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COMMUNIST CHINA: SIGNIFICANT TRENDS

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Communist China: Significant Trends

by

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SUMMARY

In the Far East today Communist China, Soviet Russia, and the United States form a power triangle. Each power has objectives in the area which are in conflict with those of the others. These conflicts are finding expression in the war in Vietnam which is more and more becoming a test of the ability of China, Russia, and the United States to project power and influence. Because the war is viewed by the other countries of Southeast Asia as a symbol of the resolve of the United States to protect them from China and a test for its containment of China policy, the war becomes one which the U.S. feels it cannot afford to lose. Because Vietnam is a key in China's drive for power in Asia, a key for a coalition of Asian Communist parties, and a key in China's effort for influence in the "third world," China cannot afford a defeat in Vietnam. For Russia, the war is becoming a struggle with China for influence in the Communist world, a struggle which Russia will strive to win. Therefore, factors which will lead to escalation of the war are present.

China wants to expel the U.S. from Asia and to establish Asian hegemony. Vietnam is a first step in achieving this long range objective. China is also threatening Thailand, India, and Malaysia with wars of liberation similar to Vietnam. She is maintaining large armed forces, is developing nuclear weapons, and trying to modernize her industry. The equipment of her armed forces is obsolete and she suffers from lack of strategic mobility and her transportation system and industry is vulnerable to air attack. China is, however, able to field a formidable armed force on the mainland of Asia but cannot now project power beyond the periphery of China.

China is engaged in a worldwide struggle with Russia for leadership of the Communist nations. She is contesting Russian influence in Vietnam, in Africa, and in Latin America. She has accused Russia of half-hearted support to North Vietnam and of conspiring with the United States to encircle China. Relations between China and Russia appear to be near a formal break.

There appears to be no reasons to expect China's objectives to change when China's aged leaders are replaced since these objectives are mainly nationalistic and involve security of China's borders. The United States is blocking the realization of Chinese aspirations to the South, in Taiwan and in Korea. Conflicts between China and the U.S. are likely to continue after conclusion of the war in Vietnam.

Despite set-backs during 1965, China's policy of supporting wars of national liberation is being maintained and is the basis

of her ideological split with Russia. Diplomatic set-backs, loss of influence, feelings of encirclement, and isolation, and reports of unrest among Army personnel have resulted in some degree of withdrawal and internal preoccupation at the beginning of 1966.

COMMUNIST CHINA: SIGNIFICANT TRENDS

In the Far East today Communist China, the USSR and the United States form a power triangle. Japan, although possessing significant power, does not seem likely to have a military role in any conflict on the mainland of Asia because of the anti-war sentiments of her people and the no-war provisions of her constitution. India may become a factor in the power equation if China continues to press her territorial claims along India's northern frontier. The dominant roles, however, will continue to be played by the three major powers whose objectives in Asia are in conflict. The apex of the power triangle now obviously is Vietnam where the determination of the three powers to achieve their objectives is being tested. And in the future each power will maintain careful surveillance of the other two powers' capabilities, changes in capabilities and intentions; and each will guide its own actions according to its estimates of these power factors.

BASIS OF THE CONFLICT

The foremost Chinese objective is to drive the United States from the Asian mainland and expel American influence from the offshore islands between Japan and the Philippines. Another objective is to reestablish the borders of China to include the territory that once belonged to her. Restoration of these borders would bring Chinese territory **approximately** to that held during

the 18th century Manchu Dynasty.¹ This objective, along with her concept of national security, is manifested in her current efforts to subvert Nepal and Bhutan, in her designs on Outer Mongolia, and in her efforts to achieve hegemony over southeast Asia. The United States opposes China's expansionist ambitions since they can be achieved only through subjugation of other Asian nations by force. The U.S. therefore is following a policy of containment of China in her present borders. The U.S. policy originated with President Truman's enunciation of the "Truman Doctrine" in 1947 when he said: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." His policy has been followed by all American presidents since that time and is the main reason the U.S. maintains a string of bases which form an arc along the rim of Asia. The U.S. has the corollary objective of the creation of military and economic stability and progress in Asia.

The Soviet Union is vying with the Chinese for influence among the Asian nations and for leadership of the Communist world. The Russians are particularly sensitive to Chinese designs on territory now a part of the Soviet Union which formerly was a part of China. And Russia does not want to be drawn into a nuclear war with the United States as a result of Chinese adventurism in Asia,

¹China's borders then penetrated deeply into what is now Soviet territory, both on the west and beyond the Amur River to the north. Manchu China encompassed all of Mongolia, Korea, and Taiwan and dominated trade and exacted tribute from a considerable part of the Indo China peninsula.

e.g., Chinese intervention and escalation of the war in Vietnam. But the Russians cannot abandon North Vietnam without jeopardizing their position of leadership among the Communist nations.

The conflicting U.S. and Soviet objectives originate from the U.S. policy of supporting non-Communist governments against aggression and its drive to achieve stability in Asia as opposed to Soviet policy of support of so-called wars of national liberation.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE VIETNAMESE WAR TO CHINA

In Vietnam the conflicting objectives of the three great powers come into sharp focus. So fundamental and important are these objectives that the likelihood of escalation and increasing involvement of China, Russia, and the U.S. becomes greater the longer the war goes on. And the conflict in Vietnam becomes more and more a symbol and a test which each power feels it cannot afford to lose - a symbol to the countries of Asia of the U.S. willingness to use its power and expend its resources in their defense; a test of U.S. military, political, and economic strategy and tactics against the revolutionary insurgency strategy and tactics espoused and used successfully by Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh; and a test between Russia and China for leadership and influence among the Communist and neutralist nations in Asia. The results of this struggle will be felt in the nations of Africa and Latin America also.

Dr. Morton H. Halperin of the Harvard University Center for International Affairs confirmed this interpretation when he stated

on 10 February 1966 that Vietnam was of extraordinary importance to China because it is at the center of the struggle with the United States, it is close to the center of the dispute with the Soviet Union, it is a key in China's drive for power in Asia and for a coalition of Asian Communist parties and it is a key in China's effort to swing the "third world" in China's direction. "For all of these reasons the Chinese cannot afford a defeat for Communism in Vietnam. For the same reasons, it may possibly be necessary, from their point of view to obtain a real victory," he said.²

IS CHINA PREPARING FOR WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES?

The present Chinese regime takes a long view of history and recognizes that the struggle for victory in Vietnam may take a long time and shifts in tactics from time to time may be required. The objectives in their conflict with the U.S. are generally long range. Therefore Chinese leaders can minimize the importance of miscalculations in their time table and rationalize defeats as being temporary set backs which will be rectified when conditions become more favorable. Mao Tse-tung has taken this point of view and repeatedly stated his conviction that he is on the winning side. His time schedule for Communist take over of southeast Asia, however, is far off target. In 1954 he predicted that the British would be forced out of the Malay Peninsula by 1960 and that Burma

²Austin C. Wehrwein, "Vietnam Called Vital to China; Pursuit of 'Real Victory' Seen", New York Times, 11 Feb. 1966.

and Thailand would be in the hands of the people, i.e., the Communists in the same year. He predicted correctly that the French would be made "to back out of Indochina, preferably through the face saving means of an armistice." He did not then foresee the involvement of the United States in Indochina, Laos, and Thailand. He justified the Chinese failure to win in Korea by noting the "larger stockpile of atomic weapons on the part of the capitalist countries and the immaturity of China's agricultural development."³

In the aftermath of the Korean War Mao urged caution stating that "until we are certain of victory, we have to take a course which will not lead to war." Chinese actions have been characterized by caution since the Korean War. China tested U.S. resolve in 1958 by threatening the islands of Quemoy and Matsu but backed down when the U.S. rushed planes, ships, and the U.S. Marines to the area. The conquest of Tibet and the border clashes with India involved little risk for China. The Chinese have been fighting the U.S. in Vietnam quite successfully by proxy and doubtless would like to take over Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, all of southeast Asia and Korea by the employment of similar tactics. The Peking leaders however may feel this is not very likely because in late 1965 and early 1966 their public statements have been emphasizing the likelihood of an eventual war with the United States. The question of primary

³This time scheduled was contained in a memorandum from Mao Tse-tung to Chou En-lai for Chou's use on a trip to Moscow and was read into the Congressional Record in 1954 by Senator William F. Knowland of California.

interest to the United States is: Is China capable of conquering all of southeast Asia and threatening India and perhaps eventually even Japan? And is she likely to enter the war in Vietnam or elsewhere as an active participant?

Although most authorities on China hold that she should be judged on what she does and not on what her leaders say, there is substantial evidence to support the thesis that the war in Vietnam is only the first step in her campaign to evict the U.S. from Asia and to establish Chinese hegemony in its stead. The evidence also favors Chinese entrance as an active participant in the war in Vietnam if intervention is necessary to save North Vietnam from defeat and destruction. In March 1965, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi stated that China would "intervene beyond any doubt if the existence of North Vietnam were threatened." In April a statement from Peking described China and North Vietnam as "interdependent as a man's lips and teeth." The Hong Kong correspondent of The New York Times in a dispatch dated December 2, 1965 stated that Peking had alerted its peoples' organizations "to make full preparations to send their own people to fight together with the Vietnamese people and drive out the United States aggressors in the event that United States imperialism continues to escalate its war of aggression and the Vietnamese people need them." In a later dispatch on 25 January 1966, this correspondent wrote that "Peking leaders, in their public statements are emphasizing the likelihood of an eventual war between Communist China and the United States. This apparent mood of the Chinese Communist leadership is worrying political analysts

in Hong Kong and southeast Asian centers who previously had cast doubt on the dangers of such a conflict." This dispatch also quoted Hsiao Hua, director of the political department of the Chinese Communist Army, as saying in a speech at an Army conference that the U.S. is expanding the war in Vietnam and "is directing its spearhead of aggression against China." He declared further that the armed forces must "prepare well for war against aggression" and take into account the most difficult circumstances that might arise. On January 12, 1966 the North Vietnamese party paper, Nhan Dan, in reference to a specific Chinese division said: "All combatants of this division have volunteered to go to help our people defeat the U.S. aggressors."

There have been newspaper reports of completion during the last year of an arc of airfields extending from Hainan through south China to the big base at Mengtzu, in Yunnan Province, that facilitates air shuttle movements in the region north of Vietnam. Chinese Communist jets have been reported flying over North Vietnam for months and have also been identified on airfields north and west of Hanoi. One report stated that Peking apparently was keeping one squadron of jet aircraft on duty in North Vietnam.

Reports have also been published of civil defense alerts and drills in Chinese cities and construction of air raid trenches and shelters in such large southern cities as Canton and Foochow. Reports have also been made of the completion of new dispersed POL storage facilities throughout China.

Peking is reported as adjusting its economy for possible war. In the press comment accompanying the announcement of the third five year plan for economic development to begin in 1966, the nation was told "we must gear our various kinds of work to the basic point of a probable war adventure by the U.S. imperialists." Consistent with this belief, The New York Times on December 3, 1965 reported that Peking had disposed of much of its sterling balances abroad and had made large purchases of gold and platinum, ostensibly to withdraw assets that otherwise would be frozen in the event of war. Also newspaper reports indicate that part of the six million tons of grain which China imported in 1965 is being held in reserve in case future shipments are cut off because of war with the U.S.

Premier Chou En-lai, speaking at a Peking reception on 20 December 1965 marking the fifth anniversary of the founding of South Vietnam's National Liberation Front, the political organization of the Viet Cong, said:

Should the United States insist on going along the road of war expansion and on having another trial of strength with the Chinese people, the Chinese will resolutely take up the challenge and fight to the end. Come what may, the Chinese people will unswervingly side with the fraternal Vietnamese people and contribute all of our efforts to the defeat of United States imperialism until final victory.

Mr. C. L. Sulzberger, The New York Times correspondent in a report from Paris on 2 January 1966 wrote:

Communist China is supremely disinterested in all efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Vietnamese war on any basis other than total U.S. surrender. The Peking regime made this entirely plain to responsible interlocutors shortly before the start of President Johnson's massive

peace offensive. . . . As far as it can control the situation, Peking wants war at any price. Should current peace efforts fail, the conflict may well be escalated, involving first Laos and Cambodia, then Thailand, and ultimately, perhaps China itself. China is prepared to accept the risk even though it acknowledges extended war might destroy all the revolution's accomplishments. . . . Peking sees the Vietnamese war as only the first battle in its own long range struggle to achieve a form of global hegemony and therefore as a battle that must be won.

The Chinese, isolated from world realities appear convinced the United States will crack from within and American public opinion will erode the Administration's capacity to act.

Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, testified on 1 February 1966 before the House Foreign Affairs Far Eastern subcommittee that the United States and Communist China are on a collision course that can only result in war. The New York Times Hong Kong based reporter advances the same thesis in an article published on 30 January 1966. This reporter states that as the U.S. resorts to military escalation in support of the Saigon government, Peking is broadening its commitment to Hanoi.

Peking fears that the U.S. will not continue to treat Communist China as an inviolate supply base for material and a sanctuary perhaps eventually for men to fight South Vietnam and the Americans. Also, some students of China believe that Peking will provide air support for Hanoi with aircraft operating from China's airfields. U.S. pursuit could violate the Chinese border and provide the basis for full scale war. This is the most likely first step in Chinese intervention in the war.

The foregoing facts support the conclusion that China will intervene in the war with troops if in the judgement of Peking such intervention is needed by North Vietnam to prevent defeat or destruction. She may also intervene if the situation should arise whereby such intervention would likely drive the U.S. from South Vietnam in a military defeat. At present North Vietnam has enough manpower without the Chinese, and since China itself is not being threatened, Mao can afford to wait. "The Americans will tire," he told Edgar Snow, "they don't have the patience for this." For the present the new aid agreement signed in Peking on December 5, 1965 by Hsieh Fu-chih, Vice Premier of China and Le Thanh, Vice Premier of North Vietnam, provides that China will furnish trucks, steel to repair bombed out bridges, and other items which North Vietnam cannot provide for itself. In addition, several thousand Chinese service troops have been assigned to help maintain the rail supply line between China and North Vietnam.

WILL THAILAND BE ANOTHER VIETNAM?

The Chinese are not confining their efforts in southeast Asia to Vietnam alone. Mao sees the United States as having weakened herself by occupying many places in the world, overreaching herself, stretching her fingers out wide and dispersing her strength. He thinks that the fingers of the American hand can be chopped off one by one with Vietnam the place for the chopping to begin. The site for the next chop is likely to be Thailand according to Secretary

of Defense Robert S. McNamara in an address to the NATO ministers in Paris on 15 December 1965.

Militarily, Vietnam, Laos and Thailand are strategically indivisible. U.S. air strikes against Communist forces in Laos originate in Thailand. An estimated 80 per cent of the bombing raids over North Vietnam have been made by American planes based in Thailand.⁴ The Thais permit U.S. use of these bases because they are convinced that they are next on Mao Tse-tung's list for a war of national liberation. This was made clear by Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi's statement in 1965 that "we hope to have a guerrilla war in Thailand before the year is out."⁵ In December Peking announced the formation of the Patriotic Front of Thailand. This organization was formed by the merger of Thai revolutionary groups under former Thai Lieutenant Colonel Phayum Chulanont who operates from China. Also associated with this group is Pridi Phanomyong, a former cabinet minister, who fled the country in 1956 and now lives in Canton. This group advocates the overthrow of the Thai government and the establishment of a peoples democracy; the withdrawal of Thailand from SEATO; ending treaties with the U.S. and driving out all foreign troops; the restriction of foreign capital; and the realization of independence and neutrality.

The situation in Thailand is in some respects similar to the initial stages of the war in Vietnam. In recent months guerrilla

⁴This estimate is made by correspondents of Newsweek magazine in Thailand. "Thailand: The Anatomy of a Domino," Newsweek Vol. LVII No. 5, 31 Jan. 1966, pp. 35-41.

⁵Ibid.

bands have been active in both the northeast region and the Kra Isthmus in the south. Twenty-one political assassinations have been reported in the last year. Peking agitators have been active among the 60,000 Vietnamese refugees who have fled to Thailand's northeast and are mostly pro-Hanoi. In the south Chin Peng and the 500 guerrillas who fled Malaya in 1960 after the failure of their twelve year insurrection against the British form a Communist nucleus which is recruiting Moslem Malays to form an insurgent force. A U.S. official was quoted in the 31 January issue of Newsweek magazine as saying "The Communists have recruited enough Malays and others to field about three battalions."⁶

Thailand has never been a colonial possession and is one of the most affluent countries in southeast Asia. She is devoting 70 per cent of her budget to social welfare programs, is receiving substantial U.S. assistance, and is aggressively combating subversion. The course of the war in Vietnam will doubtless have a profound influence on events in Thailand but at the present time the outlook is favorable for the Thai government to be able to contain and reduce the threat of insurgency, although the situation in the north appears an extremely difficult problem requiring years to solve.

Thailand is also assisting anti-Communist forces in Laos. Thai pilots and artillerymen in Laotian uniforms have been supporting

⁶Ibid.

Laotian forces against attacks by the pro-Communist Pathet Lao. Thailand has also succeeded in organizing the Meo Mountain tribesmen into guerrilla units which are proving to be effective in operations against the Pathet Lao and Communist supply routes from North Vietnam. The Pathet Lao forces have been forced into defensive operations. The situation in Laos also is dependent on the course of events in Vietnam but at present Laos is enjoying its greatest stability in years.

WILL CHINA CONTINUE TO THREATEN INDIA AND THE NEUTRALIST NATIONS?

Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC-Ret., a long time student of China, has been quoted as seeing a "good potential" for a Vietnam type war in India's northeast area, possibly starting in 1967. This view is shared by other authorities on China and there is substantial evidence that this item is on Peking's schedule. In a January 1966 article published in The Washington Post, its New Delhi correspondent Warren Unna quoted Indian officials as fearing that China has begun a long term harassment of their eastern border with the specific objective of penetrating India's tribally unstable Northeast Frontier Agency. This would permit China to break loose from the geographical confines of the Himalayas and begin to mix with the peoples of the subcontinent. China would then infiltrate and subvert in the revolutionary manner. Several developments support this view:

- China without explanation has abandoned her pledge to the Colombo powers in March 1963 to step back 20 kilometers from her side of the disputed border.

- China has also abandoned her pledge to leave the key border passes as no-man's zones by occupying Thagla Ridge and Lonju in what the Indian Ministry of External Affairs considers to be "an open message sent through facts." It was China's seizure of these passes in the fall of 1962 that signaled the earlier Chinese invasion.

- In the border kingdom of Sikkim, where China has never disputed the frontier, Chinese troops have intruded. India has a right to maintain troops in Sikkim and exercises it. Indian officials suspect China intends to keep probing across the border in order to force the Indian patrols back and eventually out of the kingdom.

- The London Observer has reported that the Chinese have linked the Sikkim border at Nathula with the road to Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. This strategic road, suitable for motor vehicles, will enable the Chinese to bring heavy guns to Nathula.

- Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi several months ago in a press conference wondered whether India really was entitled historically to speak for Sikkim.

- There have been incidents in the two other Indian frontier areas, Ladakh on the far northwest and in what is called the "middle segment," the border between Ladakh and the Kingdom of Nepal. Chinese roadbuilders and technicians are very active and a growing contingent in Nepal.

On January 7, 1966 the Chinese official press agency Hsinhua reported that China had warned India that if intrusions and provocations continue along their Himalayan border "the Chinese side will resolutely strike back." The warning was made in a Foreign Ministry note handed the Indian Embassy on 6 January 1966.

O. Edmund Clubb in his book 20th Century China explains Chinese designs on Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, and Ladakh by citing the Chinese view that these countries have had close ties to Tibet, their people are related to the Tibetans by blood and therefore it is entirely proper that these people should be brought under Chinese aegis. Mr. Clubb expects this objective to be maintained until it is realized. Thus, India becomes another point of insistent pressure by China in its effort to expand its influence to the south. Undoubtedly this course, if pursued, will bring the United States to the support of India, and the Soviet Union will be faced with a difficult decision as to an appropriate course of action. The timetable for intensification of the subversion on India's borders is probably not established and will depend on events in Vietnam and other developments in China and Asia.

Burma, although a signator of the atomic test ban treaty and on good terms with the Soviet Union, strives to maintain good relations with China. General Ne Win, head of the neutralist military government, is leading his country down the Burmese road to socialism. He is reported to be annoyed with the slow progress of the work on the 13 aid projects promised in aid agreement signed

with Peking in 1961. He is said to be distrustful of the Chinese, who through professing friendship with his government, continue to give ideological encouragement to armed dissident bands of White Flag Communists who roam the countryside and who are trying to overthrow the Ne Win government. Burma's proximity to China makes improbable any move away from her neutralist policy. In the future Chinese pressure may make it difficult for Burma to maintain a neutralist position in Asia.

On January 13, 1966 Hsinhua, the official Chinese press agency announced that China was giving assistance to a new clandestine organization dedicated to the overthrow of the Government of Malaysia. The announcement said that a mission of the National Liberation Army of Malaya headed by P. V. Sarma had been welcomed to Peking. Mr. Sarma asserted that his organization would use Chinese Communist tactics in seeking dismemberment of Malaysia.

All available evidence points to Chinese efforts to expand their influence to the south through subversion and support of clandestine Communist groups. The prospects of success of these efforts may be tied to the course of events in Vietnam. Success in Vietnam will doubtless encourage other governments to resist or not to resist according to the side which is victorious.

IS CHINESE INFLUENCE WANING?

On September 7, 1965 the famous 20,000 word document titled "Long Live the Victory of the People's War" signed by Lin Piao,

Chinese Defense Minister was issued. This article contained the blueprint for remaking the world in Peking's image and has received varying interpretations by Chinese scholars in the U.S. Some have compared it to Adolph Hitler's "Mein Kampf"; others hold that it only made more explicit what has been contained in Mao's writings and Peking's pronouncements over the years. Its now famous thesis is that Communist victory can be achieved through the strategy of encirclement of the "cities of the world," the "imperialist strongholds" of North America and western Europe by the "countryside of the world," Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Lin is apparently making a plea for a worldwide peoples war and his purpose is to stimulate Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans to wage revolution themselves without external participation, at least initially. This Chinese view of the future had scarcely been published before she received her major reverse of 1965--the failure of the Communist coup in Indonesia and the consequent destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party by the Indonesian Army.

Peking's influence in Africa except in Brazzaville appears to have almost fizzled out. In 1964 Premier Chou En-lai proclaimed that "Revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout Africa." Since that time China has committed \$300 million in aid to African countries. Reports indicate that a very small fraction of this aid has been delivered. Chou's advocacy of revolution has frightened the new leaders of Africa who are now interested in stability and are suspicious that China would not hesitate to overturn them if

it served her interests. Hastings Banda of Malawi fired three cabinet ministers for conspiring with China; Kenyan members of Parliament have called for a diplomatic break; statesmen in Niger have warned other Africans against Chinese subversions; the former French colony of Dahomey has broken diplomatic relations with China; Tunisia appears to be near to a similar diplomatic break; another setback was the loss of the diplomatic bridgehead in Burundi in February 1965.

Foreign Minister Chen Yi acknowledged to a Japanese interviewer in 1965 that "some adverse currents have appeared in certain areas in Asia and Africa." There is no indication however that these adverse currents will cause a change in policy toward Africa. Peking still beams more than 80 hours of broadcasts a week to Africa in native languages, distributes films, books, and magazines, and provides visits to China for Africans. The Chinese see Africa as far behind in revolutionary development. But they are prepared to work slowly and wait for the proper time for the revolution. Africa is second only to Asia as a foreign policy priority. Africa can be aroused at the right time, Peking believes, by a campaign of racial solidarity against the white man as well as a theme of anti-imperialism. The Chinese penchant for patience is also their antidote for what they consider only temporary setbacks.

China's influence in Latin America also seems to be on the decline. The only country in Latin America where formal diplomatic relations are maintained is Cuba and these relations are near the

breaking point. Cuba has charged the Chinese with trying to subvert the Cuban Army by distributing propaganda material to its members and trying to influence them by personal contact. Cuba also charged Peking with arbitrary reduction of a planned \$250 million exchange of goods by refusing to accept 800,000 tons of sugar from Cuba and refusing to ship 115,000 tons of rice. This action will reduce the rice ration in Cuba to about three pounds per person per month and has caused Premier Castro to charge China with extortion, blackmail and economic strangulation. Some observers see Peking's reason for this as an effort to increase its rice reserves in the event of war with the U.S.; others see it as an attempt to punish Cuba for being pro-Soviet in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The former appears to be the more likely rational. Regardless of the reason, the exchange of name calling continues with Peking denouncing Castro for his "vicious abuse."

The recent Havana conference of African, Asia, and Latin American leftists was to a considerable extent a struggle between pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions of International Communist movement. American analysts appear to feel that the Soviets had the greater influence. Throughout the Latin American nations Peking's chief accomplishment has been the formation of splinter groups from Communist parties which generally are pro-Russian. Nevertheless Jermin Jih Pao, the Chinese Communist party organ cited the results of the first conference as proof that Peking's doctrine of armed revolutionary struggle was winning acceptance

on three continents. The results referred to was the alleged rejection by the conference of the attempts of Soviet delegates "to bring the national democratic movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the orbit of U.S. Soviet collaboration for world domination."

In summary, 1965 was a bad year for China insofar as her relations with other nations are concerned. She appears to be becoming more isolated, is turning inward rather than gaining in world influence, and is having little success in exporting its brand of revolutionary communism to Africa and Latin America.

ARE RUSSIA AND COMMUNIST CHINA NEAR A COMPLETE BREAK IN RELATIONS?

The war in Vietnam has intensified the contest between China and Russia for influence in Asia. The Chinese consider that not only her national interest is involved but also the ideological question as to the tactics and strategy which should be used to convert the underdeveloped nations to communism. The dispute is being conducted with growing fierceness that may lead to a complete severance of relations. Peking is charging the Soviet Union of collaboration with the United States in a military encirclement of China. Moscow has not denied a report that a secret letter read recently to all Soviet Communist party members accuses Peking of seeking to provoke a war between Russia and the U.S. The Chinese have charged Soviet leaders with encouraging India in its confrontation with China along their border, attacked Soviet Premier

Kosygin for having brought about the Tashkent accord between India and Pakistan on Kashmir, and criticized Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev for his visit to Outer Mongolia. These moves were all part of the design to contain China according to Jermin Jih Pao, the Chinese Communist Party newspaper.

China is in a major contest with the Soviet Union for influence in North Vietnam. This contest is being waged with both material and strong language. North Vietnam has endeavored to maintain a neutral stand in the Chinese-Soviet quarrel in order to receive aid from both, but the Chinese are exerting mounting pressure on Hanoi to end cooperation with the Soviets. This the North Vietnamese are showing no inclination to do since the Chinese cannot furnish the military equipment that the Russians can offer. On 10 February 1966, a warning to Hanoi was contained in a commentary in Hung Chi, the ideological journal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which implied that North Vietnam could never win its struggle against the U.S. unless it ended cooperation with the Soviet Union. Hung Chi declared: "The new leaders of the Soviet Communist Party have uttered some words of support for Vietnam and given her some aid but their aim in all this is to get more of a say for themselves on the Vietnam question, to sow dissension in Chinese-Vietnamese relations and to help the U.S. realize its peace talk plot. In the final analysis, they want to find a way out for U.S. imperialism on the Vietnam question, to enable it to

occupy South Vietnam permanently and to strike a deal with it."⁷
The Chinese commentary rejected Soviet proposals for a united front to oppose American policy in Vietnam. The Russians in turn have charged the Chinese with impeding their shipments to North Vietnam. The charges and counter charges in this dispute have become so frenzied that the 23rd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party scheduled to meet in Moscow in March 1966 may, in the opinion of some experts, vote to expel the Chinese and formally split the Communist movement. In the interim the Russians are charging the Chinese with an increase in provocative incidents along the Sino-Soviet frontier.

HOW STRONG IS CHINA?

The threats and bluster of the Chinese are backed up by a military force and economic resources that limit her to the category of a second rate power. China's leaders are still in the process of trying to convert an almost medieval economy into a modern industrial state. On September 30, 1965 Chou En-lai said that China needed at least another 20 years to become really strong. He said that although the country was experiencing a new all around upsurge in industrial and agricultural production, and the country was somewhat stronger than before, China was still not very strong. To feed the people it has again been necessary to contract for

⁷Seymour Topping, "Red China Calls on Hanoi to End Soviet Cooperation," New York Times, 11 Feb. 1966, p. 1.

large grain imports in 1966, \$400 million worth of wheat from Canada alone. Grain imports have been running at about 6,000,000 tons a year and using one-third of China's foreign exchange. Although the Chinese are eating better than they have for five years, their population growth of 12,000,000 per year will soon offset the small gains of the last year. The problem of becoming self-sufficient in food remains as far from solution as it ever did.

Another prominent weakness is a shortage of trained scientific personnel. A massive report titled "Scientific and Engineering Manpower in Communist China 1949-1963", recently made public by the National Science Foundation contains the conclusion that China's aim to become an industrial giant with a great leap forward in science and technology probably will not be realized for another 20 or 30 years. The report indicates that Chinese science suffers from political intrusions, economic difficulties, and failure to woo back 10,000 capable, Western-trained Chinese scientists and engineers from abroad.

Mao Tse-tung counts on the ocean of 750,000,000 people to drown any invading army and does not feel pressed toward any significant modernization of the equipment of the Chinese Army. China does however recognize the importance of nuclear weapons and is exerting strong efforts to develop a nuclear stockpile and means of delivery. According to Mr. Robert S. McNamara, U.S. Secretary of Defense, in his address to the NATO Ministers on 15 December 1965, China could have a medium range ballistic missile with a

nuclear warhead operational as early as 1967. Several launchers for these missiles could be deployed by 1969. The initial deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles which could hit Europe or the United States is possible by 1975. China will produce enough fissionable material in the next two years to start a small stockpile of atomic weapons, Mr. McNamara was quoted as having said. China's third nuclear test is predicted for 1966.

The immediate significance of China's nuclear weapons program is that she will be able to threaten nations beyond her borders including Formosa - to engage in nuclear blackmail. In approximately ten years when China probably will have developed thermonuclear weapons and the means of delivery to reach the United States, a reappraisal of U.S. Asian policy will be necessary. Doubtless at that time U.S. allies in Asia will question the reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent to protect them.

The Chinese maintain the largest army in the world consisting of 2,500,000 troops backed by 12 million militiamen. This army is well trained in both conventional and guerrilla warfare. The infantry is armed with Chinese made copies of Russian World War II burp guns, and is supported by light and medium mortars, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles and artillery. About 4,000 Russian T-34 tanks are on hand but are obsolete compared to U.S. types. The Army is dispersed however and suffers from weaknesses in transportation and strategic mobility. Nevertheless, because of its enormous manpower and mass, its discipline and loyalty, China's Army is a formidable force if employed in Asian conflicts.

China's Air Force of 3,000 planes consists mostly of obsolete Russian types, of which only about 300 are bombers with the remainder being predominantly MIG-15 and MIG-17 fighters with a few modern MIG-21's. Of her approximately 30 submarines, only half can be considered modern and even these are obsolete by U.S. standards. Her navy which consists of a few destroyers, 250 patrol craft, and 700 armed junks, are able to offer little opposition to the U.S. Navy. Her communications are primitive, her industries vulnerable to U.S. air attack, and her transportation system is vulnerable to air attack. Until these weaknesses can be overcome China's military strategy will be Mao Tse-tung's dictum "the decisive factor is man, not materiel." Peking's Peoples Daily recently stated "an atomic bomb cannot end a war. It is necessary to depend on politics, on man's brave spirit, on bayonet fighting and on grenade throwing. . . ." Mao believes that China's vast territory and huge population will prevent China from ever being defeated in war and occupied. But because of lack of naval and air power, China is able to influence events only by ground forces in areas on her periphery.

The press has carried several reports and monitored broadcasts from China indicate that the Chinese Communist Party is encountering difficulties in controlling the army. Statements and actions by Peking hint that not all of the army leaders share the Party's confidence in China's ability to cope with a war against the U.S. According to the reports the Party is vigorously demanding obedience from the army and acceptance of the Party's tactical and strategic

doctrines. It is defending Peking's support of North Vietnam, anticipating an eventual war with the U.S. and insisting that a mass army of properly indoctrinated troops is more important than modern weapons in winning such a war.

Since 1959 increasing pressure has been put on Chinese Army officers to concede that the final authority in all decisions should rest with the political cadres. The authority of Army officers has been steadily whittled away since Marshal Peng Teh-huai unsuccessfully contested the Party's program for the armed forces and was removed as Defense Minister. Military ranks were abolished in 1965. The Communist Party is reported to be recruiting hundreds of thousands of members from the lower levels of the army in an apparent effort to strengthen its political control of the armed forces. Senior members of the army are being pressured to "remold themselves ideologically" in line with Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung's political and military doctrines. The effect of this reaffirmation of Mao's axiom that "the Party controls the gun" is difficult to assess but military efficiency and capability are not likely to show improvement under this dictum.

STATUS OF CHINESE LEADERSHIP

Mao has given the impression to foreign visitors that he is a disappointed man. In a conversation with Edgar Snow in 1965, he raised the possibility that a future generation might negate the revolution. In talks with France's Andre Malraux, he complained

that China's revolutionary elite had become just another ruling class. He sees failures in Indonesia and the Afro-Asian block fragmented by divergent national interests. And he is discouraged by the gains of revisionist Russia in the struggle for influence in Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam. Mao is 72 and his aims for a classless Communist society under Peking's leadership he knows will not be realized during his lifetime. Mao's fears that his revolutionary religion will lose its fervor and the scientists and technicians will form a new elite class as in the Soviet Union is illustrated by the series of articles in the theoretical journal of the Communist Party, Red Flag, in 1965 in which scientists were told that they, like everybody else, should consider the class struggle as their foremost task. They were exhorted to spend more time reading Mao's political theories to guide their research work. Scientists were directed to use political as well as scientific criteria to determine suitability of Western scientific theories. Communist leaders have recently emphasized the all important role of politics in maintaining the force of the revolution. Maintenance of party loyalty and revolutionary fervor has become an all prevailing objective of Mao and his coterie.

China is ruled by a group of old men, most of whom are veterans of the Long March in the 1930's. Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-chi, Chu Teh, and Chen Yi are all in their sixties. No one can predict what the next generation of leaders of China will bring but Chinese aims, being essentially nationalistic, do not seem likely to change.

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

China's course of action in Asia has as its basis the expulsion of the United States from Asia militarily, economically, and politically. To regain in time what China regards as lost territory is a concomitant objective. This territory involves not only Taiwan, Korea, and Southeast Asia but also parts of Soviet Asia. Thus the triangular power struggle involving China, the United States and the Soviet Union is likely to continue into the future beyond the Vietnamese war.


The war in Vietnam has become a test case for the three powers and its outcome is likely to have profound influence on the future development of Asia. At stake in the war in Vietnam for China is not only the first step in realizing her objective of expelling the U.S. from Asia and asserting her own domination but this war is the type China has been advocating throughout the underdeveloped nations and a failure would discredit the Lin Piao concept of victory through wars of national liberation. For these reasons China likely feels she cannot afford a North Vietnam defeat. For the same reasons, the U.S. feels that it cannot afford to lose in Vietnam. Therefore further escalation of the war is a likely prospect and direct Chinese intervention cannot be ruled out.

Chinese military strength, now formidable on the Asian mainland, cannot be projected beyond the periphery because of weaknesses in naval and air forces. By 1975 China is expected to be able to deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles with thermonuclear warheads.

China will then be able to threaten both the United States and the Soviet Union. The current power balance will be upset and a reappraisal of policies toward China will doubtless result.

The Chinese, despite failures during 1965, continue to maintain a policy of support to revolutions throughout the developing world and continue to attempt to discredit Soviet theories of peaceful coexistence. This ideological dispute with Russia, along with conflicting objectives in Asia and rivalry for Communist world leadership appear likely to result in a break in diplomatic relations between the two countries which will continue at a minimum for as long as the present Chinese leadership holds power.

Although the present leadership of Communist China is old and doubts have been raised that the next generation of leaders will maintain the revolutionary fervor that now exists, there are no reasons apparent to expect any significant changes in objectives. The United States in maintaining its containment policy is blocking these Chinese objectives. The militant, nationalistic Chinese are unlikely to be contained without challenging the United States at favorable places and times along their periphery.


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