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8 April 1966

COMMUNIST CHINA'S NATIONAL STRATEGY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

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WALTER G. RUNTE

Colonel, Signal Corps



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Communist China's National Strategy Toward Latin America

by

Col Walter G. Runte
Signal Corps

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
8 April 1966

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
SUMMARY.	iv
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF THE COMMUNISTS IN LATIN AMERICA.	4
General.	4
Latin America: A Marxist-Leninist ideological target	4
Communist China's foreign policy	5
Strategic value of Latin America to the United States	8
United States recognition.	11
3. VULNERABILITIES OF LATIN AMERICA TO COMMUNISM PEKING-STYLE	12
General.	12
The requirement for change	14
Deterrents to change	24
Vulnerability of Latin American intellectuals to communism--Peking-style.	26
Summary of vulnerabilities	29
4. A HYPOTHETICAL COMMUNIST CHINESE POLICY FOR LATIN AMERICA.	31
Policy considerations.	31
Objectives and policies.	32
5. COMMUNIST CHINESE PENETRATION IN LATIN AMERICA	35
General.	35
Penetration in Argentina	36
Penetration in Brazil.	38
Penetration in British Guiana.	40
Penetration in Chile	41
Penetration in Colombia.	42
Penetration in Costa Rica.	43
Penetration in Cuba.	44
Penetration in the Dominican Republic.	46
Penetration in Ecuador	47
Penetration in Guatemala	47
Penetration in Mexico.	48
Penetration in Panama.	50
Penetration in Peru.	51
Penetration in Uruguay	52
Penetration in Venezuela	54
6. HYPOTHETICAL COMMUNIST CHINESE STRATEGY VS ACTUAL COMMUNIST CHINESE PENETRATION IN LATIN AMERICA.	56

	Page
Reference objective 1.	56
Reference objective 2.	58
Reference objective 3.	60
Reference objective 4.	60
7. CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS	63
EPILOGUE	65
BIBLIOGRAPHY	67

SUMMARY

Communist China over the past few years has made some strong foreign policy statements. These statements coupled with her joining the nuclear club have caused much speculation as to her actual policy as opposed to her spoken policy. The area of interest in this thesis is, as the title indicates, Latin America.

To appraise Communist China's policy toward Latin America, this thesis first analyzes the strategic interest of Communist China in Latin America to include Communist ideology, foreign policy, and the strategic value of Latin America to the U. S. A.--the key target of Communist foreign policy. The military security, reservoir of raw materials, economic interests and political support that Latin America provides the U. S. A. is discussed as part of the strategic value of Latin America to the U. S. A.

The vulnerabilities of Latin America to communism, Peking-style, are discussed to include the requirements for social reform and the deterrents to change in social conditions. A brief treatment is given to the population explosion, housing, poverty, vestiges of the feudal order, rate of economic growth, and inflation as social ills. A separate treatment is given to the vulnerability of Latin American intellectuals to communism--Peking-style.

Based on the above mentioned vulnerabilities a hypothetical Communist Chinese strategy is developed which includes four main objectives. First, to penetrate Latin American countries culturally, economically, socially, and politically. Secondly, to subvert United States influence in Latin America. Thirdly, to establish ideological leadership over the revolutionary movements in Latin America. And lastly, to spread a revolutionary pattern throughout Latin America characterized by virulent anti-Americanism and state seizure of all property, whether domestically or foreign owned, without compensation.

An analysis is made of Communist penetration in twenty Latin American countries. The conclusion is made that some economic, social, and political penetration has been made; however, it is negligible. All other Communist strategy objectives have not been met.

A comparison is made between the hypothetical Chinese Communist strategy and actual Peking penetration. Among the conclusions, the principal one is that the hypothetical strategy closely approximates the probable actual strategy, as measured by Red Chinese efforts. Secondly, except for the provision of some arms to Cuba immediately after Castro seized power, and a large propaganda outlay, there is no indication of any significant expenditure of any Chinese resources

to subvert Latin American countries. Thirdly, Communist China is attempting to create an image of power, probably to cover her own internal problems. Russia, not China, is the principal Communist threat in Latin America.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

China, long the slumbering enigma of the East, burst into international political consciousness with an oriental shot-heard-round-the-world when she unexpectedly joined the nuclear club in 1964. This dramatic achievement, coupled with her break with Russia in 1960 and her aggressive, if not truculent, foreign policy pronouncements in 1965, have startled thoughtful men everywhere.

A Communist China-caused consternation reached all capitals of the world. The degree of consternation is probably in direct ratio to the relationship of any given capital to the United States. Appraisal of the intentions, pretenses, expectations, and apprehensions of the most populated nation on earth has graduated from amateur speculations to serious international study. A red dragon syndrome now lives with the West.

Despite the dramatic role Communist China is playing in the world scene, it was an event 9000 miles from China, the fall of Cuba to Castroism, that encouraged the hitherto weak political interests and activities of Communist China in Latin America to be reawakened--to be revitalized--to become reactivated with new political fervor. Before 1958, the Chinese did not think the Latin American people were ready to employ armed uprisings in their revolutionary struggle, but the success of the Cuban revolution caused them to change their

minds.¹ Furthermore, the emergence of Castro's Cuba is used by Peking as "proof" of the validity of Chinese political analysis. According to the Chinese, the "26th of July" movement was victorious primarily because it had followed a "correct line of revolutionary action" the line of armed struggle and the united front.²

The Sino-Soviet schism which split the allegiance of the Latin American Communist parties between Moscow and Peking paved the way for an analysis of the source of Communist penetration in Latin America. While not altering the ultimate objective of the two major Communist movements, this split will manifest itself in variant short range objectives and tactics employed. Regarding the Sino-Soviet rift, the late President Kennedy in his January 1963, State of the Union Message said, "The Soviet-Chinese disagreement is over means, not ends. A dispute over how to bury the West (which includes Latin America) is no grounds for Western rejoicing." The schism simply means that the West must now look in two directions instead of one.

Although the Chinese Communists did not attempt serious political penetration into Latin America until after 1958, evidence of cultural exchanges date back to 1956. Earlier "exchanges" may have been effected, since the chief agency for supervising and directing this cultural exchange, "The Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries," was established in 1950. Furthermore,

¹"Main Characteristics of Latin America National-Democratic Movements," World Culture, No. 16, 20 Aug. 1958, p. 18.

²"Armed Struggle and the Fourth Anniversary of Revolutionary Victory," World Culture, No. 1, 10 Jan. 1963, p. 4.

in selling the Communist ideology in Latin America, Communist China did not have to cultivate virgin territory. For instance, a history of Communist activity in Argentina existed since 1918, and in Cuba since 1919. Since then, the Communist movement has spread throughout Latin America with varying degrees of success--its apogee being the absorption of Cuba into its orbit. This introduction to Latin American Communism leads to the mission of this thesis, which is to appraise the Communist Chinese national strategy toward Latin America.

As a point of departure, the strategic interests of Peking in Latin America are hopefully isolated. These interests coupled with the social, economic, and political vulnerabilities of Latin America provide source material from which a hypothetical or derived Communist China strategy can be evolved. A comparison of the actual Peking penetration or attempted penetration into Latin America against the hypothetical or derived Chinese Communist national strategy toward Latin America will provide disparities and similarities. An analysis of these disparities and similarities should provide conclusions.

The cutoff date for this thesis is 15 January 1966. Although this date is related to an academic cutoff date, more significantly, it is the closing date of the First African-Asian-Latin American Solidarity Conference held in Havana. The impact of this Conference could start a new phase of Communist expansion--a discussion of which can be found in the Epilogue.

CHAPTER 2

STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF THE COMMUNISTS IN LATIN AMERICA

GENERAL

An understanding of strategic interests of the Chinese Communists in Latin America is necessary to provide source material for the development of a hypothetical foreign policy. Besides being an ideological target, Latin America is also inextricably interwoven into her northern neighbor's (the U. S. A.) economy. The significance of Latin America as an ideological target, and also as a vehicle for helping destroy the U. S. A., is discussed in this chapter.

LATIN AMERICA: A MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGICAL TARGET

The promotion of world communism by Red China throughout the world makes Latin America an ideological target. Chinese communism has a stern doctrinal core. It is inflexibly associated with the principles of Marxism-Leninism--a doctrine which provides the basis for all the political, economic, social and cultural policies of Red China. From the Communist Chinese viewpoint, doctrine is inseparable from practice.¹ Red China's strict adherence to Marxist-Leninist doctrine is best exemplified by her ideological split with Russia, as announced by Chairman Mao through the Chinese Communist party

¹H. Arthur Steiner, "Mainsprings of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 44, 1950, p. 72.

newspaper, "The People's Daily," in a Peking dispatch of 15 December 1962. At that time, and since that time, Peking has been calling the Russians "revisionists" for deviating from the Marxist-Leninist line.²

As early as 1948, Mao Tse-tung warned that the Chinese Communist party must always base its actions upon conscious doctrine,

The working class and the people as a whole cannot be successfully led in their struggle against imperialism and its lackeys without such a revolutionary party based on the ideological, organizational, and theoretical principles of Marx-Leninism and guided by the all powerful ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.³

COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Marxism-Leninism forms the backbone and purpose of Red China's foreign policy. These policies may change, because the Chinese Communists do not preclude progressive modification of policies in their pursuit of world communism. Modifications are part of the dialectical method of Marxism-Leninism. On the other hand, basic doctrine is immutable.

In his "Mainsprings of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy," H. Arthur Steiner has isolated what he believes to be the major thesis of Red Chinese foreign policy.⁴

1. Imperialism is the greatest enemy of the Chinese people and the Chinese revolution.

²Adam Kellet-Long, "Peking in Blast as Soviet Admits Red World Split," Washington Post, 16 Dec. 1962.

³Mao Tse-tung, "Revolutionary Forces of the World Rally to Combat Imperialist Aggression," For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, 1 Nov. 1949.

⁴Steiner, op. cit., pp. 77-90.

2. The United States is the major enemy among the nations of the world because it is the "necessary" leader of the world imperialist camp.

3. China must struggle in common with the "international united front" of all revolutionary and anti-imperialistic peoples.

4. Counterrevolutionary policies of the imperialist states must be resisted by political and ideological counterattack.

5. Incessant struggle must be sustained until the inevitable victory is complete.

It is interesting to note that at the time of the publication of Steiner's comments on Red China's foreign policy, another thesis was also included. In essence it stated that the Soviet Union was the leader of the world revolutionary front against imperialism. Apparently, this fact has not changed; however, it is now being challenged and not being accepted as fact by Peking.⁵

A Foreign Policy Conclusion

Since the People's Republic of China has designated the United States as the citadel of capitalism and, therefore, her avowed enemy, all the friends, allies, and above all, neighbors of the United States are included in the Red Chinese grand design. The neighbors to the south have been particularly cited as targets of Chinese Communist ideological hegemony.

⁵Ibid., p. 85.

What imperialism fears most is the awakening of the Asian, African, and Latin American people, the awakening of the peoples of all countries. We should unite and drive US imperialism from Asia, Africa, and Latin America back to where it came from.⁶

Mao Tse-tung, 14 May 1960

In his famed September 1965 article, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War,"⁷ Defense Minister Lin Piao reaffirms Chinese Communist foreign policy by stating that it is the internationalist duty of all socialist countries to support the revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Furthermore, he states that Red China will conquer the city states (U. S. A. and Europe) by approach from the country states (Asia, Latin America, and Africa). By her own statement, therefore, Communist China intends to defeat the U. S. A. by way of Latin America.

In a major policy statement of 30 June 1949, Mao Tse-tung⁸ stated that for the Chinese people the only possible political alternatives were "the side of imperialism and the side of socialism." "To sit on the fence," he declared, "is impossible; a third road does not exist." What held for the Chinese people also held for the remainder of the world: "Without exception, one either leans to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is a

⁶Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Speaking Before a Delegation from Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Japan. Wuhan, China, 14 May 1960.

⁷Lin Piao, Long Live the Victory of the People's War, 3 Sep. 1965.

⁸Mao Tse-tung, Policy Statement of 30 Jun. 1949, on "People's Democratic Dictatorship," as quoted in The International Position of Communist China, by H. Arthur Steiner, American Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 8.

camouflage and a third road does not exist." Obviously, Mao Tse-tung does not believe in neutralism or the condition of uncommitted nations.

STRATEGIC VALUE OF LATIN AMERICA TO THE UNITED STATES

If the United States is the primary target of destruction for Communist China, then any country or group of countries of strategic significance to the United States will also become a target. The strategic value of Latin America to the United States falls in four general categories: military security, reservoir of raw materials to include strategic materials, economic interests, and political support.

Military Security

A quick glance at an appropriate map shows that Mexico, the Caribbean area, and the upper portion of South America comprise the backdoor to the U. S. A. Directly to the south lies the Panama Canal, the naval base at Guantanamo, and Venezuelan oil. Farther south lies vast mineral resources. The United States cannot be too vigilant about the military security of this area.

Cuba is the great lesson learned. The loss of any Latin American country to Communist China's hegemony constitutes another base for subversive activities and potential enemy military base. Finally, the rapidly growing manpower pool of Latin America comprises a force that not only may be capable of providing for its own defense but a force that might also assist a friendly nation in offensive

operations.⁹

Reservoir of Raw Materials

Most all Latin American countries abound in raw materials. With the possible exception of Uruguay and some Caribbean countries, Latin America has untold mineral wealth. Furthermore, the giant, ever growing industrial complex of the United States, must be fed. Projections for mineral imports by the United States show an increase of over 100 per cent by 1975, from a base date of 1952.¹⁰ Latin America is a most likely supplier of many of these minerals and other raw materials. Many Latin American minerals have gone virtually untapped because of early emphasis on the "precious" metals, and the formerly inaccessible location of mines.

Strategic Materials

Approximately 35 materials of strategic value to the United States come from Latin America. Listed below are the most significant materials, with the approximate percentage of total US requirement obtained from Latin America.

<u>Material</u>	<u>Per cent obtained from Latin America</u>
Antimony	64
Bauxite	53 should increase considerably

⁹Thomas W. Palmer, Search for a Latin American Policy, pp. 18-19.

¹⁰H. G. Audrey, United States Imports and World Trade, p. 12.

Beryl	49
Copper	27
Iron Ore	7 estimated to be 10 in few years
Lead	31
Manganese	13 should increase considerably
Petroleum	8 estimated 18% by 1975
Quartz Crystals	92
Tin	17
Tungsten	15
Zinc	18

According to the Atomic Energy Commission, moderate deposits of fissionable materials can be found in Bolivia, Peru, Chile, and especially Brazil.¹¹

Economic Interests

In 1963, United States imports from 19 Latin American countries totaled \$3,451 million. During the same year, United States exports to the same countries amounted to \$3,118 million dollars. By comparison, total Latin American exports that year were \$9,190 and imports were \$7,860. Therefore, well over one third of all exports of Latin America came to the U. S. A. and almost half her imports came from the U. S. A.¹²

¹¹Palmer, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

¹²Organization of American States, Report to Inter-American Economic and Social Council, Oct. 1964, pp. 27-28 (referred to hereafter as "OAS, Report 1964").

The U. S. A.'s direct private investment in the 19 Republics amounted to \$8,657 million dollars in 1963, an increase over 1962.¹³

Political Support

Latin America constitutes a block of twenty votes in the General Assembly. While not as numerically significant as in the days before the huge African country influx, the votes of the Latin American countries could easily be the deciding factor on issues of vital interest to the United States.¹⁴

UNITED STATES RECOGNITION

The Monroe Doctrine, the Good Neighbor Policy, and more recently, the Alliance for Progress attest to America's recognition of her dependence on Latin America. The loss of the South American markets, and the essential and critical raw materials which the United States imports and requires to maintain her defense posture, would surely deal a severe blow to the American standard of living. It is worthy to note that in FY64 US economic aid to Latin America amounted to \$1,190,200,000.¹⁵

¹³ Ibid., p. 39.

¹⁴ Palmer, op. cit., p. 24.

¹⁵ OAS, Report 1964, Introduction p. 1.

CHAPTER 3

VULNERABILITIES OF LATIN AMERICA TO COMMUNISM PEKING-STYLE

GENERAL

This chapter will attempt to develop the requirements for social reform in Latin America which, if not met, may constitute the seeds of revolution--the potential vulnerabilities to Peking-style communism. Furthermore, it will attempt to identify the forces that are resisting social change. An added section discusses the vulnerabilities of the Latin American intellectuals to Chinese communism. No discussion is made of the counterforces to communism, such as the church, because of length limitations and scope restrictions.

There have been many theories advanced as to the reasons for Latin America's underdeveloped condition today. A most popular theory in the West is that the breakdown of the colonial system in Latin America left that region with an outdated, if not feudal, social structure.¹ The concentration of wealth and political power in the hands of a few was the principal characteristic of this social structure. The Communists have expanded the guilt in this theory to include "US imperialism and exploitation." However, regardless of the reason, the fact remains that Latin America is relatively underdeveloped--a situation that has vast political implications.

Poverty, illiteracy, overpopulation, unemployment, inadequate

¹Mildred Adams, Latin America: Evolution or Explosion, p. 5.

housing, and excessive disease result in social unrest. This unrest could easily expand and erupt into revolution, if given a strong uniting force. Communist ideology could provide this force and direction. Communist ideology has a special appeal for people who are living in misery and oppression under governments which are, or appear to be, indifferent to their desires for social and economic betterment. The Communists seek power by tactical identification with the demands of the discontented group. Latin American countries have these social ills. Therefore, the Communist ideology promises the people of the countries equality and abundance for all, land reforms, and benevolent rule of the working class. It offers a hope for escape from the reality of hunger and a dream of peace and prosperity. The doctrine of communism is presented by the Communists as the panacea for all Latin American troubles.

While both Russia and Communist China are attempting to sell the doctrine of communism, it is Communist China that has presented the shortest route, the most direct path to this Utopia. Luis Prestes, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Brazil stated,

China's victory in 1949 has opened the road of national liberation for the peoples of all countries under the exploitation and oppression of imperialism. It is of great importance to learn from China's rich experience and correctly combine the universal law of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution.²

²"Current Background," U. S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, No. 591.

What is the Chinese way? Two elements of Mao's teaching are presented as guides for Latin American democratic movements--armed struggle and the united front. The united front is, in the words of Li Wei-han, a leading Chinese propagandist, a "magic wand" with which the Chinese people won their victory.³ The Yen-an Way is the term frequently applied to the Chinese Communist technique of revolution, since in the caves of Yen-an, their revolution was born. Stalin suggested that the Yen-an Way--the Chinese way--could be best applied in Latin America. Mao Tse-tung credits Stalin with originating the idea, according to Li Lu Ssang, a Mao contemporary,⁴

The fundamental key to the Road to Yen-an, lies in the fact that our work does not consist in thinking exclusively in proletarian terms, or taking into account only the working class. We think in much wider terms, which touch on other social sectors and include other classes. In view of the menace of fascism millions of people are disposed to fight on our side.

THE REQUIREMENT FOR CHANGE

The Population Explosion

Much has recently been written about the future problems that will be caused throughout the world by the population explosion. The population explosion is not in the future tense in Latin America. It is a current problem of tremendous magnitude. The effect on the future of this population explosion staggers the imagination. During

³Li Wei-han, The United Front is the Magic Wand with which the Chinese People Won their Victory, Red Flag No. 11, 1 Jun. 1961.

⁴Eudocio Ravines, The Yen-an Way, pp. 148-150.

the past twenty years, traditional social patterns in Latin America have been reshuffled, almost to the point of losing their identities by the population pressures of this explosion in Latin America.⁵

This tremendous human expansion daily augments the social pressures in the Hemisphere and, in itself, constitutes the most powerful reason for social revolution, as the available resources under the existing antiquated economic and social structures cannot make even a dent in the needs of runaway populations.⁶

Latin America's population in the next 35 years will increase by 157%--from 245 million now to over 600 million by the turn of the century. Already, all Latin American countries except Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay have inadequate diets, according to the US Department of Agriculture.⁷ Latin America's per capita food production has declined 16% since World War II and this region may soon be face to face with widespread hunger.⁸

Housing

Landless rural populations are migrating to the urban areas and causing festering pockets of misery. Urban renewal and modernization is losing ground in its competition with the influx. Slums now ring most of the urban areas of Latin America. Former Vice President Nixon, after spending two days in Lima, remarked that Peru lives atop a social volcano. As reported by Peru's own housing institute, the

⁵Tad Szulc, The Winds of Revolution, p. 46.

⁶Ibid., p. 47.

⁷"The World's Biggest Problem," US News and World Report, Vol. LIX, No. 14, 4 Oct. 1965, p. 53.

⁸"The World in a Mess," US News and World Report, Vol. LIX, No. 23, 6 Dec. 1965, p. 40.

country (Peru) has a rural and urban housing deficiency of nearly 2 million units out of a total population of 11 million.

In Quito, Ecuador about 250,000 out of 300,000 persons live in substandard conditions of housing, sewerage, water supply, public transportation, and other essentials. Peru and Ecuador are not isolated examples; all Latin American cities have a slum problem. Even relatively affluent nations such as Argentina have housing shortages; to meet current requirements in five of the main Argentinean cities, one million dwellings are needed.⁹

Poverty

The annual per capita income of the average Latin American is alarmingly low, when compared with his North American counterpart. It is approximately \$325, as compared to \$3,241 in the United States or \$2,100 in Canada. Furthermore, average figures for the continent do not reveal that the average Haitian's income is only \$80 per year, or a Bolivian's average income is only \$154 for the same period. These very low average incomes are offset by the Venezuelan annual average of \$728, and the Argentinean average of \$614.¹⁰

The presence of dire poverty, side by side with concentrated wealth, especially in backward countries such as Paraguay and Bolivia and in certain regions of Peru and Venezuela, spotlights the social inequality and maldistribution of wealth that is characteristic of

⁹Szulc, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

¹⁰"Notebook Charts," A World of Facts, 1965.

Latin America. Abject poverty, as it exists in Latin America, is in itself, a sufficient cause of social discontent. When this poverty is to be found in the presence of great wealth, the comparison encourages revolutionary movements.

Even among the working class, there is vast disparity of salaries between the workers in the main export industries and the ordinary urban workers. This disparity, in itself, is a disruptive social factor. For instance, a Chilean copper miner earns the equivalent of \$90.00 a week, but the average Chilean industrial weekly wage is only \$14.¹¹

Illiteracy in Latin America

The educational facilities in Latin America are grossly inadequate. Teachers are underpaid and undertrained. Elementary schools frequently operate on a shift basis. Secondary educational facilities are worse. There are insufficient secondary and technical schools. Many of those that exist are second-rate.¹² Illiteracy is especially high in the nations that have predominantly Indian populations. There has only been a modest improvement in literacy in most Latin American countries during the last decade. This slow improvement, of course, stems from the fact that improvements to the educational posture of Latin America must compete with the exploding population in rate of growth. Listed

¹¹"Revolution of Rising Expectations," The Economist, 22 Apr. 1961, p. 322.

¹²Ibid., p. 331.

below are current statistics of a sample of Latin American countrys' literacy postures:

<u>Percentage Literate</u> ¹³			
Bolivia	32%	Ecuador	60%
Peru	61%	Colombia	62%
Brazil	49%	Chile	85%
Venezuela	80%	Argentina	86%
Mexico	65%	Paraguay	68%

The literacy rate average for Latin America is 60 per cent as compared to 98 per cent in the United States.¹⁴

Illiteracy in itself is a vulnerability in the political life of any country because it impedes progress, promotes ignorance, creates a block to understanding, and fosters a lower standard of living. However, there is another vulnerability that illiteracy creates. In areas where the literacy rate is low, radio is a highly effective medium of propaganda. Radio is inexpensive in proportion to the number of people that it reaches and it reaches all segments of the population. The use of long-wave (broadcast band) transmission makes it possible for propaganda broadcasts to be received on the ordinary sort of receivers that most people have. The short-wave bands are generally used for broadcasts from abroad, sometimes in pre-arranged combination with long-wave stations. The use of short-wave

¹³Country Statistics from "Notebook Charts," A World of Facts, 1965.

¹⁴Overall Latin American Statistics by Juan deOnis, "Hemisphere: Rio Plus and Minus," New York Times, 5 Dec. 1965, p. 32.

receivers has become common in Latin America.¹⁵ The number of radios in Latin America is on the rise and radios are more numerous than would be indicated by the standard of living. A sample of the ratio of people per radio is listed below, utilizing the same countries that were used for the literacy sample--¹⁶

<u>People Per Radio</u>			
Bolivia	6	Ecuador	8
Peru	9	Colombia	4
Brazil	9	Chile	4
Venezuela	3	Argentina	3
Mexico	9	Paraguay	12

Vestiges of the Feudal Order

Prior to World War I, most Latin American countries were dominated by landholding aristocracy. The great mass of people lived on the land in a state of servitude. In the Indian countries, the peasants were semiserfs, cultivating the landlord's acres and rendering him personal service in exchange for the right to farm small portions of land to provide their families with a minimum existence. This system was an inheritance of colonial days.¹⁷

World War I created a demand for Latin American agriculture

¹⁵OAS, Report of Special Committee to Study Resolutions 11.1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 1963, p. 40.

¹⁶"Notebook Charts," A World of Facts, 1965.

¹⁷Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, The Strategy of Deception--A Study in World-Wide Communist Tactics, pp. 383-384.

products and also stimulated the industrialization of Latin America. Thus, it can be stated that the economic stirrings that followed World War I started a social revolution in Latin America as well. Unfortunately, the social and economic upheavals have not brought prosperity to the average citizen. Farm workers, whether hired laborers, sharecroppers, tenant farmers or small landholders, are underprivileged, underpaid, and usually underfed.¹⁸

Rural Latin America, with the exception of a few areas in such countries as Argentina and Uruguay, has changed little since the colonial days. Estimates indicate that 90 per cent of the land still belongs to ten per cent of the landowners--the "latifundios." The remaining arable land is in the form of dwarf holdings or "minifundios" which are economically unsound. In Paraguay, eleven farms cover 35 per cent of the wealthier half of the country. In Chile, 63 per cent of the arable lands is held by big estates while only .3 per cent is devoted to small farms.¹⁹

Worse yet, a latifundio utilizes only a very small part of its land. In Brazil, for example, it is charged that only 1.6 per cent of the arable land is under production, and in Venezuela only 1.0 per cent and this is an area where 70 per cent of the peasants are without land.²⁰

In northeast Brazil, the system of "cambao" still exists. This

¹⁸"Revolution of Rising Expectations," The Economist, p. 333.

¹⁹Szulc, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

²⁰"A Glorious Historic Mission," World Culture, No. 3, 5 Feb. 1959, p. 23.

is a system under which a peasant must work one day a week free for the landlord for the privilege of employment or for the right to raise a subsistence crop. Similar free labor programs can be found in Ecuador and Peru.²¹

Again, these examples are not isolated cases, but represent a situation prevalent throughout Latin America.

Rate of Economic Growth of Latin American Countries

Latin American countries generally have had a low rate of economic growth during the past fifteen years. Many reasons have been given for this economic stagnation. Among some of the more popular causes are the lack of skilled and semiskilled labor. This deficiency is aggravated by the fact that there is not an adequate educational and training base in Latin America. Another popular cause is the lack of transportation and communication facilities between the countries of Latin America has deterred the pace of industrial development and has tended to isolate the pockets of prosperity, thus impeding the flow of labor and capital according to market demand. Another significant cause of the lack of growth has been the disadvantageous terms of trade that Latin American countries have experienced since 1950.

Trade is essential in economic growth, but Latin American trade has not been expanding rapidly. For instance, in 1961, Latin American exports were only 11 per cent more than 1951. During the same period the population increased by 26 per cent; production by 5 per cent;

²¹Szulc, op. cit., pp. 54-58.

and manufacturing by 80 per cent. Trade earnings are not devoted to the growth process in Latin America but are needed to offset an unfavorable term of trade. Another popular cause of Latin American economic stagnation is the presence in power of the conservatives--the supporters of the status quo. This item is discussed more fully in the deterrents to change portion of this chapter.²²

Of concern to Latin America is the slowing down of the rate of growth as measured by the growth of the gross national product of the Latin American countries. During the ten year period prior to 1961, the gross national product rose 2.2 per cent, but, during the period 1957 to 1961 the gross national product only rose an average of 1.6 per cent. This is far below the 2.5 per cent rate regarded to be the minimum needed to achieve the goals of the Alliance for Progress.²³

The Communists blame the many years of domination of foreign capital, primarily that of the U. S. A., for the retardation of not only the economic but the cultural and political development of the Latin American countries. The Communist thesis is that the economy of almost all Latin American countries is of the monoculture type, i.e., it supplies some U. S. A. monopoly with some particular raw material such as oil, wheat, coffee, etc. Taking advantage of this, foreign capital dictates the most unprofitable terms. This view is

²²Joe R. Wilkinson, Latin America and the European Economic Community: An Appraisal, pp. 6-9.

²³Ibid., p. 10.

expressed in the Communist "Bible," Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism,²⁴

As a rule, the U. S. A. purchases their raw materials at low prices and sells them its industrial commodities at high monopoly prices. Unequal exchange, along with the export of profits by foreign capital and extortionate interest on foreign credits and loans, devitalizes the economy of Latin American countries and perpetuates their economic backwardness.

The Communist indictment continues,

Even the largest of them (Latin American countries) do not have a well-developed, modern heavy industry and act as raw material appendages to the United States.

The obvious implication of these propaganda statements is that the Latin American countries should trade with the Communist countries and break off the yoke of imperialism.

Inflation

During the ten year period prior to 1961, all the southern Republics--Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay were plagued by inflation. For example, the Chilean cost of living index rose tenfold from 1953 to 1961. During the same period Bolivia's cost of living rose threefold. Such inflation hampers economic growth, widens the gap between the social classes (since wages are slow to catch up with rising prices), and increases taxes on the urban population.

In the past several years, some economic stability has been noted and runaway inflation has been arrested; however, many of the ill

²⁴Manual, Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, 13 Aug. 1965, p. 414.

effects of inflation linger on.²⁵

DETERRENTS TO CHANGE

The Political System

While many political doctrines have had an effect on the political life of Latin America, none has been more enduring and more significant than the concept of the "caudillo," the leader. The "caudillo" who has "la suma del poder" (the sum of the power) governs because he can, not because he was elected. Unlike Anglo-Saxons who sanctify and give their loyalty to an institution such as the American Constitution, Latin Americans give unstinting loyalty to their leader. The basis for the leader's authority is more customary than constitutional. The loyalty is always to the leader, never to his party. There are no political counterparts in Latin America to the political influence or power of the many social or political organizations in the United States, such as the VFW, the Chamber of Commerce, or local political clubs. None of the vast political matrix found in the United States exists in Latin America. All instruments or agents of formal government such as tax officials, police, etc., are part of the central administration. In Mexico, for instance, no governor of a state could be elected against the wishes of the president. There is no effective local self-government. A highly centralized government is not responsive to the needs of the masses. It has no

²⁵"Revolution of Rising Expectations," The Economist, p. 328.

administrative mechanism for evaluating the political pulse of the people. Changes as desired by the people have no outlet and hence go unfulfilled.²⁶ An old Brazilian proverb is: Our country grows by night when the politicians sleep.²⁷ The Economist, expresses the problem as follows:

If the Latin American governments fail to shift the dead weight of privilege that blocks the path to self-generating social and economic change, the way may be blown open by the violence of revolution.²⁸

Vested Interests

As indicated in the previous section, Latin American politics are characterized by centralized control. This control frequently represents vested interests which would naturally be against any degree of change. Juan Bosch, former President of the Dominican Republic, states:²⁹

Anyone who does not demonstrate in a satisfactory manner that he respects and will continue to respect the established order in Latin America, that he will not touch a single hair of the vested interests, and that on the contrary, he will dedicate himself to defending them with body and soul, day and night is transmuted into and suspected of being a secret Communist.

The Army

With the abundance of coups d'etat in Latin America, it would

²⁶Frank Tannenbaum, The Political Dilemma in Latin America, pp. 497-512.

²⁷"Revolution of Rising Expectations," The Economist, p. 340.

²⁸Ibid., p. 325.

²⁹Juan Bosch, The Unfinished Experiment.

appear as if the Army has been an instrument of change, instead of a deterrent to change. Actually it is both. With regard to the established order, it has been a deterrent to change. When a Latin American president veers from the sacrosanct established order, the Army becomes an instrument of change. An example of this was in Brazil in 1964 where the leftist leaning President Goulart was disposed by a coup d'etat.

The support that the President of the United States gets from his political party is not available to the Latin American President. On the other hand, historically, the Army has provided the Latin American President with support. Without this support a Latin American President's position would be in jeopardy. In the past, the senior Army members all came from the privileged classes, and naturally favored their vested interests. However, with the new generation, career officers are coming less from the privileged classes and more from the middle class, with the result that in the future the Army may not necessarily favor vested interests.³⁰

VULNERABILITY OF LATIN AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS TO COMMUNISM--PEKING-STYLE

Every few days, in the daily press, one can read of student demonstrations or rioting somewhere in Latin America. These demonstrations and riots do not represent collegiate irresponsibility as they would

³⁰Rosendo Adolfo Gomez, Government and Politics in Latin America, pp. 55-60.

in the United States; but are merely symptoms of the active part that Latin American students play in their countrys' political life. Since the number of Latin American students is small and they probably include the future leaders of their countries, they enjoy higher positions of honor, prestige, and privilege than their US counterparts. It is not uncommon for students to stage demonstrations, strikes, and parades in challenge to government policy. Frequently, violence breaks out and on other occasions these strikes trigger other-than-student groups to join the disturbances. Student demonstrations frequently bring about immediate attention to a grievance.

In Guatemala in 1960, a student strike caused the resignation of the Minister of Interior. In Cuba in 1952, the student demonstrations that followed the Batista coup prefaced a continuing opposition that culminated in the Castro Revolution in 1959.³¹ One of the most respected leaders in Latin America, President Betancourt of Venezuela, was an extremely active political agitator in his student days.³²

Unlike their US counterparts, Latin American students wield much political influence. Why then are left-wing demonstrations so frequent? Why do many of these demonstrations advocate the "activist" type of revolution? The answer is partly because the faculty members, who are Marxist or at least have "leftist" tendencies, although few in number, can easily plant the seed of discontent, and encourage these demonstrations and uprisings.

³¹Ibid., pp. 46-47.

³²Charles Moritz, Current Biography 1960, p. 37.

The press of Latin America on the whole is not pro-Communist but there are some notable exceptions. A significant exception is in Uruguay, where it has been estimated that half the members of the fourth estate are Communist oriented. One of the Uruguayan daily papers, Epoca, openly advocates the Peking brand of communism. It is a recorded fact that Communist China invites many journalists and personnel from other professions to Red China each year. Many have accepted this invitation; some have returned with a changed political outlook. What draws these intellectuals and quasi-intellectuals to communism, Peking-style?

An immediate answer might be that these intellectuals are ideological converts. Undoubtedly, this fact is true in some cases; however, as Frank Tannenbaum states in his book, Ten Keys to Latin America, "Politics in this world we have been describing (Latin America) is very political, very pragmatic and not at all ideological. It is also personal."³³

If politics are not primarily ideological in nature, what then is Chinese communism's appeal to these people? It may be that the intellectual, unlike the underprivileged individual, sees all his country's economic, social, and political ills in a composite matrix of misery. The intellectual's lack of confidence in his highly centralized government's failures to cope with the day to day economic, social, and political evils, weaknesses, and problems that are

³³Tannenbaum, op. cit., p. 136.

characteristic of most of Latin America, is a most significant vulnerability. More than a change in government is needed. For over one hundred and fifty years, Latin American countries have been replacing governments with like governments--probably more frequently than any other region. However, the evils, weaknesses, and problems of each country are carried from one administration to another, with little improvement in the overall situation. A more radical change is needed.³⁴

Many Latin American intellectuals and professional men who have visited Cuba or have had access to information regarding Cuba single out three achievements of that country. First, land distribution has been a success. Secondly, if Cuban statistics are reliable, the industrialization program has been producing results. And thirdly, the nationalization of large concerns (including enterprises owned by United States citizens) has helped the Cuban economy.³⁵

Moscow, Peking, and Cuba consider the Latin American intellectual a highly vulnerable, lucrative, and likely target.

SUMMARY OF VULNERABILITIES

Communism, especially communism Peking-style, has a particular appeal in Latin America. The many prevalent social ills create vulnerabilities to communism which are magnified by their presence

³⁴Wallace R. Buelow, What Do Latin American Intellectuals See in Communism, p. 45. (This is a general summation of Buelow's thesis.)

³⁵"Revolution of Rising Expectations," The Economist, p. 340.

in an environment of affluence by a few. Deterrent forces to social reform exist and constitute a formidable bottleneck to much needed change; and all such forces that tend to deter change become inadvertent tools of Communist propaganda. The peoples of Latin America are not only frustrated by these social ills but aspirations for improvement are also thwarted by their governments' continued inability to cope with these social problems. They want a significant change and want it now. Peking has provided the roadmap. Students, because of their virtual immunity from criticism and their influence on national politics, constitute a dangerous vulnerability. And finally, in improvement itself a vulnerability lies. The process of change--although ultimately leading toward the goals of greater freedom and a higher standard of living for the individual--brings temporary frictions, frustrations, and maladjustments which the Communists seek to exacerbate and to use to their own advantage.

CHAPTER 4

A HYPOTHETICAL COMMUNIST CHINESE POLICY FOR LATIN AMERICA

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

While Communist China's foreign policy for Latin America, as follows, is hypothetical, it has concrete derivations in an analysis of the preceding chapters of this thesis. The obvious strategic importance of Latin America to Communist China and the vulnerabilities of Latin America to communism (Peking-style) form the basis and provide the clues to the development of Chinese foreign policies toward Latin America.

In expressing a Communist strategy for Latin America, it must be stressed that this strategy, although expressed in isolation, is actually part of Peking's long range grand strategy. This strategy has for its goal the spread of Marxist-Leninist doctrine throughout the world, with Peking as the Communist Mecca. This goal has deep ideological roots--both in doctrine and in application.

Furthermore, it must be recognized that any potential Communist Chinese foreign policy directed at Latin America must compete not only with foreign policy applicable to other regions of the world, but also with Communist China's domestic policy. It is recognized that many of the above mentioned policies can be implemented concurrently; however, where a significant expenditure of Communist China's limited assets is concerned, priorities must be established. For instance, on the domestic scene, Communist China would give very

high priority to the development of agricultural self-sufficiency and to the development of an advanced industrial state. Today, Communist China can neither feed herself nor can she produce her basic annual requirements of many industrial goods. By now, the Red Chinese are fully aware of the limitations of Mao Tse-tung's "glorious backyard" enterprises. In the realm of foreign policy, Communist China would give high priority to maintaining and expanding her hegemony over her peripheral neighbors and the regaining of her lost territories. Her need for a vigorous domestic policy is a prerequisite to improving her power position in the world. Her desire for hegemony over all Asian neighbors and the reclaiming of her lost territories is a "historical imperative" among the Chinese people.

OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES

Objective 1

To penetrate Latin American countries culturally, economically, socially, and politically.

Policies. a. To pursue a vigorous cultural exchange program by first establishing "friendship and cultural societies" in all Latin American countries and then actively pursuing the exchange of entertainers, intellectuals, students, union officials, journalists, educators, and government officials.

b. To establish trade and industrial fairs and expositions in Latin American countries to foster trade of all types.

c. To establish more political intimacy with all "overseas Chinese" living in Latin America, with emphasis on the Caribbean. These Chinese, who by Chinese law cannot divest themselves of their nationality, should be reminded of their obligations and loyalty to China. To increase their numbers in Latin American countries where law permits, with additional "loyal" overseas Chinese.

Objective 2

To subvert United States influence in Latin America.

Policies. a. To neutralize all United States penetration in Latin America by exposing its real nature--exploitation.

b. To provoke United States into actions and attitudes inconsistent with the spirit of partnership which regulates inter-American relationship.

c. To promote nationalism and socialism in the Latin American countries at the expense of foreign interests.

Objective 3

To establish ideological leadership over the revolutionary movements in Latin America.

Policies. a. To identify the revolutionary struggles of the Latin American people with Communist Chinese revolutionary tradition.

b. To convince the people of Latin America that Communist China's revolutionary experience is applicable to their situation.

c. To make wide distribution of Mao Tse-tung's written

works on revolution.

d. To organize all dissident Communists in Latin America, who support the Peking "activist" line, into true Communist parties.

Objective 4

To spread throughout Latin America a revolutionary pattern that is characterized by virulent anti-Americanism and state seizure of all property, whether domestically or foreign owned, without compensation.

Policies. a. To initiate a strong propaganda campaign against the existing land distribution in Latin America, with its concentration of ownership in the hands of big estate owners.

b. To initiate a strong propaganda campaign against foreign investors in the Latin American countries who reap profits from activities that should be home owned.

CHAPTER 5

COMMUNIST CHINESE PENETRATION IN LATIN AMERICA

GENERAL

In attempting to discuss Chinese Communist penetration in Latin America, two problems are noted. The first problem is whether to present Communist penetrations by functional areas, such as cultural, political, economic, etc., or to list known penetrations or attempted penetrations by country. The "Country Approach" has been adopted where possible because the number of countries to be considered makes generalizations very difficult. The dangers of thinking of Latin America as an entity are well-known but still practiced by the general public. Latin America's common Hispanic culture and certain similarities in the way the Latin Americans look at life obscure the vast indifference they have to one another and a marked desire to be unique. The second problem is how to separate the Russian brand of communism from the Peking variety. In many cases the evidence is insufficiently definitive; in other cases it is quite clear. For the purposes of this chapter, only identifiable or probable Chinese Communist penetration is used. In every Latin American country the composite Communist success in penetration is greater than the record of Chinese penetration depicted herein.

This chapter examines Communist China's penetration in 15 Latin American Republics individually. The 5 Republics not covered individually are Bolivia, Honduras, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. These

countries are not treated individually because the history of Communist China's penetration into them is very limited. The history that does exist is similar. All 5 countries have split Communist parties, with only a small faction favoring the Peking line. This "activist faction" is made up of student and youth groups.

Although not a Republic, British Guiana has been added to the list of individually examined countries because of its potential threat as a Chinese Communist base in the Caribbean.

PENETRATION IN ARGENTINA

Communist China has had only limited success in its penetration endeavors in Argentina. However, its success is increasing, particularly in its ability to infiltrate and subvert the Argentine Communist Party to its cause, and in economic penetration. The Communist Party of Argentina has officially announced that it favored the policy supported by the Soviet Union regarding the Sino-Soviet conflict. However, within Communist circles in Argentina, there is a lack of unanimity. Support for the position of Communist China has been voiced by: Communist youth groups, politically ambitious Trotskyites, and members of the "Luis E. Recabarren" school. This "Recabarren element" is made up of 60 members, most of whom are students, "expelled from the party for misbehavior and because they favor Red China." These dissident factions, although small in numbers, form the potential nucleus of a parallel Chinese Communist Party.¹

¹OAS, Report of Special Consultative Committee on Security on the Work Done During its Third Regular Meeting, 16 Nov. to 11 Dec. 1964, pp. 37-38 (referred to hereafter as "OAS, Report 11 Dec. 1964").

Guerrilla groups were discovered in Argentina, and suppressed by the armed forces in March 1962. The Communists' plan to carry out widespread terrorist activities failed to materialize. Recently there have been some insignificant terrorist activities which seem to have been carried out by certain "Peronist" groups of the so-called "hard line," in association with leftist nationals who are linked to the Castro-Communists.²

Peking has succeeded in achieving an ever-expanding economic infiltration of Argentina, beginning with the establishment of commercial relations with Argentina in 1952. Argentina exported 20,000 tons of wheat to China in 1954. After leftist negotiators visited Peking in 1955 and 1957, Argentina sold wheat valued at \$1,456,000 to China in 1960. After an invitation to visit a commercial fair in Canton, Argentina sold wheat valued at \$4,200,000. In 1962, \$30,000,000 worth of wheat was sold to Red China, and in 1963, the amount was \$100,000,000.

Since 1958, there has been an interchange of visits between Chinese and Argentinean commercial, cultural, and press missions.³

²OAS, Report of Special Consultative Committee on Security on the Work Done During its Fourth Regular Meeting, 12 Apr. to 7 May 1965, Pan-American Union, Washington, D. C., p. 9 (referred to hereafter as "OAS, Report 7 May 1965").

³US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Laws, Red Chinese Infiltration in Latin America, 4 Aug. 1965, pp. 44-45 (referred to hereafter as "Congress, Senate Report 4 Aug. 1965").

PENETRATION IN BRAZIL

The Sino-Soviet split has manifested itself more clearly in Brazilian Communist politics than in the politics of any other nation in Latin America. Brazil now has two Communist parties. One, the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), completely supports the Moscow line, and the other, the dissident Brazilian Communist Party (which claims to be the only true party), was founded by several ex-members of the Presidium and the Central Committee of the PCB who were expelled from the regular party for questioning the leadership and gradualist policies of the PCB. By 1963, the dissident party had declared all-out loyalty to the Chinese line and was quickly recognized by Communist China as the Marxist leaders in Brazil. Since 1962, a monthly publication, A Close Operaria, has been the official voice of the dissident party. This publication is in frequent dispute with the official organ of the PCB, Novos Rumbos.

The dissidents are stronger in the state of Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, and Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro). The membership of the PCB is an estimated 1000 members; however, its leaders are full-fledged revolutionaries who are dedicated to the idea that the present government will be overthrown and that they, the PCB, will be asked to lead the Communist movement in Brazil.⁴

Brazil has been a favored target of Peking. The "Association

⁴OAS, Report 11 Dec. 1964, pp. 41-42.

of Sino-Brazilian Friends" was established in Rio de Janeiro in 1954 by Brazilian leftists. A similar association was established in Sao Paulo in 1956. Leaders of the Brazilian Labor Party, the Socialist Party, the Peasant Association, the Students Union, the Association of Newspapermen, etc., were all invited to visit China. In 1956, films showing the armed Chinese Communist insurrection in China were distributed to Brazilian leftists, after being smuggled into the country. In 1960, Red China increased the Portuguese radio broadcasts beamed to Brazil to 21 hours per week. During the following year, a branch of the New China News Agency was established. It soon became the focal point of Chinese propaganda. That same year, many leaflets, printed in Portuguese and sent by Peking, were given to the Association of Brazilian Farmers for distribution in northeast Brazil. These leaflets gave instructions in how to provoke revolts and how to fight in a guerrilla war.

Trade relations between Brazil and Communist China, however, have not shown a significant increase. Peking's exports to Brazil amounted to \$22,604 in 1960, \$60,477 in 1961, \$420,317 in 1962, and \$685,000 in 1963. Brazil's exports to Communist China totaled \$485,317 in 1960, \$5,287 in 1962, and \$3,000 in 1963.

In 1963, Communist China sent a trade mission to Brazil to make preparations for a commercial and industrial fair in that country. After arrival in Brazil, the members of the mission contacted Brazilian leftists to undertake subversive activities. Their conspiracy was discovered, and they were detained by the Brazilian

Government in April 1964.⁵

The new militarily-oriented Government, which seized control in a 1964 coup d'etat, put a halt to the dangerous spread of communism and the infiltration into the political structure that had been fostered by the left-of-center previous government. Nevertheless, since that time, there have been some terrorist activities in Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre.⁶

PENETRATION IN BRITISH GUIANA

Communism in British Guiana is controlled primarily by one family, the Jagans. The leader of the Popular Progressive Party is Dr. Cheddi B. Jagan, an East Indian who became Premier in 1961. The party in general maintains a neutral line in the Moscow-Peking split; however, one faction of this party promoted by Janet Jagan, his wife, is markedly pro-Chinese.⁷

Janet Jagan, alumna of Northwestern University, has flown half-way around the world to tie her party to the Chinese Communists. It is her faction that is attempting to subvert the allegiance of the 4,100 overseas Chinese living in British Guiana to the Peking line; thereby, providing a base for the over one million Chinese who live in the Caribbean, Central and South America.⁸

⁵Congress, Senate Report 4 Aug. 1965, p. 3.

⁶OAS, Report 7 May 1965, pp. 9-10.

⁷OAS, Report 11 Dec. 1964, p. 50.

⁸Congress, Senate Report 4 Aug. 1965, pp. 12-13.

In 1961, the Popular Progressive Party failed to win an Assembly majority; Forbes Burnham, a negro, heading a coalition of two other parties, became Premier.⁹

PENETRATION IN CHILE

Despite the fact that the Communist Party of Chile "categorically adopted the Moscow line," it cooperated in the creation of the Association of Sino-Chilean Friends for the subversion of Chile. A party spokesman has stated that the party is a firm supporter of peaceful coexistence; however, during recent celebrations of the anniversary of the Chinese revolution, several events were held with the support of dissident sectors of the Communist Party of Chile and leaders of the Revolutionary Popular Action Front. The Central Committee of the Chilean Communist party reacted violently, forbidding participation of party members in the activist activities. Several activists were expelled as a result of their disobedience. This dissident faction, while apparently weak in members, indicates a potential split in the Communist camp.¹⁰

Although the National Labor Union of Chile is Communist controlled it is not known what percentage of this organization is sympathetic to, or supports, the Peking line. Communist China has invited some of the radical elements of Chilean politics, who are in Parliament, an opportunity to visit China. Several economic and

⁹World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1966, p. 649.

¹⁰OAS, Report 11 Dec. 1964, p. 48.

cultural missions have been sent from China to Chile, and Chile has been invited to send missions to China.

During a visit to Chile in 1964, to prepare the celebration of a commercial fair, an executive of the Administrative Office of the Chinese Chemical Industry negotiated for the purchase of 5,000 tons of Chilean copper valued at 57 million dollars. The purchases were made in 1965, and were paid in hard currency. At the same time, Peking showed an interest in purchasing one million tons of sodium carbonate. However, due to limited production capabilities in Chile, it was suggested by Chile that Red China construct the plant with Chilean help.¹¹

The current Government of Chile is anti-Communist. In fact, Chile's President, Eduardo Frei, had to beat a Marxist to win office.¹²

PENETRATION IN COLOMBIA

Communist Chinese penetration and influence in Colombia manifested itself in September of 1961, when a wave of violence broke out in the rural areas. This violence immediately followed the Third National Communist Youth Conference which adopted resolutions favoring communism Peking-style. This started the split in the Communist party which became so severe that the usual name calling and expulsions took place. Despite the split in 1964, the National Plenary held in

¹¹Congress, Senate Report 4 Aug. 1965, p. 44.

¹²"The Hemisphere," Time Magazine, 24 Sep. 1965, p. 30.

Colombia affirmed party loyalty to Moscow.¹³

As the result of operations that took place in the armed forces in 1964, terrorist and guerrilla activities have gradually decreased; however, in 1965, there has been an intensification. For the first time, the terrorists resorted to kidnappings, which are particularly dangerous because of psychological impact.¹⁴

Currently, extremist movements are having a field day, and winning numerous followers by capitalizing on the general discontent. A series of fiscal, monetary, and economic crises have made conditions exceedingly difficult for all. Lack of effective government, the irresponsibility of Congress, and a stalemate between President and Congress have brought things to a standstill.¹⁵

PENETRATION IN COSTA RICA

There has been little Chinese Communist penetration in Costa Rica. The People's Vanguard Party, the Communist Party of Costa Rica, remains loyal to Moscow and has openly criticized the Peking position as "trying to hide the consequences of thermonuclear war" and leading the socialist camp into economic isolation. It is significant, however, that the magazine, China Today, which is being distributed in Costa Rica has a circulation of 1000 and that is is climbing.¹⁶

¹³OAS, Report 11 Dec. 1964, p. 45.

¹⁴OAS, Report 7 May 1965, pp. 10-11.

¹⁵Vincent Andrade, "Rebel Priest in Colombia," America, 18 Sep. 1965, p. 48.

¹⁶OAS, Report 11 Dec. 1964, p. 47.

PENETRATION IN CUBA

Since 1958, there has been an interchange of "good will" missions between Peking and Havana. Many governmental representatives from both countries took advantage of this interchange. The "association of Friends of China and Latin America" provided the base for infiltration activities in Cuba and Latin America as early as 1960.

Economic infiltration of Cuba by Communist China appears to be on the increase. In 1958, a trade agreement was signed with Cuba, providing for the purchase of 50,000 tons of Cuban sugar. In 1960, the amount increased to 80,000 tons, and in the same year an agreement was reached for the purchase of 500,000 tons of sugar annually for five years. Furthermore, in 1960, Red China extended Cuba a loan of 240 million rubles, to be drawn during the period 1960 through 1965, without interest.¹⁷ In January 1965, however, Cuba had to adopt rice rationing, when the Chinese Reds failed to renew their rice-sugar agreement.¹⁸

The National Press of Cuba publishes a large quantity of propaganda for distribution in Latin America. In 1961 alone, Cuba imported 250,000 works of Mao Tse-tung in Spanish. These, as well as the books, Guerrilla Warfare by Ernesto Guevara, and One Hundred and Fifty Questions to a Guerrilla Fighter by General Alberto Bayo, circulate widely in Latin America.¹⁹

¹⁷Congress, Senate Report 4 Aug. 1965, p. 42.

¹⁸"Peking Cut Halves Cuban Rice Ration," Washington Post, 8 Jan. 1966, p. A6.

¹⁹OAS, Report of Special Committee to Study Resolutions 11.1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 1963, p. 22.

During the early days of the Sino-Soviet split, there were strong indications that Castro would follow the Peking line. This was a natural marriage, since Castro's type of revolution, successful in Cuba, and now being peddled in Latin America, was closer to the teachings of Mao Tse-tung than to those of Khrushchev or his successors. However, as the intensity of the Sino-Soviet split reached a point where Castro had to support one side or the other, financial aid proved to be the principal consideration. Understanding that the success of his revolution was due primarily to Soviet assistance and that Russia was still providing considerable financial aid to his country, Castro not only changed his position in favor of Russia, but criticized the Chinese position.²⁰ "Chinese Reds have some followers among Cuban Communists but Russia, not Red China, calls the turn in Havana."²¹

The switching of position is bound to affect adversely Havana-Peking relationships; in fact, it could impede Peking penetration in all of Latin America.

The Chinese once very much in evidence, are scarcely seen anymore. They have almost nothing to sell and very little to say.²²

Peking's drastic reduction of rice shipments to hungry Cuba has all but eliminated Fidel Castro's ability to act as a relatively independent leader of the Communist world.

This is the view expressed by Dan Kurzman, Washington Post staff

²⁰Congress, Senate Report 4 Aug. 1965, p. 42.

²¹"Worldgram," U.S. News & World Report, 27 Sep. 1965, p. 66.

²²"Cuba," Time, 8 Oct. 1965, p. 39.

writer. "Until a year ago," Kurzman continues, "Castro was able to maintain a large degree of independence by playing Moscow off against Peking."²³ The excuse given by the Chinese for cutting the rice shipments was that they needed this rice to build up a reserve in case the U. S. A. attacked China. However, China sold about 300,000 tons of rice to Japan this year, increasing by twofold last year's sale. Castro's bringing the rice cutback to world attention and the subsequent unfavorable Red Chinese reaction indicates further Peking's dwindling influence in Latin America.

PENETRATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Dominican Republic is torn between two Communist movements-- both designed to overthrow the existing Government. Communist movements, both Peking and Moscow inspired, are active despite the fact that many Communist Party leaders are in exile in Cuba.²⁴

Peking has direct ties with the rebel movement in the Dominican Republic and is preaching the doctrine that the only successful revolution is one launched from the countryside, not one based in the cities. "Communists now are fanning through the country where they have arms cached for later use."²⁵

²³Dan Kurzman, "Castro Survival is Up to Moscow," Washington Post, 13 Jan. 1966, p. 57.

²⁴Ibid., p. 56.

²⁵"Washington Whispers," U.S. News & World Report, 27 Sep. 1965, p. 29.

PENETRATION IN ECUADOR

The Communist Party of Ecuador is split and both the Peking and Moscow-oriented factions claim to be the legitimate party. Both parties have expelled each other. The pro-Peking group that favors the "hard line" has obtained its principal support from student and youth groups. The leaders of this group have been visiting Communist China since 1956 and possibly earlier. In 1963, one of these leaders, upon his return from China, was arrested in Quito. The Government found \$25,000 on his person that he was attempting to bring into the country apparently for subversive actions. The "activist" faction has so far been limited to a few sporadic sabotage actions in the cities of Quito and Guayaquil. The office of the New China News Agency in Ecuador was closed by order of a military junta in 1963.²⁶

PENETRATION IN GUATEMALA

Communism in Guatemala follows the classic pattern for Latin American countries--it is split between Peking and Moscow, but generally favors the latter.²⁷ Guatemala's Communist guerrillas were only an occasional nuisance until November 1965, when they launched a kidnapping spree. In all, nine kidnappings were reported. Kidnapping has become the number one political issue in Guatemala.

²⁶OAS, Report 11 Dec. 1964, pp. 49-50.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 50-51.

Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, who has been running the Government since 1963, claims the Government is perfectly able to maintain law and order. Nevertheless, he decreed an automatic death penalty for kidnappers, and offered a reward of \$25,000 each for the guerrilla leaders of the two bands.²⁸

PENETRATION IN MEXICO

As in many other Latin American countries, Peking was assisted by the local Communist party in getting its "bridgehead" into Mexico. Since 1953, the China-Mexican Friendship Association formed by the Mexican Reds, has been coordinating reciprocal visits between China and Mexico, and distributing propaganda.

Cultural penetration by Peking has been less than successful; for instance, in 1960 the Peking Opera Company was denied an entry permit. A similar refusal was made to Chinese Communist journalists in 1959.

Economic penetration has been much more successful. In 1963, Peking offered to buy large quantities of cotton, coffee, beans, and oil on the condition that the Mexican Government would permit Red China to hold an industrial and commercial exposition in Mexico. Mexico accepted the offer after an executive of the Peiping Chemical Industry arranged for the purchase of 350,000 tons of wheat and 35,000

²⁸"The Hemisphere - Guatemala - A New Red Offensive," Time, 7 Jan. 1966, p. 34.

tons of cotton, and signed another agreement to buy 200,000 bales of Mexican cotton for \$23,000,000.

Imports and export trade between Communist China and Mexico has been on the increase since 1960 as indicated below:

	<u>Communist China Exports</u>	<u>Mexican Exports</u>
1960	\$ 800,000	\$ 700,000
1961	\$ 100,000	\$ 1,200,000
1962	\$ 1,100,000	\$ 1,200,000
1963	\$ 1,700,000	\$ 1,300,000

The Red Chinese now have a trade office in Mexico.

Peking's political infiltration of Mexico received a blow in March 1964, when President de Gaulle of France visited Mexico. At that time, the China-Mexican Friendship Association asked Mexican President, Adolfo Lopez Mateos to establish diplomatic relations with the Peiping regime. The proposal was turned down publicly by the President, and Mexico continued to maintain diplomatic relations with the Republic of China.

A branch of the New China News Agency is well established in Mexico where it is spreading Peking-inspired propaganda. The Chinese leftists in Mexico are promoting the United Front campaign, and working closely with the Mexican National Liberation Front movement.²⁹

If presidential election returns are an indication of the political trend of a nation, then Mexico is swinging to the right or perhaps

²⁹ Congress, Senate Report 4 Aug. 1965, pp. 43-44.

better stated, away from the left. The 1964 election of Sr. Diaz Ordaz, the former Minister of the Interior, was good news to the political rightists in Mexico, the Catholic Church, and the American Embassy.³⁰

PENETRATION IN PANAMA

Communist China has demonstrated much interest in Panama. Both Russia and Communist China wasted no time in allying themselves with Panama during the anti-United States demonstrations in January 1964. Peking mobilized all its propaganda forces to denounce alleged acts of aggression by the United States in Panama. Red China gave her support to the Panamanian demand for Panamanian sovereignty in the Canal Zone. The National Action Vanguard (VAN), made up primarily of young Marxist extremists, is in keen competition with the larger People's Party (PDP) which is a strong supporter of the Moscow policies.

Sporadic terrorist activities in Panama led the Governor of Colon to state that "personnel trained in Communist China, Cuba, and Russia have attempted a coup against our democratic system" and that the Communists are trying to deceive the masses in the hope of seeing Panama converted into the second American republic to be under the heel of a foreign army.³¹

³⁰"Favorite Wins," The Economist, 23 Nov. 1963, p. 760.

³¹OAS, Report 7 May 1965, p. 16.

PENETRATION IN PERU

The Communist Party of Peru (PCP) is ideologically split between the "orthodox" who adopt the Moscow line, and the "activists" who follow the Peking guidelines. As in Brazil, the Communist Party of Peru (PCP) expelled members of its party as "political traitors" and "immoral persons." Among the expellees was the Secretary General of the PCP. This self-appointed leader of the dissident PCP has stated that his element will adopt a severely independent line. Although it is difficult to appraise the strength of the rival factions, it is significant to note that the pro-Chinese group is dominant in almost all the regional organizations of the party.

Constant pressure by the activists make it difficult for the orthodox party leaders to hold their positions. Student groups are particularly active. The activist approach is from the Castro mold and it is supported by economic aid and training from Havana and Peking.³²

"Cattle rustler, that's all," snorted Peru's President, Fernando Belaunde Terry, when the first reports of Communist guerrilla activity filtered down from the country's Andean highlands last June. The remark now haunts Belaunde. Last week, in the severest crisis of his 26-month administration, Belaunde chose to accept the resignation of his entire Cabinet rather than allow it to appear before Congress to answer criticism about the Government's laggardly response to the guerrilla threat.³³

Deep in the jungles of the Andes, terrorist bands of Indians are

³²OAS, Report 11 Dec. 1964, pp. 54-55.

³³"Peru, Harassed by Cattle Rustlers," Time Magazine, 24 Sep. 1965, p. 44.

trying to stir up a major revolt. In Lima, opposition to President Belaunde claims that guerrilla war is far more widespread than the Government admits.

Russia, Cuba, and Communist China, said President Belaunde, are to blame for the war in the Andes. Broadcasts from all three countries in the Indian language, he said, urged all Peru's Indians, half the population, to revolt.³⁴

In 1965, after terrorists had killed nine rural policemen, the Government quickly passed the bill the army wanted: death penalty for all convicted terrorists. The enemy force has been estimated at about 500 men, and is located in the mountainous area 300 miles east of Lima.³⁵

PENETRATION IN URUGUAY

The Communist Party of Uruguay has condemned the "revisionist positions of Marxism-Leninism upheld by the Chinese leaders. . . ." However, the activities of terrorist groups in this country have indicated the favoring of the violent tactics advocated by Peking. Thefts of weapons and explosives, and armed attacks on banking institutions have been defended by political, labor, and student groups. The Revolutionary Labor Party, a Trotskyite movement that as yet does not have a formal political organization of any significance, has been credited with playing an important role in these terrorist activities.³⁶

³⁴"Worldgram," U.S. News & World Report, 27 Sep. 1965, p. 66.

³⁵"Peru, Harassed by Cattle Rustlers," Time Magazine, 24 Sep. 1965, p. 44.

³⁶OAS, Report 11 Dec. 1964, p. 56.

With the help of Uruguayan Communists, China established the Association of Sino-Uruguayan Friends. Utilizing this association, Peking invited representatives of the Union of Uruguayan Workers, newspapermen, educators, intellectual workers, deputies (representatives), lawyers, and musicians to visit Red China. In turn, various Chinese groups visited Uruguay in 1959-1960. A branch of the New China News Agency was established in Uruguay after a delegation of the Association of Uruguayan Newspapermen visited Peking and signed an agreement with the Association of Chinese Communist Newspapermen. The agreement provided for an exchange of press visits and reference material.³⁷

International communism has made a serious penetration of the Uruguayan press by infiltrating the trade union organization of Montevideo and its environs. The ten daily newspapers of that city have a tremendous influence on all political issues. Of these ten newspapers, two are definitely Communist-oriented. One of these papers, Epoca, is financed by interests in behalf of Red China, through Cuba. Since for several years, the leaders of the Association of the Uruguayan Press have been Communists, the thesis has been postulated that over half the journalists of Uruguay are Communists or have leftist leanings.³⁸ There is no estimate as to what percentage of these left-wing journalists are Peking-oriented and inspired.

³⁷ Congress, Senate Report 4 Aug. 1965, p. 45.

³⁸ "Translations on Latin America." No. 358, U. S. Dept of Commerce, 22 Sep. 1965, pp. 40-41.

PENETRATION IN VENEZUELA

Even though there are three divergent points of view within the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) as to their degree of revolutionary fervor, there has been no public split, nor has there been any disciplinary action against dissident activists, as happened in Brazil. The Venezuelan Communist party is more concerned with a united front of leftists than with the ideological split between Russia and Communist China. That is why the PCV is the only Communist party in Latin America that has not taken sides in that ideological split.

Recent Communist setbacks both at the hands of the people and the Government are indicated in three resolutions adopted by the Central Committee of the PCV in April 1964;³⁹

- A. The primary objective of the Venezuelan Communist Party is to regain the support and cooperation of the masses. To that end, all terrorist acts in cities will be suspended for the time being while an intensive plan of propaganda, etc.,
- B. The suspension of terrorist campaigns will pave the way for the rehabilitation of the Party, etc.,
- C. Nevertheless, the fundamental method of conducting the revolution in Venezuela continues to be armed conflict.

Since 1963, when the underground terrorists' Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), a Communist-sponsored organization, saw the collapse of their efforts to prevent national elections, FALN units have been broken up by government troops in raids that resulted from

³⁹OAS, Report 11 Dec. 1965, pp. 57-58.

turncoats' tips. Recently, the Venezuelan Government uncovered a large terrorist munition factory 250 miles southwest of Caracas. It is thought that the FALN prefers to make its own arms and ammunition because of the Government's success in reducing smuggling of these items into the country. Government forces, for example, located and confiscated 3.5 tons of munitions from Cuba in 1963.⁴⁰ In 1964, little Communist activity was noted. A slight increase of guerrilla activity was noted in the northeast section of the country in 1965; however, this activity was ineffective.

⁴⁰"Venezuela Terrorists Make Own Arms Now, A. P. Dispatch," Washington Post, 14 Nov. 1965, p. 41.

CHAPTER 6

HYPOTHETICAL COMMUNIST CHINESE STRATEGY VS ACTUAL COMMUNIST CHINESE PENETRATION IN LATIN AMERICA

REFERENCE OBJECTIVE 1

To penetrate Latin American countries culturally, economically, socially, and politically.

Comment: The Chinese Communists have been only moderately successful in penetrating Latin America culturally, economically, and socially, and to a far less degree politically.

To establish administrative machinery for the coordination of cultural exchanges in Latin America, Peking established the "Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations" in 1950. This was quickly followed by the establishment of "friendship societies" such as the "Association of Sino-Brazilian Friends," activated in Rio de Janeiro in 1954, or the "Association of Sino-Chilean Friends," established the same year. The nonavailability of normal diplomatic channels limits the number of cultural delegations Peking can send to Latin America and the number of countries they can visit. To compensate for this limitation, Communist China has invited Latin Americans to visit China instead. Between January 1959 and December 1960, for instance, China sent only twenty-four delegates to fifteen Latin American countries, but received well over two hundred delegations from twenty-one Latin American countries. At one time or another, Communist China has had some kind of exchange with practically

every Latin American country. Individuals visiting China were mainly students, artists, journalists, trade unionists, university professors, lawyers, and doctors.

The visit to Latin America by art ensembles, folk art exhibits, acrobats, etc., has been on the increase. These exchanges have been extremely well received in Latin America. However, it is not known whether these warm receptions have political overtones or whether free entertainment or mere curiosity was the drawing factor. Success in meeting the cultural penetration objectives has not been universal; for instance, in 1960 the Peking Opera Company was denied an entry permit. A similar refusal was made to Chinese Communist journalists in 1959.

Economic penetration in the form of increased trade between Latin American countries has been generally on the increase; although it has never reached proportions approximating the trade between the Latin American countries and the United States. One notable exception to this trade penetration is the case of Cuba. Up until this year, trade between Cuba and Communist China increased each year. This year, however, Communist China did not renew the sugar-rice agreement which has been in effect for the past five years. The abrupt change in Chinese Communist trade policy forced Cuba to adopt rice rationing. The exposure of a Chinese Communist "trade mission" as a subversive element of the Chinese Communists in 1964 adversely affected Communist Chinese and Brazilian relations.

Political penetration into Latin American political organizations,

other than established Communist parties, has been less than successful. For instance: In 1964, when President de Gaulle visited Mexico, the China-Mexican Friendship Association requested that Mexican President, Adolfo Lopez Mateos establish diplomatic relations with Peking. The proposal was turned down publicly at that time. Mexico continued to maintain diplomatic relations with the Republic of China.

In Brazil a leftist leaning government was toppled and in Chile the current President, Eduardo Frei defeated a Marxist to take office. In 1963, despite an all-out Communist effort to prevent elections in Venezuela, the elections were held and many of the terrorist units were broken up as the result of turncoats' tips

During the November 1965 UN vote on the seating of Communist China, all Latin American countries voted against the seating of Communist China except Cuba and Chile. Cuba voted for the seating and Chile abstained.¹

REFERENCE OBJECTIVE 2

To subvert United States influence in Latin America

Comment: United States prestige in Latin America appears to be at a high level. United States investments have been on the increase. Even the Communists recognize this, stating in the Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism:²

¹"How the U.N. Voted on Seating of Communist China," New York Times, 21 Nov. 1965, p. 2e.

²Manual: Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, p. 414.

During 1929-61 alone capital investments of the U. S. A. in this area increased almost 3.5 fold, from \$3,500 million to \$12,000 which constitutes 36 per cent of all foreign investments in the U. S. A.

Politically, left of center governments are being overthrown, as in Brazil in 1964; other governments are successfully holding democratic elections. In Venezuela, in 1963, for the first time, a President was replaced in office by a man who had been elected through the constitutional process. Subversive books were being confiscated and burned in Brazil in 1965. Mexico remains with the U. S. A. in recognizing Nationalist China, as opposed to Communist China.

United States prestige, although currently high, has had its ebbs and tides. The Communists are quick to seize upon all incursions of the U. S. A. into Latin America and brand them as imperialist actions. Both Russia and Communist China denounced our actions in Cuba in 1961, in Panama in 1962, and in the Dominican Republic in 1965.

A major contributing factor that has acted as a countersubversive element for the U. S. A. has been the Alliance for Progress. A veteran Latin American diplomat remarked, as the Special Inter-American Conference closed at Rio de Janeiro in January of 1964,³

If President Kennedy hadn't launched the Alliance for Progress in 1961, I doubt that the Inter-American system would be in one piece today.

The same newspaper article continues,

³Juan deOnis, "Hemisphere: Rio Plus and Minus," New York Times, 5 Jan. 1965, p. 30.

There were clear signs in Rio of growing confidence among governmental leaders and regional technicians in the Alliance for Progress, a program designed originally to achieve specific targets of economic growth within a decade. Toward these goals the U. S. pledged \$20 billion in public aid and private investments to supplement an estimated \$80 billion in Latin American development spending.

It appears as if the Communist attempt to subvert U. S. influence in Latin America is facing an adequate if not overwhelming counter-subversive in the Alliance for Progress. Results indicate that Peking's attempt, in fact all of the Communist camps' attempts, to subvert U. S. influence in Latin America have failed

REFERENCE OBJECTIVE 3

To establish ideological leadership over the revolutionary movements in Latin America.

Comment: The Chinese Communists have been able to penetrate the revolutionary movements in some countries; however, they have not assumed leadership over these movements in any of the Latin American countries. Most Communist parties in Latin American countries have Peking factions, but the parties themselves remain loyal to Moscow. Only in one country, Brazil, has the Communist Party split into two parties.

REFERENCE OBJECTIVE 4

To spread a revolutionary pattern throughout Latin America, characterized by virulent anti-Americanism and state seizure of all property, whether domestically or foreign owned, without compensation.

Comment: It is difficult to determine whether the terrorists in Latin America are Peking or Moscow-inspired. In most cases they are Havana-supported and trained. In any event, they appear to be losing their revolutionary struggle. For instance, guerrilla groups were discovered in Argentina in 1962, and were suppressed by the armed forces. In 1964, terrorist and guerrilla activities decreased as the result of the armed forces' operations in Colombia. Guatemala claims to have controlled subversion; however, \$25,000 each has been offered for the heads of the two guerrilla bands in that country. In Peru the revolutionary element, although small (an estimated 500 men), has been particularly troublesome. In 1965, the Peruvian Army received the tool it believed it needed--a law decreeing the death penalty for all convicted terrorists.

After many terrorists activities in Venezuela in 1963, including the burning of the \$4.5 million warehouse of Sears-Roebuck and the blowing up of six highway bridges, the Government cracked down. With the help of "turncoats'" tips, the army suppressed the terrorists. To help spread the revolutionary pattern and spread virulent anti-American propaganda, the Communist bloc is making full use of radio broadcasts for propaganda purposes. In 1959, Radio Peking's Spanish language broadcasts were increased to the point that they were second only to the worldwide English language broadcasts.⁴

⁴Roy Richard Rubottom, International Communism in Latin America, Statement made before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, p. 3.

In 1965, it was reported that the total number of hours per week transmitted in the Spanish language by Communist China, the Soviet Union, and Soviet satellites was 420 hours per week.⁵

⁵OAS, Report 7 May 1965, p. 16.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

1. In comparing the hypothetical Communist Chinese strategy to actual or attempted penetration in Latin America by Communist China, the conclusion emerges that the hypothetical strategy could in fact be the "actual" strategy of Communist China.

2. The "actual" strategy of Communist China toward Latin America has had only minimal success in meeting its objectives.

3. In recent years, some of the minimal successes, mentioned above, have been reversed. Communist China appears to be losing ground in its attempt to meet its strategy objectives in Latin America.


4. Except for limited arms help to Cuba and a heavy propaganda outlay, Communist China is either unwilling or unable to provide military or economic assistance to revolutionary movements in Latin America.

5. Latin Americans are eager to preserve their freedoms; they desire social change, but not by the violent route that the Chinese Communists are attempting to sell.

6. Communist China has failed in its attempt to replace the Soviet Union as the leader of the Communist party and revolutionary movements in Latin America. The revolutionaries prefer the coexistence policies of Soviet Russia to the more activist approach of Communist China. Russia, not Communist China, is the primary threat in Latin America.

7. Communist China is attempting to exploit her huge manpower reserve unto an image of overall power. Furthermore, it appears as if the Chinese Communists' truculent foreign policy is merely a smoke screen to hide their internal problems.¹ A Mr. Legum writing in the, Observer, states:

Keen to appear as the principal abettors of revolution, the Chinese actually welcome Western propaganda which exaggerates the importance of their support for liberation movements.


WALTER G. RUNTE
Col, Signal Corps

¹"China in Proportion," The Economist, 3 Oct. 1961, p. 18.

EPILOGUE

The First African-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Conference which closed in Havana on 15 January 1966, may start a new phase in Red China's infiltration of Latin America. Recent setbacks to the spread of international communism in Latin America must have caused a review of policies both in Peking and Moscow. The keynote of this Conference was solidarity--that magic ingredient that the Communist world hopes will again stimulate the growth of communism in Latin America.

U.S. News & World Report, states that at the Havana Conference mentioned above, there was an initial showdown between Russia and Red China and angry words were exchanged. However, after this initial flurry "the Conference got down to work."

A new Communist run "international" was created to direct Reds in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. "Wars of Liberation" like that in Vietnam, pro-Red rebellions like that in the Dominican Republic will be supported also. . . . A Communist general headquarters for Latin America was set up on a permanent basis in Cuba. There a team of professional Reds will do what it can to support Communist-led activities all over Latin America. Money, arms, and aid will be supplied by Russia and Red China through Havana.¹

At first glance it would appear that the Peking-Moscow "team" would now embark on a coordinated effort to spread communism throughout Latin America, utilizing the activist approach; however, it is not known whether the Communist unity-of-effort will ever be achieved. For instance, Jenmin Jih Pao, the Chinese Communist Party Organ, three

¹"Worldgram," U.S. News & World Report, 31 Jan. 1966, p. 67.

days after the close of the Solidarity Conference, made the comment that the Conference had rejected the attempt of Soviet delegates "to bring the national democratic movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America into the orbit of U. S.-Soviet collaboration and world domination." It added, "that the Soviet delegation had resorted to all kinds of despicable tricks to smuggle into the Conference its contraband--peaceful coexistence."

Only time will tell how closely or for how long the Sino-Soviet solidarity program will be effective. While its future does not appear bright, it should receive the closest scrutiny.²

²Seymore Topping, "Red China Calls U. S. Target of World Movements," New York Times, 9 Jan. 1966, p. 28.

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