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**LANGUAGE POLITICS IN BOSNIA, CROATIA,
AND SERBIA**

by

Eric A. Rice

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Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

David S. Yost
Daniel J. Moran

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LANGUAGE POLITICS IN BOSNIA, CROATIA, AND SERBIA

Eric A. Rice
Major, United States Air Force
B.A., Regent's College, 1999

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March 2010**

Author: Eric A. Rice

Approved by: David S. Yost, PhD
Thesis Advisor

Daniel J. Moran, PhD
Second Reader

Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

The political union of southern Slavs in the multiethnic state of Yugoslavia came to a violent end in the 1990s. The joint Serbo–Croatian language also ceased to exist as an official language when the Yugoslav successor states Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia identified only Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian as their respective official languages. Language use in these states became a political tool used to emphasize the differences among the ethnicities and to gauge ethnic loyalty. Croatia endeavored to “cleanse” its language of any characteristics in common with the joint Serbo–Croatian language. Serbian nationalists rejected the Latin alphabet and insisted on using the Cyrillic alphabet. Bosniaks recognized a Bosnian language that was not acknowledged by Bosnia’s ethnic Croats or ethnic Serbs. While language previously had been a means to unite Balkan Slavs, it became an instrument of nationalism wielded by politically motivated actors to widen the division among the ethnicities. Language disputes did not destroy Yugoslavia, but they may hinder recovery and modernization. As each Yugoslav successor state strives toward integration into the European Union, political questions concerning language may polarize domestic politics and inhibit regional cooperation, thereby hampering efforts to carry out needed economic and political reforms.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION.....	1
B.	IMPORTANCE.....	1
C.	PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS	2
D.	METHODS AND SOURCES.....	4
E.	THESIS OVERVIEW	5
II.	LANGUAGE POLICIES OF CROATIA, SERBIA, AND BOSNIA	7
A.	HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SERBIAN AND CROATIAN.....	7
B.	BIRTH OF THE SERBO-CROATIAN / CROATO-SERBIAN LANGUAGE	13
C.	LANGUAGE POLICY IN CROATIA.....	17
D.	LANGUAGE POLICY IN SERBIA.....	20
E.	LANGUAGE POLICY IN BOSNIA	24
III.	LANGUAGE USE IN CROATIA, SERBIA, AND BOSNIA	31
A.	LANGUAGE USE IN CROATIA	31
B.	LANGUAGE USE IN SERBIA	38
C.	LANGUAGE USE IN BOSNIA.....	44
IV.	CONCLUSION	51
	APPENDIX.....	59
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	61
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	67

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Balkans, 1908 through the Second Balkan War of 1913	11
Figure 2.	Ethnic Majorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1991	27
Figure 3.	Glagolitic alphabet	59
Figure 4.	Serbian and Croatian alphabets.....	60

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

EC	European Community
EU	European Union
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FCNM	Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
UN	United Nations

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

The multiethnic state of Yugoslavia came into existence after the First World War, when southern Slavs united in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The Yugoslav Kingdom remained only until the Second World War, but the union remained intact under communist rule. After the death in 1980 of its strong leader, Josip Broz Tito, the differences that were partially suppressed after World War II began to emerge. Political disputes enhanced by or rooted in historical differences in religious, political, and economic traditions during several centuries of cultural development proved more potent than the many commonalities of the Yugoslav peoples and the political forces that had originally brought them together, and eventually led to the dismantling of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

The future of the former Yugoslav space and the individual successor states depends partly on how social and cultural differences are treated. Language has become one of the key differences within Bosnia and between Serbia and Croatia. While the shared standard was once Serbo-Croatian, which is still almost universally understood and widely spoken throughout the former Yugoslavia, each successor state and ethnicity now appears intent on asserting the uniqueness of its own language. This thesis attempts to answer the following research questions: What are the internal trends and dynamics of language usage in each of these three countries? What is the relationship between official policies and actual language use?

B. IMPORTANCE

When fighting started in Yugoslavia in 1991, European Community (EC) leaders expressed confidence that the EC could handle the situation. In the event, however, neither the EC nor the United Nations (UN) was able to stop the combat among the warring parties. NATO forces brought an end to fighting in Bosnia and Kosovo, and they have remained to provide security and stability for the implementation of peace

agreements. The European Union assumed primary responsibility for the mission in Bosnia in December 2004. Slovenia has joined the European Union (EU) and Slovenia and Croatia have joined NATO, but most of the Yugoslav successor states—and Bosnia and Kosovo in particular—present a continuing challenge to the EU and NATO. Moreover, Balkan instability tests the EU’s resolve and its capability to maintain order near its borders.

The matter of language usage as a potential point of contention within and among the former Yugoslav republics may appear trivial alongside other causes of division. However, official language policies can provide a helpful gauge of a government’s political intentions, and actual language usage—“authentic speech,” as experts in linguistics term it—may help reveal the inclinations of the public. Both can offer insight into the root causes and current trends of conflict and disunity in the countries of the former Yugoslavia and may throw light on possible solutions for resolving conflict.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

Slovenia, the first republic of Yugoslavia to declare independence, uses a language similar to but distinct from Serbo-Croatian. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) likewise uses a related but separate language. Both left the Yugoslav state with little commotion in comparison with the violence occasioned by the departures of Croatia and Bosnia, whose languages are largely identical to that spoken in Serbia. Kosovo represents a unique case in that the United States and most EU member states regard it as a former province of Serbia, but the fact that the overwhelming majority of the population speaks Albanian certainly played a role in the strivings for independence.

While language differences played some role in Yugoslavia’s demise, the future of the Yugoslav successor states now depends on cooperation among them and their neighbors, as well as their capacity to establish domestic harmony and cohesion. This was made abundantly clear when Croatia’s bid to join the European Union was blocked

for a time by Slovenia due to a border dispute. Similarly, FYROM's admission to NATO has been barred by Greece, which lays claim to the word "Macedonia" as a place name and contests its use by another state.

On the surface, the differences among the languages of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia are quite minor. The alphabet for each language contains the same characters, but they are written differently. Serbia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia primarily use a Cyrillic alphabet, often referred to as the Eastern variant, while Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) use a Latin-based alphabet referred to as Latin or the Western variant.¹

Beyond how the languages are written, there are some dialectal distinctions that incorporate different vocabulary and spellings. The differences are sufficiently minor to make the languages mutually intelligible in speech and writing, but great enough to allow one to classify speech or writing based on word choice, pronunciation, or spelling and other elements of orthography.

Using a different script and a few different words to communicate the same meaning should not generally have a significant effect on relationships between two countries—or two ethnic groups within the same country. When associated with memories of atrocities during war, however, any difference can become a wedge. The impetus for Croatia and the other successor states of the former Yugoslavia to seek independence may be attributed to the revival of much earlier exhibitions of nationalism. Uniting in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes offered the constituent parts protection from continued subservience to the great powers that would have otherwise probably divided the Balkans at the end of World War I.²

This union of Southern Slavs was compelled by circumstances and not regarded as preferable to the independence of each ethnic group. The Croats and the Slovenes subsequently never lost their desire for independence. The turbulent birth of the

¹ Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina are the two political entities that constitute the country recognized as Bosnia and Herzegovina.

² Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Serbia: The History of an Idea* (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 108–111.

Kingdom of Yugoslavia, as it came to be known, was perhaps a portent of its troubled future. Externally, the Kingdom, whose territory was not well defined at its inception, engaged in border disputes all around, including a struggle with Italy for control of coastal regions. Internally, ethnic strife developed as the Croats and the Slovenes complained about what they perceived as the overbearing manner of the Serbs.³ A pattern developed in which each ethnic group sought to maintain and at times emphasize its individuality in lieu of surrendering its identity to the concept of pan-Yugoslavism.

Language represents one of the many ways in which nationalism has been expressed in the Yugoslav successor states. Since 1991, efforts to preserve and even cultivate the unique characteristics of the Croatian language have increased. Moreover, in Bosnia, a new language, though perhaps only in name, has emerged—Bosnian. This phenomenon raises several questions. How much of the manipulation of language in these countries is the product of the political agendas of governing or aspiring elites? How much is the result of the peoples of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia wishing to express their individuality? How do changes in their languages affect relations among the countries and among the residents of each country? This study hypothesizes that each government has politicized language to some degree, but that only the more extreme elements of each government have suggested policies that, if implemented, would result in significant changes to language usage.

D. METHODS AND SOURCES

In addition to the scholarly works cited, this thesis also draws on relevant official documents and statements of the governments of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. Other sources include studies conducted on the spoken and written languages in each country. Reports in the media also provide revealing information regarding changes in language use and language policy and the public reaction to those changes.

The language environments in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia are analyzed as case studies. Each country is first treated as a separate case, to the extent possible given the

³ Misha Glenny, *The Balkans* (New York: Penguin Group, 1999), 365–366.

historic connections among the languages in the subject countries. The effects of the language environment on the international relations of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia are also treated as individual cases.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis identifies the current official language policies of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia as determined by their respective constitutions, relevant laws, and government positions and statements pertaining to language use. An analytical description of the patterns of actual language use in each country follows. This enables the thesis to compare official intent with the behavior of the public, and to assess the effects of language policy and other factors on common usage. A final analysis of the factors presented yields conclusions regarding the influence of official language policies and the role of politics on language use and in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia.

This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II describes the official language policies of the governments of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. Chapter III examines actual language usage in each state and the politicization of language. Chapter IV presents an analysis and conclusions.

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II. LANGUAGE POLICIES OF CROATIA, SERBIA, AND BOSNIA

Independence for each of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia brought with it the opportunity for a fresh start. Each new state drafted a constitution, established a government, wrote laws and set policies. As the new states endeavored to improve their circumstances, opportunities arose for them to join international organizations and enter treaty arrangements that arose from NATO and European Union efforts to increase stability and address human rights issues. Among the many policies each government proceeded to address, the matter of language use was not particularly prominent in itself, yet the treatment of language plays an important role in each new state.

A state's language policy does not simply identify a language for official use. Language policy also serves as a means to remedy social concerns, or at times to assert a political agenda.⁴ The policy decisions pertaining to language use in each successor state of the former Yugoslavia derive from the unique history of the development of language in the region. The efforts to distinguish the language of each state did not arise from the antagonisms that tore Yugoslavia apart in 1991, but instead represent a continuation of the evolution of language that began with the origins of the languages in use in each Yugoslav successor state today. A brief recounting of that history sets the context of the current language policies.

A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SERBIAN AND CROATIAN

Slavs first moved south onto the Balkan Peninsula in the sixth century A.D., descending from the north first as raiders, and eventually settling across the region.⁵ The Byzantine Empire brought Christianity to the region by the ninth century; and because the Church used Latin, the literate elements of society likewise spoke and wrote in Latin.

⁴ Thomas Ricento, "Language Policy: Theory and Practice—An Introduction," in *An Introduction to Language Policy: Theory and Method*, ed. Thomas Ricento (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 11.

⁵ Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 7.

The origins of written Slavic languages in the Byzantine Empire are attributed to the missionary brothers Constantine and Methodius (now better known as Saints Cyril and Methodius) and Saint Methodius who devised an alphabet in order to facilitate their proselytizing efforts among Slavic speakers. Commissioned by Byzantine emperor Michael III in the ninth century A.D., the brothers devised the letters of the Glagolitic alphabet using combinations of symbols important in Christianity for the primary purpose of translating religious texts into the Slavic languages.⁶ This alphabet, which came to be known as the Glagolitic alphabet (the name is derived from *glagol*, Old Slavic for *speak*), formed the literary basis for Old Church Slavonic, or Old Slavic, and gained widespread acceptance in the Balkans.⁷

This new alphabet encountered resistance from church officials in Rome, which condemned any attempts to write scripture in any language other than Aramaic, Greek, Hebrew or Latin. Accused of heresy in Venice, Saints Cyril and Methodius traveled to Rome to convince the Church of their righteous intentions. Saint Cyril died in Rome, and Saint Methodius returned to the Balkans unsuccessful in his attempt to gain church approval of the new alphabet. However, the followers of Cyril and Methodius continued the campaign to spread the use of written Slavic with the alphabet that Cyril and Methodius had devised. In Bulgaria, the followers found a ready supporter of written texts in King Boris. However, the Bulgarians found the Glagolitic alphabet too cumbersome. More acquainted with the Greek alphabet, the followers of Cyril and Methodius adapted the Greek alphabet to the spoken Slavic languages, giving rise to the Cyrillic alphabet, named in honor of Saint Cyril.⁸ Despite continued resistance from the Church in Rome, the Cyrillic alphabet gained prominence in Bulgaria.⁹ After the deaths

⁶ Ronelle Alexander, *Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian: A Grammar with Sociolinguistic Commentary* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 380.

⁷ Milan Moguš, *A History of the Croatian Language: Toward a Common Standard* (Zagreb, Croatia: Globus, 1995), 14.

⁸ Alexander, *Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian*, 380–381.

⁹ Stanley G. Evans, *A Short History of Bulgaria* (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1960), 43.

of Cyril and Methodius, their followers propagated the Slavic language written with the Cyrillic alphabet, which by the twelfth century had largely displaced the Glagolitic alphabet throughout the Balkans.¹⁰

In Croatia, however, the Glagolitic script had become widely accepted and more entrenched in Croatian texts. Despite the quick advance of the Cyrillic alphabet throughout the region, including in Croatia, the Glagolitic script endured in Croatia into the Renaissance period.¹¹ However, Croatia's position between east and west created friction between the influences of the East and the West. Croatia's religious ties to Rome and political ties to Vienna proved stronger and slowly eroded Eastern influences, resulting in the prevalence of Latin in official and liturgical use.

The mixing of Eastern and Western influences resulted in changes to the written language in Croatia. By the fourteenth century Croatians had fully adapted the Latin alphabet to the Slavic language.¹² The Serbian Orthodox Church made exclusive use of the Cyrillic script. Moreover, differences in vocabulary arose based on distinct cultural influences introduced through political and religious connections.¹³ This early and significant differentiation between language use in Croatia and Serbia was perhaps fateful, as it set apart the language used in Croatia as exceptional in comparison with other south Slavic languages.

The development of language in the western and central Balkans was heavily shaped by the politics of the nineteenth century. During that time, the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires exercised control over the Balkans. The Habsburg Empire maintained control over Croatia, Slovenia and much of Serbia, while the Ottoman Empire predominated in Bosnia, Macedonia and the southern part of Serbia. Each empire influenced the culture and, subsequently, the language of its Balkan vassals.

¹⁰ Moguš, *A History of the Croatian Language*, 27.

¹¹ Roland Sussex and Paul Cubberley, *The Slavic Languages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 74.

¹² Moguš, *A History of the Croatian Language*, 29.

¹³ Norman Berdichevsky, *Nations, Language and Citizenship* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2004), 165.

Habsburg policies and practices aimed at increasing unity applied to regular society as well. To create a state of a united people required, it was presumed, the creation and perpetuation of a Magyar nationality. This goal gave rise to the policies of Magyarization, which consisted of the introduction of Magyar culture, including the Hungarian language, into other cultures and nationalities.¹⁴ Students in the Northeast Balkans forced to learn Hungarian did so at the expense of learning their own language well and, thus, learned neither sufficiently well.¹⁵ Likewise, in the Northwest Balkans the Dual Monarchy mandated education in German.¹⁶

The Ottoman Empire similarly imposed its own standards and influences, most notably on Kosovo and Bosnia. Ottoman policies favored converts to Islam, which predictably resulted in numerous households embracing the religion of their masters. Ottoman rule also introduced the Turkish language, resulting in the adoption of numerous Turkish terms that persist today, especially in Bosnia.¹⁷

¹⁴ Oscar Jaszi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), 145.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 330.

¹⁶ Robert A. Kahn, *A History of the Habsburg Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 439.

¹⁷ John D. Prince, "Surviving Turkish Elements in Serbo-Croatian," in *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 51:3 (September 1931): 241.



Figure 1. Balkans, 1908 through the Second Balkan War of 1913¹⁸

The first political union of southern Slavs occurred at the end of the First World War in hopes of ending centuries of foreign domination. The southern Slavs did not trust the great powers that were soon to decide the fate of much of Europe. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes offered the constituent parts protection from continued subservience to the great powers that would likely have otherwise divided the Balkans up at the end of World War I. However, the formation of this union of southern Slavs was compelled by circumstances, even though some groups, the Croats in particular, favored

¹⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, *The Former Yugoslavia: A Map Folio*, 1992, Perry Castaneda Library Map Collection, University of Texas. Available online at <http://lib.utexas.edu/maps> (accessed March 8, 2010).

independence.¹⁹ Montenegro, which had resisted Ottoman incursions and maintained its sovereignty, was reduced overnight to a republic in a new state. Croatian politician August Košutić, speaking at the Chatham House in London fifteen years later, contended that not all southern Slavs agreed with the act that created the Kingdom. Croats in particular were not inclined to forego an opportunity for independence by accepting union with Serbia and the other south Slavic entities. Košutić's Croat Peasant Party protested to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson when he met with other world leaders in Paris that the act creating the Kingdom was unwelcome and not representative of the will of all affected.²⁰ Throughout Yugoslavia's history, Croatia consistently asserted its independent nature, including through distinctions in language.

The turbulent birth of the Kingdom was perhaps a portent of its troubled future. Externally, the Kingdom engaged in border disputes with neighboring states, as the Yugoslav territory was not well defined at its somewhat hasty inception. Internally, ethnic strife developed as the Serbs exerted their influence in a manner that the other ethnicities regarded as overbearing.²¹ Both of these factors directly affected the population of Vojvodina, the northern province of Serbia bordering Hungary and home to a sizeable number of ethnic Hungarians that in 1918 suddenly became subjects of Belgrade.

Commonly known as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from the beginning, it was officially named so in 1929 to discourage the resurgence of nationalism among the numerous ethnic groups within its borders. Despite efforts to deemphasize differences, a pattern developed in which each ethnic group sought to maintain and at times assert its

¹⁹ Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 116–119. See also Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Serbia: The History of an Idea* (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 108–111.

²⁰ August Kossutitch, "The Croatian Problem," in *International Affairs* 12:1 (January 1933): 82–3.

²¹ Misha Glenny, *The Balkans* (New York: Penguin Group, 1999), 365–366.

individuality in lieu of surrendering its unique identity to the concept of pan-Yugoslavism. Language represented one aspect of differentiation. Croatia, whose language most resembled that of Serbia, made special efforts to affirm the uniqueness of its language.

B. BIRTH OF THE SERBO-CROATIAN / CROATO-SERBIAN LANGUAGE

In 1850, a small number of Croat and Serb linguists met in Vienna to discuss a joint language. The result was the 1850 Literary Agreement, a manifestation of efforts to encourage south Slavic unity through the standardization of the Croatian and Serbian languages. The Literary Agreement did not follow logically in the course of cultural evolution, however, as each language had until then consistently grown more different from the other.²² But movements to standardize communications within Croatia and Serbia faced challenges within their own language communities as well. The written form of Serbian prior to the Literary Agreement bore little resemblance to the language spoken by the common people and was not used outside literary circles. Meanwhile, four primary dialects of the Croatian language had attained literary status in their own right within the regions where each dialect dominated.²³

The primary figures in language reform in the middle 1800s, Ljudevit Gaj in Croatia and Vuk Stefanović Karadžić in Serbia, hoped to use language as a means to unite southern Slavs politically. These men filled prominent roles in reforming the Croatian and Serbian languages during a time of rising nationalism and revolts against the Ottomans. For Gaj, language reform fit into the larger picture of the renewed Illyrian movement in Croatia, of which Gaj was a proponent, and also agreed with the concept of Pan-Slavism to which he subscribed. In Serbia, Karadžić also labored diligently to record and promulgate the Serbian language as spoken by the common people. Karadžić published collections of folk songs and a Serbian dictionary. He also revised the

²² Robert D. Greenburg, *Language and Identity in the Balkans: Serbo-Croatian and its Disintegration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 24.

²³ Greenburg, *Language and Identity in the Balkans*, 25.

Serbian alphabet, removing disused and redundant graphemes. In formulating the reforms he proposed, Karadžić subscribed to the maxim proposed by German linguist Johan Adelung to “write as you speak.”²⁴

The Croatian Illyrian movement, drawing its name from a historical identification of the Balkan peninsula, particularly relied on a literary tradition that perpetuated the Croatian language and thus a Croatian nation through extensive periods of foreign domination.²⁵ The short-lived Croatian kingdom of the tenth century united Croats along the Dalmatian coast and in the Roman province of Pannonia under the Croat King Tomislav.²⁶ However, Croatia had little chance to solidify its position and form lasting national institutions before foreign powers divided and dominated Croatia. Both Magyars to the east and Venetians to the west exercised control over the lands where the Croats lived. While the Catholic religion provided some cohesion, it was not a distinctively Croatian institution and, therefore, did not provide a base upon which to build a Croatian nation.²⁷

In contrast, Serbia maintained greater political autonomy through periods of foreign domination. Furthermore, the Serbian Orthodox Church, established in Kosovo in the fourteenth century A.D., served as a consistent symbol of the Serbian nation.²⁸ For Croatia, a common language represented the only institution that could serve to unify the Croatian people.²⁹ Collaborating with Serbia in language reform through the Literary Agreement, while distasteful to Croatian purists, represented a compromise that corresponded with the concept of pan-Slavism while simultaneously helping to standardize the Croatian language and thereby unify the Croatian people.

²⁴ Duncan Wilson, *The Life and Times of Vuk Stefanović Karadžić* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1986), 104.

²⁵ Moguš, *A History of the Croatian Language*, 158.

²⁶ Marcus Tanner, “Illyrianism and the Croatian Quest for Statehood,” in *Daedalus* 126:3 (Summer 1997): 47.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 48.

²⁸ Židas Daskalovski, “Claims to Kosovo: Nationalism and Self-Determination,” in *Understanding the War in Kosovo*, eds. Florian Bieber and Židas Daskalovski (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 15.

²⁹ Tanner, “Illyrianism and the Croatian Quest,” 49.

The 1850 Literary Agreement made little change to either the Serbian or Croatian languages because it dealt primarily with recognizing the status of the languages and dialects along with minor phonological inconsistencies between the languages. It therefore contributed little toward reconciling the Croatian and Serbian languages. The Agreement was most significant in that it derived from the willingness and desire on the part of at least some language reformers to compromise in order to bring the languages into closer agreement, and largely in opposition to the Habsburg policies of Magyarization.³⁰

In the years following the 1850 Literary Agreement, sustained nationalism in Croatia prompted the creation of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb in 1867. The Yugoslav Academy contained the first institution concerned with south Slavic languages. The leaders of the Academy promoted the idea of a union of southern Slavs that would include a shared language.³¹ At the Yugoslav Academy, Serbs and Croats worked together to publish language guides, including grammars and dictionaries, in hopes to define a single standard for both languages. In 1886, newly independent Serbia founded the Royal Academy of Sciences and Arts that then introduced its own works to standardize the Serbian language alone, effectively splitting away from the Yugoslav Academy.³²

Serbian and Croatian were spoken in three dialects during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Each is identified by its term for the pronoun what—što in the Štokavian dialect, kaj in Kajkavian, and ča in Čakavian. Štokavian has always been the most widely spoken dialect, displaced as the predominant dialect only in parts of Croatia. Kajkavian is spoken in northern Croatia, especially in the Zagreb area, and Čakavian is spoken along the Adriatic coast in Dalmatia and on the Istrian peninsula.³³ Another literary division arose from different renderings of the old Slavic grapheme, or letter, jat. In Serbia and eastern Bosnia, the jat became e, and in Croatia and western Bosnia it was rendered ije. The result was an Eastern variant identified as ekavian and a Western ijekavian variant.

³⁰ Mogoš, *A History of the Croatian Language*, 160.

³¹ Greenburg, *Language and Identity in the Balkans*, 20.

³² Greenburg, *Language and Identity in the Balkans*, 21.

³³ Alexander, *Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian*, 388.

Substantial efforts to unite the Serbian and Croatian languages came with the creation of Yugoslavia despite continued opposition by groups that promoted the purity of their own language. While Vuk Karadžić and his followers promoted the Štokavian dialect using the Cyrillic alphabet, Croat nationalists were reluctant to abandon their regional dialects. In 1914, Jovan Skerlić, a prominent Serb linguist, proposed a compromise in which the Latin script and the ekavian variant would become the standard. The Serbs would have under this arrangement given up the Cyrillic script and the Croats would have accepted the Eastern variant.³⁴ This proposal never gained traction, but it set the stage for future negotiations on the matter.

In December 1954, Serb and Croat linguists representing the primary literary societies of each republic met in Novi Sad with the support of Tito's government to resolve inconsistencies between Serbian and Croatian and to determine a name for the joint language.³⁵ At the end they agreed to ten conclusions that set a course of greater collaboration and standardization between the dialects and variants. The name of the joint language, they determined, must include the names of both of its main communities of speakers—hence, it would be referred to as Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian. Known as the Novi Sad Agreement, this opened a new era in linguistic cooperation.³⁶

The cooperation exhibited in the Novi Sad Agreement and subsequent publication of joint grammars and dictionaries never eliminated opposition to a joint language. Some cultural and literature institutes and societies in Croatia and Serbia always asserted the independence of each language. This opposition, along with popular use of language, ensured that the joint language never displaced the regional dialects or variants. When Yugoslavia dissolved, the time was ripe to renew commitments to national languages and to emphasize their differentiation.

³⁴ Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia*, 211.

³⁵ Berdichevsky, *Nations, Language and Citizenship*, 168.

³⁶ Greenburg, *Language and Identity in the Balkans*, 31.

C. LANGUAGE POLICY IN CROATIA

When Croatia gained independence from Yugoslavia, nationalist sentiments fueled a prompt return to all things Croatian. With independence came an equally independent Croatian language. Croatia's constitution clearly defines the official stance on language. Article 12 of the constitution reads,

The Croatian language and the Latin script shall be in official use in the Republic of Croatia. In individual local units, another language and the Cyrillic or some other script may be introduced into official use along with the Croatian language and the Latin script under conditions specified by law.³⁷

This policy clearly accommodates minority languages and especially those Serbs that remain in Croatia that may prefer the Cyrillic script that is the standard in Serbia. However, the caveat that other scripts may be used “along with” the Croatian language and the Latin script emphasizes their primacy.

The insistence on using a particular language and alphabet seems quite natural. After all, most states have an official language. Only those who reside in Croatia and do not speak Croatian might struggle to communicate. Croatia's 2001 census reports indicate that approximately 4 percent of the population speaks one of twenty-three mother tongues other than Croatian.³⁸ Though a few of the languages identified perhaps did not warrant a separate category, such as Croatian-Serbian³⁹ and Serbo-Croatian, the plethora of languages provides some insight into diversity in Croatia. The majority of other mother tongues identified, such as Hungarian, Italian, Romanian and Slovenian, are native to neighboring states. It is reasonable to expect that significant populations of other nationalities from neighboring states would

³⁷ Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, <http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=2405> (accessed February 11, 2010).

³⁸ Republic of Croatia Central Bureau of Statistics, *2001 Census: Population by Mother Tongue*, March 31, 2001, http://www.dzs.hr/Eng/censuses/Census2001/Popis/E01_02_03/E01_02_03.html (accessed October 12, 2009).

³⁹ The census identifies “Croatian-Serbian” as a language category, though “Croato-Serbian” is a more common rendering of the name for the joint language as referred to in Croatia.

reside in Croatia. More revealing is the fact that the vast majority of the population, approximately 96 percent, reported their mother tongue as Croatian.⁴⁰

Several laws address the treatment of Croatia's multiple minority languages. In 2000, the Croatian Parliament passed two laws—the Law on the Equal Official Use of Language and Script of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, and the Law on Education in Minority Languages. In December 2002, Croatia passed another law on the rights of minorities that replaced the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia. Each of these laws updated Yugoslav-era policies and brought Croatia into greater compliance with European Union standards regarding the treatment of minority languages.⁴¹

The newest legislation on minority rights confirms the government's stance on language. The law forthrightly protects the use of minority languages in public and official use, and in education. However, the law also states that “the right and obligation of pupils educated in the language and script of national minorities shall be to learn the Croatian language and Latin script according to the determined curriculum, apart from their own language and script.”⁴² Furthermore, all official business and documents completed in a minority language must also be accomplished in Croatian and in Latin script. Requiring the majority language for education and official business makes perfect sense. What stands out is the consistent requirement of the use of the Latin script. While this also makes sense, as it is the script in most common use, it appears to serve also as a statement against the Cyrillic script promoted in Serbia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia.

The manner in which other languages are received in Croatia is addressed by international agreements to which Croatia is a party. Besides its Constitution and other laws, Croatia has agreed to certain European treaties that prescribe liberal policies on

⁴⁰ Republic of Croatia Central Bureau of Statistics, *2001 Census*.

⁴¹ European Parliament, *European Charter of Fundamental Human Rights*, Article 22, Nice, December 2000, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm (accessed January 27, 2010).

⁴² Croatian Parliament, *The Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia*, Article 11, para. 5, Zagreb, December 19, 2002, <http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=2448> (accessed October 2, 2009).

language use. Croatia acceded to the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) in November 1997. The FCNM sets standards for access to information and services for national minorities and monitors signatory states for compliance. Standards include the freedom of the members of any nationality or ethnic group to use their national language as they see fit, and for the state to facilitate their language preference by making information available in that language, including government publications, ballots, and road signs in areas with a sizeable population that uses a minority language.⁴³

Croatia also ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which is intended to preserve and encourage the use of minority languages in the media and in education. A Croat, Vesna Crnić-Grotić, currently serves as the first vice-chair of the Committee of Experts of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (hereafter termed the Charter). In its 2001 evaluation of Croatia's implementation of the Charter, the Charter's Committee of Experts noted a number of ways in which Croatia could improve its support of minority languages, and stated that "the reorganisation of territorial administration, since 1992, seems to have created an obstacle to the promotion of regional or minority languages."⁴⁴ Subsequent reports on Croatia indicate that in general it has cooperated with the Committee but has implemented changes in reaction to requests rather than proactively identifying areas that need improvement and taking the necessary action. Based on the assessments of the Charter's Committee of Experts and the tone of the legislation in Croatia, it appears that Zagreb's efforts to support minority languages are probably attributable to pressures from the European Union; but there is no design to impose the use of Croatian over any other tongue.

A 2005 evaluation of the implementation of the Charter further noted that the number of people in Croatia whose first language was not Croatian declined significantly

⁴³ Council of Europe, *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Explanatory Report*, Strasbourg, February, 1995, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/default_en.asp (accessed October 11, 2009).

⁴⁴ Regional Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, *Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of the Charter in Croatia*, Strasbourg, September 20, 2001, http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/local_and_regional_democracy/regional_or_minority_languages/2_monitoring/2.3_Committee_of_Experts%27_Reports/Croatia_1st_report.pdf (accessed October 26, 2009), 12.

in the 2001 census from the numbers reported in the 1991 census.⁴⁵ The number of people that claimed Serbian as their language registered the largest decline, 78.4 percent, no doubt due in large part to the exodus of ethnic Serbs from Slavonia and the *Vojna Krajina* (Military Frontier) after Croatia's Operation Oluja (Storm) in 1995.⁴⁶ The evaluation did not venture any hypotheses to explain the decrease in the population of those claiming other mother tongues.

D. LANGUAGE POLICY IN SERBIA

Serbia remained united with Montenegro in what remained of the Yugoslav federation after each of the other former republics declared independence. In 2003, Yugoslavia ceased to exist and was replaced by the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. A 2006 referendum in Montenegro decided for independence, thus terminating the last vestiges of Tito's federation of south Slavs.

Serbia adopted a new constitution, the first for an independent Serbia, in November 2006. Several provisions of the constitution address language use. Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia sets basic language policy in two simple sentences—"Serbian language and Cyrillic script shall be in official use in the Republic of Serbia," and "Official use of other languages and scripts shall be regulated by the law based on the Constitution." The constitution also protects the use of languages besides Serbian. Article 21 prohibits discrimination based on language, and Article 199 provides for the use of one's own language in court proceedings or other interactions with the state.⁴⁷ Several other sections of the constitution likewise protect and promote the use of other languages in Serbia. Among the other references to language, Article 79 most thoroughly discusses the use of other languages under the title "Right to preservation of specificity:"

⁴⁵ Regional Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, *Application of the Charter in Croatia*, Strasbourg, September 7, 2005, http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/minlang/Report/EvaluationReports/CroatiaECRML2_en.pdf (accessed October 26, 2009), 5.

⁴⁶ Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel*, 4th. ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 230.

⁴⁷ Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice_o_srbiji/ustav.php (accessed September 8, 2009).

Members of national minorities shall have a right to:

expression, preservation, fostering, developing and public expression of national, ethnic, cultural, [and] religious specificity;

use of their symbols in public places; use of their language and script; have proceedings also conducted in their languages before state bodies, organisations with delegated public powers, bodies of autonomous provinces and local self-government units, in areas where they make a significant majority of population;

education in their languages in public institutions and institutions of autonomous provinces;

founding private educational institutions;

use of their name and family name in their language; traditional local names, names of streets, settlements and topographic names also written in their languages, in areas where they make a significant majority of [the] population;

complete, timely and objective information in their language, including the right to expression, receiving, sending and exchange of information and ideas;

establishing their own mass media, in accordance with the Law.⁴⁸

As one might suspect considering the lengthy treatment of language in the constitution, the matter of using other languages and scripts arises daily in Serbia. The last census, conducted in 2002, reported that there were twelve ethnicities residing in Serbia—Serb, Montenegrin, Yugoslav, Albanian, Bosniak, Bulgarian, Bunjevac, Valachian, Gornac, Hungarian, Macedonian, and Moslem.⁴⁹ Many of the larger populations of minority ethnicities, particularly Hungarian and Albanian, are concentrated in specific geographical areas. The majority of the residents of Kosovo, which declared independence from Serbia in 2008, are ethnic Albanian. The Sandžak region along the border between Serbia and Montenegro hosts a large Bosniak population. The northern province of

⁴⁸ Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice_o_srbiji/ustav.php (accessed September 8, 2009).

⁴⁹ All Serbian census data is from the 2002 census as published by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, <http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/axd/en/popis.htm> (accessed October 12, 2009).

Vojvodina is home to many Hungarians, Croats and other ethnic minorities. Vojvodina's status in relation to Serbia has changed several times throughout their association, and it presently operates with substantial autonomy.

Serbia is a party to international laws and agreements that stipulate specific rights for minority populations. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of which Serbia is the legal successor, assented to the FCNM treaty in November 2001.⁵⁰ Serbia also inherited signatory status with the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. A 2007 Charter report indicated that Serbia has been faithful in efforts to accommodate speakers of minority languages. For example, the Ministry of Education and Sport permits Roma assistants to help Roma students attending Serbian schools. Also, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has helped Serbia modernize its police force. As part of that effort, the Ministry of Internal Affairs publishes advertisements for police employment and offers police training courses in minority languages.⁵¹

At least one minority rights advocacy group has expressed concern about the extent of official support for the use of national languages. The Fund for an Open Society in Serbia published research on the availability of news media in national languages. Analysis of the laws regulating information dissemination in minority languages revealed inadequate provisions due to frequent revision of existing laws and, during the period when Slobodan Milošević served as president, political interference and legal machinations that restricted the flow of information.⁵² This report also points out the potential for the privatization of state media to threaten news media production in minority languages. Privatization of state-run media outlets is viewed as beneficial for unbiased and independent news coverage; however, state-run media also subsidize production and distribution in minority languages.

⁵⁰ It is interesting to note that the Council of Europe provides the text of the FCNM treaty in the Serbian language with the option of the Cyrillic or Latin script.

⁵¹ European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, "Initial Periodic Report: Serbia," Council of Europe, Belgrade, June 2007, 114, http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/local_and_regional_democracy/regional_or_minority_languages/2_monitoring/2.2_States_Reports/Serbia_report1.pdf (accessed 30 October 2009).

⁵² Jadranka Jelinčić, *Right to Information in Minority Languages* (Belgrade: Fund for an Open Society, 2007), 49.

Because small-scale publication in low density languages produces little economic benefit, private outlets will be less likely to serve those communities.⁵³

Since the publication of the research by the Fund for an Open Society, Serbia has initiated structural changes to address minority rights. Most notably, Serbia created a National Minority Council to coordinate issues pertaining to national minorities and to propose relevant legislation. The Ministers for Culture, Education, Human and Minority Rights, Interior, Justice, Public Administration, Religion, and Youth and Sports sit on the National Minority Council. The National Minority Council held its first meeting in October 2009 to establish operating procedures.⁵⁴ A primary aim of the National Minority Council is to facilitate implementation of the Law on National Minorities Councils, which was drafted days before the Council's first meeting. This law calls for the formation of councils for national minorities in Serbia as a first step toward granting a degree of self-government to minority groups. Presently, minority councils only operate within their locality. Serbia will register minorities for elections of minority councils to be held in May and June 2010.⁵⁵ Once elected, the presidents of the new minority councils will represent their nationality in the National Minority Council.

Serbia clearly advocates the use of the Eastern variant of Serbian accompanied by the Cyrillic script. However, based on its constitution, laws and official actions, Serbia does not by any official means impinge on the use of other languages, including the use of the Western variant or the Latin script. This tolerance or even promotion of minority national languages in Serbia corresponds to Serbia's efforts to join the European Union. Furthermore, the apparently neutral legal stance on variations in the use of Serbian, to be addressed in the next chapter, indicates only that no agreed upon standards for the Serbian language exist.

⁵³ Jelinčić, *Right to Information*, 119.

⁵⁴ Statements of the Government, "National Minority Council Holds First Session," *Serbian Government*, October 30, 2009, <http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=60353> (accessed October 30, 2009).

⁵⁵ Serbian Government Activities, "National Minority Councils a Precondition to Minority Self-Government," *Serbian Government*, October 30, 2009, <http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=60364> (accessed October 30, 2009).

E. LANGUAGE POLICY IN BOSNIA

Bosnia presents a unique case among its peers in that its government was designed under the close supervision of interested international parties and drafted as part of the 1995 peace negotiations in Dayton. The peace agreement created an internal partition of Bosnia, organizing the state into two entities—the (Bosniak and Croat) Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska. The people of Bosnia likewise remain distinctly divided between three factions—Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks.

Bosnia's internal divisions stem from its location near several large civilizations through most of its history. Parts of Bosnia fell at different times under the control of Romans, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Croats, Serbs, and Ottomans.⁵⁶ One result of the numerous conquests was the introduction of different religions. The Catholic Church dominated in the north and west of the region that today is Bosnia, while in Herzegovina, the Orthodox Church dominated from Constantinople and later from Serbia. These territories remained largely separated until a strong Bosnian leader united them, along with much of the Dalmatian coast, in the early 1300s. The Ottoman conquests in the late 1300s brought Muslim rule initially to Kosovo and Herzegovina and within the next two hundred years to much of Bosnia and Serbia.⁵⁷ Bosnia therefore became a middle ground between East and West, and between Christianity and Islam.

Although Bosnia served as a mixing bowl for west Balkan nationalities, each resident group maintained its own identity. The enduring nature of national divisions in Bosnia was manifest in the first political parties that Austria-Hungary allowed to organize. Parties formed along the lines of religion and ethnicity—Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs and Muslims (Bosniaks). The identities that naturally formed through political processes were over time reinforced and further institutionalized.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine Jr., *Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 15.

⁵⁷ Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia—A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 17, 43–54.

⁵⁸ Sumatra Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 44–45.

As nationalism grew in the territories under Habsburg rule, the monarchy recognized a need to dampen this trend and, therefore, attempted to inculcate a sense of unity among its subjects. To achieve this sense of unity would require a common identity and purpose. The military served as one vehicle to achieve this end. Soldiers in the joint Habsburg army were assigned to posts away from home and frequently transferred to other areas. The monarchy hoped that exposing soldiers to essentially foreign places and cultures would foster solidarity and overcome any tendency toward greater loyalty to their own nationality.⁵⁹

Although this policy did not fulfill its intended purpose, it did succeed in mixing the population somewhat and promoting different settlement patterns. One potent manifestation of this policy was the formation of the Military Frontier, or *Vojna Krajina*. The Military Frontier stretched from northern Serbia across Croatian Slavonia and northern Bosnia to the Adriatic coast. The Habsburgs designed the Military Frontier as a barricade against advances by the Ottomans. Serb families received exemption from taxes in exchange for settling the Military Frontier and pledging military support to the Habsburg monarchy.⁶⁰ Serbs remained a significant proportion of the population of the *Krajina* in Croatia until many Serbs fled before the Croat military advance in Operation Oluja in 1995. The Serb population of Bosnia now concentrated in Republika Srpska also derives largely from the Military Frontier.

Austria-Hungary's efforts to check Slavic nationalism extended to language policy as well. The Serbs showed the greatest propensity for opposing foreign rule, and thus were most targeted by policies designed to undermine their solidarity. Austria-Hungary therefore supported the creation of a Bosnian language in 1890, though no uniquely Bosnian language ultimately emerged at that time.⁶¹ Ironically, Austria-Hungary reversed this policy in 1904 and forbade the identification of a separate Bosnian

⁵⁹ Jaszi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, 144.

⁶⁰ Tim Judah, *The Serbs* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 13–16.

⁶¹ Greenburg, *Language and Identity in the Balkans*, 137.

language, reasoning that it would be easier to exercise authority over its Balkan holdings if there was but one language—Serbo-Croatian.⁶²

Efforts to discourage strong associations with an ethnic identity continued after the formation of Yugoslavia. The first official title of the new state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, appears in retrospect to have placed too much emphasis on a select few of the constituent ethnicities, a concession to those groups that had expressed strong reservations about abandoning hopes for sovereignty. The state was commonly known from the beginning as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and was officially renamed so in 1929 in part to discourage nationalism.⁶³

Nationalism as a divisive force remained a concern for Yugoslavia's communist regime. Tito encouraged the residents of communist Yugoslavia to view themselves as Yugoslavs, not as members of any particular ethnic group.⁶⁴ Despite efforts to “cleanse” Yugoslavia's citizens of their ethnic identities, cultural differences persisted. Croatia sustained its independent spirit, including the maintenance of a measure of linguistic distinction through the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb.

As a meeting ground between Croatia and Serbia, Bosnia's population became the most heterogeneous of the Yugoslav republics. In 1991, Croats, Serbs and Muslims (Bosniaks) constituted 17.4 percent, 31.2 percent, and 43.5 percent, respectively. The percentages from earlier censuses reveal a trend toward a steadily increasing percentage of Bosniaks relative to Croats and Serbs, along with a decrease in the total number of Serbs in Bosnia.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, prior to the violence of the 1990s, Bosnia's capital Sarajevo presented a cosmopolitan face to the world, an example of what Tito had hoped to achieve throughout Yugoslavia. Sarajevo even hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics.

⁶² Radoslav Katičić, “Undoing a “Unified language,” Bosnian, Croatian, Serbia,” in *Undoing and Redoing Corpus Planning*, ed. Michael G. Clyne (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Company, 1997), 177.

⁶³ Greenburg, *Language and Identity in the Balkans*, 21.

⁶⁴ Francine Friedman, *The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 154.

⁶⁵ Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Federal Office of Statistics, “Population Grouped According to Ethnicity, by Census 1961–1991,” <http://www.fzs.ba/Eng/population.htm> (accessed September 22, 2009).




Figure 2. Ethnic Majorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1991⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, *The Former Yugoslavia: A Map Folio*, 1992, Perry Castaneda Library Map Collection, University of Texas. Available online at <http://lib.utexas.edu/maps> (accessed March 8, 2010).

A decade after Tito's death in 1980, the Yugoslav federation began to unravel. Slovenia and Croatia grew impatient with the pace of reform and lobbied Belgrade for economic liberalization, while the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo clamored for greater autonomy. Slobodan Milošević, as chairman of the Serb-dominated League of Communists of Yugoslavia, capitalized on growing Serb nationalism and anti-Albanian sentiment in 1989 to rescind the autonomy of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. In the midst of consolidating its power, Belgrade was not amenable to granting greater autonomy to Yugoslavia's constituent republics. The political tension in Yugoslavia culminated with Slovenia and Croatia declaring independence in June 1991, with Bosnia following in October 1991. Bosnian Serbs then declared independence from Bosnia and established the Republika Srpska. The fighting that ensued between Serbs and Bosniaks and between Croats and Bosniaks dramatically altered the demographic landscape of Bosnia. Negotiations held in Dayton in 1995 finally ended the violence, and also produced Bosnia's constitution as an annex to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bosnia's violent birth and contentious formation shaped all aspects of its government, including official policies on language. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina makes liberal allowances for the use of one's language of preference. The first mention of language, in Article I of the constitution, prohibits the denial of citizenship in Bosnia, FBiH, or Republika Srpska based on language. Article II further prohibits the denial of any of the rights and privileges enumerated in the constitution based on language.⁶⁷ The only other reference to language is buried in Annex I to the constitution, which identifies the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages among the human rights agreements that apply in Bosnia.

The bifurcated governance of Bosnia allows each entity to establish policies and practices separate from one another and from those of the federal government. The

⁶⁷ Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, "Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina," http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/p_stream.php?kat=518 (accessed February 11, 2010).

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognizes Bosnian and Croatian, both using the Latin script, as the official languages. The Federation also acknowledges that other languages may be used in official communications and in education.⁶⁸ Constitutional pronouncements on language in Republika Srpska resemble those of its neighbors. The official language in Republika Srpska is Serbian using the Cyrillic script and either the Eastern (*ekavski*) or Western (*ijekavski*) variant.⁶⁹ The constitutions of both the Federation and of Republika Srpska protect the use of other languages and prohibit discrimination based on language.⁷⁰

While the Croat-dominated regions of Bosnia look to Croatia for guidance on language standards, the Republika Srpska likewise looks to Serbia. Just as Croats strictly use the Latin-based alphabet, Serbs use Cyrillic. But not all Serbs use Cyrillic. The common use of language by Serbs living in parts of Republika Srpska that border with Croatia has come to resemble Croatian more than Serbian. Bosnian Serbs tend to use words specific to Croatian in lieu of their Serbian equivalents, and prefer the Latin script over Cyrillic. Because the constitution officially allows free choice of language, there is little the government of Republika Srpska can do to influence this trend. However, that has not stopped this government from trying. To halt the “Croatization” of the language of Bosnian Serbs and to protect Republika Srpska’s “national interests, culture, and tradition,” a law has been proposed that would require government representatives to pass a language test to ascertain their proficiency in employing the official Serbian language and the Cyrillic alphabet.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Constitutional Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Article I, <http://www.ads.gov.ba/javniispit/index.html> (accessed March 8, 2010).

⁶⁹ National Assembly of Republika Srpska, “Constitution of the Republika Srpska,” Article 7, <http://www.ads.gov.ba/javniispit/index.html> (accessed March 8, 2010).

⁷⁰ “Constitution of the Republika Srpska,” Articles 10 and 34, and “Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Article II.

⁷¹ “Kroatizacija Srpskog Jezika,” *Večernji List*, March 3, 2009, 2.

These three former Yugoslav republics treat language in a mostly neutral fashion under the law. Apart from the Republika Srpska's interest in requiring a language proficiency test for state employment, language appears as a choice for each individual and community to make without government interference. The degree to which that in fact occurs is the topic of the following chapter.

III. LANGUAGE USE IN CROATIA, SERBIA, AND BOSNIA

The terms and tone of speech one uses at home often differ somewhat from that spoken at school or at one's place of employment. Similarly, certain terms or phrases often gain greater favor within a geographical region or amongst members of a particular industry or profession. For example, business professionals and those in the medical field or the military develop unique terms and acronyms not commonly employed outside of a professional setting. This poses no challenge to communication, however, but rather enhances communication as individuals tailor their language to suit their environment. Similarly, regional distinctions in language use within a country generally pose no challenges to communication. For example, in the Midwest of the United States one might request "pop" to drink, while elsewhere someone else may refer to the same beverage as "soda" or simply "Coke." Given the disparities in common, everyday language, it is not surprising that officially acceptable language does not always equate with social acceptance.

The dialectical differences between the languages spoken in Croatia and Serbia gained renewed political significance with the breakup of Yugoslavia. The republics of Slovenia and Macedonia, each of which has a comparatively homogenous ethnic population and its own unique language, avoided the brunt of the physical and cultural assaults occasioned by Yugoslavia's demise. The populations and hence cultures of Croatia, Serbia, and especially Bosnia had intermingled long enough to ensure that attempts at separation would be painful.

A. LANGUAGE USE IN CROATIA

The everyday use of language in Croatia has been heavily influenced by politics and events. When Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia, Croat leaders sought independence specifically from Serbia. Croats and others perceived Serbia as dominating the Yugoslav federation from the beginning of its existence. Ethnic Serbs tended to dominate the military and police forces until after the Second World War when Tito

endeavored to encourage multiculturalism by appointing leaders from different ethnicities to important positions in the new communist government.

However, even Tito's vigorous attempts to create a uniform society blind to ethnicity encouraged only 5.4 percent of the population of Yugoslavia to identify themselves as Yugoslav in the 1981 census.⁷² The Yugoslav ethnic category persists in Serbia's latest census, with 1 percent of the population identified as Yugoslav in 2002.⁷³ Bosnia's 1991 census reported 5.5 percent of the population as Yugoslav. The census planned for 2011 will probably show a change in that percentage, however.⁷⁴ Croatia's 2001 census did not include an ethnic category for Yugoslavs.⁷⁵

Even before declaring Croatia's independence in 1991, Croatian nationalist and long time Yugoslav dissident Franjo Tuđman endeavored to "cleanse" Croatian society of any Serbian elements that had worked their way in during the Yugoslav years. Active in Croatian resistance to the Yugoslav state, Tuđman made a name for himself as a nationalist and advocate of Croatian independence. He persevered in his efforts to promote Croatian nationalism until 1990 when his Croatian Democratic Union party came into power with the help of an electoral system that allotted his party over 60 percent of the seats in the Sabor (Croatia's legislature) with only 42 percent of the vote.⁷⁶

Immediately voted President of Croatia, Tuđman came into office in May 1990 with a plan for Croatia's future. In conversations with Warren Zimmermann, then the U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Tuđman communicated his dislike of the Yugoslav

⁷² Slobodan Stanković, "Yugoslavia's Census – Final Results," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, March 10 1982, in the Open Society Archives, Central European University, <http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/85-4-120.shtml> (accessed January 14, 2010).

⁷³ Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, "Census 2002," <http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/axd/en/popis.htm> (accessed October 12, 2009).

⁷⁴ Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federal Office of Statistics, "Population Grouped According to Ethnicity by Census 1961-1991," <http://www.fzs.ba/Eng/population.htm> (accessed September 22, 2009).

⁷⁵ Republic of Croatia Central Bureau of Statistics, "Census 2001," <http://www.dzs.hr/Eng/censuses/Census2001/census.htm> (accessed October 12, 2009).

⁷⁶ Mark Biondich, "Croatia," in *Eastern Europe: an introduction to the people, lands, and culture*, Vol. 1, ed. Richard C. Frucht (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 444.

federation and his intentions to create a new Croatian constitution, reform the economy, and fundamentally change the relationship between the Yugoslav republics and the central authority in Belgrade, the capital of Serbia and of Yugoslavia.⁷⁷ Tuđman also observed that Serbs comprised only 11 percent of Croatia's population, yet held 40 percent of government positions. Furthermore, Serbs essentially controlled the media and the police.⁷⁸ Tuđman resolved to remedy the situation by driving ethnic Serbs out of public office, replacing them with ethnic Croats. Other segments of society responded to Croatian nationalism by assisting in the "purification" of Croatian culture. Anything that exhibited Serbian influence or that symbolized Yugoslavia became a target for elimination. Librarians removed books written in Cyrillic or by Serb authors from public access, and works by Croat authors were prominently displayed and distinguished as authentically Croatian.⁷⁹

Tuđman made it a priority to fortify Croatian military forces to prepare for the possibility of a military confrontation with Serbia. The Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army (*Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija*, JNA) responded to Croatia's declaration of independence in 1991 by attacking Vukovar and other locations in Slavonia. Many ethnic Serbs residing in Croatia chose to join the JNA. When the fighting ended in February 1992, Serb forces occupied approximately one-third of Croatia's territory.⁸⁰ Croatia quickly set about its recovery, including reconstituting its fledgling military. In 1995, the Croatian army proceeded to oust Serb forces from Croatia, and in the process targeted not just Serb forces, but anything identifiably Serbian that they encountered. The Croatian military destroyed several Serbian Orthodox churches, religious libraries, and other significant artifacts of Serbian culture in Croatia.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Warren Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe* (New York: Random House, 1996), 72.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁷⁹ Rebecca Knuth, *Libricide* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 118.

⁸⁰ Ramet, *Balkan Babel*, 163.

⁸¹ Knuth, *Libricide*, 120.

Efforts to “cleanse” Croatian culture from foreign influences extended to language as well, resulting in immediate changes to the Croatian used in publications. The Croatian used in news media and radio and television programs exhibited changes in word choice. The state encouraged the media to eschew words of foreign origin in favor of Croatian terms.⁸² In some instances, newly coined words filled a gap in the lexicon previously filled by an adopted word of foreign origin. In such cases, even terms commonly used throughout Yugoslavia were rejected due largely to the fact that many foreign words had been readily adopted by Serbia, making those words all the more distasteful to Croats. The new words were not technically new, but revived after having been lost to common use with the advent of the joint language during the Yugoslav period (1918–1991). Other terms were new, formed by drawing on older Croatian vocabulary, using words long neglected and giving them new meaning or combining them with other words to create new terms.⁸³ The need to create new terms arose particularly in the areas of technology, where most new words come from the country that creates and exports new technology. For example, “pure” Croatian does not include the cognate for *computer*. While most language communities have elected to adopt the foreign word, as did Serbia, in Croatia the acceptable term is *računalo*, from the verb *računati* which means *to count*.

The impetus to “purify” the Croatian language after securing independence came from the top down. The changes in language exhibited in the media arose first and most consistently in the state-controlled media outlets. Overtly nationalistic media outlets also quickly transitioned to more “pure” Croatian, while independent media adopted many of the changes but did so more slowly.⁸⁴ The media even provided guidance on which

⁸² Brigita Busch and Helen Kelly-Holmes, “Language Boundaries as Social, Political and Discursive Constructs, in *Language, Discourse and Borders in the Yugoslav Successor States*, ed. Brigita Busch and Helen Kelly-Holmes (Buffalo: Multilingual Matters, 2004), 9.

⁸³ Sabrina P. Ramet, “The Roots of Discord and the Language of War,” in *Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and Ljubiša S. Adamovich (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 5.

⁸⁴ Keith Langston, “Linguistic Cleansing: Language Purism in Croatia after the Yugoslav Break-up,” *International Politics* 36:2 (1999): 188.

terms were most correct and warned against non-Croatian alternatives.⁸⁵ Once the preoccupation of literary journals, a plethora of books and pamphlets emerged that instructed their readers on the proper use of language. Books on the subject, such as *Do We Speak Croatian Correctly?*,⁸⁶ offered assistance to the patriotic-minded that wished to speak “proper” Croatian, complete with dictionaries showing Croatian equivalents to Serbian words in popular use. The changes prescribed by Croat nationalists prompted Serb linguistics professor Ranko Bugarski to describe the altered language as Newspeak, a reference to George Orwell’s novel *1984*, in which language was manipulated and simplified by the state in an effort to control thinking.⁸⁷

Some argue that in fact the Croatian language has not changed. Mario Grčević, a linguist and a humanities professor at the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb, insists that the Croatian language always remained distinct from Serbian.⁸⁸ Grčević claims that any changes apparent since Croatian independence result from a return to a more natural Croatian language that Yugoslav authorities had censored. As evidence of this, Grčević cites examples of the destruction of books published using distinctly the Croatian language, and of prominent individuals suffering censure or even imprisonment for using Croatian words. He furthermore compares a list of words he compiled from common Croatian news sources published from 1997 to 1999 with a similar list compiled by Croatian linguistics professor Milan Moguš from 1935 through the 1970s. Grčević found that many of the words that Croats supposedly created or resurrected since Croatia’s independence were found in public use through the 1970s, though with decreased frequency attributable to censorship. The distinctly Croatian

⁸⁵ Melitta R. Malabotta, “Semantics of War in Former Yugoslavia,” in *Language, Discourse and Borders in the Yugoslav Successor States*, ed. Brigita Busch and Helen Kelly-Holmes (Buffalo: Multilingual Matters, 2004), 80.

⁸⁶ Stanka Pavuna, *Govorimo li ispravno hrvatski? Mali razlikovni rječnik* (Zagreb: Integra, 1993).

⁸⁷ Ranko Bugarski, “Language, nationalism and war in Yugoslavia,” *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 151 (2001): 84.

⁸⁸ Mario Grčević, “Some remarks on lexical changes in the Croatian language,” in *Lexical Norm and Language Policy in South-Slavic Languages after 1989*, ed. Radovan Lučić, vol. 14 of *Der Welt der Slaven Sammelbände* (Munich: Otto Sanger, 2002), 151.

words censored by the Yugoslav government were relegated to a “passive” vocabulary—never completely falling out of use by Croats but yielding to Serbian terms in the name of political expediency.⁸⁹

Croatia’s academic community has also exerted some leverage in favor of linguistic “purification.” The Croatian Philological Society in Zagreb publishes a journal on the Croatian language titled *Jezik* (Tongue or Language). The articles published in this journal often advocate a cleansing of the Croatian language. Proceedings published in the journal from a conference on the Croatian language include a commentary by Croatian linguistics professor Milan Moguš in which he argues that changes to the language came from foreign influence, and that using “proper” Croatian is essential to promote clear communication. On the words introduced from Serbian, Moguš compares the change and development of language to illness. He states that “to develop does not have to mean only to progress and flourish, but develop might also mean to regress, because even illness spreads and develops. This kind of development can mean regression of language because progress can be bad.”⁹⁰ The comparison leaves no doubt as to his opinion on the use of words borrowed from other languages, though his argument that the loss of precision from using words that convey a slightly different meaning hinders communication is flawed. In a technical or legal setting precision in communication can be vital and word choice can certainly have significant implications. However, as Croatia interacts increasingly with other countries, more precise communication often requires the use of terms from other languages.

The fact that the public requires instruction on the most acceptable use of Croatian suggests that the changes introduced since Croatia’s independence arose from an artificial and directed source. Grčević’s explanation of the revival of the Croatian language once it was unencumbered by censorship explains why Croatian words returned to more common use, but the rapid abandonment of Serbian words and the promotion of “pure” Croatian do not equate with a natural return to a suppressed but preferred

⁸⁹ Grčević, “Some remarks on lexical changes in the Croatian language,” 152.

⁹⁰ Milan Moguš, “Položaj hrvatskoga jezika,” *Jezik* 56, no. 3 (June 2009): 84, translated by author.

language. The state promotion of “pure” Croatian reveals a political agenda that ironically resembles that of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav government as identified by Grčević.

Common use of the Croatian language since independence provides another indicator of political tampering. If the typical Croat had condescended to eliminate distinctly Croatian terms from his speech for the sake of political correctness, surely the return to using Croatian speech would have been spontaneous and widespread. In practice, that was not the case. A survey conducted to determine public views of correct language revealed that respondents were generally conscious of changes to language and elected based on individual circumstances either to adapt their language to the new, politically endorsed standards or to continue to speak as they always had.⁹¹ Those that responded strongly in favor of Croatian words did so when choosing between Croatian and Serbian alternatives, and were less critical of foreign words not of Serbian origin.⁹² As might have been expected, older respondents were less likely than younger respondents and current students to select “pure” Croatian words as more correct.⁹³

In spite of efforts to significantly differentiate Croatian from Serbian, many elements of the joint Serbo-Croatian language persist in Croatia today. Making a point to speak “pure” Croatian appears important to journalists, teachers, politicians and others in public positions in order to demonstrate their loyalty and correctness, but it comes across as excessively formal and stilted in every day settings.⁹⁴ Which changes introduced to the Croatian language since independence will become permanent remains to be seen.

⁹¹ Keith Langston and Anita Peti–Stantić, “Attitudes towards Linguistic Purism in Croatia: Evaluating Efforts at Language Reform,” in *At War with Words* (Berlin: Mouton, 2003), 270 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice_o_srbiji/ustav.php (accessed September 8, 2009)–271.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 267–8.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 269.

⁹⁴ Mirjana N. Dedaić, “Introduction: A Peace of word,” in *At War with Words*, ed. Mirjana N. Dedaić and Daniel N. Nelson (Berlin: Mouton, 2003), 12.

B. LANGUAGE USE IN SERBIA

The language situation in Serbia today is probably less complicated than that in Croatia or Bosnia, though not without political issues. Serbia's strong literary tradition at the time of the formation of the joint Serbo-Croatian language meant there was no need to establish a language identity in Serbia after Croatia seceded. Overall, there has been little change to Serbian since the dissolution of Yugoslavia.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, three distinct camps, identified by Robert Greenburg in his research on the death of Serbo-Croatian, emerged in the 1990s to advocate changes in different directions for the future of the Serbian language.⁹⁶

The first group consists of linguists who argue that the joint literary language established via the Novi Sad Agreement in 1954 provided a sound basis for the Serbian language and should be perpetuated using the eastern, or *ekavian*, variant of the *štokavian* dialect already prevalent in Serbia. This argument essentially promotes the status quo.⁹⁷ The other two groups exhibit greater nationalistic sentiment and propose changes to the language. The members of the second group, identified by Greenburg as Neo-Vukovites, suggest a return to the standards proposed by the practically legendary language reformer Vuk Karadžić during the middle to late 1800s. This would involve adapting the language of Serbia to the *ijekavian* dialect more prevalent to the west in Bosnia and Croatia.⁹⁸ The third group exhibits the most nationalistic sentiments of the three, recommending a return to the Serbian language before the creation of a joint language. Supporters of this agenda assert that the joint language was never legitimate, and they claim that the *štokavian* dialect and Cyrillic alphabet are inherently Serbian. Conversely, they consider the Latin alphabet anathema, and even recommend reincorporating letters from the Slavonic

⁹⁵ Ljubomir Popović, "From Standard Serbian through Standard Serbo-Croatian to Standard Serbian," in *Language in the Former Yugoslav Lands*, ed. Ranko Bugarski and Celia Hawkesworth (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2004), 25.

⁹⁶ Robert D. Greenburg, "Language Politics in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," *Slavic Review* 59, no. 3 (Autumn 2000), 626.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 627.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 628.

alphabet into modern use.⁹⁹ The academic debate in this regard continues as evidenced by a meeting in the fall of 2009 of prominent Serb linguists to discuss the perceived absence of language policy in Serbia. Their concern led to the creation of a new Council for Language within the Vuk Foundation, a cultural institution named in honor of Vuk Karadžić.¹⁰⁰

The treatment of the Cyrillic alphabet has perhaps represented the most significant issue facing the Serbian language since 1991. Because Cyrillic was developed as a means to translate religious texts into the early Slavic language, Cyrillic maintains a close relationship with the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Serbian Orthodox Church also represents Serbian culture. The Church became autocephalous in the 14th century A.D. and took a prominent role in political matters of the Medieval Serbian Empire.¹⁰¹ The close ties to a national religion and the long history associated with the height of Serbia's power incorporated the Cyrillic alphabet into the Serbian national identity.

Using a Cyrillic alphabet seems increasingly out of place in the 21st century. Global communication has increased exponentially in the last century, conducted predominantly in English.¹⁰² Some former republics of the Soviet Union are choosing to abandon Cyrillic alphabets in favor of Latin-based alternatives. The inspiration for such changes is partly political, because it represents a final severing of ties with the Soviet Union; but it has practical advantages as well. Kazakh officials cite the greater ease of integrating with the global economy as an impetus to change to a Latin-based alphabet.¹⁰³ A similar trend in Serbia to adopt the Latin-based alphabet used extensively throughout Yugoslavia came about as a practical matter because it facilitated

⁹⁹ Greenburg, "Language Politics in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," 629.

¹⁰⁰ "Kultura jezika u Vokovoy Zadužbini," *Blic*, September 15, 2009, 29.

¹⁰¹ Židas Daskalovski, "Claims to Kosovo: Nationalism and Self-Determination," in *Understanding the War in Kosovo*, eds. Florian Bieber and Židas Daskalovski (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 18.

¹⁰² David Crystal, *Language and the Internet* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 216.

¹⁰³ Paul Bartlett, "Kazakhstan: Moving Forward with Plan to Replace Cyrillic with Latin Alphabet," *Eurasianet.org*, September 4, 2007, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav090407.shtml> (accessed October 23, 2009).

communication with the rest of the world. The eventual proliferation of Cyrillic typewriters and computer fonts, however, removed some of the incentive to convert alphabets.¹⁰⁴

Amid the debate in Serbia over the appropriate alphabet, the organization Ćirilica has arisen to promote and preserve the Cyrillic alphabet in Serbia. Through its website¹⁰⁵ and the publication of numerous booklets on the subject, Ćirilica argues that Serbia has one national language and should therefore have one national alphabet, that the Cyrillic alphabet is in danger of extinction, and that Serbs should protect that alphabet.¹⁰⁶ This campaign appears to have had little effect on alphabet choice in Serbia. State-affiliated media publish by default using Cyrillic, but provide the same content using both alphabets on their internet sites. Media outlets more closely tied to Western Europe or that are critical of the government tend to publish using the Latin alphabet.

The debates on the future of the Serbian language remain academic and gain considerably less traction among serving politicians compared to the corresponding debates in Croatia. In lieu of debating over how they write and speak, the general population of Serbia seems content to continue with established practices. Consequently, in marked contrast to the tone in Croatia, Serbia readily embraces foreign influences on its language. The reason for Serbia's acceptance of foreign words derives from the early development of the language. While the Croatian linguistic community always remained centered in Zagreb, the center of the Serbian linguistic community shifted between Novi Sad and Belgrade. Moreover, rural areas of Serbia and Bosnia have exerted varying degrees of influence on standard Serbian since the early efforts of Vuk Karadžić to use the language of the common Serb as the standard for the literary language.

The shifting of literary influence in Serbia and the failure to develop a common standard permitted German, Hungarian and Turkish elements in particular to leave

¹⁰⁴ Pavle Ivić, "Language Planning in Serbia Today," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 151 (2001): 11.

¹⁰⁵ <http://www.cirilica.com>

¹⁰⁶ Dragoljub Zbiljić et.al., *Jednoazbučje i u Pravopisu Srpskog Jezika Spas za Ćirilicu* (Novi Sad: Ćirilica, 2007), 11–12.

impressions on Serbian.¹⁰⁷ Belgrade's role as the capital of Yugoslavia also introduced more foreign influences on Serbian, because a significant proportion of Yugoslavia's interactions with other countries took place there. Even before the breakup of Yugoslavia, linguists observed the contrast between (a) the tendencies of the Serbian language to readily accept foreign words into its lexicon and (b) efforts to "purify" the Croatian language.¹⁰⁸ The ready acceptance of foreign influences has given a greater international flavor to Serbian.¹⁰⁹

Serbia has experienced its greatest challenges with language in Vojvodina and Kosovo. The latter declared independence from Serbia in 2008. Both Vojvodina and Kosovo enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy as provinces of Serbia throughout most of Serbia's existence as a state. A significant population of ethnicities other than Serb also resides in each territory, each with its own mother tongue. Ethnic Albanians presently comprise over 90 percent of the population of Kosovo.¹¹⁰ The proportion of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo began to decline in the 1960s and then dropped precipitously after Kosovo became in essence a "protectorate" of the United Nations in June 1999 under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 1244.¹¹¹

Vojvodina, on the other hand, is home to a greater number of ethnicities, making the language environment there rather dynamic. Ethnic Serbs comprise the majority of the population, but they share the province with large numbers of ethnic Hungarians and

¹⁰⁷ Dragoljub Petrović, "Languages in Contact: Standard Serbian Phonology in an Urban Setting," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 151 (2001): 20.

¹⁰⁸ Ranko Bugarski, "Sociolinguistic Issues in Standardizing Linguistic Terminology," *Language in Society* 12, no. 1 (March 1983): 66.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹¹⁰ Statistical Office of the Republic of Kosovo, "Demographic Changes of the Kosovo Population 1948 – 2006," Republic of Kosovo Ministry of Public Administration, <http://www.ks-gov.net/ESK/eng/index.php> (accessed January 15, 2010).

¹¹¹ Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2009–Kosovo (Serbia)," July 16, 2009, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a6452a8c.html> (accessed February 4, 2010).

Croats along with Romanians, Roma, Bunjevci and Ruthenians.¹¹² Challenges arise for speakers of minority languages to gain access to education, news, and government information in their primary language. State media outlets that previously subsidized publication in minority languages have undergone privatization and can no longer justify the expense. The sizeable ethnic Hungarian population in Vojvodina therefore takes upon itself the responsibility to provide education and other services in Hungarian.

The Hungarian population is sufficiently concentrated in some cities to prompt dramatic change in local conditions. In Subotica, the second largest city in Vojvodina, public schools that are required to teach Serbian also offer Hungarian as an elective.¹¹³ In Stara Moravica, ethnic Serb parents that want their children to study in their native Serbian must send them to a school in another town, as the public schools in Stara Moravica hold classes in Hungarian. The local population in Stara Moravica furthermore implemented plans to replace the remaining dual language street signs with signs written solely in Hungarian, and to rename many streets after figures from Hungarian history rather than Serbian history.¹¹⁴ The language policy of Vojvodina's ethnic Hungarian population poorly serves the primary school students. Because they do not gain a solid foundation in Serbian, the students struggle to adapt to life in Serbia outside their ethnic community, where Serbian is the standard. The lack of a bilingual education hobbles ethnic Hungarian citizens of Serbia in their search for employment and advanced education in Serbia, and ultimately further widens the gap between the ethnicities.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Dubravka V. Nedeljković, "Education and Mass Media in the Languages of Ethnic Communities in Vojvodina," in *Language in the Former Yugoslav Lands*, ed. Ranko Bugarski and Celia Hawkesworth (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2004), 41–42.

¹¹³ A. Isakov, "Mađarski i hrvatski jezik kao izborni predmeti," *Politika*, November 12, 2008, <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Srbij/Madarski-i-hrvatski-jezik-kad-izborni-predmeti.lt.html> (accessed April 16, 2009).

¹¹⁴ J. Simić and J. Bekić, "Putuju da bi čuli Srpski," *Večernje Novosti*, November 9, 2008, http://www.novosti.rs/code/navigate.php?Id=1&status=jedna&vest=131848&title_add=Tenzije%20na%20severu%20Ba%20C4%8Dke&kword_add=vojvodina%20madjari&search=stara%20moravica (accessed January 16, 2010).

¹¹⁵ Jelena Filipovi et al., "Critical Review of Language Education Policies in Compulsory Primary and Secondary Education in Serbia," *Current Issues in Language Planning* 8, no. 2 (2007): 230.

Groups that promote the Serbian language for nationalistic purposes complicate matters in Vojvodina by insisting on the use of Serbian for official activities. The linguistic organization Ćirilica proposed in September 2008 that official communications in Vojvodina take place in the Serbian language using the Cyrillic alphabet, with allowance for translation into other languages and scripts as allowed by law.¹¹⁶ The primary target of the proposal, however, was the favored use of the Latin alphabet by ethnic Croats and some Serbs in Vojvodina.

In Kosovo, the only threat to Serbian is the dearth of people who wish to speak it. Since the UN assumed responsibility for Kosovo in 1999, and since Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008,¹¹⁷ many ethnic Serbs have left the territory and few have returned. Events in the 1990s leading to the present circumstances in Kosovo revealed that radical nationalistic Serbs sought to influence the political outcome in Kosovo based on its place in Serbia's medieval history. Serb nationalists revived accounts of the 1389 battle of Kosovo Polje, in which invading Turkish forces clashed with the Serbian armies and killed their leader, Prince Lazar. The Serbs eventually became subjects of the Ottoman Empire, and the battle has served as a symbol marking the beginning of over 500 years of Ottoman rule over Kosovo.¹¹⁸ For Serbs, Kosovo became a symbol of the kingdom that they had lost, and the battle represented the Serbs' sacrifices for their people and for Christianity as well as the beginning of repression at the hands of the Turks. Kosovo Albanians, a majority of whom are Muslim, came to be viewed as accomplices of the Turks.

Serbian authorities continue to refer to Kosovo by its older name "Kosovo and Metohija." Metohija was a region of Orthodox monastic estates in the southwest of Kosovo. Slobodan Milošević invoked the battle of Kosovo Polje in April 1987 when, as

¹¹⁶ "‘Ćirilica:’ Latinica u srpskom neustavna," *Radio-televizija Vojvodine*, September 26, 2008, http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/vojvodina/cirilica:-latinica-u-srpskom-neustavna_83799.html (accessed February 4, 2010).

¹¹⁷ The Republic of Kosova was first declared in December 1991, but this was never recognized by any established states. Richard Caplan, "International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo," *International Affairs* 74, no. 4 (October 1998): 748.

¹¹⁸ Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: a History of Kosovo* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 14.

chairman of Yugoslavia's Central Committee of the Communist Party, he addressed a prearranged gathering of Serbs in Kosovo. The speech and choreographed news coverage sparked nationalistic sentiments throughout Serbia.¹¹⁹ Patriotic Serbs also referenced the history of their language, and many books published in the 1990s manifested nationalistic rhetoric intended to inspire patriotism among the citizens of Serbia. *The Oldest Language of the Bible*, originally published in 1929, was brought forth again in a new edition.¹²⁰ It celebrates the old Church Slavic origins of the Serbian language.

Advocates of harkening to the past to find a direction for the Serbian language have continued their efforts. Serbia's leaders remain steadfast in their assertion that Kosovo is a province of Serbia. However, the drive to join the European Union and the continuing international presence in Kosovo preclude Serbia from launching another attempt to claim it by force.

C. LANGUAGE USE IN BOSNIA

East and West still collide in Bosnia, as they have throughout its turbulent history. Parts of Bosnia fell at different times under the control of Romans, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Croats, Serbs, and Ottomans.¹²¹ Once an example of multiculturalism and religious and ethnic harmony, after gaining independence in 1992 Bosnia fell victim to politically manufactured hatred and violence that drastically changed its political and demographic landscape.

Bosnian Serbs took exception to calls for Bosnian independence. They instead declared the independence of ethnic Serb-controlled areas which they called Republika Srpska, boycotted the vote on independence, and proceeded to violently consolidate

¹¹⁹ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: a History of Kosovo*, 228.

¹²⁰ Anđelija S. Spajićeva, *Najstariji jezik Biblije, ili, Jedan od najstarijih kulturnih naroda* (Belgrade, Serbia: Miroslav, 1994).

¹²¹ Robert J. Donia and Fine, John V.A. Jr., *Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 15.

ethnic Serb-controlled territories. To understand the Bosnian Serb point of view, Phillip Corwin, an American who served as a UN chief political officer in Bosnia, recommended the following thought experiment:

I am fond of asking my European and North American (Christian and Jewish) friends who are so emotionally pro-Bosnian: if tomorrow you were told, through no decision of your own, that you were no longer a citizen of your own country, but were now a member of a minority in a Moslem country that had never before been a country, [and] that had been a Nazi collaborator during World War II, what would you say? Without exception, they answer the equivalent of 'No way!'¹²²

The response of ethnic Serbs and ethnic Croats was the same. Bosnia descended into war between ethnic Serbs and Bosniaks, and between ethnic Croats and Bosniaks, until a peace agreement was brokered in Dayton.

The Dayton Accords also created a new state, incorporating in its constitution guarantees of equality and fairness for the main ethnic communities. The compromise that allowed the successful conclusion of the peace also enacted a *de facto* partition of Bosnia into two entities—the (Bosniak and ethnic Croat) Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the (ethnic Serb) Republika Srpska. FBiH was further divided into ten cantons, the majority of which contain a majority of one or the other ethnicity with little mixing of the Bosniak and ethnic Croat populations.

The presence of three main ethnic communities complicates the language situation in Bosnia, because each tries to assert its unique identity and to exercise authority over its own affairs. Bosnian Croats endeavor to associate themselves with Croatia, and Bosnian Serbs likewise look to Serbia. Moreover, the death of Yugoslavia brought also the death of Serbo-Croatian, leaving Bosnia with no language of its own. While the ethnic Croats and ethnic Serbs of Bosnia insisted that they would speak the language of their own respective ethnicity, approximately half the population was left with no mother tongue. The solution was a Bosnian language.

¹²² Phillip Corwin, *Dubious Mandate* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 23. Corwin's argument that Bosnia had never been a country should be qualified because the Kingdom of Bosnia was independent from approximately 1180 until the Ottoman conquest in the 1390s (Malcolm, *Bosnia – A Short History*, 13–23).

During the Yugoslav years (1918–1991), language was not a concern in Bosnia. The Serbo-Croatian spoken in the Bosnian republic of Yugoslavia was not identical to that spoken in Belgrade or Zagreb. However, the minor differences in language proved irrelevant. Everyone could understand what he heard and read and paid little heed to dialect or variant. In the present environment of heightened awareness of cultural and ethnic identity, with the powerful impetus to emphasize the uniqueness of each culture, language use is no longer just about communication; it is about identity.

The desire of ethnic Serbs in Republika Srpska to emphasize their Serbness presents a dilemma. The *ekavian* variant of the *štokavian* dialect predominates in the eastern part of the former Yugoslavia, corresponding approximately to Serbia. In the west and throughout Bosnia, including Republika Srpska, the primary variant is *ijekavian*. In 1993, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić mandated that Bosnian Serbs use the *ekavian* variant in order to differentiate their language from that employed by Bosniaks and ethnic Croats.¹²³ Karadžić found this politically expedient because Serbs in Serbia proper spoke *ekavian* while Bosnian Serbs mostly spoke the same *ijekavian* as everyone else in Bosnia. The push for Bosnian Serbs to speak and write like their ethnic cousins in Serbia continues, with all products and publications from the Republika Srpska government prepared in the *ekavian* variant using the Cyrillic alphabet. Serbia has assisted Republika Srpska by sending linguists to universities in Bosnia to develop Serbian language curricula.¹²⁴

Bosnian Croats face a challenge similar to that of Bosnian Serbs. The best employers and the best schools in Croatia take into account how well the applicant's language conforms to the standards of "pure" Croatian. The effects of these concerns appear starkly in the formerly multiethnic city of Mostar. Previously a shining example of ethnic and religious acceptance, Mostar was home to a rather heterogeneous

¹²³ Greenburg, "Language Politics in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," 637.

¹²⁴ Robert D. Greenberg, "Dialects, Migrations, and Ethnic Rivalries: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Journal of Slavic Linguistics* 17 (2009): 201.

population of ethnic Croats, Muslims¹²⁵ and ethnic Serbs, with no ethnicity constituting a majority.¹²⁶ Mostar's population underwent a tremendous shift when, in late 1992, the ethnic Croat forces that had been cooperating with Bosniak forces in fighting Republika Srpska turned against their ally and began attacking Bosniaks.¹²⁷ Bosnian Croats also attempted to form their own autonomous region, Herceg Bosna.

After the war ended, Bosnian Croats continued their efforts to drive away Bosniaks from areas with a Croat majority, particularly Mostar.¹²⁸ The lingering effects of the war and its aftermath resulted in the subsequent segregation of the Bosniak and ethnic Croat populations of Mostar in every respect, including the education system. When it was safe to return to school, students did not necessarily return to their previous school, but to the school on "their" side of the Neretva River that flows through the city. Students therefore attend schools segregated by ethnicity. This arrangement allowed instruction in the language and curricula preferred by each ethnic group, further entrenching each ethnicity in its own communities and practices.

International organizations working to repair the damage inflicted on Bosnia recognized that separate schools would only perpetuate ethnic divisions. Hence, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) pursued education reforms, and the possibility of future accession to the European Union was associated with progress toward meeting EU standards.¹²⁹ The standards called for integration of school systems in localities where Bosniaks and ethnic Croats attended different schools. However, in localities where schools did combine at the OSCE's urging, as in Mostar, the

¹²⁵ The term Muslim refers to the Muslim Slav population of Bosnia as identified as an ethnicity during the Yugoslav period. Since independence that ethnic group is commonly identified as Bosniak.

¹²⁶ Sumatra Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 100.

¹²⁷ Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia – A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 252–6.

¹²⁸ International Crisis Group, *Bosnia: A Test of Political Maturity in Mostar* (Sarajevo/Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 27, 2009), 3.

¹²⁹ Azra Hromadžić, "Discourses of Integration and Practices of Reunification at the Mostar Gymnasium, Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Comparative Education Review* 52, no. 4 (2008): 544.

students remained divided within the school, each ethnic group adhering to separate curricula and receiving instruction in its “own” language.¹³⁰

Just as political leaders manufactured the conditions for ethnic segregation, teachers, administrators, and parents perpetuate the ethnic division of students in Mostar. Ethnic Croats appear to support this segregation more than Bosniaks. In interviews with researcher Azra Hromadžić, some Bosnian Croat students revealed a lack of concern regarding ethnicity reminiscent of the attitude prevalent before the 1992–1995 civil war.¹³¹ On the other hand, many ethnic Croat students readily accepted segregation from Bosniaks, but chiefly for practical reasons. Association with Bosniaks might lead to corruptive language habits and thereby jeopardize an ethnic Croat’s chance to gain acceptance at a university in Croatia.¹³²

Bosniaks, meanwhile, express an openness to conciliation and a desire to integrate and cooperate. However, Bosniak students acknowledged ulterior motives. In their view, Bosniak teachers intend to gain what advantage they can from integration with no intention of achieving reconciliation.¹³³ This attitude reflects the perception common among Bosniaks that ethnic Croats have generally fared better despite having initiated the 1993 conflict between these ethnic groups.¹³⁴ The ethnic tensions do not promote political reconciliation or cooperation in the realm of language.

Does the Bosnian language really even exist? The debate on the existence of a distinct Bosnian language predictably finds supporters among ethnic Bosniaks and detractors among Croat and Serb commentators. Croat and Serb linguists prefer to identify the language of Bosniaks (not of Bosnia) as Bošnjачki (Bosniak), which

¹³⁰ Aida Cerkez-Robinson, “Bosnia’s ethnic divisions are evident in schools,” *Associated Press*, August 22, 2009, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=8389967> (accessed January 20, 2009).

¹³¹ Hromadžić, “Discourses of Integration and Practices of Reunification at the Mostar Gymnasium, Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 548–5, 552.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 557–8.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 552.

¹³⁴ International Crisis Group, *Bosnia: A Test of Political Maturity in Mostar* (Sarajevo/Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 27, 2009), 8.

associates the language with the Bosniak people, just as Croats speak Croatian and Serbs speak Serbian. Croatian linguist Daibor Brozović has opined that, even though Croats might recognize the language as Bosniak, it is the right of the people to call their language what they wish.¹³⁵ Serb linguist Vladislav Sotirović postulated that the mere announcement of a Bosnian language does not make it so.¹³⁶ Another Serb linguist, Branislav Brborić of the Center for Applied Linguistics in Belgrade, did not even deign to call Bošnjčki a language, but declared it only an idiom of the Serbian language.¹³⁷

Politics aside, Bosnia does have a literary tradition separate from Croatian and Serbian, even if not as old or as well developed. Muslim Slavs followed Turkish culture during the long Ottoman rule over Bosnia. Turkish, Arabic, Persian and Slavic were spoken in different settings. A unique Cyrillic alphabet, Bosančica, came into use by Bosnians regardless of religious affiliation.¹³⁸ In 1890, the Austro-Hungarian administration sanctioned a Bosnian grammar text with the intention of promoting Bosnian solidarity at the expense of Serbian nationalism.¹³⁹ However, Serbo-Croatian was still commonly accepted as the language standard of Bosnia. Neither the 1850 Literary Agreement nor the 1954 Novi Sad Agreement addressed a language for Bosnia other than the joint Serbo-Croatian language.

Senahid Halilović published an orthography of the Bosnian language in 1996, announcing the existence of a Bosnian language that differed sufficiently from Croatian and Serbian to warrant its own designation.¹⁴⁰ In 1998, Bosnia's Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sport sponsored a conference in Bihać along with Bosnia's Institute for Language and Literature to discuss the status and future of language in Bosnia. This

¹³⁵ Dalibor Brozović, "Odnos hrvatskoga i bosanskoga odnosno bošnjčkog jezika," *Jezik* 47, no. 1 (1999): 13.

¹³⁶ Vladislav B. Sotirović, *Социолингвистички Аспект Распада Југославије и Српско Национално Питање* (Vilnius: Vilnius University Press, 2006), 113.

¹³⁷ Branislav Brborić, *S jezika na jezik* (Belgrade: Centar za primenjenu lingvistiku, 2001), 334.

¹³⁸ Svein Monnesland, "Is There a Bosnian Language?" in *Language in the Former Yugoslav Lands*, ed. Ranko Bugarski and Celia Hawkesworth (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2004), 129.

¹³⁹ Greenberg, *Language and Identity in the Balkans: Serbo-Croatian and its Disintegration*, 137.

¹⁴⁰ Senahid Halilović, *Pravopis bosanskoga jezika* (Sarajevo: Preporod, 1996), 2.

meeting represented the first concerted effort to discuss the status and distinctions of a Bosnian language. The meeting exhibited a nationalistic tone, with arguments presented on the case for a language of the people of Bosnia, and for active language planning to differentiate the language of Bosnia from that of Croatia and Serbia.¹⁴¹

In the absence of language planning purposefully designed to maximize the differences among the languages, the joint Serbo-Croatian standard would remain and serve as a possible bridge to heal the wounds inflicted in the wars of Yugoslav secession. Even with the efforts to differentiate each language, analysts have determined that the distinctions are largely superficial and serve only to identify association with an ethnic community.¹⁴²

Bosniaks will continue to argue for the legitimacy and distinctiveness of the Bosnian language. The recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the international community lends the language legitimacy. Even outside Bosnia, the OSCE facilitates education in Bosnian for the Bosniak minority in Kosovo, where most education is delivered in Albanian.¹⁴³ But the language debate in Bosnia reflects greater challenges. It serves as one more field of competition between the ethnic factions.

The consequences of linguistic nationalism affect Bosnia more than Croatia and Serbia because of the still heterogeneous population in Bosnia. Clinging to vestiges of national identity and promulgating them through education and fractured governmental organizations only exacerbate the politics of division in Bosnia, making reconciliation and progress toward meaningful reform practically unobtainable. The implications for Bosnia's future unity are ominous.

¹⁴¹ Curtis Ford, "Language Planning in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The 1998 Bihac Symposium," *The Slavic and East European Journal* 46, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 352–3.

¹⁴² Greenberg, "Dialects, Migrations and Ethnic Rivalries," 195.

¹⁴³ Hasan Sopa et.al., "OSCE Kosovo Mission helps sustain Bosnian-language education," *OSCE Mission in Kosovo*, June 18, 2009, <http://www.osce.org/item/38222.html> (accessed January 19, 2010).

IV. CONCLUSION

“A language is a dialect with a navy and an army.”¹⁴⁴

Nationalism remains a potent force in the Balkans today, though not as virulent as witnessed in the 1990s. The nationalism that brought about the union of Southern Slavs in Yugoslavia was checked, but not halted, by that union. Yugoslavia’s advocates hoped their interests would be better addressed when the Slavic ethnicities banded together. However, traces of ethnic nationalism survived in Yugoslavia despite the efforts of each of Yugoslavia’s leaders to suppress it. The forces that brought Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and the other ethnicities of Yugoslavia together overcame nationalistic tendencies, but latent nationalism remained sufficiently potent over the 73 years of Yugoslavia’s existence to eventually wreak havoc on that state when stoked and manipulated by opportunistic leaders.¹⁴⁵ The momentum gained by nationalism did not abate after Yugoslavia dissolved, but gained legitimacy in the eyes of each ethnicity and justified the further pursuit of self-serving goals.

The prestige associated with a national language follows naturally from efforts to assert a national identity. As an instrument in the politics of identity, language gained a prominent role in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia. Each new Balkan state used language in a similar manner in promoting nationalistic aims. The freedom of expression afforded by independence in Croatia provided the opportunity to pursue all things distinctly Croatian, including the “cleansing” of the national language to purge non-Croatian influences. In Serbia, abandonment of the joint language permitted language-conscious groups to promote a return to Serbia’s historical roots, particularly emphasizing the Cyrillic alphabet. The Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina also took advantage of the new state’s independence and declared that it had its own language.

¹⁴⁴ Max Weinreich, “The YIVO Faces the Post-War World,” *YIVO-Bleter* 25, no. 1 (January–February 1945), 13. Cited in Victoria Fromkin et. al., *An Introduction to Language* (Boston: Heinle, 2003), 445. YIVO is an acronym for the Yidisher Visnshaftlekher Institut, or Yiddish Scientific Institute. The *YIVO-bleter* is its Yiddish-language scholarly journal.

¹⁴⁵ Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe*, vii.

That the different ethnic groups of the former Yugoslavia would manipulate language to serve their purposes comes as no surprise. After past efforts to repress nationalism had little effect, Tito instead worked toward establishing a degree of autonomy for each ethnicity; and this opened the door to increased nationalism. The failure of the Yugoslav state ended any remaining suppression of national character and therefore provided the opportunity for each group to assert its identity. Because language can serve as a component of national identity, the symbolism of language took priority and communication became ancillary.¹⁴⁶

The converse principle, that language can also identify the “others,” is equally true. In the states that emerged from Yugoslavia, distinguishing one ethnic group from the “others” appears to have been a prime motivator for much of the manipulation of language since 1990. Asserting the national language in Croatia underlined the distinction between Croats and resident ethnic Serbs. In Bosnia, a physical separation of the ethnicities resulted from the use of force. Bosnian Serbs implemented changes in language to further separate themselves from Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, while Bosnian Croats sought to follow Croatia’s lead. Bosniaks found themselves the odd group out with no language to call their own until they declared that Bosnian was a distinct language in its own right. Each group determined that its identity, which had been weakened by fighting and in some cases by large population shifts, required strengthening. Language manipulation served as a means to build a strong national identity, because language was one area in which each group could exercise control.

The process of language planning continues in each state. Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian share many characteristics from over a century of intermingling and efforts to bring the languages closer together. (This assumes that the Vienna Literary Agreement of 1850 is a reasonable starting point for such efforts.) Language activists can point to linguistic standards and reference materials that predate the joint Serbo-Croatian language to explain present-day changes. Each language community seeks to depart

¹⁴⁶ Josip Baotić, “The Language Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in *Language in the Former Yugoslav Lands*, ed. Ranko Bugarski and Celia Hawkesworth (Bloomington: Slavica, 2004), 117.

from the joint standard and to return to the point at which language integration efforts began with the 1850 Vienna Literary Agreement.

Disagreements or miscommunications due to language clearly did not lead to the violence that dismembered Yugoslavia and rent Bosnia three ways. To the contrary, in Bosnia, where the violence was greatest and the devastation most widespread, the inhabitants spoke in the most identical terms. Language nevertheless played a significant role in Yugoslavia's demise. Politically motivated actors exaggerated minor differences and emphasized the nationalistic value of language and culture.¹⁴⁷ The role of nationalistic politics in language manipulation becomes clear through observing general political trends in each state. The nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ) party pursued linguistic purity, but once a coalition led by the less nationalist Social Democrat-led party formed a new government in 2000, previously suppressed opposition to "purifying" the Croatian language moderated the politicization of language. Likewise, the choice to use Cyrillic in Republika Srpska was mandated by Bosnian Serb leaders and not the result of an outpouring of Serb patriotism from the populace.

Ongoing efforts to establish the autonomy and distinctiveness of the Bosnian language will include the publication of grammar textbooks and dictionaries to document language standards. The process of compiling these works will confirm that Bosnian is quite similar to Croatian and Serbian. However, this similarity need not complicate relations between Bosnia's dominant ethnic groups. Instead, it may foster an environment in which similarities and differences can be openly and amiably discussed for the purpose of understanding and enhanced cooperation.¹⁴⁸

Amidst the struggle to establish national identity, Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia must also fulfill the functions of a state. As relatively small states, to successfully provide traditional state services they must overcome any remaining animosity for one another

¹⁴⁷ Burgarski, "Language and Boundaries in the Yugoslav Context," 30.

¹⁴⁸ Josip Baotić, "The Language Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina," in *Language in the Former Yugoslav Lands*, ed. Ranko Bugarski and Celia Hawkesworth (Bloomington: Slavica, 2004), 125.

and cooperate to resolve pressing problems. The united Yugoslavia was never an economic powerhouse; and the economy of each successor state has suffered the debilitating effects of war, the ongoing transition to privatization, and in 2009 the pressures of a global economic downturn. The republics traded extensively within Yugoslavia, and as independent states they have demonstrated a recognition of the need to foster productive trade relations.¹⁴⁹ However, protectionism prompted by a flagging economy in 2009 has particularly hurt these still recovering states that rely on Europe's otherwise accommodating trade policies.¹⁵⁰

Organized crime and corruption have attained practically legendary levels in the Balkans and will require considerable cooperation to defeat. Corruption has replaced nationalism as the major campaign issue in Croatia, and has dominated the debates leading up to the 2009 presidential elections.¹⁵¹ International trafficking of weapons, narcotics, and human beings have long given the Balkans a bad reputation. This has resulted in stricter entry requirements for travel throughout Europe from some locations in the Balkans.¹⁵² These factors combined make the former Yugoslav states much less attractive to foreign investors, further impeding economic recovery and development.¹⁵³

Residual disputes among the successor states of the former Yugoslavia also inhibit reconciliation and rehabilitation. Croatia applied for accession to the EU in 2003 and was accepted as a candidate state in 2004. However, a border dispute with neighboring Slovenia, already an EU member, has threatened Croatia's bid to join the EU. Croatian president Ivo Josipović, elected in January 2010, is expected to work

¹⁴⁹ "Former Yugoslavia patches itself together: Entering the Yugosphere," *Economist* 392, no. 8645 (August 22, 2009): 45.

¹⁵⁰ Nelson D. Schwartz, "The European Single Market Shows Its Seams," *New York Times*, April 2, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/02/business/global/02eurotrade.html> (accessed January 28, 2010).

¹⁵¹ Neil MacDonald, "Corruption fight is focus of Croatia polls," *Financial Times*, December 28, 2009, 3.

¹⁵² "Balkan states' travel to EU eased," *BBC News*, December 19, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8420513.stm> (accessed January 28, 2010).

¹⁵³ Dan Bilefsky, "War's Lingering Scars Slow Bosnia's Economic Growth," *New York Times*, February 8, 2008, A12.

toward EU membership for Croatia, a goal which reflects the sentiments of the current government. The Croatian parliament recently approved an agreement to submit the border dispute with Slovenia to international arbitration. This agreement probably reflects a Croatian decision to yield to pressure from Slovenia in hopes of winning EU membership.¹⁵⁴

The status of Kosovo remains a continuing grievance in Serbia. Kosovo became a de facto UN “protectorate” after NATO forces helped bring an end to the fighting between Serb forces and the separatist ethnic Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army in June 1999. Under the protection of the UN and NATO, Kosovo was able to create a government and in February 2008 declared independence from Serbia. Serbia insists, however, that the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which established the interim UN administration in Kosovo, also guarantee Serbia’s territorial integrity, and that Kosovo’s declaration of independence therefore violates international law. Serbia’s current liberal, Harvard-educated Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić set the matter in context when he declared that Kosovo is Serbia’s Jerusalem and that Serbia is not prepared to let it go.¹⁵⁵ At Belgrade’s urging, the International Court of Justice agreed in December 2009 to provide an advisory opinion regarding Kosovo’s 2008 unilateral declaration of independence.¹⁵⁶

Bosnia remains the most troubled of the three states. The Dayton Accords enacted a de facto partition of Bosnia, recognizing (and thereby legitimizing) the Republika Srpska and also creating the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). Along with substantial autonomy for each ethnicity, the provisions of the Dayton Accords ultimately permitted the main factions to get entrenched in their respective geographic regions. The constitutional division of power between the federal

¹⁵⁴ “Croatia: Border deal with Slovenia is Ratified,” *New York Times*, November 21, 2009, A6.

¹⁵⁵ Nicholas Kulish, “Recasting Serbia’s Image, Starting With a Fresh Face,” *New York Times*, January 15, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/world/europe/16jeremic.html> (accessed January 28, 2010).

¹⁵⁶ International Court of Justice, “Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion),” The Hague, Netherlands, November 23, 2009, <http://www.icjci.org/docket/files/141/15599.pdf> (accessed January 16, 2010).

government and each entity in Bosnia was intended to provide for equal representation. It also created a large and cumbersome bureaucracy. Bosnia's federal government consists of the three members of the presidency and their staffs, 57 legislators, and 10 ministers—all for a country of about 4.6 million people. In addition, each entity has its own government and bureaucracy. The large number of high-level government positions represents a significant drain on Bosnia's already heavily burdened economy.

Republika Srpska generally uses its latitude in conducting its own affairs to hinder efforts to consolidate power at the state level. Prime Minister Milorad Dodik has been particularly vocal about asserting Republika Srpska's sovereignty while simultaneously hindering the operation of Bosnia's federal institutions.¹⁵⁷ In October 2009, the United States and the European Union recommended reforms to Bosnia's constitution to strengthen the central government. In a protest against international intervention, Republika Srpska Prime Minister Dodik denounced the proposed constitutional reforms and withdrew from constitutional reform discussions, asserting that they favor FBiH at the expense of the Serb entity.¹⁵⁸ Prime Minister Milorad Dodik's handling of the matter clearly communicated the message that at least one Bosnian leader increasingly views international intervention in Bosnian politics as more of a burden than a benefit.¹⁵⁹ Instead of fostering an environment of cooperation and stability as intended, Bosnia's constitution has served to make Bosnia dependent on external intervention for the continued peaceful coexistence of the three factions.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ James Lyon, "Halting the Downward Spiral," *New York Times*, December 4, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/opinion/24iht-edlyon.1.20395827.html> (accessed January 28, 2010).

¹⁵⁸ Olja Stanić, "Bosnia Serb Leader Says Has Quit EU, U.S. Talks," *Reuters*, October 30, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE59T2MB20091030> (accessed January 28, 2010).

¹⁵⁹ Gordan Milošević, "Bosnian Serb Reform Effort Scuttled," *Reuters*, October 30, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUS247171+30-Oct-2009+PRN20091030> (accessed January 28, 2010).

¹⁶⁰ Janusz Bugajski, "Balkan in Dependence?" *The Washington Quarterly* 23:4 (Autumn 2000), 177–192.

The future of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia appears to reside in more integral association with the European Union and the broader Euro–Atlantic community through NATO. The new Balkan states became intimately familiar with NATO when the military forces of its members engaged in various peacemaking and peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia through the 1990s. NATO and EU forces remain in Kosovo today, and NATO and EU forces have conducted missions in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and are currently operating in Bosnia. These states now seek to join the same organizations that have at some times conducted military operations on their soil. Croatia joined NATO in 2009, while Bosnia and Serbia are both members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Croatia and Serbia have both applied for EU membership. Although this turn of events may seem ironic, the EU and NATO were created in part to prevent the very problems that precipitated NATO and EU intervention in the Balkans. Bringing these states into the fold, it is presumed, will foster better relations and prevent future conflict.

Regardless of increased integration with European and Euro–Atlantic institutions, Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia will still face domestic political questions concerning language. In Bosnia, questions about language have the potential to contribute to further disruption of progress toward economic and political reform, and in Croatia and Serbia language politics may alienate the minority language speakers of their populations and engender internal instability. Sentiments such as those expressed in this comment in a Croatian linguistics journal serve only to perpetuate language politics:

Whose concern is it to nurture and love the Croatian language, to deepen their knowledge of it, to prepare (and continue preparing) it so that it can respond to new challenges and survive in the linguistic mosaic of Europe and the world? Whose responsibility is it? I will answer: this concern is in some fashion for all institutions and individuals, all who have a mind and a heart.¹⁶¹

¹⁶¹ Mile Mamić, “Hrvatski se jezik voli znajem i srcem,” *Jezik* 56, no. 3 (June 2009): 101, translated by author.

Language concerns contributed to the destabilization of Yugoslavia, and they have the potential to foment discord in the future. Where Serbo-Croatian once served to bring people together, the manipulation of language by elites has brought it into use as a weapon. Current debates about language in Kosovo and contested regions of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia also threaten to strain tense relations in each territory. The experiences with language in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia may provide models to use as indicators for identifying possible instability in other ethnically divided regions.

APPENDIX

This appendix contains the Glagolitic alphabet along with the Serbian and Croatian alphabets which are currently in use in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. The Serbian and Croatian alphabets are presented in their respective orders.

Ɱ Ɱ	Ɑ Ɑ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ
az'	buky	vede	glagolji	dobro	jest'	zhivete	dzelo	zemlja
a	b	v	g	d	e	zh	dz	z
[ɑ]	[b]	[v]	[g]	[d]	[ɛ]	[ʒ]	[dz]	[z]
Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ
izhe	izhe	i	djerv'	kako	ljudije	mislete	nash'	on'
i	i	i	dzh	k	l	m	n	o
[i, j]	[i, j]	[i, j]	[dʒ]	[k]	[l]	[m]	[n, ɲ]	[ɔ]
Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ
pokoji	rtsi	slovo	tvrdo	uk'	fit'	kher'	oht'	pe
p	r	s	t	u	f	kh	o	p
[p]	[r]	[s]	[t]	[u]	[f]	[x]	[ɔ]	[p]
Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ
shta	tsi	chrv'	sha	jer'	jery	jerj'	jat'	
sht	ts	ch	sh	j	ji	j	ja	
[ʃt]	[ts]	[tʃ]	[ʃ]	[w]	[j]	[ɛ]	[æ, ja]	
Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	Ɱ Ɱ	
ye	yu	ens'	yens'	ons'	yons'	thita	izhitsa	
je	ju	ě	jě	ǫ	jǫ	th	ü	
[jɛ]	[ju]	[ě]	[jě]	[ǫ]	[jǫ]	[θ]	[ʏ, ɪ]	

Figure 3. Glagolitic alphabet¹⁶²

¹⁶² Simon Ager, "Glagolitic alphabet," *Omniglot*, <http://www.omniglot.com/writing/glagolitic.htm> (accessed February 12, 2010).

Serbian Alphabet Српска Азбука		Croatian Alphabet Hrvatska Abeceda	
А	Н	А	Л
Б	Њ	В	Љ
В	О	С	М
Г	П	Ї	Н
Д	Р	Џ	Њ
Ђ	С	Д	О
Е	Т	Џ	Р
Ж	Ћ	Ђ	Р
З	У	Е	С
И	Ф	Ф	Ѓ
Ј	Х	Г	Т
К	Ц	Н	У
Л	Ч	И	В
Љ	џ	Ј	З
М	Ш	К	Џ

Figure 4. Serbian and Croatian alphabets

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