SPECIAL FEATURE

The Changing Face of Europe and Africa

The USEUCOM AOR in 25 Years



Roman Coliseum at night

IT Stock International

Local residents at dedication of school in Kenya built with assistance from Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa

U.S. Navy (Eric A. Clement)

By THOMAS P. GALVIN

What comes to mind first when you hear the word *European*? Perhaps it is one of the great landmarks located on the continent, such as the Roman Coliseum or Parthenon in Athens. Maybe it is the beautiful mountain scenery of the Alps that inspired *The Sound of Music* or the flatlands dotted with windmills and dikes in Holland. Or perhaps it is the people of the continent and the varied societies they have built over the past 500 years. The skin tones differ from Ireland to Spain, but the people are largely Caucasian. The societies are mostly law-abiding and orderly, although a drive through Copenhagen does not compare to a drive through Naples. There is a balance between city dwellers and rural sites. Quaint but vibrant villages still dot the landscape. The Swiss still maintain a large number of separate languages among their townspeople. Finally, the overall culture is strongly based on Christianity, with churches the centerpiece of many cities and towns, and religious tradition deeply ingrained despite modern secularism.

But there is no denying that Europe is changing. The foundations of the continent's sociopolitical structures and culture will still exist in 2030, but a number of trends from the past few decades point to a continent that is becoming heavily urbanized, modernized, and blended. Young Europeans are moving out of the towns and into the cities for economic opportunities and vibrancy. They are being joined by significant and growing minority populations of Asians, Middle Easterners, and especially Africans, with Muslim communities growing the fastest.

One reason Europe is changing is that Africa is changing. Overall, Africa is experiencing a population boom unlike anything seen in modern history due to the successful efforts by the international community to reduce infant and child mortality. This is producing a large youth population that, at current rates, will cause the population of sub-Saharan Africa to increase by half by 2025,

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despite the numbers that will succumb to AIDS.[1] However, sub-Saharan Africa does not have the economy to maintain such growth, so these youths are moving about the continent and across to Europe, seeking better lives.

As these peoples congregate in increasingly concentrated areas, the cultures on both continents change. Much of this can happen peacefully, though tensions and occasional flare-ups of violence may be unavoidable. But by 2030, these changes could alter the entire security landscape of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). While there appears to be consensus on the broad nature of the threats, how these people will blend and assimilate against the backdrop of a quarter-century of globalization will best determine what capabilities the United States will need to deal with them.

one reason Europe is changing is that Africa is changing

Where the Trends Lead

Much work is being done to look into the future, but more is needed. For example, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has maintained a marvelous living document that describes the 2030 joint operating environment from a global perspective. However, because it is focused on a world view, it does not go into great detail about the future of the USEUCOM AOR. Instead, it uses individual data points from Europe and Africa to illustrate global trends, and its conclusions and implications for our national military strategy are global as well.

The document focuses rightfully on future characteristics of military operations and therefore the capabilities that the U.S. defense establishment requires to win future wars. However, it pays little or no attention to requirements for theater security cooperation and other preventative Phase Zero activities that involve the interagency community.[2] This is an unfortunate flaw in the document, as security cooperation activities ranging from military-to-military cooperation, education and training, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and others are important in maintaining what it assumes away: U.S. leadership in the world.

While the joint operating environment document discusses an exhaustive range of trends, this article focuses on three areas that make a particular impact on the changing face of Europe and Africa—demographics, resources, and effects of globalization—and the implications these areas have for the U.S. military.

Of the three areas, demographic trends carry the greatest impact. Immigration is a hot issue on both sides of the Atlantic. It affects the United States and Europe differently, though neither is happy with illegal movements. Our culture of assimilation in the pursuit of the American dream has fostered a wide range of immigrant success stories. Moreover, numerous ethnic minority communities are generally satisfied with their lot and therefore do not cause trouble. Finally, there are essentially no restrictions to moving about within the United States.

In Europe, the situation is more complicated. Migrant movements, both inter- and intracontinental, stand against the desire of many indigenous Europeans to maintain their national and cultural identities. Their minority communities, including an intra-European diaspora, do not have the same opportunities to assimilate. Americans have a greater tendency to intermarry among ethnic groups, while minorities in Europe are more likely to marry within their own ethnicity, including arranged marriages, thus reinforcing separation from the majority. This is particularly true of some sectors of Europe's fast-growing Muslim population.[3] This leaves some relegated to a second-class status, subject to xenophobic backlash from their neighbors, and quietly becoming an angry group. Yet the migrants still emigrate because of the economic opportunities.

Indeed, the migrants are coming, and Europe is not in a good position to stop them. Europeans need the migrants to keep their economies going despite their own declining birth rates, and Africa has the young population to provide the labor. Africa's overall population is expected to double from 2000's figure by 2025, compared with Europe's indigenous population, which will decrease slightly. This is fueling a major migration across the Mediterranean, from northern Africa to southern Europe.[4] While some are migrating legally to escape chaos, corruption, or criminal activities back home, increasing numbers are migrating illegally as the result of human trafficking.[5]

Both continents are rapidly urbanizing, following a global trend that will see over three-fifths of the world's populations living in cities by 2030, but the growth in Africa is particularly steep.[6] In the next 10 years alone, 40 African cities will rise above the half-million barrier, 10 of those breaking 1 million. Much of the population growth will occur in less developed countries that are not prepared to handle it. Nigeria (25 percent increase in population by 2015), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (35 percent), and Uganda (45 percent) are three examples of poorly governed or conflict torn nations that will experience such growth.[7] Meanwhile, African nations lag behind the Europeans in providing access to the global information infrastructure and therefore the ability to join the world economic community. Europe's already densely populated cities will see an increase from the current 72 percent to 78 percent of its total population by 2030.[8]

Some parts of the AOR will see sharp reductions in indigenous populations over the next generation. Two regions that seem particularly vulnerable are Central and Eastern Europe and southern Africa. Decline in the former is due primarily to low birth rates. Of the 10 nations with the lowest birth rates in the world, 8 are in this region. Many of these countries are landlocked, such as Belarus, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Moldova. The region also includes the almost-landlocked countries of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia, as well as Poland and Ukraine. Compounding the problem for these nations are their roles as sources of emigrants to Western European countries, particularly Ukraine, which further hastens the overall population decline. Though its birth rates are higher, Russia is also experiencing long-term population decline, especially outside its most populous regions in the southwest.[9] This trend is countered by increases in Chinese immigration, both legal and illegal, into production areas east of the Urals.[10] The overall result is that the future rural landscapes of Europe may be filled with ghost towns.

Southern Africa, on the other hand, will see its population growth reduced due to a more destructive cause: AIDS. Currently, percentages of adults aged 15 to 45 infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus range from almost 19 percent to 33 percent among Africa's six southernmost nations.[11] The raw numbers are staggering now: 24.5 million infected in sub-Saharan Africa compared with 14.1 million in the rest of the world.[12] Awareness of AIDS and its detrimental impacts on African societies will fuel the pursuit of a cure, but short of finding one,



1st Combat Camera Squadron (Joseph McLean)

Right: Navy hospital corpsmen examining woman during medical civic action program in Djibouti, Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa

Below: Marine instructing members of Djibouti National Police on basic weapons procedures and room clearing, Camp Lemonier, Djibouti



U.S. Navy (Eric A. Clement)

SPECIAL FEATURE

many of the infected may remain sequestered from the global society at large and be left to die in place.

The changes in demographics will cause equally dramatic shifts in the demands for fundamental resources: food, water, and waste management, among others. While the amount of food produced globally is theoretically sufficient to prevent starvation now, by 2030 land degradation, soil erosion, and desertification will reduce arable land. Hastily developing locations in the USEUCOM AOR moving toward modernized agriculture are at risk. Potable water is a different matter. The competition for water for human consumption and agriculture is outstripping natural supplies. Many developing nations, especially in Africa, do not have the political or social structures to manage their river systems and ground water sources, particularly as their populations grow.[13] At least one estimate suggests that half of the world's population in 2025 will not have adequate safe drinking water.[14] Meanwhile, waste and pollution are already significant urban problems that population increases will exacerbate.

Modern cities throughout the AOR will also face infrastructural and economic challenges as they cope with this growth. Lack of adequate housing, a shortage of education programs for the young, inadequate health care services and providers, and insufficient transportation networks will be among the problems these cities will face.[15] Health care will be the greatest problem, as now there is a deficiency of 4 million health care workers, and the existing care population is improperly distributed against the demand. This gap in services will widen.[16]

Access to global information technologies that might provide economic opportunities for the young and disadvantaged will also remain unequal. While those in developed and developing areas will have more opportunities to gain regular access to modern and future information technologies, significant parts of the population (including those within developed areas) will be shut out. This is more likely to aggravate current economic disparities than create new ones.[17] As a result of these and other factors, the denizens of underdeveloped locations will probably define progress as things getting worse rather than better.

The third area of interest, impacts of globalization, concerns a broad range of functions under which the societies of the future will operate. Two trends that will shape the security environment in Europe and Africa are the misuse of information technology and the rise of key entities that rival the powers of the nation-state.

Technology should continue to advance in leaps and bounds, with the Internet and its related technologies taking ever-broader roles in the daily activities of ordinary citizens. However, while these technologies benefit the global economy and facilitate greater global social interaction, they also provide a tremendous conduit for criminal activity, such as identity theft, intellectual property infringements, encouragement of illicit sexual or violent behaviors, and hacking or other forms of information warfare. The criminal justice systems of developed countries are already poorly equipped to deal with this domain of crime, the scope of which can be devastating to legitimate business. The Internet as a tool of free speech also has its downfalls. Transnational terrorist groups such as al Qaeda have been effective in using it to spread their ideology, plan training and operations, recruit, and communicate with the public while avoiding physical detection. The problems are too pervasive for governments to intervene via controls or censorship, and security technologies are hard pressed to keep up.

Globalization will cause shifts in the political landscape, as the number of significant political and economic entities that are not nation-states is increasing. These include transnational corporations (TNCs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),[18] and big cities. Some TNCs are already extremely powerful entities. For example, if Wal-Mart were a nation-state, it would have the 22d largest gross domestic product in the world, roughly that of Austria.[19] As TNCs grow rapidly and invest in the developing world, they can catalyze development and stability where nation-state–based programs do not succeed. But while TNCs will engage in social issues and other acts of so-called corporate citizenship,[20] the bottom line will still drive their decisions. Thus, social concerns left wanting by nation-states will fall in the domain of NGOs, which will have the resources, manpower, and will to tackle the world's toughest problems through the charity of the global community. However, not all NGO activities will be welcome, as shown in examples of Islamic charities funding terrorist groups.

The growing size and power of cities in Europe and Africa will disrupt the predominant order of nation-states. Large cities from different nations will forge greater peer-to-peer cooperation to address common economic, political, and security threats that differ vastly from the problems found elsewhere in their respective countries. This teamwork can extend to providing resources for disaster relief, such as that given by New York City to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. The downside is further reinforce-

ment of the separation between the cities and other areas. In countries whose capital is also the lone large metropolis, governments will contend with perceptions of paying attention exclusively to the capital, where TNCs and NGOs are most likely to reside, and none to rural areas. Security and other services such as police, fire, medical care, customs, immigration, border patrol, consequence management, and emergency command and control will be heavily concentrated in the capital, with rural areas getting reduced services. Ungoverned or misgoverned areas may expand rather than contract, leading to poorly patrolled borders and inviting even greater mass migration. Transnational criminal and insurgent groups will seek safe havens in abandoned rural areas to establish operations for moving drugs, trafficking humans, or preparing for terrorist activities.

Nexus of Instability

How will this play out in the USEUCOM AOR? It will differ greatly by region, but overall, nation-states will experience greater pressure to do more to provide stability, security, and the basic needs of their people. Western Europe will likely cope, as will parts of Eurasia and Africa, but the stresses of an urbanized environment will create conditions in 2030 that will generate threats to peace. These threats will increasingly be unconventional as urban areas facilitate hard-to-detect, small-scale, terrorist-style activities at far lower cost and effort than generating conventional threats, although the latter will remain. The following five conditions could spark urban conflict in the future:

- increased competition for critical resources, especially water
- difficult conditions within emerging metropolises
- potential for mass panic, particularly from terrorism and disease
- growing ungoverned or misgoverned areas as populations shift
- general stress from dense populations.

The Adversary in 2030

It is easy to cast people driven to violence as a result of tough living conditions in a mold because there is an expectation in civil society that they should overcome their challenges. Individual actors are dismissed as having mental or emotional illnesses that make them unable to cope and thus prone to violent action. Moreover, latent racism or other prejudices might lead some to believe that certain ethnicities or followers of certain religions are driven to violence. However, the above five conditions will not discriminate. They will cut across all classes, races, and religions. The dwindling majorities will be just as uneasy and fearful as the marginalized minorities. Why and how they will band together and act are the key questions that will lead us to the best approaches to securing and maintaining peace.

The adversary will want to act against those who imposed the undesirable conditions upon them, real or perceived. Hence, conventional avenues such as joining the national armed forces will not resonate because even when the evils are being blamed on a distant nation-state (such as the United States), it is the symbolic local manifestations of that state that will draw attention (such as nearby American TNCs or Embassies). Unconventional, surreptitious activities are also easier for conventional adversaries to perform, so terrorism will continue to be the tactic of choice, although the motivations and methods will differ greatly.

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There are at least five different groups of actors that pose a threat to security, and each interacts differently with the external world. The first three have been part of the strategic environment for some time. *Anarchists* use violence against political targets in response to real or perceived injustice. *State-sponsored terrorist groups* advance a national political agenda or assert national power. Traditionally employed by states against other states, this form of terrorism may prove attractive for some states to check the power of meddling TNCs and NGOs, even if they are not present within the state. *Separatist groups* will endeavor to create geographically separate entities such as new ethnically or ideologically pure states. Some will pursue their goals by force, but others will be nonviolent groups desiring to create and enforce protective enclaves within a society. Pressure by the state to conform could spark violence. These three types of groups are well-understood threats that can be dealt with using current military and law enforcement capabilities.

The other two, however, require responses with new or transformed capabilities. The greatest threat comes from the *rejectionists*, who will actively seek to destroy or overthrow the political system and supplant it with their own ideological form. Currently, there is one clear and present instance of this variety, the *caliphatist threat* of a transnational movement to establish global domination under an Islamist regime. Its adherence to a jihadist ideology and the strict application of sharia law make this movement unappeasable and unconcerned with the use of excessive violence, such as employment of weapons of mass destruction or wanton killing of innocents. Because al Qaeda has successfully conducted attacks and effectively employed the Internet to pursue its ideology, attract recruits, and enable operations, it is conceivable that other rejectionist movements may arise that use similar methods to pursue an alternative ideology.

The fifth group is the *nihilists*. These will be the most unpredictable and are growing increasingly dangerous. Under the hardened conditions of 2030, individual actors will be more prevalent, reacting when provoked, and occasionally combining to form mass disturbances. Many will be otherwise peaceful members of the society who simply become overwhelmed and act out their hostility. Others will be opportunists who will use the cover of ongoing disturbances to steal or vandalize. Small groups could serve as provocateurs or form alliances with other groups such as rejectionists. But nihilists may not initially be part of any movement. By definition, they just want to commit violence. Yet once they have acted without consequence, they will find it easy to join larger violent groups or movements.

Available to these actors in the global environment of 2030 will be a wide range of strategic enablers that will help them plan and conduct operations, recruit and train, and communicate with the public. At the root of these enablers lies the general condition of governance under stress that creates a permissive environment for the actors. This environment permits holes and seams in national or local security such as weakened borders, under-resourced police forces, or bureaucratic infighting over authorities and responsibilities. It generates corruption that permits the

growth of illegal economic activities and organized crime from drugs to arms to trafficking in people. It allows TNCs, NGOs, and other major entities to engage in illegal or unethical practices (such as financing terrorism) unchecked. Finally, it allows problems to fester just below the level of societal response. Each of these enablers provides ways, means, and opportunities for terrorist groups of all sorts to operate, along with access to the populations of potential recruits.

Needed Capabilities

Winning a global campaign for good governance requires combating the nexus of rejectionist ideologies, the harsh conditions that spawn nihilists, and the array of enablers in the strategic environment. To do so requires all elements of national power working together proactively on several fronts to achieve several goals. One front is accelerating growth of civil society under the rule of law to counter the effects of exploding population growth, mass migration, and socioeconomic issues. Another is developing broader avenues to apply elements of national power beyond the nation-state apparatus, which includes all political actors such as TNCs, NGOs, cities, and others, to resolve issues that contribute to the flashpoints that the rejectionists exploit (such as distribution of key resources). Achieving these goals requires the right grand strategy, operationalized through the interagency process in which the U.S. military will play an active role.

One grand strategic idea that appears consistent with these goals is the Cooperative Security approach.[21] This method describes an interdependent world order that recognizes how globalized problems require globalized solutions. American interests are transnational. Conflict prevention and intervention serve to contain unrest to a localized area and keep it from sparking conflict elsewhere. Counterproliferation of arms and WMD is important. But rather than deferring national interests to international organizations, collective security could be achieved through a network of partnerships among the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, African Union, and other key regional organizations. International organizations such as the United Nations would play a role where others fail.

Consequently, the U.S. military will see even greater emphasis on theater security cooperation activities to achieve the objectives of conflict prevention and conventional training and readiness. Other nations will need the capacity to conduct urban operations, supported by highly responsive intelligence. Regional organizations will need similar capacities to mobilize when nation-states require assistance. Roles and responsibilities among nation-states, TNCs, and NGOs must be consistent and actionable. Interoperability among all these efforts is vital and is fostered through direct personal contact among peers. Thus, activities that build relationships between U.S. Servicemembers and those of other nations or entities will be important in building a unified response capability against threats to peace.

The U.S. military will need to devote considerable resources toward consequence management capabilities. The concentration of European and African populaces in the cities brings with it the potential for national collapse as the result of a disaster. Stabilizing a situation and providing humanitarian assistance rapidly will be increasingly important to prevent situational deterioration due to panic and opportunism. Hybrid military and police capabilities, perhaps similar to the gendarmes of other nations, would be useful in instilling order quickly in such chaotic situations. Technological advancements such as robots that can decontaminate areas affected by chemical, biological, or radiological weapons will be important. Scanners capable of diagnosing life-threatening injuries in victims instantaneously will greatly assist doctors in providing care during mass casualty situations. Making these and other capabilities portable in briefcases and distributing them widely around the AOR will go a long way toward establishing goodwill and building confidence within nervous societies.

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A crucial part of the campaign will surround the process of developing rules of engagement that address the new realities. What is permissible and what is forbidden in terms of intelligence gathering, protections of privacy, relationships between or convergence of military and law enforcement capabilities, the laws of war and authorities to engage, handling of violent juveniles, etc., will be important subjects of debate, from both the legal and cultural perspectives. These also represent seams that our adversaries will exploit. These seams must be closed, so that our security forces have the authorities and responsibilities to vigorously pursue the enemies of peace while upholding the rules of law and civil society.

Finally, transparency and strong information operations are necessary to win the campaign of good governance. These are not confined to nation-states, as it is also in the best interests of TNCs, NGOs, and other entities that have stakes in maintaining long-term global stability. To check the threat of nihilist violence, populaces must remain convinced that there are avenues to resolve grievances other than breaking the order of civil society. The rule of law must remain supreme. In the information-heavy environment of the future, values and ethics will be crucial to maintaining civil society, building trust between the people and their governmental institutions, and diffusing the sparks of conflict. The U.S. military is well suited for this role as an example of good citizenship and good stewardship of the public trust.

Looking into the future, especially beyond a whole generation, is hard business. Applying the conclusions is equally difficult when one is attempting to develop requirements and capabilities to address that future. While the USJFCOM joint operating environment document builds a framework for explaining a range of threats and defining the requisite future combat capabilities for the U.S. military, it does not address the whole story of Europe and Africa in 2030. That story will be a battle for good governance over highly concentrated populations that will not resemble today's Europeans and Africans. In Europe particularly, there will be tremendous stresses and strains on these societies that will challenge governmental ability to maintain stability. Getting the answers right requires putting aside what the people of these two continents look like now and understanding how the faces of Europe and Africa will look then. **JFQ**



Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic (Roger S. Duncan)

Left: Marine checks French assault rifle during desert survival training led by French army in Djibouti

Below: Coastguardsmen discussing boarding tactics with members of Djibouti navy aboard USCGC *Midgett*, Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa



U.S. Coast Guard, Pacific Area (Mariana O'Leary)

NOTES

[1] The 2006 Population Reference Bureau, *2006 World Population Data Sheet*, 6, available at <www.prb.org/pdf06/06WorkDataSheet.pdf>, predicts that sub-Saharan Africa will grow from 767 million to 1.151 billion people between 2005 and 2025.

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