

Remaining Relevant In The 21st Century

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Remaining Relevant in the 21st Century.

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Research Question: Is the direction, as defined in the Department of the Navy White Papers "...From the Sea", "Forward From the Sea", the Marine Corps operational concept "Operational Maneuver From the Sea", and the 31st Commandant's Planning Guidance, the manner in which the Marine Corps should be concentrating to remain relevant in the 21st century political and military environment? Are there any institutional changes which may be incorporated that might enhance Marine Corps relevancy?

Discussion:

We are entering an era of smaller, mainly unconventional and culturally motivated conflicts, waged for the most part either inside, rather than outside national boundaries, or in an environment in which boundaries do not matter at all. This chaotic situation of many smaller crises ranges from well-publicized natural disasters, to ethnic unrest, to civil wars. While the American military may remain focused on major regional conflicts, the most likely challenges we will confront already exist in the form of ethnic and religious conflicts, international terrorism, and drug trafficking. The forces required for such operations are generally small in number with specialized capabilities and assets designed to arbitrate, contain, and control conflict, reestablish stability, or assist law enforcement, other government, nongovernmental

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organizations (NGOs), and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) to accomplish these "things."

This study hypothesizes the 21st century world order and threat environment. It analyzes the nature of future warfare and the probable implications for a 21st century military force. It reviews current Department of the Navy strategic guidance, as well as Marine Corps specific direction, which delineates the envisioned role of the future Marine Corps. It provides an assessment of the capability required to follow this direction and the feasibility of attaining and maintaining this desired capability. Finally, it offers some "new think" which may serve to ensure the relevancy of the Marine Corps during the next century.

Conclusions:

The Marine Corps of the 21st century is envisioned to be oriented toward the world's littoral regions, operating forward deployed, with the capability to respond swiftly to any emerging crises by projecting sustainable combined arms power from the sea to any foreign shore. We are to be a strategically mobile, tactically flexible, and immediately ready force inextricably linked to the Navy for the projection and presence of Naval power overseas. We are to be prepared to seize, through forcible entry operations, and defend an adversary's port, naval base or coastal air base in order to enable the flow/entry of follow-on land-based air and ground forces.

Yet, due to budget considerations, we may not possess the capability to execute this vision. The Marine Corps cannot modernize the force, cannot procure the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), cannot procure the MV-22 Osprey, cannot procure required ammunition, cannot pay for operations and maintenance, and cannot provide the

quality of life that our Marines deserve while maintaining an active end strength of 174,000 Marines. With a total requirement for only 90,750 MAGTF Marines, it is time to rethink our hard and fast stand on force structure and refocus our roles and mission on a much "leaner and meaner," more modernized, more efficient Marine Corps.

It is time to face the reality of the illusion of maintaining "three combat divisions and air wings". In doing so, we should realign the units stationed in Hawaii with I MEF and do away with III MEF. It is also time to reorient our focus from the MEF waging sustained land combat back to our proper maritime role. We should explore expanding the utilization of our capabilities triad. Based upon the probable 21st century environment and nature of future conflict, we should also examine the feasibility of assuming the role of the nation's premier Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) force. In particular, we should become the nation's force of choice for peace operations commitments.

In order for the Marine Corps to remain relevant in the 21st century, it must understand that the nature of future conflict is much more complex, and delicate, than what we have experienced for most of the 20th century. It will require a Marine Corps that is better educated and trained; an institution that is rightsized and modernized for maximum efficiency, and senior leadership who understand the intricate political objectives of a changing world environment and realize that continuing to do "business" the old way will not serve this nation well in unconventional, culturally motivated, conflicts in which national boundaries are not relevant.

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Remaining Relevant in the 21st Century

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the world scene is changing rapidly. Although the economic systems of the globe are increasingly interdependent, and the flow of information and technology facilitate our mutual cooperation and global integration, there is an increasing trend towards fragmentation of global stability. Gone are the days of superpower bipolarity. Instead, we face an anarchical world in which potential balance of power confrontations, and conflicts involving ethnic and religious issues, as well as threats against nation-states by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organizations abound. This changing world situation has major implications for the changing use of military force. Now more than ever, the United States must maintain its world leadership position. While we must be capable of deterring aggression by maintaining overseas presence and participating in multilateral peace efforts, we must also be exploring the military means to respond to this changing world.

The current National Security Strategy (NSS) of engagement and enlargement has seemingly placed the United States in a role of global peacekeeper and erstwhile nation assistance provider which is proving to be extremely expensive and difficult to execute during a period of diminishing resources. Additionally, the strategy to "help" defeat aggression in two near simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) addresses the threat of the Cold War and not the most likely challenges American forces will confront during the initial decades of

the 21st century. The National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy (NMS) do, however, recognize that Low Intensity Conflict (LIC),¹ and Gray Area Phenomena (GAP),² are challenges to U.S. national security, and provide a strategy for combating these problems. As we stand today, there is a glaring mismatch between current and future policy/strategy and appropriations/resources to carry out that policy and strategy. It is unlikely that the defense budget, and therefore the Marine Corps' budget, will increase in the immediate future. With an internal cry to shift our focus from the international dimension of security to the domestic dimension and a subsequent realignment of Department of Defense (DoD) dollars to domestic issues, we cannot afford to maintain the force structure and associated capabilities that we and our allies are accustomed to. We must caution against overstretching ourselves. Therefore, given the potential 21st century security environment and the continued downsizing of military resources, it is time to reassess the envisioned Marine Corps' role within the next century.

CHAPTER TWO

21ST CENTURY ENVIRONMENT

The world today is indeed a very complex and uncertain place. It is a world in which ethnicity, religion, and special interests are beginning to influence geography, nations, and political ideology in producing alliances and conflicts.³ For the foreseeable future, nations of the world will continue to align themselves in a new pattern of international political and economic order. The familiar bipolar world of the last half century has become multipolar. An in-depth look of the world might indicate that militarily, the world is unipolar, with no serious rival to the United States. Economically, the world is tripolar with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan sharing center stage, with China poised to emerge as an economic power as well, and in terms of transnational interdependence, the world is multipolar.

New World Order

While some factors appear to be drawing the nations of the world together, many other factors indicate a "falling apart" of the world order as it stands today. There exists, to a limited extent, an advancement beyond the mere coexistence of independent, self-interested states to a true community of shared interests, goals, and resources - in essence the emergence of a true cooperative interdependent global nationality. Shared information through the continuous exchange of ideas along with the integration of financial, commercial, environmental, and security issues facilitate this emergence. On the other hand, partly as a result of the end of the Cold War, there is an ever increasing trend toward global disintegration. Potential balance of

power confrontations, conflicts involving nations and peoples of different ethnic groups and religious backgrounds, as well as the rise of GAP which threaten the stability of nation-states by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organizations, all contribute significantly to the varying degrees of world disorder.⁴

It may be argued that we will not be conducting information warfare but rather conducting warfare in an information age.⁵ Regardless, the information revolution is shaping a world that is much more different than the world that created and employed modern military forces in the 20th century. In the absence of a bipolar superpower dominance based upon political ideology, the relative power of the world's nations will very likely decline while the power of transnational special interest groups such as business conglomerates, crime syndicates, and advocacy organizations, will increase.⁶ These organizations, drug cartels for example, often times have more power, wealth, and status than many nations. They may have larger armies, more capable intelligence services/agencies, and more influential diplomatic services than many countries. Transnational corporations may in fact decide to put their own military forces in the field if state or governmental forces cannot impose order. It is very conceivable that a mega oil company may organize its own army to protect oil fields from a terrorist attack. Additionally, the ability of nations to control their borders against the flow of people, commodities, and information is declining. Military weaponry is diffusing beyond the control of governments, while global wealth continues to concentrate within Europe and the Pacific Rim.

Ethnic and religious conflicts are spreading and pose significant threats to regional and global stability. Christians are fighting against Muslims. Muslims are joining sides against their brother Muslims. Protestants are killing Catholics. Palestinians are conducting terrorist attacks

against Jews. The end of ideologically defined states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union permits traditional religious animosity and ethnic rivalry to surface and serve as sources of conflict. Differences in culture and religion create differences over issues ranging from human rights, illegal immigration, trade, commerce, and the environment. Misaligned geographical boundaries give rise to conflicting territorial disputes. Within the Caucasus powderkeg alone, Christian Armenians, Muslim Kurds and Arabs ally together because of their mutual legacy of hatred toward Turks.⁷ The Israelis support Turkic peoples because Arabs support the Christians. The Iranians see the Armenians as allies against the Turks but are torn because Azeri Turks are Shi'a Muslims. In Bosnia, Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and Bosnian Muslims have again been fighting as old enemies and hatreds vent forth.

Experience suggests that actual or anticipated imbalances of power that favor hegemonic development are a threat to our vital interests. Three examples quickly come to mind - militarily, the Germans and Japanese during World War II, and economically, the Japanese during the 1980's. Power may take any of several forms - military, economic, political, or cultural. Regardless, the essence of power is influence over behavior. From a strategic viewpoint, military, economic, or cultural power can all be reduced to the common currency of greater or lesser control over behavior. The ever changing distribution of this power will ensure that the world will long remain a dangerous place. While the demise of the Soviet empire has removed a superpower adversary and produced a period of superpower peace, the world is far from ushering in an era of general peace. In fact, a combustive vacuum has been created into which national, ethnic, and religious antagonisms are very much the order of the day and which could easily trigger a generation of wars.⁸ Current events in the Balkans are revealing the

repetitiveness of history rather than its end. The huge area of anarchy that stretches between the Baltic, the Adriatic, and the Caspian seas is a seedbed of further conflicts and confrontations.⁹ Europe's drive toward integration has been thrown into mass confusion. Historically, when Russian influence in Europe has receded, German influence has advanced. Although Germany is currently preoccupied with the process of reunification, this internal preoccupation will likely end much sooner than Russia's disarray, causing an imbalance of military and economic power to again reappear in Europe in the near future. Within Asia, China and North Korea are seen as potential challenges to the world's balance of power via military means. Economically, there is an increasing gap between rich and poor countries. Markets are emerging in areas such as North and South America, Europe, and the Pacific Rim, yet the majority of countries will remain poor causing ethnic tensions and possible imbalance of power conflicts. Economically, Japan or even China may be seen as challenging the balance of power by its unfair trade practices.

What will this new era look like? We can anticipate that the 21st century will continue to be an age of exponential increase in the number and type of players on the international scene. Besides the huge increase in the number of nation states - there were only 51 nations in the United Nations when it was founded at the beginning of the Cold War; in 1994, that number jumped to 184 nations.¹⁰ The International society of Geographers estimates that as many as 50 new nation-states may emerge from the religious, ethnic, nationalistic, and separatist political violence and tribal factionalism that are confronting one another around the planet.¹¹ The 21st century can expect to contain at least six powers: the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and probably India. We will undoubtedly witness the slow emergence of China as a great military power and certainly will see the augmentation of the military power of the

economically gigantic trading empire that is Japan. We will likely see the even firmer arrival of India as a regional power. Within Europe, we may see the revival of a Western European defense entity hinged on the Paris-Bonn/Berlin axis and associated with some of Moscow's security clients in East-Central Europe.

Yet, there has been a fundamental change in the conduct of international affairs. Nation states still remain the primary actors. No nation state will relinquish sovereignty to any regional or supranational organization because of the strong desire to remain a viable, independent player within the arena of global politics. However, they will very likely be members of multinational economic organizations that may or may not be regional. Increasingly international actors (UN, NATO, EU) and a wide variety of non-governmental organizations are making themselves felt in the international arena.¹² Transnational actors such as religious movements, terrorist groups, drug cartels, and others influence international relations. Subnational groups such as the Serbs, Kurds, Zulus, and Palestinians are attempting to elevate their issues from matters of internal politics to a level of international concern.¹³

What are the implications for the United States? Victory in the Cold War has propelled America into a world which bears many similarities to the European state system of the 18th and 19th centuries. The absence of an overriding ideological or strategic threat frees nations to pursue foreign policies based upon on their immediate national interest. What is clear about the new emerging world order is that, for the first time, the United States can neither withdraw from the world nor dominate it. In the post Cold War world, the various elements of national power - military, political, and economic, are likely to grow more congruent and more symmetrical. The relative military power of the US will gradually decline because the absence of a clear-cut

adversary will produce domestic pressure to shift resources from defense to other priorities. When there is no longer a single threat and each country perceives its perils from its own national perspective, those societies which had nestled under US protection will feel compelled to assume greater responsibility for their own security allowing the United States, if it chooses, to selectively engage in security actions. The United States will be required to develop a military strategy which ensures its security and preserves its position of leadership. While there may not be a single threat, the US and its allies will face threats from virtually all directions and at all levels of warfare. It will be a security environment that virtually demands a maritime strategy.

The Threat

Many nations of the world in the early 21st century almost certainly will be keenly interested in maintaining a peaceful attitude toward their neighbors. The industrial infrastructure will have been modernized. Many will possess a new status within the new order of nations. For many, this change will be accompanied by national benefits and increasing economic growth. Most nations will attempt to moderate the new surge and growth of nationalism. Yet, there remains a good chance that due to increasing competition for scarce resources needed by new and old industrial states, virtually all nations will prepare for war by investing in a conventional military establishment.¹⁴ Even more importantly, there are other threats that we may face which may be as lethal if not more so.

The U.S. Army, in their TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*, indicates that the 21st century threat spectrum contains three categories of threats which United States Armed

Forces may encounter. The first category of threat is defined as phenomenological.¹⁵

Phenomenological threats are non-military threats resulting from human occurrences and experiences which may require a military response or support and can include environmental disasters, health epidemics, famine, major population dislocations and illegal immigrations.

The second category is non-nation security threats which are threats posed by non-nation entities. They are categorically divided into subnational, anational, and metanational threats.¹⁶ Subnational threats include the political, racial, religious, cultural, and ethnic conflicts that challenge the defining features and authority of the nation state from within. As national bonds become less important, allegiance to these subnational groups is increasing. Anational threats operate without regard to the authority of their nation states. They are not part of the nation state nor do they desire to be so. Regional organized crime, piracy, and terrorist activities comprise these threats. Metanational threats move beyond the nation state and operate on an international or global scale. They include religious movements, international criminal organizations, and informal economic organizations that facilitate weapons proliferation.

Gray Area Phenomena (GAP) can be found in all three threat categories. One need only to read the newspaper or watch television to see the number and diversity of GAP threats around the world. Examples of these threats include: the globalization of organized crime, drug trafficking, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and other infectious diseases, emigration, and famine. Famine in Somalia led to gangster and war-lordism, making aid missions difficult. The Somali government was unable to quell the violence and neighboring Kenya's stability was threatened.¹⁷ In Peru and Colombia, insurgency and the international drug trade feed political terrorism and killing causing political refugees and illegal migrants.¹⁸

International organized crime and its diversified operations are increasingly capable of disrupting, if not completely, destabilizing nations. Italy's mafia and Colombia's drug cartels have done just that. Infectious diseases such as AIDS, cholera, and tuberculosis all of which are on the increase and readily travel across national boundaries add to the GAP threat to the traditional nation-state. Yet, GAP effects are often ignored or when recognized, not incorporated into any viable political policy or military strategy action equation until it reaches a major destabilizing, or legitimacy threatening crisis stage within the community of nations. Even then, because of jurisdictional and organizational boundaries and understandings, nation-states cannot easily respond to such threats.

The porusness of international borders means that international crime, narcotics, disease, terrorists, illegal immigrants, pollution, and smugglers of nuclear materiel pose even greater threats to our national security. For example, the cocaine cartels have financial resources that rival those of entire nations. The drug bosses offered to pay the national debt of Colombia, \$14 billion, if its government would refrain from signing an extradition treaty with the United States.¹⁹ By providing jobs, building affordable housing and public facilities, and donating millions of dollars each year to the poor, the drug cartels have put together a formidable political base. The drug traffickers have presented themselves as an attractive alternative to existing civil authorities, who are perceived to be supporting the United States against the best interests of the people.

The third category of threat is defined as nation state forces, the militaries and security forces of internationally recognized nations.²⁰ Nation state forces can run the range from internal security forces, the small poorly trained and equipped forces of the less-developed world that

can maintain order within a country but would be hard pressed to defend its borders, to infantry based armies such as the Afghanistan forces, to the complex, adaptive armies such as our own Army. Though most national military establishments in the Third World, which today includes much of the former Soviet Union, are incapable of waging large scale conventional warfare, the few that are or have the potential to do so are all authoritarian states with ambitions hostile to U.S. security interests. These countries include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, North Korea and China. Russia can probably be excluded from this list only for the early decades of the new century.

In my view, China may well be "the threat" of the early 21st century. China's vast and talented population and spectacular economic performance could provide the foundation for a military challenge in Asia of a magnitude similar to that posed by the growth of Japanese military power in the 1930's. With the Chinese seizure and occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratley Islands during early 1995, China has shown itself in what the region regards as a major territorial dispute, as an emerging power seeking to write its own rules for international order.²¹ This act both in symbol and substance may foreshadow a role reversal in the Pacific, with China ultimately displacing the traditional US preeminence. China has in fact stepped up a systematic military modernization program, conventional and nuclear, aimed at attaining blue water naval projection and long range air power projection capabilities.²² The question is not whether China will be a major regional and global power; that is a fact of life. The question facing the Asia-Pacific community and therefore the rest of the world is on whose terms China will become such a power. One can surmise that China's emergence is for the 21st century what Germany's emergence was in the 19th century that destroyed the existing European balance resulting in two world wars.²³ Yet, however strong the Chinese or Third World nation state forces may be, it is, I

believe, the first two categories of threats that will comprise the true nature of conflict within the next century.

CHAPTER THREE

NATURE OF FUTURE CONFLICT

An assumption - neither general war nor a war between the United States and any other military equal state, nor a war among other major 20th or 21st century powers will occur before 2020.²⁴

Major General Mike Myatt of the CNO's staff (N85) gave his assessment of future conflict in a brief entitled "Chaos in the Littorals."²⁵

We have probably seen the future in our operations since 1989, but the scenarios will get worse by an order of magnitude. Natural disasters routinely kill tens of thousands every year. Mass migrations are becoming a cause of conflict and tension between developed nations and the third world. Nation states are failing in Africa and the former Soviet sphere of influence. These failures often lead to conflicts which cause humanitarian crises and the evacuation of foreign nationals. The possibility of nuclear, biological, chemical, or environmental disaster on an as yet unheard of scale is a very real possibility. Any of these may result from accident, decay, or conflict. In any case, the implications are potentially catastrophic.

The character of conflicts is changing. Violence of all kinds continues to increase throughout the world - terrorism, tribal and ethnic slaughter, religious conflicts, intifada type resistance, drug wars, riots, and more. Predictions such as William S. Lind's on Fourth generation warfare, Martin Van Creveld's on nontrinitarian warfare, Samuel P. Huntington's on the clash of civilizations, and Robert D. Kaplan's on widespread anarchy seem to be materializing before our eyes.²⁶ The nation-state appears to be losing its monopoly on war, and its hold on its citizens' loyalty in a growing part of the world. The two are closely related. One of the most important roles of the state is to protect its people. When that ability is lost, it loses the loyalty of the people. Those loyalties will transfer to whatever organizations can protect them, typically those non-state entities such as ethnic groups, gangs, ideologies, and religions.

The world has entered a period of radical and often violent transformation. Conflict will be waged in so many ways at such fluctuating levels of intensity. We will operate in a world in which we may be forced to engage enemies who operate outside of the traditional structures and rules that have defined our past military behavior. Conflicts involving irregular forces may most frequently elicit US involvement. The enemies we are likely to face will not be "soldiers" with the disciplined modernity that term conveys in European armies, but "warriors."²⁷ Warriors can be defined as erratic primitives who shift allegiance as the situation dictates, are habituated to violence, and have no stake in civil order. They are the underclass of society. They are opportunists, patriots, zealots, fanatics. They may be renegade military, terrorists, narcocriminals, militias, or persons dispossessed by a conflict. Warriors do not play by modern rules of war and do not respect our treaties nor do they obey orders that they do not like. They have nothing to lose and are absolute merciless in their waging of war. They snipe, ambush, rape, murder on a scale approaching genocide, mislead and betray. They attempt to fool the constrained soldiers confronting them into alienating the local population of allies, while they simply hunker down and try to outlast the organized military forces facing them.²⁸ Their warfare may limit or even negate our conventional technological advantage.

In any future commitment-from humanitarian assistance to regional war-we can now expect to encounter unconventional opposition. Most of the world understands that countering US conventional combat power with conventional forces is folly. Nations unable to compete in technology might seek to bypass their enemy's armed forces and directly attack his culture or undermine his will by some combination of measures such as terrorism, LIC, political maneuvering, psychological warfare, and information management.²⁹ Despite being militarily

superior, a national military may fail to defeat a non-state enemy. The American forces in Somalia, the British in Northern Ireland, and the Russians in Afghanistan are all examples of this.

William S. Lind, in an October 1989 *Marine Corps Gazette* article entitled "The Changing Face of Warfare: Into the Fourth Generation," addressed three generations of warfare and an emerging fourth generation.³⁰ First and second generation warfare were thought to be technology driven characterized by massed manpower and massed firepower respectively. Third generation warfare was considered to be idea driven characterized by maneuver. It was proffered that the emerging fourth generation was driven by both technology and ideology and would likely be fought in a complex arena of LIC and would include tactics and techniques from earlier generations. It was also thought that fourth generation warfare would be fought across the spectrums of political, social, economic, informational, and military networks and would be fought worldwide and involve a mix of national, international, transnational, and subnational actors. Martin Van Creveld, in *The Transformation of War*, also contends that future warfare will not be relatively simple high tech conventional war, but rather extremely complex low-intensity conflict.³¹

We have in fact seen the rise of a growing external threat to our modern military system based on terrorism/LIC. Terrorism/LIC is being employed by those outside of western society as a counter to our modern military system and its method of conducting war.³² A terrorist can attack attributes of our military system without in turn being subjected to certain harm. The threat this form of warfare possesses to western civilization is immense and cannot be discounted because its decentralized nature, stealth based attacks and ability to grind down

western security and peacekeeping forces makes it extremely difficult to contend with.

Terrorist/LIC warfare places the future of the nation-state in considerable doubt with a loss of its monopoly over the reins of politically organized violence. Terrorism on its own is a significant threat, but it has now been blended with guerrilla warfare based on LIC.³³

Terrorist/LIC acts are viewed in the West as morally repugnant and cowardly in nature. This form of warfare, with its reliance upon the indiscriminate killing of soldier and civilian alike, is seen as dishonorable and criminal. It is also very effective as the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, the bombing of the World Trade Center and the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995 can attest to.

Four trends have been identified regarding terrorist/LIC warfare in the future. First, there will be a definite increase in the frequency and effectiveness of this type of warfare as non-western opponents refine this form of warfare. Second, the escalation of these attacks on American soil due to the inability of our modern military system to defend against such attack?³⁴ Third, the institutionalization of this form of warfare by non-western states as the preferred means of conducting war against the west. Fourth, there is an increasing potential that this form of warfare may in fact be adopted by various elements of American society such as inner city gangs engaged in drug trafficking.³⁵

If we are to combat this terrorist/LIC form of fourth generation warfare, we must go beyond joint operations to interagency operations. If the enemy is going to strike across the spectrum of human activity then our national response must be coordinated across the multiple national agencies that deal with international issues. It will require much more intelligence gathering, analytical, and disseminating capability to serve a highly flexible, interagency

command system.³⁶

In addition to the terrorism/LIC form of warfare, the future warfare environment will increasingly consist of operations other than full scale war; what is termed as military operations other than war (MOOTW). United States interests have increased the number of and expanded the range of MOOTW that the Armed Forces may be required to perform or support. MOOTW includes operations, that may or may not be combat related, and involve the employment of forces in pursuit of limited objectives, often for a prescribed period of time and against forces, including non-nation state armies, operating outside of western convention.³⁷ These operations can include: humanitarian assistance, peace operations, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), strikes and raids, combating terrorism, and counterdrug operations.³⁸ They will most probably be multinational and multiagency operations and involve non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs).³⁹ Overwhelming decisive power is a "must have." In MOOTW, decisive power may not be firepower but food delivered to starving civilians or a demonstration of joint military capability so decisive that an adversary modifies its behavior to meet friendly goals. Regardless of the type of operation, the one constant factor is that political concerns, the delicate legal and political constraints that leaders and followers alike face, will dominate the military operation. General Myatt in his assessment of "chaos in the littorals" provides a very vivid description of the endless possibilities of these types of operations. If recent history is indicative of the future, then one can surmise that between forward presence and crises response, naval forces will regularly conduct MOOTW.

What roles must the 21st century military force be capable of performing? Over 867

overseas bases have been closed, replaced, or reduced in the last 4 years.⁴⁰ This decrease in forward presence combined with the increase in littoral crises, requires that we concentrate on our ability to undertake expeditionary operations. There is certainly a need for expeditionary forces.⁴¹ Water covers 70% of the planet and over 80% of the world's nations are in the littorals. Within 200 miles of the sea, resides 7 out of every 10 people on earth. Regarding national capitols, 4 of every 5 are located within the littorals. Of cities with a population of over 1 million, 125 are located in the littorals and by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, that number is estimated to rise to over 300 cities. With the end of the Cold War and the growing instability in the world, there is greater latitude for U. S. involvement in the littorals. In 1993 alone, some 70 nations experienced some kind of disorder.

The 21st century force must be an integrated/joint, flexible force capable of being mobilized quickly and projected rapidly over extended ranges and sustained effectively over prolonged periods. The overall force must be capable of performing a wide range of missions under a variety of circumstances and conditions around the world, from fighting regional wars against such potential enemies as China, North Korea, and Iraq, to fighting against "warriors," to conducting operations other than war. Additionally, this future force must contain a forward presence capability in order to deter would be aggressors and prevent such conflicts. One can surmise that the majority of conflicts involving US. forces will be MOOTW or LIC, as few states will risk open war with the United States. Consequently, the 21st century military must recognize LIC, what some term as "Gray War," as a major warfighting arena.⁴²

Yet, from Somalia to Bosnia, we have learned that the end of superpower conflict does not mean the end of regional conflict. Instability in the developing world will continue to pose a

significant threat to U. S. interests. It is impossible to tell which of the conceivable surging forces will be most dominant or most threatening. Will it be Russia, China, or perhaps radical Islam? Perhaps it will be some sort of combination. Three of the world's five largest armies are in the developing world.⁴³ All countries now seeking to become nuclear powers are in the developing world and most are not friends of the United States?⁴⁴ Accordingly, while our major focus may in fact shift to LIC warfare and MOOTW, it behooves us to ensure that our capability to win a large scale war is retained.

Traditionally, the nation-state has depended upon the police or the military to defend it. More recently, we have turned to international peacekeeping forces to react to destabilizing violence and disorder around the world backing up police forces that are outgunned and outmanned. This trend will very likely continue well into the next century. The U.S. military has increasingly since the end of the Cold War, and will continue to be, called upon to react to GAP issues ranging from political terrorism and drug trafficking, to Third World famine, natural disaster, and threats of political destabilization.⁴⁵ Assessing the nature and magnitude of these nontraditional threats and methods for dealing with them, fighting GAP will demand quick, reflexive, and free-form thinking. The thrust and direction in combating GAP must be rooted in law enforcement as most GAP activities, such as drug trafficking and political terrorism, are criminal in nature.⁴⁶ GAP operations will not only be joint operations with other services but combined operations with other nations. In order to drive these operations, the military might be called upon to provide intelligence, monitoring, and development of all source actionable intelligence.⁴⁷ Legitimate transfers of forces, whether it be excess Navy ships or military reconnaissance and surveillance assets, to the Coast Guard during their support of the

nation's law enforcement agencies may prove useful in the war on drugs.⁴⁸ Other illegal activities may be prevented by applying future technology and resources to improve abilities to enforce embargos, no-fly zones, or civil order.⁴⁹ The discipline, field skills, and organizational expertise of infantryman may be of value to agencies seeking to gain control of our porous borders or regain order in our cities. Within this environment, interagency operations crossing military and civilian law enforcement jurisdictions and activities will be common place. Although difficult to fathom now, within the 21st century this must be recognized, understood, and incorporated into law and military doctrine.

Those forces allocated to conduct MOOTW must be able to go beyond joint operations to interagency operations. They must be capable of coordinating across the multiple national agencies that deal with international issues. Additionally, they will require much more intelligence gathering, analytical, and disseminating capability to serve a highly flexible, interagency command system. These forces may be required to look, equip, and prepare themselves in a very different fashion from today's forces. These specialized units might even be removed entirely from the regular force structure and placed under a command that aimed to train its forces largely for the peace-keeping mission. This command would contain its own organic engineers, military police, logistics, communications, psychological operations, and civil affairs elements as well as its own mobility and protective capabilities. These MOOTW oriented units would facilitate the majority of the MOOTW mission to be concentrated in units that are specifically educated and trained for this mission. This would negate the requirement for regular conventional forces to conduct operations for which they have little or no training; leaving them to focus on their regular combat skills. In fact, the Army in their Force XXI

pamphlet states that "although we envision achieving success in MOOTW through training, the possibility of tailoring forces based on the unique requirements of MOOTW should be explored".⁵⁰

In summary, the 21st century force must be expeditionary in nature, focused on the littorals, capable of deterring and defeating aggression in major regional conflicts, yet flexible enough to operate in a LIC environment against an unconventional opposition, and trained to conduct delicate MOOTW missions. This overall 21st century force can be established either by creating more diverse multi-mission forces or more narrowly tailored, specialized forces. Now that we have examined the forces required for the 21st century, what role is currently envisioned for the Marine Corps in the next century?

CHAPTER FOUR

CURRENT GUIDANCE

The 82nd Congress articulated and wrote into law that the Marine Corps would be organized "as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings" and would be organized, trained, and equipped for "service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." Additionally, the Marine Corps is to "perform such other duties as the President may direct." The Congressional Conference Report that supported the legislation went on to say that a "strong force in readiness" was required and that such a force would have "a very powerful impact in relation to minor international disturbances." This force would be able to "prevent the growth of potentially large conflagrations by prompt and vigorous action during their initial stages."⁵¹

"For service with the fleet" indicates that the Marine Corps is, above all, part of the Navy-Marine Corps team. "Seizure" and "land operations" indicate missions that require the team to be an amphibious force for the projection and presence of naval power overseas. However, the additional requirement to perform "such other duties as the President may direct" indicates that the force should be as flexible as possible in terms of when, where, and how it can be employed.

The current National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy provide the framework for the DoD as we transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. The Secretary of the Navy's vision and new direction for the Naval service in the 21st century has

been defined in two documents: "...*From the Sea*" and "*Forward.. From the Sea*". Marine Corps operational concepts such as Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and Other Expeditionary Operations (OEO) provide broad principles and directions for operations and force development. The current Commandant, upon assuming command in July of 1995, issued strategic direction for the Marine Corps in his *Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG)*. Designed to serve as a roadmap delineating "where the Marine Corps is going and why, what the Marine Corps will do...", the intent of the CPG is to focus our thought and effort on where and what we want the Marine Corps to be in the 21st century.⁵² What then do these documents say about the role of the Marine Corps in the 21st century?

"...From the Sea"

With the publication of "...*From The Sea*" in September 1992, the Department of the Navy announced a landmark shift in operational focus. The naval forces would shift from a Cold War, open ocean, blue water naval strategy to a regional, littoral, and expeditionary focus. The littoral region was defined as "those areas adjacent to the oceans and seas that are within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking power of sea-based forces."⁵³ Based upon the current striking power of naval forces, these areas can extend up to approximately 650 nautical miles from the coastal region.⁵⁴ "...*From The Sea*" articulated that our maritime capabilities are particularly well tailored for forward presence and crises response missions and offered that the new naval force must expand and capitalize upon its traditional expeditionary roles by being specifically designed to operate forward and to respond swiftly to any emerging crises.⁵⁵ With an eye to joint operations, by focusing on the littoral area, the Navy and Marine Corps could

seize and defend an adversary's port, naval base or coastal air base in order to allow for the entry of heavy Army or Air Force forces. In fact, the document went on to state that Navy and Marine Corps "equipment design...and task force structure would be optimized for taking and holding objectives on or near the enemy's coastline."⁵⁶ In order to accomplish this, several immediate tasks were assigned to the Navy and Marine Corps. In addition to Marine expeditionary staffs being able to command a joint task force and function as, or host, a Joint Force Air Component Commander, two other Marine specific tasks were identified: provide the Marines with the medium-lift aircraft that is required and increase emphasis on generation of high-intensity power projection, support of force ashore, and weapons necessary to fulfill the mission.⁵⁷ These tasks, designed to facilitate our ability to project power from the sea in the critical littoral regions of the world, would serve as the basis for much in house fighting during the Department of the Navy (DoN) budget wars.

"Forward .. .From the Sea"

In 1994, *"Forward ..From The Sea"* was published to address the unique contributions of naval expeditionary forces in peacetime operations, in responding to crises, and in regional conflicts.⁵⁸ During the two year period between the two documents, DoD conducted a review of strategy and force requirements which emphasized the importance of maintaining forward-deployed naval forces. Stating that naval forces are the foundation of peacetime forward presence operations and overseas response to crises, *"Forward ...From The Sea"* articulated that the most important role of naval forces in situations short of war is to be engaged in forward

areas, with the objectives of preventing conflicts and controlling crises.⁵⁹ The document went on further to say that our basic presence "building blocks" would remain Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups with special operations capable Marine Expeditionary Units. In a crises, the naval expeditionary force would provide the means for immediate sea-based response - to include forcible entry operations into coastal port and airfield facilities and providing the protective cover essential to enabling the flow of follow-on land-based air and ground forces. Expanding on the. . . *From The Sea* concept that "expeditionary" implies a mind set, a culture, and a commitment to forces that are designed to be deployed forward and to respond swiftly, "Forward... From The Sea" was an attempt to convey the point that forward-deployed naval forces provide the critical operational linkages between peacetime operations and the initial requirements of a developing crises or major regional contingency.

Operational Maneuver From the Sea

As stated in the Commandant's Planning Guidance published by the 31st Commandant, "OMFTS is a new concept of naval warfare which covers the full spectrum of conflict...and reflects a fundamental re-orientation toward the littoral regions."⁶⁰ It is a blend of maneuver warfare and classic maritime strategy. It is a concept for the projection of naval power ashore and is viewed as a response to both danger and opportunities; danger as seen in the increasing "chaos in the littorals" and opportunities such as enhancements in information management, battlefield mobility, and conventional weapon lethality.⁶¹

As has been discussed thus far, future warfare will be anything but predictable. The involved actors and their associated goals, armaments, and tactics are numerous and varied in

nature. The only constant within this environment is their close proximity to the littorals. OMFTS treats the littoral as a single environment; a single battlespace in which naval expeditionary forces move without interruption from ships at sea to their objectives inland. While OMFTS is the maneuver of naval forces at the operational level, it is much more than that. Incorporating the six principles identified within the concept, OMFTS, as in maneuver warfare, can be defined as a "thinking process." It is a means to get inside the enemy's decision loop by extensively using the sea as an avenue for gaining an advantage over that enemy.

There are two key guiding principles identified within the OMFTS concept that convey strategic direction for the Marine Corps. The first principle is that it is imperative for the Marine Corps to resist the temptation to prepare for only one conflict and only one type of threat. This is due to the unpredictable, chaotic warfare environment depicted earlier. As the concept states, "to focus on one threat, alter all, greatly increases the danger that we will be surprised, and perhaps defeated, by another."⁶² The second principle is that America requires a credible, power projection capability that is forwardly deployed, and sustainable. This is rationalized by shrinking forward staging bases and an operating environment with no friendly borders, as in Bosnia where political support by those we are in fact trying to assist is questionable. In order to effect these two principles and OMFTS as a whole, the concept states that the Marine Corps must focus its efforts on improving our operations, modernizing our capabilities, and strengthening our underpinnings.⁶³ Although OMFTS is mostly a mindset that not only the Marine Corps but the Navy must cultivate, there are challenges within the areas of mobility, intelligence, command and control, fires, aviation, mine countermeasures, and combat service support that must be overcome. While many of these challenges may be eliminated by changing

our doctrine, such as developing new concepts (intelligence, combat service support, C2I, fire support, etc.) for supporting the OMFTS concept, and restructuring our training, most will require an equipment solution. Consider, for example, the remaining two parts of the mobility triad, the AAV and the MV-22. Consider also the equipment requirements for OMFTS fires and minecounter measures. These equipment solutions may or may not be strictly Marine Corps programming decisions. Should Navy programming be involved, then we must hope that the Navy is attuned and committed to our concept as much as we.

Commandant's Planning Guidance

Upon assuming stewardship of the Marine Corps in July 1995, the 31st Commandant provided his strategic direction for the Marine Corps with the publication of the Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG). The CPG was to serve as the "intent" for moving the Marine Corps into the 21st century. Comprehensive in nature, the document delineates how the Marine Corps is to continue to be "the premier crises response force - ever ready to project the power and influence of the United States from the sea to any foreign shore."⁶⁴ We are to be "operating forward in fully capable combined arms teams."⁶⁵ The center piece of the document is the section on warfighting. After all, other than make Marines, the most important thing that the Marine Corps does for our nation is win battles. Throughout this section, the key question for MEU (SOC), MEF (FWD), MEF, Division, Aviation, and Combat Service Support units is "Are we organized properly?" The Commandant mandates that we remain the nation's naval, combined arms, expeditionary force in readiness - with the MEF as the principal warfighting organization⁶⁶

The document specifies certain requirements/capabilities, along with tasks to facilitate attainment of those capabilities that the Commandant feels the Marine Corps must possess. They are classified as either joint, strategic, or operational and tactical. The joint capabilities include a requirement for the Marine Corps to provide a fully capable, expeditionary Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters and the maintenance of a capability to enable the seamless introduction of follow-on joint and combined forces and to provide the framework for the formation of JTFs.⁶⁷ Strategically, the Marine Corps must possess the capability to conduct operations from the sea. This is to be accomplished via amphibious lift which provides the world's only self-sustaining forcible entry capability. Our lift requirement is viewed as 3.0 brigade equivalents, approximately 49.5 thousand Marines.⁶⁸ The document also emphasizes the requirement to maintain the capability of 12 ARGs. Additionally, the Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) is discussed as it is "the key to the rapid deployment of large-scale sustainable Marine Forces."⁶⁹ Operationally and tactically, discussion centers on OMFTS and its fundamental re-orientation toward the littoral regions. Hasn't the Marine Corps always been oriented toward the littoral regions? Emphasis is placed on the continued requirement for forward presence forces centered around the MEU(SOC) program. Contained within the summary guidance is the Commandant's focus of effort. The number one focus is the requirement to secure adequate resources needed to sustain the Marine Corps' warfighting capability. In a final attempt to get his message across, the Commandant simplifies his guidance by stating "Be prepared to fight, under any circumstances of weather or resistance, in conflicts large or small...be prepared, in conjunction with the US Navy, to project power from the sea."⁷⁰

CHAPTER FIVE

GUIDANCE ASSESSMENT

From these four documents, one can summarize what the current Secretary of the Navy and Commandant believe the Marine Corps' role will be, at least during the initial decades of the 21st century. The Marine Corps of the 21st century is envisioned to be oriented toward the world's littoral regions, operating forward, with the capability to respond swiftly to any emerging crises by projecting sustainable combined arms power from the sea to any foreign shore. We are to be a strategically mobile, tactically flexible, and immediately ready force inextricably linked to the Navy for the projection and presence of Naval power overseas. We are to be prepared to seize, through forcible entry operations, and defend an adversary's port, naval base or coastal air base in order to enable the flow/entry of follow-on land-based air and ground forces. In order to accomplish this, we must possess the capability to operate extensively from the sea. Above all, the MEF will be the principal warfighting organization. Our role will be to win the "battle", not the "war"! We are not to be the second land Army.

Required Combat Capability

What combat power is required for the Marine Corps to fill this role? Our ability to project power and conduct sea-based operations is predicated upon amphibious lift and the Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF). Although current amphibious ship lift capability provides for lifting 2.5 expeditionary brigade equivalents, approximately 41,250 marines if the standard notional number of 16,500 marines per brigade is utilized, this is in reality a fiscally constrained capability. As currently envisioned, the actual requirement is the lift of 3.0 brigade equivalents,

approximately 49,500 Marines. With the problems being encountered maintaining a 2.5 brigade lift capability, it is doubtful whether a full-up 3.0 brigade lift capability will be attained during the next several decades. From these same amphibious ships are sourced the amphibious lift to maintain the required capability of 12 Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs), although only seven ARGs are currently sourced. It is therefore assumed that since the seven ARGs are sourced from the 2.5 brigade equivalent amphibious ship mix, then the seven Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) associated with those ARGs are sourced from the 2.5 brigade equivalent force. These forces are not considered additive to the 2.5 brigade equivalent, but inclusive. For our amphibious forcible entry role, as well as our forward presence role, a total force of 41,250 Marines is required. For the MPF role which provides large-scale sustainable forces for the defense of seized ports, naval bases or coastal air bases, the force requirement is one brigade equivalent or 16,500 Marines per Maritime Prepositioned Squadron (MPSRON). Should all three MPSRONs deploy, the associated force structure is again three brigade equivalents, or approximately 49,500 Marines. Thus, given the availability of lift, the actual requirement for Marine Corps deployable forces to accomplish the envisioned 21st century role is 90,750 Marines.⁷¹ One may argue that the Marine Corps really needs 99,000 deployable Marines but that the fiscally constraining 2.5 lift capability drives us to the 90,750 number. That may be true, however, as one Marine Corps General Officer has stated, "At times, you may not be able to size the force according to the mission but you may in fact be required to size the force according to available lift."⁷²

How close does this estimated force structure requirement compare to a real MRC force requirement? Consider the last MRC that we fought, and one of the MRCs that we plan for now,

Desert Storm against Iraq. I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) had a total strength of 92,990 Marines in theater, making operation Desert Storm the largest Marine Corps operation in history.⁷³ By mid-January of 1991, almost half of the Marine Corps' active duty strength was in the Persian Gulf area. Forces from both I MEF and II MEF combined to make the Marine component and the Landing Force of the Naval Force component. Four main task forces - Ripper, PaPa Bear, Taro, and Grizzly - stormed the breaches.⁷⁴ At the same time, units from the 4th and 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) were afloat in the Persian Gulf. In all, 20 active duty infantry battalions were utilized to make up eight regimental sized elements.⁷⁵ Reserve units were called up to round out the force structure making I MEF a "total force" of 92,990 Marines, as previously stated. One can thus conclude that the force structure as estimated above is sufficient to allow the MEF to serve as the principal warfighter.

Availability of Resources

Do we have the resources to fill this role? General Carl E. Mundy, 30th Commandant of the Marine Corps, was quoted as saying "...I am paying for the "health" of the Corps today with funds that I need to be spending to guarantee our long-term wellness. Future readiness and capability will require additional funding for the Corps to modernize equipment, to meet the growing backlog of maintenance and repair of real property,...."⁷⁶ Marine active force appropriations are divided into four major accounts: Manpower (MPMC), Operations and Maintenance (O&MMC), investment ground - Procurement Marine Corps (PMC), and investment infrastructure (FHMC, MCON,MCNR). Using Program Review 97 dollar figures for the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), Fiscal Years (FY) 96 through FY 01, an assessment

of the Marine Corps' ability to operate within the initial decades of the 21st century is possible.

A quick historical analysis indicates that for the period FY85-95, MPMC accounts have averaged 60% of the Marine Corps total obligational authority (TOA), PMC accounts have averaged 11.8% (although the account has shown a significant decrease in annual percentage of TOA from a high of 18.9% in FY85 to a low of 5.0% in FY94 - decreasing from \$1,718.5million to 442.9 million), and O&MMC accounts have grown from a 18.2% of TOA in FY85 to 23.3% of TOA in FY95 with an average of 19.9% of TOA.⁷⁷ These three accounts alone comprise an average 91.7% of the annual TOA during this period. During FY95 when the Marine Corps end strength stabilized at 174,000 active and 42,000 reserve Marines, MPMC was 63%, PMC was 5.8%, and O&MMC was 23.3% of TOA - 92.1% of the Marine Corps TOA.⁷⁸ Reserve force structure and operations and maintenance funding add another 4.8% for a total of 96.9% of TOA.⁷⁹ In FY96 alone, 73.2% of the Marine Corps TOA is manpower related.⁸⁰

For the FYDP, it is estimated that MPMC will average 61%, PMC will average 7.1%, and O&MMC will average 23.1% of TOA - for a total of 91.2% of the TOA.⁸¹ With an estimated 4.8% of TOA required to fund a reserve force structure of 42,000 Marines and reserve O&MMC, approximately 4% of TOA is left to fund infrastructure accounts such as military construction and family housing as well as pay our civilian Marines.⁸² Is this sufficient? When one considers, for example, that current DoD policy is to recapitalize existing plant property every 100 years and that our FYDP dollars allows for recapitalization in excess of every 200 years, then perhaps it is not.⁸³

USMC unfunded FYDP requirements total \$6.5 billion⁸⁴ Ground investment items such as equipment, ammunition, and RDT&E are unfunded by \$1,891 million, force enhancement

items by \$583 million, quality of life items to meet DoN established goals are unfunded by \$1,485 million, and support area needs such as facilities maintenance, and military construction are unfunded by \$2,802 million.⁸⁵

The PMC account used to modernize the force averages \$640 million per year during the FYDP with an annual average requirement of \$1.2 billion.⁸⁶ Within the Concepts Based Requirements System of the Combat Development Process, there are 230 total validated requirements; 68 are fully funded, 27 are partially funded, and 135 remain unfunded.⁸⁷ In 1995, the average age of the AAV7 was 19 years old, the 5-ton truck was 16 years old, the 155 howitzer was 15 years old, and the LAV was 11 years old.⁸⁸ The Program Manager for ammunition has estimated that there will be a \$1.5 billion shortfall in our ammunition account for the FYDP.⁸⁹

There can be seen an absolute requirement to modernize the force and yet the PMC account has traditionally been the bill payer when funds are required to cover shortfalls identified within the other accounts. This mindset of continually using force modernization dollars to pay for other shortfalls may have changed. Secretary of Defense Perry cited in two articles found in the 1 January 1996 *Navy Times*, indicated that force modernization was one of his most important tasks. He went on further to say that shrinking defense budgets, as well as an erosion of defense buying power due to a DoD wide annual budget increase well below the inflation rate, would force the military to choose between keeping the current force structure and buying new weapons.⁹⁰ Secretary Perry was further quoted as saying, "If the money is not there...we have to cut force structure."⁹¹

What about the OMFTS triad - those capabilities required to conduct OMFTS as we

espouse in our DoN and Marine Corps guiding principals? The LCAC has been operational for some time. Where are the AAV and MV-22? When will they arrive in the Fleet? The AAV remains the Marine Corps' number one ground priority. It is designed to eliminate the battlefield mobility gap and link maneuver in ships and landing force maneuver ashore into a single seamless stroke. It will provide uninterrupted maneuver forward to key objectives inland and will be employed to attain surprise and the rapid build-up of combat power deep into the objective area. As currently scheduled, the initial operating capability (IOC) for the AAV is 2007 with full operational capability (FOC) of 1013 vehicles scheduled for 2014 at which time the current AAV7 will be 40 years old.⁹² Total program cost for RDT&E and procurement in FY95 dollars is estimated at \$7.6 billion.⁹³ Total program life-cycle (FY96-FY33) cost is estimated at \$17.7 billion.⁹⁴ The MV-22, as the third part of the OMFTS triad, has been identified as the most cost and operationally effective replacement for the CH-46E and Ch-53D. Requiring 425 aircraft to meet the 20 year medium lift airframe requirements, the Marine Corps is currently scheduled to procure 33 aircraft within the FYDP for an IOC of 2001⁹⁵. Current planning calls for FOC of 18 active squadrons by FY 2017 resulting in the Marine Corps using its CH-46's until that aircraft is over 50 years old.⁹⁶ Estimated total program procurement cost is \$21 billion.⁹⁷

Can DoN/USMC funding support the procurement of these two items so critical to our espoused operational doctrine? Can we continue to cut PMC funding in order to maintain our force structure? One thing, I believe, is for certain. The Marine Corps cannot modernize the force, cannot procure the AAV, cannot procure the MV-22, cannot procure required ammunition, cannot pay for operations and maintenance, and cannot provide the quality of life

that our Marines deserve while maintaining an active and reserve end strength of 174,000 and 42,000 respectively. The issue is whether we actually need to maintain this size end strength.

Need for Change

Do we need to maintain an active force structure of 174,000 Marines when total deployable forces required is only 90,750 Marines? Is paying approximately 70 cents of every dollar for manpower, efficient usage of the American taxpayers' dollars? A Marine Corps significantly enhanced through the readressal of manpower resources, and the introduction of newer technology to offset declining end strength would go far in attempting to optimize combat effectiveness in terms of mobility, tactical flexibility, and firepower. We are entering an era of smaller, mainly unconventional and culturally motivated conflicts, waged for the most part inside rather than outside national boundaries. Therefore we must tailor the organization and structure of the military to address this chaotic situation of many smaller crises, ranging from well-publicized natural disasters to ethnic unrest to civil wars. History suggests that the chances of American military forces engaging in two MRCs at or near the same time is minimal to say the least. We fought only three MRCs during the entire Cold War period. The Marine Corps will most probably never be involved in two MRCs. With no peer competitor militarily in sight for the next several decades, the most likely challenges we will confront already exist in the form of ethnic and religious conflicts, international terrorism, and drug trafficking.

The current Commandant, in his CPG, stated that "the principal challenge facing the Marine Corps today lies in continuing to fulfill its charter as an expeditionary force in readiness with a leaner force structure and with fewer Marines."⁹⁸ With a total requirement for only

90,750 MAGTF Marines, perhaps the Marine Corps, as Secretary Perry is doing for DoD, should begin to rethink our hard and fast stand on force structure and refocus our roles and missions oriented on a much "leaner and meaner," more modernized, more efficient Marine Corps.

CHAPTER SIX

NEW THINK/RECOMMENDATIONS

Revisit Title 10

As previously indicated, the 82nd Congress articulated into law that the Marine Corps would be organized "as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings". With 70 cents of every Marine Corps dollar being spent to cover manpower costs and with recapitalization and modernization accounts almost nil, it is time, particularly with a maximum requirement of 90,750 deployable Marines, to revisit the Title 10 requirement.

I would argue that the Marine Corps could undergo a structure realignment, divest ourselves of III MEF and still keep our desired warfighting capability. Reviewing current force structure within III MEF, one will find that the MEF is a MEF in name only. It certainly does not possess the capabilities of I and II MEF. It is, in all aspects, a "hollow" MEF.

Examining the 3rd Marine Division, one finds two infantry regiments - the 3d Marines in Hawaii and the 4th Marines on Okinawa. Upon closer review, the only Marines permanently assigned to 4th Marines is the Headquarters element. The three infantry battalions of that regiment are Unit Deployment Program (UDP) battalions taken from the regiments of I and II MEF. The artillery regiment, 12th Marines, likewise has a battalion on Hawaii and a battalion on Okinawa. Again, however, two of the three batteries of the Okinawa battalion are UDP units. Even within the combat assault battalion, a mixture of combat engineer, Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR), and AAV companies, the LAR and AAV companies are UDP units. Even the infantry battalion that serves as the GCE for the 31st MEU is a UDP battalion.

Consequently, without the UDP organizations, there is no division within III MEF.

Reviewing the Marine Aircraft Wing's structure, one finds the same situation. Within Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 36, the helicopter Group, the only permanently assigned squadrons are the two CH-46 squadrons. The two heavy lift (CH-53D/E) squadrons and the Light Attack squadron are UDP squadrons. With regard to MAG 12 at Iwakuni, Japan, almost the entire Group of F/A 18's, AV8-Bs, and EA6-Bs, 4 squadrons total, are UDP units. Only one squadron is permanently assigned.

Likewise, the Force Service Support Group (FSSG) is only a shell of the other two FSSGs. It possesses no Beach and Terminal Operations Company. It is minus one Landing Support company, one Direct Support motor transport company, one Engineer line company, an Engineer Maintenance company, and an Ammunition company.

With the exception of the Hawaii units, III MEF would not and could not exist without the UDP organizations from I and II MEF.⁹⁹ It is time to face the reality of the illusion of maintaining "three combat divisions and three air wings." Realign the Hawaii units with I MEF, do away with III MEF, and utilize the dollars saved from the force structure for recapitalization and modernization of the force.

Relevancy of the MEF as a Warfighter

If prospects for being drawn into two large-scale conventional conflicts at the same time are remote, prudence dictates that the United States should maintain sufficient military power to deal quickly and effectively with such conflicts one at a time. Does this mean, however, that the Marine Corps must be prepared to wage a super MEF sized sustained operation ashore? Do we

need to have a warfighting MEF with a focus on fighting a "Corps" of five divisions? Is our current preoccupation with having the "MEF as a Warfighter" and fighting sustained operations ashore due to fiscal constraints within the Washington, DC "Beltway"? Are we just attempting to preserve our institution in times of fiscal austerity?

Truthfully, the MEF cannot conduct sustained operations ashore without substantial assistance from either our sister services or host nation support. Tank and MLRS support are prime examples of warfighting capabilities augmentation that the Marine Corps routinely requires from the Army. We certainly do not possess the theater logistic support or even the tactical line haul capabilities that are required for the MEF to wage sustained land combat. It is absolutely essential that the Marine Corps be linked to either the Navy or Army support systems.

It is time to reorient our focus from the MEF waging sustained land combat back to our proper role of "seize and defend," with a subsequent retrograde to Navy shipping for future operations. Let us return to our maritime nature and our historical strength of operating in the so called "small wars" arena along the littoral regions of the globe. After all, realistically, the potential threat scenarios suggest a heavier concentration on the MEU or smaller- that- a- MEF sized force (MEB) to participate in all the possible contingencies that have been examined. The Marine Corps should be organized to meet the more probable threats, and not World War III or even a second Persian Gulf War.

The Marine Corps currently possesses a capabilities triad with the MEU (SOC), MPF, and Air Contingency Force (ACF) capabilities. The MEU (SOC) capability is a well understood and appreciated resource available to the CINCs. The MPF and ACF are quite distinctive

capabilities but have yet to attain the stature or status commensurate with their contributions to contingency operations. I would argue that we need to focus on these three capabilities vice the primacy of the MEF as a warfighter.

The MEU is well qualified to serve as an enabling force to seize airheads and port facilities for follow-on forces. The ACF is capable of providing additional combat capability to the MEU should the situation dictate. Yet, they both have great potential to serve in an operational level of war capacity as well and have in fact done so on several occasions during the past few years. 24th MEU (SOC) forming the nucleus for joint Task Force Bravo under Combined Task Force Provide Comfort in 1991, elements of the MEU (SOC) conducting humanitarian relief operations in Rwanda in 1994, and the 24th MEU (SOC) employment in support of Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE in Somalia are but three examples.¹⁰⁰ An ACF element could have very easily flown into each of those areas of operations to provide additional capability if the requirement had existed.

These three capabilities provide a framework from which the Marine Corps can promote and sustain our relevancy in the 21st century threat scenario environment. With such current concepts as reducing the size of the infantry battalion yet retaining the current capability, perhaps we should explore increasing the number of MEU/ACF sized elements available for forward presence/forcible entry operations. Refocusing on the MEB would likewise facilitate our utilization of the MPF capability in a potentially ever expanding role. The 21st century threat environment portends less of a MRC threat and more of a LIC and MOOTW threat. Let the Army prepare for the "war" and let us turn our focus to smaller units and the LIC/MOOTW environment.

Military Operations Other Than War

Based upon the probable 21st century environment and nature of future conflict, I would suggest that the Marine Corps assume the role of the nation's premier MOOTW force.

Operations of this kind constitute the most likely form of future armed and unarmed conflict.

That must be understood and acknowledged. Joint Pub 3-07 identifies sixteen types of MOOTW.¹⁰¹ Of these, the Marine Corps could play a substantial role in thirteen of these operations. Only arms control, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, and protection of shipping operations are ill-suited for Marine Corps involvement.

Marine Corps concentration in this arena would facilitate the nation having a well-educated, well-trained, well-disciplined, focused organization prepared to wage the complex, often delicate operations associated with MOOTW. While most types of MOOTW can utilize warfighting skills, there are other types in which those skills are not appropriate. These situations, both involving and not involving the threat or use of force, require a different mindset than that of other military operations. Lieutenant General A.C. Zinni, is quoted in Joint Pub 3-07 as stating, "Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you create a political committee, a civil military operations center (CMOC) to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat or fire-support operations center."¹⁰²

Focusing on MOOTW as a full-time occupation would ensure that leaders at all levels would understand the unique nuances of MOOTW as well as the specific objectives, principles, and characteristics associated with these operations. A focus on these operations would also enable a well thought out, coherent training program to be established for individuals, units, and

staffs. This would eliminate the inefficiency of first time operational encounters with multinational partners, NGOs, PVOs, and interagency activities. This would also enable our intelligence and information gathering resources, C2 systems, public affairs, civil affairs, and psychological operations specialists to train extensively with the units and agencies they would habitually support.

As part of the Marine Corps assuming the role of the nation's premier MOOTW force, I would also suggest that the Marine Corps further refine our focus and assume the role of the nation's force of choice for United Nations peace-keeping and peace-enforcement commitments (under Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter). If there is a redundancy in missions today within the armed forces, this is it. Both the Army and the Marine Corps expend valuable resources preparing for these type of missions. Let the Marine Corps focus on these missions and let the Army concentrate on preparing to win the nation's wars. After all, it must be understood that Military forces designed primarily for one type of warfare are inherently ill-suited for other kinds of warfare.

Peace-keeping involves the monitoring and enforcing of a cease-fire agreed to by two or more combatants.¹⁰³ It proceeds in an atmosphere where peace exists and diplomatic efforts are seeking a political settlement. The peace-keeping force can be relatively small, lightly armed and defensive in nature. Impartiality is essential. Peace enforcement, on the other hand, is the physical interposition of armed forces to separate ongoing combatants to create a cease-fire that does not currently exist.¹⁰⁴ Peace enforcers are active fighters who must impose a cease fire that is opposed by one or more of the combatants. They are combat troops thrust into conditions of war. The principles of impartiality and minimum use of force do not apply to a peace

enforcement operation. The force must be large enough, and equipped with the right equipment, to protect themselves in combat and to conduct offensive missions. One must keep in mind that peace enforcement troops are not suitable to transitioning to a peace keeping force.

We must not think of peacekeeping or peace enforcement either as an extension of what the Marine Corps does or as parallel and compatible missions. A focus of effort on these two missions must be established if we are to succeed in this environment. The Marine Corps has very limited experience in peacekeeping, Beirut and more recently Somalia come to mind, but I believe that it could probably adapt itself easily to that mission through an increased emphasis on roles traditionally performed by military police and civil affairs groups. As peace enforcement essentially requires going to war, albeit in a complex, politically difficult environment, our combat skills are already honed for that mission. However, we would be required to hone our political skills.

It must be cautioned that significant involvement in peacekeeping and peace enforcement would require us to modify our way of doing business. This is particularly true for peace enforcement. Because peace enforcement operations occur in more complex politico-military environments, the Marines conducting this mission must necessarily be smarter and better trained than regular military forces. The peace-enforcer must understand that even the most tactical actions he takes or orders to occur may have enormous strategic and political implications. Because the peace enforcement action at a small unit level, squad/fire team, can have such important strategic effects, it will be necessary that someone in the operating unit be capable of communicating with the local inhabitants. Additionally, leaders and followers at all levels will be required to conduct their actions in an interagency and international environment.

Therefore, they must be educated and possess the requisite knowledge of the operating policies of the organizations they may come into contact with. The necessity for an extensive education and training program, not only for peace operations but for MOOTW as a whole, reinforces the reasoning for the Marine Corps to assume the MOOTW role for the nation and let the Army concentrate on winning the nations wars.

Summary

The Marine Corps of the 21st century is envisioned to be oriented toward the world's littoral regions, operating forward, with the capability to respond swiftly to any emerging crises by projecting sustainable combined arms power from the sea to any foreign shore. We are to be prepared to seize, through forcible entry operations, and defend an adversary's port, naval base or coastal air base in order to enable the flow/entry of follow-on land-based air and ground forces. It is also envisioned that the MEF will be the principal warfighting organization within the Marine Corps.

There are three major issues which necessitate a change in the way the Marine Corps is currently planning to function in the 21st century. The first issue is the continuously declining Marine Corps budget and the impact increasing manpower costs has on other accounts within the budget. The second issue, related to the first, is the sacrificing of the "long-term wellness" (modernization and recapitalization) of the Marine Corps in order to maintain the "health" of the Corps today. The third issue is the changing environment which we will face during the initial decades of the 21st century - this era of smaller, mainly unconventional and culturally motivated conflicts. These three factors require a reorganization and refocus of effort if the Corps is to survive as an institution. We must earnestly revisit Title 10 and make the obvious

decision to forego our hard and fast stand on end strength, subsequently divesting ourselves of III MEF. We must reorient our focus from fighting sustained land combat back to maritime operations. Bring back the MEB, explore expansion of our MEU and ACF capabilities, and truly focus on operations from the sea. Finally, since the most likely form of future conflict will be MOOTW or LIC, focus the Marine Corps on those operations and that environment.

- ¹ Low intensity conflict (LIC) is defined in Joint Pub 1-02, dated 23 March 1994, as: Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third world, but contain regional and global security implications. With the publication of Joint Pub 3-07, the term LIC has been renamed MOOTW.
- ² Gray Area Phenomena (GAP) is addressed in the NMS as "transnational dangers. Examples of these transnational dangers include: spreading diseases, fleeing refugees, international crime syndicates, and drug lords. This topic will be discussed later.
- ³ Carl H. Builder, "Looking In All The Wrong Places" *Armed Forces Journal* , (May 1995): 2.
- ⁴ For a thorough discussion on Gray Area Phenomena, see J.F. Holden-Rhodes and Peter A. Lupsha, "Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Gray Area Phenomena and the New World Disorder" *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement* Vol 2, no.2 (Autumn 1993).
- ⁵ Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Ripper made this argument during his presentation to the Marine Corps Command and Staff College students on 5 January 1996.
- ⁶ Builder, 2.
- ⁷ This sentence plus the two following are contained in an excellent discussion on the problems posed by human behavior and regional history in Ralph Peters', "The New Warrior Class" found in *Parameters* Vol XXIV, no. 2 (Summer 1994):23.
- ⁸ Alvin Toffler, *Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence At The Edge of the 21st Century* (New York: Bantam Books, 1990), 243.
- ⁹ Cohn S. Gray, "Strategic Sense, Strategic Nonsense" *The National Interest* , no. 29 (Fall 1992): 13.
- ¹⁰ Richard Nixon, *Beyond Peace* (New York: Random House, 1994), 246.
- ¹¹ Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, 214.
- ¹² Lieutenant Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation" *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol 78, no. 9 (September 1994): 36.
- ¹³ Hammes, 36.
- ¹⁴ Charles W. Taylor, *A World 2010- A New Order of Nations* (PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S Army War College, 1992), 63.
- ¹⁵ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S Army TRADOC, 1 August 1994,2-3.
- ¹⁶ TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, 2-4.
- ¹⁷ Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, 212.
- ¹⁸ Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, 212.
- ¹⁹ Wayne G. Shear Jr., "The Drug War: Applying the Lessons of Vietnam" *Naval War College Review*, Vol XLVII, no.3, Sequence 347 (Summer 1994): 111.
- ²⁰ TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, 2-3.
- ²¹ Robert A. Manning and James J. Przystup, "China's Syndrome: Ambiguity," *Washington Post*, 19 March 1995, Sec. C1.
- ²² Manning and Przystup, Sec. C1.

²³ Manning and Przystup, Sec. C2.

²⁴ Charles W. Taylor, *Alternate World Scenarios For A New Order of Nations* (PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993), 24.

²⁵ This is an extract of a MCCDC/N85 brief on the future presented by Major General Mike Myatt entitled "chaos in the Littorals".

²⁶ Lind's thoughts on fourth generation warfare are addressed later in the paper. Van Crevald, in the *Transformation of War*, indicates that the future fate of the nation state is in considerable doubt with the loss of its monopoly over the reins of political violence. Huntington in his Summer 1993 *Foreign Affairs* article "The Clash of Civilizations", recognized a new pattern of conflict between western civilization and the rest of the world. Robert Kaplan in his February 1994 *Atlantic Monthly* article "The Coming Anarchy", contends that the trend toward anarchy will eventually win out and much of the third world will see the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war.

²⁷ For an excellent discussion on the enemies/soldiers we are likely to face during the next several decades, see Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class" *Parameters* Vol XXIV, no.2 (Summer 1994)

²⁸ Peters, 20.

²⁹ Colonel John E. Greenwood, USMC (Retired), "Editorial: MTR/RMA" *Marine Corps Gazette* Vol 78, no.6 (June 1994):2.

³⁰ Robert J Bunker in "The Transition to Fourth Epoch War" *Marine Corps Gazette* Vol 78, no. 9 (September 1994) revisits Lind's article presenting a synopsis of the discussion on the four generations of warfare and proposes an alternative and far larger historical paradigm that better explains the "military revolution".

³¹ Martin Van Crevald, *The Transformation of War*, quoted in Hammes, 37.

³² Bunker, 27.

³³ Bunker, 28.

³⁴ Although Bunker states that it is the inability of our "modern military system" to defend against terrorist/LIC warfare, it is actually Executive Branch agencies such as the Departments of State and Justice, the FBI and the CIA who have day-to-day cognizance over these matters.

³⁵ Bunker, 28.

³⁶ Hanimes, 44.

³⁷ TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, 1-4.

³⁸ Joint Pub 3-07 presents sixteen types of military operations other than war. The focus of these operations is on deterring war, resolving conflict, supporting civil authorities, and promoting peace.

³⁹ TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, 3-2.

⁴⁰ Lieutenant General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, "Expeditionary Warfare" *Marine Corps Gazette*, (June 1995):1.

⁴¹ The following facts are derived from the June 1995 *Marine Corps Gazette* article on expeditionary warfare cited above. The article offers an explanation of what we actually mean when we say "expeditionary warfare". The article states that all of the great crises of this century have occurred within the boundaries of the littorals.

⁴² Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, 221.

43 Nixon, 160.
44 Nixon, 160.
45 Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, 221.
46 Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, 223.
47 Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, 223.
48 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Seal, USMC, "Continuity and Change in U.S. Security
Strategy" *Naval War College Review*, Vol XLVII, no. 2, Sequence 346 (Spring 1994):38.
49 Builder, 2.
50 TRADOC Pamphlet, 4-7.
51 This paragraph is paraphrased from the U.S. Marine Corps Planning Guidance,
Commandant's Planning Guidance (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1 July
1995), 2. Here after referred as CPG.
52 CPG, 1.
53 Department of the Navy Pamphlet, *Forward...From The Sea* (Washington, DC:
Department of the Navy, 1994), Forward. Here after referred as FFTS.
54 Department of the Navy Pamphlet, *...From The Sea* (Washington, DC: Department of the
Navy, September 1992), 6. Here after referred as FTS.
55 FTS, 5.
56 FTS, 13.
57 FTS, 15.
58 FFTS, Forward.
59 FFTS, 1.
60 CPG, 9.
61 U.S. Marine Corps Concept, *Operational Maneuver From The Sea* (Washington, DC:
Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1995), 1. Here after referred as OMFTS. This document was
handed out to the students at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
62 OMFTS, 2.
63 OMFTS, 12.
64 CPG,3.
65 CPG,3.
66 CPG,6.
67 CPG,7.
68 CPG, 7. The number 49, 500 is derived by a brigade equivalent having a notional Table
of Organization of 16, 500 Marines. Three brigade equivalents would equal 49, 500 Marines.
69 CPG,8.
70 CPG, 29.
71 This number is derived from combining the amphibious MEF notional 2.5 brigade
equivalent strength of 41, 250 and the MPF notional 3 brigade equivalent strength of 49, 500
72 I have heard Lieutenant General Charles E. Wilhelm, as Commanding General Marine
Corps Combat Development Command, state this on several occasions.
73 Major Charles D. Melson, USMC (Retired), Evelyn A. Englander, and Captain David A
Dawson, USMC, *US Marines in the Persian Gulf 1990-1991: Anthology and Annotated
Bibliography* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps, 1992), 236.

⁷⁴ Melson, Englander, and Dawson, 236.

⁷⁵ The number of infantry battalions was derived from counting the number of infantry battalions within the 8 regimental sized elements of the Marine Corps Ground Combat Element forces in the Persian Gulf Region in February 1991. These regimental sized elements were comprised of the 1st, 3d, 4th, and 7th Marine regiments from the 1st Marine Division under the command of Major General James M. Myatt, the 6th and 8th Marine regiments from the 2d Marine Division under the command of Major General William M. Keys, Regimental Landing Team (RLT) 2 from 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade under the command of Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., and Regimental Landing Team 5 from 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade under the command of Brigadier General Peter J. Rowe. This task organization was found in Melson, Englander, and Dawson, 224.

⁷⁶ Marine Corps General Officers Conference, *Briefing: Program Review 97*, 29 June 1995 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1995), Marine Appropriations Summary slide. Here after referred as PR 97.

⁷⁷ The actual dollar amounts are found in the Fiscal Year Historical Data Worksheet for Fiscal Years FY-62 through FY-01 (Quantico, VA: Warfighting Development Integration Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 11 December 1995). Here after referred as Historical Data Sheet. This worksheet provides account data in CB96 dollars for the period FY-62 through FY-01. The various percentages are derived by determining the percentage of Total Obligational Authority (TOA) that particular account is for a given fiscal year and then averaging the annual percentage for the given period. For example, for FY-95, the PMC account was 540.4 million dollars and TOA was 9172.7 million dollars. The PMC account therefore comprised 5.8% of TOA. The average of the annual percentages for the specified period would then render the percentage in the text. Note: This methodology was applied to produce the various percentages in end notes #74, 75, 77, and 78.

⁷⁸ Historical Data Sheet.

⁷⁹ Historical Data Sheet.

⁸⁰ Commandant of the Marine Corps, Congressional Testimony Preparation Material: FY96/97 President's Budget (Quantico, VA: Warfighting Development Integration Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1995), USMC FY96 TOA slide. Here after referred as CMC Prep Material.

⁸¹ Historical Data Sheet

⁸² Historical Data Sheet.

⁸³ PR 97, Marine Appropriations: Facility Construction slide. It is also interesting to note that current projected FYDP dollars enable the Marine Corps to eliminate our Bachelor Enlisted Quarters construction backlog (as it currently stands) within 41 years.

⁸⁴ PR 97, Marine Appropriations: USMC Unfunded FYDP Requirements slide.

⁸⁵ PR 97, Marine Appropriations: USMC Unfunded FYDP Requirements slide.

⁸⁶ PR 97, Marine Appropriations: Ground Equipment slide.

⁸⁷ PR 97, Marine Appropriations: Ground Equipment slide.

⁸⁸ PR 97, Marine Appropriations: Ground Equipment slide.

⁸⁹ PR 97, Marine Appropriations: Ammunition slide.

⁹⁰ William Matthews, "An inevitable 2nd drawdown," *Navy Times*, 1 January 1996, Almanac '96 Sec.

⁹¹ Navy Times Staff, "Perry braces for a 'difficult' year," *Navy Times*, 1 January 1996, Almanac '96 - Price of Peace Section.

⁹² Commandant of the Marine Corps presentation to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, subject: "Review of the AAV Program," February 1995. This presentation was prepared by the Direct Reporting Program Manager/AAA.

⁹³ This dollar amount is derived from the presentation cited above. RDT&E was estimated at 910.5 million dollars and procurement costs were estimated at 6719.2 million dollars. Average unit costs are estimated at 6.63 million dollars per vehicle.

⁹⁴ This total program life-cycle cost estimate is in FY95 dollars and is derived from combining the total costs of the program's four phases - development, production, operations and support, and other requirements. The life-cycle covers the years FY96 through FY33.

⁹⁵ CMC Prep Material, Answers to the questions "What is the Marine Corps' replacement for the CH-46E?" and "What is the current status of the V-22 program?"

⁹⁶ CMC Prep Material, Answer to the question "What is the impact of a 24 per year maximum production rate on the Marine Corps' medium lift capability and force modernization?"

⁹⁷ CMC Prep Material, Answer to the question "What is the current unit flyaway, unit procurement, and total program procurement cost of the MV-22?"

⁹⁸ CPG, 23.

⁹⁹ This information was determined by reviewing a "III MEF Force Structure" briefing package developed by Warfighting Development Integration Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA for the Commanding General ,MCCDC on 26 February 1996.

¹⁰⁰ Lieutenant Colonel George P. Fenton, USMC, "Marine Expeditionary Units-On the Operational Level in MOOTW" *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol 80, no. 3 (March 1996): 58-59.

¹⁰¹ The sixteen types of MOOTW are: Arms Control, Combating Terrorism, DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations, Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations, Enforcing Exclusion Zones, Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight, Humanitarian Assistance, Military Support to Civil Authorities, Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, Peace Operations, Protection of Shipping, Recovery Operations, Show of Force Operations, Strikes and Raids, and Support to Insurgency.

¹⁰² Joint Pub 3-07, II-1.

¹⁰³ Joint Pub 3-07 defines peacekeeping as: Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

¹⁰⁴ Joint Pub 3-07 defines peace enforcement as: Application of military force, or the threat of its use, norm ally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

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