

THE MADRID TRAIN BOMBINGS: A DECISION-MAKING
MODEL ANALYSIS

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Homeland Security

by

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ABSTRACT

THE MADRID TRAIN BOMBINGS: A DECISION-MAKING MODEL ANALYSIS,
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The events of 11 September 2001 brought the threat of terrorism into American public focus and gave politicians political capital to pursue terrorism with all elements of national power. Since then the United States has fought an unconventional war against an adaptive and violent enemy. However, extremist organizations still exist with the means and will to do harm to America and its allies. This thesis analyzed a terrorist case study using two decision-making models in an effort to more accurately explain government strategic reactions in the wake of a terrorist attack. A validated decision-making model would provide detailed understanding of national strategic reactions. It would also provide critical knowledge to more efficiently focus instruments of national power to marginalize terrorism and stabilize the international community. This case study documented the Madrid train bombing attacks of 11 March 2004, specifically because of the strategic consequences of Spain's reactions. The attack in Madrid influenced national elections, changed Spain's diplomatic focus away from the United States and resulted in the withdrawal of Spanish troops from the Iraq war. The case study was analyzed using both the Rational Choice Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model. Results of analysis indicated that the Bureaucratic Politics model more accurately explained Spain's strategic reactions. The real value, however, was the depth of study required for the analysis. It provided important insight that framed strategic problems associated with Spain's reactions.

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ACRONYMS

9/11	Terrorist Attack against the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 11 September 2001, perpetrated by the terrorist group al Qaeda
11M	11 March 2004, specifically referring to the Madrid train bombing terrorist attack
AML	Anti Money Laundering
CFT	Combating the Financing of Terrorism
ETA	Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna otherwise known as the Basque Terrorist Organization
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GICM	Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain otherwise known as the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
PP	Popular Party
PSOE	Socialist Workers' Party
U.S.	United States

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

No certitude of righteousness justifies violence: —To kill a man is not to defend a doctrine, it is to kill a man.”¹

— Sebastien, Castellion,
Whether Heretics Are To Be Persecuted

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, brought about a dramatic shift in awareness to the general public of America regarding the threat of terrorism and mass murder instigated by organizations other than nation states. A group called al Qaeda declared war against the West. By Western standards the war was unlawful. Terrorist tactics did not proscribe to traditional methods or rules established by the Geneva Accords. Most especially, al Qaeda targeted civilians for mass murder, which is anathema to Western values. To the West, Castellion’s quote regarding righteousness and doctrine as an unjustifiable excuse for murder accurately described the Western attitude toward terrorism.

In the past decade, numerous countries have fallen victim to terrorism. International strategic responses have ranged from declarations of war by the United States to diplomatic sparing between India and Pakistan. There have been internal legal overhauls like that of Morocco and Indonesia.² The European Union has attempted to synchronize information from its member’s intelligence agencies.³ Even the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund board of executives have —adopted action plans to enhance efforts for AML/CFT [anti money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism].”⁴ Since 9/11 virtually all elements of national power have been used to strategically react to terrorism.

This study will analyze a terrorist event as a case study and compare the government strategic response to different conceptual decision-making models. If one of the decision-making models were validated to accurately explain government strategic reactions, future leaders would be in a better position to mitigate international fallout resulting from a terrorist attack. This would be a powerful tool in the war against terrorism.

This chapter will discuss some background information regarding terrorism and establish the argument for a decision-making model to accurately illustrate government reactions to terrorist attacks. This chapter will also provide a list of required assumptions and definition that are necessary in a study of this kind. Additionally, this chapter will outline limitations, scope, and delimitations imposed on the case study as well as the decision-making models. Finally, it will conclude with a statement of significance outlining the importance for a decision-making model in this age of terrorism.

Background

“War against Terrorism,” “The Long War,” the “Global War on Terror,” and most recently, “The War against al Qaeda and its violent, extremist allies”⁵ has troubled America for decades. In fact terrorism was identified as a threat to the United States and to United States’ national interests as early as the mid 1980s. John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State mentioned in a speech to the Brookings Institute on 10 December 1986, that “we are working at home and abroad in our war against terrorism.”⁶ Whatever the war is called, however, there exist extremist organizations with the will and means to do harm to the United States and its allies.

It was the events of 11 September 2001, that truly brought the threat of terrorism into American public focus and gave politicians political capital to pursue terrorism with all elements of national power. Since the fall of the World Trade Center the United States military has been fighting an increasingly complex unconventional war. In point of fact, America has spent billions of dollars, invaded two countries and exhausted incredible resources in the pursuit of defeating terrorist organizations.⁷

The “National Priorities Project,” a web site dedicated to deducing the cost of the War on Terror, estimates that America has spent \$915 billion actually in the fight against international terrorism.⁸ This of course includes the invasion of two countries: Afghanistan and Iraq. However, this figure does not include the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, or institution overhauls such as intelligence sharing capabilities and legal jurisdiction. It does not cover infrastructure hardening such as airport security or deepwater port security. It does not even include diplomatic foreign security assistance to allies. In all actuality, no one knows the total financial cost of this unconventional engagement.

The fact that 9/11 was not the first, but only the most recent of attacks by al Qaeda, was lost in America’s outrage at the awful success of the attack. In fact, according to the British report, *Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001*, “Osama bin Laden has claimed credit for the attack on U.S. soldiers in Somalia in October 1993, which killed 18; for the attack on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, which killed 224 and injured nearly 5,000; and were linked to the attack on the U.S.S. Cole on 12 October 2000, in which 17 crew members were killed and 40 others injured.”⁹ With this terrible background it is understandable that after

the end of the “Cold War” the United States has made the strategic shift to a “War on Terror.”

Terrorist attacks throughout the world have proven that the West and most especially America and its interests and allies were targets. In fact in October 2003 an audio tape by Bin Laden stated that al Qaeda “reserve the right to respond at the opportune moment and place against all of the countries participating in this unjust war, in particular: Great Britain, Spain, Australia, Poland, Japan, and Italy.”¹⁰ To date, Great Britain fell victim to London bus and train bombings 7 July 2005, Spain was victim to Madrid train bombings 11 March 2004, and Australian tourists were attacked in the Indonesian Bali nightclub bombings on 12 October 2002.¹¹ Obviously terrorism is a global problem. It is also a problem that specifically targets the United States and its allies.

President Barrack Obama has made the defeat of al Qaeda and its violent extremist allies a part of national strategic policy.¹² This fact and the presidential mandate to protect and defend American citizens imply that the United States will continue to battle terrorism well into the future. With this fight as a centerpiece to our national policy, it is incumbent upon professional military officers to study terrorists and terrorism in order to defeat the enemy and protect American interests. The impetus behind this study is to provide United States policy makers the means to understand the natural response to a major terrorist incident and mitigate the terrorist strategic intent.

In the article “The Strategy of Terrorism,” David Fromkin stated that the purpose of terrorism is to “achieve its goals not through its acts but through the response to its acts.”¹³ In other words, the point of a terrorist attack is to set conditions for a particular

response by a government or its people in order to create a change. A terrorist lacks strength enough to achieve any real political change by his or her own actions. Instead they use acts of violence to shape and manipulate a more powerful entity, such as the legitimate government, to react in a particular way that will achieve a political endstate desired by a specific cause.

The international community expects governments to provide security for their citizens. This is particularly true of democracies, which are answerable to their people. In order to remain legitimate in the eyes of the international community, governments are forced to react strategically to terrorist events. This is in line with the terrorist's strategy to manipulate government reaction. However, the government ultimately decides which instruments of national power to use and to what effect. A decision-making model could be used to describe the national strategic reaction. With the understanding of why a nation reacted in a particular way, international powers could focus support to mitigate the terrorist cause and promote international stability.

If a decision-making model could be validated to accurately describe government reactions in the wake of a terrorist event, then governments could modify their reactions in order to marginalize the purpose of the terrorist attack as well as minimize the strategic fallout from the crisis. Additionally, a working decision-making model could focus foreign policy. If one could understand the reactions of individual nations to terrorist attacks, one could promote stabilizing efforts and deter destabilizing trends to a greater degree of fidelity and success. A powerful nation could then more effectively direct elements of national power to support allies and influence international reactions.

The case study used for analysis is the Madrid, Spain, train bombings that occurred on 11 March 2004. This case study is developed in detail in chapter four. There exists an extensive body of literature regarding decision-making models and the literature review in chapter two will discuss the more prominent models in use.

Primary and Secondary Questions

The severe nature of terrorist attacks requires government actions to manage the crisis and defeat the terrorists. Additionally, government reactions to terrorist events tend to have strategic implications. The primary question of this study is: how does one best explain Spain's strategic response to the Madrid train bombings of 11 March 2004? This paper will analyze the Madrid terrorist event case study and compare it to different decision-making models to determine if the models accurately explain the Spanish government's strategic reactions.

Three secondary questions need to be addressed as well. These questions are listed as follows: (1) What decision-making models are used to explain government actions? (2) What were Spain's strategic reactions following the terrorist attack? (3) Which model best explains Spain's response? All these questions will be answered progressively throughout this study.

A secondary effect to the compilation of research is knowledge gained about the terrorists themselves. Sun Tzu stated, "He who knows neither the enemy nor himself will be at risk in every battle."¹⁴ To this end, exposing terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures will benefit governments to defeat future terrorist activities.

Assumptions

In order to research and frame the case study, three assumptions had to be made. First, enough time had to have elapsed in order that the results of the terrorist attack had played out completely on the international scene. For the March 2004 attacks in Madrid, this is a relatively safe assumption based on the elapsed time since the event and the writing of this paper.

The second assumption was that all necessary information was unclassified, captured by media or government reports and available in English. While local media in Spain heavily covered the attacks, there were numerous international media outlets that reported on each event as well. Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, State Department, Department of Homeland Security and other institutions all have reports describing the attacks in detail. These sources imply that there was sufficient available information for the completion of this thesis.

Definition of Terms

There are numerous terms regarding terrorism that need to be defined in order to complete a study of this kind. Terrorism, international terrorism, terrorist sanctuary and terrorist incident are all subject to debate not only between intergovernmental organizations but also between countries. In fact, for years the United Nations has failed to define terrorism. Instead the United Nations settled for defining terrorist actions as a means of working around a precise definition. Apparently, terrorism as a political term is more difficult to define than mass murder.

Crisis. According to Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, the Department of Defense defines crisis as ~~an~~ incident or situation involving a threat to a

nation, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such . . . importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated in order to achieve national objectives.”¹⁵ The resulting environment following a terrorist incident meets the Department of Defense definition of crisis.

Diplomacy. JP 1-0 defines diplomacy as, ~~the~~ principal instrument for engaging with other states and foreign groups to advance” a government’s ~~values~~, interests, and objectives.”¹⁶

Economic. Economic power is another complex idea to define. According to JP 1-0 a strong economy, ~~is~~ a fundamental engine of the general welfare, the enabler of a strong national defense, and an influence for economic expansion.”¹⁷ It goes on to identify in general terms the uses of economic power to include working ~~with~~ other federal agencies, the governments of other nations, and the international financial institutions to encourage economic growth, raise standards of living, and predict and prevent, to the extent possible, economic and financial crises.”¹⁸ The very nature of working with another nation and opening up markets as opposed to not is an example of economic power.

Information. Information is a complex idea to define in terms of national power. JP 1-0 states that, ~~in a~~ broad sense, the informational instrument of national power has a diffuse and complex set of components.”¹⁹ It goes on to say, ~~in~~ information readily available from multiple sources influences domestic and foreign audiences including citizens, adversaries, and governments.”²⁰ This explanation is adequate for the purpose of this study.

Instruments of National Power. The Department of Defense defines instruments of national power in Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning* as “~~h~~ of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military.”²¹ According to President Obama in his remarks on national security on 12 May 2009, law has been added as a fifth instrument of national power.²² For the purpose of this study, law will be included in analysis. Finally, the words instruments and elements are interchangeable in this paper with regard to expressing a nation’s power through: Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economics and Law.

Except for the instrument of law, the other four instruments of national power (Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economics) are well defined in Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. For more information regarding each element of national power with relation to United States military action reference JP 1-0.

International Terrorism. The United States Code, Section 2656f (d) defines international terrorism to mean “~~t~~errorism involving citizens or the territory of more than 1 country.”²³ This definition is useful and relevant for the purpose of this thesis.

Law. The instrument of national power law includes governmental laws and regulations, the judicial system, law enforcement, and any other critical element to rational rule of law. Nations subject themselves and their citizens to the instrument of law. The effectiveness of which determines the strength of this instrument of national power.

Military. JP 1-0 declares, ~~the~~ purpose of the Armed Forces is to fight and win the Nation's wars."²⁴ It goes on to state that governments, ~~wields~~ the military instrument of national power at home and abroad in support of its national security goals in a variety of military operations."²⁵

Terrorism. There is a lot of debate about the definition of terrorism. Internationally the debate gets hung up on the difference between terrorists and freedom fighters. There is no debate in the United States, however. The United States has, according to Title 22 United States Code, Section 2656f (d), stated ~~the~~ term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents."²⁶ All U.S. agencies appear to be incorporating this definition to include the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security.

An old definition from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defined terrorism as ~~the~~ unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."²⁷ While this definition appears to be more specific, for the purpose of this thesis the United States Code definition will suffice.

Terrorist Incident. The FBI definition of a terrorist incident ~~is~~ a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of criminal laws of the United States, or of any state, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof."²⁸ Since United States Code does not define a terrorist incident, this working definition by the FBI will suffice for this thesis. Furthermore, terrorist incident, terrorist attack and terrorist event were used interchangeably throughout this study.

Terrorist Sanctuary. The United States Code also goes on to define terrorist sanctuary and sanctuary to mean ~~an~~ area in the territory of the country that is used by a terrorist or terrorist organization to carry out terrorist activities, including training, fundraising, financing, and recruitment; or as a transit point; and the government of which expressly consents to, or with knowledge, allows, tolerates, or disregards such use of its territory.”²⁹

This last definition of sanctuary makes a distinction between countries that know of terrorist organizations within their countries and those that do not. Practically speaking, if a country does not know of a terrorist organization operating within its borders, that country is still a sanctuary for that organization. Additionally, a country that knows about a terrorist organization operating from within but is ineffective at policing and monitoring, then that country is still a sanctuary for the terrorist organization as well.

For the purpose of this thesis a modified definition of sanctuary and terrorist sanctuary is the same as the Title 22 definition but also includes the line: or the government of which does not have knowledge of or cannot effectively police its territory against the terrorist organization. The full definition reads as follows: ~~—a~~ area in the territory of the country that is used by a terrorist or terrorist organization to carry out terrorist activities, including training, fundraising, financing, and recruitment; or as a transit point; and the government of which expressly consents to, or with knowledge, allows, tolerates, or disregards such use of its territory” or the government of which does not have knowledge of or cannot effectively police its territory against the terrorist organization.³⁰ The addition of the last line allows for a broader and more practical definition of sanctuary.

Limitations

A limitation of this study was the inability to travel to Madrid, Spain. Additionally, it was not possible to interview those individuals who had direct impact or were involved during the events of 11 March 2004. Instead, this paper was limited to media articles written or translated to English as well as unclassified government agency reports and analysis. Finally, this study is limited by the amount of time available to complete within the proscribed Command and General Staff College academic year.

Delimitations

This study will involve a strategic look at the attacks and government approaches and reactions as opposed to the actual police tactics used to solve the crisis. This study will not discuss law enforcement techniques to analyze crime scenes. The case study may highlight unique tactical aspects of the attack, especially in the background development, but the analysis will be focused on strategic government reactions and decision-making models.

Significance

The United States has a vested strategic interest in defeating terrorism as a tactic. Having one or more decision-making models to compare a terrorist attack to any given country that allows for a greater depth of understanding as to the strategic reaction of the victim nation would be a powerful tool in the current war. The United States could then focus elements of national power to assist the nation in crisis, stabilize the international environment and marginalize the terrorist attack within the victim nation.

Summary and Conclusions

Since 11 September 2001, the United States has been fighting an unconventional war against an adaptive and violent enemy. The United States has gone to extreme measures in the pursuit of defeating terrorist organizations that threaten the stability of the international environment. Unfortunately the fact remains that extremist organizations, with the will and means to do harm to the United States and its allies, will continue to operate for years to come. The logical conclusion then is that the United States will continue to battle terrorism and terrorist organizations. Armed with elements of national power and a model or models that explain a nation's response to a terrorist event, the United States could work to promote stability, deter destabilizing trends and marginalize the terrorist cause that perpetrated the attack.

There exists a large volume of articles and reports regarding the Madrid bombings as well as the government response. Furthermore, numerous articles, journals and books have been devoted to the subject of terrorism, homeland defense and decision-making models. The next chapter will outline the different sources used in the development of this thesis.

¹David Fromkin, "The Strategy of Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs* 53, no. 4 (July 1975), 692.

²Robert C. Martinage, *The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment* (Washington, DC: Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008), 152.

³George Wright, "Profile: New EU Anti-Terror Tsar," *guardian.co.uk*, 26 March 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/mar/26/eu.politics1> (accessed 11 December 2009).

⁴World Bank, *Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)*, X-2, http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/html/amlcft/docs/Ref_Guide_EN/v2/10-Ch10_EN_v2.pdf (accessed 10 December 2009).

⁵The White House, Remarks by John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, –A New Approach to Safeguarding Americans,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, James S. Brady, Press Briefing Room, Washington, DC, 6 August 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-John-Brennan-at-the-Center-for-Strategic-and-International-Studies/ (accessed 11 December 2009).

⁶John C. Whitehead, –Terrorism: The Challenge and the Response,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 16, no. 3 (Spring 1987): 221.

⁷National Priorities Project, –Notes and Sources: Cost of War Counter,” http://www.nationalpriorities.org/cost_of_war_counter_notes (accessed 19 November 2009).

⁸Ibid.

⁹–Britain’s Bill of Particulars: Planned and Carried Out the Atrocities,” *New York Times*, 5 October 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/05/international/05ETEX.html?scp=8&sq=USS%20Cole&st=cse&pagewanted=all#> (accessed 11 December 2009).

¹⁰History Commons Website, –May 16, 2003: Suicide Bombings in Casablanca, Morocco, Kill 45,” <http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a101903binladenquagmires#a101903binladenquagmires> (accessed 11 December 2009).

¹¹guardian.co.uk, –Al-Qaeda’s Terrifying Decade of Worldwide Slaughter,” *The Observer*, 10 July 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/jul/10/alqaida.july7> (accessed 27 October 2009); Jane’s Intelligence Digest, –Spain: Defeat for a US Ally,” 15 March 2004, <http://search.janes.com.lumen.cgscarl.com/Search/printFriendlyView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jiwk/history/jid2004/jid00418.htm@current>, (accessed 14 September 2009).

¹²The White House, Remarks by John O. Brennan.

¹³David Fromkin, –The Strategy of Terrorism,” *Foreign Affairs* 53, no. 4 (July 1975): 692.

¹⁴Sun Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*, trans. Roger Ames (New York: Ballentine Books, 1993), 113.

¹⁵Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 26 December 2006), GL-9.

¹⁶Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), I-9.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, I-10

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹JP 5-0, GL-13.

²²The White House, “Remarks by the President on National Security,” Washington, DC, 21 May 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09 (accessed 11 December 2009).

²³Cornell University Law School, “Title 22 United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 2656f (d) Annual Country Reports on Terrorism,” 8 January 2008, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/search/display.html?terms=2656f&url=/uscode/html/uscode22/usc_sec_22_00002656---f000-.html (accessed 12 December 2009).

²⁴JP 1, I-10.

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶Cornell University Law School, “Title 22 United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 2656f (d) 8 January 2008,” http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/search/display.html?terms=2656f&url=/uscode/html/uscode22/usc_sec_22_00002656---f000-.html (accessed 7 December 2009); Sean N. Kalic, *Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 8, Combating a Modern Hydra Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 2.

²⁷Federal Bureau of Investigation, Baltimore Field Office, “Domestic Terrorism Program,” <http://baltimore.fbi.gov/domter.htm> (accessed 11 December 2009).

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹Cornell University Law School.

³⁰*Ibid.*

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The United States and numerous allies have identified terrorism as national and international threats. While national policy dictates the importance to study terrorism, one often overlooked element is the study of national reactions to terrorist events. Decision-making models provide a paradigm that may accurately explain government reactions in the wake of extremist violence. Armed with this knowledge, the United States would be in a better position to use elements of national power to promote stabilizing regional trends and deter destabilizing elements thus marginalizing the terrorist's stated cause by constructing a government reaction detrimental to an extremist terrorist ideology.

The Literature Review consists of four sections beginning with research regarding the Madrid train bombings of 11 March 2004. The next two sections discuss government reactions to a terrorist event and terrorism in general. The final section discusses the research of decision-making models used to analyze the Madrid case study. This review concludes with an observation on the application of decision-making models to actual terrorist events.

Case Studies

Numerous media outlets reported on the Madrid, Spain, attack of 11 March 2004. Specifically, *The New York Times*, *USA Today*, *BBC News*, and *The Guardian* have detailed descriptions of the events to include timelines, analysis and evidence reports.

The FBI, the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security have reports, speeches and congressional statements regarding the attack.

Spain has numerous media outlets that have been critical of their government's reaction and reaction by individual leaders. The *La Vanguardia* newspaper stated about the elections in Spain immediately following the terrorist attack that, ~~the~~ electorate has punished Mr Aznar . . . because of the very authoritarian way he governed. His decision to involve Spain in the war in Iraq, together with the growing feeling that he was hiding information about the Madrid attacks, sent his party to the grave."¹ Similarly, *El Pais* stated the same opinion in that one reason for the election results was due to, ~~the~~ inevitable feeling of the electorate that the government manipulated and deceived it."² Even before the elections *El Pais* referenced ~~the~~ more than dubious attitude of the government in relation to the lines of investigation."³ Only the conservative newspaper *ABC* gently commented that the election loss was the result of ~~the~~ brutal impact of an attack that led to the search for a scapegoat within the government," and that ~~the~~ period of government under the leadership of Mr Aznar--whose contribution to Spain's progress has been exceptional--has come to an end."⁴

Two institutions produced case studies regarding the 11 March 2004, train bombings. Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre produced an excellent time line detailing the attack to include government response and analysis.⁵ However, it failed to set a proper international setting required for this study. Furthermore it lacked some organizational detail necessary for decision-making model analysis. The other case study was by Michigan State University's School of Criminal Justice. This study has some inaccurate details and is strongly slanted to an American viewpoint. For example, it

mixed up the date of the attack in places and referenced an inaccurate number of casualties.⁶ Furthermore, it goes on to claim al Qaeda orchestrated the regime change in Spain and that Spanish troop withdrawal was “~~a~~apitulation” to terrorist demands.⁷ These concepts are typical of American and British commentary and represent a bias against the Spanish government’s strategic reactions to the terrorist crisis.⁸ The real value of the Michigan State University case study is its analysis of al Qaeda and how al Qaeda evolved into an “all channels leaderless resistance network as its means of organization.”⁹

A couple of websites were found to be helpful in the development of the case study. First, the website Global Oneness was an encyclopedia with a wealth of information regarding the Madrid train bombings and aftermath. The purpose of the website, “to co-create a happy world,” did not reflect credibility with the author of this study. However, the information garnered was almost always validated by other sources. The other website found to be exceptionally useful was HistoryCommons.org. This website appeared to lean toward a Spanish government conspiracy to withhold information from the Spanish citizenry. Because of the conspiracy angle to each article, the details like the exact times of media engagements as well as investigation discoveries were captured and highlighted. Additionally government weaknesses such as undermanned counterterrorist agencies were emphasized. These facts were exceptionally helpful in developing the case study detail needed for decision-making model analysis.

Other references that were of considerable assistance in both the development of the case study and the analysis was Jane’s Intelligence Review and the *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* article by Fernando Reinares, “After the Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms and Prevention of Global Terrorism in Spain.” Jane’s provided detailed

facts and background but also provided helpful political and strategic analysis. The article by Reinares detailed reforms to Spanish law enforcement initiated after the 11 March 2004, train bombings. The agency detail described in the article was critical to the development of decision-making model analysis.

The BBC webpage, “Madrid Train Attacks” and the “ITIC Terrorism Case Study No.1: The Madrid Rail Bombings” contain excellent accounts and timelines of the morning of 11 March 2004. However, there were some minor discrepancies between the two sources. For example, the exact times of each explosion were subject to some debate. However, the difference was only a matter of two or three minutes and was considered insignificant for the purposes of this paper. Furthermore, the number of people killed in each train was slightly different between the two sources and neither source exactly matches the recognized total of 191 killed as a result of the attack. While the difference between the sources was small and insignificant for the purposes of this paper, the BBC webpage was the most published and will be used for this statistic. The difference in total casualties was probably due to the fact that a number of victims died at the hospital while being treated for injuries sustained in the attack.

Government Reactions to Terrorism

The Homeland Security Institute has useful documents for in-depth study of government reactions to crisis situations. “Homeland Security Strategic Planning: Mission Area Analysis” offers a useful measuring stick for how countries should respond and recover from a terrorist attack. Another report, “Underlining Reasons for Success and Failure of Terrorist Attacks: Selected Case Studies” is an example for how to analyze terrorist attacks as case studies. Additionally the document’s findings correspond almost

exactly to the events of the Madrid train bombings. For example, in the area of law enforcement and intelligence sharing, the Homeland Security Study states that —security services may not recognize the context into which a certain piece of information fits, but by sharing with other organizations more parts of the puzzle can be pieced together.”¹⁰ According to the Routledge article, —After the Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms and Prevention of Global Terrorism in Spain,” intelligence sharing and coordination between police forces and other agencies was a weakness prior to the train bombings of 11 March 2004.¹¹

—Dynamic Threat Mitigation,” —Dealing with Terrorism,” and —Terrorism the Challenge and the Response,” are articles that attempt to offer solutions to the strategic problem of terrorism. The article, —Dynamic Threat Mitigation,” explains in detail the growing link between terrorism and criminal activity, specifically in the realm of finance. As the article states, —terrorist groups appear to be resorting to organized criminal activity as a means of self-financing, including through drug dealing, credit card theft, and insurance scams.”¹² As it turned out, the extremists who perpetrated the attack in Madrid financed their operation —through drug sales.”¹³

The —Dealing with Terrorism” article suggests using elements of national power in varying degrees to persuade foreign nations to join against terrorism.¹⁴ Typically that would imply the use of diplomacy, information, military and economic forces. Curiously, the President of the United States, in a speech given 21 May 2009, added law and moral example as additional elements of national power.¹⁵ While moral example may provide debatable results to any given crisis in an international community, law and international law may provide tangible results in the long term. Theoretically one way a country within

a law abiding international community would be able to react to a crisis initiated by terrorists would be through law enforcement and legal processes. For example, the proper use of law would provide a government with national and international credibility and political capital in terms of public support both nationally and internationally. This thesis incorporated law as one of the plausible elements of national power.

The last article, “Terrorism the Challenge and the Response,” is important in that it describes the purpose of terrorism. It stated that terrorists want citizens to lose faith in their government’s ability to protect them. It said that by this reaction a terrorist attack could —undermine the legitimacy . . . of a government.”¹⁶ Furthermore, it goes on to state that terrorism succeeds when states overreact with repressive policies that alienate populations.¹⁷

Most of the extremists prosecuted for the terrorist attack in Madrid were originally from Morocco.¹⁸ Consequently, the results of two governments interacting to solve an international terrorist problem have been played out to a large extent between Spain and Morocco in the years following 2004. This international aspect added an element of sanctuary to the case study. The concept of sanctuary for terrorists and guerrilla warfare has been thoroughly analyzed in the book, *Out of Bounds:*

Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare.

Terrorism

There is an overwhelming amount of literature describing terrorism. However, a basic understanding of terrorism is necessary to analyze case studies of terrorist events.

Combating Al Qaeda Fighting a Modern Day Hydra; Global War on Terrorism

Occasional Paper 8 written by Mr. Sean Kalic was an excellent reference defining

terrorism, providing background regarding terrorism in general and explaining the unique complexity of al Qaeda. “The Strategy of Terrorism” by Dr. David Fromkin offers interesting insights into the purpose of terrorism. Fromkin states that terrorists attack in order to cause a reaction that will accomplish specific goals, in essence manipulating a stronger agent, either the government or the population, to create a change in society commensurate with the terrorist’s ideology. This concept was echoed in the article, “Terrorism the Challenge and the Response,” discussed earlier.

Speeches from John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, and from John C. Whitehead, former Deputy Secretary of State, offer insight as to a fundamental flaw in the general logic of terrorism as a strategy. The fact that terrorists do not control the reaction to the event that they have initiated translates into a loss of initiative. Instead governments and the public at large decide how to react and can choose to react in a manner detrimental to the terrorist’s stated purpose and ideology.¹⁹

Decision-making Models

There exists a large body of literature regarding different decision-making models used to study government and government policy. However, each model fits into one of four categories: Rational Policy, Organizational Process, Bureaucratic Politics and Cognitive models. Below is a description of the four models and review of applicable literature.

Rational Choice Model

The Rational Choice Model is an economic theory applied to foreign policy and government. It is defined as a model in which ~~h~~ happenings in foreign affairs are conceived as actions chosen by the nation or national government. Governments select the action that will maximize strategic goals and objectives.”²⁰ It is a simple and pervasive model. In fact according to Suzan Lohmann in her book, *The Poverty of Green and Shapiro*, ~~e~~ven though rational choice scholars constitute a minority of political scientists, they publish a disproportionate number of articles in the *American Political Science Review* and they are sought after by leading political science departments.”²¹

According to Vani K. Borooah in the paper *Rational Actor Models in Political Science*, the Rational Choice Model consists of four parts. The first and primary idea of the model is that when confronted with multiple options, the rational actor will choose the option that provides the greatest benefit. A second feature of the model is that the rational actor acts as an individual. In other words when faced with choices, even an organization of many people still acts as one entity. The next part of the model is that the rational actor is consistent in judging the value of all options. Finally, the last feature of the Rational Actor Model is that the model applies to all entities at all times. This implies a consistency of action.

There are numerous examples and variations of this model in use today. For example, George Friedman in *The Next 100 Years*, predicts world politics for the next century. His method was the Rational Choice Model with a twist about control over oceans and advantages of strategic geography.

Another example of the application of the Rational Choice Model is called the Game Theory Model. Game Theory is used to analyze different policies. It compares one player's choice of strategy against another's and offers a mathematical means of measuring policy choices to determine which one maximizes benefit. However, Game Theory is based on the assumption of rational actors and is consequently a derivative of the Rational Choice Model.²²

Professor Raymond Tante provides an example of the utility of the Rational Choice model in his paper regarding United States policy toward Taiwan and China. Professor Tante compared The Rational Choice Model explanation of policy to two versions of the Bureaucratic Politics Model. In his conclusion he states that the U.S. decision to send two aircraft carriers to Taiwan during China's military exercise in March could be best explained by using the rational actor model.²³ Professor Tante goes on to recommend future policy options consistent with rational choice.

The Rational Choice Model is subject to numerous critiques. A primary problem with the model is that political scientists engage in 'post hoc theory development': first they look at the facts and then devise a theory.²⁴ Allison puts it another way, 'Given any action, an imaginative analyst should always be able to construct some rationale for the government's choice.'²⁵ Another critique of the theory occurs when a strategic choice appears to be inconsistent and does not maximize benefits. When this occurs it is explained as a mistake on the part of the choosing party. However, labeling an inconsistency in the model a mistake on the part of an individual or agency does nothing to explain the choice or decision. Instead, the model provides a broad cover for what really is a failure to rationally explain the motivation behind a choice.²⁶ An example of

this fact occurs when faced with a choice between honesty and deceit. At times it may be in the best interest of an individual to lie, however that individual may choose the moral high ground and remain honest. As one might surmise, rational choice can depend on individual perspective. Where one sees a simple choice, another might see incomprehensible irrationality.

Organizational Process Model

The Organizational Process Model is relatively new compared to the Rational Choice Model. It uses processes and predetermined procedures of different agencies and organizations to explain foreign policy. This model makes the claim that governments are a “constellation of loosely allied organizations,” and that “the happenings of international politics are outputs of organizational processes.”²⁷ National strategic events rarely fall within the confines of one organization’s purview and must be dealt with by multiple bodies within a government. Furthermore, an organization’s standard operating procedures rarely fit a strategic event exactly and instead must be adapted to produce an adequate solution. The reaction to a strategic event tends to be handled “sluggishly or inappropriately.”²⁸ A key premise, the Organizational Process Model declares that standard operating procedures are slow to evolve or change.

Literature using Organizational Process trends toward application in economics and domestic policy. Besides Allison, only a few others have applied Organizational Process to international relations. This appears to be a lapse in literature. Christopher M. Jones of the Political Science Department of Northern Illinois University gave one explanation for this lack of study. There is a tremendous amount of information required to analyze foreign policy according to competing organization’s standard operating

procedure. Jones stated that the research requirement for the organizational process model was —considerable if not prohibitive.²⁹ A final critique of the Organizational Process mentioned by Jones is that there is —ambiguity over the dividing line between” the Organizational Process Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model.³⁰

An example of the Organizational Process Model that supports Jones’ critique can be found in the 2006 case study of the Augusta, Maine Bridge. The process described was complicated with multiple agencies expressing opinions. The organizational process the article emphasized was the process of town hall meetings, public engagements, and government outreach through which the government went about getting public approval for the bridge.³¹ However, the Bureaucratic Politics Model, a negotiated compromise through town hall meetings, better explained actual elements of decision-making

Bureaucratic Politics Model

A third model for consideration is the Bureaucratic Politics Model. The primary characteristic of the Bureaucratic Politics Model is that foreign policy decisions are the result of bargaining among different involved leaders, resulting in a negotiated policy.³² Of the three models introduced by Allison in *The Essence of Decision*, the Bureaucratic Politics Model —generated the greatest enthusiasm.”³³ The model has been updated numerous times since its inception to include a second edition of the original book.³⁴

The Bureaucratic Politics Model is a complicated model with multiple points and assumptions. Both Todd Hatley and Christopher Jones in separate studies summarize a laundry list of assumptions and concepts applicable to the model. Jones’ rendition, however best captures the model’s more pertinent points.

1. Individuals in governmental positions make government decisions and actions.
2. Actors outside the executive branch play a far less influential role in policy making than those inside.
3. An individual's policy preference can be predicted from his or her governmental position. Decision makers' policy stands, however, can also be affected by idiosyncratic factors.
4. An individual's policy goals and interests are influenced by national security, organizational, domestic and personal concerns.
5. Deadlines and events compel busy individuals to take policy stands on a variety of policy issues.
6. Different individuals see different sides of the same policy issue, because they occupy different governmental positions.
7. An Individual's influence on particular policy issue is dictated by (a) bargaining advantages, (b) willingness to use such assets, (c) skill in using such advantages, and (d) other actors' perceptions of the second and third items.
8. Action-channels--Regularized means for taking action on a specific kind governmental issue--activate bargaining advantages and formal or informal rules that govern political interactions.
9. Governmental decisions and actions are unintended political resultants. That is, political bargaining produces outcomes that do not reflect what any one actor would have selected independently.³⁵

The Bureaucratic Politics Model has considerable strengths. The model suggests policy is made through ~~d~~ebate, compromise, consultation and consensus . . . with a

variety of views represented.”³⁶ This is especially true of democracies and implies careful deliberation of multiple options. Furthermore, the model suggests that “experts and specialists” create foreign policy and thus reduce the chances of serious flaws in policy.³⁷

Jones however summarizes a considerable list of weaknesses of the model, the more prominent being its complexity. According to critics, the model also fails to narrow down the variables associated with a strategic policy. Furthermore it is not considered a genuine social-scientific model. In other words it does not develop the relationships of variables from which changes will differentiate outcomes. Another criticism is that the model ignores the importance of personal experience, operating styles and goals. Finally, some scholars argue that the model is too closely tied to the American political system and may not be applicable to other governments.³⁸ Despite these complaints, however, the model is prolific and in continuous use today to explain foreign policy decisions.³⁹

Hataly also provides valuable insight into the problems associated with the Bureaucratic Politics Model. In his study *Bureaucratic Politics and the Department of National Defence*, Hataly attempted to analyze the Canadian Defense Department and its role in formulating national foreign policy through the lens of Bureaucratic Politics. While his first observation was that the scenario fits the criteria necessary for the model to be applicable, he then complains that the number of actors involved multiplied by the dynamic shifts of Canadian foreign policy implies an “almost infinite list of potential considerations.”⁴⁰ Hataly also criticized the fact that the model is “a difficult commodity to measure, since much of what characterizes it takes place outside of public record or is a matter of convention and tradition.”⁴¹

Despite these drawbacks, however, Hataly makes some very insightful observations and suggestions concerning the Canadian Defense Department and its influence on foreign policy. He states that with the new strategic dynamic of a post Cold War international environment, Canada will shift its focus from defense to security. He adds that this is more in line with Canadian peacekeeping traditions. Furthermore he noted that with the inability of anyone . . . to articulate an acceptable primary role for the military,” the Canadian Defense Department will continue to lose leverage in policy making.⁴² While these insights do not predict Canadian foreign policy precisely, it does offer a framework and train of thought to work from when a controversial policy does come to light.

In his analysis Hataly confirmed Allison’s statement that the Bureaucratic Politics Model tells a fascinating story. ‘ But its complexity is enormous, the information requirements are often overwhelming, and many of the details of the bargaining may be superfluous.’⁴³ At the same time the model dives deeply into the strategic situation and offers considerable insight. The real value of this model may be the depth of study required and the resultant understanding of the strategic problem.

Cognitive Model

The fourth model identified in this study was the Cognitive Model. Cognitive psychology is the study of mental processes involved in perception, learning, memory and reasoning.⁴⁴ The Cognitive Model attempts to describe the decision making process of foreign policy. A notable example of the use of cognition was *The Heart of Altruism* written by Kristen R. Monroe. Her argument was that not all human behavior is based on self-interest and she sites acts of heroism as examples of individuals who risked

everything to act selflessly.⁴⁵ Monroe works through the scientific process to analyze and explain altruistic behavior to develop a parallel theory to the Rational Choice Model. This argument directly affects political science and the models that rely on the principles of self-interest.⁴⁶

David Mendonca and William Wallace also produced an example of cognition in political science in their work *A Cognitive Model of Improvisation in Emergency Management*. An eclectic study, they compare the improvisation of a jazz musician to the improvisation necessary in the management of a large-scale emergency. Insights to their study include how a jazz musician uses a skeletal framework with broad boundaries within which the musician devises solutions to phased problems. The musician uses declarative knowledge in terms of past experience, as well as procedural knowledge in terms of application to develop solutions.⁴⁷

Mendonca and Wallace then suggested that emergency management could replicate a similar affect. A skeletal emergency management plan with broad application could be used as a basis for emergency response. Furthermore the combined use of declarative knowledge (equipment, training, objectives, and others) and procedural knowledge (routines which enable both improvisation and plan-following) are used to progress through a problem to an adequate solution.⁴⁸

The cognitive model attempts to breach a gap of understanding between policy and the individual. Scientific knowledge of how humans make decisions have obvious applicability to political science and policy development. However, despite continuous study in the academic community, the full application of cognition on policy has yet to be realized. Furthermore, a detailed knowledge of psychology and cognitive theory are

necessary to developing analysis of individuals and their decisions during a crisis event. Interviews and psychological profiles of key actors are needed to accurately model decision-making processes throughout the emergency event. These requirements are time and resource intensive and demand a professional background in psychology.

Analysis of Literature--Trends and Gaps

Numerous references exist with regard to building a detailed case study of the Madrid train bombings terrorist attacks. Mainstream newspapers and media covered the crisis in detail to include timelines and analysis. Government agencies provided reports and leadership gave speeches. There exists plenty of information to develop a detailed account of what occurred before, during and after the Madrid terrorist event.

Terrorism is not a new tactic within the international environment. Governments have been reacting to terrorism for centuries and the United States has considered it a national priority for decades. In recent years the Homeland Security Institute has produced valuable reports analyzing strategic guidance and developing trends for success and failures of terrorist activity.

The study of terrorism has become a popular subject in recent years, with a great deal of references and books to choose from. It was important for this study to have a solid understanding for what terrorism is and why it works as a tactic. Even more importantly it was necessary to understand why terrorism can be defeated. Speeches from John O. Brennan and John C. Whitehead provided vital insight with regard to a means of defeating terrorism through government reactions.

While the Rational Choice Model is pervasive in political literature, the Organizational Process Model has enjoyed less popularity and seems to be limited to

mostly domestic policy. The Bureaucratic Politics Model, despite its relative complexity, has generated great interest in its potential for accuracy. Finally the Cognitive Model offers great promise in the explanation of decision-making but requires an extensive background in psychology.

Overall there seems to be a complete gap in coverage with regard to analyzing government reactions to a terrorist attack with a decision-making model. While Allison analyzed the Cuban missile crisis with decision-making models, the strategic environment was drastically different. In October 1962 the Cold War was at its peak and emphasized two opposing super powers and the threat of nuclear destruction whereas this thesis proposes to study the Madrid train bombings in the current strategic setting of the War against al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organizations.

Significance of Thesis to Existing Literature

Terrorism is a horrific threat to the international community but one that can be overcome through strategic government reactions. It is therefore advantageous to study government responses to terrorist events and develop tools the statesmen can use to shape a reaction that marginalizes the terrorist ideology. This thesis will apply decision-making models to a terrorist case study to better understand government reactions in the wake of extremist violence. Armed with this knowledge the United States would be in a better position to use elements of national power to assist victim nations and stabilize the international community. Additionally the victim nation would be armed with knowledge necessary to strategically construct a reaction detrimental to the terrorist's extremist ideology.

Conclusion

The literature review found there to be extensive resources available for the development of a case study about the Madrid train bombings of 11 March 2004. Next, the chapter discussed sources concerning government reactions to extremist violence. There exists an extensive body of research available for the examination of terrorism in general. The literature review then, examined different decision-making models used for analysis of case studies of this kind. The final section explained the relevance of this thesis to today's environment of international terrorist violence. The next chapter will discuss the method and models used to accomplish this analysis.

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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Terrorism focuses sudden extreme violence in order to manipulate a government or the people to further a terrorist's goals. If one fully understood the reactions of governments to an act of terror, one could act to promote stabilizing trends as well as marginalize the terrorist's cause. This thesis will analyze a terrorist attack as a case study and compare it to different decision models. The purpose is to validate one of the models in order to provide a framework for the accurate explanation of government actions to future terrorist acts.

This chapter will discuss the method for analyzing the terrorist case study to determine which model most accurately explains government behavior. To begin with, the chapter will establish reasons for choosing the train bombings of Madrid as a terrorist event for analysis. Next, it will discuss the feasibility of the decision-making models and clarify why the Organizational Process Model and the Cognitive Model were eliminated as analysis tools for this case study. Subsequently, this chapter will explain how the remaining models will be applied. Finally this chapter will end with a discussion how to compare the results of decision model analysis to determine which model most accurately described the actual outcome resulting from the terrorist event.

Research Criteria

The case study used for analysis is the Madrid, Spain train bombings that occurred on 11 March 2004. This case study was based primarily on media reports but

also speeches and government reports written by various United States and Spanish agencies. The Madrid bombing was significant in its scope and influence on the international community and was, therefore, well documented.

The Madrid train bombing terrorist event was specifically selected because it reflects numerous international strategic consequences. Specifically, it was the first attack by al Qaeda on the continent demonstrating European vulnerability to attack by international terrorists. Where Europe has had dealings with domestic terrorism for generations, it has remained relatively free of the influence of international terrorists up until this point.¹ It was also the first recognized attack by al Qaeda in over two years following the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. Suddenly, and unexpectedly, al Qaeda managed to demonstrate capability and flexibility previously thought by the media and public opinion as not feasible.² Additionally, Spain held national elections three days after the attack, which demonstrated al Qaeda efforts at influencing Spanish politics. The cell responsible for the attack originated from a neighboring country, Morocco. This implied possible sanctuary from another nation. The most notable strategic consequence, however, was that Spain pulled out of the coalition fighting to stabilize Iraq. In all, the scope and magnitude of the attack precipitated challenges and effects throughout the international community making the case study valuable in and of itself.

Case Study Format

The Madrid train bombings case study will be developed in the three phases of a terrorist attack according to Judith Mathewson in her article, “The Psychological Impact of Terrorist Attacks: Lessons Learned For Future Threats.” The first phase described in Mathewson’s model is the pre-attack/pre-crisis phase. In this phase, background detail

was developed to include the national as well as the international environment leading up to the attack. The next phase, the acute event management phase, discussed the actual terrorist event itself to include initial government rescue and recovery efforts. The case study concludes with a detailed discussion of the last phase, consequence management. This phase includes the government reaction and its effects on the strategic environment.³

Feasibility of the Decision-making Models

Four models were initially chosen for analysis of the 11 March 2004, Madrid train bombing's terrorist event. A preliminary review of political science literature revealed that the Rational Choice Model, the Organizational Process Model, the Bureaucratic Politics Model, and the Cognitive Model were prevalent and academically accepted means of analysis used in modern political science. Furthermore, each model was distinct and contained completely different characteristics that should translate into distinct findings following analysis of the case study.

The Rational Choice Model requires a knowledge base of the international community throughout the crisis. This would include background information of the pertinent countries as well as an accounting of the government's strategic reaction following the terrorist crisis. The scope of the Madrid train bombings ensured this type of information existed in news articles as well as in political commentary and government reports. The Rational Choice Model is feasible and will be used in the analysis of the Madrid case study.

The Organizational Process Model, on the other hand, requires extensive research in the areas of pertinent organization's standard operating procedures. This would include all the police and intelligence agencies of the Spanish Interior Ministry. This would also

include the Foreign Ministry and even the cabinet of the Prime Minister himself. Many of these standard operating procedures are classified beyond the scope of this study.

Furthermore, the classification makes these documents inaccessible to the author. Also, in the five years following the Madrid crisis, agencies have updated and changed their standard operating procedures to adapt to the international terrorist threat. It is doubtful standard operating procedures from before 11 March 2004, were archived and kept. Even if they were, the data would likely be incomplete. Finally, it was discovered that the computer systems used by Prime Minister Aznar and his cabinet to document strategy and the emergency management of the Madrid terrorist crisis were destroyed following the election.⁴ While this caused much controversy within Spain, it also makes an analysis using the Organizational Process Model virtually impossible. Therefore, this thesis will not employ the Organizational Process Model as an analysis tool of the Madrid train bombing's case study.

The Bureaucratic Politics Model was the third model discussed in chapter two. This model requires a detailed account of the event to include strengths, limitations and political stance of different organizations involved in the strategic aftermath of the terrorist event. While a massive amount of information regarding the terrorist attack and its aftermath is available through news articles and government reports, the Bureaucratic Politics Model requires considerable analysis and sorting to attain the detail needed to explain the negotiated strategic response of the Spanish government. But, given the information available, the Bureaucratic Politics Model is a feasible tool to analyze the Madrid case study.

The Cognitive Model requires an extensive background in psychology in order to accurately model the decision making process of key players throughout the crisis and aftermath of 11 March 2004, Madrid terrorist attack. Furthermore, extensive interviews and detailed profiles of key decision makers are required to perform this type of analysis. A limitation discussed in chapter one was the inability to travel to Spain and interview those individuals most involved in the crisis management process. Without such interviews and profiles, a cognitive analysis would be impossible. Had information from the computer systems of the Prime Minister not been destroyed but instead made available, it may have been possible to create profiles and better map the decision making process of the Prime Minister and his cabinet.⁵ Unfortunately that information was destroyed and consequently unavailable for cognitive study.

Furthermore, in the time allotted for this study the author would be unable to attain the degree of knowledge required concerning cognitive theory and psychology necessary to accurately analyze the events using the Cognitive Model. For these reasons, this model will not be used in this study. While an analysis of the Madrid terrorist crisis utilizing the Cognitive Model would be a valuable addition to the field of political science, such an analysis is beyond the scope of this study.

Fortunately information does exist in the forms of news articles, reports and journals for the development of both the Rational Choice Model as well as the Bureaucratic Politics Model. This study will, therefore, use these two models to analyze and attempt to explain Spain's strategic reactions to the Madrid terrorist attack case study through these lenses. Furthermore the different focus of the two models should result in a distinct contrast in analysis. The Rational Choice model focuses on –states as the central

actors in international politics” and considers “what happens within states is of little consequence.”⁶ The Bureaucratic Politics Model on the other hand is focused more on the internal politics of the nation state and focuses on those significant players who “pull and haul” to negotiate a response.⁷

Instruments of National Power and Scope of Analysis

According to Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, instruments of national power are defined as “all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives.”⁸ Based on this concept, nations project power through instruments of national power. Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* discusses four instruments of national power: Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economics.⁹ President Obama in his remarks on national security on 12 May 2009, added law as a fifth instrument of power.¹⁰ Accordingly and as a result of any particular crisis, governments have only these five means of responding to an event within the international community. Because of this concept, analysis of the decision-making models will be limited to governments projecting these five elements of national power.

Following an international incident or crisis, the primary focus of a country tends to be limited to only one element of national power at a time. If a government reacts with a strong military response then the other elements, while still active, will play a less visible role in comparison. Accordingly, analysis of the terrorist case study utilizing the two decision-making models will concentrate on determining which of the five instruments of national power Spain primarily used to respond to the crisis.

Results Comparison

Analysis of the case study according to either decision-making model results in a government response focused on a particular instrument of national power. The results of the Rational Choice Model, the Bureaucratic Politics Model and the actual historical event itself will be labeled according to the instrument of national power identified through analysis. In the case of the two decision-making models, the results will be compared to the actual historical event. If a government response, according to the decision-making model, matches that which actually occurred then that model would be validated. If a government response, according to the decision-making model, does not match that which actually occurred then that model would be flawed and unable to explain government responses.

Ideally one of the decision-making models compares favorably to the actual historic event. If a model accurately describes the government response in the case study, than it may be used for further study of government reactions to terrorist events. However, if both decision-making models results are negative then further study will be required to refine the models to more accurately explain government responses.

Conclusion

The use of a decision-making model to explain government reactions would be a powerful tool in the war on terror. With a validated model, a nation could work to influence the international community to promote stability and deter terrorism. The purpose of this chapter was to outline the method by which a decision-making model could be verified according to government reactions to a past terrorist event. Initially, an argument was made for the Madrid train bombings of 2004 as a case study to be used in

this study as the subject of analysis. Additionally the four decision-making models described in chapter two were analyzed for feasibility. The Organizational Process Model and the Cognitive Model were found to be beyond the limitations of this study. However, the requirements for the Rational Choice Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model were found to be feasible. Analysis of the two remaining models will focus on the Spanish government responses according to instruments of national power. Finally, a comparison of the decision-making model outcome to actual events will verify or disprove each particular model. If a model is validated it could then be used to assist a nation to stabilize the international community and deter terrorism following a terrorist event. If neither model is verified then modifications to one or both models may be suggested to more accurately predict government reactions.

The next chapter will detail the Madrid case study. Chapter 5 will apply both decision-making models to the case study to determine government reactions in accordance with each model and compare to the historical record. The first decision-making model used for analysis will be the Rational Choice Model to be followed by the Bureaucratic Politics Model. Conclusions concerning the usefulness of these models in respect to government reactions to a terrorist event will not be made until the last chapter of this thesis.

¹David T. Armitage Jr., “The European Union: Measuring Counterterrorism Cooperation,” *Strategic Forum* no. 227 (November 2007), 1.

²BBC News, “The Legacy of the Madrid Bombings,” 15 February 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/6357599.stm> (accessed 11 December 2009).

³Judith J. Mathewson, Homeland Security Advance Sheet and Readings, "The Psychological Impact of Terrorist Attacks: Lessons Learned for Future Threats" (Fort Leavenworth, KS, Command and General Staff College, August 2009), 192-194.

⁴Giles Tremlett, "Aznar 'Wiped Files on Madrid Bombings' All Computer Records in PM's Office Destroyed, says Zapatero," *The Guardian*, 14 December 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/dec/14/spain.gilestremlett> (accessed 27 October 2009).

⁵Ibid.

⁶Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Foreign Policy Analysis and Rational Choice Models," *International Studies Association Compendium Project Paper* (2009), 11, http://www.isacomps.com/info/samples/foreignpolicyanalysisandrationalchoicemodels_sample.pdf (accessed 16 December 2009).

⁷Jones, "Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Process Models," 7.

⁸JP 5-0, GL-13.

⁹JP 1.

¹⁰The White House, "Remarks by the President on National Security."

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to determine if a decision-making model when applied to a terrorist event case study accurately explains government strategic responses. The Madrid train bombing attack that occurred 11 March 2004, was the event chosen for this study. Using the Mathewson model presented in Methodology, this chapter divides the 2004 bombing into three phases. First is the pre-attack/pre-crisis phase. In this phase the national and international setting leading up to the attack is developed as background. The next phase discussed is the acute event management phase. Here the actual terrorist event itself is explained in detailed. Finally, the case study concludes with a discussion of the consequence management phase, which includes the government reaction and the resulting strategic environment.

Madrid Train Attack Overview

On 11 March 2004, Madrid, Spain, awoke to a massive terrorist attack. Ten backpacks filled with explosives, cell phone detonators and metal fragments exploded on four separate passenger trains.¹ These trains, on the rail line from Alcala de Henares to Madrid (see figure 1), were full of working class commuters and students.² The bombs were timed to explode simultaneously to cause massive destruction and loss of life. Three additional bombs were found undetonated possibly timed to affect first responders.³ Over all 191 commuters were killed and 1,856 were wounded.⁴ The day's events, called 11M in Spain, demonstrated European vulnerability to large-scale terrorist attacks.⁵



Figure 1. Attacks

Source: BBC News, "Madrid Train Attacks," 12 March 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457031/html/nn2page1.stm> (accessed 12 December 2009).

Pre-attack/Pre-crisis Phase

International Setting

11M occurred exactly 30 months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks perpetrated by al Qaeda against the United States.⁶ However, following the spectacular attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the terrorist organization had not conducted a successful operation in two and a half years. The United States had toppled the Taliban government in Afghanistan and seemingly dispersed al Qaeda. With the fundamentalist organization under significant international pressure, a common belief was developing, that al-Qaeda might have been significantly disrupted and its ability to strike inside the West severely dented.⁷ With Osama Bin Laden on the run and regulated to producing

audiotapes, the United States turned its attention to Iraq and the threat of that regime's resurgent nuclear, biological and chemical weapons capabilities in the face of deteriorating international sanctions. On 20 March 2003, the United States led a coalition of 30 nations against Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq.⁸ Spain was a member of the coalition and provided a force of 1,300 troops.⁹ This was a hugely unpopular action in Spain whose citizens questioned the legitimacy of the war in Iraq.¹⁰ In fact, some public opinion polls suggested as many as 90 percent opposed Spanish support to the Iraq War.¹¹

Al Qaeda may have been disrupted; however, Bin Laden did produce an audiotape on 19 October 2003, threatening attacks against the coalition. On the tape Osama Bin Laden is quoted as saying that al Qaeda reserved the right to respond at the opportune moment and place against all of the countries participating in this unjust war, in particular: Great Britain, Spain, Australia, Poland, Japan, and Italy."¹² While seen as a general threat against the West, Spain was a target of significance. The re-establishment of the caliphate, a goal publicly proclaimed by al Qaeda, includes territory within Spain itself.¹³

In the years leading up to the Madrid attack, Spain was busy developing relationships with its neighbors. Spain became a staunch ally of Britain and supported British initiatives regarding the Global War On Terror.¹⁴ Spain was also working closely with France with regard to their shared border in order to pressure the Basque armed terrorist group ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna).¹⁵ Spain and Morocco were another matter, however. Separated by just eight miles of water, the two countries were still recovering

from —territorial disputes” over the cities of Ceuta and Melilla and over some small islands off the coast of Morocco.¹⁶

In July 2002, the Spanish and Moroccan relationship hit a low point over the Perejil Island.¹⁷ On 11 July 2002, Morocco occupied the island claiming its purpose was to monitor illegal immigration.¹⁸ Spain also claimed the island and suspected that Morocco was making a bid for the disputed cities of Ceuta and Melilla.¹⁹ Spain believed that by occupying Perejil, Morocco was testing Spanish resolve.²⁰ In general Arab nations backed Morocco’s claim and the European Union backed Spain.²¹

In response to the occupation, Spain recalled their ambassador and on 17 July 2002, performed an armed assault to recapture the island.²² The Moroccan forces did not fight and were returned to Morocco unharmed.²³ The United States eventually mediated talks between the two countries and the status quo was restored with no permanent solution.²⁴

In February 2003, Spain and Morocco resumed political dialog and re-established ambassadorship to both countries.²⁵ One reason suggested for why Morocco set the crisis in motion was to draw attention to the territorial dispute as well as other problems Spain and Morocco share, mainly fishing rights, drug trafficking and illegal immigration.²⁶ Since the crisis, Spain and Morocco were attempting to mend their relationship with Morocco allowing Spain to fish in Moroccan territorial waters.²⁷

Morocco had experienced its own problems with terrorism. On 16 May 2003, a little less than a year before the 11M attacks, targets within Casablanca were hit by a coordinated attack involving 12 suicide bombers.²⁸ Moroccan authorities linked the suicide bombings to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM).²⁹ Forty-five

people were killed including most of the bombers.³⁰ GICM was affiliated with al Qaeda and its objectives included the establishment of an Islamic state within Morocco.³¹ In 2002 GICM was placed on the United Nations list of terrorist organizations.³² However, some European intelligence officials regard GICM as more of an ideological concept than that of a structural organization” and that it has no hierarchy, structure, or formal manifesto.”³³

National Setting

Spain had been fighting terrorism on the domestic front since 1959 and the establishment of the terrorist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty, known locally as ETA or the terrorist band.”³⁴ According to the State Department 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism, ETA was founded with the aim of establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist principles encompassing the Spanish Basque provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, and Alava, the autonomous region of Navarra, and southwestern French territories of Labourd, Basse-Navarre, and Soule.”³⁵

In the years leading up to 11M, the government had been working vigorously to dismantle ETA. Spain was working with France to ensure boarder security.³⁶ In the last two years, four of its (ETA’s) top leaders have been arrested and five of the sections that come under them--recruitment, intelligence, training, transport and reserve units--have been hit.”³⁷ In 2003, the government had even managed to ban the political entity Batasuna for its close ties with ETA as well as have it declared a terrorist group recognized by the European Union and the United States.³⁸ Three deaths were attributed to ETA for the year 2003 as compared to 23 people killed in 44 attacks in 2000.³⁹ This was thought to be evidence of a weakened organization.

Despite all this effort, in the months leading up to 11 March 2004, the Spanish government had indications that pointed to their (ETA terrorists) intention of carrying out a major attack in Madrid.”⁴⁰ In fact, on 24 December 2003, Spanish police foiled an ETA attempt with the same apparent modus operandi, to bomb a train in the northern city of Burgos.⁴¹ Additionally, on 28 February 2004, Spanish police intercepted two ETA caravans loaded with 500kg of explosives heading toward Madrid.⁴² This was just 12 days prior to the actual Madrid bombings. Furthermore, the drivers had a map with a circle around the town of Alcala de Henares, the same town from which the trains that blew up on 11 March all departed.⁴³

With national elections scheduled to take place on 14 March 2004, the Spanish people were absorbed with the final days of campaigning. The incumbent party was the Popular Party and was led by Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar. Mr. Aznar was completing his second term as Prime Minister and had promised to not run for a third term. The Popular Party candidate was Mr. Mariano Rajoy. The challenging party was the Socialist Worker’s Party lead by Jose Luis Rodriques Zapatero. The Popular Party (PP) was based on a modern, centrist, Christian, democratic platform dominated by conservative values and emphasized law and order.⁴⁴ The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) was a moderate, social, Democratic Party dominated by liberal positions such as same sex marriage.⁴⁵ The PSOE platform was based on withdrawing support to the Iraq war and opening communication channels with ETA.⁴⁶ Opinion polls prior to the Madrid train bombing showed the PP was leading by four and half points with less than three days until the election.”⁴⁷

Acute Event Management Phase

Investigations have suggested a fairly robust pre-operational surveillance and planning exercise in relation to target selection, surveillance and 'dry-runs' before the actual attack.⁴⁸

The Attack

Ten bombs, four trains, 191 people dead, and 1,856 people wounded, this was the scene in Madrid the morning of 11 March 2004.⁴⁹ The bombers performed extensive surveillance and exercised dry runs prior to the day of the attack.⁵⁰ More importantly they did this in a non-permissive environment with a police corps on alert for terrorist attacks in the run up to the elections.⁵¹ Furthermore they managed a hugely successful attack despite a serious lack of training and resources.⁵²

The four trains targeted for attack were the 17305 service from Guadalajara to Chamartin with stops at Alcala de Henares and Atoch station, the 21431 service from Alcala de Henares to Alcobendas, the 21435 service Alcala de Henares to Alobendas, and the 21713 service Alcala de Henares to Principe Pio (see figure 2).⁵³ The bombs were loaded on the commuter trains at Alcala de Henares station between 0655 and 0715 local Madrid time.⁵⁴ Eyewitnesses later claimed to observe three men with their faces mostly covered carrying rucksacks into the Alcala de Henares train station.⁵⁵



Figure 2. Timeline

Source: BBC News, "Madrid Train Attacks," 12 March 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3504912.stm> (accessed 12 December 2009).

At 0738 local the first train, the 21431, drew into the Atocha station as three bombs exploded in the crowded fourth, fifth, and sixth carriages. A fourth device was found in the first carriage and later deactivated. Thirty-four passengers were killed from these explosions.⁵⁶

The second train, the 17305, was running two minutes late. At 0738 local time four bombs exploded in the first, fourth, fifth, and sixth carriages killing 63 people. It was still moving slowly about 800 meters outside the Atocha station when the bombs exploded. Investigators believe the bombs were timed to explode to cause the most damage possible to the station.⁵⁷ There is some discrepancy as to which train blew up first at the Atocha station. JTIC Terrorism Case Study states that the second train, the 17305, actually exploded first by two to four seconds.⁵⁸ The argument is unimportant for this paper, as the timing is close enough to be considered simultaneous.

At 0738 local time two devices exploded in carriages four and five of the third train, the 21435. This train had two decks with the devices located on the upper one. The train was passing through the El Pozo del Tio Raimundo Station and killed 65

commuters. Two other devices on the 21435 were found undetonated, one of which provided crucial evidence for the police.⁵⁹

The fourth and final train, the 21713, had one bomb detonate in the fourth carriage. Fourteen people were killed from the explosion while the train was in Santa Eugenia Station. This occurred at 0739 local Madrid time and was the last of the trains to explode.⁶⁰

Initial Response

The Ministry of Interior coordinated the initial response to the crisis through an established national emergency plan.⁶¹ Emergency services arrived on scene within 15 minutes of the explosions.⁶² Accounts from first responders and eyewitnesses, other than expressing shock at the severity and violence of the attack, suggests an efficiently run operation.

The attack was massive. It involved over 1,800 wounded and required innovative solutions to rescue, recovery and treatment. Paramedics set up an emergency field hospital outside Atocha station where two of the four trains exploded.⁶³ The Parque Ferial Juan Carlos I exhibition center was turned into a makeshift morgue and chapel of rest.⁶⁴ Local busses became temporary ambulances (and hearses) transferring the wounded and the dead to the hospitals.⁶⁵ Volunteers provided water, while psychologists comforted victims and their families.⁶⁶ Administratively, Spain's national telephone operator requested customers use text messaging to relieve pressure on a collapsed network.⁶⁷ Schools were closed and all trains entering Madrid were cancelled as of 1027 local Madrid time.⁶⁸

In the end, 70,000 people were involved in the immediate aftermath of the attacks.⁶⁹ This figure includes 291 ambulances, citywide hospital staff, elements of Spanish armed forces, and 112 personnel (112 is Spain's emergency number).⁷⁰ Overall, 250 people were given on-site medical attention, and an astonishing 2,002 people were hospitalized.⁷¹

Consequence Management and Reconstruction Phase

Speculation

Initial speculation identified two possible terrorist groups responsible for the attacks: ETA and al Qaeda. Shortly after the blasts, Spanish intelligence blamed ETA, pointing to explosive material (Titadine) similar to that used by the organization in the past and earlier attempts to blow up trains.⁷² This assumption, the recent activity of ETA, and the motivation to disrupt Spanish elections made the Basque separatist terror group a strong candidate for the bomb blasts. However, per Jurgen Storbeck, head of Europol, "It could have been ETA . . . But we're dealing with an attack that doesn't correspond to the modus operandi they have adopted up to now."⁷³ Traditionally ETA issued warnings prior to its bombings, however, as evidenced by the carnage, there were no warnings for the 11M attacks.⁷⁴

According to Cristopher Jaspardo in *Jane's Intelligence Review*, "Elements of the attack bore al-Qaeda trademarks: synchronized explosions; mass casualties; economic targets; and strategic timing."⁷⁵ Additionally the attacks came precisely 30 months after 11 September 2001, which follows a noted pattern of terrorist groups choosing to strike on days of significance to them.⁷⁶ Finally as BBC analyst Jonathan Marcus stated in an article printed the day of the attack, "Spain's strong support for the US and Britain in the

run-up to war with Iraq could make Spain a target in the eyes of shadowy Islamic groups.”⁷⁷

Post Crisis Government Response

Within hours of the explosion the police did a sweep of each train stop and were tipped off by one citizen about a stolen white van located in a parking lot of the Alcala de Henares train station. By two o'clock, police had confiscated and searched the van, finding numerous detonators and a tape with Koran verses.⁷⁸ The discovery gave the police their first big lead.

By 0840 the Popular Party candidate, Mr. Rajoy, suspended his campaign for the next three days. Shortly thereafter the Socialist Party also suspended campaigning. Prime Minister Aznar cancelled all public appearances.⁷⁹ He later called for demonstrations of solidarity against terrorism on the following day. The Interior Minister, Mr. Ángel Acebes, spoke to the country at a media engagement at 1:30 that afternoon and subtly blamed ETA for the attacks.⁸⁰ The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Ana Palacio, echoed the Interior Minister's sentiment that ETA was most likely responsible. The Interior Minister, however, did add that his guidance to the police was to follow all leads.⁸¹ The Foreign Minister Palacio, however, went a step farther. Blaming ETA outright, she issued an order for all diplomatic agents to direct blame towards ETA wherever opportunity presented itself.⁸² The diplomatic channels were quick to work and were successful in getting the United Nations Security Council to condemn ETA for the attacks in Resolution 1530 of 11 March.”⁸³

ETA, on the other hand, represented by the banned political Batasuna party, denied involvement and suggested that —Ab resistance” may have perpetrated the

attacks.⁸⁴ Later that night, King Juan Carlos spoke to the country in a televised address but did not blame any particular group for the attack.⁸⁵ Queen Sofia, the Prince of Asturias, and the Prince's fiancée, Letizia Ortiz, demonstrated their support to those afflicted by the tragedy by visiting the wounded as well as the medical personnel at Gregorio Marañón hospital.⁸⁶ The Spanish people had their own way of condemning the attack. Spontaneous demonstrations broke out across Spain in protest against terrorism that same afternoon.⁸⁷

That evening a London Paper printed a letter from “the Brigade of Abu Hafs al-Masri,” who claimed responsibility for the attack. However officials were quick to point out that this same group has made false claims in the past.⁸⁸ It was not until the evening of 12 March that a video was discovered in which an unknown Islamic extremist group, who called themselves Abu Dujan Al Afghani, claimed responsibility for bombings in retaliation for the deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁸⁹

The planned demonstration against terrorism called for by the Prime Minister on the day of the attack took place on 12 March. It was massive. More than a quarter of Spain’s population, 11.4 million people, demonstrated across Spain.⁹⁰ Even the royal family, specifically the Prince of Asturias and his sisters, Elena and Cristina, took part in the demonstration as a sign of unity and fidelity to the Spanish people.⁹¹

On 12 March investigators dismantled one of the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that had failed to detonate.⁹² From this evidence they retrieved a cell phone that rapidly led to the arrest of one of the bombers. Additional leads were established with regard to the explosive used in the attack.⁹³

Public response to both the arrest of a Moroccan as well as the video claiming responsibility was confused and angry. A disjointed message was communicated to the public in that the politicians were blaming ETA while law enforcement was arresting Islamic extremists. Prime Minister Aznar went so far as to call newspapers and explain that ETA was still the prime suspect in the investigation.⁹⁴ This caused confusion in the minds of the voting public and possibly the impression that the Popular Party was misleading the public for political gain in the elections.

The 13th of March was the day before general elections and was by Spanish law to be a “day of reflection.” Accordingly demonstrations were illegal. Despite this fact, a spontaneous demonstration did occur outside the Popular Party’s headquarters. Protesters were demanding to know, prior to the elections, who was responsible for the attacks. The BBC News even predicted that the election results would hinge on who was responsible, ETA or al Qaeda. If ETA was responsible the Popular Party would be vindicated for their platform and comments. However, if al Qaeda was responsible then the Popular Party foreign policy was to be blamed for putting Spain in the crosshairs of al Qaeda terrorists.⁹⁵

The general elections took place on 14 March with the largest electoral turnout since democratic inception within Spain. The Socialist Worker’s Party won the elections with 42.6 percent of the votes and took over the government of Spain, while the Popular Party won only 37.7 percent of the votes.⁹⁶ Mr. Zapatero, the party’s leader, promised to make good on his campaign pledge that Spain would withdraw troops from Iraq as early as that summer.⁹⁷

On 2 April 2004, a second bombing attempt was made. The target was a high-speed rail train and the bomb was placed under an overpass. The bomb was discovered and dismantled and found to contain the same type of explosive and detonator as the 11M attack.⁹⁸ Alphas Hinds, a risk adviser on strategic and national security issues, suggested in his analysis of the JTIC case study that ~~the~~ 2 April 2004 failed bombing suggests that the Spanish government's support for the United States provided the bombers with justification rather than motivation.⁹⁹ Analysis by the news agency, The Independent, suggested that with the second bombing attempt ~~that~~ Islamic radicals aim to keep on targeting Spain, despite the electoral victory three weeks ago of the Socialist leader, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, with a clear mandate of withdrawing troops from Iraq.¹⁰⁰

A day after the second bombing attempt, seven suspects of the Madrid train attacks blew themselves up in a flat in Leganés Spain, when cornered by anti-terrorist police. Sadly, one officer also lost his life in the standoff between the police and the extremists. Later the Interior Minister, Mr. Acebes, stated, ~~the~~ core of the group that carried out the attacks is either arrested or dead in yesterday's [Saturday's] collective suicide.¹⁰¹ Additionally, ~~the~~ police found 200 detonators identical to those used in the 11 March attacks and in a bomb placed alongside a rail track between Madrid and Seville on Friday that failed to detonate.¹⁰² A second threatening video was also discovered in the rubble. This video demanded the withdrawal of all troops from ~~the~~ Muslim lands.¹⁰³ Within a month of the attack Spanish police had closed in on those who had bombed the trains on 11 March.

A key campaign pledge by the newly elected Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, was the withdrawal of 1,300 Spanish troops from Iraq. Prime

Minister Zapatero later softened his pledge to say that if the coalition was led by the United Nations then Spain would maintain troops in Iraq. However, on 17 April 2004, the United States Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared, in a conversation with Spanish defense secretary, Mr. Bonno, that “a non-American commander will never command an American soldier.”¹⁰⁴ After this declaration Spain withdrew its forces from Iraq.¹⁰⁵

The European Union was energized to action following the Madrid terrorist attack. On 25 March 2004, members elected an anti-terrorist coordinator, a Dutch politician by the name of Gijs de Vries, and agreed to a number of law enforcement and intelligence sharing proposals. Many of the items agreed to were proposed but never realized following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.¹⁰⁶

Spain became more European focused following the elections of Prime Minister Zapatero and the Socialist Worker’s Party. Mr. Zapatero vowed to “return Spain to its rightful place within Europe” and mend relationships with France and Germany.¹⁰⁷ Additionally Spain developed greater counterterrorism relationships with its neighbors, France and Morocco.¹⁰⁸

The court system in Spain continued to work through evidence in a very publicized trial in which 28 people were accused. Finally on 31 October 2007, courts found 21 individuals guilty of involvement in the train bombings. Seven others were acquitted.¹⁰⁹ Three terrorists were convicted of mass murder while the others were convicted of lesser crimes.¹¹⁰ Of controversy, some of those acquitted were alleged masterminds of the attack, which produced public outrage but also highlighted the difficulty in prosecuting individuals for terrorism.¹¹¹ Of note ETA, the Basque separatist

terrorist group, was cleared of any involvement in the Madrid train bombings. According to a BBC news article, “the trial judge went out of his way to say there was no evidence to support” ETA involvement in the 11 March 2004 train bombings.¹¹² The Associated Press in a CNN article quoted Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero as saying: “Justice was rendered today.”¹¹³

Small-time Spanish criminals assisted the religious extremists who committed the atrocious bombings. The two groups developed a connection when an associate of the plotters spent time in prison with a member of the criminal gang. When the terrorists required explosives, the associate was able to connect the two groups.¹¹⁴ The terrorists purchased the explosives two weeks before the attack. According to Robert Martinage, author of *The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment*, “a small cell, comprised mainly of Moroccan immigrants, . . . was able to barter 35-40 kilograms of smuggled hashish and a stolen Toyota Corolla for about 210 kilograms of stolen dynamite.”¹¹⁵ The whole operation cost an estimated and paltry \$7,500.¹¹⁶

Conclusion

The Madrid train bombing attack that occurred 11 March 2004, was an important event that had international strategic consequences. The Madrid attack was developed using the Mathewson model, which divided the attack up into three phases: the pre-attack/pre-crisis phase, the acute event management phase and the consequence management phase. The case study laid out in this chapter provided the basis for decision-making model analysis. The next chapter will analyze the Madrid train bombings case study according to the two decision-making models: the Rational Choice Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model.

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CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The case study developed in the last chapter establishes what happened historically and provided detailed information necessary for analysis. This chapter will first analyze the events of 11M in terms of the elements of national power. Then, by applying these elements, decision-making model analysis using the Rational Choice Model and Bureaucratic Politics Model will analyze the Spanish government's response in the days following the attack. Results of both models will be in terms of the elements of national power as the means for government response. For this study the elements of national power are diplomatic, information, military, economic and law.

Historical Strategic Results Of 11M

A historic look at the case study of the 11M Madrid train bombings depicts numerous strategic reactions following the crisis. Elections took place three days after the attack and resulted in a change of government. The new government of Spain withdrew military forces from Iraq but continued to maintain a military presence in Afghanistan. Additionally the new Spanish administration changed diplomatic focus away from the United States and Britain and toward Europe, specifically Germany and France. The law enforcement investigation successfully found, prosecuted and sentenced a terrorist cell and related criminal elements. Furthermore, the new government dramatically increased its counterterrorism budget revamping intelligence, law enforcement and counterterrorist

agencies as well as systems and procedures to increase communication and situational awareness between these agencies.

One would have thought that Spain would engage in a large diplomatic campaign as a result of its decision to withdraw from the Iraq War. It did initially petition the United Nations and even worked a U.N. resolution (Resolution 1530) against a terrorist group.¹ Unfortunately for Spain, the assumption that ETA was behind the attack did not pan out and Spain lost diplomatic credibility with members of the U.N.² Additionally Spain lost valuable diplomatic ties with Britain and the United States by withdrawing support from the Iraq War.³ Spain diplomatically pursued other members of the European Union, mainly France and Germany to act as a counter to what was considered unilateral action by the United States.⁴ As it turned out France and Germany shared a similar opinion of the Iraq conflict, namely that without a United Nations mandate foreign presence in Iraq was not legitimate.⁵ Spain also put forth diplomatic efforts to improve relationships with France and Morocco in order to tighten border security and improve counterterrorism efforts across borders.⁶ As it stood strategically, however, Spain enjoyed only limited effects for their larger diplomacy efforts.

Spain did not prioritize its information element of national power. Media engagements did not focus on Spain's impressive initial emergency response to the attack. Nor did the government focus the media on Spain's ongoing efforts in Afghanistan. Instead, the Spanish government lost the initiative with regard to information when it turned out that ETA was not responsible for the bombing as was originally claimed. As it turned out, the media focused on three subjects. First the media focused on who was responsible--ETA or al Qaeda. Next, the media dealt with the issue

of Spain's withdrawal of support and troops from Iraq. And lastly, the media engaged the issue of al Qaeda's metamorphosis from a terrorist group to more of a suggestive leadership structure for loosely affiliated radical domestic cells. Both administrations of the Spanish government remained on the defensive and never really regained information initiative with respect to the terrorist crisis. The initial administration led by the Popular Party blamed ETA for the attack and because it lost the elections never recovered strategic communication and information. The Socialist Workers' Party, when it came into power, reversed Spain's foreign policy and withdrew forces from the Iraq theater. However, the new administration never managed to effectively explain its action to the international community. Instead Spanish actions were labeled capitulation to terrorist demands by former allies.⁷ Since the attack, however, Spain has effectively engaged in intelligence sharing according to European Union mandates and bilateral agreements with the United States.⁸ Overall, however, Spain mismanaged its strategic communication and information element of national power.

Spain did not increase its military efforts following the train bombings. In fact Spain reduced its military commitments. Although consistent with voter opinion, withdrawing from Iraq caused significant information and diplomatic problems for Spain in the months following the terrorist attack. Therefore, Spain used its military element of national power very little with regard to the terrorist event.

Economics had little to do with the Spanish government's response to the attack. There are arguments that individuals are radicalized because of lack of opportunities, poverty, and through recruitment in the prison systems.⁹ This may be true but, as far as strategic foreign policy is concerned, Spain used very limited economic power in the

traditional sense of sanctions and buying power with regard to managing the strategic outcome of the terrorist attack.

It was crucial for Spain to establish who perpetrated the attack and this was done through law enforcement and the court system. Additionally Spain supported European Union counterterrorism efforts and moved rapidly to comply with European Union mandates in this arena.¹⁰ Following the attack, Spain put forth a great amount of money and personnel toward its two law enforcement agencies (National Police--*Cuerpo Nacional de Polic'ia* or CNP and the *Guardia Civil*), its counterterrorist agency (Spanish security forces--*Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado* or FCSE) and its National Intelligence Center (*Centro Nacional de Inteligencia*, or CNI).¹¹ Even more important was the development of synergistic processes and databases to share intelligence and information regarding terrorists and criminal cases.¹²

From a national power perspective, Spain had a robust law enforcement response to the terrorist train bombing. Spanish law enforcement was extremely effective at finding and bringing the perpetrators to justice. Furthermore, effective law enforcement and an open court system lent the Spanish government international credibility with regard to protecting civil rights and still managing the crisis.¹³ Finally, with regard to the aftermath of the terrorist attack, law was the one element of national power that actually resolved the problem of that particular terrorist cell attacking civilians within Spain.

Spain primarily focused its efforts on its law enforcement with regard to elements of national power. While an argument could be made that it was forced to direct effort toward diplomacy due to the change in government and the decision to withdraw troops from Iraq, strategically Spain did not benefit greatly from this shift in focus. While it

further developed relationships with France, Germany and Morocco, it primarily did so in terms of counterterrorism law enforcement, which falls under the legal instrument of national power.

The withdrawal of troops, though a military act, was less significant than Spain's poor strategic communication regarding the withdrawal of troops. Even today, Spain has not managed to counter the argument that it had capitulated to terrorist demands. This is inaccurate in that Spain continued to support the war in Afghanistan and continued to allow the use of Spanish ports and air bases to coalition members.¹⁴ If Spain truly were to capitulate, it would have withdrawn support from Afghanistan as well as the use of bases and ports. Furthermore, the idea of capitulation ignores the fact that over 90 percent of Spanish citizens disagreed with their government's support of the war in Iraq.¹⁵ To the Spaniards, the War on Terror and the Iraq War were two separate events. Reducing support for the Iraq War did not mean that Spain would reduce its support for the War on Terror. Unfortunately for Spain, al Qaeda views the two wars as branches of the same display of Western aggression. Therefore they still view Spain's actions as part of a Western campaign against the Islamic community. The fact that Spain pulled out of the Iraq War was only a partial victory in the eyes of al Qaeda.

The historic analysis describes Spanish law enforcement as the primary element of national power used by Spain to strategically react to the terrorist bombing of trains in Madrid. While diplomacy was also heavily utilized, it was mired by first misplacing blame for the attack and then by a reversal of foreign policy due to the change of government from the national elections. While Spain actually reduced its military presence by withdrawing from the Iraq War, it never effectively explained the action so

as to leave the opinion by former allies that it capitulated to terrorist demands. In fact, information was mismanaged and poorly communicated to the public throughout the aftermath of the terrorist attack. Finally, economic power was not utilized as a reaction to the terrorist event.

The next two analyses will use the different decision-making models as paradigms for evaluation of the Madrid train bombings case study. The first analysis will use the Rational Choice Model followed by a second analysis using the Bureaucratic Politics Model. Comparison of the results of the models to the historic account will be completed in chapter six.

Rational Choice Model Analysis

The Rational Choice Model argues that foreign affairs “are conceived as actions chosen by the nation or national government” and that governments select actions “that will maximize strategic goals and objectives.”¹⁶ This perspective implies clear and logical actions to be taken by government in order to achieve strategic goals and objectives. It is an impersonal and simple process in which instruments of national power are used to achieve strategic effects. Following a massive terrorist attack, the primary interest of a nation is the safety of its citizens.¹⁷ Accordingly, government will use all elements of national power to further this end.

At the time of the terrorist attack, Spain was three days from national elections. Normally this would seem to be of strategic importance, however, observing the situation through the Rational Choice Model, paradigm elections are considered unimportant. Instead government policies are paramount, no matter who is in power. It is government policies, which are designed to advance the nation’s strategic interests that account for

government reactions to strategic events. So for the purpose of this analysis, the election results and the administration that is in power are dismissed. Instead, the individuals and political parties and organizations are all grouped under the broad heading of the –Spanish government.”

The Spanish government’s initial response needed to be oriented to stopping any continued attack and simultaneously perform victim rescue and recovery operations. The Spanish Interior Ministry followed a published national emergency plan in the wake of the train bombings.¹⁸ Very little is written criticizing the government emergency response to the attack. There were some important aspects that would need to be improved; for example, the phone system was overloaded and inoperable and streets were gridlocked following the cancellation of all trains.¹⁹ This however is relatively small compared to having emergency responders at the scene within 15 minutes and as many as 70,000 individuals working to rescue and recover victims.²⁰ Over all Spain’s initial response was relatively quick and efficient despite the fact that the attack was so massive.

The next step to protecting Spanish citizens was to ensure those who committed the act were caught and punished so they would be incapable of continued attack. Within 24 hours of the attack, police possessed serious leads in the form of detonators, explosives and a cell phone SIM-card that lead to the identification and arrest of five alleged perpetrators.²¹ The terrorist cell attempted another attack on a high-speed rail but, due to an elevated government alert posture, the attempt was foiled.²² Within the next several months, most if not all the local al Qaeda cell responsible for 11M were caught or committed suicide when cornered by police.²³ This proved to be an efficient and effective law enforcement response. However, this legal response was all internal to Spain.

Strategically speaking and with regard to foreign policy in the Rational Choice Model, unless Spain was exporting terrorism, actual law enforcement is less important than intelligence sharing and military support to allies. Therefore, despite an effective law enforcement response, the instrument of law was strategically less important to Spanish international interests than other elements of national power.

The Spanish government, to maintain legitimacy, needed to work to prevent future terrorist attacks. To do this Spain had to develop and implement a defensive and offensive plan. Defensively speaking, Spain was forced to tighten transportation security, address radicalized elements within Spanish territory, improve accountability of explosives, increase intelligence and intelligence sharing capability and work to increase border security. Offensively Spain needed to improve counterterrorism capability, neutralize al Qaeda leadership and develop allies to assist strategic efforts. As far as foreign policy is concerned, this list boiled down to increasing intelligence and intelligence sharing capability, increasing border security, neutralizing al Qaeda leadership and developing allies to assist its strategic efforts.

Spain was not alone in a desire to neutralize al Qaeda leadership. A greater military effort within the NATO structure in Afghanistan would have provided a Spanish outlet against al Qaeda. Incredibly there was no significant increase in Spanish forces or military support for Operation Enduring Freedom. Furthermore a branch of al Qaeda was beginning to perform operations in Iraq. With troops already engaged in the area, Spain was poised for greater participation in the Iraqi theater.

Pre-11M the Spanish government actively supported the Iraq War. Surprisingly, after the attack Spain actually withdrew its forces from Iraq. Spain may have believed

that it was a target for terrorism because of its foreign policy support of the Iraq War.²⁴ This is false logic. The ideology of al Qaeda does not distinguish operations against itself. In other words, an attack against al Qaeda in Afghanistan is no different than an attack against al Qaeda in Iraq. Terrorists attempted a second train bombing because Spain was still engaged in Afghanistan.²⁵ Al Qaeda is also focused on re-establishing the caliphate, which included the territory of Andalusia in southern Spain opposite Morocco.²⁶ For the sake of territorial integrity, Spain had a vested interest in defeating al Qaeda. For these reasons and according to the Rational Choice Model, Spain should have emphasized military options above all other elements of national power.

Following the train bombing crisis, Spain created counterterrorism agreements with France and Morocco in order to increase security along the Spanish border. Spain already enjoyed a counterterrorism relationship with France from fighting the terrorist group ETA for the past 50 years.²⁷ However, a working security relationship with Morocco had to be created since relations with Morocco had been strained leading up to the attack.²⁸ This is especially true since the majority of the perpetrators of 11M were Moroccan.

The fact that Spain did withdraw support for and troops from the Iraq theater was a surprising decision according to the Rational Choice Model. The United States is a major player in the Global War on Terror. Spanish withdrawal from Iraq significantly damaged its relationship with the United States who was otherwise a powerful ally. Furthermore, the Iraq theater was developing its own branch of al Qaeda, known as “al Qaeda in Iraq”. After such a severe terrorist attack from al Qaeda affiliated extremists, it is surprising that Spain would withdraw support from such an obvious extension of the

same terrorist group. What would have otherwise been a large diplomatic effort, arguably as important as any military effort, was reduced by an irrational policy, according to the Rational Choice Model, to withdraw troops from Iraq.

Information is extremely important immediately following a terrorist attack as it typically drives all the other elements of national power. In fact, the train attacks in Madrid revitalized the European Union counterterrorist efforts.²⁹ All members, to include Spain, agreed to measures improving intelligence sharing with regard to terrorism.³⁰ This fact initially implies a decent effort at the information element of national power. However, by withdrawing support from Iraq, Spain appeared to capitulate to terrorist demands. Even the appearance of appeasement to radical extremists was damaging to Spanish credibility in the eyes of its allies in the war against al Qaeda.³¹ Furthermore, Spain continued to support the Global War on Terror in the Afghanistan theater. This continued military support negated any diplomatic good will it might have received from al Qaeda by pulling out of Iraq. According to the Rational Choice Model, this was an inconsistent use of information power. If Spain intended to disengage from al Qaeda to protect its citizens from a terrorist threat, it should have disengaged in Afghanistan as well as Iraq.

Economic sanctions might have initially been threatened against Morocco if Morocco had not shown an interest in cooperating with Spain with regard to terrorist activity. However, Morocco was cooperative since it too shared an interest in reducing terrorism within its own borders. Spain did not need to use any economic incentives to enjoy cooperation from its neighbors.

Ultimately Spain's decision to remove troops from Iraq falls outside the Rational Choice Model paradigm. Spain should have been more liberal with its military and more consistent with its information message. Instead it demonstrated inconsistency by supporting one theater and withdrew its support in another. According to the Rational Choice Model, Spain's elements of national power should have consisted of a large military effort heavily supported by diplomacy and information with slightly less emphasis on law and economics.

Bureaucratic Politics Model Explanation

The Bureaucratic Politics Model is a decision-making model where multiple players holding different policy preferences struggle, compete, and bargain over the substance and conduct of policy.³² Different entities —pl and haul” with their associated power to influence elements of foreign policy.³³ The result is not always a consistent logical course of action or policy but instead more of a compromise of ideals.

In the run up to the Spanish elections of 2004, the terrorist law enforcement and intelligence capabilities were in retrospect extremely limited. There existed two police forces, the National Police and the *Guardia Civil*, with virtually no structures in place to provide shared intelligence or efficiently divide caseloads.³⁴ As an added barrier, there existed a culture of competition and “institutional rivalries” between the agencies.³⁵ Therefore one agency's informant could become another agency's criminal. One agency might have intelligence regarding black market explosives and another agency may be pursuing drug trafficking. In context of radical Islamic extremists, if the two cases were seen holistically, the risk would have been obvious. Separately, however, the cases appeared to pose little risk to the general Spanish population.

Spanish law enforcement, at the time, was not well adapted to the challenges related to international terrorism.³⁶ Al Qaeda developed into a leaderless organization in which cells are only loosely aligned with their brand of extremist ideology.³⁷ There was no or very limited direct contact, training support, material support or financial support between al Qaeda leadership and radical extremist cells.³⁸ Al Qaeda therefore only needed to present generic guidance in the forms of audiotapes, internet postings and video footage in order to affect dispersed radicalized extremist cells. At the time, however, police suspected al Qaeda was a group unto itself pinned down along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The 11M attack demonstrated a new threat of domestic extremist terrorism only loosely affiliated with al Qaeda.³⁹

The assets available for terrorist law enforcement were, in hindsight, too few for this new model of al Qaeda.⁴⁰ Police actually had some of the terrorists under surveillance with wire tapped phone conversations prior to the attack.⁴¹ Unfortunately the tapes were not translated in time because the counterterrorist unit had too few translators.⁴²

Internal terrorism by ETA further clouded the issue. Al Qaeda had not attacked the West directly in two and a half years.⁴³ Although there were attacks like the Casablanca bombings as well as attacks against embassies in Africa, those were considered either domestic terrorism or demonstrations against Western (United States) Middle Eastern policy. Spain, like other European nations, viewed these as attacks aimed at vulnerable outlying and peripheral assets. ETA, on the other hand, was a known entity with a significant history of violence against the Spanish government. There was ample

intelligence as well as concrete examples of recent foiled attacks leading up to the elections, which established a deep-seated paradigm of significant threat.⁴⁴

The counterterrorism agency, *Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado*, at the time consisted of 150 individuals.⁴⁵ With such limited capability the organization was forced to prioritize threats in order to direct their limited assets. In this case ETA appeared to be the greater threat and assets were aimed specifically in that direction.⁴⁶ This was done to exceptionally good effect. ETA failed in its stated objective to disrupt the Spanish general elections and was foiled at least twice in the three months leading up to the polls.⁴⁷

After the elections the Interior Ministry realized that without a major adjustment to counterterrorist, police and intelligence agencies that Spain would remain vulnerable to al Qaeda terrorist attacks.⁴⁸ The Interior Ministry, rather than imposing change, empowered the law enforcement and intelligence agencies to change themselves.⁴⁹ These agencies internally initiated drastic improvements in the form of intelligence and information sharing between police agencies.⁵⁰ Additionally they engaged with the Moroccan minority population directly by recruiting agents, translators and informants and indirectly by working with moderate leaders of the Islamic Commission of Spain.⁵¹ Transformations of the law enforcement and counterterrorist agencies have been so successful that elements have been adopted by European Union members.⁵²

According to the Bureaucratic Politics Model, the political structure in the run up to the elections was also significant to the strategic results of the train bombings. Spain consists of a multi-party democracy.⁵³ The 15 March 2004 elections, however, boiled

down to two main parties competing for power. The incumbent party was the Popular Party and the challenging party was the Socialist Workers' Party.⁵⁴

The incumbent Popular Party was based on centrist, Christian values with emphasis on law and order.⁵⁵ In fact a major focus of the Popular Party's domestic agenda was its fight against the domestic terrorist group ETA.⁵⁶ It is important to note that the Popular Party was slightly ahead in the poles (about 5 percent) indicating that its domestic agenda was working despite significant disagreement of the Spanish populace with Spain's foreign policy and military support of the Iraq War.⁵⁷

The challenging party was the Socialist Workers' Party with an emphasis on more liberal domestic issues to include negotiations with ETA, but also more in line with the general population's foreign policy ideals.⁵⁸ A main position of the Socialist Workers' Party electoral platform was the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq.⁵⁹

With the elections three days away and the paradigm that Basque separatists were the greater threat, it was natural for the Popular Party cabinet to initially assume that ETA perpetrated the attack. Additionally, because the Popular Party was the incumbent government, it was forced to react with rescue efforts and media engagements before the challenging Socialist Workers' Party.

Mr. Angel Acebes, the Spanish Interior Minister, had a media engagement set for 1:30 p.m. local time, before a white van with detonators and a Koran tape was searched.⁶⁰ With little indication that radical Islamic militants loosely associated with al Qaeda were responsible for the terrible attack, it was natural to assume that the known domestic terrorist group with a known agenda to disrupt Spanish elections was responsible. This would explain Mr. Acebes initial comments implicating ETA.⁶¹ Furthermore, implicating

ETA would advance the Popular Party's political platform and justify the energy and focus of the government in recent years against ETA.⁶² This logic also explains the Prime Minister's and Exterior Minister's comments and focus leading up to the elections.

The Popular Party's plan initially was to blame ETA. The plan was disseminated throughout the organization, to include the Interior Ministry and the Exterior Ministry, and was rather quickly initiated. In large organizations it takes considerable effort and time to change a plan completely once new information was obtained. Furthermore the new information, that an al Qaeda cell was responsible for the attack, highlighted an unpopular opinion of the incumbent's foreign policy. It is reasonable that the government, represented by the Popular Party, would not wish to believe much less highlight this fact just three days prior to the election. While information and updates regarding the investigation pointed more and more toward an al Qaeda operation, it is also reasonable to conclude that government official's beliefs were not easily changed. Therefore, political opinions in the media and elsewhere continued to focus on ETA.

Bureaucracies, by their nature, inhibit the flow of information up the chain of command. Meetings must be held, assets must be re-allocated and reports must be filed. However, in a crisis situation it is reasonable to believe that subordinates would be updating their bosses with information as quickly as possible--probably by telephone. Unfortunately overloaded telephone systems probably hindered official and traditional communications.

The media does not share this problem. With information technology available and applied by mainstream media, information leaked by the police can be distributed virtually real time. It is therefore likely that the media, and consequently the general

public, had accurate information as quickly as the government. Thus with government officials expressing their paradigm that the attack must have come from ETA, whereas the media and general public were getting near real-time updates from the investigation which pointed to a radical Islamic cell, a divergence in message is plausible.

It is also plausible that the general public would feel frustrated and galvanize against what was considered a misinformation campaign for political gain. Add to the fact that nearly 90 percent of the Spanish voting public disagreed with the current foreign policy support of the Iraq War, and the resulting electoral upset is easy to perceive.⁶³

The UN general assembly met the afternoon of the attack. With ETA's historic paradigm in the minds of the diplomatic branch of the Exterior Ministry and orders to blame ETA at every opportunity, it is reasonable, though perhaps a little premature, for the Spanish envoy to push a resolution against ETA.⁶⁴ This rash move in the UN is an indication at how fundamental the belief was in the minds of the Spanish administration that ETA was responsible for the attacks.

From a bureaucratic perspective, however, had the UN general assembly not met until the Monday after the elections, the Spanish envoy to the UN would not have pushed for such a resolution. By Monday information from the investigation was pointing more and more toward an Islamic extremist cell. At this point Spain could have capitalized on the sympathy of the world from a vicious attack from al Qaeda and not blamed ETA prematurely. As it stood, however, the UN had their assembly on the day of the attack. UN members, based on Spain's assurance, passed a resolution against ETA.⁶⁵ Later when it was evident that an al Qaeda cell had perpetrated the attack, Spain lost serious diplomatic credibility.⁶⁶

With a new government in place, it is also reasonable to believe that the incoming administration would make good on their campaign pledge to remove troops from Iraq. This ends up being a cornerstone strategic foreign policy decision for Spain. It would be naïve to assume that continued military support of NATO in Afghanistan would offset the strategic decision to pull out of Iraq. However such a policy is representative of the general public's opinion as well as the Socialist Workers' Party opinion that there is a distinction between the Iraq War and the Global War on Terror in that one was illegitimate while the other was lawful. This is an internal distinction rather than a reaction to a terrorist threat and therefore a procedural bureaucratic response.

The decision to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq isolated Spain from their British and American allies.⁶⁷ This, in turn, resulted in a natural change of focus for Spain toward Germany and France, or "Old Europe."⁶⁸ At this point Germany and France possessed similar opinions of the Iraq War. Additionally this decision translated to a greater economic focus on the European Union and away from the United States.

From a purely military perspective, the Spanish troops sent to support Iraq were trained and equipped for reconstruction.⁶⁹ In 2004, however, the counterinsurgency was picking up steam and there existed more fighting than rebuilding. The Spanish troops were not prepared for the offensive role they were expected to pick up.⁷⁰ From a purely military perspective, it would make sense to remove the untrained and under equipped troops and replace them with those more able to perform operations. Instead of Spain providing properly trained and equipped troops for the mission, however, they just withdrew their forces and ultimately the Coalition in Iraq was forced to fill the void.

The problem of the attacks and a radicalized Islamic cell within Spain needed to be addressed in order to assure the general public that the Spanish government was legitimate and could protect its citizens.⁷¹ To do this the government had to place a large focus and budget toward intelligence and counterterrorism. This explains all the initiatives and apparatuses designed for intelligence sharing between police agencies and the military in the five years since the attack.⁷² Furthermore, the counterterrorism budget was expanded by 48.4 percent over a four-year period following the terrorist attack and an additional 300 personnel was added annually for the next three years to the counterterrorism unit.⁷³

From a bureaucratic perspective it is easy to see how an attack in Madrid would translate to re-energizing the European Union in its counterterrorism efforts.⁷⁴ Creating a European Union counterterrorism tsar, avenues for intelligence sharing between countries and other counterterrorism initiatives makes sense in that current agencies otherwise were not equipped or simply were unable to manage the international terrorist threat of al Qaeda.⁷⁵

With regard to counterterrorism, Spain's relationship with Morocco was as complex as Spain's relationship with France was simple. While battling ETA, Spain and France worked together extensively in the area of counterterrorism.⁷⁶ A year before the Madrid train attacks, Morocco and Spain were at military odds over an uninhabited island with little strategic value.⁷⁷ However, the cooperation between the two countries in terms of counterterrorism and law enforcement immediately following the train bombings was remarkable.

In light of the fact that most of the radicalized cell members were of Moroccan origin and the fact that Morocco had recently experienced a terrorist event itself implicates a common terrorist factor. Moroccan diplomacy immediately expressed sorrow and sympathy for the Spanish people following the terrorist event.⁷⁸ Additionally once a suspect of Moroccan origin was identified, Moroccan law enforcement offered immediate assistance.⁷⁹ Good will between the two country's counterterrorism agencies and justice departments continues today and is proving to be a positive development that is spreading between the two countries.⁸⁰

The Bureaucratic Politics Model explains the dramatic election results in terms of information management. The nation's two political parties, the Popular Party and the Socialist Workers' Party, maintained drastically different political positions regarding domestic, economic and foreign policy. Each developed a platform and campaigned for electorate votes. The terrorist attack highlighted foreign policy just prior to the elections. The Socialist Workers' Party maintained a foreign policy platform more representative of the general Spanish citizenry and the Popular Party was unable to refocus the electorate on other agenda items. Furthermore the difference of information regarding responsibility for the attack resulted in perceived mistrust toward the incumbent party. The Socialist Workers' Party capitalized on this fact in the elections. The elections represented the negotiation between the two political parties. The negotiated response was the election results of the Socialist Workers' Party.

Strategically, the change of government resulted in a foreign policy change of focus. Iraq troops were withdrawn and Spain courted European Union countries with similar foreign policy opinions. Had the Popular Party properly managed the information

and a perceived campaign of misinformation for political gain did not exist, they may have won the elections and Spanish foreign policy would have stayed consistent. However, based on greater than expected voter turnout and the very unpopular foreign policy supporting the Iraq War, Spanish voters voted in the opposition. Diplomatic focus changed drastically and the strategic environment today is a result of that change. Spain's main instrument of national power was, therefore, diplomatic.

Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis is to validate a decision-making model by analyzing the Madrid train bombings terrorist attack. The attack of 11M focused sudden extreme violence upon the citizens of Madrid in an effort to manipulate Spanish foreign policy. This chapter began with a historic account of Spain's strategic response to the attack. As it turned out, Spain focused a large amount of effort on the law enforcement and legal instrument of national power. The next analysis was completed using the Rational Choice Model. Based on this paradigm, Spain should have used a larger military response, but instead actually withdrew military forces from the Iraq War. The last analysis used the Bureaucratic Politics Model. According to this model, Spain used diplomacy as its main instrument of national power. A comparison of the results will be conducted in chapter six.

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⁷⁴Matthew Tempest, “EU to Appoint Anti-Terror ‘Tsar’,” *guardian.co.uk*, 19 March 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/mar/19/eu.politics> (accessed 12 December 2009); Norton-Taylor, “EU Set to Agree Sweeping Counter-Terror Policies”; Fuller, “Leaders of 25 Nations Endorse Plan in Wake of Madrid Bombings: EU Adopts Ambitious Antiterror Measures.”

⁷⁵Tempest, “EU to Appoint Anti-Terror ‘Tsar’”; Norton-Taylor, “EU Set to Agree Sweeping Counter-Terror Policies”; Fuller, “Leaders of 25 Nations Endorse Plan in Wake of Madrid Bombings: EU Adopts Ambitious Antiterror Measures.”

⁷⁶Sciolino and Fuchs, “Bombings in Madrid: The Attack”; Naval Post Graduate School Dudley Knox Library, “Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)”; Hinds, “JITC Terrorism Case Study No. 1: The Madrid Rail Bombings”; Reinares, “After the Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms and Prevention of Global Terrorism in Spain.”

⁷⁷Tremlett, Bowcott, Black, and Arie, “Spain Accused of Easing Up on Terror Watch”; BBC News, “Deal Reached Over Disputed Island”; Jane’s, “External Affairs, Morocco”; Absolute Astronomy, “Isla Perejil.”

⁷⁸Pascale Harter, "Morocco's Shock at Madrid Bomb Link," *BBC News*, 17 March 2004, <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3519816.stm> (accessed 12 December 2009).

⁷⁹Jane's, "External Affairs, Morocco."

⁸⁰*Ibid.*

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 brought about a dramatic shift in awareness to the general public of America regarding the threat of terrorism and mass murder instigated by organizations other than nation states. Although Europe had been witness to the 9/11 atrocities, the Madrid train bombings of 11 March 2004 served the same purpose to Europe. Suddenly and with incredible violence, Europe experienced the “deadliest terrorist attack on a European target since World War II” and consequently joined the United States as a victim of international terrorism.¹

This study analyzed the Madrid train bombings as a terrorist event case study and compared the government strategic response to the Rational Choice Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model, the point of which was to validate one of the two models in order to best explain government strategic reactions. With such a model, future leaders would be in a position to mitigate international fallout resulting from a terrorist attack. This would be a powerful tool in the war against terrorism.

This chapter compared the results of the analysis of the two models. It then attempted to determine if one of the models accurately explained the historic Spanish strategic reaction. If the models were proven inaccurate, modifications of the model may be possible to more accurately reflect the historic actions of the Spanish government. On the other hand, if a model is reflective of the historic event or if a model can be modified, then the potential impact with regard to a terrorist event would prove invaluable to the statesmen in combating terrorism.

Model Results Comparison

After building the Madrid train bombings terrorist attack case study, it was determined historically how the Spanish government strategically reacted. The study was analyzed using first the Rational Choice Model and then the Bureaucratic Politics Model. In each case the primary instrument of national power was established based on the historical outcome and then each decision-making model.

Historical analysis indicated that the law instrument of national power was the primary focus of the Spanish government. Based on the Rational Choice Model, military should have been the primary instrument of national power. Analysis using the Bureaucratic Politics Model indicated that diplomacy was the primary element of national power.

A historic review of the Madrid train bombings and the resulting strategic actions of the Spanish government indicated a large effort toward the legal instrument of national power. The government's focus on blame was a strategic mistake. It resulted in a change of administrations from the conservative Popular Party to the more liberal Socialist Workers' Party. Unfortunately, it also gave the strategic impression that the terrorist attack dramatically influenced the elections. Furthermore, the Socialist Workers' Party campaign promise to remove troops from the Iraq theater, although in line with mainstream Spanish opinion, caused a complete reversal in foreign policy. As a result, Spain lost the good will of the United States and Britain. By removing troops, the government gave the appearance of capitulation to terrorist demands reducing Spanish credibility. However, Spain continued to support the Afghanistan theater in the "War on Terror." Because of continued military support against al Qaeda, Spain remained a target

for terrorist attack. This added to the importance of the law enforcement as a solution to the terrorist threat. Ultimately it was the effective reaction of the Spanish law enforcement and court system that identified, caught and sentenced the al Qaeda cell responsible for the attack.

Analysis of the case study through the paradigm of the Rational Choice Model resulted in unexplainable inconsistencies. According to the Rational Choice Model, the military instrument of national power should have been the focus of the Spanish government. Al Qaeda strategically communicated its intentions to attack Spain in Bin Laden's tape of 2003. Furthermore it is a documented goal of al Qaeda to re-establish the caliphate to include the Spanish territory of Andalusia. Based on these two facts, Spain should have developed a strong military response to the Madrid train attacks. Instead Spain withdrew troops from Iraq, an obvious branch in the "War against al Qaeda" and isolated itself from powerful allies, Britain and the United States. On the other hand, had Spain wished to completely capitulate to al Qaeda in an attempt to exempt itself from future terrorist attacks, Spain should have withdrawn from the Afghanistan theater as well as the Iraq theater. This did not happen, which resulted in an inconsistent message to both al Qaeda and coalition allies. Over all the Rational Choice Model does not compare favorably or explain reasonably the historic actions of the Spanish government.

The last analysis was done through the Bureaucratic Politics Model. This analysis required a large amount of research compared to the Rational Choice Model, but seemed to explain more closely what happened historically during and after the Madrid train bombings. It explained the contradiction of information between the Popular Party administration and the investigation through the media. This resulted in the appearance of

deception by the government for the purpose of political gain in the elections held three days after the attack. It also justified the pre-11M focus of the limited number of counterterrorist forces against the known threat of ETA. Additionally, it illustrated that once the threat of al Qaeda terrorism was recognized, the law enforcement agencies transformed themselves to better neutralize it.”² Furthermore, the Bureaucratic Politics Model explained the otherwise and seemingly inconsistent military withdrawal from Iraq while Spain continued military support of the Afghanistan theater. This was a negotiated response of the elections in which a new administration took power. In the end, the Socialist Workers’ Party and the general Spanish populace both believed the two wars were not related. Finally the model accounted for the diplomatic efforts of both administrations. Initially the Popular Party administration petitioned the United Nations for a resolution against ETA whom they thought were responsible for the attack. Later the Socialist Workers’ Party refocused their diplomacy efforts toward neighboring countries and the Europe Union and away from the United States and Britain. Even though the Bureaucratic Politics Model emphasized the diplomatic instrument of national power and therefore did not perfectly match the historic account, it more closely explained what actually happened following the Madrid train bombings as compared to the Rational Choice Model.

Adjusting the Models

In the case that a decision-making model was not validated, a secondary question for this study was: would it be possible to adjust one of the models to better capture the Spanish government reactions? In this case the Bureaucratic Politics Model provided the

more accurate description of what happened following the 11M Madrid train bombings. However there may still be merit to the Rational Choice Model as well.

The Rational Choice Model portrayed inconsistencies in the Spanish government's reaction to the 11M crisis. However, the value of the Rational Choice Model is that it is simple. Nations follow a reasonable course of action to achieve national objectives. This model does not require an in-depth study of the event or the players involved. Therefore, the first indicator that an event is more complex than usual is when a historic event deviates from logic. In other words, if current events deviate from the Rational Choice Model, a more in-depth study may be necessary to explain why.

Another area for possible study would be the application of the Rational Choice Model not as a whole but instead on an event-by-event basis. This would imply that the government's reaction might evolve as different events and information emerge. This may explain some of the inconsistencies of the original Rational Choice Model analysis. The inconsistency of the military response and the withdrawal of troops from Iraq may be explained in this manner. A new administration is elected based strongly on the public opinion that the former administration's support for the War in Iraq was wrong. It is reasonable then for the new administration to follow through on the campaign pledge to withdraw troops from Iraq. It is also reasonable that, following an attack by an al Qaeda affiliated terrorist cell, the country should continue to pursue al Qaeda in the Afghanistan theater. If one separates the elections from the attack and view the events separately, both actions could be seen as reasonable. More study of the relationships and events is necessary however to determine the utility of this new approach to the Rational Choice Model.

The Bureaucratic Politics Model more accurately portrayed the government reaction to the 11M terrorist crises than the Rational Choice Model. It adequately addressed the emphasis in law enforcement and diplomacy. Even more importantly, it explained some of the strategic events that took place following the attack. For example, it explained the information management and strategic communication immediately following the attack. It clarified the dramatic shift in polls during the election process. It even accounted for the shift in diplomatic focus and the withdrawal of troops from Iraq. However there are some fundamental issues that must be resolved before the Bureaucratic Politics Model can be used as a tool to explain government reactions to future terrorist attacks.

The Bureaucratic Politics Model explained the information management and strategic communications following the attack. The Interior Minister, Mr. Acebes, had a media engagement at 1:30 PM local where he blamed ETA for the attack. However, it was not until 2:00 PM local that police investigated the white van with detonators and Koran tapes. One of the big breaks in the case pointing to possible al Qaeda and Islamic extremists occurred after the initial media engagement. This set the stage for conflicting messages coming from public leadership and leaked investigation information. There is no way to predict when critical evidence in an investigation is going to take place.

Furthermore, the actual management of strategic communication of information following the attack appeared presumptuous. Very early in the consequence management phase of the attack, the Popular Party made a leap of faith in assuming ETA responsibility. Had Mr. Acebes and the rest of the Popular Party answered the question of responsibility in vague terms and even diverted questions till the investigation provided a

clearer picture, they may not have lost the election. This line of thought implies that there was a human element of choice to a strategic decision that may be impossible to predict.

Finally, the Bureaucratic Politics Model does an excellent job of explaining what happened in terms of past actions. In other words, an argument can be built following the logic of what actually occurred. While there is great benefit to this in understanding and fully developing the problem, it does so only at the whim of the analyst. If the analyst ignored a pertinent fact or not enough information was available for analysis, incorrect conclusions would be possible. Incorporating a greater degree of the scientific approach would assist in narrowing the information requirements. A series of studies using different hypothesis followed by attempts to prove and disprove may focus information requirements. Future study in organizational relationships is necessary to assist in this endeavor. In fact, the real value of this model as it stands is the amount of study required to analyze the case study and develop the strategic problems.

Advantages, Application of a Working Model

The value of the decision-making model may not be in its ability to predict outcomes but instead to explain behavior. While there was value in organizing the case study that alone did not provide a framework for understanding why events took place when they did, in working through the decision-making model analysis, a large amount of information had to be processed. The Bureaucratic Politics Model provided a framework for understanding key strategic events. Understanding what happened and why is extremely valuable in mitigating a terrorist attack.

Through that type of understanding, a strategic entity (UN, NATO, World Bank, United States, European Union) could focus assistance to the victim nation in its reaction

to the crisis. For example, it is possible to discover through Bureaucratic Politics Model analysis that a country lacked financial institution capability to counter money-laundering techniques exploitable by terrorist organizations. Powerful international organizations, like the World Bank for example, could assist the nation to develop financial networks and systems to counter the terrorist's ability to launder money. This would effectively deny terrorist financial capability to pursue ideological attacks.

An example of this type of assistance was done to great effect in Indonesia following the terrorist bombing of a nightclub in Bali.³ The United States and Australia assisted the Indonesian government to dramatically improve security and law enforcement capability.⁴ By this approach, the Indonesian government has successfully countered terrorist attacks, developed credibility and stability within its borders and effectively joined the War against al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist networks.⁵

This focused approach is economic in that resources are not pushed to areas unnecessarily. Through decision-making model analysis, a weakness in government may be identified. Experts in the field can then apply the correct resources to shore up that weakness. This reduces the tendency to push resources to all areas of counterterrorism and watering down the effectiveness of the entire effort.

In the Bureaucratic Politics Model analysis of the Madrid train bombings, it was found that counterterrorism efforts were under resourced in light of the al Qaeda terrorist threat. Had Spain been analyzed through the Bureaucratic Politics Model for an al Qaeda style attack prior to 11 March 2004, it is possible that this deficiency might have been recognized. The utilization of the Bureaucratic Politics Model in this respect, when

performed by experts in the field of counterterrorism, could act as a risk assessment for the identification of weaknesses in government institutions vital to fight against terror.

The Bureaucratic Politics Model provides a framework for study of complex problems. In historic context it also explains why strategic events turned out the way they did. Furthermore, counterterrorist experts could use it as a risk analysis tool to determine areas of weakness in government. A nation could then focus resources to strengthen those organizations and institutions.

Impact of a Working Model

A working decision-making model would have a strong impact in the War against al Qaeda and associated terrorist organizations. The Bureaucratic Politics Model provides a framework for understanding how governments react to strategic events. Armed with this information, nation states and international agencies could concentrate on the critical aspects of the problem to influence or stabilize the situation within the international community. Furthermore an analysis would identify where to direct resources to strengthen government agencies to counter future attacks. This focused approach would also act to center victim nation response and prevent an overreaction. This would deny the terrorist the full effect of their attack and criminalize the terrorist ideology.

Conclusion

Analysts think about problems of foreign and military policy in terms of largely implicit conceptual models that have significant consequences for the content of their thought.⁶

The United States has a vested strategic interest in defeating terrorism as a tactic. The purpose of this study was to validate a decision-making model in order to account for government reactions following a terrorist attack. The Rational Choice Model, as utilized in this study, did not adequately explain the Spanish government's reactions to the Madrid train bombings of 11 March 2004. The Bureaucratic Politics Model, on the other hand, better illustrated what historically occurred and more importantly offers an explanation for why. While significant flaws still exist in the Rational Choice Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model, there is considerable value in the use of decision-making models in explaining why strategic events occurred following an attack. With this level of study and understanding, major powers like the United States could focus resources at the organizational root of the problem. Armed with elements of national power and a model to explain in detail a nation's response to a terrorist event, the United States could work to stabilize the victim nation and assist to focus resources to strengthen critical government organizations required in the War against al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organizations. As Allison stated, perhaps it is not the model that is as important as the "significant consequences" of the content of their thought."⁷

¹Sciolino and Fuchs, "Bombings in Madrid: The Attack."

²Reinares, "After the Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms and Prevention of Global Terrorism in Spain."

³Martinage, *The Global War On Terrorism: An Assessment*.

⁴Ibid., 152.

⁵Ibid., 153.

⁶Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.”

⁷Ibid., 693-694.

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