
Combat Leadership Styles: Empowerment versus Authoritarianism

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Recent research in Israel and the United States suggests that trusting and empowering subordinates is more likely to lead to success in combat than the traditional authoritarian mode of structuring relationships within a military hierarchy.¹ My purpose in this article is to step back from contemporary research and experience into recent history to see if empowerment is just a fresh cliché, or a principle of leadership with a record that can stand up to scrutiny. I have selected three campaigns that are of limited scope and short duration in which to compare the effectiveness of the opposing forces with the relative emphasis in each force on empowerment and authoritarianism. These campaigns are the German invasion of France in 1940, the Japanese seizure of Malaya and Singapore from the British in early 1942, and the Chinese intervention against American forces in Korea in 1950.

As long as the combat power of an army derived from closely packed masses of human beings—archers, musketeers, horsemen—and the general could see most of the battlefield, unquestioning obedience and submission by subordinates was a prerequisite for coordinated action on the battlefield. Independent thinking by subordinates was not necessary, and it could lead to disarticulation of the general's battle plan. In the 19th century, rifled small arms and explosive artillery shells ended the era of close-order combat. Subsequent developments in weaponry have imposed progressively greater dispersal on the battlefield.² The evidence of the three campaigns to be discussed indicates that while coordinated action still requires quick and complete compliance with orders, blind obedience by subordinates who have only limited understanding of the context in which they are acting reduces combat power. On the other hand, autonomous obedience by subordinates who understand their commander's

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objective and have discretion to act as they see fit to further the achievement of that objective can assist numerically inferior forces to win.

This discussion is a necessarily narrow and inevitably selective analysis of the subject campaigns, each of which has been the topic of several books. A plethora of military, political, physical, and psychological factors were operative in their outcomes. I do not argue that the battles were decided on the basis of empowerment or authoritarianism; rather, I invite the reader to include this facet of superior-subordinate relations in reassessing these familiar campaigns in the light of the expected nature of future wars.

The Battle of France

The perception of the German army as the archetype of military authoritarianism reflects command behavior in 17th- and 18th-century Prussia.³ In the latter half of the 19th century, Prussian military leaders identified a need to prepare company-level officers to function as independent decision-makers—a process that came to be labeled by American writers *Auftragstaktik*.⁴ After several false starts, by 1916-18 command practice was moving toward reliance on subordinate leaders.⁵ The German army during the interwar years emphasized trust across ranks, decentralization of authority, and developing in junior leaders the competence and judgment that would make empowering them militarily feasible.⁶

By the time of the Second World War, German generals usually trusted the judgment of junior leaders.⁷ After the campaign in which Germany conquered Poland in 40 days, the army undertook a thorough self-evaluation in which soldiers of all ranks felt secure enough to criticize their own and others' actions as well as procedures and policies of higher headquarters.⁸

The experiences of French officers during the First World War led them to value centralization. Between the wars they saw themselves as rejected by the public and in an adversarial relationship with the political regime. The officers feared Germany, doubted the reliability of their troops, and mistrusted the government.⁹ To minimize their exposure to uncertainties they withdrew almost all discretion from subordinate leaders, curbed initiative, and demanded unquestioning conformity¹⁰ to a rigid, methodical, and obsolete doctrine of war.¹¹

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The decisive battle between the French and the German forces took place at Sedan on 12-15 May 1940. The German commander, Lieutenant General Heinz Guderian, had established a climate of trust, respect, and open communication across ranks. He and his subordinate commanders led from the front, paid attention to the opinions of junior leaders, were supportive rather than punitive toward subordinates who made errors or lost their nerve, and concerned themselves with their men's welfare.¹² His XIX Corps comprised three and one-third divisions with 750 tanks and 120 guns, and he could call on a force of 340 dive bombers for close support. His task was to assault across the Meuse River against infantry protected by concrete bunkers and strong artillery.

The French Second Army had the mission of holding the Meuse River line in the vicinity of Sedan. Its commander, General Charles Huntziger, was its youngest full general and enjoyed a reputation as the most brilliant officer in the French army. He was expected to be its next commander-in-chief.¹³ Second Army comprised 11 divisions, 400 tanks, more than 500 guns, and the best fighter group in the French air force.¹⁴ Though his resources were more than adequate to destroy the German forces, the French general, behaving in accordance with the authoritarian values of the French army at the time, squandered the valor of his soldiers and the fighting power of his positions.

On the 10th of May, General Huntziger directed an additional division from within X Corps to enter the forward defensive lines in front of Sedan. Huntziger did not discuss this move with the corps commander, Lieutenant General Charles Grandsard. It deprived the corps of a reserve divisional headquarters, and it entailed a night march and relief in place the night before the defenders would face a major assault.¹⁵ The Germans reached the Meuse across from Sedan on 12 May. General Huntziger withheld from Grandsard motor transport for his infantry, authority for his artillery units to stock ammunition at their positions, and tank units to support counterattacks. Further, he detached two divisional reconnaissance battalions from X Corps for service in the rear.¹⁶

The next day the French artillery pinned down and demoralized the German bridging units and assault forces.¹⁷ General Guderian called for aerial support, and dive bombers attacked the French artillery. General Huntziger refused his corps commander's request for fighter aircraft to protect the gunners, saying, "They [the artillerymen] have to have their baptism of fire."¹⁸ The Germans, freed from bombardment by the French artillery, forced a crossing. Most of the assaults failed, but the individual squads and platoons that got across operated independently to attack the French pillboxes from the rear with demolitions and flamethrowers. According to one account, General Huntziger reported to his superior that when he learned that some of his fellow Frenchmen had surrendered he ordered his own artillery to fire on them.¹⁹ The

Germans destroyed the defending division and made a deep penetration that dislocated the French defensive position. General Huntziger reported only that “a small slice south of Sedan has been bitten off.”²⁰

As the situation at Sedan deteriorated, Huntziger provided his corps commander with no additional resources. Rather, he walked out on him and refused to talk to him or send orders through him to his units.²¹ He withheld authority from adjacent divisions to counterattack the flanks of the German penetration.²² He gave his mechanized reserve corps orders both to hold and to counterattack. The order would protect him from blame, whatever happened. Given the French emphasis on obedience rather than initiative, the order guaranteed that the commander of his most powerful striking force would not act.²³ Huntziger withdrew his command post 50 miles, then swung his left wing to the south, abandoning the isolated elements of the French 55th Infantry Division, which continued a stubborn resistance.²⁴ He opened a path for the German forces to surge westward in the decisive maneuver of the campaign. General Huntziger dismissed four of his divisional commanders to deflect criticism that might arise.²⁵ He then reported to his superiors that the counterattacks they had ordered had not been made “because of unfavorable technical conditions” and “mechanical breakdowns.”²⁶

The French general’s disdainful treatment of his subordinate commanders, and his indifference amounting to hostility toward his troops, reveal how foreign any notion of empowerment of subordinates was to him. His misleading reports to his superiors reflected the absence of trust at the top of the French army. Though his behavior directly caused a defeat which was immediately recognized as decisive, and which violated basic norms for senior commanders, the critical point is that the military hierarchy found no fault with his conduct. Three weeks later he was promoted to the command of an army group.

The French army was defeated by an army that was numerically inferior in trained men, armor, aircraft, and artillery²⁷—but in which commanders dared to empower subordinates. Though the outcome of an event as complex as the Battle of France cannot be attributed to a single factor, one compelling difference between the two armies was in the nature of the relationships across ranks.

The Battle of Malaya and Singapore

The Japanese army had played no significant role in the First World War, and it fell behind European armies in technology, weaponry, and training. The officer corps was divided among samurai officers loyal to the Meiji oligarchs, and non-samurai graduates of the military academy who looked for support to the nascent political parties.²⁸ Rather than unite to experiment and

modernize their army, the Japanese officers consecrated their energies during the interwar years to internecine struggles for control of promotions and key positions.²⁹ They denied the validity of foreign ideas and technology, downgraded such concepts as retreat and defense, and reaffirmed their belief in the superiority of the Japanese warrior spirit—the superiority of flesh over steel.³⁰ Yet while the Japanese officers were authoritarian in requiring complete submissiveness to superiors, and in being harshly punitive, they empowered their subordinates and respected their judgment.³¹ Officers shared soldiers' hardships, led them personally in time of danger, and did not hesitate to entrust autonomous missions to junior officers and NCOs.³²

The British army between the World Wars was organized, as it had been since the Middle Ages, along class lines. Officers were gentlemen, and their right to command was vested in that status. "The men would not follow an officer who was not a gentleman."³³ Competence was not expected; in fact, an excess of "cleverness" (intelligence) was undesirable. Officers were to serve as models of honor and courage.³⁴ Paternalism, not respect, was the essential characteristic of officers' treatment of enlisted personnel.³⁵ Though the system worked, it became anachronistic as Britain evolved into a universally educated, middle-class society.³⁶ Between the World Wars, British officers protected their privileged positions by becoming progressively more conventional, arbitrary, intolerant of unfamiliar ideas and people, and dependent on corporate myths.

British leaders in Malaya and Singapore preferred to present a tough, optimistic facade to subordinates who expressed concern about the war with Japan. They asserted that Japanese troops were second-rate, that Japanese airmen could not fly at night, that the Japanese army would never attack Singapore through Malaya, and that no one could use tanks in the Malayan jungle. The commander-in-chief, an RAF officer, declared: "We can get on all right with the Buffaloes [substandard fighter aircraft] here. They are quite good enough for Malaya."³⁷ When his chief engineer asked for authority to fortify Singapore, the army commander said, "I believe that defenses of the sort you want to throw up are bad for the morale of troops and civilians."³⁸

The Japanese invaded Malaya with three divisions in December 1941. Commanders entrusted junior NCOs with independent missions to infiltrate the jungles and attack the British rear, block lines of retreat, destroy supplies, and kill specific officers.³⁹ The Japanese put tanks ashore and sent them through the jungle. Because British doctrine stated that tanks could not be used in Malaya, the commander of the land forces declined to issue manuals on antitank combat to troops. The commander of the Australian division responsible for preparing a final defensive line on the mainland declined to build antitank obstacles, saying, "Personally I have little time for those obstacles . . . preferring to stop and destroy tanks with antitank weapons."⁴⁰

Within 54 days the three Japanese divisions had walked 500 miles through jungle against a more-numerous, better-armed, and better-supplied opponent, and attacked Singapore. Four of the five British divisions were exhausted and demoralized.⁴¹ The high command had not built fortifications for Singapore's defense. British resistance lasted only a week.

Leaders of both forces in the Malayan campaign were doctrinaire, punitive, submissive, and preoccupied with presenting an image of toughness. The Japanese, in their respect for military realities, and in their practice of trusting their subordinates, broke free from some authoritarian practices. The British leaders withheld trust, respect, and power from their subordinates. They centralized authority, ignored input from below, and kept even senior subordinate leaders in the dark. Again, one must be wary of attributing too much influence to human factors, but the Japanese prevailed over a numerically superior and better-equipped adversary who occupied a potentially strong defensive position.

The Chinese Intervention in Korea

It is reasonable to expect that in centralized communist states such as the Peoples' Republic of China, military officials would be reluctant to empower subordinates. But in their modes of operation the Chinese army leaders of 1950 showed that they were prepared to trust their most junior leaders. The Chinese sent 300,000 soldiers into North Korea between September and November 1950.⁴² They were disciplined in the sense that commanders believed, correctly, that they could depend on platoon- and squad-sized elements to perform effectively in the absence of supervision by or communications with higher headquarters. They routed an American-led United Nations Force of 350,000 men.⁴³

The Chinese in Korea had no tanks, antitank weapons, or close air support, and few vehicles.⁴⁴ The strength of the Chinese army lay in the confidence its commanders reposed in junior leaders, and in the supportive psychological climate in the squad. There were three cells of three to five men in each squad. The cell leaders were in daily face-to-face contact with their soldiers and lived by a high standard of courage, dedication to the mission, and caring attention to their subordinates' welfare. They served their soldiers as teacher, friend, advocate, critic, and comrade under fire. The cell always acted as a unit. The intimacy of the cell assured that no soldier could stray or fail to do his duty in the field and in combat. The soldiers did not have to subscribe to communist dogma, but they did have to put the welfare of the cell and their comrades above their own interests. Discipline, though backed up by surveillance and coercive power, was based primarily on interdependence and loyalty to members of the cell.⁴⁵

Chinese commanders would brief their junior leaders about an entire operation, then entrust them with carrying out their parts of it on their own.

Commanders had only bugles, whistles, flares, and flashlights with which to communicate with their subordinate units once an attack began. Because they knew the overall plan, small-unit leaders acting independently usually produced coherent operations. They moved so quietly, used ground so skillfully, and attacked so violently that Americans reported that "hordes of Chinese" had "risen up out of the ground" to overrun them.⁴⁶

The United Nations army that faced the Chinese in Korea had just completed, in less than two months, the annihilation of the 130,000-man North Korean Peoples' Army. UN forces had advanced 350 miles from the southern tip of Korea to, at some points, the Yalu River border with Manchuria. They had uncontested control of the air, massed artillery, motorized logistics, and 600 tanks. The Americans, who made up most of the United Nations forces, enjoyed superiority over their Chinese adversaries in every dimension except the human, and that weakness proved to be decisive.

The US Army had expanded from 190,000 to 7,400,000 between 1939 and 1945.⁴⁷ Regular Army officers, who made up only about 1.6 percent of the officer strength during the Second World War, found themselves assigned command and staff responsibilities that were far more extensive than any they had experienced before. Personal concerns about their own abilities to cope were aggravated by their having to rely on subordinates who were relative amateurs. Their responses were, in most cases, to centralize control and prescribe the actions of subordinate units in detail.

When the Second World War ended, the Army was cut back to a little less than three times its prewar strength, but it retained almost five times as many officers as were on duty in 1939.⁴⁸ Many of the officers on duty in 1947 could never have aspired to commissioned rank before the war. The Army offered them undreamed-of status and authority, but it could not make them secure in that status and authority. Many of the officers adopted authoritarian behavior patterns such as uncritical submission to superiors, hostility to innovation, and indifference toward subordinates. They did not trust their troops or teach small units how to act on their own. Together with their Regular Army colleagues who had developed habits of mistrusting their subordinates during the war, these new officers structured human relations in the American Army in an authoritarian mold. The conventional view of the US Army of 1950 is that it was permissive, democratic, and undisciplined—a victim of liberal democratization following the Doolittle Report in 1945-46.⁴⁹ I submit that it was insecurity and authoritarian behavior, with consequent loss of respect and trust downward, that had undermined discipline.⁵⁰

American units had captured Chinese soldiers in Korea on several occasions in October 1950, and had reported each event to higher headquarters. The intelligence staff in Tokyo had conceived the belief that the Chinese would not intervene in Korea in force. The Chinese first attacked on

1 November. They killed or captured 600 out of the 800 men in a US infantry battalion, and almost annihilated a neighboring South Korean regiment.⁵¹ The Supreme Command gave no credence to reports from below, stuck to its beliefs that there were no major Chinese forces in Korea, and ordered advances to more exposed positions.⁵² Fearing to challenge their superiors, intermediate commanders denied the evidence before them and acquiesced in the dogma from the supreme command.⁵³

Junior commanders, made wary by bloody encounters with aggressive Chinese troops, were reprimanded by superiors for not moving faster. Chinese soldiers had surrounded many United Nations units before they launched their main attacks. In the midst of intense danger, officers sought to rally and reorganize their men to defend themselves, but when the officers looked away, many of the men disappeared. Chinese roadblocks manned by a score of men provoked the disintegration of American companies and battalions.⁵⁴ Officers who had given no respect inspired no trust. With one officer for every seven enlisted men, the Army as a whole was overstrength in officers,⁵⁵ thus offering a large pool from which to pick unit commanders. Yet, in Korea, senior officers knew they had in their units some “officers wholly unfitted for troop command.”⁵⁶ Though many individual officers and soldiers behaved courageously, with bonds of trust and respect developing in many units, the absence of those bonds at the beginning of the war led to the worst defeat in American history. As the war continued, less experienced leaders were brought in, trust disappeared totally, and centralization reached absurd levels.⁵⁷

Trust, Respect, Empowerment, and Combat Effectiveness

The three campaigns discussed above tend to confirm the Israeli and American findings that trust, respect, and empowerment of subordinates can assist an army to fight outnumbered and win. This type of leadership philosophy, encapsulated as we have seen in the German term *Auftragstaktik*,⁵⁸ is more than the new conventional wisdom. It has a solid record for enhancing the combat power of forces operating on a dispersed battlefield. Though in the campaigns discussed in this article the losers claimed they were outnumbered, or inferior in equipment, or both, in fact it was the *victors* who were inferior in numbers and in materiel. Soldiers and historians will debate indefinitely the factors that gave each force its margin of victory, but one factor common to all three campaigns was the difference in the relationships across ranks. The leaders of the victorious forces had the vision to recognize that the dispersed nature of the battlefield made it impossible to control directly the action of small-unit leaders, and they had the courage to entrust them with discretion to execute parts of operations. The losers clung to the familiar authoritarian patterns. Many leaders in the US Army today do so also.

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Granting discretion to subordinates increases the uncertainty and tension the superior must bear. He remains responsible for what his subordinates do. By their nature military activities entail an abundance of uncertainty and tension as a matter of course, so most military professionals have been reluctant to relinquish the illusion of certainty conferred by authoritarian practices.⁵⁹ Behavior that is deeply rooted both in culture and in practical psychological utility tends to persevere even though the circumstances in which it was objectively useful have changed. Commanders who do not wish to empower their juniors insist that obedience to command is essential for coherency; the senior commander and other subordinate leaders need to know what each element is doing. They are correct about the need for coherency; however, the evidence of recent history indicates that they are wrong about how to achieve it. What has changed is that the optimum form of obedience on dispersed battlefields is not immediate and unquestioning, it is thoughtful and adapted to the situation as seen through the eyes of subordinates who understand their commander's intent.

Even if trusting, empowering leadership makes armies more effective, it is extremely difficult to institutionalize. A few officers of the US Army are currently experimenting with empowering leadership based on the concept that each act, word, and policy sends a message to their subordinates. They seek to behave in ways that convey trust, respect, and common purpose. They listen to their troops; pay attention to the troops' personal, professional, and familial welfare; and treat them as competent members of the military profession. This kind of behavior has produced significant improvement in teamwork, cohesion, confidence, and military proficiency in the few units in which it has been implemented.⁶⁰ Sergeants, lieutenants, captains, and a few field grade officers have succeeded in building islands of trust, respect, and competence in punitive, micro-managed, and event-oriented commands, but they have had to be extremely wary. Many have been relieved.⁶¹

The question for the US Army is how long is it going to continue to tolerate authoritarian practices that limit the development during peacetime

of the command relationships needed in wartime. The alternative to authoritarianism is support, trust, and empowerment from senior to junior. But such a posture puts the superior at risk. Unless each commander can count on support from his boss, authoritarianism will continue to seduce even the best-intentioned officers. Change must therefore originate at the top—with senior officers whose psychological integrity and organizational independence are strong enough for them to sustain a commitment to empower and support their subordinates, rather than mistrust and intimidate them.

NOTES

1. See Reuven Gal, *A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986); Faris R. Kirkland, *Leading in COHORT Companies*, Report NP-88-13 ADA 192886 (Washington: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1987); Dandridge M. Malone, *Small Unit Leadership: A Commonsense Approach* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1983); David H. Marlowe, *New Manning System Field Evaluation*, Technical Reports 1 ADA 162087, 3 ADA 207195 (Washington: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1985-1986); and J. A. Simonsen, H. L. Frandsen, D. A. Hoopengardner, "Excellence in the Combat Arms," *Military Review*, 65 (June 1985), 19-29.
2. In 1906 the frontage of a German infantry battalion on the offensive was 300 to 400 meters; a brigade of six battalions (two regiments) attacked on a 1500-meter front. See *Drill Regulations for the Infantry, German Army, 1906*, trans. F. J. Behr (Washington: War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, 1907), p. 84. The frontage of a current US Army infantry battalion in the attack is 2000-2400 meters. See US Department of the Army, *The Infantry Battalion (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger)*, Field Manual 7-20 (Washington: GPO, 1978), pp. 4-10, 4-32.
3. Martin Kitchen, *A Military History of Germany* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 2-3, 7-14, 24-25.
4. *Auftragstaktik* is a concept that emerged after the Second World War to describe the German philosophy of warfighting, with its complementary system of leadership and leader development, that had evolved between 1866 and 1945. The principal tenets of *Auftragstaktik* are rapid and decisive offensive action, mission-type orders, implementation of orders entrusted to subordinate leaders, trust in subordinates, and careful, supportive mentoring of subordinate leaders to develop in them the judgment, confidence, and trust that make decentralized operations effective in combat. For a concise and comprehensive exposition of *Auftragstaktik*, see John T. Nelsen II, "Auftragstaktik: A Case of Decentralized Battle," *Parameters*, 17 (September 1987), 21-23.
5. Lieutenant Erwin Rommel's forthright memoir of his three years commanding a mountain infantry company in the First World War illustrates command behavior in a unit that was disciplined, but not authoritarian. Erwin Rommel, *Attacks*, trans. J. Driscoll (Vienna, Va.: Athena Press, 1979) (first published in 1937 as *Infanterie Greift An* when Rommel was a lieutenant colonel).
6. Martin van Creveld, *Fighting Power* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1982), pp. 127-28, 138, 151; Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Auftragstaktik: In Its Proper Perspective," *Military Review*, 66 (October 1986), 52-54.
7. Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, trans. C. Fitzgibbon (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1952), pp. 70, 78, 92, 128.
8. Williamson Murray, "The German Response to Victory in Poland: A Case Study in Professionalism," *Armed Forces and Society*, 7 (Winter 1980), 286-87, 289, 295; Robert M. Kennedy, *The German Campaign in Poland*, Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-255 (Washington: GPO, 1956), pp. 130-5; Guderian, p. 89.
9. Philip C. F. Bankwitz, *Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 41-42, 50-67, 87-115, 165-66, 378.
10. Faris R. Kirkland, "The French Air Force in 1940: Was it Defeated by the *Luftwaffe* or by Politics?" *Air University Review*, 36 (September-October 1985), 103-05; and "The French Military Collapse in 1940: A Psychohistorical Interpretation," *Journal of Psychohistory*, 12 (Winter 1985), 317-19.
11. Robert A. Doughty, *The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Military Doctrine, 1919-1939* (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1985).
12. Guderian, pp. 70, 76, 81, 102, 105, 108, 153, 156, 188.
13. Claude Paillat, *Dossiers secrets de la France contemporaine, Vol. IV, Le désastre de 1940 - La guerre immobile* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1984), pp. 336-38, 351, 358-59; Edmond Ruby, "Un grand français,

le Général Huntziger," *Ecrits de Paris* No. 129, (1955), pp. 48-49, 52-53, and No. 130 (1955), pp. 85-86; Martin Alexander, "Prophet Without Honor? The French High Command and Pierre Taittinger's Report on the Ardennes Defenses," *War and Society*, 4 (May 1986), 57-58, 60-62.

14. For detailed composition and condition of ground forces, see Charles Grandsard, *La 10^e Corps d'Armée dans la bataille, 1939-1940* (Paris: Berger Levrault, 1949), pp. 11-16, 18-20, 28, 45-48. For air defense Second Army had Fighter Group I/5, which had 85 confirmed victories. Other groups in the top five had only 40 to 51 victories. See Paul Camelio and Christopher Shores, *Armée de l'air* (Warren, Mich.: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1976), p. 64.

15. William L. Shirer, *The Collapse of the Third Republic* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 645; Charles Leon Menu, *Lumière sur les ruines: Les combattants de 1940 réhabilités* (Paris: Plon, 1953), pp. 202-06; Guy Chapman, *Why France Fell* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968), pp. 116-17; Grandsard, pp. 97, 100-01, 108, 110-12, 116, 133.

16. Grandsard, pp. 106, 112-16.

17. F. W. von Mellenthin, *Panzer Battles*, trans. H. Betzler (New York: Ballantine Books, 1956), pp. 17-19; J. A. von Kielmansegg, *Panzer zwischen Warschau und Atlantik* (Berlin: Verlag "Die Wehrmacht," 1941), pp. 113ff.

18. Priority on French aviation assets went to First Army on 10, 11, and 12 May. During this period Second Army had Fighter Group I/5, Reconnaissance Group II/22, and four observation squadrons. On 13 and 14 May priority on aviation assets went to Second Army. These assets included, in addition to the units listed above, Fighter Wing 23 with six additional fighter groups (all but two of those available in the Northern Zone of Aerial Operations) and all of the French and British bomber units in France. On the 14th even night bomber units were committed in daylight low-level assault missions against the German pontoon bridges at Sedan and in support of a counterattack Huntziger was ordered to make but did not execute. See François-Pierre-Raoul d'Astier de la Vigerie, *Le ciel n'était pas vide* (Paris: René Julliard, 1952), pp. 83-87, 91-92, 95-97, 104-06; Lieutenant Colonel Salessé, *L'aviation de chasse en 1939-1940* (Paris: Berger Levrault, 1948), pp. 83, 85, 91, 96, 99; Grandsard, pp. 132-33.

19. Alistair Horne, *To Lose a Battle: France 1940* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. 341.

20. Shirer, p. 650.

21. Grandsard, p. 138, note 1.

22. The 3d North African Infantry Division was the right flank division of X Corps and was therefore on the eastern shoulder of the penetration. Rather than order it to counterattack, or even to hold the shoulder, Huntziger detached it from X Corps and attached it to XVIII Corps, then ordered XVIII Corps to withdraw its left wing—which then included 3d North African Division—in a southerly direction out of the Chiers River defensive line to a line south of Carignan. The order specified abandonment of the pillboxes on the Chiers and all heavy equipment.

The 2d Light Cavalry Division and 1st Colonial Infantry Division were in position immediately to the west of 3d North African Division in contact with the southern flank of the German westward thrust. These two divisions, reinforced with a tank battalion, were to operate as a group under General Roucaud, commander of the Colonial Division. Though 2d Light Cavalry Division was prepared to counterattack, it was not permitted to do so.

The XXI Corps with 3d Armored Division and 3d Motorized Infantry Division was to the west of 2d Light Cavalry Division, around Stonne and Mont Dieu. The corps was sent there for the purpose of counterattacking into the southern flank of the German penetration. Huntziger's contradictory orders paralyzed the corps.

The XVIII Corps had two divisions—3d Colonial Infantry and 41st Infantry—east of 3d North African. These divisions were not in contact with the penetration, but neither were they engaged. Their sectors were protected by Maginot Line fortifications.

23. Gaston Roton, *Années cruciales* (Paris: Charles Lavauzelle, 1947), p. 168.

24. See Menu, *Lumière . . .*, p. 218.

25. The generals dismissed were La Fontaine of the 55th Infantry Division, Baudet of the 71st Infantry Division, Brocard of the 3d Armored Division, and Roucaud of the 1st Colonial Infantry Division.

26. Roton, p. 182.

27. Faris R. Kirkland, *The French Officer Corps and the Fall of France: 1920-1940* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Univ. Microfilms, 1982), pp. 2-3, 492-516.

28. Yoshihisa Nakamura and Ryoichi Tobe, "The Imperial Japanese Army and Politics," *Armed Forces and Society*, 14 (Summer 1988), 518-19.

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33. John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York: Viking Press, 1976), pp. 220-22.
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35. Simon Raven, *The Decline of the Gentleman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962).
36. Robert Graves, *Goodbye to All That* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1929, rpt. 1957); Brian Bond, "Doctrine and Training in the British Cavalry—1870-1914," in Michael Howard, ed., *The Theory and Practice of War* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 100-02.
37. Norman Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976), pp. 134, 139.
38. Neal Barber, *Sinister Twilight* (London: Collins, 1968), p. 65.
39. US Department of the Army, *The War with Japan, Part I*, pp. 39-43.
40. Barber, p. 60.
41. The divisions were 9th and 11th Indian Divisions, 8th Australian Division, a fresh division that arrived just in time to take part in the surrender, and a reserve Indian brigade, two Malayan volunteer brigades, and fortress troops that together were more than the equivalent of a fifth division: "138,708 British, Indian, and Australian soldiers either died or went into captivity" (Dixon, p. 144). Japanese forces totaled about 70,000.
42. Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, June-November 1950* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), pp. 750, 765-68.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 606.
44. John A. English, *On Infantry* (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 169-70.
45. T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 428, 618; William Darryl Henderson, *Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat* (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1985), pp. 118-26.
46. English, pp. 171-72. For detailed descriptions of Chinese small-unit tactics from the perspective of their adversaries, see S. L. A. Marshall, *The River and the Gauntlet*, (New York: William Morrow, 1953), and *Pork Chop Hill* (New York: William Morrow, 1956).
47. Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 599-600.
48. US Department of the Army, *Strength Reports of the Army* (Washington: Office of the Army Comptroller, 1 January 1948), pp. 3, 14.
49. Fehrenbach, pp. 429-39.
50. Others who saw the the Army during the Korean Conflict in a similar light are David R. Campbell, *Fighting Encircled: A Study in Leadership* (Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1987), pp. 9-10, 21; David R. Hackworth, *About Face* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 200, 253, 260, 262-65, 286-87; and Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann, as his perceptions are portrayed in Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie* (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 453, 461.
51. Appieeman, pp. 689-708.
52. James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Years* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), pp. 197-201, 230, 233-36, 239-41, 251; Appleman, pp. 757-70.
53. Schnabel, pp. 257, 259, 266.
54. Appelman, p. 698.
55. For comparison, the trusting and empowering German army of 1944 had one officer for every 28 enlisted men. Van Creveld, p. 152.
56. Fehrenbach, p. 151; Appelman, p. 84; for vivid examples see Hackworth, pp. 57-58, 116, 137, 142, 152, 160-61, 228-38, 252-55, 265-66, 272.
57. Hackworth, pp. 262-65, 460-61, 465, 469.
58. Echevarria, pp. 51-53.
59. Nelsen, pp. 30-31.
60. Simonsen, Frandsen, and Hoopengardner, pp. 23-24, 27.
61. Faris R. Kirkland et al., *Unit Manning System Field Evaluation*, Technical Report No. 5 ADA 207193 (Washington: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1987), pp. 12-13, 17-19, 22-24, 47-48, 50-51.