

CHALLENGES IN LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR POLISH ARMED FORCES

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**CHALLENGES IN LOGISTIC SUPPORT
FOR POLISH ARMED FORCES**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Since joining NATO in 1999, Poland has made significant progress in modernizing its armed forces. This modernization effort has been characterized by the gradual retirement of obsolete Soviet-era equipment, a reduction in active duty military personnel, and an increase in the number of forces that can be deployed beyond Poland's borders.

Poland has a continuing interest in transforming its military into one that can more effectively participate in NATO collective defense operations as well as in EU Operations.

This SRP describes challenges related to logistic support for the Polish Armed Forces when they are participating in NATO missions and European Union (EU) Crisis Management Operations (CMOs) in the context of modernizing their forces into a fully professional military organization.

CHALLENGES IN LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR POLISH ARMED FORCES

We have to reform our armed forces... it is popular opinion that this process comes down to technical modernization and abolishing compulsory conscription, while in fact it is much more complex. It includes the professionalization of military personnel and the introduction of new training standards, new types of weapons and equipment, more effective organizational structures.¹

—Bogdan Klich (2008) *Polish MOD*

Since joining NATO in 1999, Poland has made significant progress in modernizing its armed forces. This modernization effort has been characterized by the gradual retirement of obsolete Soviet-era equipment, a reduction in active duty military personnel, and an increase in the number of forces that can be deployed beyond Poland's borders.

During this modernization program, the end of the Cold War and the events of 9/11/01 changed the global strategic environment. The attack on the World Trade Center and the ensuing Global War on Terror forced many countries to transform their military forces from territorial defense forces to expeditionary forces capable of conducting modern warfare.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (PAF), General Franciszek Gągor stated that:

We have to take the contemporary challenges into account while pursuing new capabilities of our armed forces. These challenges encompass a move from static to mobile expeditionary forces: joint, coherent, interoperable, ready for a range of conflicts wherever and whenever they are required, prepared for transition from war fighting to peacekeeping and vice-versa.²

Poland has a continuing national interest in transforming its military into one that can more effectively ensure its own security, participate in NATO collective defense as

well as in EU's Crisis Management Operations in order to ensure a stable world order. Poland has participated actively in demanding operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan in recent years. In doing so, Poland has gained critical combat experience and demonstrated its strengths. Expeditionary operations are a key driver of technical modernization, especially with regard to equipment and armament. The expeditionary operations also provide uncommon opportunity to practice and improve joint, cooperation procedures.

It is clear that the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) are multi – purpose forces that must be available for national purposes and then for either NATO or EU deployment, or both. Our logistics system must extend beyond a purely national and military way to support our troops. The PAF require logistics support that must provide as much multinational logistics as possible by pooling certain assets and resources. This may also require contracting particular sources and perhaps outsourcing other capabilities.

This SRP describes challenges related to the logistic support for Polish Armed Forces when they are participating in NATO missions and European Union (EU) Crisis Management Operations (CMOs), in the context of modernizing our armed forces into a fully professional military organization.

Polish Armed Forces Logistics Resources

According to the National Security Strategy (NSS) of The Republic of Poland – the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) “are an essential element of the national defense”. Further, “their fundamental task is to guarantee that the state is capable of defending itself and is ready to counter aggression under our allied commitments.”The NSS directs that “Poland shall develop combat readiness of its armed forces to ensure effective defense and protection of Polish borders within the framework of operations carried out

independently or as part of collective defense, as well as outside its borders, pursuant to Article V of the Washington Treaty.” It also pledges that PAF “will maintain their readiness to participate in operations of asymmetrical nature, including multinational, joint anti-terrorist operations carried out in compliance with international law, organized by NATO, EU or an ad hoc coalition of states.”³

The Chief of General Staff of PAF, on behalf of the Minister of National Defense, is responsible for defense planning, including determining the force structure and modernization programs, as well as “setting of the armed forces development concept and planning of this development”, along with “strategic-operational positioning and use of armed forces.”⁴

Logistics support of the PAF (based on NATO doctrine) is described by “Logistics Doctrine of the PAF” as the art and science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of PAF in the territory of Poland as well as when operating abroad. In its most comprehensive sense, logistics is involved in military operations that deal with design, development, acquisition, storage, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; transport of personnel; acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; acquisition or furnishing of services and medical and health service support.⁵

PAF logistics are executed through two separate channels: production logistics and consumer logistics. Production logistics are managed by an Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of National Defense. Among other activities, involves the procurement of weapon systems and material resources; the development of military technologies; operation and maintenance of defense infrastructure and acquisition of

some supply items (fuel, uniforms and other minor equipment), as well as the disposal of redundant military equipment and real estate. Production logistics serves as a “bridge” between the national economy and acquisition of all other classes of military supply.⁶ Consumer logistics is divided into planning and executive components. The planning component is present at all levels of PAF structure, but there is no executive logistics authority at the central and PAF services headquarters’ levels. This authority is exercised at the operational level and at the tactical level now represented by a newly created Support Inspectorate.

Logistics planning is organized by the J-4 of the General Staff, which serves as the PAF logistic system organizer. The J4 is responsible for: 1) setting up policy and guidance for development of PAF logistics system and its performance during times of peace, crisis, and war, 2) determining ways to ensure efficient and effective execution of logistics support in national and multinational environments, 3) developing National Economy Mobilization Program and coordinating its execution in Poland, and 4) coordination of all activities related to Host Nation Support (HNS).

Created in 2007, the PAF Support Inspectorate was formed in recognition of the need to thoroughly modify the existing C2 system of Polish logistics in order to meet the requirements of new tasks, especially to support Polish military contingents operating overseas. The changes deal essentially with three main areas: 1) division of responsibilities for logistic planning and control over executive logistics between the J-4 of the General Staff and the specially created central executive body, designated as the Support Inspectorate, 2) organization of regional logistic support for units of all services,

and 3) transfer of financial and economic tasks from operational units to support organizations.

The creation of Support Inspectorate set better conditions for: 1) simplification of the logistic C2 structure, supported by information management system, 2) streamlining the logistics system through integration of resources, through regional organization of support and transfer of financial and economic tasks from operational units, 3) through division of tasks between the logistics system organizer and the central logistics executive body, 4) through better logistic performance, and 5) through the use of civilian contractors.

Currently PAF logistics performs its tasks according to the following scheme: The J-4 of the General Staff is the PAF logistics system organizer, while the Support Inspectorate is the Central Logistics Authority with the responsibility for the provision of logistics support for all forces in country and operating abroad. To accomplish its mission the Support Inspectorate has two military districts with eight regional material bases and two technical material bases. The Support Inspectorate has also 53 depots, four district and regional maintenance workshops, and two logistic brigades.

The main elements of the mobile logistics system report to the Inspectorate. The two logistics brigades serve northern Poland with the 1st Logistics Brigade Headquarters in Bydgoszcz, and southern Poland with the 10th Logistics Brigade Headquarters in Opole. These two brigades have two principle missions: 1) to provide support to the units assigned to the NATO Response Force, European Union (EU) Battle Groups, and Polish Military Contingents operating abroad, and 2) to provide support to the units

located in the two military districts' areas of responsibility. Logistics brigades provide supply and other kinds of services.

The PAF logistic system ensures a sufficient level of sustainability for supported forces. It's major tasks can be grouped into three main areas: 1) maintaining continuous logistics support, throughout all areas of operations, resupplying and continuous follow-on support, ensuring operational readiness of military equipment, replenishment of combat losses and non combat attrition of equipment, and rotation of personnel, 2) assuring effective use of logistics capabilities by providing logistics support of modern command and control systems, effective use of military intelligence findings, availability of stocks, and holding their required echelon with logistics training, and 3) participation in allied and coalition operations by using common logistics C2 procedures, unified identification system of military equipment and supplies, and by achieving interoperability and providing combat service support capabilities.

Current PAF logistics capabilities do not meet all of these requirements and as a result there are some deficiencies and shortfalls. Therefore, PAF has been seeking more effective use and management of limited logistics resources in order to optimise logistics structures and capabilities. The new developmental logistic Information Technology (IT) system will eventually eliminate most shortfalls and deficiencies. Obviously, closer cooperation with the national economy and wider reliance on civilian resources, including outsourcing solutions, are vital.

PAF's logistic challenges can be divided in two groups: logistics support for PAF in the territory of Poland, and second group the logistics support for troops operating abroad within the NATO or European Union (EU).

Logistic Support Challenges for the PAF in the Territory of Poland

The big challenge for the PAF came from Poland's abolishing of compulsory conscription in 2010, when PAF became a fully professional army as well as the plans for technical modernization of PAF. PAF's experience in foreign missions forced PAF to accelerate professionalization of its personnel. In the contemporary world, only a professional army can ensure the country's territorial defense and expeditionary capabilities and enable it to function effectively within the international organization. PAF will have 100,000 active personnel. A new formation, the National Reserve Forces, will include 20,000 in case they are needed.

The Polish Defense Minister has declared: "We have to reform our armed forces. It is popular opinion that this process comes down to technical modernization and abolishing compulsory conscription, while in fact it is much more complex. It includes the professionalization of military personnel and the introduction of new training standards, new types of weapons and equipment, more effective organizational structures."⁷ Professionalization of the PAF is a qualitative and quantitative process of transformation of human resources and PAF equipment. The changes are being introduced gradually so that PAF is ready to perform its constitutional tasks and fulfill its missions at home and abroad in order to fulfill allied commitments and international agreements. Professionalization will replace a recruited military with a voluntary military service and a contract service. The number, structure and equipment of the army will adapt to new requirements, threats and public expectations with respect to national security.

The effectiveness of the professionalization of the Armed Forces is based on the two factors: essential legislative changes in the Polish Constitution and related laws and

regulations; and motivating qualified citizens to volunteer for military service in sufficient number to fulfill the ranks.⁸

This transition to an all-volunteer force will surely impact logistical support. Analysis shows the need for changes in the following areas: 1) accommodation of soldiers, 2) uniforms and equipment for the personnel, and 3) logistical support of functioning military units in the garrisons, including maintaining military installations.

Professionalization will also determine the changes within the PAF's logistics system especially in training logisticians, in optimization of logistics structures, and in the necessity for contracting services from outside companies. From a logistic perspective, when the PAF transitioned to an army without mandatory conscription the functional expertise could not adjust accordingly. The logistical base within the PAF had been designed and built for a larger force. Logistic experts can not be sized in the same fashion as combat soldiers. The foundation for logistics requires a more deliberate process. As the PAF evolves, other options such as contracting, can be instituted to replace certain requirements and logistic functions.

Logistic Support Challenges for the PAF Operating Abroad, within NATO and EU

Admission to NATO was one of the priorities of Poland's 1990's foreign and security policy. Poland's participation in the "Partnership for Peace" program was a significant contribution to its preparation for membership and has been participating in the program since 1994. Poland achieved its strategic target of NATO membership on 12 March 1999. Membership in NATO made our engagement in its activities more dynamic and enabled us to integrate with NATO forces and structures. Membership in NATO remains the main pillar of Poland's security policy. According to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance provides a warranty of security for our country. With

other members of NATO nations in support Poland can more confidently respond to new threats. Today Poland needs to concern itself with new threats to include: terrorism, proliferation of weapon of mass destruction and threats connected with energetic security⁹. Stabilization activities carried out in different regions of the world demonstrate the role of the Alliance in international security. As a fully fledged member of NATO Poland is capable and willing of supporting most NATO operations: in Afghanistan (ISAF), Kosovo (KFOR), Iraq (training mission NTM-I) and in the Mediterranean Sea (Active Endeavor) while also involved in many transformation initiatives such as the NATO Response Force (NRF). The logistic arm of the PAF is stressed, but constantly adjusting and improving.

As acknowledged on the NATO webpage, the NATO Response Force “is a highly ready and technologically advanced force made up of land, air, sea and Special Forces components.” NRF “is capable of performing missions worldwide across the whole spectrum of operations” such as: “evacuations, disaster management, counterterrorism, and acting as ‘an initial entry force’ for larger, follow-on forces”. NRF can include “up to 25,000 troops, who start to deploy after five days’ notice and sustain itself for operations lasting 30 days or longer if resupplied”.¹⁰

As a member of the EU, Poland actively participates in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and has been engaged in ESDP before becoming a member of the EU by participating in the creation of the European Security Strategy. Poland also participated in the project of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe by contributing to the document’s security policy. By joining the EU in 2004, Poland’s engagement in ESDP has become more dynamic. Our activities within ESDP

concentrate on projects connected with the Headline Goal 2010, based on the promise increasing the EU capabilities within crisis management, by the European Defense Agency and by creating Battlegroups to promote regional peace and stability.

Poland's participation in EU defense activities is the second, next to its NATO membership, principal factor in guaranteeing its national security, and also a manifestation of Poland's sense of responsibility for shaping regional and global security. A practical example of this involvement is Poland's political will, expressed in 2004, to participate in forming one of the Battlegroups of the European Union, joining with Germany, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Latvia. This Battlegroup is scheduled to reach its operational capacity in the first half of 2010. At that time, for a period of six months Poland will serve as the framework nation - the state responsible for the group's formation, and for access to all the required components including logistical support, command capacities, communications, reconnaissance, and the transportation.¹¹

Battlegroups are designed to accomplish tasks faced by the CSDP, namely the Petersberg tasks,¹² and the tasks from the European Security Strategy: humanitarian and rescue tasks, crisis management, including peacemaking, joint disarmament operations, support for 3rd countries in combating terrorism, security sector reform operations as part of broader institution building.

A European Union Battlegroup is a military force consisting of at least 1500 combat soldiers. Fifteen Battlegroups have been established, most of which are multi-national structures. The groups rotate actively, so that two are ready for deployment at all times. The forces serve under the direct control of a unanimous European Council of the European Union (EU). The groups are prepared to deploy within 5-10 days of

approval from the Council and sustainable for at least 30 days. This deployment could be extended for up to 120 days, if they are resupplied¹³.

The EU Helsinki Headline Goal 2010 has formed the basis for force planning process by describing the five illustrative scenarios which were covering a wide spectrum of military operations. These were: 1) Separation of parties by force, 2) Stabilisation, reconstruction and military advice to third countries, 3) Conflict prevention, 4) Evacuation operation, 5) Assistance to humanitarian operations.¹⁴

Based on the illustrative scenarios the European Battlegroups will operate in a radius about 6000 km from Brussels. To meet the full range of tasks as lay down in illustrative scenarios and taking account of the new challenges with the necessary flexibility, there will be a significant role for strategic transport.

Taking into consideration that the strategic transportation is a key enabler to allow the EU to respond to Crisis Management Operations across the full spectrum of the tasks and the shortfalls in strategic lift assets (both in NATO and the EU), focusing on the more effective use of all available means for transport co-ordination is the key to improving strategic transport capability¹⁵. Poland is the framework nation for one of the Battlegroups. Having no strategic air transportation assets in their inventory PAF will have to rely on other than national solutions. Progress is in the making. To date Poland has received and is operation US made c 130; a strategic transportation asset. In the future four more C 130 will be available.

The PAF Logistic Challenges and the Possible Solutions

Engagement of PAF in different theatres of operations and processes of professionalization of the armed forces for PAF' logistics system is a big challenge. Based on Ministerial Guidelines, the national level of ambition assumes contribution of

one combat brigade and three combat battalions in separated employment areas.

Accordingly, this logistic system should ensure capabilities, which are defined as: 1) preparation of force for mission (mounting), 2) deployment to the theatre, 3) provision of combat troops sustainability (follow on support & recovery), and 4) redeployment after the mission.

The PAF logistics capabilities will not always provide adequate support of forces and therefore we will have to rely on other than national resources. This will apply to: 1) enhanced contribution from multinational logistics, 2) increased outsourced capabilities in mission areas as well as in the territory of Poland, and 3) wider reliance on international programs especially for strategic air transport and support of other nations with theatre air transport assets.

Interoperability

The NATO Logistic Handbook describes (although there is not yet any official NATO definition) multinational logistics as “a tool which depending on the operational requirements and the specific situation, can enhance efficiency and effectiveness.”¹⁶

The document reports advantages of multinational logistics: “More specifically, the benefits of multinational logistics can be the reduction of the overall cost of the logistics footprint, the ability of nations to contribute their fair share of support, the improvement of the force’s flexibility, the conservation of scarce resources and a better use of specific national expertise.”¹⁷

NATO doctrine specifies three types of multinational logistics, listed in order of increased multinationality: 1) pre-planned mutual support, host nation support (HNS), and contract support are arranged bilaterally or multilaterally by NATO and/or nations, 2) a nation formally agrees to provide support or services to all or part of the

multinational force but under national command (tasking authority will be the NATO Commander); and 3) one or more nations serve all or part of the multinational forces under the control of the multinational Commander.¹⁸

Multinational logistics is also an important force multiplier because it optimizes individual national logistic support efforts. It is based on bilateral or multilateral arrangements which enhance the cost effectiveness of individual national logistic support activities. All entities, as a result of an agreed upon multinational approach to logistics, becomes more efficient. All concepts, technologies and business practices become stream lined and more effective. By approaching logistics in a multinational way, efficiency is gained as redundant capabilities are eliminated. Such arrangements can contribute significantly to the success of both the planning and the implementation of logistic operations. Several concepts and initiatives are facilitating multinationality in the logistics: Lead Nation and Role Specialist Nation concepts, multinational integrated logistics units, HNS, Third Party Logistic Support Services (TPLSS); and a Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC)

Contracting and Outsourcing

Contracting support has become increasingly important for NATO in the conduct of operations, particularly in operations beyond NATO's area of responsibility. It is a significant tool that may be employed to gain fast access to in-country resources by locally procuring the supplies and services that the NATO Commander requires¹⁹.

NATO publication AJP-4.9 (Modes of Multinational Logistic Support) describes TPLSS as “the use of preplanned civilian contracting to perform selected logistic support services”.²⁰ TPLSS is designed “to enable competent commercial partners to

provide a proportion of deployed logistic support, so that such support is assured for the Commander and optimizes the most efficient and effective use of resources.”²¹

A third-party logistics company is a private firm that provides logistics services under a contract with a primary manufacturer, vendor, or user of a product or service. It is called third-party because the logistics provider does not own the product but participates in the supply chain at points between the manufacturer and the user of a given product. A third-party logistics company can perform any or all logistics functions between the manufacturer and the user, including, among others including food supply, transport, sea and air port of debarkation (disembarkation) operations, food preparation, POL, laundry/bath, storage, maintenance and repair.²²

TPLSS, however, is not universally effective across all operational situations. It is not generally suited to support an Article 5 operation, because of the high level of risk for personnel. However, TPLSS is most likely to be useful in a non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation (CRO) - especially after the operational environment has become more benign. The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) plays a critical role in ensuring that standing contracts fill potential national logistics gaps which would affect NATO operations both in defense of the alliance or as part of NATO operations.

Interoperability of forces plays an important role in the EU Battlegroups. The interoperability is a complex technical issue. In its simplest meaning it refers to the ability of set of forces (land, sea, air) to communicate and operate with another. This is equally important within a country (joint air, sea and maritime operations) and between countries. It has become a key objective for modern armed forces and is crucial for established multinational forces (such as within EU, NATO, or UN) as well as for those

member states intending to take part in ad hoc coalitions of the willing such as Desert Storm or more recently in Iraq. Interoperability is relevant to the Battlegroup because they can be formed by a framework nation or a multinational coalition of member states.

NATO has led the way in overcoming European and Transatlantic difficulties of interoperability by developing agreements on military standards and procedures known as STANAGS which provide the basis of EU Member States interoperability discussions. Nevertheless, there are expected to be significant challenges for the Battlegroups in particular for actual interaction of military units from different member states which may not have trained or worked together. Difficulties with interoperability of equipment may also arise. The Headline Goal 2010 includes an objective to improve European interoperability in the areas of communications during this period. It assents the need to improve communications at all levels of EU operations by developing appropriate compatibility and network linkage for all communications equipment and assets (both terrestrial and space) by 2010.

Pooling of Resources

As mentioned previously one of the challenges for PAF is strategic airlift. By means of the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS), 6 Antonov An124s are now available to the EU, NATO, or for national needs. SALIS provides interim airlift capability for outsized cargo through an agreement among several member states. This partnership is designed to close the current capability gap for strategic airlift for outsized cargo by jointly acquiring the additional needed assured access and capabilities in the most cost-efficient manner. The purpose of the strategic air lift capability partnership is: 1) to deploy equipment for forces for rapid deployment in support of NATO and/or EU-operations, 2) to allow participants to acquire additional flying hours on an annual basis

for their national use, 3) under normal circumstances, to pre-plan participant's use of their national outsized airlift flying hours and co-ordinate the employment of these hours through the Strategic Air Lift Coordination Cell (SALCC), Eindhoven, NL. NAMSA will be the contracting authority, responsible for conducting the procurement process.

The multinational airlift consortium is chartering six Antonov An-124-100 transport aircraft, which are capable of handling 'outsize' – unusually large – cargo. The Russian and Ukrainian Antonov aircraft are being used as an interim solution to meet shortfalls in European strategic airlift capabilities, pending deliveries of Airbus A400M aircraft, expected to arrive in 2010. This is why the project is called SALIS - Strategic Airlift Interim Solution. The consortium is led by Germany and includes Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey²³.

Under a three-year renewable contract, two Antonov An-124-100 are on full-time charter, two more on six days notice and another two on nine days notice. The countries have committed to using the aircraft for a minimum of 2000 flying hours per year.

In the European Union, the agency seeking to improve defense capability is the European Defense Agency (EDA). The EDA was established under a joint action of the Council of Ministers on 12 July 2004 "to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defense capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defense Policy as it stands now and develops in the future."²⁴

One of the initiatives launched by EDA is the EU Third Party Logistic Support (TPLS) platform which will serve as a common interactive website-based instrument for

European industries with expertise in the field of mission and operations-related TPLS. Companies will have the opportunity to advertise their services in a very detailed and user-friendly way to a specialized community of customers. In turn these customers, contracting authorities from all over Europe, will be provided tools that enable them to directly interact with particular service providers.²⁵

The European TPLS Platform is designed to improve situational awareness of solutions for contracting services in support of crisis management operations to facilitate business-to-business co-operation and to create a more efficient, more competitive and more transparent market. The Platform will: 1) support the identification of contracting solutions offered by private suppliers in the field of logistics, 2) support rapid and organized response to unforeseen logistic requirements, and 3) provide better visibility of economic operators through offering high quality databases.²⁶

The next option to enhance the EU and Polish strategic lift capacities is the development of a “European Air Transport Fleet”, based on a pooled acquisition of airlift assets. This option is currently under consideration by the EDA and the member states. For the user community not currently taking part in the A400M acquisition program, such a solution would be helpful for countries with operational requirements for strategic lift which are insufficient to justify independent acquisition. The EDA is promoting a combined model. Under this concept some countries would contribute with assets, for example pooling their A400Ms, while others would draw on the pooled acquisition of additional assets. The EDA has already investigated possible acquisition models for other purposes (Air to Air Refueling (AAR) capability)). These models could be applicable to a pooled acquisition of A400M. Of particular interest is whether a pooled

acquisition of assets and a form of collective operation is possible and whether there are some innovative ways of achieving this.²⁷

Conclusion

Since joining NATO in 1999, Poland has made significant progress towards modernizing its armed forces. The modernization effort has been characterized by the gradual retirement of obsolete Soviet-era equipment, by a reduction in active duty military personnel, and by an increase in the number of forces that can be deployed beyond Poland's borders.

Poland has an on-going national interest of improving its national security in transforming its military into one that can more effectively participate in NATO collective defense and in the EU's Crisis Management Operations in support of a stable world order. Poland has participated actively in demanding operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan in recent years. Poland's military forces have gained important experience and demonstrated their strengths. This is true for all elements of the PAF to include its logistics. Expeditionary operations are a key driver of technical modernization, especially with regard to equipment and armament. The supply, transport and maintenance of this equipment have improved greatly. In these operations, PAF have practiced and improved cooperative procedures including multinational logistics and practices. This increased participation in expeditionary operations however, has strained Poland's deployable logistic capabilities. The challenges of developing a professional armed force and providing logistics support abroad remain a critical element in achieving Polish national interests. Therefore, PAF is going to increase these capabilities by releasing them from part of their daily routine tasks in garrisons. These expeditionary missions have also revealed shortfalls in the

logistics domain, especially in strategic lift assets, transport of containerized or heavy cargo, recovery and building bases and sustaining them in long-haul operations. Lessons learned from these operations revealed the need to implement into the structures of logistic units integrated protecting elements to provide convoys and logistics depots with a proper level of security.

Endnotes

¹ Polish Defense Minister Bogdan Klich , *Second Wind for the Alliance*, Polska Zbrojna Special Edition, (Warszawa February 2009), 12

² Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces General Franciszek Gagor *Lessons Learned From Operations – Defence Transformation*, <http://aon.edu.pl/files/Gagor%20F.doc> (accessed 2008)

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