics of future terrorist attacks, especially those that could occur simultaneously in different parts of the United States or involve the use of weapons of mass destruction.”⁴⁷ It provides a useful case study that will help further civil and

⁴⁷ Lynn E. Davis, *Hurricane Katrina Lessons for Army Planning and Operations*, Report sponsored by the United States Army under contract no. W74V8H-06-C-0001, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), xi.

military understanding of the problems that can arise during civil support operations. Such a case study will also help to determine how military forces might better prepare and respond at the tactical level to future domestic emergencies. Domestic emergencies begin and end at the local level with civil authorities in the lead and local citizens, not combatants, as the primary focus of effort.

Application of Doctrine and Planning Themes

Using a methodology based on a Combat Studies Institute publication concerning stability operations, the following vignettes provide a means to assess the relevance of current and emerging doctrine and the nine domestic civil support planning themes presented in the previous section.⁴⁸ An analysis is conducted by applying the analytical questions listed earlier to each unique situation in order to derive understanding of the operational environment. Each vignette is followed by a summary of relevant doctrine and planning themes along with training recommendations to improve domestic civil support operations and civil military relations at the local level.

The following vignettes were extracted from a much larger Combat Studies Institute case study published in 2009, titled *Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster*, by James A. Wombwell.⁴⁹ Much has been written about the successes and failures concerned with the Hurricane Katrina disaster response. However, from the military perspective, there is very little guidance concerning improvements in domestic civil support preparation and response at the local level.

⁴⁸ LTC David P. Cavaleri, Occasional Paper 7, *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations*, (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2005).

⁴⁹ James A. Wombwell, Occasional Paper 29, *Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster*, (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2009).

PREPARE

Colonel Barry Keeling, the Louisiana aviation officer responsible for organizing the state's aviation assets, began repositioning air assets on 27 August 2005 to protect them from the high winds Hurricane Katrina was expected to produce. He was unable to acquire enough hanger space at either the Baton Rouge or Hammond airports, so he negotiated for additional space in Beaumont and Houston, Texas. He also set up ground support, including heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) fuel tankers, at the Hammond, Louisiana, airport.

Keeling took several actions to prepare for the expected post-landfall search-and-rescue mission. First, he organized a roving helicopter cell, consisting of four UH-60 Blackhawk and two UH-1 Huey helicopters. The helicopters were relocated to Houston at 1500 on Sunday. They planned to return to Louisiana and commence search-and-rescue operations as soon as Hurricane Katrina's winds decreased to 45 knots (52 miles per hour), the level at which it was safe for the aircraft to fly.

Keeling also requested additional aviation assets from other states through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) on 26 August. He asked for two UH-60 helicopters with hoists and four CH-47 helicopters along with aviation maintenance support.



PREPARE

While Keeling organized the state's aviation assets, other National Guard forces implemented the state's emergency response plan. They positioned high-water vehicles, boats, engineering equipment, supplies, and other assets throughout the state. Aviation liaison officers deployed to 13 parishes where they provided advice to local officials on how to best use National Guard aircraft for search-and-rescue missions. Engineers from the 225th Engineer Group, along with OH-58 Kiowa helicopters, helped the Louisiana state police evacuate the southernmost parishes and the greater New Orleans area.

Despite the short amount of notice, the Louisiana National Guard did take measures to shape the environment and prepare for immediate response once the winds fell and air search-and-rescue operations could commence. By deploying ahead of the storm and partnering with local, state, and regional civilian and military agencies, prepositioning of critical resources enabled a unified effort before, during, and after the storm hit Louisiana. As these planning and operational efforts were underway, the media provided instructions to the populace at-large on where to seek safety and assistance from various local agencies and how to cooperate with the civil and military preparation efforts. At this point, it should have been noticed that a large portion of the community that did not evacuate prior to the storm was unwilling for lack of resources or physically unable to evacuate. Such a large mass of people left behind would ultimately overwhelm the local and the state government's capacity to provide security and basic services in the first few days following the disaster.

Planning Themes:

Readiness, Partnership, Understanding, Unity of Effort, Planning Effort

Doctrinal Linkages:

Shaping, Staging, Deployment, Prepare

Tactical Training Recommendation:

- ID alternate equipment staging sites and conduct movement exercises along various routes
- Organize an annual meeting with city and county leaders to build local relationships with the goal of understanding each other's existing capabilities and support requirements during a most likely and most dangerous event
- Participate in civilian sponsored emergency planning exercises at the local level. Invite civilian leaders to tactical exercises. Exchange of liaison officers is key to establishing long term relationships among the leaders
- Ensure individual Soldiers participate in civilian led first responder training and exercises. Key areas are search-and-rescue, evacuation, medical treatment, food distribution, damage assessment, safeguarding persons and property, removing debris

Tactical military first responders must gain an appreciation of the benefits of planning and preparation beyond the typical crisis-specific military preparation activities occurring hours or days before a disaster. The National Guard, because of its local presence across the nation, is in a unique position to leverage Phase I, Shaping, by improving long term civil military relations throughout the year and participating in emergency first response training and development with local civil authorities.

STAGING

The Louisiana Special Response Team conducted a reconnaissance of the Superdome early Saturday morning, anticipating that it would be responsible for providing security there the next day. Army National Guard troops began flowing into the Superdome Sunday morning, 28 August. Forty-six members of the Special Response Team arrived at 0700 hours. The Louisiana Army and Air National Guard also sent substantial medical contingents.

To assist with security, 220 Soldiers from the 225th Engineer Group also deployed to the Superdome. The Air Guard sent 100 security personnel to the Superdome as well. Later in the day, TF *Castle* sent a six-person forward operations element to the Superdome to provide command and control of the security forces

When the city of New Orleans opened the Superdome as a special needs shelter at 1000 Sunday morning, 28 August, there were more than 450 Louisiana National Guard security and medical personnel in place. Critical care patients began arriving almost immediately. By the end of the day, National Guard medical personnel had more than 500 patients under their care. Thousands of people converged on the Superdome after city officials opened it to all citizens as a “shelter of last resort” at noon on Sunday. As people waited in line, Soldiers conducted security checks at the access points to weed out contraband and weapons.



STAGING

By 1700, more than 2,500 citizens self-evacuated to the Superdome, many of whom brought their own food and water. Conditions at the Superdome were satisfactory at that point in time—there were lights, running water, working toilets, and air conditioning. National Guard Soldiers delivered 9,792 meals, ready to eat (MREs), and 13,440 one-liter bottles of water late Sunday afternoon. That brought the total number of MREs pre-staged at the Superdome to 43,776 and the liters of water to 90,000, so leaders at the Superdome thought they had plenty of food and water.



Although recent national and regional exercises were based on scenarios of similar scope, very few had been built around a local interagency response where multiple emergency management systems collapsed simultaneously. During Phase II and III, Staging and Deployment, the military's capacity to deliver support across the emergency support functions was critical in filling the vacuum of unmet basic services typically provided by local civil authorities. Additional support is delivered through coordination and cooperation with civil authorities and various agencies based on proper understanding of the situation and stated objectives. Unified effort was hampered mostly due to differences in approaches between agencies and a lack of unified command at various levels. Differences were, and continue to be,

rooted in organizational culture, mind set, and training. Due to the complex nature of the operational environment, poorly defined information requirements and knowledge management led to incomplete or poorly understood assessments. Operational and tactical units had a limited understanding of how the local environment was rapidly deviating from what was expected. Leaders failed to connect the negative environmental changes to relevant response actions. As the human and infrastructure problems began to overwhelm local, state, and national response capabilities, the media and the public at large began to ask why local help was not more responsive given the dire circumstances at hand.

Planning Themes:

Support Status, Capacity, Understanding, Unity of Effort

Doctrinal Linkages:

Staging, Deployment, Civil Support Operations, Prepare

Tactical Training Recommendation:

- Conduct local reconnaissance of primary and alternate emergency facilities. Assess the location and organic tactical capabilities which support security, medical, evacuation, and supply distribution operations
- Conduct monthly site visits to local special needs centers to gain understanding and appreciation of the amount and types of specific medical equipment and training needed if these institutions are forced to evacuate large numbers of patients with little notice.

Planning Themes:

Support Status, Capacity, Understanding, Unity of Effort

Doctrinal Linkages:

Staging, Deployment, Civil Support Operations, Prepare

Tactical Training Recommendation (continued):

- Participate in civilian sponsored training exercises, specifically local law enforcement, to gain individual and organizational skills related to search and seizure of illegal contraband and weapons
- Enable Soldiers to understand the tactics, techniques, and procedures associated with mass distribution of humanitarian supplies. Coordination and liaison with local non-government organizations, such as the local American Red Cross, Salvation Army, and non-profit organizations, should be ongoing to foster working relationships prior to an event. Understanding each other's standard operation procedures is critical to ensuring unity of effort.

RESPOND

Another challenge that complicated the mission at the Superdome was the prevalence of wild rumors. As Major Edward M. Bush, a Louisiana National Guard public affairs officer, described it: “the Superdome itself was its own little microcosm. . . . A lot of them [evacuees] had AM radios, and they would listen to news reports that talked about the ‘dead bodies at the Superdome’ and the ‘murders in the bathrooms of the Superdome,’ and the ‘babies being raped at the Superdome,’ and it would create terrible panic.” Although Bush was originally assigned to the Superdome to deal with the media, his job soon morphed into disseminating information to the evacuees and squashing rumors that were causing unrest and undue concern. Bush recalled that he and two other Soldiers walked around the Superdome constantly making announcements to keep everyone informed of the situation as best they could. When people approached him with wild stories, he asked them questions until they realized that they were reacting to unfounded rumors.



RESPOND

With the crowds gone, all that remained in the Superdome were mounds of trash and the echoes of what had transpired there. The numerous media reports of murder and rape at the Superdome were, in retrospect, overblown. None of the six people who died at the Superdome were victims of crime. Colonel Patrick Santos, a Louisiana Army National Guard officer present at the Superdome, offered this explanation of why there was so little violence at the Superdome, despite the massive influx of people into the building. He said, “The only reason things did not get totally out of hand was that the National Guard represented a force in being, since the New Orleans Police Department was under-represented.” National Guard Soldiers continued to operate out of the Superdome for several more days before they, too, moved on to other missions.



Once the immediate search-and-rescue efforts were beginning to subside, civil authorities and military units transitioned the majority of their efforts and resources into Phase IV, Civil Support Operations. The threat of the storm had passed, but surprises presented themselves on a regular basis as the response system wrestled with returning a sense of security and normalcy to what was by all accounts a chaotic situation. Media flocked to New Orleans to report on the largest domestic disaster response operation in United States history. This was expected, but

poorly planned at the tactical level. Leaders must not leave to chance information operations and media engagements in an environment where rumors are cause for panic. Units must conduct specific domestic civil support training on a regular basis with local media and regional outlets. Military media engagement training is one of the few core competencies that carry across all elements of full spectrum operations. Instant messaging on a global scale is part of today's operational environment. It is incumbent on the military commander to leverage this capability towards reaching local objectives. Soldiers committed to the primary purpose of saving lives, alleviating suffering, and protecting people and property in reaching local objectives send the strongest message.

Planning Themes:

Partnership, Media

Doctrinal Linkages:

Civil Support Operations, Local Transition, Respond

Tactical Training Recommendation:

- Schedule regular interactions between the local media, Soldiers, and tactical units.
- Media training should not be limited to specific MOSs and key leaders. All Soldiers need to know how to effectively communicate to enable mission success.
- Require small unit leaders to attend local speaking engagements to large groups of people.

Planning Themes:

Partnership, Media

Doctrinal Linkages:

Civil Support Operations, Local Transition, Respond

Tactical Training Recommendation (continued):

- When dealing with the media or large crowds, training must ensure Soldiers are:
 - Prepared** with anticipated questions, talking points, and a brief 20-30 second message that encapsulates the relevant issues from the military perspective
 - Comfortable** with public speaking and interviews by having a clear knowledge of the issue and all sides of it
 - Positive** delivery of the message by speaking in complete sentences using proper nouns, not repeating negative phrases or rumors, communicating what is known versus what is not known.

Prepare tactical units to transition between high OPTEMPO missions to relief-in-place / transfer-of-control as local civilian authorities return isolated areas of the disaster region back to normal use. This type of local transition is similar to Phase V, Transition, in civil support operations. However, this is a local redeployment within the affected area versus marking an overall end of military support to the entire civil support operation. Military forces remain committed to conducting civil support operations until local civilian authorities are capable of assuming responsibility.

RESPOND

The Mayor of New Orleans, Ray Nagin, opened the Convention Center to citizens on Tuesday as an alternative to the Superdome, no stockpiles of food or water were in place, no National Guard troops were onsite to provide security, and no medical personnel were there to provide medical support to the hundreds in need of assistance.

The situation at the Convention Center clearly illustrates the lack of situational awareness leaders had to deal with. Brigadier General Gary L. Jones, commander of Task Force *Pelican*, recalled that he knew nothing about the situation at the Convention Center until Wednesday, 31 August, when a reconnaissance patrol reported that 15,000 or more people were congregating there. He quickly passed that information on to Louisiana Adjutant General, Major General Bennett C. Landreneau. With available military assets stretched to the limit, and no request from the city or state for assistance, Landreneau told Jones to stick to the mission at the Superdome. This was an important, ultimately bad, decision since it doomed those people seeking refuge at the Convention Center to several more days of hardship.

With no food, water, or security, the situation at the Convention Center was grim. It turned into “a living hell that became the symbol of all that went wrong in Katrina’s aftermath.” There were media reports of gunfire, sexual assaults, and robberies. There were reports of 30 to 40 bodies stored in a freezer at the Convention Center, including a 7-year-old girl whose throat had been cut. Most, if not all, of these wild rumors were untrue. Although there was a small local police presence at the Convention Center, the police officers were quickly overwhelmed and retreated from the building.



RESPOND

There was, however, a substantial contingent of National Guard troops at the Convention Center. More than 200 engineers from the 528th Engineer Battalion arrived there on Sunday. They intended to use the Convention Center as a staging area for engineering missions after the hurricane passed. The obvious need of the thousands of people stranded there put the engineers in a predicament. Although they were physically in a position to help, the engineers were not trained in crowd control and the limited amount of food, water, and other supplies they had on hand was not sufficient to provide for the thousands of people congregating at the Convention Center. With no orders to the contrary, the engineers stuck to their assigned mission. Over the next few days, they conducted search-and-rescue missions, removed debris, cleared roads, and repaired a breach on the west side of the 17th Street Levee. The battalion also sent out assessment teams to outlying parishes to determine what assistance, if any, those parishes needed.

The situation at the Convention Center grew worse and worse over the next four days as rescuers dropped off more and more people there, which was one of the highest points in the city. Little in the way of food or water came along with the influx of people plucked from the flooded city. The police brought in some water and there were several other deliveries by air, but overall, the amount of supplies delivered there was wholly inadequate. The only food the evacuees received in the 3 days following the storm came from looters who broke into stores in the neighborhood. By Friday, nearly 20,000 people were stuck at the Convention Center awaiting rescue.

RESPOND

Despite all, most people were genuinely glad to see the National Guard. The comments of one woman, who said, “I feel great to see the military here. I know I’m saved,” summed up the attitude of many survivors of the Convention Center debacle. With order restored, food and water was quickly distributed to everyone there. The next day, Lieutenant Colonel Jacques Thibodeaux, commander of the Louisiana Special Response Team, coordinated the evacuation of some 19,000 people from the Convention Center to other sites in Northern Louisiana, and Texas. From 1000 to 1830 hours, 14,000 people had left by bus, 2,000 departed by ferry, and 3,000 critical care patients were flown out by helicopter.

The lack of awareness about the situation there represents the worst-case scenario for the relief operation. Although the mayor opened the center as a place of refuge, he neglected to inform anyone at the state Emergency Operations Center that he had done so. The rescue workers dropping people off there either did not inform their chain of command that they were doing so or the information got lost in confusion and chaos of those first few days after the storm. The New Orleans Police Department was obviously aware of the situation since it dispatched police officers there on Wednesday and dropped off water on several other occasions. But once again, it is not clear that they passed that information along to either the city or state Emergency Operations Center. Even though the engineers from the 528th Engineer Battalion were aware of the situation, they apparently did not inform their chain of command either, since General Jones did not find out about the people congregating at the Convention Center until Wednesday. Even then, Jones did not send assistance because his troops were stretched thin by their current missions. The only people who seemed aware of the situation were the media. When FEMA Director Michael Brown told Ted Koppel on *Nightline* Thursday night that he just learned about the situation at the Convention Center that day, Koppel pointedly asked if FEMA officials watched television because, he said, the media reported the situation days earlier.

Soldiers on the ground must understand what normal looks like and what to do when tensions and opportunities present themselves. The example above is a clear indication of the loss of unity of effort due to a series of misunderstandings and not initiating relevant actions in the face of changing local circumstances. The mere presence of the National Guard provided a sense of security where none was planned. Timely and relevant feedback, ongoing assessments, and regular media engagements will inform ongoing operations at the tactical level while enabling unity of effort and proper allocation of capacity where it is most needed. All stakeholders, according to Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré, commander of Joint Task Force *Katrina*, should avoid becoming “stuck on stupid!”⁵⁰

Planning Themes:

Understanding, Unity of Effort, Planning Effort, Capacity, Security, Media

Doctrinal Linkages:

Civil Support Operations, Local Transition, Respond

Tactical Training Recommendation:

- Soldiers and units should be trained in reporting procedures which link observations in the field to the military and civilian incident commander’s critical information requirements. Leaders must be able to gain understanding in a timely manner in order to direct resources accordingly. When changes in the environment and the problem situation occur, relevant and reflective action must follow to address the realities of the situation. Developing a robust set of atmospherics which are relevant at the tactical level is critical to the reporting process.

⁵⁰ Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré (U.S. Army, retired), *Survival: How a culture of preparedness can save you and your family from disasters* (New York: Atria Books, 2009), 57.

Planning Themes:

Understanding, Unity of Effort, Planning Effort, Capacity, Security, Media

Doctrinal Linkages:

Civil Support Operations, Local Transition, Respond

Tactical Training Recommendation (continued):

- Participate in updates to the local emergency management plan and provide ongoing input towards its development. When event-driven changes to the plan occur, planners and responders are then familiar with the original concept of support from which they can now reframe the environment, problem, and range of solutions to effectively tackle surprises.
- Conduct knowledge management and effective communication training at all levels and across agencies. Exercises should require Soldiers and units to use multiple reporting requirements that support the local incident commander as well as the military chain of command.
- Civilian and military emergency operations centers should ensure that the reporting process is two-way communication between the sender and the receiver. Timely and relevant feedback will inform ongoing operations at the tactical level while enabling unity of effort.

RECOVER

When Hurricane Katrina hit, almost 6,000 National Guardsmen were on state active duty in Louisiana. Three days later, the total number of Guardsmen from various states and Louisiana doubled to more than 12,000 (figure 10). The initial focus of the Louisiana Soldiers was rescuing people in New Orleans and the surrounding parishes, clearing primary roads of debris, and delivering relief supplies to those in need. As the number of troops in the state increased, the National Guard took on additional tasks. National Guard Soldiers conducted house-by-house searches in New Orleans and, later on, in outlying parishes by both boat and on foot; helped the New Orleans Police Department restore order in the city; established relief distribution points; and cleared debris from public buildings and roadways.

Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) was managed by TF *Belle Chasse*. There were two RSOI sites. The headquarters for TF *Belle Chasse* was at Belle Chasse Naval Air Station in suburban New Orleans. Those National Guardsmen who flew into New Orleans in-processed at that site while those who arrived by ground convoy in-processed at England Air Force Base near Alexandria.

Texas also provided a large contingent of ground troops to the relief effort in Louisiana. By Saturday, 3 September, more than 1,300 Guardsmen were in Louisiana helping that state's citizens recover from the storm. Four days later, that number swelled to 2,100. The first task force from Texas left on Wednesday, 31 August, and arrived in New Orleans the next day. That task force brought with it a broad range of capabilities, including some 300 military police; a medical unit with 5 doctors, 10 nurses, 30 physician's assistants; and 30 medics, 120 engineers, a water purification detachment, fuel tankers, and more than 50 high-water vehicles. Initially, they went to the Louis Armstrong International Airport where they helped with the evacuation process by providing security, medical attention, and other support to those passing through the airport.

RECOVER

Some of the Texas military police helped with crowd control and the evacuation of both the Superdome and the Convention Center. The medical team proceeded to the Convention Center as well, where medics provided on-the-spot medical evaluations and treatment for citizens stranded there for days after flood waters swamped the city. Following the main evacuation effort, the medical team remained at the Convention Center where it continued to provide medical support to citizens who trickled in. Other Texas Soldiers provided humanitarian support throughout the city and assisted with cleanup operations at city schools, hospitals, and other locations. On 19 September, when it appeared that Hurricane Rita posed a significant threat to his state, Governor Rick Perry recalled all Texas personnel from Louisiana to prepare his state for that hurricane.

By the end of the first week, the tide began to turn in Louisiana. Although rescue operations continued, everyone who sought refuge at the Superdome and Convention Center had been evacuated, and thousands of National Guard and Active-Duty troops were beginning to pour into the state in what became the largest domestic deployment of forces since the American Civil War. At the peak, more than 72,000 Active, Reserve, and National Guard personnel participated in the Hurricane Katrina relief effort. The military response was truly a joint effort—not only was every service involved, but every state sent forces as well. The US military rescued people in need, provided critically needed humanitarian aid, and set the conditions for restoration of life in the region.




Figure 10. National Guard response to Hurricane Katrina.



Planning Themes:

Readiness, Partnership, Unity of Effort, Capacity, Planning Effort

Doctrinal Linkages:

Staging, Deployment, Transition, Recover

Tactical Training Recommendation:

- Conduct relief-in-place and transfer-of-responsibility training at the lowest level, especially between military and civilian field operators and first responders. Periods of transition are ripe with opportunities and tensions. If not handled properly or executed prematurely, then civilian authorities may not be successful in reaching local objectives as quickly as possible.
- All Army National Guard brigades should include Civil Support Operations in their C-METL to emphasize unique individual and collective training at the tactical level not tied directly to core competencies. Liaison training is only one component. Military and civilian local first responders must train together on a regular basis to develop and update local standard operating procedures which emphasize and rehearse civilian authorities in the lead role.
- Conduct redeployment training which distinguishes between local transitions within the disaster area, and transitions out of the disaster area at the end of the operation. In both cases civilian authorities resume a level of control and responsibility of the local environment. Soldiers must remain adaptive and flexible at all times when required to shift resources in order to provide capacity where local authorities lack it. Until such time, the military is committed to the goals and missions in support of a unified effort to restore normalcy.

The military must be prepared to Transition, civil support Phase V, with little notice between all elements of full spectrum operations. All Soldiers, and specifically the National Guard, must be trained to conduct combat operations one day and domestic civil support the next. Local transitions also occur during the disaster response, as evidenced by the recall of the Texas National Guard personnel from Louisiana back to Texas to prepare for Hurricane Rita. In order to effect a smooth transition, relying on core competency training is not enough. Soldiers must be trained in specific domestic civil support tasks at the tactical level in partnership with local first responders and civil authorities. National Guard and Active Component commanders and planners at the operational and tactical levels must define partnership and readiness based on longer time frames which recognize the lead role of civil authorities. “Straightforward command relationships rarely exist, and the greater number and variety of participating agencies, the greater the risk of misunderstanding and disputes.”⁵¹ By building trusting and familiar working relations throughout the year, commanders, planners, and first responders will begin to understand the critical “pre-existing societal dynamics as well as identify the key social and political players who might factor into their plans” at the local level.⁵² Civil military relations and civil support operations will improve and unity of effort achieved if the interagency gap is closed at the local level during all phases of disaster response.

The next section presents a review of the current military perspective of civil support operations, recommends an improved perspective which incorporates the nine domestic civil support planning themes presented in this paper, and identifies ways to close the interagency gap that exists at the local level.

⁵¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, Version 3.0 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 15 January 2009), 20.

⁵² LTC David P. Cavaleri, Occasional Paper 7, *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations*, (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2005), 52.

Improving Civil Support Operations at the Local Level

*After returning to its home station following service in Joint Task Force Katrina, one unit reported that its “staff lacked a general familiarization with civilian disaster response organizations.” The staff officer who trains for and participates in combat operations will experience culture shock when involved in responding to a major domestic catastrophe. He will see a seemingly amorphous array of individuals and organizations from all levels and corners of government, nongovernmental organizations, and private volunteer organizations, all employed in providing disaster relief, though often not working together in a coordinated manner. The staff officer will quickly learn that lack of knowledge slows the unit’s response and leads to duplication of effort.*⁵³

Colonel Lawrence H. Saul
Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned

This chapter provides an environmental perspective of current and improved civil support operations and associated recommendations to close the interagency gap at the local level. Army civil support operations are part of a tiered government response guided by law, national policy, and joint directives. To a much greater degree than found in operations conducted outside the United States, legal restrictions affect the employment of military forces. Various laws restrict the Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Marine Corps from performing some missions. The National Guard has greater latitude, when serving under its Governor in accordance with federal and state laws. However, certain fundamental principles guide military support regardless of component.⁵⁴

Current Civil Support: Operational, Respond, Regional

“The National Guard, the nation’s community-based force, will always answer the call of the President and the Governors.”⁵⁵ This statement from the National Guard Bureau’s 2010 Posture Statement continues to send the same message; assuming general availability, the National Guard is focused at the national and state level when it comes to readiness and deployment. However, in the same document, the ARNG correctly points out its importance to

⁵³ Center for Army Lessons Learned, Handbook 06-08, *Catastrophic Disaster Response Staff Officer’s Handbook*, (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 2006), Forward.

⁵⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-28 (Revised Final Draft Version 6), *Civil Support Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 23 November 2009), 1-1.

⁵⁵ U.S. National Guard Bureau, *2010 Posture Statement: America’s Indispensable Force*, (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2009), 7.

the local community, having a local presence in over 3000 communities across the nation and US territories.




Figure 5: Army National Guard Locations⁵⁶

The current focus of military doctrine and resourcing is at the operational level.⁵⁷ As such, the Army, both active and reserve component, takes an operational approach towards full spectrum operations, to include domestic civil support operations. Units rely upon doctrine, training, tactics, techniques and procedures gained from current offense, defense, and stability overseas operations to meet the requirements of domestic civil support operations. Many times, core competencies are inappropriately applied in a complex domestic joint, interagency, intergovernmental operational environment for which they were never directly intended. The military relies upon established relationships at the national and state level to provide sufficient and immediate disaster response capacity across the various emergency support functions in the joint operations area during planning and preparation of civil support. With the exception of a few major population centers, the military currently does not have ongoing emergency

⁵⁶ U.S. Army National Guard, *Footprint of the Army National Guard*, [online news publication]; available from <http://www.arng.mil/news/publications/pages/default.aspx>; Internet; accessed 06 December 2009.

⁵⁷ Justin Kelly and Michael J. Brennan, "The Leavenworth Heresy and the Perversion of Operational Art," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, #56, 1st Quarter 2012, 109-116.

management relationships with civil authorities at the local level. The DOD typically conducts domestic civil support with a short term (30 to 90-day) perspective, mostly as a result of the need to transfer control and responsibility back to local civil authorities as soon as possible. At the tactical level, there is no emphasis on preparing for domestic civil support operations. Figure 6 depicts the current operational, regional focus overly reliant on inappropriately applied core competencies. Feedback to the various stakeholders is misunderstood because it discounts the need for tactical and local disaster response preparation.




Figure 6: Operational and regional focus, reliant on core competencies

Civilian emergency management begins at the local level with local first responders. Civil authorities are usually in the lead role during all phases (Prepare, Respond, and Recover) of disaster response. The bottom-driven National Incident Management System, which includes the Incident Command System, and the National Response Framework mandate the civilian leadership role. One or more incident commanders, depending on the size of the disaster area, are responsible for directing resources and efforts where most needed in order to return stability to the area and community. If the situation overwhelms a community's existing local capacity to

respond effectively, requests for assistance are submitted to the next higher level of government until enough response capacity is temporarily provided.

Improved Civil Support: Tactical, Prepare, Local

By enabling an approach that is tactical and local during Phase I, Shaping, the military will begin to establish critical relationships with local civil authorities far in advance of when disasters actually occur. As shown in Figure 7, the nine domestic civil support planning themes provide a framework which properly aligns military doctrine, training, tactics, techniques and procedures with civilian guidance within the complex domestic joint operational environment at the local level.




Figure 7: Tactical and local focus reliant on specific civil support preparation

Armed with an appropriate organizational and individual perspective, commanders and planners can specifically prepare for and conduct domestic civil support operations focused on local goals and objectives. The result is a unified effort utilizing a specifically trained joint force postured to conduct effective domestic civil support operations at the tactical level. Improved civil military relations will result from the necessary ongoing and habitual relationships at the

local level through means of joint, interagency, intergovernmental emergency management preparation and planning. When a disaster does occur, a base of understanding will already exist amongst the local stakeholders and first responders so that confusion and inefficiency is avoided during the vital first few hours of the disaster response.

Closing the Interagency Gap at the Local Level

To improve domestic civil support operations and civil military relations at the local level, three things must occur to close the interagency gap: (1) military commanders and planners, especially those in the National Guard, must prioritize domestic civil support preparation at the local level, (2) operational and tactical military organizations must decrease their current reliance on core competency training and non-domestic experiences and increase interagency, domestic civil support specific training at the tactical level, and (3) the Department of Defense must view domestic civil support operations from a long term, local partnership perspective.



Figure 8: Bridging the gap between current and improved civil support operations

Conclusion

“Get those damn weapons down!” I shouted to the Soldiers in the first truck. “Hey! Weapons down! Weapons down, damn it! Put the weapons down!” I felt justified ordering those National Guard Soldiers, even though I did not command them, to put down their weapons. I wanted the crowd to know we were there to help and did not consider them dangerous.⁵⁸

Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré
Commander, Joint Task Force – Katrina

Despite the US military’s rich history of providing domestic disaster response, it continues to exhibit a culture of avoiding operations other than war.

As useful as the concept of “operations other than war” might have been in designing a post-cold war raison d’être for the army or in guaranteeing continued funding from Congress, there is absolutely no place in FM 100-5 [now FM 3.0] for the intricacies of hurricane relief or the details of the 1991 antimeningitis campaign in the Cameroons. There are plenty of other organizations that do that sort of work, and probably do it better than the army.⁵⁹

The reality of the situation is that there are no other organizations that can provide the immediate response capacity and support capabilities better than the Army. As long as national and state policies, combined with joint and service specific doctrine, mandate that the military maintain such critical capabilities, it is the responsibility of all commanders and planners to allocate resources and efforts across all phases of civil support. Based on existing and emerging civilian and military guidance and the certainty of future disasters, natural or manmade, there is no mistaking that domestic civil support requires just as much, if not more, preparation and planning as the other elements of full spectrum operations.

One main question presents itself concerning the nine domestic civil support planning themes presented in this paper. Are they as applicable to future domestic civil support operations

⁵⁸ Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré (U.S. Army, retired), *Survival: How a culture of preparedness can save you and your family from disasters* (New York: Atria Books, 2009), 132.

⁵⁹ Robert M. Citino, *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 294.

as they were during the military's disaster response to Hurricane Katrina? The answer is yes if commanders and planners keep the following points in mind.

First, depending on the situation, there is no doubt that some themes will be more important than others. The three planning themes that are most critical are readiness, unity of effort, and understanding. By keeping these three themes at the forefront, leaders will consider the other six themes during all phases of disaster response, across all of the emergency support functions, and at all levels of government. Commanders and planners must consider first, second, and third-order effects in terms of readiness, unity of effort, and understanding at the local level.

Second, in applying the nine planning themes, leaders must appreciate the fact that "the enemy" in disaster response is time and inefficiency. Local US citizens comprise the names on the casualty list at the end of the day. Because of these unique environmental conditions and social dynamics, it is important to remember that the military "leads from behind" during civil support. By improving local civil military relationships throughout the year, gaining an understanding of the environment will take less time, preparation and conduct of domestic civil support becomes more efficient, and associated casualties are significantly reduced.

Third, the nine planning themes are interrelated and meant to be applied in a holistic and synergistic approach preferably by a joint, interagency, intergovernmental disaster response team specifically trained to conduct domestic civil support. The vignettes of the military disaster response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted the need to link the various planning themes to civilian and military guidance and tactical training at the local level.

The Army responded to the crisis in a timely although ultimately inadequate manner. The response was timely because National Guard troops were in place in numbers before the storm hit. If Hurricane Katrina had been a normal storm, the response more than likely would have been sufficient. But this was not a normal storm, so the initial response fell short of what was needed, and many citizens suffered accordingly. Once Army leaders understood that both states

needed more help, they inundated both states with relief personnel, aircraft, and equipment.⁶⁰

Looking to the future, the 2009 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations lists the following precepts, which underlie future joint operations.⁶¹

- Achieve and maintain unity of effort within the joint force and between the joint force and U.S. government, international, and other partners.
- Plan for and manage operational transitions over time and space.
- Focus on operational objectives whose achievement suggests the broadest and most enduring results.
- Combine joint capabilities to maximize complimentary rather than merely additive effects.
- Avoid combining capabilities where doing so adds complexity without compensating advantage.
- Drive synergy to the lowest echelon at which it can be managed effectively.
- Operate indirectly through partners to the extent that each situation permits.
- Ensure operational freedom of action.
- Maintain operational and organizational flexibility.
- Inform domestic audiences and influence the perceptions and attitudes of key foreign audiences as an explicit and continuous operational requirement.

When preparing for and conducting domestic civil support, these operational precepts, combined with the nine planning themes and recommendations presented in this paper, must be considered in the context of the goals and objectives established by local civil authorities. Military

⁶⁰ James A. Wombwell, Occasional Paper 29, *Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster*, (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2009), 205-206

⁶¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, Version 3.0 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 15 January 2009), 21.

commanders must be able to “tolerate a certain degree of ambiguity and inefficiency as the price of successful cross-agency collaboration. They likewise must allocate sufficient resources and effort to overcoming this challenge. Effectiveness therefore will put a premium on close and continuous liaison and communications.”⁶² Although the Army, and specifically the National Guard, is more fully engaged in full spectrum operations throughout the world than ever before, it is the local community who will have to live with the long term consequences of domestic disaster response.

Analyzing potential interagency domestic disaster response training exercise modifications from the current regional focus used by FEMA, USNORTHCOM, and the National Guard to a local, community-based focus presents one area of further study. Another area of interest would be an analysis of state-sponsored potential modifications to brigade-level and below unit training requirements. In both cases, the purpose of the modifications would be to improve domestic civil support at the tactical level by developing ongoing, local civil military partnerships in a whole-of-government approach to emergency management preparation utilizing the nine domestic civil support planning themes.

⁶² Ibid., 20.

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