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
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JSOU Report 09-8

IW: Brazil's Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas

Pinheiro

Irregular Warfare: Brazil's Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas



Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

JSOU Report 09-8
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On the cover

Left, 2 February 2006. Then-commander of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), Brazilian Army General Jose Elito Carvalho de Siqueira addresses journalists at a hotel in Port-au-Prince. Photo, Roberto Schmidt/AFP/Getty Images.

Right, 22 April 2001. Brazilian drug kingpin Luiz Fernando da Costa is escorted by Colombian army soldiers, at the Marandua de Bichada military base at the border with Brazil. Da Costa, also known as “Fernandinho Beira Mar,” denied accusations he had ties with Colombia’s guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Photo, AFP/Rodrigo Aringu.

Background, 7 August 2006. Police cars burn at a police station in the north zone of Sao Paulo, Brazil. Photo, Ernesto Rodrigues/AFP/Getty Images.

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*Irregular Warfare:
Brazil's Fight Against
Criminal Urban
Guerrillas*

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

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Foreword

In this monograph Major General Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro contributes to the discussion of urban guerrillas, their impact on society, and the role of the armed forces in countering criminal elements. The rise of urban guerrillas is a result of an evolution in command and control capabilities, weapons, and doctrine that has given them strong influence over the daily lives of citizens living in neighborhoods where government support and control is limited or absent. The *favelas* (ghettos, slums) of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo are ready examples that provide the setting for General Alvaro's monograph. The urban guerrilla, however, is emblematic of a wider-felt problem, not limited to Brazil. What makes General Alvaro's monograph compelling is that this Brazilian story has universal application in many locales that are under-governed and under-supported by constituted authorities.

Urban guerrillas flow from a witch's brew of ersatz political doctrine, readily available and powerful weapons, and criminal gangs that typically are financed by the drug trade. Criminal groups like the Red Command (*Comando Vermelho*—CV) and Third Command have been able to thrive in the favelas because of ineffective policing and lack of government interest. These Brazilian gangs have filled the void with their own form of governance. As General Alvaro indicates herein, criminal urban guerrillas have latched on to revolutionary doctrine, such as the *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* and the *First Capital Command Statute*, so as to give political legitimacy to their lawlessness. In fact, these are gangs that terrorize the residents of the favelas, holding them hostage to criminal exploits, while keeping government legitimacy and security in check.

As in the United States, when the general welfare of civil society is at risk, the President may call upon the armed forces to aid the police or take control. Under the Brazilian Constitution the President can “intervene ... to put an end to serious jeopardy to public order ...” through his power to “decree and enforce federal intervention.”¹ This is akin to the U.S. President's authorities for civil disturbances and other emergencies, but a notable difference is the expansive role that Brazilian armed forces can take. Under the Brazilian Constitution the armed forces “are intended for the defense of the Country, for the guarantee of the constitutional powers

[legislative, executive, judicial], and, on the initiative of any of these, of law and order.”² Thus during the crisis to restore public order in Rio de Janeiro in November 1994 through January 1995, the military was put in charge as the lead agency, with operational control over federal and state police. With Presidential authorization, the Brazilian Minister of the Army designated the Eastern Military Commander as the General Commander of Operations. *Operation Rio* commenced with the goals of reducing urban violence and reestablishing government authority. Operations consisted of isolating lawless areas, conducting squad patrols and large sweeps, and on several occasions, attacking the urban guerrilla directly. The operation suppressed urban guerrilla activity—for a time. There was a decrease in bank robberies, car thefts, gang shootouts, drug trafficking and weapons smuggling, plus some 300 automatic rifles and 500 hand guns were confiscated. Yet as General Alvaro illustrates in this monograph, the problem persists today with similar public order crises in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and other cities.

It is for good reason that General Alvaro includes in this monograph a translation of Carlos Marighella’s *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, since the man and his manual continue to inspire miscreants and would-be revolutionary groups. Much as psychiatrist-philosopher Frantz Fanon provided a rationale for African anticolonialists to kill the white interlopers, Marighella is a symbol for ideological activists who would resist authority, as well as for criminals who profit when government presence and legitimacy are wanting. The military planner and strategist should be familiar with the *Minimanual* and similar writings since they contribute to the development of the strategic environment as we find it, and it is against this backdrop that we plan for countering insurgencies and terrorism.

The military will continue to play an important part in countering the urban guerrilla, whose goal is to separate the population from the government (typically by making government forces overreact) then supplanting it. This suggests that the military will need to conduct a range of irregular warfare activities in coordination with civilian agencies. Whatever the combination of direct and indirect actions that are applied to counter the urban guerrilla, the military planner will be well served to consider General Alvaro’s insights about *Brazil’s Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas*.

Kenneth H. Poole
Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

About the Author

Major General (Ret.) Pinheiro is a graduate of the Brazilian Army Military Academy (1967), a paratrooper, jumpmaster, commando, and Special Forces pathfinder. He is also military free fall and scuba qualified. He has commanded a Special Forces Operational Detachment and served as instructor at the Brazilian Army Special Operations School, the Special Operations Branch of the Brazilian Army Military Academy, and the Combined Arms School.

In 1983 he graduated from the Command and General Staff College. He then served as operations officer in a Motorized Infantry Brigade before returning to the Command and General Staff Officer Course as Tactics Instructor. From January 1989 to January 1992 he commanded the 1st Special Forces Battalion (Brazilian Army Unit specialized in unconventional warfare and counterterrorism). He then attended the Policy, Strategy and Army's High Administration Course (Brazilian Army War College) and was assigned as a staff officer at the Land Operations Command.

From June 1994 to June 1996, he was the Brazilian liaison officer to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas) advising the CAC and other agencies on Brazilian defense policy and Latin America security issues. He also was a consulting editor for *Military Review* (the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College journal), Brazilian Edition.

Returning to Brazil, he served as the chief of the Peacekeeping Operations Branch at the Brazilian Army General Staff (1996–1998), commandant of the Brazilian Army Operational Test and Evaluation Center (1998–1999). From December 1999 to January 2002, he was the commandant of the Combined Arms School. His last position before retiring in July 2002 was as third deputy chief of staff (Doctrine, Plans and Strategy) at the Brazilian Army General Staff.

Major General Pinheiro is an experienced speaker. He was the Brazilian Army representative on the Gen Mark Clark–Gen Mascarenhas de Moraes Lecture Exchange in 2001, speaking at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Military Academy, and the U.S. Army War College. In 2002, he was chief of the Brazilian Delegation at the XVIII U.S./Brazilian Armies Staff Talks at Fort Benning, Georgia. He has been a guest speaker at many events, including the Latin American Orientation

Course at the United States Air Force Special Operations School, the Joint Operational Environment Global Seminar developed by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Brazil's Defense Approach Toward a Changing Security Environment Workshop of the Institute for National Strategic Studies/National Defense University, the SOF Strategic Studies symposiums of the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), Exercise Fuerzas Comando 2007 held by USSOC SOUTH in June 2007 in Honduras, and the Forging a Counterterrorism Strategy for the Western Hemisphere Workshop held by the McCormick Tribune Foundation and the West Point Combating Terrorism Center.

Major General Pinheiro's articles include "Vision of Brazilian National Security on the Amazon" in *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement* (Winter 1994), "Guerrillas in the Brazilian Amazon" in *Military Review* (March-April 1996, English, Spanish, and Brazilian Editions), and "Battle Command – Considerations at the Operational and Tactical Levels" in *Military Review* (2nd Quarter 1996, Brazilian Edition). He is a JSOU associate fellow, and his previous JSOU publication is *Narcoterrorism in Latin America: A Brazilian Perspective* (April 2006).

Major General Pinheiro's awards and decorations include the Brazilian Pacifator with Leaf Medal (*Medalha do Pacificador com Palma*) for bravery in action while fighting irregular forces in the Brazilian Amazon and the Brazilian Military Merit Order (*Ordem do Mérito Militar*). He also has been awarded the U.S. Meritorious Service Medal and the U.S. Army Commendation Medal. He is active as a senior military analyst and a security consultant with several military and civilian institutions within and outside Brazil and lives in Rio de Janeiro.

Irregular Warfare: Brazil's Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas

1. Introduction

Urban Guerrillas Reveal Organized Crime Power in Brazil

In May 2006, the city of São Paulo endured a week of violence at the hands of organized crime. São Paulo is a huge city. It is the financial capital of Brazil and has a population of 11 million people—15 million in greater São Paulo, which includes municipalities that are practically neighborhoods of the city itself.⁴

Since 2000, violent crime had dropped throughout the state of São Paulo. The law enforcement that helped produce this drop in crime also resulted in alarmingly overcrowded state prisons. These prisons then became breeding grounds for the development of criminal organizations.



Brazil, showing the state of São Paulo (dark outline) and the location of São Paulo city.

The PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital). The violence that paralyzed the São Paulo greater metropolitan area from 12 to 18 May 2006, provoking widespread fear among the population, was organized and orchestrated by the most powerful organized criminal faction in Brazil, the *Primeiro Comando da Capital* (PCC—First Capital Command). The name First Capital Command refers to the city of São Paulo, which is the capital of São Paulo state. The PCC is an antiestablishment Brazilian prison gang and criminal organization founded in 1993 by inmates of the city of Taubaté prison in São Paulo state.

Since its inception, the PCC has grown into Brazil's most powerful prison criminal network, controlling activity within a dozen prisons in São Paulo state and around the country, as well as important sales points and transport routes for drugs and guns flowing into Brazil from source countries such as Paraguay, Bolivia, Colombia, and Suriname.

Mobile phones have greatly increased the command and control capability of criminals who direct operations from inside the prison.⁵ Some corrupt guards allowed visitors to bring phones into the prisons. The lack of surveillance to prevent prisoners from communicating with criminals on the outside has allowed them a powerful tool to spread information and coordinate uprisings and attacks in the state.

At the beginning of May 2006, São Paulo state authorities decided to transfer some 765 PCC members, including the main leaders, to the top security *Presidente Bernardes* penitentiary, in order to put them under a *Regime Disciplinar Diferenciado* (Differential Disciplinary Regimen). The PCC criminal enterprise, led by the convict Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho (a.k.a. Marcola), implemented a plan to start riots in dozens of prisons in São Paulo and around the country, as well as a wave of violent attacks and murders throughout the state. These plans "took advantage of the unusually lax security environment over a weekend when some 10,000 prisoners were given a day pass to visit families on the outside for Mother's Day" [the second Sunday in May, as in the United States], "...and thousands more civilians entered prisons to visit inmates on the inside,"⁶ according to the São Paulo state security authorities.

A Week in Baghdad was how many journalists and commentators described those violent days. Pistols, rifles, machine guns, and hand grenades were used by those involved. In a coordinated series of attacks, carried out with military precision, 293 assaults took place on police stations, patrols, road check points, stores, justice courts, 17 banks, and other establishments. Some 215 hostages were taken in 80 prison riots across the states of São Paulo, Paraná, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Bahia and also in the federal capital, Brasília.⁷ Eighty-two public transport buses were burned and a metro station was attacked causing chaos for an estimated 6 million workers in the city and the state of São Paulo. A total of 161 people were killed, included 41 policemen (most of them military) and prison guards, 107 gang members, 9 rebelling prisoners, and 4 civilians.⁸

Something that was evident in this wave of violence was that PCC masked gunmen were proficient in the tactics, techniques, and procedures stated in Carlos Marighella's 1969, *Minimanual do Guerrilheiro Urbano* (Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla). At the end of the 1960s, Marighella was the most notorious Brazilian terrorist leader. His tactics fully dominated the recent employment of the PCC. The English translation of the *Minimanual do Guerrilheiro Urbano* is included as Appendix A to illustrate the thinking of the criminal urban guerrilla.

Brazilian Justice Minister Marcio Thomas Bastos committed approximately 4,000 military police to the *Força Nacional de Segurança Pública* (Public Security National Force), a federal military police strike force trained to handle public security threats.⁹ He also offered the support of Brazilian Army units if needed. But São Paulo Governor Claudio Lembo, filling in for presidential candidate Geraldo Alckimin (the former state of São Paulo Governor) refused to accept federal help.¹⁰ A few days later Minister Bastos traveled to São Paulo to again offer federal assistance, "but ... it was refused."¹¹



Police on alert in central Sao Paulo after several attacks by the criminal organization PCC. Photo: Caio Guatelli/Folha Imagem/ITS Press Brainpix Group used by permission of Newscom.

Due to the potential impact of the PCC's wave of violence on October's presidential elections, politicians did not want to become too closely associated with it during the campaign. Actually, Brazil's federal structure, in which its 26 states retain considerable autonomy, means the central government is not responsible for the prisons or public security in São Paulo state. Alckimin's supporters had in mind at the time that if Governor Lembo accepted the federal help it would show voters that the crisis in São Paulo's

security could not be resolved without Brasilia's help. Some Brazilian political experts say that the PCC's attacks in the city of São Paulo undermined Geraldo Alckimin's candidacy for President.

Finally on Thursday, 18 May, authorities said that the situation was under total control. However, the experience was absolutely dreadful, not only for the state of São Paulo but for the Brazilian nation. The crude reality was that with urban guerrilla tactics, sophisticated command and control, communications, logistics, and superior intelligence networks, organized crime had demonstrated a great amount of power, deeply traumatized the population, and held the state hostage for a week of terror. This is an example of irregular warfare.

This report intends to show how a public security issue has become a national security problem, analyzing Brazil's fight against criminal organizations, which are currently employing urban guerrilla's tactics, techniques, and procedures to reach their criminal goals in Brazil's largest cities. It underscores the lessons learned from this complex and violent environment.

2. Foundations of Brazilian Organized Criminal Factions

Organized Urban Crime and Violence

Organized urban crime attacks governmental controls and thus the legitimacy of the sovereign government. Organized crime establishes courses of action using complex management systems; increases its capabilities through violent activities and social, economic, and sometimes political power; and it maintains a relevant transnational dimension as well as an ability to manage simultaneously different kinds of crime—for example, drug trafficking, arms contraband, and money laundering.

Besides its complex organization and networks, organized urban crime has as its main characteristics the threat or use of force to reach its goals and the employment of corruption as its main tool to erode the state's capabilities as well as to improve unpunishability of its activities. Largely because of the extensive urban crime in Brazilian cities, where homicide is the leading cause of death among 15- to 24-year-olds, the prison population has soared. Brazil's "prisons house some 360,000 inmates, the fourth largest population of inmates in the world."¹² The result of unbridled criminal violence has been the undermining of government legitimacy in some areas.¹³

Prison Origins of the Major Criminal Organizations

From 1969 to 1975, a strong connection between ordinary and radical political prisoners was established in the *Candido Mendes* prison (a very large prison, closed in 1994) on *Ilha Grande* island in the state of Rio de Janeiro, between the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. In an attempt of the Brazilian Government to equate leftist revolutionaries with the most dangerous common criminals before Brazilian society, some common criminals were convicted, like the left-wing revolutionary prisoners, on the basis of the *Lei de Segurança Nacional* (National Security Law).

Notwithstanding a sometimes difficult relationship, little-by-little guerrilla revolutionaries gained respect and admiration from the common criminals, and the criminals learned the language and organizing methods of the left-wing revolutionaries with whom they shared prison cells. This resulted in a criminal organization "with a political connotation, calling itself the *Falange Vermelha* (Red Phalanx) and making its motto "Peace, Justice, and Liberty."¹⁴ After years of sharing experiences, the common criminals

incorporated tactics, techniques, and procedures from the radical leftists.¹⁵ The same merging of criminal and revolutionary activities has also been observed in other Latin American countries. During the 1980s, particularly in Colombia, Peru, Guatemala, and El Salvador, left-wing guerrillas were able to organize and recruit inside prisons.

After years of sharing experiences, the common criminals incorporated tactics, techniques, and procedures from the radical leftists.

At the beginning of the 1980s, prisoners escaped from the Ilha Grande island prison and established hiding places in the *favelas* (slums or shanty towns) in the north and west zones of the city of Rio de Janeiro. These escaped prisoners began to put into practice the lessons learned from the political prisoners—planning and executing armed assaults against banks, enterprises, and jewelry shops. The first Brazilian organized criminal faction, now entitled the *Comando Vermelho* (CV—Red Command), became a very dangerous threat in the streets of Rio de Janeiro. William Lima da Silva (a.k.a. “O Professor”), main founder and mastermind of the CV, stated, “we have gotten what the urban guerrilla didn’t—the *favelas*’ people support!”¹⁶

From 1981 to 1982, CV members showed the security authorities of Rio de Janeiro state that a new kind of bandit had been born. He was organized, well equipped, able to develop careful plans, and able to execute effective and efficient attacks.

Also in the early 1980s, the CV got control of the cocaine traffic in Rio de Janeiro. The CV grew rapidly, distributing the drug to the local market and to Europe, becoming more and more powerful. With cocaine entered heavy weapons—larger caliber arms brought in from Europe, particularly from the former Soviet Union, whose ex-bureaucrats were selling even anti-aircraft weapons at affordable prices.

In the 1990s, the *Comando Vermelho* established an ample social base in the prisons and in the *favelas*, becoming the most powerful Brazilian criminal organization. In 1993, the CV was able to support, in São Paulo state, the founding of the *Primeiro Comando da Capital* (PCC). Later, both organizations established deep connections, particularly concerning illicit drugs and weapons trafficking.

Carlos Marighella and the *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*

To understand how important the influence of leftist revolutionaries on major Brazilian criminal organizations was, it is necessary to know the key role played by Carlos Marighella (1911-1969) and the relevance of his *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*. He influenced the current employment of the urban guerilla tactics, techniques, and procedures in the streets of the largest Brazilian cities.

Marighella was an obsessive communist in his youth. In 1945 he became a *deputado* (member of the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Brazil's National Congress), affiliated with the *Partido Comunista Brasileiro* (PCB—Brazilian Communist Party). When the PCB became illegal, Marighella was forced to live clandestinely, and he made a decision to pursue the armed struggle in order to implant a Marxist-Leninist political regimen in Brazil. He became the most notorious Brazilian terrorist with deep connections in several countries, particularly Cuba, the Soviet Union, and China. His actions made him famous even outside Brazil.

One of the main characteristics of his personality was the employment of cold-blooded killing. In Marighella's view, an urban guerrilla should maintain a willingness to kill in order to survive, and he should be able to kill naturally, without anger, because this is the only reason to be an urban guerrilla. "Terrorism is a weapon the revolutionary can never relinquish," he said.¹⁷ In 1967, when Ernesto *Che* Guevara was killed in Bolivia, Marighella was selected by Fidel Castro to replace Guevara carrying on the "Marxist Revolution of Americas"—whose slogan was "to create one, two, ... many Vietnams in Latin America."¹⁸

In 1968, Carlos Marighella became the leader of one of the most dangerous Brazilian terrorist organizations, the *Aliança Libertadora Nacional* (ALN—National Liberator Alliance). Notwithstanding that the strategic objective of the organization was proclaimed as establishing a rural guerilla force, urban warfare was its reason for existence. Marighella wrote and spread his *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* in 1969. At that time, there was a climax in actions of that nature, particularly in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. On 4 November 1969, Marighella was finally eliminated by elite security forces in a dramatic, bloody confrontation at 8 in the evening, when he was making contact with some supporters on a street in downtown São Paulo.

The *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* has become the bible of Brazilian radical leftist organizations.¹⁹ The ideas expressed and systematized in this document reflect the personal experiences of a group of radical leftists deeply engaged in armed struggle in Brazil, particularly in urban guerrilla operations. Today it remains a very valuable doctrinal orientation for people engaged in this unique operational environment. The manual was useful for several international terrorist organizations, including *Tupamaros* (Uruguay), *Montoneros* (Argentina), Irish Republican Army (IRA), Baader and Meinhoff Group (Germany), Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), Palestinian Black September, Italy's Red Brigades, Basque *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA), and others. This minimanual is clear evidence of the savagery and disregard for the human being within the insane terrorist perspective that the ends justify the means.

3. The PCC, Brazil's Most Powerful Organized Crime Faction

Criminality, Social Exclusion and the Penal System

Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo rank among the 15 most violent cities of Latin America.²⁰ According to the Brazilian public security authorities, the 2004 murder rate was 20.5 per 100,000 people.

Some experts say the crime problem is fed by an unequal income distribution. Out of a population of some 180 million, roughly 40 million live in poverty.²¹ Brazil's organized crime factions have their hiding places in the *favelas*. But the *favelas*, particularly in Rio and São Paulo, are completely different from, for example, the slums of Haiti. The housing where workers live in Rio and São Paulo provides a better quality of life than what one can find in the shantytowns of Port-au-Prince. In Port-au-Prince, 90 percent of the population live in the slums. Brazilian intellectual leftists are used to saying that poverty and social exclusion are the main reasons for the development of crime in the largest cities of Brazil. But this argument is not the full story. Recent public opinion polls show clearly that the Brazilian society rejects this point of view.

The Brazilian government has addressed urban crime by putting more people behind bars. With no new prisons, the Brazilian penal system has become overcrowded. Since 2000, the public security budget of São Paulo state, territory of the PCC, has increased from 2.4 billion reais (R\$)—about U.S. \$1.37 billion—to R\$8.7 billion—about U.S. \$4.9 billion. The rate of criminality went down 27 percent in the period 2000 to 2006. And the number of prisoners increased from 62,000 to 144,000.²² According to São Paulo state public security authorities, the number of prisoners in some prisons quadrupled over the past 10 years, while the number of guards only doubled. This shortage is exacerbated by the number of prison guards who are bribed by prisoners to smuggle them cell phones or other goods. And, of course, the conditions in most of the prisons have become deficient.

... the number of prisoners in some prisons quadrupled over the past ten years, while the number of guards only doubled.

The *Primeiro Comando da Capital* (PCC)

The PCC is a prison gang that presents itself as an organization interested in improving prison conditions and prisoners' rights, as a kind of inmates' union. It was formed inside the São Paulo state prisons in the early 1990s, and some of their rhetoric and symbols were picked up from radical left-wing political prisoners, most of them members of terrorist groups jailed at the time. The PCC made use of the Chinese "yin yang" symbol as their emblem, saying it represented "a way to balance good and evil with wisdom." Some members also use the symbol of Che Guevara's face. PCC describes itself as "the party" and its members as "brothers." It adopted the *Comando Vermelho* slogan, "Liberty, Justice, and Peace."

The PCC, which was also formerly referred to as the "Party of Crime," was founded with the pretext of a political agenda, aiming "to fight the oppression inside the São Paulo state penitentiary system" and "to avenge the death of 111 prisoners," all of them killed 2 October 1992 in the Carandiru *Casa de Detenção* (a former very large prison) when the São Paulo State Military Police stormed it in order to control a severe prisoners' rebellion.²³

The organization is partly funded by its members, the "brothers." They are required to pay a monthly fee of R\$50 (about U.S. \$29) while in prison, or R\$500 if they are outside of it. The PCC is able to earn about R\$1 million (about U.S. \$500,000) a month from fees alone. Rumors are that the gang is able to manage R\$100 million (about U.S. \$50 million) a year, but that is unconfirmed. The money is used to buy weapons and drugs and to finance operations that bail out prisoners connected to the organization.²⁴

In order to become a member of the PCC, the prospect needs to be formally introduced by another regular member, taking an oath to follow its 16-clause statute that outlines its ideology. Actually, the ideology stated in the statute is just a way to present a political cover to the gang's real purpose—criminal activities.

Written in 1993, *O Estatuto do Primeiro Comando da Capital* (First Capital Command Statute) is a kind of criminal faction's constitution. It stresses the PCC's goal of fighting what the organization identifies as "injustice and oppression" in the prison system under the banner "Liberty, Justice, and Peace." Much of the document deals with discipline. The PCC demands that members of the party set an example to follow. For that reason it does not allow mugging, rape, and extortion within the system, nor the use of the organization to resolve personal conflicts. But the party will always be loyal

and supportive to all its members so that they do not suffer any inequality or injustice in external conflicts. Furthermore, the statute reveals that the PCC intends to expand outside the São Paulo prison system to achieve national prominence and confirms its coalition with the most powerful criminal organization in the state of Rio de Janeiro, the *Comando Vermelho* (CV).

Statute Of The *Primeiro Comando Da Capital* (PCC)¹⁶

1. Loyalty, respect, and solidarity to the Party, above all.
2. The Struggle for Liberty, Justice and Peace.
3. The organization of the Struggle against injustice and oppression inside prisons.
4. The contribution from those who are free from prison to the brothers inside prisons through lawyers, money, help to family members and prison outbreak operations.
5. The respect and solidarity among all members of the Party, so there are no internal conflicts, for he who causes conflicts within the Party, trying to divide the brotherhood will be excluded and shunned from the Party.
6. Never use the Party to solve personal conflicts with outsiders. Because the ideals of the Party are above personal conflicts. But the Party will always be loyal and supportive to all its members so that they don't suffer any inequality or injustice in external conflicts.
7. He who is free and enjoying a good life, but forgets to contribute to the brothers in jail, will be condemned to death without forgiveness.
8. Members of the Party have to set an example to follow and for that reason the Party does not allow mugging, rape and extortion within the System.
9. The Party will not allow lies, treason, jealousy, greed, misdirection, selfishness and personal interest, but values truth, fidelity, manhood, solidarity and the interest in the common good, because we are one for all and all for one.
10. Every member has to respect the Party's order and discipline. Each one will be paid accordingly to what he deserves for what he has done. Everyone's opinion will be heard and respected, but the final decision will be made by the founders of the Party.
11. The *Primeiro Comando da Capital* – PCC was founded in the year of 1993, in an overwhelming and tireless struggle against oppression and injustices in the Concentration Camp of the *Casa de Custódia e Tratamento* (House of Custody and Treatment) of Taubaté, with the absolute motto "Liberty, Justice and Peace."
12. The Party will not allow internal rivalries, disputes for the Command's leadership, as each member of the Command knows his own role according to his capability to carry it out.

(Continued on Next Page)

**Statute Of The *Primeiro Comando Da Capital* (PCC)
(Continued)**

13. We must remain united and organized to avoid a similar or worse massacre as the one which occurred in October 2nd, 1992, when 111 prisoners were cowardly murdered, a massacre that will never be forgotten in the consciousness of the Brazilian society.
14. The priority of the Command is to put pressure on the state's Governor to deactivate the Concentration Camp of the House of Custody and Treatment of Taubaté, from where the roots of the Command originated, in the middle of such inglorious and atrocious suffering.
15. Emanating from the Capital's Central Command of the state's QG (Headquarters), the simultaneous actions' directives in all the state's prison facilities, in a truceless war, borderless, until the final victory.
16. The most important of all is that no one will stop us in this struggle, because the seed of the Command has spread to all the state's Penitentiary Systems and we have gotten to structure ourselves also on the outside, with many sacrifices and many irreparable losses, but we have consolidated ourselves on the state level and in the middle and the long term we will consolidate ourselves on the National level. In a coalition with the *Comando Vermelho* – CV (Red Command) and PCC we shall revolutionize the Country from within the prisons and our armed branch will be the terror of “the Powerful,” oppressors and tyrants that used the Taubaté Annex and the Bangu I Penitentiary, from Rio de Janeiro, as instruments of vengeance from the society in the production of monsters.

We know our strength and our “Powerful” enemies’ strength, but we are ready and united, and a united people will never be defeated.


LIBERTY! JUSTICE! AND PEACE!

The Headquarters of PCC, *Primeiro Comando da Capital*, in coalition with the *Comando Vermelho* (CV).

UNITED, WE WILL WIN!

Within the gang, members can be *soldados* (soldiers), who are in charge of the dissemination and execution of the orders from the leadership; *pilotos* (pilots), who are within or outside the prisons—they deliver the messages to the soldiers always using codes, by cell phones and also face to face communication—and *torres* (towers), who are the main leaders of the criminal faction, responsible for decision making.

On 10 May 2006, just two days before the riots began in São Paulo, two high officials of the *Departamento de Investigação do Crime Organizado*



Inmates at Sorocaba prison, 55 miles from São Paulo, in December 1997 brandishing PCC flags. Inmates rioted during visiting hours. The sign on the wall reads, “PCC Satan Command.” Photo: AFP, Marie Hippenmeyer used by permission of Newscom.

(DEIC—Department of Investigation of Organized Crime) of the state of São Paulo, Godofredo Bittencourt Filho and Ruy Ferraz Fontes, testified in a special hearing about their understanding of the true power of PCC.²⁷ They related that the department deals with about 100 extortion cases in São Paulo every day and this represents 70 percent of the kidnapping cases in the city. In addition to the 140,000 prisoners inside São Paulo state prisons, about half a million Brazilians support the PCC, serving as informants, lawyers, drug dealers, and the like.²⁸

Recently, the PCC decided to invest deeply in its human resources. Some of its members are being enrolled in qualification courses promoted by private security enterprises in order to handle more powerful weapons as well as offensive and defensive car driving.²⁹

While the PCC invests money in criminal enterprises of all sorts, drug trafficking is the strength of the PCC. Cocaine runs the criminal faction. According to Godofredo Bittencourt, who has been chief of DEIC for 8 years, the lawyers that defend the PCC criminals present a great problem because of the protected lawyer-client relationship. As prison guards cannot search lawyers visiting their clients, these men of law take advantage to bring into the prisons contraband items—for example, cell phones, laptop computers, and radios.³⁰

In 2001 and 2002 a bloody power dispute occurred for command of the PCC. Fifteen leaders were killed, including Idemir Carlos Ambósio (a.k.a. *Sombra*, or Shadow). *Sombra* was the PCC leader of the 2001 riots.³¹ Since 2002, according to the state of São Paulo Police, the main PCC leader is Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho (a.k.a. *Marcola* or Playboy). Under him, the police identify a group of warlords: Júlio Cesar Guedes de Moraes (a.k.a. *Julinho Carambola*), Rogério Geremias de Simone (a.k.a. *Gegê do Manguê*), Alejandro Juvenal Herbas Camacho (a.k.a. Junior, the brother of Marcola),

and others.³² Currently, all of them are jailed at the top security prison of Presidente Venceslau, in the countryside of the state of São Paulo. Marcola is isolated at Presidente Bernardes Penitentiary, considered the Brazilian maximum security prison.³³

In 2005, Marcola was in close contact with the Chilean notorious terrorist Mauricio Norambuena (a.k.a. *Comandante Ramiro*), an experienced militant of the radical leftist *Frente Patriótica Manuel Rodrigues* (FPMR—Manuel Rodrigues Patriotic Front), when both were jailed at the Presidente Bernardes Penitentiary. Norambuena was convicted for the kidnapping of the famous Brazilian publicity entrepreneur Washington Olivetto, in the city of São Paulo. This close relationship has given Marcola good guidance about how to attack and demoralize the security structure of the state of São Paulo, considered one of the most efficient and effective in Latin America.³⁴

To consolidate his leadership over the members of the organization, Marcola uses terror. Currently, there are almost 500 prisoners killed a year. According to the São Paulo state security authorities, in 2004, the number of inmates' suicides increased 200 percent. According to Catholic Church Father Valdir José Ferreira, inmates with debts to the party who do not want to "accomplish their tasks" anymore are obliged to commit suicide. He ordered that the PCC members were not allowed to use cocaine (something he said would destroy "his army") and also ordered the end of the practice of rape against the weaker prisoners.

Though he has been in prison for half his life, serving a 44-year sentence for bank robbery, the 40-year-old criminal leader is not a stupid individual. In fact, he is known for being well dressed, somewhat of an intellectual, and very articulate. Most of his time in prison is spent reading. Recent searches of his prison cell uncovered several political books, including Mao, Lenin, Clausewitz's *On War*, Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, Machiavelli's *The Prince*, and Che Guevara's *Guerrilla War*.³⁵ Marcola's ability to terrorize the population is well exposed in this statement published during the May 2006 wave of violence, by *O Globo*, the daily newspaper with the largest circulation in Brazil:

You're afraid of dying, not me. In fact, you can come into my prison cell and kill me here. But I can kill you out there. We are human bombs, suicide bombers. In the *favelas* [slums] I have one hundred thousand suicide bombers. We're in the middle of a situation without

a solution. You are on the side of “good,” I’m on the side of “bad” and in between is death, the final frontier. We are another breed, different from you . . . Death is our daily bread . . . no one is worth a thing, life is *nothing*.

Besides promoting several rebellions and killing of prisoners, PCC was responsible for the worst cases of orchestrated crimes in São Paulo since 2001. In February 2001, PCC coordinated by cell phone simultaneous rebellions in 29 prisons. In January and May 2002, the gang was responsible for 14 attacks, most of them with bombs, against public services buildings. In March 2003, PCC ordered the murder of Judge Antonio José Machado Dias in the city of Presidente Prudente. In November and December 2003, 44 attacks occurred against police stations. In January 2006, PCC controlled 2 days of attacks against police officers.³⁶

In fact, the May 2006 attacks were the most violent, decentralized, and coordinated of them all. The PCC not only attacked public service buildings and police stations but also carried out rebellions, all of them simultaneously. There is an endless discussion in Brazil of whether those attacks can be considered terrorist activities. One point is crystal clear. Frightening the population, confronting state power, and performing shows of force is a classic strategy carried out by terrorists organizations in order to negotiate their demands with local authorities. The PCC has demonstrated that it is perfectly aware of how to do it. Actually, looking at the results, this is a dubious discussion because for the security agencies, what matters is how to face the tactics, techniques, and procedures the criminal organization is using and they are predominantly terrorist.

There is no evidence that PCC has political goals to achieve. However, law enforcement authorities say that PCC is preparing itself to invest, support, and elect *Deputados Federais* (members of the Chamber of Deputies). The names of the possible candidates are still unknown. In 2002, the lawyer Anselmo Neves Maia tried to run for office, but was arrested prior to the elections because of his illegal activity supporting the criminal organization.³⁷

In the state of São Paulo, the PCC is the most powerful criminal organization, but as a result of internal dissidence in the PCC, São Paulo state has four more minor gangs. They are *Terceiro Comando da Capital* (TCC—Third Capital Command), which is the most recent; *Comitê da Liberdade*

(CDL—Freedom Committee); *Comando Revolucionário Brasileiro da Criminalidade* (CRBC—Criminality Brazilian Revolutionary Command); and *Comando Vermelho Jovem da Criminalidade* (CVJC—Criminality Young Red Command). They are small groups, independent (no interaction), and most of the time they do not accept the PCC's leadership in their criminal activities. Some of them are extremely hostile towards the PCC. CRBC is one of them; it states openly its intention to assassinate PCC leader Marcola.

In the states of the Brazilian Federation where PCC members have been jailed, criminal factions were founded based on the PCC's organization. In Brasília, the country's capital, where Marcola has been jailed, the faction *Paz, Liberdade e Direito* (Peace, Liberty and Right) has appeared. In the state of Paraná, the *Primeiro Comando do Paraná* (PCP—First Command of Paraná) has come on the scene. In the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, the *Primeiro Comando de Mato Grosso do Sul* (PCMS—First Command of Mato Grosso do Sul) has appeared. Up to now, there is no evidence of subordination amongst those organizations, just occasional collaboration.³⁸

4. The Main Criminal Factions in Rio de Janeiro and Connections with the PCC

O Comando Vermelho (CV), O Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP), and Os Amigos dos Amigos (ADA)

The first organized crime faction established in Brazil was the *Comando Vermelho* (CV—Red Command). Cocaine made the CV very powerful in the early 1980s. At that time, Rio de Janeiro became one of the main distribution centers for Europe and also for the Brazilian local market. Throughout the 1990s, the CV was the strongest Brazilian criminal organization, even supporting the founding of the PCC in the state of São Paulo in 1993.³⁹

In 1997, as a result of internal dissidence in the CV, two gangs appeared in the state of Rio de Janeiro as rivals of the CV: the *Terceiro Comando* (TC—Third Command) and the *Amigos dos Amigos* (ADA—Friends of Friends). In 1998, the TC and ADA became allies, fighting the CV for control of drug trafficking. By 2000, notwithstanding that the *Comando Vermelho* still controls about one third of the city of Rio de Janeiro's *favelas*, where seeing streets tagged with CV is common, its principal leaders had been arrested or killed, and the organization had lost much of its strength.

Luiz Fernando da Costa (a.k.a. Fernandinho Beira-Mar), considered the Brazilian top drug dealer, who reputedly controlled 70 percent of Brazil's cocaine distribution, had been the most important leader of CV. During his criminal career, he established strong connections in Peru, Colombia, and Paraguay. He lived in Paraguay and maintained his base of operations there for 13 years.

Captured by Brazilian authorities in July 1996, Beira-Mar escaped from a prison of the state of Minas Gerais 9 months later, in March 1997, after a bribe of several million dollars paid to the prison security guards. Free, da Costa returned to Paraguay, where he could carry on his criminal activities. On 21 April 2001, he was captured by Colombian security forces in Vinchada Province of eastern Colombia, exchanging weapons for drugs with the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC—Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). He was extradited to Brazil on 24 April 2001 where he remains jailed in a top security prison.⁴⁰

In September 2002, Luiz Fernando da Costa led a rebellion in the Bangu I prison in the city of Rio de Janeiro. In this event, the main leaders of the rival criminal factions TC and ADA were executed. As a consequence, the

TC became extinct, and from the fruit of this conflict was born the *Terceiro Comando Puro* (TCP—Pure Third Command). The TCP was founded by former members of the state of Rio de Janeiro military police who became criminals.

Currently, the CV, ADA, and TCP remain the most important criminal organizations in the state of Rio de Janeiro. The total amount of refined cocaine monthly negotiated in the local market is about 1,320 kg (CV: 660

kg, TCP: 330 kg, and ADA: 300 kg). Each kilogram is multiplied by three because other substances are mixed. In terms of marijuana, the total amount monthly negotiated is 5,300 kg (CV: 2,600 kg; TCP: 1,800 kg; and ADA: 900 kg).⁴¹ Their rivalry has become extremely violent, and bloody confrontations for territory have become a routine in some *favelas* of the city of Rio de Janeiro. Rocinha, the largest *favela* of Rio de Janeiro, currently controlled by ADA, has become one of the main stages for those gang fights.



22 April 2006, da Costa escorted by Colombian soldiers. He denied accusations of ties with Columbia's FARC guerrillas. Photo: AFP, Rodrigo Arungu used by permission of Newscom.

Connections between the PCC and Rio de Janeiro's Criminal Organizations

In 1999 the CV formed an alliance with the PCC to expand its CV drug business from Rio de Janeiro to São Paulo. This helped the PCC improve its earnings while it helped the CV to defend its enterprise in Rio de Janeiro from the ADA and TCP. Currently, PCC and CV “control the drug trade in Brazil’s two largest cities and operate weapons smuggling routes out of Paraguay. High level members of these organizations, especially the CV, continue to conduct a weapons-for-cocaine barter with members of the FARC based in the Colombian Amazon.”⁴²

When CV leader Luiz Fernando da Costa was transferred from his prison cell in Rio de Janeiro, after he had orchestrated a prison riot in September 2002 to mask the assassination of rival gang leaders, authorities found a number of luxury items including silk pajamas. But what surprised them

more was the number of cell phones. Beira-Mar used up to a dozen cell phones to communicate with subordinates in his black market network of gun and drug shipments and sales.⁴³

The PCC, CV, TCP, and ADA routinely use cell phones to back up their command and control systems. In both Rio and São Paulo, two-way radios are also used by criminals to relay messages to other incarcerated gang members and members on the outside. The newspaper *O Globo* reports that “In some cases, one prisoner calls a subordinate via cell on the outside who uses a two-way radio to transmit the message to a third individual who then uses another cell phone to pass along the message to its recipient in another prison. Each node on the communications network may use any number of cell phones or two-way radios, making tracking the signals very difficult.”⁴⁴ Therefore, the listening posts operated by both state civil police and federal police have a challenge developing useful intelligence.

In May 2006, during the violent Mother’s Day weekend, the top security authorities of São Paulo state requested the *Agência Nacional de Telecomunicações* (ANATEL—National Telecommunications Agency) shut down cell phone towers used by criminals to relay signals. After an important meeting with high officials of ANATEL, Marco Antonio Desgualdo—head of the São Paulo state civil police said that this regulatory body—refused to shut down the cell towers without the acquiescence of the telecommunications companies. Those companies complained that shutting down the towers would mean an unacceptable disruption of service for their law-abiding clients. This critical situation was not resolved because only a high justice court order can shut down the towers, a legal process that takes too long.

In some prison systems, cell phone signal blockers are being used successfully. However, this method must be periodically updated because of the rapid pace of technological advancement in cell phone systems.⁴⁵ Technology considerations aside, according to many observers, the big problem with Brazil’s penal system is the political situation and corruption.

Civilians and Police Killed in Rio’s Violence

On 28 December 2006 in Rio de Janeiro, the CV tried to start a similar wave of violence to that carried out by the PCC in May in São Paulo. Drug gangs set fire to buses and—using hand guns, machine guns, and hand grenades—opened fire on 12 police stations and posts around Rio de Janeiro, killing 19 people and injuring 21 according to Roberto Precioso, head of Rio’s Public

Security Department. Precioso said that the fatal victims included two policemen and seven people who burned to death in one of the six torched buses. The attacks had been ordered via mobile phones from inside one of the state's prisons and were apparently a show of force staged before a new state governor was to be sworn on 1 January 2007.⁴⁶

At a news conference, Precioso said that police intelligence had warned for some time that criminals would attempt those attacks. "But it was very difficult to prevent these types of attacks because they were practically *kami-kaze*."⁴⁷ He emphasized that police action prevented the situation from reaching levels seen in São Paulo in May.

Rio de Janeiro's mayor, Cesar Maia, stated that CV gangs appeared to be retaliating against *milícias privadas* (private militias), reportedly run by off-duty police officers that in recent months had been battling drug gangs in the *favelas* and charging residents for protection. "The reason for what's happening is that militias have grown and the drug gangs are leaving," Maia told reporters. "To maintain their income, the gangs are increasing crime on the street."⁴⁸

Just as in Colombia, where militias were thought to be a logical counter to narcoterrorists, Rio de Janeiro's militias have gotten out of control, covered by their close connections to the police and other authorities. The result has been conflict that involves militias, gangs, and police as illustrated by this event:

A decorated police officer was sitting behind the wheel of his pickup truck when a group of men surrounded the vehicle and pumped more than 40 bullets into him. Such execution-style killings are not unusual in a city where police and gang members routinely battle for turf in the *favelas*, but this one sent ripples through Rio de Janeiro. The slain officer, Felix dos Santos Tostes, had been identified as the leader of a *milícia* unit—one of the well-armed groups that had multiplied throughout the city's *favelas* in recent months, complicating an urban conflict that has defied solution for years.⁴⁹

On 30 December 2006, after a successful action carried out by about 21,000 police officers in ten of the most notorious *favelas*, the situation was brought under control. As reported by most newspapers of the Brazilian

press, President Lula condemned this wave of violence in Rio, “This barbarity that happened in Rio de Janeiro can’t be treated like common crime; it’s terrorism and must be dealt with by the strong hand of the Brazilian state.”⁵⁰

“This barbarity ... can’t be treated like common crime, it’s terrorism, and must be dealt with by the strong hand of the Brazilian state.” – Brazil’s President Lula

Fortunately, Rio’s law enforcement authorities were able to contain the violence and it did not present a danger to the 4 million people, including more than half a million foreign tourists, who crowded Rio de Janeiro’s beaches on 31 December 2006 to watch the musical acts and the fireworks that welcomed the new year.

Governor Sérgio Cabral announced, in January 2007, along with the governors of the other states in the populous southeast of Brazil (São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Espírito Santo) a new joint security program. The intent was to improve public security in Rio not only ahead of the Rio Carnival in February but also for the Pan American Games that were due to take place in July. By July 2007, it was possible to say that this program was doing well, particularly because different law enforcement agencies (LEAs) of the states were sharing a common criminal information data bank.

Security for the Pan American Games

The Pan American Games conducted in Rio de Janeiro in July 2007 were considered by national and international public opinion the best in recent years. Besides the outstanding organization, the excellent new Olympic-style village and diversified stadiums specially built for the contests, this big international event showed that Rio was able to guarantee a high level of security for its citizens and visitors.

The Brazilian Intelligence Agency established an Intelligence Center with computers connected to 80 international security services. In addition, the Public Security Command and Control Center established by the Rio de Janeiro State Public Security Department was connected to 300 different security agencies and monitored 1,500 television cameras, all of them able to transmit high accuracy images in real time. Rio’s police force received 500 patrol cars, each equipped with a global positioning system (GPS) and an electronic countermeasure radio. The LEA apparatus had 18,000 officers

in the streets during the 2 weeks of the games and the rate of criminality went down 60 percent.⁵¹

The results of the Pan American Games were very good. The *Fédération*



26 July 2007, the Brazilian silver-medalist water polo team greets the crowd at the Rio 2007 XV Pan American Games. Photo: Mauricio Lima/AFP/Getty Images, used with permission from Newscom.

Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), after a very careful inspection, particularly on security matters, announced in November 2007 that Brazil is going to be the home for the 2014 World Soccer Championship. For Brazilians, soccer is not a sport; it is a popular passion. Preparation for this important international event has become a great motivation for the Brazilian population to implement support of the fight against organized crime. Notwithstanding the public security problems, the number of foreign tourists coming to Brazil increases significantly year after year, particularly to Rio. The expectation for the 2014 World Soccer Cup is that about 1 million visitors will come for that event.⁵² Thus as can be seen, public security can be established and maintained when it enjoys the focused efforts of the government and support of the people.

5. Brazilian Organized Crime Foreign Connections

Brazilian criminal organizations have links to organized crime in Paraguay, Bolivia, and Suriname, and they have a thriving barter system with Colombia's FARC soldiers. Security authorities in Brazil are perfectly aware of the critical danger that the PCC and CV may soon become internationally known as a criminal network that has grown too big to handle.

In March 2001, Colombian Armed Forces undertook Operation *Gato Negro* (Black Cat) in southeastern Colombia. *Gato Negro* revealed the Colombian guerrillas' ties with narcotraffickers of Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and the United States, according to Colombian Defense Minister Luis Fernando Ramirez.⁵³ This 2-month antinarcotics effort culminated with the capture of Brazil's most notorious drug trafficker, Luiz Fernando da Costa (Fernandinho Beira-Mar), 33 years old, on 21 April 2001. Colombian Army officials said the event highlighted connections between da Costa's organization (CV) and the FARC. Da Costa was arrested in the Colombian jungle after a manhunt by 300 Colombian Army troops, who eventually cornered him in Vinchada Province near the Venezuelan border. Top Colombian Army officials have underscored that Beira-Mar had been selling arms to leftist rebels of the FARC in exchange for cocaine:

Until his capture, Brazil's arms-for-cocaine trafficking revolved around da Costa, known internationally as Brazil's Pablo Escobar. Brazil's Parliamentary Commission, after investigating narcotics trafficking in Brazil, identified da Costa as one of the major Brazilian organized crime chiefs, with international connections in Paraguay, Peru, and Colombia. With the contacts that he made in Paraguay during 13 years of residency in that country, Beira-Mar purchased arsenals and brought them to Barranco Minas (Province of Guainia). He maintained his base of operations in Paraguay until forced to move to Colombia. Brazilian authorities established that da Costa had connections with 53 people in Brazil through bank accounts in different countries of the world.⁵⁴

In February 2001, the Colombian Army arrested several Brazilians from the Beira-Mar gang and confiscated documents that officials said showed

how the rebels received arms from Costa in exchange for a Brazilian-bound shipment of cocaine. Colombian authorities extradited Luiz Fernando da Costa to Brazil on 24 April 2001.

After the capture of da Costa, General Fernando Tapias Stahelin, commander of the Colombian Armed Forces revealed on 23 April 2001 that “there were connections between the Brazilian criminal and Vladimir Montesinos, the security advisor for the former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, in regard to arms trafficking to the FARC.”⁵⁵ The Colombian general was referring specifically to the shipment of 10,000 AK-47s sent to the FARC by the Russian mafia in 2000. General Tapias affirmed that da Costa had delivered “10,000 arms and 3 million cartridges” to the FARC. The Colombian commander of the Armed Forces stated that Beira-Mar after his arrest told investigators that the FARC’s 16th Front (Commander *El Negro Acasio*) was in control of the drug trade in Colombia’s eastern jungles. General Tapias added that the FARC helped Luiz Fernando da Costa export more than 200 tons of cocaine to Brazil from 2000 to 2001, receiving U.S. \$500 for each kilogram of the drug and U.S. \$15,000 for every narcotics flight that left the area.⁵⁶

Four town pairs on the Paraguay-Brazil (Par-Br) border have become the largest operational bases of drug dealers that operate in Brazil, exceeding the drug trafficking in the Amazon. These are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Paraguay–Brazil border town pairs that have become the chief operational bases for drug trafficking⁴¹

| Paraguay | Brazil | Description |
|----------------------|------------------|--|
| Pedro Juan Caballero | Ponta Porã | The main entry for cocaine into Brazil. Small aircraft from Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia land on clandestine runways. Next, the cocaine moves by land to São Paulo. |
| Capitan Bádo | Coronel Sapucaia | This has become the most significant entry point for the cannabis crop of South America. It supplies 80 percent of the Brazilian market. |
| Salto del Guayrá | Guaíra | The largest center for cigarettes contraband of South America. It’s also a route for arms and drugs. |
| Ciudad del Leste | Foz do Iguaçu | Generally known as the tri-border area. In addition to a route for arms and drugs trafficking, it’s one of the main centers of money laundering in Latin America. |

Ciudad del Leste, separated from Foz de Iguaçu by the Paraná River, is an example of the relationship that Paraguay traditionally maintains with lawlessness. Imported merchandise moves U.S. \$4 billion every year, but only 30 percent of this amount is officially declared. The city is internationally known as the piracy capital. In 2005, U.S. \$62 million were apprehended by the Brazilian Customs authorities at the Ponte da Amizade (Friendship Bridge), 86 percent more than in 2004. Notwithstanding this intense supervision, apprehensions do not exceed more than 10 percent of all illegal merchandise that crosses the bridge on a daily basis. Ciudad del Leste is indeed the contraband's paradise. It is a haven for outlaws who live and work among its law-abiding citizens. "Political corruption allows for a multitude of criminal activities and illegal markets to overlap with economic activities."⁵⁸ Among other illicit products, it is possible to buy an AK-47 Kalashnikov, with 500 7.62-millimeter cartridges, for U.S. \$400. In order to escape inspection, smugglers are using alternative routes like clandestine improvised ports at the Paraná River and the Itaipu Lake.⁵⁹

Odilon de Oliveira, 56 years old, is a Brazilian federal judge in Ponta Porã city of Mato Grosso do Sul state on the Paraguayan border. In 1 year, he condemned 114 drug traffickers to convictions that reached 919 years and 6 months of jail and confiscated their goods. His court condemned more criminals than any other court in Brazil in the last 12 months. Brazilian drug dealers operating in Paraguay are offering U.S. \$500,000 for his head. But he is still hunting them successfully.

Another big problem facing South America is the policy adopted by the current President of Bolivia, Evo Morales. He decided to increase the legal coca plantation area to 20,000 hectares, which according to Márcio Paulo Buzanelli, then chief of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency, is making a large contribution to cocaine trafficking. Today 80 percent of the cocaine manufactured in Bolivia has Brazilian territory as its destination. The main purchaser of the Bolivian cocaine is the Brazilian criminal organization of São Paulo, PCC, which is importing about U.S. \$200 million of cocaine a year. After supplying the Brazilian market, the PCC is exporting to Europe and to Africa, with a profit of U.S. \$1 billion.⁶⁰

Politically independent only three decades ago, Suriname is known by the Brazilian security authorities as the "Paraguay of the North." According to the last United Nations report,⁶¹ the former Dutch colony is, along with Paraguay, one of the most important suppliers of illegal arms to Brazilian

criminals. As well as different kinds of munitions, clandestine weapons come to Suriname from countries like Libya, Russia, and China. And they arrive in Brazil to be exchanged for cocaine.

An intensive security interagency effort, oriented by the Federal Police Intelligence System is being developed in the country in order to combat the organized crime foreign connections networks. The Federal Police Department is also sharing information about criminal contacts outside Brazil with LEA of neighboring countries.

On 7 August 2007, Juan Carlos Ramirez Abadia, (aliases Chupeta, Cien, Don Augusto, El Patron, Gustavo Ortiz, Charlie Pareja), leader of the Norte del Valle Cartel, currently the most notorious Colombian drug lord, was arrested in Brazil. He was arrested along with his staff in Aldeia da Serra, a wealthy neighborhood of the city of Barueri, São Paulo state, by Brazilian federal police during a raid.⁶² According to the U.S. Department of State, Abadia has amassed a fortune estimated at U.S. \$1.8 billion. He has been cited as “one of the most powerful and most elusive drug traffickers in Colombia” by Adam J. Szubin, director of the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office Assets Control (OFAC).⁶³ Abadia’s arrest is proof of how the security connections with neighboring countries are working very well.

6. The Armed Forces' Role

Notwithstanding budget restrictions, the Brazilian Armed Forces are the second largest and most powerful (after the United States) in the Western Hemisphere. Every year, public opinion polls are carried out and the people respond about the country's most reliable institutions. The Brazilian Military Services are apolitical and enjoy (differently from the military of other Latin America countries) the highest confidence rating (followed by the Church) of any Brazilian public institution as evidenced by those polls.

The Armed Forces' mission, as clearly stated in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil, is to defend the homeland; to guarantee constitutional powers (executive, legislative and judiciary); and, when requested by one of the constitutional powers, to guarantee law and order.⁶⁴ Other tasks are established by specific legislation and Presidential directives. They are to contribute to national development and civil defense; to participate in international operations, in accordance with Brazilian foreign affairs commitments; and to operate in the land frontier areas against transnational illicit activities.

Employment of the Armed Forces to guarantee law and order is an exclusive power of the President of the Republic. This guarantee is summarized as enforcing respect for established legal norms or those derived from them.

It is important to highlight that the Brazilian Constitution specifies that the *preservation of the public order* is a duty of the Federal Police Department, National Public Security Forces, and the Federation States' law enforcement agencies (LEA).⁶⁵ Therefore, in this context, public security is not a mission of the Armed Forces. The services' primary role is to provide the LEA with logistics, intelligence, and training support when needed. Armed Forces' intervention will always be a last resort, determined by the President, when the governors of the states acknowledge

*Armed Forces' intervention
will always be a last resort,
determined by the President ...*

that the LEA have exhausted their resources and are not capable of maintaining law and order anymore and chaos becomes an imminent threat. The Constitution characterizes this context as a federal intervention.

Notwithstanding the existence of the Public Security National Secretariat (SENASP), subordinate to the Minister of Justice, public security is primarily the duty of the states and also a right as well as everyone's responsibility. It

is exercised to preserve order and to provide security to the people and their properties. For this assignment, Brazil has the following:

- a. Federal Police Department
- b. Public Security National Force (a public security force created in 2004 with 7,000 policemen selected from the military police of the states)
- c. Federal Highway Police
- d. Federal Railroad Police
- e. Civilian police and military police (*polícia militar*, or PM) of the states
- f. Military Firemen Corps of the states.

In Brazil the Armed Forces police, with the same role as the military police (MP) in the United States, are known by their service name: the Army Police (*Polícia do Exército*), the Naval Police (*Polícia da Marinha*), and the Air Force Police (*Polícia da Aeronáutica*). The Public Security National Force is subordinate to the Minister of Justice. The civilian police, PM, and Military Firemen Corps are subordinate to the governors of the states. The Public Security National Force, the PM, and Firemen Corps are organized in ranks and use uniforms. Being a reserve force, they are also considered auxiliary forces of the Armed Forces.

When the Armed Forces are deployed to guarantee law and order, the preventive and repressive actions needed to achieve positive results will be for specific contingencies or episodes, in geographic areas very well defined and for a limited time. Special legislation concerning public and official events—particularly those international summits involving chiefs of state—demands that the respective Brazilian Army's Area Military Command be responsible for the security. In these situations, the federal and state LEAs (as well as Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force elements, when needed) come under the operational control of the Army's commander in charge. Examples of this situation were the visits of President George Bush to Brasilia and São Paulo (November 2006) and Pope Benedict XVI to Aparecida (a town in São Paulo state where the important Brazilian Catholic Marian Sanctuary is located) and São Paulo (May 2007).

Several cities in Brazil have been the object of deployments—Army units (and Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force elements)—because of severe public order disturbances. Operation Rio, a 3-month military operation



2 February 2006 , Brazilian Army General Jose Elito Carvalho de Siqueira, then commander of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), during a press conference in Port-au-Prince. Photo, Roberto Schmidt, AFP, Getty Images, used with permission from Newscom.

developed by the Eastern Military Command in Rio de Janeiro in 1994, is an example of those successful deployments. Public poll results clearly demonstrate that more than 75 percent of populations in the largest Brazilian cities want the deployment of the Armed Forces to resolve public security problems.⁶⁶

The strong performance of the Brazilian Army troops in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has become an important argument for those who want to see the soldiers on the streets. Brazilian troops have been in Haiti since May 2004 carrying out the Mandate of the UN Security Council Resolution 1542/2004, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Besides the Multinational Force commander

and staff officers, the Brazilian contingent has about 1,500 troops, the largest national contingent among the 10,000 MINUSTAH force.

The focus of the complex MINUSTAH mission is to guarantee a secure environment where political human rights and humanitarian components can operate freely. In order to accomplish the mission, besides the development of humanitarian assistance, the troops are conducting selected repressive actions against criminal gangs and carrying out a general disarmament, which is an essential precondition for Haiti's stabilization.

Some Brazilian Congressmen and journalists, after visiting Haiti, recognize the success the Brazilian troops are having there and are stating that the Army should be deployed in Brazil, particularly in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The current governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, Sérgio Cabral, asked, in May 2007, for 4,000 troops from the Army, in order to cooperate with public security forces up to the end of the year. He did not acknowledge,

however, that his LEAs were having problems maintaining public order. Rather than authorize this deployment, President Lula ordered the deployment of 4,000 military policemen from the Public Security National Force (including 1,000 police observers) from 20 countries.

Lessons Learned

The last large deployment of Army troops on the streets of Rio de Janeiro was in March 2006. A CV masked group had assaulted an Army administrative transportation unit located in the northern zone of Rio, and 10 rifles and 1 pistol were stolen. The Eastern Military Commander ordered the Infantry Parachute and the 9th Infantry Motorized Brigades, under the operational command of the 1st Army Division, to carry out the Operation *Abafa* (stifle) in order to recover those arms and to arrest the criminals involved. After 12 days, performing day and night, foot and motorized patrolling, search and apprehension operations, one criminal was killed, several other suspects were arrested, and a significant amount of illegal arms, cocaine and cannabis were captured. And more importantly, the 10 rifles and the pistol were recovered.

According to the LEA, in the 12 days of the operation, the narcotrafficking gangs in Rio had a loss of more than R\$5 million (about U.S. \$2.5 million). The Army did a good job, acknowledged by the population in several public opinion polls. As a result of this and several other operations on the streets and mainly in the *favelas* of large Brazilian cities, we have some lessons learned for military operations against irregular forces in urban terrain:

- a. In the *favelas*, the streets are extremely narrow and without identification. Buildings are very close to each other. Observation and fields of fire are severely restricted. Designating targets is a hard task. In general, the topography is extremely irregular and higher places gain an overwhelming advantage.
- b. The population in the area of operations is a critical issue that demands commanders at all levels understand the human dimension. Most residents are good citizens and do not have links with drug trafficking. They work outside the operational area, using various transportation means (e.g., motorcycles and vans). They fear retaliatory actions from the gang members after the Army leaves; therefore, they usually hesitate to give information. In general, there is no empathy with the

LEAs, but the Army is accepted. It is mandatory to identify and meet the community leaders.

- c. The Army does not identify drug trafficking gangs as an enemy; the reason is because they want to avoid the appearance before public opinion that these operations are in a context of conventional warfare. The gangs are identified as *forças adversas* (opposition forces).
- d. The opposition forces have great power to intimidate the local population. The PCC, CV, TCP, and ADA have firepower based on automatic rifles, submachine guns, pistols, and hand grenades. They often employ children to deliver drugs and to get information about troop movements. The gangs use caches to hide weapons and ammunition and employ cell phones, small radios, and communications using fireworks and visual signs. When at a disadvantage, they mix with the local population, and in critical situations they may use the population as a shield. More and more they are employing urban guerrilla tactics, techniques, and procedures.
- e. Actions against criminal gangs in large cities are basically urban operations, and success depends primarily on small unit effectiveness and efficiency. Often, there is decentralization of actions down to the squad level. This requires well-trained, disciplined soldiers and exceptional leaders at all levels, capable of keeping high moral standards. Rifle marksmanship (day and night, angles and distances are different), small unit tactics (particularly in close combat), and communications are critical issues. Urban operations require special weapons and ammunition (including nonlethal) and tools for breaching and entering buildings. Close combat to clear buildings and houses is the norm. Sniper activity is intense, and it is mandatory to establish passive and active measures to counter snipers. Machine gun drills and fire control are absolutely critical. Light mechanized forces are effective because of their capability to move quickly to isolate opposition forces, control highways and main avenues, and attack decisive points. If needed, they are also useful for fire support in close combat, and they have great psychological effect.
- f. Commanders must establish Rules of Engagement (ROE) and rules for the escalation of force in order to avoid collateral damage and casualties among the civilian noncombatant people. Distinguishing opposition force combatants from civilian noncombatants is a very

hard, but necessary task to perform. Notwithstanding the aggressive attitude against opposition forces, a respectful behavior before the local population is absolutely essential.

- g. Intelligence preparation has specific demands. Terrain is described in terms of lines of communications, urban pattern, and building structure. Civilian concentrations and critical infrastructure must be studied. Intelligence data collection about the opposition forces is an essential task. Less ELINT and SIGINT and more tactical HUMINT is the rule. Counterintelligence is extremely relevant. Each soldier is a sensor. The best source of information is the “bad guy” arrested alive. Soldiers must be trained to get timely information from the gang members in order to achieve tactical advantages. However, commanders must establish limits on detention and limits on interrogation. In order to keep high moral standards, torture is completely unacceptable. To resolve this dilemma, high standards of leadership at all levels are essential.
- h. The decision-making process must establish actions to be performed in three phases—isolation, movement to contact, and conquest of key points. Principles of mass and unity of command must be observed. LEA personnel under operational control must support the decision-making process and participate in the operations receiving complementary tasks. Command posts must be established close to the operational area. In most of the *favelas* of Rio, the isolation phase demands the occupation of the railroad station used by that community as well as the establishment of blocking and checkpoints in the accesses. Whenever possible, in order to get a significant tactical advantage, stealthy occupation of dominant points must be executed in advance.
- i. Employment of Army Aviation helicopters with crews trained in special air operations tactics is very important to facilitate command and control, move the small units quickly and precisely, and to get a good psychological effect. Often, gangs raise barricades in order to block access to key points; therefore, engineer support is mandatory to clear the way.
- j. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are needed. Psychological Operations tactical teams are essential to earn the “hearts and minds” of the local population. Loudspeakers and leaflets have proven to be effective for

orienting the local population to procedures during operations. In Brazil, the best law enforcement special operations units are trained by the Army. Experience has shown that civilian police SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) teams and PM (military police) special operations teams may be deployed to accomplish specific tasks under the operational control of the Army's SOF elements.

- k. Social communication is extremely important. Selected reporters should be afforded the opportunity to cover the operations but kept under restricted control. Keeping the media updated on the operations is an indispensable measure. Legal aspects are fundamental, and justice backup is essential. All the arrests must be made on a legal basis. Mandates of search and apprehension are conducted in accordance with the law.
- l. The Brazilian Army experience in Haiti has become extremely important. Lessons learned in MINUSTAH are being effectively and efficiently disseminated. The Brazilian Army's Special Operations Training Center (Rio de Janeiro, state of Rio de Janeiro), Peace Operations Training Center (Rio de Janeiro, state of Rio de Janeiro) and the Guarantee of Law and Order Training Center (Campinas, state of São Paulo) are tasked to orient combat units in order to be prepared for that special kind of operations.

Mainly because of their political implications, the conduct of operations for *Garantia da Lei e da Ordem* (Guarantee of Law and Order) is always seen with suspicion by the services' high commands. However, the Brazilian Armed Forces, particularly the Army, are fully aware that besides their traditional tasks, they must be capable and sufficiently flexible and versatile to deploy against both guerrillas and urban drug gangs as well as against nontraditional or new security threats.

13. Summary

Organized crime runs rampant in Latin America, and homicide rates are among the highest of any region in the world. In Brazil, extreme urban crime and violence have increased many Brazilians' sense of insecurity and are undermining the institutionalization of democratic governance. The globalization of threats as well as the urban guerrilla's tactics, techniques, and procedures carried out by criminal gangs have transformed public security and become a problem of national security.

High level relationships exist between the largest crime organization of São Paulo, the PCC, and Rio de Janeiro's most powerful drug trafficking organization, the CV. These organizations have gained control of the drug trade in Brazil's two largest cities. The PCC statute states that this coalition with CV "will revolutionize the country from within the prisons," and this threat must be seriously faced by the Brazilian security community.

As a complicating factor, it is indispensable to keep in mind the significant role that foreign connections play in the operations of organized crime. In particular, the FARC, Colombia's most relevant revolutionary group, has become a criminal organization—primarily engaged in arms-for-drugs trade with the main Brazilian criminal organizations. And there are also the Bolivian and Suriname connections.

The good news is that prevention and combat against organized crime in Brazil are being accomplished by the different levels of government authorities along with an active participation by the Brazilian society. To start the reform of the penitentiary system, something that is absolutely mandatory, President Lula recently announced that about R\$3.5 billion (U.S. \$1.7 billion) will be spent in a high priority program (developed over 3 years) for the construction of top-security prisons in 11 state capitals, including Brasília, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo. Also, 187 special prisons for criminal teenagers will be constructed in the largest Brazilian cities.⁶⁷ This reform will also rectify problems in the Brazilian criminal justice code, increasing the level of legal punishment related to some crimes—for example, murder and kidnapping. The idea is to eliminate situations where good lawyers can keep guilty parties out of jail through infinite appeals that can delay rulings and prevent sentences from being carried out. The penitentiary guard corps is also being improved through a much better selection and preparation process.

Looking at the LEAs, particularly in Rio and São Paulo, some necessary improvements are needed. In Rio, the strength of the state PM (military police), in charge of the police actions, is 38,000; and the civilian police, in charge of the investigative police actions, is 12,000. In addition, a county guard has about 5,000. In São Paulo, the PM of the state has 85,000, the civilian police has 25,000, and the county guard has about 10,000. Notwithstanding denunciations from some nongovernmental organizations that those two state police forces are extremely violent (something that causes a bad relationship with communities of some *favelas* where the crime rates are high), in a general way the level of capability is very reasonable. International security institutions evaluate Rio's and São Paulo's police forces as among the best in Latin America. Bad policemen still exist, but punishment is rigorous. There is zero tolerance for corruption.

Besides a policy to provide police officers and their families a better quality of life, investments to improve results are being made in the intelligence area. A good example of improvements in the cities of Rio and São Paulo is the development of surveillance TV systems able to transmit images in real time. The criminal rates in the regions where those systems are already operating have been reduced significantly.

Other good news is the relevant improvement made in the interagency process. Particularly, military and civilian police of the states are working with much better integration than in the recent past. The improvement of digital information systems allowing them to share different kinds of data is contributing decisively to that effort.

It is impossible, however, to prevent and to combat successfully organized crime in the largest cities without very accurate security actions in critical border areas. Among them, one must highlight the Tri-Border Area, where the mechanism "3+1" (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and the United States) established in 2002 is working very well.⁶⁸ Still, foreign connections with organized crime are more capable each day. To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of preventive and repressive actions, it is more and more necessary to make a real commitment to international partnership, focused both on security matters, particularly intelligence sharing, and on the collective socioeconomic well-being of the region.

Results achieved like the success of the Pan American Games, the significant reduction of the rates of criminality in the largest cities, as well as

the preparation for the 2014 World Soccer Cup are positive signs in Brazil's fight against organized crime.

Appendix A. Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla

I would like to make a two-fold dedication of this work:

- a. First, to the memories of Edson Souto, Marco Antonio Bras de Carvalho, Melson Jose de Almeida (“Escoteiro”), and so many other heroic fighters and urban guerrillas who fell at the hands of the assassins of the military police, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the DOPS, hated instruments of the repressive military dictatorship.
- b. Second, to the brave comrades—men and women—imprisoned in the medieval dungeons of the Brazilian Government and subjected to tortures that even surpass the horrendous crimes carried out by the Nazis. Like those comrades whose memories we revere, as well as those taken prisoner in combat, what we must do is fight.

Each comrade who opposes the military dictatorship and wants to oppose it can do something, however small the task may seem. I urge all who read this minimanual and decide that they cannot remain inactive to follow its instructions and join the struggle now. I ask this because, under any theory and under any circumstances, the duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution.

Another important point is not merely to read this minimanual here and now, but to circulate its contents. This circulation will be possible if those who agree with its ideas make mimeographed copies or print it in a booklet (although in this latter case, armed struggle itself will be necessary).

Finally, the reason why this minimanual bears my signature is that the ideas expressed or systematized here reflect the personal experiences of a group of people engaged in armed struggle in Brazil, among whom I have the honor to be included. So that certain individuals will have no doubts about what this minimanual says, and can no longer deny the facts or continue to say that the conditions for armed struggle do not exist, it is necessary to assume responsibility for what is said and done. Therefore, anonymity becomes a problem in a work like this. The important fact is that patriots are prepared to fight like soldiers, and the more there are the better.

The accusation of *violence* or *terrorism* no longer has the negative meaning it used to have. It has acquired new clothing, a new color. It does not divide or discredit; on the contrary, it represents a center of attraction.

Today, to be violent or a terrorist is a quality that ennobles any honorable person, because it is an act worthy of a revolutionary engaged in armed struggle against the shameful military dictatorship and its atrocities.

Carlos Marighella, 1969

A Definition of the Urban Guerrilla

The urban guerrilla is a person who fights the military dictatorship with weapons, using unconventional methods. A revolutionary and an ardent patriot, he is a fighter for his country's liberation, a friend of the people and of freedom. The area in which the urban guerrilla operates is in the large Brazilian cities. There are also criminals or outlaws who work in the big cities. Many times, actions by criminals are taken to be actions by urban guerrillas.

The urban guerrilla, however, differs radically from the criminal. The criminal benefits personally from his actions and attacks indiscriminately without distinguishing between the exploiters and the exploited, which is why so many ordinary people are among his victims. The urban guerrilla follows a political goal and only attacks the government, the big businesses, and the foreign imperialists.

Another element just as harmful to the guerrillas as the criminal, and also operating in the urban area, is the counterrevolutionary, who creates confusion, robs banks, throws bombs, kidnaps, assassinates, and commits the worst crimes imaginable against urban guerrillas, revolutionary priests, students, and citizens who oppose tyranny and seek liberty.

The urban guerrilla is an implacable enemy of the regime, and systematically inflicts damage on the authorities and on the people who dominate the country and exercise power. The primary task of the urban guerrilla is to distract, to wear down, to demoralize the military regime and its repressive forces, and to attack and destroy the wealth and property of the foreign managers and the Brazilian upper class.

The urban guerrilla is not afraid to dismantle and destroy the present Brazilian economic, political, and social system. His aim is to aid the rural guerrillas and to help in the creation of a totally new and revolutionary social and political structure, with the armed population in power.

Personal Qualities of the Urban Guerrilla

The urban guerrilla is characterized by his bravery and his decisive nature. He must be a good tactician and a good marksman. The urban guerrilla must be a person of great cleverness to compensate for the fact that he is not sufficiently strong in weapons, ammunition, and equipment.

The career military officers and the government police have modern weapons and transport and can go about anywhere freely, using the force of their own strength. The urban guerrilla does not have such resources at his disposal and leads a clandestine existence. The guerrilla may be a convicted person or one who is out on parole and must then use false documents.

Nevertheless, the urban guerrilla has an advantage over the conventional military or the police. It is that, while the military and the police act on behalf of the enemy, which the people hate—the urban guerrilla defends a just cause that is the people's cause.

The urban guerrilla's weapons are inferior to the enemy's; however, from the moral point of view, the urban guerrilla has an undeniable superiority. This moral superiority is what sustains the urban guerrilla. Thanks to it, the urban guerrilla can accomplish his principle duty, which is to attack and survive.

The urban guerrilla has to capture or steal weapons from the enemy to be able to fight. Because his weapons are not uniform—since what he has are expropriated or have fallen into his hands in various ways—the urban guerrilla faces the problem of a variety of weapons and a shortage of ammunition. Moreover, he has no place in which to practice shooting and marksmanship. These difficulties have to be overcome, forcing the urban guerrillas to be imaginative and creative—qualities without which it would be impossible for him to carry out his role as a revolutionary.

The urban guerrilla must possess initiative, mobility and flexibility, as well as versatility and a command of any situation. Initiative especially is an indispensable quality. It is not always possible to foresee everything, and the urban guerrilla cannot let himself become confused or wait for instructions. His duty is to act, to find adequate solutions for each problem he faces, and to retreat. It is better to err acting than to do nothing for fear of making a mistake. Without initiative, there is no urban guerrilla warfare.

Here are other important qualities in the urban guerrilla:

- a. Be a good walker.

- b. Be able to stand up against fatigue, hunger, rain, or heat.
- c. Know how to hide and to be vigilant.
- d. Conquer the art of dissembling.
- e. Never fear danger.
- f. Behave the same by day as by night.
- g. Do not act impetuously.
- h. Have unlimited patience.
- i. Remain calm and cool in the worst of conditions and situations.
- j. Never leave a track or trail.
- k. Do not get discouraged.

In the face of the almost insurmountable difficulties in urban guerrilla warfare, sometimes comrades weaken and give up the fight.

The urban guerrilla is not a businessman in an urban company, nor is he an actor in a play. Urban guerrilla warfare, like rural guerrilla warfare, is a pledge the guerrilla makes to himself. When he can no longer face the difficulties or if he knows that he lacks the patience to wait, then it is better for him to relinquish his role before he betrays his pledge, for he clearly lacks the basic qualities necessary to be a guerrilla.

How the Urban Guerrilla Lives

The urban guerrilla must know how to live among the people, and he must be careful not to appear strange and different from ordinary city life. He should not wear clothes that are different from those that other people wear. Elaborate and high fashion clothing for men or women may often be a handicap if the urban guerrilla's mission takes him into working class neighborhoods, or sections where such dress is uncommon. The same care has to be taken if the urban guerrilla must move from the south of the country to the north and vice versa.

The urban guerrilla must make his living through his job or his professional activity. If he is known and sought by the police, he must go underground and sometimes must live hidden. Under such circumstances, the urban guerrilla cannot reveal his activity to anyone, since this information is always and only the responsibility of the revolutionary organization in which he is participating.

The urban guerrilla must have a great ability for observation. He must be well-informed about everything, particularly about the enemy's movements,

and he must be very inquisitive and knowledgeable about the area in which he lives, operates, or travels through. The fundamental characteristic of the urban guerrilla, however, is that he is a man who fights with weapons; given these circumstances, it is unlikely that he will be able to follow his normal profession for long without the police identifying him. The role of expropriation thus looms as clear as high noon. It is impossible for the urban guerrilla to exist and survive without fighting to expropriate.

The armed struggle of the urban guerrilla points towards two essential objectives:

- a. The physical elimination of the leaders and assistants of the armed forces and of the police
- b. The expropriation of government resources and the wealth belonging to the rich businessmen, the large landowners, and the imperialists with small expropriations used for the sustenance of the individual guerrillas and large ones for the maintenance of the revolutionary organization itself.

It is clear that the armed struggle of the urban guerrilla also has other objectives. But here we are referring to the two basic objectives, above all expropriation. It is necessary for every urban guerrilla to always keep in mind that he can only maintain his existence if he is able to kill the police and those dedicated to repression, and if he is determined—truly determined—to expropriate the wealth of the rich businessmen, landowners, and imperialists.

One of the fundamental characteristics of the Brazilian revolution is that, from the beginning, it developed around the expropriation of the wealth of the major business, imperialist, and landowning interests without excluding the largest and most powerful commercial elements engaged in the import-export business. And by expropriating the wealth of the principle enemies of the people, the Brazilian revolution was able to hit them at their vital center with preferential and systematic attacks on the banking network—that is, the most telling blows were leveled at the businessman's nerve system.

The bank robberies carried out by the Brazilian urban guerrillas hurt big businesses and others, the foreign companies that insure and re-insure the banking capital, the imperialist companies, the federal and state governments—all of them are systematically expropriated as of now.

The fruit of these expropriations has been devoted to the tasks of learning and perfecting urban guerrilla techniques, the purchase, production and transportation of weapons and ammunition for the rural areas, the security precautions of the guerrillas, the daily maintenance of the fighters, those who have been liberated from prison by armed force, those who have been wounded, and those who are being persecuted by the police, and to any kind of problem concerning comrades liberated from jail or assassinated by the police and the military dictatorship.

The tremendous costs of the revolutionary war must fall upon the big businesses, on the imperialists, on the large landowners, and on the government too—both federal and state—since they are all exploiters and oppressors of the people. Men of the government, agents of the dictatorship and of foreign imperialism, especially, must pay with their lives for the crimes they have committed against the Brazilian people.

In Brazil, the number of violent actions carried out by urban guerrillas—including executions, explosions, seizures of weapons, ammunition and explosives, and assaults on banks and prisons—is significant enough to leave no room for doubt as to the actual aims of the revolutionaries; all are witnesses to the fact that we are in a full revolutionary war and can be waged only by violent means. This is the reason why the urban guerrilla uses armed struggle, continues to concentrate his efforts on the physical extermination of the agents of repression, and dedicates 24 hours a day to expropriations from the people's exploiters.

Technical Preparation of the Urban Guerrilla

No one can become an urban guerrilla without paying special attention to technical preparation. The technical preparation of the urban guerrilla runs from a concern for his physical condition to a knowledge of and apprenticeship in professions and skills of all kinds, particularly manual skills.

The urban guerrilla can have a strong physical constitution only if he trains systematically. He cannot be a good fighter if he has not learned the art of fighting. For that reason, the urban guerrilla must learn and practice the various forms of unarmed fighting, of attack, and of personal defense. Other useful forms of physical preparation are hiking, camping, the practice of survival in the woods, mountain climbing, rowing, swimming, skin diving and training as a frogman, fishing, harpooning, and the hunting of birds and of small and big game.

It is very important to learn how to drive a car, pilot a plane, handle a motor boat and a sailboat, understand mechanics, radio, telephone, electricity and have some knowledge of electronics techniques. Other skills are also important—for example, to understand topographical information, to determine one's position by instruments or other available resources, to calculate distances, make maps and plans, draw to scale, make timings, and work with an angle protractor, a compass. A knowledge of chemistry, of color combination and of stamp-making, the mastery of the skills of calligraphy and the copying of letters, and other techniques are part of the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla, who is obliged to falsify documents in order to live within a society that he seeks to destroy.

In the area of “makeshift” medicine, the urban guerrilla has the special role of being a doctor or understanding medicine, nursing, pharmacology, drugs, basic surgery, and emergency first aid.

The basic question in the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla is, nevertheless, to know how to handle weapons such as the submachine gun, revolver, automatic pistol, FAL, various types of shotguns, carbines, mortars, and bazookas.

A knowledge of various types of ammunition and explosives is another aspect to consider. Among explosives, dynamite must be well understood. The use of incendiary bombs, smoke bombs, and other types is indispensable prior training. Knowing how to improvise and repair weapons; prepare Molotov cocktails, grenades, mines, homemade destructive devices; blow up bridges; and tear up and put out of service railroads and railroad cars—these are necessities in the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla that can never be considered unimportant.

The highest level of preparation for the urban guerrilla is the training camp for technical training. But only the guerrilla who has already passed a preliminary examination can go to this school—that is, one who has passed the test of fire in revolutionary action, in actual combat against the enemy.

The Urban Guerrilla's Weapons

The urban guerrilla's weapons are light arms, easily obtained, usually captured from the enemy, purchased, or made on the spot. Light weapons have the advantage of fast handling and easy transport. In general, light weapons are characterized as being short-barreled.

Automatic and semiautomatic weapons considerably increase the fire-power of the urban guerrilla. The disadvantage of this type of weapon, for us, is the difficulty in controlling it, resulting in wasted rounds or a wasteful use of ammunition—corrected for only by a good aim and precision firing. Men who are poorly trained convert automatic weapons into an ammunition drain.

Experience has shown that the basic weapon of the urban guerrilla is the light submachine gun. This weapon, in addition to being efficient and easy to shoot in an urban area, has the advantage of being greatly respected by the enemy. The guerrilla must thoroughly know how to handle the submachine gun, now so popular and indispensable to the Brazilian urban guerrillas. The ideal submachine gun for the urban guerrilla is the INA .45 caliber. Other types of submachine guns of different calibers can also be used—understanding of course the problem of ammunition. Thus it is preferable that the manufacturing capabilities of the urban guerrillas be used for the production of one type of submachine gun, so that the ammunition to be used can be standardized. Each firing group of urban guerrillas must have a submachine gun handled by a good marksman. The other members of the group must be armed with .38 revolvers, our standard weapon. The .32 is also useful for those who want to participate. The .38 is preferable, however, because its impact usually puts the enemy out of action.

Hand grenades and conventional smoke bombs can also be considered light weapons, with defensive power for cover and withdrawal. Long-barreled weapons are more difficult for the urban guerrilla to transport, and they attract much attention because of their size. Among the long-barreled weapons are the FAL, the Mauser guns or rifles, hunting guns such as the Winchester, and others.

Shotguns can be useful if used at close range and point blank. They are useful even for a poor shot, especially at night when precision is not much help. An air-pressured gun can be useful for training in marksmanship. Bazookas and mortars can also be used in action, but the conditions for using them have to be prepared and the people who use them must be trained.

The urban guerrilla should not attempt to base his actions on the use of heavy weapons, which have major drawbacks in a type of fighting that demands lightweight weapons to ensure mobility and speed. Homemade

weapons are often as efficient as the best weapons produced in conventional factories, and even a sawed-off shotgun is a good weapon for the urban guerrilla fighter. The urban guerrilla's role as a gunsmith has a basic importance. As a gunsmith, he takes care of the weapons, knows how to repair them, and in many cases can set up a small shop for improvising and producing effective small arms.

Experience in metallurgy and on the mechanical lathe are basic skills the urban guerrilla should incorporate into his manufacturing plans for the construction of homemade weapons. This production, and courses in explosives and sabotage, must be organized. The primary materials for practice in these courses must be obtained ahead of time to prevent an incomplete apprenticeship—that is, so as to leave no room for experimentation.

Molotov cocktails, gasoline, homemade contrivances such as catapults and mortars for firing explosives, grenades made of pipes and cans, smoke bombs, mines, conventional explosives such as dynamite and potassium chlorate, plastic explosives, gelatin capsules, and ammunition of every kind are indispensable to the success of the urban guerrilla's mission.

The methods of obtaining the necessary materials and munitions will be to buy them or to take them by force in expropriation actions specially planned and carried out. The urban guerrillas will be careful not to keep explosives and other materials that can cause accidents around for very long, but will always try to use them immediately on their intended targets.

The urban guerrilla's weapons and his ability to maintain them constitute his firepower. By taking advantage of modern weapons and introducing innovations in his firepower and in the use of certain weapons, the urban guerrilla can improve many of the tactics of urban warfare. An example was the innovation made by the Brazilian urban guerrillas when they introduced the use of the submachine gun in their attacks on banks. When the massive use of uniform submachine guns becomes possible, there will be new changes in urban guerrilla warfare tactics. The firing group that utilizes uniform weapons and corresponding ammunition, with reasonable care for their maintenance, will reach a considerable level of effectiveness. The urban guerrilla increases his effectiveness as he increases his firepower.

The Shot: The Urban Guerrilla's Reason for Existence

The urban guerrilla's reason for existence, the basic condition in which he acts and survives, is to shoot. The urban guerrilla must know how to shoot well because required for this type of combat.

In conventional warfare, combat is generally at a distance with long-range weapons. In unconventional warfare, in which urban guerrilla warfare is included, combat is at short range and often very close. To prevent his own death, the urban guerrilla must shoot first, and he cannot err in his shot. He cannot waste his ammunition because he does not possess large amounts, thus he must conserve it. Nor can he replace his ammunition quickly, since he is a part of a small team in which each guerrilla must be able to look after himself. The urban guerrilla can lose no time, thus must be able to shoot at once.

One basic fact, which we want to emphasize completely, and whose importance cannot be overestimated, is that the urban guerrilla must not fire continuously, using up his ammunition. It may be that the enemy is responding to this fire precisely because he is waiting until the guerrilla's ammunition is all used up. At such a moment, without having the opportunity to replace his ammunition, the guerrilla faces a rain of enemy fire and can be taken prisoner or killed.

In spite of the value of the surprise factor, which many times makes it unnecessary for the urban guerrilla to use his weapons, he cannot be allowed the luxury of entering combat without knowing how to shoot. And when face to face with the enemy, he must always be moving from one position to another because to stay in one place makes him a fixed target and, as such, very vulnerable.

The urban guerrilla's life depends on shooting, on his ability to handle his weapons well, and to avoid being hit. When we speak of shooting, we speak of accuracy as well. Shooting must be practiced until it becomes a reflex action on the part of the urban guerrilla. To learn how to shoot and have good aim, the urban guerrilla must train himself systematically, utilizing every practice method shooting at targets, even in amusement parks and at home.

Shooting and marksmanship are the urban guerrilla's water and air. His perfection of the art of shooting may make him a special type of urban guerrilla—that is, a sniper, a category of solitary combatant indispensable

in isolated actions. The sniper knows how to shoot at close range and at long range, and his weapons are appropriate for either type of shooting.

The Firing Group

In order to function, the urban guerrillas must be organized into small groups. A team of no more than four or five is called a *firing group*. A minimum of two firing groups, separated and insulated from other firing groups, and directed and coordinated by one or two persons—this is what makes a firing *team*.

Within the firing group, there must be complete confidence among the members. The best shot and the one who knows best how to handle the submachine gun is the person in charge of operations. The firing group plans and executes urban guerrilla actions, obtains and stores weapons, and studies and corrects its own tactics.

Planned tasks of the strategic command take preference. However, a firing group does not exist without its own initiative. In order to permit the greatest possible initiative, it is essential to avoid any rigidity in the guerrilla organization. The old type hierarchy, the style of the traditional revolutionaries, does not exist in our organization. This means that except for the priority of the objectives set by the strategic command, any firing group can decide to raid a bank; to kidnap or execute an agent of the dictatorship, a figure identified with the reaction, or a foreign spy; and can carry out any type of propaganda or war of nerves against the enemy without consulting with the general command.

No firing group can remain inactive waiting for orders from above. Its obligation is to act. Any single urban guerrilla who wants to establish a firing group and begin action can do so and thus become a part of the organization. This method of action eliminates the need for knowing who is carrying out which actions; it is free initiative, and the only important point is to greatly increase the volume of urban guerrilla activity in order to wear out the government and force it onto the defensive.

The firing group is the instrument of organized action. Within it, guerrilla operations and tactics are planned, launched, and carried through to success. The general command counts on the firing groups to carry out objectives of a strategic nature and to do so in any part of the country. For its part, the general command helps the firing groups with their difficul-

ties and with carrying out objectives of a strategic nature in any part of the country.

The organization is an indestructible network of firing groups, and of coordination among them, that functions simply and practically within a general command, which also participates in attacks—an organization that exists for no other purpose than that of pure and simple revolutionary action.

The Logistics of the Urban Guerrilla

Conventional logistics can be expressed with the *FFEA* formula —food, fuel, equipment, and ammunition. Conventional logistics refer to the maintenance problems for an army or a regular armed force, transported in vehicles, with fixed bases and supply lines. Urban guerrillas, on the contrary, are not an army but small armed groups, intentionally fragmented. They have neither vehicles nor rear areas. Their supply lines are precarious and insufficient, and they have no fixed bases except in the rudimentary sense of a weapons factory within a house.

While the goal of conventional logistics is to supply the war needs of the “gorillas” who are used to repress rural and urban rebellion, urban guerrilla logistics aim at sustaining operations and tactics that have nothing in common with conventional warfare and are directed against the government and foreign domination of the country. For the urban guerrilla, who starts from nothing and who has no support at the beginning, logistics are expressed by the *MMWAE* formula—mechanization, money, weapons, ammunition, and explosives.

Revolutionary logistics takes mechanization as one of its bases. Nevertheless, mechanization is inseparable from the driver. The urban guerrilla driver is as important as the urban guerrilla machine gunner. Without either, the machines do not work, and the automobile (as well as the sub-machine gun) becomes a dead thing. An experienced driver is not made in one day, thus apprenticeship must begin early. Every good urban guerrilla must be a driver. As to the vehicles, the urban guerrilla must expropriate what he needs.

When he already has resources, the urban guerrilla can combine the expropriation of vehicles with his other methods of acquisition. Money, weapons, ammunition and explosives, and automobiles must be expropriated. The urban guerrilla must rob banks and armories and seize explosives

and ammunition wherever he finds them. None of these operations is carried out for just one purpose. Even when the raid is to obtain money, the weapons that the guards carry must be taken as well.

Expropriation is the first step in organizing our logistics, which itself assumes an armed and permanently mobile character. The second step is to reinforce and expand logistics, resorting to ambushes and traps in which the enemy is surprised and his weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and other resources are captured.

Once he has weapons, ammunition, and explosives, one of the most serious logistics problems facing the urban guerrilla is a hiding place to leave the material and appropriate means of transporting it, then assembling where it is needed. These tasks have to be accomplished even when the enemy is alerted and has the roads blocked.

The knowledge that the urban guerrilla possesses of the terrain and the devices he uses or is capable of using, such as scouts specially prepared and recruited for this mission, are the basic elements in solving the eternal logistics problems faced by the guerrillas.

Characteristics of the Urban Guerrilla's Tactics

The tactics of the urban guerrilla have the following characteristics:

- a. It is an aggressive tactic—it has an offensive character. As is well known, defensive action means death for us. Since we are inferior to the enemy in firepower and have neither his resources nor his power base, we cannot defend ourselves against an offensive or a concentrated attack by the “gorillas.” That is the reason why our urban technique can never be permanent, can never defend a fixed base, nor remain in any one spot waiting to repel the circle of repression.
- b. It is a tactic of attack and rapid withdrawal by which we preserve our forces.
- c. It is a tactic that aims at the development of urban guerrilla warfare, whose function will be to wear out, demoralize, and distract the enemy forces, permitting the emergence and survival of rural guerrilla warfare, which is destined to play the decisive role in the revolutionary war.

The Initial Advantages of the Urban Guerrilla

The dynamics of urban guerrilla warfare lie in the guerrilla's violent clash with the military and police forces of the dictatorship. In this conflict, the police have superiority. The urban guerrilla has inferior forces. The paradox is that the urban guerrilla is nevertheless the attacker.

The military and police forces, for their part, respond to the conflict by mobilizing and concentrating greatly superior forces in the pursuit and destruction of the urban guerrilla. The guerrilla can only avoid defeat if he depends on the initial advantages he has and knows how to exploit them to the end, to compensate for his weakness and lack of material. The initial advantages follow:

- a. He must take the enemy by surprise.
- b. He must know the terrain of the encounter.
- c. He must have greater mobility and speed than the police and other repressive forces.
- d. His information service must be better than the enemy's.
- e. He must be in command of the situation and demonstrate a decisiveness so great that everyone on our side is inspired and never thinks of hesitating, while on the other side the enemy is stunned and incapable of acting.

Surprise

To compensate for his general weakness and shortage of weapons compared to the enemy, the urban guerrilla uses surprise. The enemy has no way to combat surprise and becomes confused and is destroyed.

When urban guerrilla warfare broke out in Brazil, experience proved that surprise was essential to the success of any guerrilla operation. The technique of surprise is based upon four essential requirements:

- a. We know the situation of the enemy we are going to attack, usually by means of precise information and meticulous observation, while the enemy does not know he is going to be attacked and knows nothing about the attackers.
- b. We know the strength of the enemy we are going to attack, and the enemy knows nothing about our strength.

- c. Attacking by surprise, we save and conserve our forces, while the enemy is unable to do the same and is left at the mercy of events.
- d. We determine the time and place of the attack, fix its duration, and establish its objectives. The enemy remains ignorant of all this information.

Knowledge of the Terrain

Because the urban guerrilla's best ally is the terrain, he must know it like the palm of his hand. To have the terrain as an ally means to know how to use with intelligence its unevenness, high and low points, turns, irregularities, fixed and secret passages, abandoned areas, thickets, and so on, taking maximum advantage of all this for the success of armed actions, escapes, retreats, covers, and hiding places. Impasses and narrow spots, gorges, streets under repair, police checkpoints, military zones and closed-off streets, the entrances and exits to tunnels and those that the enemy can close off, corners controlled or watched by the police, and traffic lights and signals—all this must be thoroughly known and studied in order to avoid fatal errors.

Our problem is to get through and to know where and how to hide, leaving the enemy bewildered in areas he does not know. Being familiar with the avenues, streets, alleys, ins and outs, the corners of the urban centers, its paths and shortcuts, its empty lots, its underground passages, its pipes and sewer systems, the urban guerrilla safely crosses through the irregular and difficult terrain unfamiliar to the police, where the police can be surprised in a fatal ambush or trap at any moment.

Because he knows the terrain, the urban guerrilla can pass through it on foot, on bicycle, in a car, jeep, or small truck and never be trapped. Acting in small groups with only a few people, the guerrillas can rendezvous at a time and place determined beforehand, following up the initial attack with new guerrilla operations or evading the police cordon and disorienting the enemy with their unexpected audacity. It is an impossible problem for the police, in the labyrinthine terrain of the urban guerrilla, to catch someone they cannot see, to repress someone they cannot catch, and to close in on someone they cannot find.

Our experience is that the ideal guerrilla is one who operates in his own city and thoroughly knows its streets, its neighborhoods, its transit problems, and its other peculiarities. The guerrilla outsider, who comes to a city

whose streets are unfamiliar to him, is a weak spot; if he is assigned certain operations, he can endanger them. To avoid grave mistakes, it is necessary for him to get to know the layout of the streets.

Mobility and Speed

To ensure mobility and speed that the police cannot match, the urban guerrilla needs the following: a) mechanization, b) knowledge of the terrain, c) a disruption or suspension of enemy transport and communications, and d) light weapons.

By carefully carrying out operations that last only a few moments and leaving the site in mechanized vehicles, the urban guerrilla beats a rapid retreat, escaping capture. The urban guerrilla must know the way in detail and in this manner must go through the schedule ahead of time as training to avoid entering alleyways that have no exit, running into traffic jams, or being stopped by the Transit Department's traffic signals.

The police pursue the urban guerrilla blindly, without knowing which road he is using for his escape. While the urban guerrilla escapes quickly because he knows the terrain, the police lose the trail and give up the chase.

The urban guerrilla must launch his operations far from the logistical centers of the police. A primary advantage of this method of operation is that it places us at a reasonable distance from the possibility of capture, which facilitates our evasion.

In addition to this necessary precaution, the urban guerrilla must be concerned with the enemy's communication system. The telephone is the primary target in preventing the enemy from access to information, by knocking out his communications systems. Even if he knows about the guerrilla operation, the enemy depends on modern transportation for his logistics support, and his vehicles necessarily lose time carrying him through the heavy traffic of the large cities. It is clear that the tangled and treacherous traffic is a disadvantage for the enemy, as it would be for us if we were not ahead of him.

If we want to have a safe margin of security and be certain to leave no tracks for the future, we can adopt the following methods:

- a. Deliberately intercept the police with other vehicles or by seemingly casual inconveniences and accidents; however, in this case the vehicles in question should neither be legal nor have real license numbers.
- b. Obstruct the roads with fallen trees, rocks, ditches, false traffic signs, dead ends or detours, or other clever methods.
- c. Place homemade mines in the way of the police; use gasoline or throw Molotov cocktails to set their vehicles on fire.
- d. Set off a burst of submachine gun fire or weapons such as the FAL aimed at the motor and tires of the cars engaged in the pursuit. With the arrogance typical of the police and the military authorities, the enemy will come to fight us equipped with heavy guns and equipment and with elaborate maneuvers by men armed to the teeth. The urban guerrilla must respond to this with light weapons that can be easily transported, so he can always escape with maximum speed without ever accepting open fighting. The urban guerrilla has no mission other than to attack and quickly withdraw. We would leave ourselves open to the most crushing defeats if we burdened ourselves with heavy weapons and with the tremendous weight of the ammunition necessary to use them, at the same time losing our precious gift of mobility.

When our enemy fights against us with the cavalry, we are at no disadvantage as long as we are mechanized. The automobile goes faster than the horse. From within the car, we also have the target of the mounted police, knocking him down with submachine gun and revolver fire or with Molotov cocktails and hand grenades.

On the other hand, it is not so difficult for an urban guerrilla on foot to make a target of a policeman on horseback. Moreover, ropes across the street, marbles, and cork stoppers are very efficient methods of making them both fall. The great disadvantage faced by the mounted policeman is that he presents the urban guerrilla with two excellent targets—the horse and its rider.

Apart from being faster than the horseman, the helicopter has no better chance in pursuit.

If the horse is too slow compared to the urban guerrilla's automobile, the helicopter is too fast. Moving at 200 kilometers an hour, it will never succeed

in hitting from above a target that is lost among the crowds and street vehicles, nor can the helicopter land in public streets in order to capture someone. At the same time, whenever it flies too low, it will be excessively vulnerable to the fire of the urban guerrillas.

Information

The chances that the government has for discovering and destroying the urban guerrillas lessens as the power of the dictatorship's enemies becomes greater and more concentrated among the population. This concentration of the opponents of the dictatorship plays a very important role in providing information about the actions of the police and government officials as well as hiding the activities of the guerrillas. The enemy can also be thrown off with false information, which is worse for him because it is a tremendous waste.

By whatever means, the sources of information at the disposal of the urban guerrilla are potentially better than those of the police. The enemy is observed by the people, but he does not know who among the people transmits information to the urban guerrillas. The military and the police are hated by the people for the injustices and violence they have committed, and this facilitates obtaining information that is damaging to the activities of government agents.

Information, which is only a small segment of popular support, represents an extraordinary potential in the hands of the urban guerrilla. The creation of an intelligence service, with an organized structure, is a basic need for us. The urban guerrilla has to have vital information about the plans and movements of the enemy—where they are, how they move, the resources of their banking network, their means of communication, and the secret activities they carry out. The reliable information passed on to the guerrillas represents a well-aimed blow at the dictatorship. The dictatorship has no way to defend itself in the face of an important leak that facilitates our destructive attacks.

The enemy also wants to know what actions we are planning so he can destroy us or prevent us from acting. In this sense, the danger of betrayal is present, and the enemy encourages betrayal and infiltrates spies into the guerrilla organization. The urban guerrilla's technique against this enemy tactic is to denounce publicly the spies, traitors, informers, and provocateurs. Since our struggle takes place among the people and depends on

their sympathy—while the government has a bad reputation because of its brutality, corruption, and incompetence—the informers, spies, traitors, and the police come to be enemies of the people, without supporters, denounced to the urban guerrillas and, in many cases, properly punished.

For his part, the urban guerrilla must not evade the duty—once he knows who the spy or informer is—of physically wiping him out. This is the proper method, approved by the people, and it minimizes considerably the incidence of infiltration or enemy spying.

For complete success in the battle against spies and informers, it is essential to organize a counterespionage or counterintelligence service. Nevertheless, as far as information is concerned, it cannot all be reduced to a matter of knowing the enemy's moves and avoiding the infiltration of spies. Intelligence information must be broad—it must embrace everything, including the most insignificant material. The urban guerrilla must master the technique of obtaining information. Following this technique, intelligence information is obtained naturally, as a part of the life of the people.

The urban guerrilla, living in the midst of the population and moving about among them, must be attentive to all types of conversations and human relations, learning how to disguise his interest with great skill and judgment. In places where people work, study, and live, it is easy to collect all kinds of information—for example, on payments, business, plans of all kinds, points of view, opinions, people's state of mind, trips, interior layout of buildings, offices and rooms, and operations centers.

Observation, investigation, reconnaissance, and exploration of the terrain are also excellent sources of information. The urban guerrilla never goes anywhere absentmindedly and without revolutionary precaution, always on the alert lest something occurs. Eyes and ears open, senses alert, his memory is engraved with everything necessary, now or in the future, to the continued activity of the guerrilla fighter.

Careful reading of the press with particular attention to the mass communication media, the research of accumulated data, the transmission of news and everything of note, and a persistence in being informed and in informing others—all this makes up the intricate and immensely complicated question of information that gives the urban guerrilla a decisive advantage.

Decisiveness

It is not enough for the urban guerrilla to have in his favor surprise, speed, knowledge of the terrain, and information. He must also demonstrate his command of any situation and a capacity for decisiveness, without which all other advantages will prove to be useless.

It is impossible to carry out any action, however well-planned, if the urban guerrilla turns out to be indecisive, uncertain, irresolute. Even an action successfully begun can end in defeat if command of the situation and the capacity for decision falter in the middle of the execution of the plan. When this command of the situation and a capacity for decision are absent, the void is filled with hesitation and terror. The enemy takes advantage of this failure and is able to liquidate us.

The secret of the success of any operation—simple or complex, easy or difficult—is to rely on determined men. Strictly speaking, no operations are simple: all must be carried out with the same care taken in the most difficult, beginning with the choice of human elements—which means relying on leadership and the capacity for decision in every situation.

One can see ahead of time whether an action will be successful or not by the way its participants act during the preparatory period. Those who fall behind, fail to make designated contacts, are easily confused, forget things, or fail to complete the basic tasks of the work are possibly indecisive men and can be a danger. It is better not to include them. Decisiveness means to put into practice the plan that has been devised with determination, with audacity, and with absolute firmness. It takes only one person who hesitates to lose all.

Objectives of the Guerrilla's Actions

With his tactics developed and established, the urban guerrilla trains himself in methods of action leading to attack and in Brazil has the following objectives:

- a. Threaten the triangle within which the Brazilian state and North American domination are maintained, a triangle whose points are Rio, Sao Paulo, and Belo Horizonte and whose base is the axis Rio—San Paulo, where the giant industrial, financial, economic, political, cultural, military, and police complex that holds the decisive power of the country is located.

- b. Weaken the local militia and the security systems of the dictatorship, given the fact that we are attacking and the “gorillas” defending. That means catching the government in a defensive position with its troops immobilized in the defense of the entire complex of national maintenance, with its ever-present fears of an attack on its strategic nerve centers and without ever knowing where, how, or when the attack will come.
- c. Attack every area with many different armed groups, small in size, each self contained and operating independently, to disperse the government forces in their pursuit of a thoroughly fragmented organization, instead of offering the dictatorship the opportunity to concentrate its forces in the destruction of one tightly organized system operating throughout the country.
- d. Give proof of its combativeness, decision, firmness, determination, and persistence in the attack on the military dictatorship, in order to allow all rebels to follow in our example and to fight with urban guerrilla tactics. Meanwhile, the government with all its problems, incapable of halting guerrilla actions within the cities, will lose time and suffer endless attrition and will finally be forced to pull back its repressive forces in order to mount guard over all the banks, industries, armories, military barracks, prisons, public offices, radio and television stations, North American firms, gas storage tanks, oil refineries, ships, airplanes, ports, airports, hospitals, health centers, blood banks, stores, garages, embassies, residences of high ranking members of the regime such as ministers and generals, police stations, and official organizations.
- e. Increase urban guerrilla actions gradually into an endless number of surprise raids, such that the government cannot leave the urban area to pursue guerrillas in the rural interior without running the risk of abandoning the cities and permitting rebellion to increase on the coast as well as the interior of the country.
- f. Force the Army and the police, their commanders, and their assistants to give up the relative comfort and tranquility of their barracks and their usual rest for a state of fear and growing tension in the expectation of attack or in a search for trails that vanish without a trace.
- g. Avoid open battle and decisive combat with the government, limiting the struggle to brief, rapid attacks with lightning results.

- h. Ensure for the urban guerrilla a maximum freedom of movement and of action without ever relinquishing the use of armed action, remaining firmly oriented towards helping the formation of rural guerrilla warfare and supporting the construction of a revolutionary army for national liberation.

Types and Nature of Missions for the Urban Guerrilla

To achieve the objectives previously listed, the urban guerrilla is obliged, in his tactics, to follow missions whose nature is as different or diversified as possible. The urban guerrilla does not arbitrarily choose this or that mission. Some actions are simple; others are complicated. The inexperienced guerrilla must be gradually introduced into actions and operations that run from the simple to the complex. He begins with small missions and tasks until he becomes completely experienced.

Before any action, the urban guerrilla must think of the methods and the personnel at his disposal to carry out the mission. Operations and actions that demand the urban guerrilla's technical preparation cannot be carried out by someone who lacks the technical skill. With these precautions, here are the missions that the urban guerrilla can undertake:

- a. Assaults
- b. Raids and penetrations
- c. Occupations
- d. Ambushes
- e. Street tactics
- f. Strikes and work stoppages
- g. Desertions, diversions, seizures, expropriation of weapons, ammunition and explosives
- h. Liberation of prisoners
- i. Executions
- j. Kidnappings
- k. Sabotage
- l. Terrorism
- m. Armed propaganda
- n. War of nerves.

Assaults

Assaults are the armed attacks that we make to expropriate funds, liberate prisoners, capture explosives, submachine guns, and other types of weapons and ammunition. Assaults can take place in broad daylight or at night. Daytime assaults are made when the objective cannot be achieved at any other hour—for example, the transport of money by banks, which is not done at night. Night assault is usually the most advantageous for the guerrilla.

Ideally all assaults take place at night, when conditions for a surprise attack are most favorable and the darkness facilitates escape and hides the identity of the participants. The urban guerrilla must prepare himself, nevertheless, to act under all conditions, daytime as well as night.

What follows are the most vulnerable targets for assaults:

- a. Credit establishments
- b. Commercial and industrial enterprises, including plants for the manufacture of weapons and explosives
- c. Military establishments
- d. Commissaries and police stations
- e. Jails
- f. Government property
- g. Mass communications media
- h. North American firms and properties
- i. Government vehicles, including military and police vehicles, trucks, armored vehicles, money carriers, trains, ships, and airplanes.

The assaults on businesses use the same tactics because in every case the buildings represent a fixed target. Assaults on buildings are planned as guerrilla operations, varied according to whether they are against banks, a commercial enterprise, industries, military bases, commissaries, prisons, radio stations, warehouses for foreign firms, and so on.

The assault on vehicles—money carriers, armored vehicles, trains, ships, airplanes—are of another nature, since they are moving targets. The nature of the operation varies according to the situation and the circumstances—that is, whether the vehicle is stationary or moving.

Armored cars, including military vehicles, are not immune to mines. Roadblocks, traps, ruses, interception by other vehicles, Molotov cocktails, and shooting with heavy weapons are efficient methods of assaulting

vehicles. Heavy vehicles, grounded aircrafts, and anchored ships can be seized and their crews and guards overcome. Airplanes in flight can be hijacked by guerrilla action or by one person. Ships and trains in motion can be assaulted or captured by guerrilla operations in order to obtain weapons and ammunition or to prevent troop movements.

The Bank Assault as Popular Mission

The most popular mission is the bank assault. In Brazil, the urban guerrillas have begun a type of organized assault on the banks as a guerrilla operation. Today this type of assault is widely used and has served as a sort of preliminary test for the urban guerrilla in his training in the tactics of urban guerrilla warfare.

Important innovations in the tactics of assaulting banks have developed, guaranteeing escape, the withdrawal of money, and the anonymity of those involved. Among these innovations we cite the shooting of tires of cars to prevent pursuit, locking people in the bank bathroom, making them sit on the floor, immobilizing the bank guards and taking their weapons, forcing someone to open the safe or the strong box, and using disguises.

Attempts to install bank alarms, to use guards or electronic detection devices prove fruitless when the assault is political and is carried out according to urban guerrilla warfare techniques. This guerrilla method uses new techniques to meet the enemy's tactical changes, has access to firepower that is growing every day, becomes increasingly more experienced and more confident, and uses a larger number of guerrillas every time—all to guarantee the success of operations planned down to the last detail.

The bank assault is a typical expropriation. However, as is true with any kind of armed expropriatory action, the guerrilla is handicapped by a two-fold competition—that is, competition from the outlaw and from the right-wing counter-revolutionary. This competition produces confusion, which is reflected in the people's uncertainty. To prevent this situation from happening, the urban guerrilla must use two methods:

- a. Avoid the outlaw's technique—unnecessary violence and the expropriation of goods and possessions belonging to the people.
- b. Use the assault for propaganda purposes at the very moment it is taking place and later distribute material, leaflets—every possible

means of explaining the objectives and the principles of the urban guerrillas, as expropriator of the government and the ruling elite.

Raids and Penetrations

Raids and penetrations are rapid attacks on establishments located in neighborhoods or even in the center of the city—for example, small military units, commissaries, hospitals—to cause trouble, seize weapons, punish and terrorize the enemy, take reprisals, or rescue wounded prisoners or those hospitalized under police guard. Raids and penetrations are also made on garages and depots to destroy vehicles and damage installations, especially if they are North American firms and property.

When they take place on certain stretches of highway or in certain distant neighborhoods, these raids can serve to force the enemy to move great numbers of troops, a totally useless effort since when they get there they will find nobody to fight. When they are carried out on certain houses, offices, archives, or public offices, their purpose is to capture or search for secret papers and documents with which to denounce deals, compromises, and the corruption of men in government, their dirty deals and criminal transactions.

Raids and penetrations are most effective if they are carried out at night.

Occupations

Occupations are a type of attack carried out when the urban guerrilla stations himself in specific establishments and locations for a temporary action against the enemy or some propaganda purpose.

The occupation of factories and schools during strikes, or at other times, is a method of protest or of distracting the enemy's attention. The occupation of radio stations is for propaganda purposes.

Occupation is a highly effective model for action; however, to prevent losses and material damage to our forces, it is always a good idea to plan on the possibility of a forced withdrawal. It must always be meticulously planned and carried out at the opportune moment.

Occupations always have a time limit, and the swifter they are completed the better.

Ambush

Ambushes are attacks, typified by surprise, when the enemy is trapped on the road or when he makes a police net surrounding a house or estate. A false alarm can bring the enemy to the spot, where he falls into a trap.

The principle object of the ambush is to capture enemy weapons and to punish him with death. Ambushes to halt passenger trains are for propaganda purposes, and when they are troop trains, the object is to annihilate the enemy and seize his weapons.

The urban guerrilla sniper is the kind of fighter specially suited for ambush because he can hide easily in the irregularities of the terrain, on the roofs and the tops of buildings, and in apartments under construction. From windows and dark places, he can take careful aim at his chosen target.

Ambush has devastating effects on the enemy, leaving him unnerved, insecure, and fearful.

Street Tactics

Street tactics are used to fight the enemy in the streets, utilizing the participation of the population against him.

In 1968, the Brazilian students used excellent street tactics against police troops, such as marching down streets against traffic and using slingshots and marbles against mounted police. Other street tactics consist of constructing barricades; pulling up paving blocks and hurling them at the police; throwing bottles, bricks, paperweights, and other projectiles at the police from the top of office and apartment buildings; using buildings and other structures for escape, for hiding, and for supporting surprise attacks.

It is equally necessary to know how to respond to enemy tactics. When the police troops come wearing helmets to protect them against flying objects, we have to divide ourselves into two teams—one to attack the enemy from the front, the other to attack him in the rear—withdrawing one as the other goes into action to prevent the first from being struck by projectiles hurled by the second.

By the same token, it is important to know how to respond to the police net. When the police designate certain of their men to go into the crowd and arrest a demonstrator, a larger group of urban guerrillas must surround the police group, disarming and beating them and at the same time allow-

ing the prisoner to escape. This urban guerrilla operation is called “the net within a net.”

When the police net is formed at a school building, a factory, a place where demonstrators gather, or some other point, the urban guerrilla must not give up or allow himself to be taken by surprise. To make his net effective, the enemy is obliged to transport his troops in vehicles and special cars to occupy strategic points in the streets in order to invade the building or chosen locale.

The urban guerrilla, for his part, must never clear a building or an area and meet in it without first knowing its exits, the way to break an encirclement, the strategic points that the police must occupy, and the roads that inevitably lead into the net; and he must hold other strategic points from which to strike at the enemy. The roads followed by police vehicles must be mined at key points along the way and at forced roadblocks. When the mines explode, the vehicles will be knocked into the air. The police will be caught in the trap and will suffer losses and be victims of an ambush.

The net must be broken by escape routes that are unknown to the police. The rigorous planning of a withdrawal is the best way to frustrate any encircling effort on the part of the enemy.

When there is no possibility of an escape plan, the urban guerrilla must not hold meetings, gatherings, or do anything because to do so will prevent him from breaking through the net, which the enemy will surely try to throw around him.

Street tactics have revealed a new type of urban guerrilla who participates in mass protests. This is the type we designate as the “urban guerrilla demonstrator,” who joins the crowds and participates in marches with specific and defined aims in mind. The urban guerrilla demonstrator must initiate the “net within the net”—ransacking government vehicles, official cars, and police vehicles before turning them over or setting fire to them to see if any of them have money or weapons.

Snipers are very good for mass demonstrations and, along with the urban guerrilla demonstrator, can play a valuable role. Hidden at strategic points, the snipers have complete success using shotguns or submachine guns, which can easily cause losses among the enemy.

Strikes and Work Interruptions

The strike is a model of action employed by the urban guerrilla in work centers and schools to damage the enemy by stopping work and study activities. Because it is one of the weapons most feared by the exploiters and oppressors, the enemy uses tremendous firepower and incredible violence against it. The strikers are taken to prison, suffer beatings, and many of them wind up killed.

The urban guerrilla must prepare the strike in such a way as to leave no track or clue that can identify the leaders of such an action. A strike is successful when it is organized by a small group, if it is carefully prepared in secret using the most clandestine methods. Weapons, ammunition, Molotov cocktails, homemade weapons of destruction and attack—all of these must be supplied beforehand in order to meet the enemy. So that the action can do the greatest possible damage, it is a good idea to study and put into effect a sabotage plan.

Strikes and study interruptions, although they are of brief duration, cause severe damage to the enemy. It is enough for them to crop up at different locations and in differing sections of the same area, disrupting daily life, occurring endlessly, one after the other, in true guerrilla fashion. In strikes or in simple work interruptions, the urban guerrilla has recourse to the occupation or penetration of the site, or he can simply make a raid. In that case, his objective is to take captives, to capture prisoners, or to capture enemy agents and propose an exchange for arrested strikers.

In certain cases, strikes and brief work interruptions can offer an excellent opportunity for preparing ambushes or traps whose aim is the physical destruction of the police. The basic fact is that the enemy suffers losses as well as material and moral damage and is weakened by the action.

Desertions, Diversions, Seizures, Expropriation of Ammunition and Explosives

Desertion and the diversion of weapons are actions carried out in military bases, ships, military hospitals, and so forth. The urban guerrilla soldier or officer must desert at the most opportune moment with modern weapons and ammunition to hand them over to the guerrillas.

One of the most opportune moments is when the urban guerrilla soldier is called upon to pursue his guerrilla comrades outside the military base. Instead of following the orders of the “gorillas,” the military urban

guerrilla must join the ranks of the revolutionaries by handing over the weapons and ammunition he carries or the military vehicle he operates. The advantage of this method is that the rebels receive weapons and ammunition from the army, navy, air force, military police, civilian guard, or the police without any great work because it reaches their hands by government transportation.

The military urban guerrilla must always be alert to other opportunities that may occur—for example, in the barracks. In case of carelessness on the part of commanders or in other favorable conditions—such as bureaucratic attitudes or the relaxation of discipline on the part of lieutenants or other internal personnel—the military urban guerrilla must no longer wait but rather try to inform the guerrillas and desert with as large a supply of weapons as possible.

When there is no possibility of deserting with weapons and ammunition, the military urban guerrilla must engage in sabotage, starting fires and explosions in munitions dumps. This technique of deserting with weapons and of raiding and sabotaging the military centers is the best way of wearing out and demoralizing the enemy as well as leaving them confused.

The urban guerrilla's purpose in disarming an individual enemy is to capture his weapons. These weapons are usually in the hands of sentinels or others whose task is guard duty. The capture of weapons may be accomplished by violent means or by cleverness and tricks or traps. When the enemy is disarmed, he must be searched for weapons other than those already taken from him. If we are careless, he can use the weapons that were not seized to shoot the urban guerrilla.

The seizure of weapons is an efficient method of acquiring submachine guns, the urban guerrilla's most important weapon. When we carry out small operations or actions to seize weapons and ammunition, the material captured may be for personal use or for armaments and supplies for the firing teams.

The necessity to provide firepower for the urban guerrillas is so great that in order to take off from the zero point, we often have to purchase one weapon, divert, or capture a single gun. The basic point is to begin and with a spirit of decisiveness and boldness. The possession of a single submachine gun multiplies our forces.

In a bank assault, we must be careful to seize the weapons of the bank guard. The rest of the weapons will be found with the treasurer, the bank

tellers, or the manager and must also be seized. Quite often we succeed in capturing weapons in police stations as a result of raids. The capture of weapons, ammunition, and explosives is the urban guerrilla's goal in assaulting commercial businesses, industries, and quarries.

Liberation of Prisoners

The liberation of prisoners is an armed action designed to free jailed urban guerrillas. In the daily struggle against the enemy, the urban guerrilla is subject to arrest and can be sentenced to unlimited years in jail.

The battle does not end here. For the guerrilla, his experience is deepened by prison, and struggle continues even in the dungeons where he is held. The imprisoned guerrilla views the prisons of the enemy as a terrain that he must dominate and understand in order to free himself by a guerrilla operation. There is no jail—either on an island, in a city penitentiary, or on a farm—that is impregnable to the slyness, cleverness, and firepower of the rebels.

The urban guerrilla who is free views the jails of the enemy as the inevitable site of guerrilla actions designed to liberate his ideological comrades from prison. It is this combination of the urban guerrilla in freedom and the urban guerrilla in jail that results in the armed operations we refer to as “liberation of prisoners.”

The guerrilla operations that can be used in liberating prisoners are the following:

- a. Riots in penal establishments, in correctional colonies or camps, or on transport or prison ships
- b. Assaults on urban or rural prisons, detention centers, prison camps, or any other permanent or temporary place where prisoners are held
- c. Assaults on prisoner transport trains or convoys
- d. Raids and penetrations of prisons
- e. Ambushes of guards who move prisoners.

Executions

Execution is the killing of a foreign spy, of an agent of the dictatorship, of a police torturer, of a dictatorial personality in the government involved in crimes and persecutions against patriots, of a stool pigeon, informer, police agent, or police provocateur. Those who go to the police of their own free

will to make denunciations and accusations, who supply information and who finger people must be executed when they are caught by the urban guerrillas.

Execution is a secret action, in which the least possible number of urban guerrillas are involved. In many cases, the execution can be carried out by a single sniper, patient, alone and unknown, and operating in absolute secrecy and in cold blood.

Kidnapping

Kidnapping is capturing and holding in a secret place a spy, political personality, or a notorious and dangerous enemy of the revolutionary movement. Kidnapping is used to exchange or liberate imprisoned revolutionaries or to force the suspension of torture in jail by the military dictatorship.

The kidnapping of personalities who are well-known artists, sports figures, or who are outstanding in some other field but who have evidenced no political interest can be a useful form of propaganda for the guerrillas, provided it occurs under special circumstances and is handled so the public understands and sympathizes with it. The kidnappings of foreigners or visitors constitute a form of protest against the penetration and domination of imperialism in our country.

Sabotage

Sabotage is a highly destructive type of attack using very few persons—and sometimes requiring only one—to accomplish the desired result. When the urban guerrilla uses sabotage, the first step is isolated sabotage. Then comes the step of dispersed and general sabotage, carried out by the population.

Well-executed sabotage demands study, planning, and careful action. A characteristic form of sabotage is explosion, using dynamite, fire, or the placing of mines. A little sand, a trickle of any kind of combustible, a poor lubrication job, a screw removed, a short circuit, inserted pieces of wood or iron can cause irreparable damage.

The objective of sabotage is to hurt, to damage, to make useless, and to destroy vital enemy points such as the following:

- a. Economy of the country
- b. Agricultural or industrial production
- c. Transport and communication systems

- d. Military and police systems and their establishments and depots
- e. Repressive military-police system
- f. Firms and properties of exploiters in the country.

The urban guerrilla should endanger the economy of the country, particularly its economic and financial aspects, such as its domestic and foreign banking network, its exchange and credit systems, and its tax collection system.

Public offices, centers of government, and government depots are easy targets for sabotage. Nor will it be easy to prevent the sabotage of agricultural and industrial production by the urban guerrilla with his thorough knowledge of the local situation. Factory workers acting as urban guerrillas are excellent industrial saboteurs since they, better than anyone, understand the industry, the factory, the machinery, or the part most likely to destroy an entire operation, doing much more damage than a poorly informed layman could do.

With respect to the enemy's transport and communications systems, beginning with railway traffic, it is necessary to attack them systematically with sabotage. The only caution is against causing death and injury to passengers, especially regular commuters on suburban and long-distance trains. Attacks on freight trains, rolling or stationary stock, stoppage of military transports and communications systems—these are the major objectives in this area. Sleepers can be damaged and pulled up, as can rails. A tunnel blocked by a barrier of explosives, or an obstruction caused by a derailed car, causes enormous harm.

The derailment of a train carrying fuel is of major damage to the enemy. So is dynamiting a railroad bridge. In a system where the size and weight of the rolling equipment is enormous, it takes months for workers to repair or rebuild the destruction and damage.

As for highways, they can be obstructed with trees, stationary vehicles, ditches, dislocation of barriers by dynamite, and bridges destroyed by explosions.

Ships can be damaged at anchor in seaports or riverports or in the shipyards. Aircraft can be destroyed or damaged on the ground.

Telephone and telegraph lines can be systematically damaged, their towers blown up, and their lines made useless. Transport and communications must be sabotaged immediately because the revolutionary movement

has already begun in Brazil, and it is essential to impede the enemy's movement of troops and munitions.

Oil lines, fuel plants, depots for bombs and ammunition arsenals, military camps, and bases must become targets for sabotage operations, while vehicles, army trucks, and other military or police vehicles must be destroyed wherever they are found. The military and police repression centers and their specialized organs must also claim the attention of the guerrilla saboteur. Foreign firms and properties in the country, for their part, must become such frequent targets of sabotage that the volume of actions directed against them surpasses the total of all other actions against enemy vital points.

Terrorism

Terrorism is an action, usually involving the placement of an explosive or firebomb of great destructive power, which is capable of effecting irreparable loss against the enemy. Terrorism requires that the urban guerrilla should have adequate theoretical and practical knowledge of how to make explosives.

The terrorist act, apart from the apparent ease with which it can be carried out, is no different from other guerrilla acts and actions whose success depends on planning and determination. It is an action which the urban guerrilla must execute with the greatest calmness and determination.

Although terrorism generally involves an explosion, there are cases in which it may be carried out through executions or the systematic burning of installations, properties, plantations, and so forth. It is essential to point out the importance of fires and the construction of incendiary devices such as gasoline bombs in the technique of guerrilla terrorism.

Another thing is the importance of the material the urban guerrilla can persuade the people to expropriate in the moments of hunger and scarcity brought about by the greed of the big commercial interests.

Terrorism is a weapon the revolutionary can never relinquish.

Armed Propaganda

The coordination of urban guerrilla activities, including each armed action, is the primary way of making armed propaganda. These actions, carried out with specific objectives and aims in mind, inevitably become propaganda material for the mass communication system.

Bank robberies, ambushes, desertions, and the diverting of weapons, the rescue of prisoners, executions, kidnappings, sabotage, terrorism and the war of nerves are all cases in point. Airplanes diverted in flight by guerrilla action, ships and trains assaulted and seized by armed guerrillas can also be carried out solely for propaganda effect.

The urban guerrilla must never fail to install a clandestine press, however, and must be able to turn out mimeographed copies using alcohol or electric plates and other duplicating apparatus, expropriating what he cannot buy in order to produce small clandestine newspapers, pamphlets, flyers, and stamps for propaganda and agitation against the dictatorship.

The urban guerrilla engaged in clandestine printing facilitates enormously the incorporation of large numbers of people into the struggle; it is about opening a permanent work front for those willing to carry on propaganda, even when to do so means to act alone and risk their lives. With the existence of clandestine propaganda and agitation material, the inventive spirit of the urban guerrilla expands and creates catapults, artifacts, mortars, and other instruments with which to distribute the antigovernment propaganda at a distance.

Tape recordings, occupation of radio stations, use of loudspeakers, and graffiti on walls and other inaccessible places are other forms of propaganda. A consistent propaganda by letters sent to specific addresses, explaining the meaning of the urban guerrilla's armed actions, produces considerable results and is one method of influencing certain segments of the population.

Even this influence—exercised in the heart of the people by every possible propaganda device, revolving around the activity of the urban guerrilla—does not indicate that our forces have everyone's support. It is enough to win the support of a portion of the population, and this can be done by popularizing the motto, "Let he who does not wish to do anything for the guerrillas do nothing against them."

The War of Nerves

The war of nerves or psychological warfare is an aggressive technique, based on the direct or indirect use of mass media and rumors in order to demoralize the government.

In psychological warfare, the government is always at a disadvantage; imposing censorship on the media—not allowing anything against it to

filter through, it winds up in a defensive position. At this point it becomes desperate, is involved in greater contradictions and loss of prestige, and loses time and energy in an exhausting effort at control, which is liable to be broken at any moment.

The objective of the war of nerves is to mislead, spreading lies among the authorities in which everyone can participate, thus creating an atmosphere of nervousness, discredit, insecurity, uncertainty, and concern on the part of the government.

The best methods used by urban guerrillas in the war of nerves follow:

- a. Using the telephone and the mail to announce false clues to the police and government, including information on the planting of bombs and any other act of terrorism in public offices and other places—for example, kidnapping and assassination plans—forces the authorities to wear themselves out by following up on the false information fed to them.
- b. Letting false plans fall into the hands of the police to divert their attention.
- c. Planting rumors to make the government uneasy.
- d. Exploiting by every means possible the corruption, the mistakes, and the failures of the government and its representatives, forcing them into demoralizing explanations and justifications in the very communication media they wish to maintain under censorship.
- e. Presenting denunciations to foreign embassies, the United Nations, the Papal Nunciature, and the international commissions defending human rights or freedom of the press, exposing each concrete violation and each use of violence by the military dictatorship and making it known that the revolutionary war will continue with serious danger for the enemies of the population.

How to Carry Out the Action

The urban guerrilla who correctly carries through his apprenticeship and training must give the greatest possible importance to his method of carrying out actions, for in this he cannot commit the slightest error. Any carelessness in learning tactics and their use invites certain disaster, as experience teaches us every day.

Common criminals commit errors frequently because of their tactics, and this is one of the reasons why the urban guerrillas must be so insistently preoccupied with following revolutionary tactics and not the tactics of bandits. There is no urban guerrilla worthy of the name who ignores the revolutionary method of action and fails to practice it rigorously in the planning and execution of his activities.

The giant is known by his toe. The same can be said of the urban guerrilla, who is known from afar by his correct tactics and his absolute fidelity to principle. The revolutionary method of carrying out actions is strongly and forcefully based on the knowledge and use of the following elements:

- a. Investigation and intelligence gathering
- b. Observation and vigilance
- c. Reconnaissance, or exploration of the terrain
- d. Study and timing of routes
- e. Mapping
- f. Mechanization
- g. Careful selection of personnel
- h. Selection of firepower
- i. Study and practice in success
- j. Success
- k. Use of cover
- l. Retreat
- m. Dispersal
- n. Liberation or transfer of prisoners
- o. Elimination of evidence
- p. Rescue of wounded.

Some Observations on Tactics

When there is no information, the point of departure for planning the action must be investigation, observation, and vigilance. This method produces good results.

In any event, even when there is information, it is essential to make observations to see that information is not at odds with observation or vice versa. Reconnaissance or exploration of the terrain and the study and timing of routes are so important that to omit them is to make a stab in the dark.

Mechanization, in general, is an underestimated factor in the tactics of conducting an action. Frequently, mechanization is left to the end, on the eve of the action, before anything is done about it. This is a mistake. Mechanization must be seriously considered. It must be undertaken with considerable foresight and with careful planning, based on careful and precise information. The care, conservation, maintenance, and camouflaging of stolen vehicles are very important details of mechanization. When transportation fails, the primary action fails, with serious material and morale problems for the urban guerrillas.

The selection of personnel requires great care in order to avoid the inclusion of indecisive or wavering persons who present the danger of contaminating others, a danger that must be avoided.

The withdrawal is equally or more important than the operation itself, to the point that it must be rigorously planned, including the possibility of defeat. One must avoid rescue or transfer of prisoners with children present, or anything to attract the attention of people passing through the area. The best thing is to make the rescue appear as natural as possible, winding through different routes or narrow streets that scarcely permit passage on foot, in order to avoid an encounter between two cars. The elimination of tracks is obligatory and demands the greatest caution—also in removing fingerprints and any other sign that could give the enemy information. Lack of care in the elimination of evidence is a factor that increases nervousness in our ranks, which the enemy often exploits.

Rescue of the Wounded

The problem of the wounded in urban guerrilla warfare merits special attention. During guerrilla operations in the urban area, it may happen that some comrade is wounded by the police. When a guerrilla in the firing group has a knowledge of first aid, he can do something for the wounded comrade on the spot. Under no circumstances should the wounded guerrilla be abandoned at the site of the battle or left in the enemy's hands.

One of the precautions we must take is to set up first-aid courses for men and women, courses in which guerrillas can learn the rudiments of emergency medicine. The urban guerrilla who is a doctor, nurse, med student, pharmacist, or who simply has had first-aid training is a necessity in modern guerrilla struggles. A small manual of first aid for urban guerrillas,

printed on mimeographed sheets, can also be produced by anyone who has enough knowledge.

In planning and carrying out an armed action, the urban guerrilla cannot forget the organization of medical support. This must be accomplished by means of a mobile or motorized clinic. You can also set up a mobile first-aid station. Another solution is to utilize the skills of a medical comrade, who waits with his bag of equipment in a designated house to which the wounded are brought.

The ideal would be to have our own well-equipped clinic, but this is very expensive unless we expropriate all of our materials. When all else fails, it is often necessary to resort to legal clinics, using armed force if necessary to force a doctor to treat our wounded.

In the eventuality that we fall back upon blood banks to purchase blood or plasma, we must not use legal addresses and certainly no addresses where the wounded can really be found, since they are under our care and protection. Nor should we supply the addresses of those involved in the guerrilla organization to the hospitals and health care clinics where we may take them. Such caution is indispensable to covering our tracks.

The houses in which the wounded stay cannot be known to anyone but the small group of comrades responsible for their care and transport. Sheets, bloody clothing, medicine, and any other indications of treatment of comrades wounded in combat must be completely eliminated from any place they visit to receive treatment.

Guerrilla Security

The urban guerrilla lives in constant danger of the possibility of being discovered or denounced. The primary security problem is to make certain that we are well hidden and well guarded and that there are secure methods to keep the police from locating us.

The worst enemy of the urban guerrilla, and the major danger that we run into, is infiltration into our organization by a spy or informer. The spy trapped within the organization will be punished with death. The same goes for those who desert and inform to the police.

Well-laid security means no spies or agents infiltrated into our midst, and the enemy can receive no information about us even through indirect

means. The fundamental way to ensure this is to be strict and cautious in recruiting. Nor is it permissible for everyone to know everything and everyone. This rule is a fundamental ABC of urban guerrilla security.

The enemy wants to annihilate us and fights relentlessly to find us and destroy us, so our greatest weapon lies in hiding from him and attacking by surprise.

The danger to the urban guerrilla is that he may reveal himself through carelessness or allow himself to be discovered through a lack of vigilance. It is impermissible for the urban guerrilla to give out his own or any other clandestine address to the police or to talk too much. Notations in the margins of newspapers, lost documents, calling cards, letters, or notes are evidence that the police never underestimate. Address and telephone books must be destroyed, and one must not write or hold any documents. It is necessary to avoid keeping archives of legal or illegal names, biographical information, maps, or plans.

Contact numbers should not be written down, but simply committed to memory. The urban guerrilla who violates these rules must be warned by the first one who notes this infraction, and if he repeats it, we must avoid working with him in the future.

The urban guerrilla's need to move about constantly with the police nearby—given the fact that the police net surrounds the city—forces him to adopt various security precautions depending upon the enemy's movements. For this reason, it is necessary to maintain a daily information service about what the enemy appears to be doing, where the police net is operating, and what points are being watched. The daily reading of the police news in the newspapers is a fountain of information in these cases.

The most important lesson for guerrilla security is to never, under any circumstances, permit the slightest laxity in the maintenance of security measures and precautions within the organization. Guerrilla security must especially be maintained in the case of an arrest. The arrested guerrilla must reveal nothing to the police that will jeopardize the organization. He must say nothing that will lead, as a consequence, to the arrest of other comrades, the discovery of addresses or hiding places, or the loss of weapons and ammunition.

The Seven Sins of the Urban Guerrilla

Even when the urban guerrilla applies proper tactics and abides by its security rules, he can still be vulnerable to errors. There is no perfect urban guerrilla. The most he can do is make every effort to diminish the margin of error, since he cannot be perfect. One of the means we should use to diminish the possibility of error is to know thoroughly the seven deadly sins of the urban guerrilla and try to avoid them:

- a. The first sin of the guerrilla is inexperience. The urban guerrilla, blinded by this sin, thinks the enemy is stupid, underestimates the enemy's intelligence, thinks everything is easy, and as a result, leaves evidence that can lead to disaster. Because of his inexperience, the urban guerrilla may also overestimate the forces of the enemy, believing them to be stronger than they really are. Allowing himself to be fooled by this presumption, the urban guerrilla becomes intimidated and remains insecure and indecisive, paralyzed, and lacking in audacity.
- b. The second sin of the urban guerrilla is to boast about the actions he has undertaken and to broadcast them to the four winds.
- c. The third sin is vanity. The guerrilla who suffers from this sin tries to solve the problems of the revolution by actions in the city, but without bothering about the beginnings and survival of other guerrillas in other areas. Blinded by success, he winds up organizing an action that he considers decisive and that puts into play the entire resources of the organization. Since we cannot afford to break the guerrilla struggle in the cities while rural guerrilla warfare has not yet erupted, we always run the risk of allowing the enemy to attack us with decisive blows.
- d. The fourth sin of the urban guerrilla is to exaggerate his strength and to undertake actions for which he, as yet, lacks sufficient forces and the required infrastructure.
- e. The fifth sin is rash action. The guerrilla who commits this sin loses patience, suffers an attack of nerves, does not wait for anything, and impetuously throws himself into action, suffering untold defeats.
- f. The sixth sin is to attack the enemy when they are most angry.
- g. The seventh sin is to fail to plan things and to act spontaneously.

Popular Support

One of the permanent concerns of the urban guerrilla is his identification with popular causes to win public support. Where government actions become inept and corrupt, the urban guerrilla should not hesitate to step in and show that he opposes the government, thus gain popular sympathy. The present government, for example, imposes heavy financial burdens and excessively high taxes on the people. It is up to the urban guerrilla to attack the dictatorship's tax collection system and to obstruct its financial activities, throwing all the weight of armed action against it. The urban guerrilla fights not only to upset the tax collection system; the weapon of armed action must also be directed against those government agencies that raise prices and those who direct them as well as against the wealthiest of the national and foreign profiteers and the important property owners. In short, it must be directed against all those who accumulate huge fortunes out of the high cost of living, the wages of hunger, excessive prices, and high rents.

Foreign industries, such as refrigeration and other North American plants that monopolize the market and the manufacture of general food supplies, must be systematically attacked by the urban guerrillas.

The rebellion of the urban guerrilla and his persistence in intervening in political questions is the best way of ensuring popular support for the cause which we defend. We repeat and insist on repeating—it is the way of ensuring popular support. As soon as a reasonable portion of the population begins to take seriously the actions of the urban guerrilla, his success is guaranteed.

The government has no alternative except to intensify its repression: the police networks, house searches, the arrest of suspects and innocent persons, and the closing off of streets make life in the city unbearable. The military dictatorship embarks on massive political persecution. Political assassinations and police terror become routine.

In spite of all this, the police systematically fail. The armed forces, the navy, and the air force are mobilized to undertake routine police functions, but even so they can find no way to halt guerrilla operations or to wipe out the revolutionary organization, with its fragmented groups that move around and operate throughout the country.

The people refuse to collaborate with the government, and the general sentiment is that this government is unjust, incapable of solving problems,

and resorts simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents. The political situation in the country is transformed into a military one in which the “gorillas” appear more and more to be the ones responsible for violence, while the lives of the people grow worse.

When they see the military and the dictatorship on the brink of the abyss, and fearing the consequences of a civil war already well underway, the pacifiers (always to be found within the ruling elite) and the opportunists (partisans of nonviolent struggle) join hands and circulate rumors behind the scenes begging the hangmen for elections, “redemocratization,” constitutional reforms, and other tripe designed to fool the people and make them stop the rebellion.

Watching the guerrillas, however, the people now understand it is a farce to vote in any elections that have as their sole objective guaranteeing the survival of the dictatorship and covering up its crimes. Attacking wholeheartedly this election farce and the so-called “political solution,” which is so appealing to the opportunists, the urban guerrillas must become even more aggressive and active, resorting without pause to sabotage, terrorism, expropriations, assaults, kidnappings, executions, and so forth.

This action answers any attempt to fool the people with the opening of Congress and the reorganization of political parties—parties of the government and of the positions which the government allows—when all the time parliament and the so-called “parties” only function thanks to the permission of the military dictatorship, in a true spectacle of puppets or dogs on a leash.

The role of the urban guerrilla, in order to win the support of the population, is to continue fighting, keeping in mind the interests of the people and heightening the disastrous situation within which the government must act. These are the conditions, harmful to the dictatorship, that permit the guerrillas to open rural warfare in the middle of an uncontrollable urban rebellion.

The urban guerrilla is engaged in revolutionary action for the people and with them seeks the participation of the people in the struggle against the dictatorship and the liberation of the country. Beginning with the city and the support of the people, the rural guerrilla war develops rapidly, establishing its infrastructure carefully while the urban area continues the rebellion. ↑

Endnotes

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15. Carlos Amorim, *Comando Vermelho – A História Secreta do Crime Organizado* (Red Command – The Secret History of the Organized Crime), Editora Record, Rio de Janeiro, 2000; Alan Rodrigues, “Como Nasceram as Facções” (How the Factions Were Born), *ISTO É* (Brazilian weekly magazine), 24 May 2006.
16. Ibid.
17. Carlos Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, 1969. See Appendix A herein (from the 1970 Brazilian Army Special Forces Qualification Course), specifically the section entitled “Terrorism.”
18. Agnaldo Del Nero Augusto, “A Grande Mentira” (The Great Lie), *Biblioteca do Exército Editora*, Rio de Janeiro, 2001.
19. At that time there were several terrorist organizations in Brazil. The most relevant were:
 - a. Aliança Libertadora Nacional (ALN—National Liberator Alliance)
 - b. Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária (VPR—Revolutionary Popular Vanguard)
 - c. Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro (MR-8—Revolutionary Movement 8 October)
 - d. Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária - Palmares (VAR Palmares—Revolutionary Armed Vanguard - Palmares); Comando de Libertação Nacional (COLINA—National Liberation Command).
20. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Brazil.
21. 2003 World Bank study.
22. *ÉPOCA* (Brazilian weekly magazine), 22 May 2006.
23. This event, known as *O Massacre de Carandiru* (The Massacre of Carandiru), has created an extremely violent image of the state of São Paulo Military Police. The Brazilian Penal Code does not have a death sentence. National and international human rights organizations stated that this event was, de facto, a capital punishment, in that convicts were executed outside the judicial system.
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25. “Estatuto do Primeiro Comando da Capital” (First Capital’s Command Statute). Copy from *FOLHA on Line*, Campinas, São Paulo state, 15 February 2001. English translation by the author.
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