

REBALANCING THE REGIONAL D.I.M.E.

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

REBALANCING THE REGIONAL D.I.M.E.

by

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ABSTRACT

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United States national security operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the importance of interagency interdependence across the full spectrum of operations. Joint publications, Army field manuals and numerous speakers at the U.S. Army War College have espoused a whole-of-government approach, but coordination continues to be the national mantra. U.S Departments provide resources that are out of balance and not effectively integrated to maximize results. The military instrument of power continues to fill the vacuum created by inadequate resourcing of the remaining instruments. This imbalance between Ends, Ways, and Means must be rectified to ensure the most effective response in the current strategic environment. Regionally, the U.S. Government must move from a Cold War, military-centric, coordination based organization to an all-inclusive integrated construct. By changing the Ways from coordination to integration, and rightfully balancing the Means, the USG can efficiently plan and execute a whole-of-government approach worldwide. This paper proposes an Interagency Regional Operations Center as the answer to the Ends, Ways, and Means imbalance.

REBALANCING THE REGIONAL D.I.M.E.

Interagency interdependence is essential in today's world of full spectrum operations. No matter where a mission falls on the spectrum, a whole-of-government approach should be the standard. Since the end of the Cold War, operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan required this partnership across Executive Branch Departments. In Iraq, one of the contributing factors toward the success of the surge was the fusion of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and US Mission-Iraq into a joint campaign plan. During my 2007-08 assignment to MNF-I, I could see positive changes. Both staffs began to integrate more during planning and execution and both staffs worked to achieve a set of common objectives outlined across the United States Government (USG). Yet, despite the successes in Iraq, rhetoric for a synchronized and integrated approach that capitalizes on all national instruments of power in fulfillment of national objectives continued to be an elusive goal in everyday operations.

The end state must be an integrated and interdependent organization where planning and executing a whole-of-government approach is maximized across the full spectrum of operations. However, interdepartmental coordination is flawed. Conceptually, there are an inordinate number of agencies across the USG to coordinate, each with its own mission set, limited resources and internal priorities. Additionally, USG departments provide varied resources that are out of balance and not effectively integrated to maximize results. This imbalance between the Ends, Ways, and Means is important and must be addressed to provide the most effective response across the full spectrum of operations in a post-Cold War strategic environment.¹ This

research offers a solution to the Ends, Ways, and Means imbalance through interdependence at the regional level.

U.S. National Power

The United States application of power at the regional level is too heavily dependent on the Department of Defense's (DOD) Geographic Combatant Commanders (CCDR). Department of Defense CCDRs have stepped in to fill the vacuum created in the execution of the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power because there is no Department of State (DOS) or civilian agency with adequate representation and resources present. The United States Government's overreliance and default to the military instrument of power (Means), and the military's continued acceptance of more foreign affairs missions, is resulting in a skewed application of U.S. power (d.i.M.e.) instead of a more balanced approach (D.I.M.E.)².

Most scholars regard power as "the strength of capacity that provides the ability to influence the behavior of other actors in accordance with one's own objectives."³ National power is contextual, though, in that it can be evaluated only in terms of all the power elements (diplomatic, informational, military, economic), and only in relation to the players and situation where the power is used.⁴ Although national power is historically linked with military capacity, since war is the ultimate display of power, the military element alone cannot determine national power.⁵ In today's model, the interagency departments coordinate Ways and Means to achieve national objectives (Ends).

Diplomacy is the State Department's primary function, although diplomacy never functions in isolation from the other instruments of power. Diplomacy fundamentally consists of the constant assessment of other countries' power potential, perceived vital

interests, and relationship with other states, in an attempt to maximize and assure a country's vital interests.⁶ The DOS exercises diplomacy on behalf of the United States by stationing U.S. Ambassadors in countries around the world and then reciprocating by accepting foreign ambassadors on our soil. U.S. Ambassadors operate in U.S. embassies around the globe and typically have political, economic, and administrative offices that interface regularly with foreign governments. The ambassador is a diplomat and as such is an agent of the USG ordered to carry out instructions from authorized superiors. It is important for the United States to maintain a civilian face on the diplomatic and economic instruments of power. If the military is the perceived owner of these instruments, the USG's ability to influence and work with other countries and non-governmental organizations is potentially diminished. Unbalanced military growth from 2005 to 2008 left the impression internationally that American foreign policy was being "militarized."⁷ This is not the impression America should portray.

The Department of State has faced serious reductions in capacity over the last 20 years while the Department of Defense has experienced exponential growth. Even though the founding fathers created DOS to be the face of American foreign policy, its capabilities and punch have atrophied over the years. Created separately under the U.S. Constitution to represent the United States in foreign affairs, the lines continue to blur as domestic and international politics look to the DOD to perform more non-traditional roles across the international spectrum. The CCDRs are the senior ranking USG official in the region and are well-resourced compared to other USG agencies. Therefore, the CCDRs are expected to take a more active role in wielding the diplomatic, informational and economic instruments of power to obtain and secure U.S.

national security interests. As CCDRs get more involved in all aspects of the D.I.M.E., the balance between the instruments of power becomes more skewed in favor of the military; and a natural friction emerges because one aspect of national power attempts to control the others. A military face on the diplomatic, informational and economic instruments of power is not always received well across the international community.

DOS or DOD

The Department of State has seen massive capacity and budget cuts since the end of the Cold War. During the 1990s, both the executive and legislative branches of the USG rushed to cash in on the perceived peace dividend created with the demise of the Soviet Union.⁸ Several blue-ribbon studies revealed the U.S. Government cut funding for foreign affairs programs from over \$5 billion in 1996 to approximately \$3.6 billion in 2000 (1996 dollars).⁹ During the early part of this decade, the administration often overlooked DOS and gave it a back-seat to DOD. Despite efforts over the last 4 years to build up the State Department's capabilities, a recent study by the Foreign Affairs Council found the State Department would need to hire 1,100 new staff just to meet its current obligations.¹⁰ The limited DOS budget has atrophied its regional capabilities and forced it to focus limited resources at the country-team embassy level.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), both integral partners of DOS, also experienced tremendous capacity and budget cuts. USAID was compelled to reduce its Foreign Service and Civil Service staff from about 12,000 personnel during the 1970s to a little over 2,000 today. In addition, USIA which employed more than 8,000 personnel worldwide in 1996, lost the majority of its workforce and was forced to merge with an already understaffed and underresourced DOS.¹¹ The DOS budget authority was so

meager during the late 1990s that the department often had to forego hiring any new Foreign Service Officers.¹²

The Department of Defense's capabilities far outweigh that of the State Department in both budget authority and personnel available to accomplish the mission. In the President's Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 budget submission, the request for all Department of State appropriations totaled \$16.39 billion, an increase in \$1.9 billion from FY2009. Of the total DOS submission, a mere \$12 billion was for managing and administering all foreign affairs operations.¹³ Under current budget levels, the DOS manages all U.S. foreign affairs with over 180 nations with about 9,000 Foreign Service Officers spread across all U.S. embassies, the interagency, and within the State Department.¹⁴ USAID's FY2010 budget submission totaled only \$32 billion for assistance to those 180 nations.¹⁵ Taken together, DOS and USAID budget authorities were approximately 7.5 percent of DOD's FY2010 request.

In stark comparison, the President's FY2010 budget requested \$663 billion for the Department of Defense, an increase in \$20.5 billion of discretionary budget authority from FY2009.¹⁶ As for capacity, the DOD employs approximately 1.68 million uniformed military members¹⁷ backed up by 800,000 civilian personnel¹⁸ across the globe to secure the U.S. and promote national interests. While both DOS and DOD see a greater need for increased budgets and capacity within the DOS, the foreign affairs budget has always been a tougher sell to Congress than the military budget.¹⁹

The DOD Geographic Combatant Commanders are naturally filling the void created by the State Department's lack of resources at the regional level. In 1986, the 99th Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act (GW-N) to, among other things, “place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands.”²⁰ Since the GW-N Act, and absent a similar DOS capability, the CCDR has become the U.S. Government’s top wielder of U.S. power regionally.

From a military perspective, the CCDR owns all U.S. forces in his geographic area (regardless of Service affiliation), can submit budget requests directly to the Department of Defense, and reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and President. From the CCDR’s purview, he is the only U.S. regional representative and should be able to shape the region to bolster U.S. interests. The CCDR theater campaign plans, by means of necessity, are moving closer to fulfilling the diplomatic, economic and information void.

Combatant Commanders now baseline all combatant command activities in a campaign plan for each theater of operation. In the past, CCDRs developed operation plans for possible contingencies in their theaters, but gone are the days of contingency-centric planning, replaced by a more national strategy-centric focus. The primary focus of the campaign plan is now on what DOD terms “phase 0 ops” or the stability and prevention of conflicts in a specific theater.²¹ Stability and prevention operations encompass the synchronized execution of all national instruments of power. The DOD’s most recent *Guidance for the Employment of the Force* defines stability operations as “those military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum of operations to establish or maintain order in states and regimes.”²² These are whole-of-government

missions. The regional CCDR is the only entity with the resources required to pull these agencies together.

Stability and prevention are beyond the sole capabilities of DOD. The CCDRs understand they must reach out and include the interagency in planning actions to be successful. In Pacific Command's Theater Campaign Plan, the CDRPACOM spells out his intent as follows, "In concert with interagency allies and partners, USPACOM forces will enhance security and stability throughout the Asia-Pacific region."²³ The Theater Campaign Plan now facilitates the successful practice of having DOD serve as the executor or partner for interagency programs when executive agents lack the robust manning and operational capacity.²⁴ In another recent DOD publication, *The Military Contribution to Cooperative Security Joint Operating Concept (JOC)* states, "the role of the U.S. military will remain protecting and advancing the security interests of the United States."²⁵ This too is a broader and more holistic notion than "fighting and winning the Nation's wars."²⁶

The JOC describes actions a GCC or Joint Force Commander (JFC) might take in the context of unified action to advance U.S. interests. Building partnership capacity, mitigating the underlying causes of conflict and extremism, and setting the conditions that enable action when military intervention is required are all underlying principles contained in the JOC.²⁷ This concept focuses on steady-state, interagency activities designed to promote an acceptable state of peace and security in a region and preclude or mitigate crisis.²⁸ The JOC additionally implies that an approach emphasizing conflict prevention and resolution to address regional conflict will continue to be a key component of the U.S. National Security Strategy through 2025. It is for these reasons,

driven by the U.S. National Security Strategy, and documents like the *Global Employment of the Force*, that CCDRs are taking a much more active role in the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power. These instruments are being incorporated into daily security cooperation activities with the goal of ensuring readiness when needed.

Often, DOD is not the first or preferred choice for international leadership but is often the only resort given the scale and complexity of specific operations. In fact, “many of DOD’s enduring responsibilities stem from long-recognized gaps in the broader capacity of other USG agencies.”²⁹ DOD has become America’s crutch as there is no other agency in the USG that can fully respond to the complex contingency actions expected in the 21st Century. “An undeniable strategic reality for DOD today is that if a contingency is big, bad, sudden, complex, expensive, actually or potentially violent, and strategically important, it is likely to vault to the top of the Defense priority list.”³⁰ The United States citizenry and other USG organizations view the military as the most capable organization within the government. Militaries have the capacity to get things done in remote and difficult locations in concrete ways that cause other government agencies to pale by comparison.³¹ This overreliance on DOD inappropriately puts a military face on any instrument of power.

Organizational culture and design are also contributing to CCDR prevalence in U.S. foreign affairs. As stated previously, the small regional capabilities of the DOS are structured around Assistant Secretaries of State located back in Washington D.C. In contrast, many DOD regional CCDRs have their primary offices forward deployed in the region. Additionally, although they promote the same U.S. interests, the DOS and DOD

break the world up in different ways. For example, DOS puts the “Stans” in the South and Central Asia bureau, while DOD puts them with the Middle-east focused Central Command.³² Even China divides up the world according to DOD.³³

Most components of the U.S. national security system are still organized in hierarchical departments around traditional disciplines as remnants of the Cold War. Individual departments continue to submit budgets and national strategies are executed from stovepiped points of view based on traditional roles and responsibilities. As long as the DOD has a larger regional presence, a bigger budget and more personnel, while other USG agencies remain slow to embrace the changes required in the new strategic environment, the military will inappropriately continue to be the primary face of national power at the regional level.

Re-balancing the way U.S. instruments of power are wielded at the regional level is imperative when confronting national security challenges across the full-spectrum of operations in today’s strategic environment. Success in the current environment can only be achieved by an organization capable of equally integrating all instruments of national power.

Post-Cold War Strategic Environment

There is much talk and debate nationally on today’s threat and the type of conflict the United States will face over the next 25 years. In the last 20 years, the strategic environment has gone from a multipolar, superpower standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States to a unipolar, single superpower situation that the U.S. dominates. The emerging regional powers of today could move to superpower status in the future, but as of today, the U.S. has no near peer competitor in conventional military capabilities. This military hegemony causes potential adversaries to explore new

options and expands the overall national security mission from a once state-centric approach to a construct where non-state actors also play key roles.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy, and Shawn Brimley, a key advisor, recently offered their thoughts on what they believe to be a new, expansive, and expanding defense portfolio.

In broad terms...the US military will increasingly face three types of challenges: rising tensions in the global commons; hybrid threats that contain a mix of traditional and irregular forms of conflict; and the problem of weak and failing states.³⁴

Discussions on current and future national threats are moving from the dichotomous choice between counterinsurgency and traditional warfare to the more all-inclusive form of conflict where competitors employ all forms of war, possibly simultaneously.³⁵ This new form of conflict, where state and non-state adversaries collectively employ combinations of capabilities to gain an asymmetric advantage is termed the “hybrid threat.” Future threats can be increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and execution, and nonstate actors, using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways.³⁶ Hybrid threats incorporate a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts (including indiscriminate violence and coercion), and criminal disorder.³⁷ Hybrid threats blend the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare. In such conflicts, future adversaries (states, state-sponsored groups, or self-funded actors) exploit access to modern military capabilities.³⁸

Hybrid threats naturally lead to a new kind of conflict—hybrid warfare. In hybrid warfare, the adversary most likely presents unique threats specifically designed to

target vulnerabilities.³⁹ Instead of separate challengers with fundamentally different approaches (conventional, irregular, or terrorist), future competitors will employ symmetric and asymmetric forms of war, including criminal behavior.⁴⁰ The greatest future challenge will come not from a state that selects one approach, but from states or groups that choose from a wide menu of tactics and technologies and then blend them in innovative ways to match their own strategic culture, geography, and aims.⁴¹

Evidence from open sources suggests that several powers in the Middle East are modifying their forces to exploit this more complex and more diffused method of conflict. It is increasingly irrelevant to characterize states as essentially traditional forces, or non-state actors as inherently irregular. Future challenges will present a more complex array of alternative structures and strategies, as was seen in the battle between Israel and Hizballah in the summer of 2006.⁴² Ralph Peters described the combination of Hizballah's combat cells and militia as "a hybrid of guerrillas and regular troops—a form of opponent that U.S. forces are apt to encounter with increasing frequency."⁴³

The U.S. must adapt appropriately to confront hybrid threats operating across the full spectrum of operations. The CCDR-centric military application of U.S. national power at the regional level is potentially incapable, under the current governmental construct, to fully integrate the diplomatic, informational, military and economic instruments of power. National security leaders must examine the threat and adjust the organization to adequately address the changing strategic environment.

A Hybrid Organization for Full Spectrum Operations

Full spectrum operations require the USG to synchronize elements of national power to advance interests around the world in today's hybrid environment. The USG must reorganize its national security apparatus to ensure attainment of objectives

related to national security. The United States still organizes its national elements of power along historic Cold War lines where DOS held a monopoly on the diplomatic and economic instruments of power and the military focused solely on the traditional Clausewitzian form of warfare with the Soviet Union. However, in the last 20 years there has been greater likelihood of operating in the peacetime crisis, low intensity and mid-intensity conflict areas within the spectrum of operations.

The increasingly probable scenario of involvement in a hybrid conflict, or encountering some type of hybrid threat in any national operation, and operating in contested urban zones is a stressing one that generates operational risk in the near- to mid-term for U.S. national interests. Stability operations are expected to occur more frequently, while conventional type of warfare is expected to be the new one percent possibility in this same range.⁴⁴

A whole-of-government approach is needed at the regional level to synchronize all national elements of power. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations, defines the whole-of-government approach as one that “integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.”⁴⁵ Field Manual 3-07 goes on to say that a whole-of-government approach is vital to achieving the balance of resources, capabilities and activities that reinforce progress made by one of the instruments of national power while enabling success among the others.

A whole-of-government approach is directed under National Security Policy Directive 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*.⁴⁶ As the USG departments are currently configured, interagency

coordination among agencies attempts to ensure that the full range of capabilities is brought to the table. Success in this approach depends upon the ability of civilians and military forces to plan jointly and respond quickly and effectively through an integrated, interagency approach to a dynamic situation.⁴⁷ Under this construct, agencies must be willing to share resources and prioritize the relationship accordingly to work toward a common goal. Many departmental resources are in short supply and must be managed based on priority.

A key to a successful whole-of-government approach is operational integration from the onset. Planning, execution and feedback must involve all agencies from the beginning. Under today's construct, a single department will develop an entire plan and then forward it to another department for coordination. A better methodology would be integration from the beginning. For the whole-of-government approach to be successful, FM 3-07 states all actors must be represented, integrated, and actively involved in the process; share an understanding of the situation and problem to be resolved; strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal; integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities; and collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goal.⁴⁸ Commander, USPACOM, includes in his Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) that through the effective, long-range U.S. interagency activity planning and inculcation in the TCP process, USPACOM forces and resources can best meet national policy goals.⁴⁹ A combination of diplomatic, economic, military, and informational objectives is central to supporting U.S. interests in each theater of operations.

Although a whole-of-government approach is widely accepted as a requirement for successful full spectrum operations, it is nonetheless extremely rare to find the requisite levels of political, military, economic, and civil resources being successfully integrated into the overall effort.⁵⁰ Integration is much different than coordination. Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, the capstone publication for joint operations, identifies interagency coordination as the vital link between military, diplomatic, informational and economic instruments of national power. Joint Pub 1 also states that military operations must be coordinated, integrated, and/or deconflicted with the activities of other agencies of the USG, IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, the operations of foreign forces and the activities of various host nation organizations.⁵¹ Integration is the cornerstone of Army FM 3-07 and several studies have shown that coordination is problematic, however, coordination continues to be the methodology employed.

In 2006, the Iraq Study Group issued a sweeping recommendation on national security policy that went well beyond the subject of the Iraq War:

For the longer term, the United States government needs to improve how its constituent agencies—Defense, State, USAID, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others—respond to a complex stability operation like that represented by this decade’s Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the previous decades’ operations in the Balkans.⁵²

The Iraq Study Group report went as far as recommending a sweeping change similar to what the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 did for jointness in the armed forces. Today, there is agreement in pockets across the interagency that the national security system must become more integrated and adaptable. The USG is currently unequipped to integrate the various departments or harness their skills to carry out complex operations.⁵³ In his 2006 letter to the White House, Senator John Warner wrote, “the

missions in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed that our government is not adequately organized to conduct interagency operations.”⁵⁴ There are too many players and each wants to protect their mission, resources, and independence. Until participating agencies get beyond coordination to embrace integration, the interagency will continue to be less effective and underutilized.

The U.S. National Security System is very complex, and obtaining coordination between all agencies is extremely difficult. There are competing priorities and interagency operations are never looked upon as favorably as internal agency problems and agenda items. During President George W. Bush’s first administration, there were 9 unified commands, 16 agencies in the Intelligence community, 17 agencies in DOD, 17 committees on the NSC, 22 agencies folded into the Department of Homeland Security, and 305 embassies, consulates, and diplomatic missions around the globe.⁵⁵ Unity of effort must be brought to the interagency, especially at the regional level.

A New Operational Objective

The time to reorganize the operational element of the national security system is upon us. Interagency departments and numerous studies have shown the difficulty in coordination between the myriad of agencies present in today’s system. However, coordination is not enough, there must be integration across the operational spectrum, and plans must be built from the ground up with all agencies involved. Gone should be the days of a CCDR building a theater engagement or campaign plan and including a separate interagency annex at the end, only to send it forward to the National Security Council for coordination among the interagency after SECDEF approval. Conversely, State Department Country Team activities should be integrated and synchronized with a CCDR’s campaign plan. As it stands now, a CCDR may have to coordinate with over 30

separate U.S. Ambassadors on his regional campaign plan and there are many activities that a country team accomplishes that could positively or negatively affect a CCDR's effort in the same area. There is just not enough time to fully integrate and synchronize all activities. This lack of synchronization leads to redundancy, undermining of certain efforts, strained relationships between all players and improperly managed resources. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently commented:

If we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad... New institutions are needed for the twenty-first century, new organizations with a twenty-first century mindset.⁵⁶

The new way is obvious – integration instead of coordination, and a new framework capable of synchronizing the planning and execution of all elements of national power across the full spectrum of operations.

Interagency Regional Operations Centers (IROC)

An operational organization must be constructed that ensures unity of effort and unity of command. The Departments of State, Defense, and all relevant interagency partners should form integrated regional operations centers (Example: IROC-C for the Central Region) for each of the currently identified DOD theaters. These centers should all be at strategic locations within the region. This center will be the one place that integrates all elements of U.S. national power into an effective regional strategy supporting U.S. grand strategy.

The Department of State should assign a senior civilian to the region to direct the center and oversee the regional implementation of all diplomatic, economic and informational elements of power. The current DOD Combatant Commander would

serve as the IROC Deputy Director and retain his command authority over military personnel in the region. The CCDR would continue to be responsible for implementing the military instrument of power but would synchronize all military efforts with other elements. The staffs of DOD, DOS, and other interagency partners would no longer be separate but integrated across the organization.

The Department of State country teams and respective ambassadors would report to the center and the CCDR's current organization would be subsumed by the center. Other interagency partners would lead required divisions within IROC yet all evaluations and administrative actions would be completed within the center's chain of command. A regional engagement plan would be required to maximize the synchronization and implementation of all elements of U.S. power and an organization with a single chain of command would ensure unity of command and effort across all regional activities.

Empowering a senior civilian as the center's director returns a civilian face to all regional activities and removes the CCDR from the media spotlight, helping to reduce the over politicization of the military. As we have seen with Iraq and Afghanistan, it is easy for a government official to alter a strategy and portray the military commander as the responsible agent for the USG. The military commander becomes the voice of the government and the associated success or failure is diverted inappropriately, to the military alone.⁵⁷ Lastly, a single chain of command across the centers would facilitate a better understanding of roles and responsibilities across both the civilian and military senior leadership, alleviating the military advice versus public dissent argument. Managing civil-military relations so that civilian and military roles are not blurred, while

ensuring civilian and military competencies are maximized are important ingredients for strategic success.⁵⁸

The center would be under the operational control of the National Security Council (NSC), reporting directly to the President. Current USG departments would provide trained personnel and equipment, similar to the military services' role in manning the combatant commands. The NSC staff must grow significantly in order to take on this role. While actual command authorities must be constructed and worked out in a separate effort, it is obvious the capabilities of the NSC must be increased to adequately take on a strategic headquarters role.

The Ashridge Centre, a strategy research group, collected data in the 1990s that suggest a hypothetical corporation with 4 million employees would have more than 3,200 staff members in its corporate headquarters.⁵⁹ Currently, the NSC, which should be the headquarters for the national security system, is approximately one-fifteenth that size, with 71 funded employee slots and 155 detailees.⁶⁰ An NSC that is vaulted into a command and control function, with so little capability as currently configured, could never effectively coordinate the efforts of its subordinate regional centers. Like the staffs of the IROCs, the authorizations and resources required to bolster the NSC should come from the existing departments in their proposed resource provider roles.

The center's budget submissions would be made directly to the NSC based upon specific missions and annual operations rather than via historical departmental lines. Each department would then divest that part of its respective budget currently allocated for regional engagement or aid. Initially, I recommend Congress direct the establishment of a single center in the AFRICOM area of responsibility to evaluate the

concept via the next National Defense Authorization Act. Following a 2-year test period, I recommend codifying the center in an Interagency Reorganization Act. Obviously, additional Congressional action would be required for budgetary and organizational changes.

Adopting an IROC construct is an out-of-the-box idea that will draw push-back from the various departments on relinquishing personnel, budget authority, direct mission oversight and ultimately power within the Executive Branch. DOD has the most to lose and DOS the most to gain, but Secretary Gates has made it clear that the diplomatic, economic, and informational elements of national power should be strengthened. He has recognized that it would take a new institution with a 21st Century construct to accomplish this task.⁶¹

There has been much discussion lately on how the interagency should move forward to ensure success across the full spectrum of operations. In all cases, each agency continues to protect its own primacy. Combatant Commands have developed different levels of joint interagency task forces to bring interagency members into the planning and execution cycle of operations inside their commands, but in the end, the interagency does not send decision makers or its best people to these positions. There have been discussions within the departments and Congress on a possible “interagency” combatant command, but here again, the other departments would have to come over to the Department of Defense’s turf, fueling the long-standing and complicated interdepartmental battles seen in current contingencies.

In a recent memo from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, Secretary Gates proposed a new model of shared responsibility and pooled resources

for cross-cutting security challenges.⁶² He proposed pooled funding mechanisms for three specific missions; Security Capacity Building, Stabilization, and Conflict Prevention, which span DOD and DOS mission areas.⁶³ These new budgetary accounts are on the right track, but are only a portion of the solution that I propose above. I agree that budget authority must come separately based on missions to be performed. However, I also think that all agencies should assign members to a single hybrid organization with a separate mission statement, vision, and with the objective to fully integrate U.S. national power into a synchronized effort.

The window is now open with both Secretaries wanting reform, and the IROC is the construct that best captures the interagency mindset. The IROC is the new Ways – it is designed to integrate and harness each department’s piece of U.S. power into a single and focused implementer of that power. The biggest risk associated with the IROC is the cultural change associated with the construct and the time that will be required to implement the concept. It took the military over 20 years to harness a majority of the potential envisioned in the 1986 GW-N Act. Another risk is the possibility that Congress could intervene and alter the proposal to improve its oversight and monitoring.

Today’s coordination status quo may be acceptable to all departments because it preserves their primacy in the personnel, budgetary and mission areas, but it is not suitable for reaching the desired end state—there must be a balance between the Ends, Ways, and Means. The IROC is a feasible solution that provides this balance by offering a different way for integrating the national instruments of power. And while the contributions of each department will remain unbalanced with DOD as the primary

provider, the new IROC can manage and integrate all departmental means into an effective organization that puts the right face on the various instruments of power. This integrated organization can then effectively use all tools in the pursuit of U.S. national objectives. In a post-Cold War strategic environment, plagued by constrained resources, success across the spectrum of operations is a necessity and interagency integration is a must.

Endnotes

¹ Ends, Ways, and Means is a general concept of strategy formulation developed by the US Army War College applicable to any element of national power. Ends represent the objectives towards which one strives, Ways depicts the course of action chosen, and Means are the instruments by which some end can be achieved. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, ed. By Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb Jr., (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College): 179.

² D.I.M.E. refers to the Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic areas of application within US power.

³ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958): 86.

⁴ David Jablonsky, "National Power," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, Volume 1: Theory of War and Strategy, 3rd ed., ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College): 145.

⁵ *Ibid*, 146.

⁶ Reed J. Fendrick, "National Power," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, Volume 1: Theory of War and Strategy, 3rd ed., ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College): 190.

⁷ Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, "Through the Complex Operations Prism," *Prism* 1, no. 1 (December 2009): 13.

⁸ Richard G. Lugar, "Stabilization and Reconstruction a Long Beginning," *Prism* 1, no. 1 (December 2009): 8.

⁹ Josh Kurlantzick, "Manpower Failure: The State Department's Critical Personnel Shortage", *The New Republic Online*, July 2007, <http://www.carneigieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19426>.

¹⁰ *Ibid*.

¹¹ Binnendijk and Cronin, "Complex Operations Prism," 11.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Presidential Budget Submission, United States Department of State, *Budget in Brief Fiscal Year 2010* (Washington DC) 2.

¹⁴ David J. Kilcullen, *New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict*, May 2007, <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0507/ljpe/kilcullen.htm>, 12, (accessed 27 December 2009).

¹⁵ David W. Barno, "Military Adaptation in Complex Operations," *Prism* 1, no. 1 (December 2009): 31.

¹⁶ US Department of Defense News Release, "*DOD Releases Fiscal 2010 Budget Proposal*," United States Defense Department News, <http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12652> (accessed 27 December 2009).

¹⁷ Kilcullen, "New Paradigms," 12.

¹⁸ Barno, "Military Adaptation," 31.

¹⁹ Lugar, "Stabilization and Reconstruction," 8.

²⁰ *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Public Law 433, 99th Congress, 2nd Sess. (1 October 1986), 4.

²¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Guidance for the Employment of the Force, 2008-2010*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense), 40.

²² Ibid, 39.

²³ U.S. Pacific Command, *Commander, USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan 5000-09, FY2009-2015*, (Camp Smith, HI: U.S. Pacific Command, October 1, 2008), 16.

²⁴ Ibid, 18.

²⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Contribution to Cooperative Security Joint Operating Concept, V1.0* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 19, 2008), iii.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid, 2.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Nathan Freier, "The Defense Identify Crisis: It's a Hybrid World," *Parameters* 39, no. 3 (Autumn 2009): 85.

³⁰ Ibid, 82.

³¹ Barno, "Military Adaptation," 31.

³² Parag Khanna, "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony", *New York Times Magazine*, Jan 27, 2008: 34.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, "The Contested Commons," *Proceedings*, 135, July 2009, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=1950 (accessed 27 December 2009).

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³⁶ Ibid, 5.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ralph Peters, "Lessons from Lebanon: The New Model Terrorist Army," *Armed Forces Journal International*, no. 39 (October 2006): 36.

⁴⁴ Hoffman, "Hybrid Threats," 6.

⁴⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2008), 14.

⁴⁶ U.S DOD, "Global Employment," 39.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ U.S. PACOM, "Theater Campaign Plan," 18.

⁵⁰ Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "Complex Operations and Interagency Operational Art," *Prism* 1, no. 1 (December 2009): 37.

⁵¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “*Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*,” Joint Publication 1, (Washington DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 May 2007, Incorporating Change 1 20 March 2009): VII-1.

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⁵⁴ John Warner, Letter to White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, March 15, 2006, quoted in James R. Loucher III, “National Security Reform—A Prerequisite for Successful Complex Operations,” *Prism* 1, no. 1 (December 2009): 82.

⁵⁵ Loucher III, “National Security Reform,” 82.

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⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹ J. David Young, “Benchmarking Corporate Headquarters,” *Long-range Planning* 31, no. 6 (December 2008): 933-936.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Gates, speech to Kansas State University.

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⁶³ Ibid.