FOREIGN POLICE DEVELOPMENT: THE THIRD TIME’S THE CHARM

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One of the most important aspects of governmental development or reform in a counter-insurgency (COIN) environment is the growth and sustainment of the police force charged with maintaining law and order. However, despite billions of dollars and a huge United States Government (USG) effort, significant challenges remain in both Iraq and Afghanistan with respect to police organization and development. The majority of the problems in those two countries are the result of early USG mistakes in the police development process, which included: 1) not properly defining an organizational end state for either police organization, and 2) expanding both organizations so quickly that the growth outpaced institutional development. Consequences of this unbalanced approach, which have grown exponentially over time, were that the USG wasted resources and the developing police forces institutionalized bad business practices. In an attempt to prevent the same mistakes from occurring again, this paper reveals what went wrong with police development missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.
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ABSTRACT

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One of the most important aspects of governmental development or reform in a counter insurgency (COIN) environment is the growth and sustainment of the police force charged with maintaining law and order. However, despite billions of dollars and a huge United States Government (USG) effort, significant challenges remain in both Iraq and Afghanistan with respect to police organization and development. The majority of the problems in those two countries are the result of early USG mistakes in the police development process, which included: 1) not properly defining an organizational end state for either police organization, and 2) expanding both organizations so quickly that the growth outpaced institutional development. Consequences of this unbalanced approach, which have grown exponentially over time, were that the USG wasted resources and the developing police forces institutionalized bad business practices. In an attempt to prevent the same mistakes from occurring again, this paper reveals what went wrong with police development missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.
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Failed states and unstable governments, combined with religious and ethnic extremism, are the incubators for Irregular Warfare (IW), which is occurring more frequently throughout the world. Insurgency intermixed with terrorism and other traditional and unconventional warfare combinations (hybrid wars), like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, are at the heart of IW. The United States Government (USG) will be involved in this type of complex counterinsurgency (COIN) for the foreseeable future. If there is consensus that security is an essential element of any COIN strategy and that some form of professional policing is essential to security, how did police development in Afghanistan and Iraq stray so completely off-course? The answer, which is no surprising revelation, is that the USG rushed police development in both countries in an uncoordinated and impromptu manner with respect to planning, structure and end state. This rushed development resulted in wasted resources and effort. In Afghanistan and Iraq, each Ministry of Interior (MOI) expanded at a frantic pace from what should have been traditional roles of supervising police to assisting with stabilization of their respective countries, each of which were in the midst of an insurgency. The rapid growth forced each MOI to manage forces, equipment, and missions far beyond what they could hope to control. That, coupled with a large turnover inside each MOI, added to the difficulty of achieving a balance as each force grew. As witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq, when the USG conducts police development in this manner during COIN, it encourages corruption, apathy, poor leadership and counter-productive business practices. In the short-term, the process undermines public support for the government when citizens view the police, arguably the most visible representation of a fledgling
government, as dishonest and incompetent. Over the long-term – in this case more than eight years in Afghanistan and six years in Iraq – negative habits that form due to rapid and unbalanced development become institutionalized, which makes future course correction more difficult.

Because of the USG’s failings, “tipping points” occurred when the problems associated with Afghan and Iraqi police development grew so exponentially that they became almost debilitating.4 Like ripples in a pond, in which little changes have large consequences over time, the cumulative effect of early USG mistakes will take years to correct while unnecessarily robbing each emerging police force and government of critical organizational energy.5 Specifically, the USG made two fundamental errors early in the process when it failed to: 1) design a coherent structure or organizational blueprint from which to build upon, and 2) sacrificed quality for quantity and speed. The four-fold purpose of this paper is to explore: 1) the context of the errors, 2) the impact of the errors, 3) the reasons for the errors, and 4) solutions to preclude similar errors in the future. With insight into those four areas, this paper seeks to advance the strategic theory that the goal of foreign police development (a self-sustaining and functional police force) is achieved more rapidly and more efficiently when the creation and subsequent development is slow and deliberate, as opposed to hasty and disorganized, which requires large course corrections during the process. In essence, this paper argues that “slow is smooth and smooth is fast” or, when considering the antonym for police development during COIN, “fast is sloppy and sloppy wastes time, energy and billions of dollars.” This is important because the USG, with an ever-increasing number of complex international problems to resolve and with ever-shrinking resource pools,
has no choice, but to do better the next time. Hurriedly “throwing together” a police force in the next failed or failing state and placing the burden on the budding government to fix the mistakes will not be a viable option.

The Context of the Errors

With respect to Iraq, in May 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) dissolved former security organizations and began anew with the establishment of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In this respect, ISF included both Ministry of Defense (MOD) and MOI forces. In general, U.S. military units assumed the responsibility for recruiting and training MOD forces whereas the CPA worked with the Department of State (DOS) to train MOI forces with emphasis on the Iraqi Police Service (IPS). With respect to the MOI forces, the USG incorporated many of the same pre-war personnel into the hastily reorganized IPS. As a result, the brief and ad hoc IPS training courses provided by the USG did little to change the fundamental culture of the police. Consequently, the IPS initially failed to make any significant contribution to the COIN mission. In February 2004, the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) attempted to transfer responsibilities to ISF, which at that pointed included about 76,000 IPS. However, despite the USG’s expenditure of billions of dollars to train and equip ISF, MOI forces performed poorly during the escalation of insurgent attacks in April 2004. In some cases, ISF fought well alongside Coalition units. However, in many instances IPS units simply collapsed with a few even assisting the insurgents. In June 2004, the CPA transferred power to the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) when the CPA officially dissolved. At that point, the USG lost much of its influence to reform at the same time that the IIG lacked the capacity to reform, resulting in wasted organizational energy for both groups. From the USG’s perspective, the plan was to develop ISF as quickly as possible (a means to an end) to
facilitate a U.S. force reduction and subsequent withdrawal from Iraq. This short-term focus on ISF development hindered the development of a self-sufficient IPS and the rapid growth created unrealistic expectations for the MOI.¹⁰

Regarding Afghanistan, a near 30-year history of civil war, dictatorship, and regime change shattered any chance of an effective centralized legal system long before the USG’s 2001 invasion. The resulting chaos left a confusing patchwork of conflicting and overlapping laws influenced by Islam, tribal law, Marxism, fragmentary western legal principles, and different interpretations by those in power of all the above.¹¹ Given the complexity of the environment, the USG simply did not accomplish its goal of building a competent and legitimate Afghan National Police (ANP) during the early stages of the COIN. Four years after the initial invasion, the ANP force was corrupt, incompetent, and under-resourced. Additionally, in most cases, ANP were still more loyal to local commanders than to the MOI or central government. Similar to IPS in Iraq, ANP was low priority and received little attention in the early stages.¹² In 2005 and 2006, the USG made significant changes to the police-training program, investing more than $6.2 billion in the MOI and ANP in an attempt to overhaul organizational structures, leadership abilities, and pay systems.¹³ With respect to the structure, USG and Coalition partners assisted the Afghan government in developing an organizational document (the Tashkil) for both the MOI and ANP. However, the Afghan government did not adopt the document until November 2005 after substantial and uncoordinated growth had already occurred. At that point, a committee composed of members from the Afghan MOI, the German Police Program Office, and Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) managed the Tashkil, which required committee recommendation and MOI approval to change.¹⁴
As late as 2007, both DOS and Department of Defense (DOD) personnel concluded that the MOI suffered from corruption, low institutional capacity and limited control over provincial police structures. Additionally they found that the MOI lacked: 1) a clear organizational structure, 2) basic management functions, 3) a clearly defined mission, 4) a strategy for policing, and 5) a culture of accountability and transparency. Those conditions, the two agencies concluded, contributed to pervasive violations of the MOI’s chain of command in ANP districts and provincial commands, which weakened the MOI’s ability to command and control. The Coalition will amplify this problem with its 2010 announcement to add 20,000 additional ANP by October 2011.

The Impact of the Errors

The list of second and third order effects resulting from the USG’s failings is large. The not all-inclusive list of problems below represents the most detrimental and shares two characteristics: First, correction of each problem either has or will require a large expenditure of USG or host nation energy. Second, each problem represents an obvious characteristic of any paramilitary organization that the USG should have considered during the developmental process without fear that they were forcing “Western” policing models upon either country.

The first problem involved lack of a vetting process and employee accountability. As Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2 correctly identifies, there are four common cultural challenges that often complicate designing a correctly functioning police structure: nepotism, denial of negative results or errors, corruption, and influence from competing loyalties (ethnic, religious, tribal, or political). Given the history and cultural peculiarities of both Afghanistan and Iraq, the effects of not considering these challenges were significant. The lack of a vetting process meant that large numbers of
both IPS and ANP chosen to serve were of questionable character. The lack of a personnel accountability system meant that the USG did not track incoming recruits from training to final assignment. “Phantom” police, or those personnel retained on the payroll after they had left the force or died, significantly contributed to the lack of accountability in both countries. This resulted in both the ANP and IPS possessing more personnel on the rolls than actually served. Dishonest police commanders often retained the “extra” pay that the “phantom” police accrued. In Iraq alone, an MOI investigation discovered that between 15 and 20% of names on the police payroll at that time were no longer active-duty officers, which resulted in the purging of more than 11,000 names from the rolls.\textsuperscript{17}

In Iraq, the USG instituted wildly ambitious and unrealistic hiring programs in the fall of 2003, such as “30,000 in 30 days” and “60,000 in 60 days.” In these two instances, the USG ordered military commanders to hire 30,000 and 60,000 IPS in 30 and 60 days, respectively, which they did with the utmost of zeal. Though this approach resolved the short-term problem of getting unemployed Iraqis to work, it was the beginning of the end of any coherent plan to carefully and deliberately assemble the IPS. The unintended second and third order effects of this hiring technique were numerous, but two stand out from the rest. First, the masshirings strained relations between the provinces and the central government because no one knew who the new hires were or how they were to receive their pay. Second, it exacerbated the problem of an inadequate training system, which could barely handle the existing police, much less thousands of new officers.\textsuperscript{18} In early 2005, DOS reported they had trained and equipped about 82,000 IPS. However, DOS later qualified that statement by adding that the
82,000 was an estimate because subordinate police leaders around the country had not accurately and consistently reported the personnel strength to the MOI. Additionally, DOS explained that the 82,000 total did not exclude those police officers who the MOI considered absent from duty. Additionally, this process did not reflect the extent to which the 82,000 were equipped with required weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and body armor.¹⁹ The immediate impact of the large-scale hiring plan, which omitted a fundamental vetting process, came to light in 2006. In the spring, MOI investigators conducted background checks, which exposed that more than 5,000 IPS recruits with criminal histories, some of which included attacking American troops. Not surprisingly, a 2006 internal police survey conducted northeast of Baghdad reflected that 75% of respondents did not trust the police enough to tip them off to insurgent activity.²⁰

Similarly, DOS and MOI in Afghanistan attempted to validate the status of more than 103,000 applicants for police identification cards by positively identifying all the ANP and developing a computerized police database to validate salaries. Because ANP regional commanders would not respond to requests to confirm police officers in their areas, DOS established joint contractor/MOI validation teams to execute the mission. As of November 2008, nearly 47,000 MOI and ANP personnel received ID cards after validation teams confirmed the applicants had not retired, died, or otherwise left the MOI or ANP. The validation teams also determined that another 26,700 applicants had retired, died, or had otherwise left the MOI or ANP, including an estimated 14,200 to whom the MOI issued identification cards to before they retired, died, or left the ANP.²¹
The second problem concerned rank imbalances that affected promotions, chain of command, and the budget process in both countries. While the USG has accomplished a large amount of work with the ANP and IPS, they must continue to provide additional resources to sustain each institution on a long-term basis.

In Iraq, this problem manifested itself as a critical shortage of competent IPS non-commissioned officers (NCO) and mid-level officers. Because the USG’s training effort focused on generating street level policemen and the time it takes to grow professional NCOs and officers, there were inadequate numbers of junior leaders entering the ranks. The lack of mid-level supervisors adversely affected command and control, morale, retention, and ethical conduct. Compounding the problem was the fact that the MOI had to compete with the MOD for the same pool of recruits, severely undermining the effectiveness of MOI incentive programs.22

In Afghanistan, rank equals status, which resulted in early development of a reverse pyramid organizational structure of the ANP. In response, the USG reduced the ANP officer corps from about 17,800 to approximately 9,000. At the same time, the USG pushed the MOI to reorganize their headquarters by reducing a large number of higher-ranking officers.23

The third problem was a general lack of sustainment capacity development. The inability of either MOI to develop key ministerial functions at the national and local levels directly influenced not only logistics systems, but also command and control. As both forces grew, each became less self-sufficient and more reliant on the USG for support, a less-than desirable effect.24
In Iraq, neither the USG nor the MOI initially developed a national inventory, distribution, or maintenance system for vehicles, weapons, and communications. As a result, the MOI was incapable of supplying its forces or maintaining its equipment on a consistent basis. The USG eventually developed a logistical concept for the IPS, but the MOI will not be able to fully implement it below the regional level for some time.25

In Afghanistan, the USG developed a plan where the ANP would receive their initial issue of equipment as they arrived to their unit. As an accountability incentive, the USG replaced vehicles and equipment lost by the ANP due to maintenance failures and combat damage, but did not replace equipment lost by the ANP due to corruption.26 Despite this rather unsophisticated system, the ANP still suffered from equipment shortages of trucks, radios, and body armor, which the leaders at the MOI and regional levels stockpiled. To counter this problem, the Tashkil called for establishment of a central logistics office, national logistics center, five interregional logistics centers, and 34 provincial supply points, which the USG has scheduled for future construction. Unfortunately, the new system comes eight years too late and the USG will be unable to fully implement the plan prior to completion of an enormous hiring and training campaign for maintenance and supply personnel.27

The Reasons for the Errors

In general, there are two strategic level reasons and one operational level reason that account for USG errors in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the strategic level, the first reason was that among President George Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and Secretary of State Colin Powell, there was little consensus regarding the type of wars the U.S was fighting or what the correct strategy should have been to execute them. On one hand, the
Pentagon’s chief measure for Iraq in 2004 was the number of ISF personnel completing training. At that point in the war, both President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld were eager to hand the war off to the Iraqis and withdraw U.S. forces as quickly as possible. As a result, there was little emphasis on quality control. On the other hand, by this time the USG had relegated Afghanistan to an economy of force operation, which was just beginning its downward spiral. One of 2007’s most memorable quotes by Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed the general attitude of the two wars in this way: “In Afghanistan, we do what we can. In Iraq, we do what we must.” The mindset toward Iraq and the reality of the situation in Afghanistan facilitated a jumbled approach to police development in both countries. In this respect, “groupthink” was a contributor at the highest level in which the national leadership became so engaged in concurrence seeking that they never really considered alternative courses of action (COA). In “The War Within,” Bob Woodward wrote, “Now in the fourth year of war, the defense secretary was still asking about the elusive numbers of exactly how many Iraqi soldiers were trained and ready for duty.” Woodward recounts that despite General George Casey’s best efforts to explain the war, President Bush reduced the conflict to simple attrition warfare – a strategy that failed so miserably in Vietnam.

The second strategic level reason, closely related to the first, was that the USG did not designate a lead agency for foreign police development since the mid 1970s, resulting in an uncoordinated and ineffective approach to the problem. In 1962, President Kennedy placed the Office of Public Safety (OPS) under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The OPS’s mission was to promote effective civilian law enforcement development in countries threatened by Communist
expansion. At its peak in 1968, OPS administered a $60 million budget and supervised 458 police advisors working in 34 different countries. Over the course of its existence, OPS provided more than $300 million in police training, equipment, and technical assistance to 52 countries. In 1974, after growing weary of Vietnam and uncovering allegations of human rights abuses in OPS-supported countries, Congress adopted Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act. That act significantly restricted USG funding for foreign law enforcement assistance and effectively ended the OPS program. Additionally, the USG cut USAID by nearly 40% during the past two decades. In 1990, USAID had 3,500 personnel assigned to the task of annually administering approximately $5 billion in developmental aid and other assistance. Today, USAID has 2,200 personnel administering more than $8 billion each year, excluding cash grants. Since 1974, Congress authorized several exemptions that allow police development under certain conditions. However, USG sponsored law enforcement development is inefficient, chaotic, and unsynchronized. In summary, DOD, DOS, Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of Transportation (DOT) all conduct foreign police development in some form, but with little coordination.

Further aggravating the situation is the fact that the USG does not budget by mission resulting in unprepared agencies taking on tasks that fall outside their capabilities or core mandates. As a result, agencies do not adequately train or plan for what they attempt to tackle. In the end, when DOD and DOS face challenges (such as foreign police development) that fall outside their traditional competencies, they produce insufficient ad hoc arrangements. Government personnel with little relevant training or experience end up deploying to difficult missions, such as DOS personnel operating in
hostile environments. The lack of clarity regarding exact missions or roles explains why like Iraq and Afghanistan DOD and DOS experienced trouble cooperating or working in unison because nothing in the process prepared them to do so.37

The third reason (operational level) was the U.S. military’s unpreparedness for police development at the point when it did become involved. Specifically, the U.S. military did not realize how intrinsically more complicated police development was as compared to military development in COIN. By its very nature, military development is more structured, consolidated, and centralized with hierarchical chains of command. Additionally, military units tend to operate in large formations, facilitating top-down as opposed to bottom-up expansion, which require less manpower. Moreover, military units can better insulate themselves from problems such as ethnic rivalries or corruption because they generally operate at a distance from society.38 Police, on the other hand, operate in smaller, more decentralized groups, which complicates matters exponentially from both a security, and a supervisory perspective. Unlike military development, police development likely begins and continues as the police force becomes operational. This phenomenon is similar to the analogy of building an airplane while in flight.39

Solutions to Preclude the Errors Again

In the future, the probability of a large-scale police development mission beyond Iraq and Afghanistan is not only possible, but very likely. At some point, Cuba, North Korea, and possibly Iran are all likely candidates for large-scale police development missions. Additionally, the chances of at least two of those police development missions occurring in hostile environments are extremely high. To improve the USG’s ability to develop police forces in the next failed or failing state and to preclude the errors of Afghanistan and Iraq, three fundamental considerations are presented for review.
The first consideration is the USG leadership, at the highest levels, must clearly understand that war in the future will be much more complex. It will consist of multiple participants possessing various abilities who will fight by combining conventional and asymmetric capabilities, inevitably creating even more fog and friction. In addition to understanding the characteristics of future war, there must be strategic level consensus concerning where on the scale of national interests a particular conflict will fall, as well as agreement on the end state and exit strategy. Additionally, the USG must transform the interagency process to make it more agile. As the Project on National Security Reform points out, the USG has transformed into an excessively hierarchical system and is unable to effectively plan or achieve unity of effort. Charles Lindbolm describes this as an incremental approach where the USG makes decisions, like those made in Afghanistan and Iraq regarding police development, in small analytical increments (decision fragmentation).

The second consideration is the USG needs to determine how it can best organize the agencies to execute foreign police development in the most effective and flexible manner. An example of how the USG successfully integrated civilian and military expertise to achieve effect occurred in the late 1960s when President Johnson signed National Security Action Memorandum 362. That policy established the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam. The CORDS program placed General Westmoreland, Military Assistance Commander – Vietnam (MACV), in charge of the pacification program with three deputies (one of whom was a three-star equivalent civilian) in charge of pacification. This approach embedded civilians within a wartime command and put them in charge of military
personnel and resources. Subordinate units adopted parallel structures, which facilitated a common approach.\textsuperscript{43} The synergy garnered from the CORDS program facilitated a South Vietnamese National Police growth from 60,000 in 1967 to more than 120,000 in 1971.\textsuperscript{44} Clark Murdock suggests the even more inclusive concept of a standing Interagency Task Force (IATF) headquarters, which would deploy on short notice as part of a combatant command’s (COCOM) combined joint task force (CJTF). In this case, the President would appoint a senior civilian to lead the IATF and its fully integrated civil-military staff.\textsuperscript{45} Part of that IATF would be a fully integrated police development team.

With respect to designating a lead agency for police development, power sharing by DOD and DOS, based on the situation with other agencies in support seems the most practical, flexible, and cost-effective.\textsuperscript{46} Documents like National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44)\textsuperscript{47} and Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.5\textsuperscript{48} are a good start at promoting this concept. In this case, NSPD-44 directs the Secretary of State to coordinate and lead integrated USG efforts for stabilization and reconstruction (SR) activities, while DODD 3000.05 establishes stability operations as a core military mission on par with combat operations. The directive also articulates that DOD will execute SR missions in the event host nation or other civilian agencies are incapable. Under that concept, DOD could take the lead in hostile environments and DOS could take the lead in permissive environments. This concept best combines the strength of DOS (police expertise) with the strength of DOD (capacity and security) in the most efficient arrangement for the given environment.
The third consideration, after the USG creates an effective interagency police development team, is the planning effort the team undertakes to develop the force. In this respect, there are seven general considerations: 49

First, the team must determine on paper the personnel end state, the command and control structure, and the support structure of the new police force before they begin creating the force. Just as no DOD organization would form a military unit without first designing a template; neither should a police development team form a police unit without proper planning and preparation.

Second, the team should identify and hire local national human resources, logistics, and training personnel, and simultaneously create support mechanisms to sustain the force. These key positions will assist in recruiting, equipment procurement and distribution, and training the new force. Teaching and assisting these key personnel as the team moves through the process will also facilitate a smoother transition to the newly appointed police leadership. Failure to do so will result in the USG providing logistics, maintenance, training, and other types of support to the fledgling force for a much longer period.

Third, the team should develop personnel policy up front by deciding how and who will identify, hire, fire, and pay police officers. The team should clearly articulate which USG personnel or new police leaders have authority. The team should also consider the type of promotion system the new government should institute.

Fourth, the team should locate, identify, and classify (large, medium, small, and extra-small) police structures on a nationwide basis as early as possible. The team should also assign an adequate number of personnel to this project, ensuring that those
personnel have continuity for the long term. The identification and classification of all police facilities early in the process will help determine which existing police structures to repair and where to construct new ones.

Fifth, the team should link its personnel organization plan to the building infrastructure plan. Reducing the number of police stations to a manageable level will allow more money to be spent on real improvements (including force protection) on the few, as opposed to simple cosmetic repairs on the numerous.

Sixth, the team should determine if they should fully modernize or simply upgrade the new police force. Unless team members thoroughly think this through in advance, they typically cannot modernize some aspects of the police force and skip others. For example, spending millions of dollars on a state-of-the-art communications center will be in vain if the rest of the force cannot communicate with it due to lack of radios. Along the same line, buying thousands of automobiles for a force that has traditionally been static and reactive (and plans to remain that way), could potentially be a waste of time and money.

Seventh, the team should obtain the newly established government’s buy-in to whatever plan they develop. On one hand, if the host nation is not part of the planning process, the plan will not likely progress. T.E. Lawrence best articulated this point when he said:

Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as perhaps you think it is.50

There is a small window of opportunity when the USG has more control of the developing force than does the forming government and has the greatest influence to
make positive changes to the organizational design. It goes without saying that different cultures organize and delegate differently. With that in mind, there are certain aspects of any paramilitary organization that transcend culture. Primarily, those involve training, discipline, standardized equipment, and a recognizable command structure with clearly defined responsibilities. The challenge is to impart those universal aspects of paramilitary organizations onto the new force while, at the same time, allowing newly designated police and government officials to embed their unique cultural aspects into the organization. Although there may be danger in over-relying on western models and concepts, there is a greater risk in allowing a newly established force to resort to old habits. Balanced with new governmental leaders’ input, the team should make sound changes to the organizational structure. After the newly installed government assumes control, the police development team, and the USG in general, must live with the seeds it has sown.

With the Afghan and Iraqi police development missions still fresh in the minds of many, the USG must capture and learn from its errors. Decision-making with respect to police development in those two countries became frustrated and fragmented for three primary reasons. First, there was little consensus in the USG at the strategic level concerning the type of war the U.S. was waging as the insurgency grew in both countries. Second, the USG did not designate a lead agency for police development since the early 1970s, resulting in an uncoordinated effort among different USG agencies. Third, the U.S. military was ill prepared for the complexities of police development. These three conditions resulted in the USG making two fundamental errors early in the Afghan and Iraqi police development processes: 1) it failed to first
design a coherent structure or organizational blueprint from which to build upon, and 2) it sacrificed quality in exchange for quantity and speed. Those fundamental errors resulted in lack of a vetting and personnel accountability process, rank imbalances, and a general lack of sustainment capacity for both developing forces. To preclude those errors from reoccurring, the USG must reform in a variety of ways. First, the USG must clearly understand that the style of war has changed and that future COIN will be intrinsically more complex. Second, the USG must design coherent policy to help determine which failed or failing states warrant an appropriate level of USG response, and establish a list of clearly articulated goals, expectations, and end states. Additionally, the USG must improve the interagency process, which will facilitate cooperation and unity of effort. The interagency process simply must become more agile and less bureaucratic. Before development begins, the interagency team must take into consideration the personnel end state, command and control structure, and support structure of the new police force. Additionally, the team should identify and hire local national human resources, logistics, and training personnel, while at the same time create support mechanisms to sustain the force. The team should also create up-front policies that articulate how and who will identify, hire, fire, and pay new police personnel. Moreover, the team should locate, identify, and classify police structures by size, on a nationwide basis, as soon as possible. The team can begin to link and integrate the infrastructure plan into the overall personnel organization concept. Finally, the team should determine if they are going to fully modernize or simply upgrade the new police force and obtain buy-in from the newly established government.
Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, the USG will likely undertake other large-scale police development missions in hostile environments while conducting COIN. If it is true of COIN that: 1) citizens are the center of gravity, 2) citizen confidence in government is paramount, 3) police are the most visible representations of the government, and 4) little development occurs without the security provided by a well-established police force, then it is critical to develop quality police organizations from the start. With respect to police development, the USG must significantly improve its efforts in the next failed or failing state because it will not possess the resources or political capital to squander. More importantly, the next failed or failing state will not have the time to waste.

Endnotes


5 Ibid., 10.


9 Ibid., 3.


14 U.S Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense Inspectors General, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, 11.


18 Sherman and Carstens, Independent Task Force on Progress and Reform, 2.


26 U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense Inspectors General, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, 47.


34 Ibid.


