



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY AND GREEK-TURKISH
RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION**

by

Konstantinos Patsiaouras

December 2009

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Donald Abenheim
Scott Siegel

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE December 2009	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Democratic Peace Theory and Greek-Turkish Relations in the Context of the European Union			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Konstantinos Patsiaouras				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The European Council Helsinki Summit marked the initiation of the rapprochement procedure between Turkey and Greece, a dyad that for many decades was a source of instability in the Eastern part of Europe. After 1999, Greece abandoned the "Cold War rhetoric" in its relations with Turkey and shifted its foreign policy towards a more moderate stance by raising its veto regarding Turkey's accession in the European Union (EU). Greece's new foreign policy has many common elements with the Democratic Peace Theory of international relations. Hence, this thesis asks the following question: do the Greco-Turkish peaceful relations from 1999 until today fits the Democratic Peace Theory? By examining the three pillars of the theory, namely economic interdependence, consolidation of democracy and common participation in intergovernmental organization, the thesis concludes that the Democratic Peace Theory cannot explain the Greco-Turkish rapprochement procedure initiated by Greece after 1999.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS European Union, Greece, Turkey, Democratic Peace Theory, Economic Interdependence, Intergovernmental Organizations, NATO.			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 133	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

**DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY AND GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Konstantinos Patsiaouras
Lieutenant, Hellenic Navy
B.S., Hellenic Naval Academy, 1998

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(EUROPE AND EURASIA)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2009**

Author: Konstantinos Patsiaouras

Approved by: Donald Abenheim
Thesis Advisor

Scott N. Siegel
Thesis Co-Advisor

Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

The European Council Helsinki Summit marked the initiation of the rapprochement procedure between Turkey and Greece, a dyad that for many decades was a source of instability in the Eastern part of Europe. After 1999, Greece abandoned the “Cold War rhetoric” in its relations with Turkey and shifted its foreign policy towards a more moderate stance by raising its veto regarding Turkey’s accession in the European Union (EU). Greece’s new foreign policy has many common elements with the Democratic Peace Theory of international relations. Hence, this thesis asks the following question: do the Greco-Turkish peaceful relations from 1999 until today fits the Democratic Peace Theory? By examining the three pillars of the theory, namely economic interdependence, consolidation of democracy and common participation in intergovernmental organization, the thesis concludes that the Democratic Peace Theory cannot explain the Greco-Turkish rapprochement procedure initiated by Greece after 1999.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	THE PRECARIOUS RELATIONSHIP OF GREECE AND TURKEY	7
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	7
B.	POISONOUS ISSUES IN THE GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS	7
1.	Aegean Sea Issues	7
a.	<i>Delimitation of the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf</i>	7
b.	<i>Length of Territorial Waters</i>	10
c.	<i>“Grey Zones” in the Aegean Sea</i>	12
d.	<i>Greek Air Space</i>	14
2.	The Cyprus Issue.....	15
III.	DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY.....	17
A.	THE KANTIAN APPROACH.....	17
1.	Democracy and Public Opinion.....	17
2.	International Trade	18
3.	Establishment of a Peaceful Confederation.....	19
B.	EXPLANATIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY.....	20
1.	The Institutional or Structural Explanation	20
2.	The Normative or Cultural Explanation.....	22
3.	The Rationalist Explanation.....	24
C.	THE RATIONALE BEHIND GREECE’S RAPPROCHEMENT POLICY	26
IV.	ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND GRECO-TURKISH RELATIONS	33
A.	THE ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE HYPOTHESIS AS AN ELEMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY.....	33
B.	THE GREEK-TURKISH ECONOMIC RELATIONS. DID THE OLD ADVERSARIES BECOME NEW PARTNERS.....	37
1.	Economic Cooperation through the Ratification of Low Politics Agreements	37
2.	Analysis of the Data Concerning the Bilateral Economic Relations of Greece and Turkey	39
V.	THE PILLAR OF DEMOCRACY.....	49
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	49
B.	EU AND TURKEY. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	51
1.	Period Prior to the Helsinki European Council (December 1999).....	51
2.	Period of Greco-Turkish Rapprochement (1999 to the present)	55
C.	TURKEY’S POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE START OF THE RAPPROCHEMENT PERIOD WITH GREECE (1999).....	69

D.	THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS IN TURKEY'S POLITICAL REFORM.....	75
1.	Freedom of Associations and the Evolution of Civil Society in Turkey	77
2.	Civil—Military Relations in Turkey	80
3.	Overall Evaluation of Turkey's Democratic Reforms	84
VI.	INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE THIRD PILLAR OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY.....	89
1.	The Greco-Turkish Relations in the Context of NATO	90
2.	The Greco-Turkish Relations in the European Union's Context	96
3.	Progress on the Greek-Turkish "High Politics" Issues....	100
VII.	CONCLUSION	105
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	109
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	117

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Trade between Greece and Turkey.....	42
Figure 2.	Trade between Greece and Turkey.....	43
Figure 3.	Index of Greek Competitiveness in its Trade Relations with Turkey... 44	
Figure 4.	Violation of Greek National Airspace by the Turkish Air Force	101
Figure 5.	Dogfights between Greek and Turkish Fighter Jets.....	101

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Distribution of the Aegean Sea Territorial Waters	11
Table 2.	How Economic Interdependence Promotes Peace	35
Table 3.	Description of the Data Indexes	39
Table 4.	Trade between Greece and Turkey.....	40
Table 5.	Trade between Greece and Turkey.....	41
Table 6.	Description of the Data Indexes	45
Table 7.	Openness of Greece and Turkey's Economies.	45
Table 8.	Core Topics Regarding Turkey's EU Membership.....	67
Table 9.	Comparison of Greece-Turkey Rating for the Year 1999.	71
Table 10.	Reforms Concerning the Freedom of Association	79
Table 11.	Comparison of Greece-Turkey Rating for the Years 1999–2009.....	87

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank my advisors Professor Donald Abenheim and Professor Scott N. Siegel for all the valuable knowledge they offered me through their courses during my studies at the Naval Postgraduate School.

I mostly thank my wife, Irida, for her support and patience during my two-years of studies at the Naval Postgraduate School.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

Greece and Turkey constitute an interesting and controversial dyad of the international system. The majority of scholars in the international relations field have characterized their relationship as conflicting, antagonistic, turbulent, problematic, etc. In spite of the turbulent relationship, both of Greece and Turkey have been “allies” in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952. Furthermore, Greece has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 1981 and Turkey’s efforts to join the EU officially started during 1963.¹ Greece, initially sought to obstruct Turkey’s entrance to the EU; however, in March 1995 Greece suddenly removed its veto concerning the custom union of Turkey with the EU. That was the first sign of Greece’s change of stance towards Turkey’s European ambitions. In addition, during the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Greece openly changed its stance and decided to support Turkey’s European dream.

Greece initiated its rapprochement policy towards Turkey because the costs of the alternative (continuous tension in their relationship) were too great. In order to avoid a future military conflict with Turkey, Greek politicians decided to see the foreign relations of Greece from a more liberal perspective. Therefore, this thesis argues that after 1999, the main axes of Greece policy towards Turkey have many common elements with the democratic peace theory. Greece decided to promote Turkey’s EU candidacy because according to Russett, “states typically share common institutions just because they have major interests in conflict as well as in common; institutions are supposed to provide a means to resolve those conflicts peacefully.”² Furthermore, as Bearce and Omori note, “state leaders sometimes engage in economic integration in an effort to manage

¹ Only the European Economic Community (EEC) existed during that time. It was later referred to as European Community (EC), during the 1980s, and as European Union (EU) after 1991.

² Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 26.

historically conflictual relationships.”³ Finally, Page, in one of her economic regionalism studies, argues that, “it is precisely former enemies which may want to institutionalize the end of conflict.”⁴

Hence, this thesis will try to answer the following main question: do the Greco-Turkish peaceful relations that initiated after Greece’s decision in 1999 to support Turkey’s efforts for entrance in the EU fits the democratic peace theory? Since the democratic peace theory, as well as other liberal theories of international relations, is based upon three pillars, namely, democracy, economic interdependence and international organizations, in order to answer the main question we have to address some additional questions. More specifically, how does democracy and especially the efforts for the consolidation of a truly democratic regime that Turkey made after 1999, affect Greco-Turkish relations? At what level are the economic interactions of Greece and Turkey after the initiation of the rapprochement policy by Greece? How do the existent economic relations affect their bilateral relations? Did the EU, as an international organization, assist towards the improvement of Greco-Turkish relations? Is there any progress towards the resolution of the problems that poison the relations of the two states? Is there an element of the democratic peace theory that plays a more significant role in the promotion of peace and stability between the two countries?

In Chapter II of the thesis, a summary of the contemporary problems that exist between the two countries will be provided. Being acquainted with the problematic issues that have been poisoning for so many decades the bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey is essential in distinguishing if the rapprochement procedure has generated any positive results concerning those issues.

In Chapter III, a brief synopsis of the three main elements of the democratic peace theory will be also presented, through a detailed review of the

³ David H. Bearce and Sawa Omori, “How Do Commercial Institutions Promote Peace?” *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no.6 (November 2005): 674.

⁴ Sheila Page, *Regionalism among Developing Countries* (New York: St. Martin’s University Press, 2000), 62.

literature. This chapter will provide a comprehensive explanation of how democracy, economic interdependence and international organizations can be combined in order to promote peace and stability between states. In addition, a short reference will be made to the two prevailing explanations for the democratic peace theory, namely, the structural or institutional explanation and the cultural or normative explanation. Finally, in this chapter, evidences that support the argument that all the Greek governments regardless of party preferences,⁵ after the Helsinki Summit in 1999, became committed supporters of Turkey's efforts to join the European family and thus tried to apply the fundamental assertions of the democratic peace theory, will be presented.

Chapter IV will analyze the macroeconomic and trade data of the two countries in order to verify whether there is an improvement of the bilateral economic relationship and thus if the two countries fulfill successfully one of the three criteria of the democratic peace theory, namely, advanced/liberal economy with enhanced economic interdependence. The analysis of the two countries bilateral trade data will show that their economic relations remain limited and thus they perform relatively poor in terms of the economic interdependence pillar of the Democratic Peace Theory. Hence, this chapter will conclude that it is highly unlikely that economic relations will become so advanced in any domain as to assume a position of primacy in their bilateral relationship as a whole.

Chapter V will investigate if the democratic pillar of the Democratic Peace Theory contributed to the establishment of peaceful relations between the two countries after 1999. More specifically, in this chapter an evaluation of whether Turkey became a more democratic state through its efforts to access in the EU, will be presented. The data will show that both countries improved their democratic indexes. The important finding is that Turkey, which is the less democratic country of the dyad and thus according to Russett and Oneal the primarily responsible for determining the likelihood of conflict, made important

⁵ From 1999 to 2004, Greece had a government formed by PASOK (the leading Socialist Party in Greece). From 2004 until today, the power is in the hands of New Democracy (center-right party).

steps towards the adoption of liberal democratic norms and rules. Therefore, the conclusion of this chapter is that democracy is the element of the democratic peace theory that plays the most significant role in the promotion of peace and stability between the two countries.

The sixth chapter will examine whether the common participation of Greece and Turkey in the EU will be able to provide a viable solution in the problematic issues that exist between the two countries. In addition, this chapter will provide answers to the following questions. Why did their common participation in NATO fail to produce the virtuous circles that can lead to a resolution of the Greco-Turkish disputes and, consequently, is the EU more capable of resolving these issues? The available evidence will show that until today neither NATO nor the EU is capable of contributing to a peaceful solution of the Greco-Turkish bilateral disputes. The problems that are poisoning the relations of the two countries still exist despite the fact that both countries have common participation in numerous intergovernmental organizations. Thus, the international organization pillar of the Democratic Peace Theory cannot sufficiently explain the peaceful relations that exist between the two countries after 1999.

This thesis will conclude that the Democratic Peace Theory cannot explain the peaceful relations that established after Greece's decision in 1999 to support Turkey's EU vocation. In the period from 1999 until today, Greece and Turkey avoid a major crisis that could bring them close to a military conflict.⁶ Thus, an easy conclusion of this thesis could be that the major finding of the Democratic Peace Theory, namely that democracies do not fight each other, is valid in the case of the Greco-Turkish dyad. However, as Jane Addams believed, "peace is not merely an absence of war."⁷ This is an unpleasant reality especially in the

⁶ The last crisis that almost led the two countries to war was the "Imia crisis" in 1996.

⁷ Jane Addams: American Social Reformer, Peace Activist. Nobel Peace Prize Winner, 1931.

case of Greece and Turkey, and that because it is difficult to claim that a peaceful relation exists when the causes of all the previous crises are still present.

In this point, it is useful to mention that it is widely accepted that Greek–Turkish relations are a complex process with multiple layers that has already been shaped by multiple critical domestic and international factors and actors. However, this thesis will deal only with the influence that EU had in the rapprochement procedure between Greece and Turkey, since EU has become the key reference point for Turkish policy after 1999, and has emerged as an active promoter of conciliation between the two countries.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. THE PRECARIOUS RELATIONSHIP OF GREECE AND TURKEY

A. INTRODUCTION

Even though, after the Helsinki Summit of 1999, a rapprochement policy started by both the governments of Greece and Turkey, up to now many issues continue to cause tension in the two countries' relations. This chapter will provide a brief overview of the main points of friction between Greece and Turkey. More specifically, we can separate the high-politics issues that cause tension between the two countries in two categories. The first category consists of issues that are related with the status quo of the Aegean Sea. The second category deals with the Cyprus issue. The main characteristic of both categories is that they consist of security related problems. Greece considers as a major threat to its security the Turkish claims over the Aegean Sea as well as the fact that Turkey did not hesitate to invade Cyprus back in 1974.

A good knowledge of the problems that have shaped the Greek-Turkish relations during the last five decades will facilitate us in understanding the rationale behind Greece's decision to support Turkey's European aspirations. In addition, it is necessary to be acquainted with what has happened in the past in order to be able to compare it with the present-day situation and judge if the rapprochement policy had beneficial consequences in the two countries' relations.

B. POISONOUS ISSUES IN THE GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

1. Aegean Sea Issues

a. Delimitation of the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf

The dispute concerning the delimitation of the Aegean Sea's continental shelf dates back to 1973, when the Turkish Official Gazette issued a decision with which permission for conducting petroleum research in the Aegean Sea was granted to TPAO (National Petroleum Company of Turkey).

Simultaneously, Turkey issued a map where the limits of its continental shelf were west of Greece's easternmost islands. The main problem was that the area that Turkey was claiming as its continental shelf, "overlapped with the area of the continental shelf claimed by Greece, and in some cases the Turkish awards were in areas where Greece had already granted licenses to foreign companies."⁸ Unfortunately, this ongoing dispute led the two countries, during March of 1987, very close to a military conflict.⁹ Moreover, the delimitation of the Aegean Sea's continental shelf remains an unresolved issue today because of the very different perspective that the two countries have regarding this problem.

From Greece's perspective, the delimitation of the continental shelf is the only legitimate dispute that exists between the two countries in the Aegean Sea, and thus need to be resolved. However, even if both countries have agreed that this issue needs to be resolved, a disagreement exists concerning the means that must be used for the resolution of the dispute. Greece supports the notion that the demarcation of the continental shelf is a purely legal issue and thus must be resolved through the arbitration of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). According to Greek officials, the Court is able to provide a clear and permanent solution to this contentious issue, as it has already done with similar cases in the past.¹⁰ An additional advantage to the arbitration by the International Court of Justice, according to Greece, is that the any decision of the Court will be

⁸ Dimitris Dotas, "The Aegean Dispute and its Implications for the U.S. Policy," Master's thesis, (Naval Postgraduate School, 2000), 10.

⁹ In March 1987, Turkey announced that Seismic 2, an oil exploration ship, would conduct oil research in the Aegean Sea and particularly in the area that was under dispute since 1973. Greece responded with a massive mobilization of its Armed Forces. A further escalation was avoided when Turkey canceled the mission of its survey ship.

¹⁰ 1967 North Sea Continental Shelf, Federal Republic of Germany against Netherlands; 1967 North Sea Continental Shelf, Federal Republic of Germany against Denmark; 1978 Continental Shelf, Tunisia against Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; 1982 Continental Shelf Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against Malta.

final and binding to the parties, and if either fails in its obligation to the judgment, it will be answerable to the United Nations Security Council.¹¹

Turkey, on the other hand, claims that the delimitation of the Aegean Sea's continental shelf is not only a legal issue, but also an old political problem between the two countries. Additionally, the Aegean Sea represents a special case of international law, and thus cannot have similar treatment with previous cases concerning delimitation of the continental shelf between neighboring states.¹² Therefore, Turkey proposes that the problem must be resolved through bilateral negotiations between the two governments. Kemal Baslar resourcefully summarizes the reasons for the reluctance that Turkey is demonstrating towards a solution based on the arbitration of the International Court of Justice.¹³ To begin with, Turkey believes that "the Court's timid attitude in contentious cases is a warning for Turkey that in the Aegean Dispute the ICJ is likely to uphold the present rules of international law and judge in favor of Greece."¹⁴ Furthermore, there is a fear on the Turkish side that "there is no guarantee that the Court will remain always as a court of justice" because the judges can be biased by factors such as "nationality, the interests of the international society or even religion."¹⁵ Finally, another weak point is that "the possible judgment of the Court cannot be prophesied beforehand."¹⁶ Therefore, the predicament for Turkey is that "in cases where there is no established

¹¹ Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, *The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World* (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005), 261.

¹² Turkey supports the view that the Aegean Sea is a semi-enclosed sea and that the Greek islands of the Aegean Sea cannot have their own continental shelf. Therefore, the proper solution is to divide the continental shelf with the demarcation of an imaginary line in the middle of the Aegean. Doing that, both countries will have equal rights in the exploitation of the resources that exist in the Aegean Sea. Additionally, Turkey claims that the above-mentioned equitable solution can be achieved through a bilateral agreement between Greece and Turkey.

¹³ Kemal Baslar, "Two Facets of the Aegean Sea Dispute: de lege lata and de lege ferende," in *Turkey and International Law*, ed. Kemal Baslar (Ankara: Ozen Publications, 2001), 1–39.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 29.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

practice and consistent case law, conferring jurisdiction upon the Court could be of rather irreversible consequences.”¹⁷ It is obvious that the road towards the resolution of this issue will be long and full of convoluted issues.

b. Length of Territorial Waters

Currently, both countries have established in the Aegean Sea a six nautical miles zone of territorial waters.¹⁸ However, the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS-III) of 1982, in article 3, clearly states, “every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.”¹⁹

Greek Parliament ratified UNCLOS-III on May 31, 1995, and from that moment Greece made it clear that it is in its discretion when and where it is going to exercise these rights. On the other hand, Turkey did not become a signatory member of the UNCLOS-III, and therefore, according to Turkish officials, this law does not bind it. Moreover, just few days after the ratification of the UNCLOS-III by the Greek Parliament and more specifically on June 08, 1995, the Turkish Grand National Assembly issued a resolution, which stated that any unilateral extension of Greece’s territorial waters in the Aegean Sea beyond six nautical miles would be equivalent to a cause of war (*casus belli*) for Turkey. Greece from its side, argues that the declaration of a *casus belli* against Greece does not contribute towards the peaceful resolution of the differences that the two countries have, and additionally is a clear violation of international law, since

¹⁷ Kemal Baslar, “Two Facets of the Aegean Sea Dispute: de lege lata and de lege ferende,” in *Turkey and International Law*, ed. Kemal Baslar (Ankara: Ozen Publications, 2001), 30.

¹⁸ Initially, both countries had agreed in 1923, by signing the Lausanne Peace Treaty, to keep their territorial waters within a three nautical mile zone. However, Greece first expanded its territorial waters to six nautical miles in 1936, while Turkey did the same in 1964 and in both cases, no tension was caused between them.

¹⁹ For the complete text of the United Nation Convention on the law of the sea visit http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (accessed August 10, 2009).

Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter prohibits member-states from using or threatening to use violence. Greece's position on the possible expansion of its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles can be summarized in the words of Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis:

Almost 160 countries have ratified the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea. One of the few that have not – i.e., the U.S. – recently declared its willingness to do so. This comes as no surprise, given that UNCLOS codified existing customary law. It put into paper existing practice. This is the trend internationally and the only rational and legal framework within which to converge our differing views.²⁰

Turkey's main fear is that, if Greece decides to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 nautical miles, then automatically the Aegean Sea will become a Greek lake and thus access of Turkey's commercial ships to the high seas from Turkish ports will be completely cut off. The following table shows that if Greece decides to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles then there will be an enormous increase of the Greek territorial sea, a minor increase of Turkish territorial sea and a huge decrease of high seas.

Extent of territorial waters	Greek territorial sea (percentage of the Aegean)	Turkish territorial sea (percentage of the Aegean)	High seas (percentage of the Aegean)
6 nautical miles (present situation)	43.68%	7.47%	48.85%
12 nautical miles (if Greece decides to increase its territorial waters).	71.53%	8.76%	19.71%

Table 1. Distribution of the Aegean Sea Territorial Waters²¹

²⁰ Interview of Greek Foreign Minister Bakoyannis to Hurriyet Daily News, Athens, 1 August, 2009. The entire interview can be read at http://www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/010809_P1845.htm (accessed August 24, 2009).

²¹ Table by the author, data derived from Kemal Baslar, "Two Facets of the Aegean Sea Dispute: de lege lata and de lege ferende," in *Turkey and International Law*, ed. Kemal Baslar (Ankara: Ozen Publications, 2001), 1–39.

From its side, Greece is declaring that even if a unilateral extension of its territorial waters is decided, the free movement of commercial ships inside the Aegean will not be affected since the right of the “transit passage”²² will also be implemented, and therefore there is no reason to discuss this issue. Moreover, Greece is constantly reminding Turkey that it has already extended its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in the rest of the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea since 1964.

The issues of the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf and of the territorial waters are two interrelated issues. More specifically, if the two countries want to find a durable solution for the delimitation of the continental shelf, first they must resolve the dispute over the territorial waters. An unambiguous demarcation of the continental shelf in the Aegean demands a clear-cut determination of both countries’ territorial sea. Having solved this issue, the two countries will have a rigid base on which they can resolve the common accepted dispute of the delimitation of the continental shelf.

c. “Grey Zones” in the Aegean Sea

The Aegean Sea has over 3,100 islands, islets, and atolls. A careful look at a navigational map of the region reveals that, with the exception of Tenedos, Imvros, Lagousai and 62 rocks located in close proximity with the Anatolian coast, the rest of the Aegean Sea’s islands are under Greek sovereignty. The most recent alteration of the status quo in the Aegean was made after the end of World War II with the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty of February 10, 1947, between the Allies and Italy. According to Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, the Dodecanese islands were ceded to Greece in full sovereignty.²³

²² According to articles 37 through 44 of the UNCLOS-III, the regime of “transit passage” is established, which means that all commercial ships and warships, as well as aircraft, have the right of passage through the territorial sea of the coastal state without its permission.

²³ Haralambos Athanasopoulos, *Greece, Turkey and the Aegean Sea: a Case Study in International Law* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2001), 76.

No one could imagine that after almost five decades, and more specifically in January 1996, the “Imia crisis”²⁴ would lead Greece and Turkey very close to a full-scale armed conflict. After the end of this crisis, the “grey-zones” theory came to the surface. According to this theory, Turkey supports that there is no legally determined status for a large number of Aegean islands and islets. Therefore, the two countries must initiate an overall negotiation in order to determine clearly and permanently the status of these islands. Turkey’s main argument is that the islands, which are not mentioned by their names in the Treaties that ceded them to Greece, cannot be considered under Greek sovereignty. Greece counter argues that the international legal framework, which formulated the existent status-quo in the area, is indisputable. More specifically, the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) and Paris Peace Treaty (1947) leave no question concerning the status-quo of the islands that Turkey does not recognize as Greek territory. Greece believes that Turkey is trying to continue raising “add-on issues”²⁵ with the purpose of pressuring Greece towards a general negotiation of the Aegean Sea’s status-quo in order to alter the current territorial status of the region, which is completely unfavorable to Turkey’s interests.

²⁴ On December 29, 1995, Turkey sent a verbal message to the Greek Embassy in Ankara claiming that the Imia islets are under Turkish sovereignty. After a few days, Greece responded, also with a verbal message, stating that Turkey’s allegations are unacceptable and that according to the already existent international legal framework, the Imia islets belong to Greece. Two weeks after the above-mentioned exchange, a journalist of the Turkish newspaper *Hurriyet* landed in a civilian helicopter on one of the two Imia islets, lowered the Hellenic flag and raised the Turkish flag. The next day a warship of the Hellenic Navy approached the islet and raised again the Hellenic flag. In response, Turkey sent a second verbal message, repeating its initial claims on the two islets and requesting negotiations in order to determine clearly the status of hundreds of Aegean islands, which always, according to Turkey’s assertions, had a legally undetermined status. Unfortunately, this verbal message was the drop that overflowed the glass of water. During the next few days, the Armed Forces of both countries came very close to a full-scale conflict. Furthermore, tension increased dramatically when Hellenic Navy Special Forces landed on the larger of the two Imia islets in order to guard the Hellenic flag, and few hours later Turkish commandos landed on the second islet. U.S. intervention demanding the withdrawal of both countries’ forces from the area and a return to the *status quo ante* caused a further escalation of the conflict to be avoided.

²⁵ Evangelos Raftopoulos, “The Crisis over the Imia Rocks and the Aegean Sea Regime: International Law as a Language of Common Interest,” *The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law* 12, no.4 (November 1997): 427–46.

d. Greek Air Space

Similar with the above-mentioned problematic issues that exist in the Greco-Turkish relations, the problem of the Greek National Airspace emerged after the 1974 Turkish invasion in Cyprus. From 1931, Greece had established a 10-nautical-mile airspace²⁶ and at the same time, it officially informed all the responsible international organizations. At that time, no country, including Turkey, raised any objection concerning the paradox phenomenon of a country having a 3 nautical miles of territorial waters (extended to six nautical miles in 1936) and 10 nautical miles of national air space. Furthermore, in the first conference of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1952, in which both Greece and Turkey participated, there was a unanimous vote concerning the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR). More specifically the decision dictated, “except for a narrow strip of national airspace along the Turkish coast, responsibility for Aegean air space should fall to the Athens FIR.”²⁷

After the Cyprus crisis of 1974 and until today, Turkey does not recognize Greece’s jurisdiction over the entire 10-nautical-mile air space zone, but only up to six nautical miles. Therefore, it does not submit flight plans to Greece for its military aircrafts that are flying in the Aegean Sea. Greece considers this action as violation of the International Air Traffic Rules. This dispute results, in the majority of the incidents and usually in a daily basis, in dangerous dogfights between Greek and Turkish fighter jets.²⁸

Quoting the words of a Greek academic is the best way to summarize the current situation concerning all of the above-mentioned Aegean Sea’s issues. “Currently, there is not even agreement over what the ‘Aegean

²⁶ Presidential Decree of 18 September 1831 published in the Governmental Gazette, Paper Sheet A’ 325/1931).

²⁷ Dotas, “The Aegean Dispute,” 15.

²⁸ Unfortunately, sometimes these dogfights end up very badly. For example, read, “A Dangerous Dogfight,” at <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,119712,00.html> (accessed August 20, 2009) concerning the most recent lethal collision between a Hellenic and a Turkish F-16 fighter jet during a dogfight over the Greek island of Karpathos, located in the Eastern part of the Aegean Sea.

dispute' consist of, with Turkey insisting that there is a list of unresolved issues to address, and Greece saying there is only one, the delineation of the continental shelf."²⁹

2. The Cyprus Issue

Probably one of the most serious problems between the two countries is the 1974 Turkish invasion and occupation of approximately one third of the Republic of Cyprus' territory until the present day. Why is Greece so upset about this event since Greece and Cyprus are two separate, independent states? The answer is that Greece and Cyprus are indeed two different states, but they are part of the same nation (Hellenic nation), their citizens have the same language, the same religion (the vast majority are Christian Orthodox), the same national anthem, and even the same traditions. In addition, during the past Greek Cypriots made efforts to achieve unification with Greece but with unfortunate results. Finally, many people in Greece feel that their country is one of the main responsible for the tragedy of the Greek-Cypriots. Therefore, there is a widespread desire throughout the Greek population and subsequently in the Greek political leadership, to assist with all the available means the efforts that the Republic of Cyprus is making towards the resolution of this issue. The importance of this issue for the Greeks and the Greek-Cypriots is made very clear by the words of the current Prime Minister of Greece, Konstantinos Karamanlis:

The settlement of the Cyprus problem is a high priority for Greece and an essential component to long-lasting improvement in Greek-Turkish relations. After all, the perception of a military threat from Turkey has dominated Greek public debate and security planning since the 1974 Cyprus crisis. In a post-Cold War world that has recently shown such a keen interest in opposing the displacement of peoples (a policy supported by Greece during NATO's

²⁹ Constantine Papadopoulos, "Economic Cooperation: Guarantor of Détente or Hostage to Politics," in *the Long Shadow of Europe: Greeks and Turks in the Era of Post nationalism*, ed. Othon Anastasakis, Kalypso Aude Nicolaidis and Kerem Oktem (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 312.

intervention in Yugoslavia), the military occupation currently in place in the Northern part of Cyprus needs a viable resolution. Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the last dividing wall in Europe still stands in Cyprus.³⁰

After Cyprus' independence from Britain in 1960, the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities began to behave aggressively towards each other. The hostility between the two communities transformed into an open conflict and finally, in 1974, the Greek Junta planned and executed a coup against the legal government of Cyprus with the justification that this was the only way for Greece and Cyprus to achieve the long desired "Union." A few days later, Turkey invaded the island in order to guarantee the safety of the Turkish-Cypriot community. From that time until now, there have been numerous unsuccessful efforts to find a viable solution to the Cyprus issue. Cyprus is still divided, and the part of the island that is occupied by Turkish Armed Forces has not been recognized officially as an independent state by any country; thus, it has remained isolated. Moreover, Turkey has not recognized Cyprus despite the fact that since 2004, Cyprus has been a permanent member of the EU and Turkey is a candidate country for EU.³¹

³⁰ Konstantinos Karamanlis, "Greece: The E.U's Anchor of Stability in a Troubled Region," *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no.2 (Spring 2000): 7–11.

³¹ The parallel history of Greece, Cyprus and Turkey in the context of the EU will be analyzed in the subsequent section of this thesis.

III. DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

A. THE KANTIAN APPROACH

Immanuel Kant with his essay “Perpetual Peace”³² was the first person to link the ideal of democracy with the preservation of world peace. According to Kant, there are three main elements of a peaceful coexistence between republics. Each element will be briefly analyzed in the following sections.

1. Democracy and Public Opinion

Public opinion plays an important role in the planning and application of one state’s foreign policy. In particular, it can act as a counterforce against any kind of violent behavior or antagonism. As Kant stated, “if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared, nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war.”³³

Many academics have supported Kant’s views by arguing that the public opinion can indeed affect the foreign policy of a democratic state.³⁴ Of course, the degree of influence that the public opinion has varies, and it is analogous to each democracy’s political and constitutional procedures.³⁵ If we especially examine the case of dyadic relations, then it is possible that the greater the public’s opinion influence, the bigger the danger of hindering cooperation between states.³⁶ That happens because usually in democratic states the

³² Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politic, History, and Morals* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983).

³³ *Ibid.*, 12.

³⁴ Bruce Russett, *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).

³⁵ Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,” *World Politics* 43, (1991): 479–512.

³⁶ Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization* 42, (1988): 427–60.

government must first precede with the ratification of its policies on a domestic level, then move forward and start negotiating on the international level.

2. International Trade

The second vital element of the democratic peace theory always, according to Kant, can be summarized in his following statement: “A peaceful traffic among nations was established, and thus understanding, conventions, and peaceable relations were established among the most distant people.”³⁷ In the majority of the cases, international commerce entails great profits for democratic states, which can be translated into increased levels of prosperity for the citizens of these states. Consequently, the majority of the democratic states “are self-deterred from fighting wars against one another because of the prospective losses that could result from disrupted trade.”³⁸ Many researchers verify Kant’s argument that trade is a major contributor to peaceful relations and thus states with strong commercial ties are less likely to start a war.³⁹ Naturally, there are also some objections to the previous argument. More specifically, many scholars do not deny the peaceful aspects of trade; however, they support the view that economic interdependence can lead to conflictual situations as well.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, since the majority of the states in the international system choose their trade partners based on the element of mutual trust, and always having in mind the security implications involved in such activities, major academics support a general conclusion. This conclusion states that even if commercial ties

³⁷ Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 28.

³⁸ Steve Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise,” *Mershon International Studies Review* 41, no.1 (May 1997), 75.

³⁹ Solomon W. Polachek, “Conflict and Trade,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24, no.2 (1980): 55–78; William K. Domke, *War and Changing Global System* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); William J. Nixon and Bruce E. Moon, “Political Similarity and American Foreign Trade Patterns,” *Political Research Quarterly* 46, no.3 (1993): 5–25; Joanne Gowa, *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Edward D. Mansfield, *Power, Trade and War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

⁴⁰ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Complex Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977); Michael S. De Vries, “Interdependence, Cooperation and Conflict: An Empirical Analysis,” *Journal of Peace Research* 27, (1990): 429–44.

are not absolutely certain that they can lead to peace, democratic countries have the tendency to establish close trade relations with each other and furthermore they have more peaceful relations among them.⁴¹

3. Establishment of a Peaceful Confederation

The establishment of a peaceful confederation between the already existent democratic states will avert them from going to war. This kind of association will help towards the consolidation of internationally shared norms and values, which in turn will contribute, to the strengthening of peaceful procedures for the resolution of interstate problematic issues. According again to Kant, a peaceful confederation would “eventually include all nations and thus lead to perpetual peace.”⁴² Steve Chan states the causal mechanism behind this argument briefly, “as democracies increase in number, a general strategy for conditional cooperation should become more attractive for all states. The norms guiding democracies’ interactions could evolve into the dominant pattern in international relations.”⁴³ Following the same logic, Daniel Deudney suggested that, “a world dominated by liberal states affords the remaining illiberal states both a need and an opportunity to liberalize.”⁴⁴

It is clear that Greece’s policy of rapprochement towards Turkey after 1999 was based on these three elements. The political leaders of Greece realized, especially after the Imia crisis of 1996 where the two countries reached the brink of war, that the only way to gain public support is to initiate a policy of appeasement towards Turkey. It is evident that citizens are not willing to pay the grave consequences of a military conflict; on the other hand, the deeper

⁴¹ John R. Oneal, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce M. Russett, “The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950–1985,” *Journal of Peace Research* 33, (1996): 11–28; Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, “Power Politics and International Trade,” *American Political Science Review* 87, (1993): 408–20.

⁴² Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 117.

⁴³ Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace,” 77.

⁴⁴ Daniel Deudney, “The International Sources of Soviet Change,” *International Security* 16, no.3 (1991), 97.

integration of Greece in the European Union can offer only advantages for the Greek population. Therefore, it was evident that the majority of the Greek population supported the decision of the government to back Turkey's European aspirations. Consequently, during the 2004 election, when a new government was elected, the conservative party of "New Democracy" took the power from the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK), but the policy of rapprochement towards Turkey remained the same.

Furthermore, Greece, by its decision to support Turkey's efforts for accession in the EU, opened the road towards the Custom Union of Turkey with the EU. In this way, Greece tried to enhance its bilateral economic relations with its neighboring state in order to increase the costs of a future conflict. Finally, the negotiations between the EU and Turkey concerning the entrance of the latter in the European family will certainly lead Turkey to a further democratization of its political system. This means that Turkey must adopt a less aggressive behavior towards its neighboring states and, in general, will have to adopt norms, values and patterns of behavior that will help towards the peaceful resolution of conflictual issues.

B. EXPLANATIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

The following section contains a short analysis of the efforts that various prominent academics made in order to interpret the democratic peace theory.

1. The Institutional or Structural Explanation

The institutional or structural explanation was the research subject of many contemporary academics.⁴⁵ Their main argument is that "the institutional

⁴⁵ Melvin Small and David J. Singer, "The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1, no.4 (1976): 50–69; Rudolph J. Rummel, "Libertarian and International Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, (1983): 27–71; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986," *American Political Science Review* 87, (1993): 624–38; John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19, no.2 (1994): 87–125; James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88, (1994): 577–92.

arrangements of a democracy limit the autonomy and discretion of leaders to launch war.”⁴⁶ According to Maoz and Russett, this argument is based on the following two assumptions:

1) International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support to their policies. Such support must be mobilized from those groups that provide the leadership the kind of legitimacy that is required for international action.

2) Shortcuts to political mobilization of relevant political support can be accomplished only in situations that can be appropriately described as emergencies.⁴⁷

Consequently, as Bueno de Mesquita suggests, “democracies are more deliberate in their decision making than autocracies because their procedures preclude unilateral action by leaders.”⁴⁸ The previous statement implies that in democratic states where the decision-making procedures are complex and they demand the support of the vast majority of the population, the political leaders are aware that their decision to wage war will entail a devastating political cost. The only exception to this rule are cases “wherein war seems a necessity or when the war aims are seen as justifying the mobilization costs.”⁴⁹ However, Maoz and Russett’s argument implies that a democratic state will not be hostile against any kind of regime, either democratic or authoritarian. This is against the historical record that on the contrary proves that democracies do not wage war against each other, but in many cases engage in wars with authoritarian states.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace,” 77.

⁴⁷ Maoz and Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes,” 626.

⁴⁸ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,” *The American Political Science Review* 93, no.4 (December 1999), 792.

⁴⁹ Maoz and Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes,” 626.

⁵⁰ John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985,” *International Studies Quarterly* 41, (June 1997): 267–93.

Summarizing the structural/institutional explanation, we conclude that democratic political leaders will always be supportive of a peaceful resolution of problems related with the foreign policy and national interests of their country, just because the alternative option will bear heavier costs on them.⁵¹ “All of this comes from the free movement of information in liberal democracies, the existence of opposition groups, and the accountability of national leaders, which make democracy transparent to outsiders.”⁵²

2. The Normative or Cultural Explanation

The main argument of the normative/cultural school of thought is that all democracies “externalize their domestic political norms of tolerance and compromise in their foreign relations, thus making war with others like them unlikely.”⁵³ Maoz and Russett add two basic assumptions to this argument,

- 1) States, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and institutions.
- 2) The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than by the former.⁵⁴

More specifically, the first assumption suggests that fundamental democratic principles, one of which is the resolution of political differences in the domestic level without the use of violence, can be used to solve conflictual issues in the international level as well. In a democracy, domestic political dispute does not have the form of a zero-sum game where the winner takes it all and the loser is doomed to disappear from the state’s political picture. On the contrary, in a

⁵¹ The vast majority of the academics that have analyzed the issue of democratic peace assume that all political leaders, either of a liberal or authoritarian regime, are motivated by their strong desire to remain in power.

⁵² Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: Norton & Company, 2001), 54.

⁵³ Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace,” 77.

⁵⁴ Maoz and Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes,” 625.

situation like the previous one, usually prevails “an atmosphere of live and let live that results in a fundamental sense of stability at the personal, communal, and national level.”⁵⁵ As Morgan and Campell successfully emphasize, “the key feature of democracy is government by the people, and the people, who must bear the costs of war, are usually unwilling to fight.”⁵⁶

The second assumption deals with the anarchical structure of the international system and the impediments that it imposes to the propagation of democratic norms. One of the main characteristics of the anarchical international system is that it is a self-help system. Every state has a primary target, which is its survival. Only its own forces can guarantee the maintenance of a state’s sovereignty. Therefore, if a democratic state has to choose between a democratic behavior that will possibly endanger its national interests or its sovereignty and an undemocratic behavior that will enhance its sense of security, then it is very likely to choose the application of nondemocratic norms in order to satisfy its security dilemma. It is empirically observed that this shift occurs when a democracy is in conflict with an authoritarian rival. In the case of two democracies facing each other in conflictual issues, it is almost certain that their interaction will be characterized by the application of the democratic norms discussed earlier. This reciprocal behavior will prevent the escalation of a small crisis to a full-scale conflict and will lead to a peaceful settlement, either by compromise or by third-party arbitration.⁵⁷

Naturally, the cultural/normative explanation has some deficiencies. In one of his articles, Harvey Starr questioned whether democracies generally treat each other better. His answer was that “they do not, even though they always

⁵⁵ Maoz and Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes,” 625.

⁵⁶ Clifton T. Morgan, and Sally Howard Campbell, “Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, (June 1991), 201.

⁵⁷ William J. Dixon, “Democracy and the Management of International Conflict,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, (1993): 42–68.

manage to avoid escalating their disputes to outright war.”⁵⁸ However, Joanne Gowa articulated the most insightful criticism, supporting the view that it is very difficult to understand if the behavior of a state is based on the application of democratic norms or on the sponsoring and promotion of their national interests.⁵⁹ If the latter is true, then democracies are behaving according to the principles of the realist theory of international relations, and thus they are no different from nondemocratic states. Nevertheless, there is not much evidence in support of this criticism. Academics that attempted to establish a relation between state’s common interests (for example through the formation of alliances) and the possibility of interstate violence, failed to do so.⁶⁰

Finally, many academics tried to compare the two explanations, with the vast majority of them concluding that the cultural/normative explanation of democratic peace is more credible than the structural/institutional. In more detail, Maoz and Russett draw the conclusion that “the relationship between institutional constrains and measure of dispute and war occurrence is not as robust as the relationship between measures of democratic norms and the dependent variables.”⁶¹ Furthermore, Morgan and Campell confirm the previous argument by stating that, “...structural constrains on chief decision makers are not important determinants of the probability that disputes escalate to war.”⁶²

3. The Rationalist Explanation

The main question that arises from the previous two sections is whether there is a method of combining the two explanations in order to generate a single

⁵⁸ Harvey Starr, “Why Don’t Democracies Fight One Another? Evaluating the Theory-Finding Research Loop,” *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 14, no.4 (1992), 48.

⁵⁹ Joanne Gowa, “Democratic States and International Disputes,” *International Organization* 49, (1995): 511–22.

⁶⁰ David L. Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth, “Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918–1988,” *American Political Science Review* 90, (1996): 512–33.

⁶¹ Maoz and Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes,” 636.

⁶² Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace,” 77.

and sound justification of the democratic peace theory. It is true that many prominent academics have examined the possibility of combining the principle assumptions of the debated explanations.⁶³ Steve Chan, in one of his articles, named this methodology the “rationalist approach.” He supports the view that the rationalist approach emphasizes “on [sic] elite perception deliberate calculation, cross-national signaling, and expected- utility formulation.”⁶⁴ Thus, the motivations behind a democratic leader’s decision play a very important role in the formulation of the democratic peace puzzle. For example, if a democratic leader decides to initiate a conflict with a non-democratic state, then it is possible that his fellow citizens will support his decision (the so-called “rally around the flag syndrome”). However, if the same leader decides to attack a democratic state, then it is very likely that he will not have support from the citizens. In fact, the people will probably conceive his actions as a sign of political catastrophe.⁶⁵ Therefore, one of the advantages of the rationalist approach is that it gives us “a powerful basis for understanding why democracies are peaceful toward each other but not toward non-democracies.”⁶⁶

The current thesis will refer only to the latest work that is using the rationalist approach. Russett and Oneal, in their book *Triangulating Peace*, clearly suggest that “the two explanations are really complementary: culture influences the creation and evolution of political institutions, and institutions shape culture,”⁶⁷ and they conclude that, “the two approaches can be reconciled to show how they affect the opportunity and willingness of decision makers to

⁶³ James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” *International Organization* 49, (1995): 379–414; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999.

⁶⁴ Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace,” 79.

⁶⁵ Alex Mintz, and Nehemia Geva, “Why Don’t Democracies Fight Each Other? An Experimental Assessment of the ‘Political Incentive’ Explanation,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, (1995): 484–503.

⁶⁶ Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace,” 80.

⁶⁷ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 53.

choose between conflict and cooperation.”⁶⁸ Consequently, Russett and Oneal, following the “rationalist approach,” argued that, “countries that fulfill successfully and durably three interrelated criteria, namely consolidated democracy, advanced/liberal economy with economic interdependence, and joint membership in regional organizations, simply do not fight wars with each other.”⁶⁹

The same approach will also be used to test if the democratic peace theory can be applied to the Greco-Turkish dyad. More specifically, this thesis will follow Russett and Oneal’s steps in order to examine if the rapprochement policy, which initiated in 1999 after the Helsinki Summit, managed to strengthen the economic ties between the two countries. Moreover, if Turkey, through its efforts to fulfill the criteria for accession to the EU, became more democratic, and finally if the possibilities of a conflict between Greece and Turkey have been reduced because of their common participation in international organizations (for the purposes of this thesis, the EU and NATO).

C. THE RATIONALE BEHIND GREECE’S RAPPROCHEMENT POLICY

In this section, a short analysis of the reasons that exist behind Greece’s decision to support Turkey’s EU bid will be provided. By explaining the rationale behind Greece’s rapprochement policy, it will become evident that the political leaders in Greece based their new policy, in a large extent, on the principles of the Democratic Peace Theory.

The major turning point in Greece’s policy in general, and especially with regard to the European future of Turkey, was the “Imia crisis” during 1996.⁷⁰ This

⁶⁸ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 54.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 87.

⁷⁰ For a chronology of the events that led to the Imia crisis read, Stelios Arapoglou, *Dispute in the Aegean Sea, the Imia/Kardak Crisis* (Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, 2002). Also, for the two countries view of the Imia crisis according to the international law read, Haralambos Athanasopoulos, *Greece, Turkey, and the Aegean Sea: a Case Study in International Law* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2001); Deniz Bolukbasi, *The Aegean Disputes, a Unique Case in International Law* (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2004).

crisis nearly caused a war between the two countries, but also contributed significantly to Greece's change of stance on several issues. The "Imia crisis" proved clearly and beyond any doubt that Turkey's foreign policy, followed by continuous provocations, mainly in Aegean air space and territorial waters, could easily get out of hand with unpleasant results for both countries. During that period, and after the first shock of the Imia crisis, the new elected socialist government of Konstantinos Simitis decided to initiate a tension-reducing policy towards Turkey. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this change of stance towards Turkey was facilitated by the creation of sentiments of solidarity and sympathy between the citizens of the two countries due to the catastrophic earthquakes that hit both countries during the summer of 1999. Everyone in Greece agreed that the maintenance of a hostile atmosphere, or even worse, the outbreak of a war with Turkey, would result in a serious decline in Greece's economy (reduction of gains from tourism, domestic and foreign investments, trade, etc.). Furthermore, it would be a big obstacle to Greece's efforts for deeper integration in the EU, namely, Greece policymakers' efforts for accession to the European Monetary Union.

At this point, it must be mentioned that Greece is a clearly democratic *status quo* country, thus it does not have any territorial or other type of claims towards its neighboring states with the purpose of changing the balance of power in its region. It is very satisfied with the regional and international *status quo* and is not motivated to generate disputes that would probably escalate to a conflict. Thus, Greece understood that the only way to solve the long-term problems that it continued to have with Turkey was to help Turkey towards further democratization by supporting its efforts for accession in the EU. As Bennett argues, countries that face enduring disputes have more possibilities of resolving those disputes during a period in which both countries happen to be democratic.⁷¹ Moreover, democracies tend to resolve their differences either

⁷¹ Scott Bennett, "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1985," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 4 (1998): 1200-32.

through mutual concession or by using third parties for arbitration.⁷² Therefore, the range of legitimate reasons to use force is greatly restricted between democracies. In our case, and as mentioned in Chapter II, Greece preferred to take advantage of Turkey's desire to join the EU, and tried to transfer the disputes that had with Turkey to the EU level.

For this reason, the Greek government applied the so-called "Simitis doctrine," which was a perceptible synthesis of "international law, international ethics, solidarity with like-minded international actors, and reliance on appropriate international organizations, together with a simultaneous commitment to a strong Greece (economically, politically and diplomatically) and to rational, that is, moderate deterrence."⁷³ In other words, Greece maintained its position that the only Aegean issue demanding resolution is the delimitation of the continental shelf, and it insisted on its proposition to negotiate this issue by submitting it to the International Court of Justice. In addition, Greece is still supporting that the rest of the Turkish claims are not acceptable because they all involve non-negotiable issues of sovereignty.

On the other hand, right after the Helsinki Summit Greek, political leaders clearly expressed their support towards Turkey's efforts for accession in the EU. The new element of Greece's policy and the main reason for the shift in its stance toward Turkey was the fact that Greek politicians decided to see the foreign relations of Greece from a more liberal perspective. A careful reading of the "Simitis doctrine" definition identifies the main axes of Greece's policy, which has many common elements with the Democratic Peace Theory as it is expressed by Russett and Oneal in their book *Triangulating Peace*.

⁷² Michael Mousseau, "Democracy and Compromise in Militarized Interstate Conflicts 1816-1992," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no.2 (1998): 210–30.

⁷³ Costas Melakopides, "Implications of the Accession of Cyprus to the European Union for Greek-Turkish and Euro-Turkish Relations," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, (Winter 2006):73–101.

More specifically, after the end of the Helsinki Summit of 1999, in which Turkey became a candidate state for the EU with the support of Greece, prominent Greek politicians made several statements that show clearly the embracement and application of the Democratic Peace principles. For example, George Papandreou, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time,⁷⁴ in one of his articles clearly stated that,

With the harrowing war in Kosovo still fresh in our memories, the Greek people are critically aware of the importance of good neighborly relations. We believe that our neighbor's strength is our strength. To exclude a country from the full benefits of international society is a sure path to the kind of crises we have faced for too long in Southeast Europe.⁷⁵

With the previous statement, Mr. Papandreou showed that Greece's policy of rapprochement towards Turkey was based on the belief that only through the common participation in international institutions (in our case the EU) could peaceful relations between neighboring states effectively be promoted.

Moreover, in the same article Mr. Papandreou emphasized the fact that, "Greece is committed to embracing all nations which strive for democracy within their frontiers, and peaceful cooperation beyond them, in the European family."⁷⁶ Here it is clear that Greece's desire was the further consolidation of democratic norms in Turkey through the requirements that the EU has for candidate members. Again, we can observe a clear link with the Democratic Peace Theory, since according to Russett and Oneal, in a dyad between a democratic (Greece) and a less democratic state (Turkey), if we manage to make the less democratic state more democratic then the probability that the two states will involve in a

⁷⁴ As this thesis was still in process and particularly on October 4, 2009, national elections took place in Greece and Mr. Papandreou became the Prime Minister when his party (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party) won the elections over the Conservative Party of New Democracy.

⁷⁵ George Papandreou, "Greece Wants Turkey to Make the Grade," *The New York Times*, December 10, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/10/opinion/10iht-edgeorge.2.t.html> (accessed October 1, 2009).

⁷⁶ Ibid.

military conflict is drops significantly.⁷⁷ According to the authors of *Triangulating Peace*, “the higher the level of democracy a state achieves, the more peaceful that state is likely to be. Transitions in themselves do not appear dangerous. It is important, however, that a transition become consolidated at a high level of stable, institutionalized democracy.”⁷⁸ Therefore, Greece as a *status-quo* country that seeks peaceful coexistence with its neighboring states realized that the only way Turkey could become more democratic was by trying to adopt the *acquis communautaire* and fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, as well as the additional criteria concerning its relations with Greece and Cyprus.

Greece’s policy of rapprochement towards Turkey did not change when the new conservative government of Greece assumed its duties after the elections of 2004. The new Prime Minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis, leader of the New Democracy Conservative Party, moved in the same direction as the previous Socialist government concerning the efforts of Turkey to join the EU. On May 7, 2004, the Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan, became the first Turkish leader to visit Greece in sixteen years. The statements of the two leaders after their meeting in Athens are indications of the positive climate that existed between the two countries. In detail, Mr. Karamanlis stated that, “I confirmed the support of the Greek government and me personally for Turkey’s course towards Europe and Mr. Erdogan’s reform program.”⁷⁹ On the same spirit, Mr. Erdogan stated that, “It is time to look ahead to new horizons. We have to turn to the future and let the events of the past remain in the past. Peace and love is [sic] deep in the hearts of our two peoples.”⁸⁰ Mr. Erdogan’s visit to Athens is additional evidence that the two countries were determined to reduce the dangerous tension that existed in their bilateral relations before 1999. As Ker-

⁷⁷ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 109.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 122.

⁷⁹ Helena Smith, “Greece to Back Turkey’s EU Bid,” *The Guardian*, May 8, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/may/08/turkey.eu> (accessed October 1, 2009).

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

Lindsay, the director of a think-tank located in Cyprus, stated, "Greece has realized, above all, that a European Turkey will be a less threatening Turkey."⁸¹

Consequently, Greece followed the same approach regarding its relations with Turkey because among the majority of Greek politicians there was a wide consensus that the EU could produce the desirable virtuous circles that for years Greece sought.⁸² Helpful to that direction was the fact that, "The European experience of the late twentieth century shows that it is possible to establish virtuous circles that solidify peaceful relations even while states retain many of their traditional Westphalian characteristics."⁸³ At the time that Greece decided to support the efforts of Turkey for accession to the EU, Turkey was still (and maybe still is) a state with many Westphalian characteristics. Nevertheless, Greece was convinced that the most effective virtuous circles between the two countries could only be created through the accession of Turkey in the EU. In particular, Greek policy was inspired by visionary leaders like Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer, and Robert Schuman, who right after the ending of World War II "consciously decided to break the old pattern of hostility and war by creating a set of virtuous circles that would both directly and indirectly promote peaceful relations."⁸⁴

Furthermore, in Greece there was a widespread belief that its supportive stance could cause a "spillover" effect in the relations between the two countries.⁸⁵ Therefore, Greece was hoping that its policy would improve all the levels of Greek-Turkish relations, including the more important level of economic

⁸¹ Helena Smith, "Greece to Back Turkey's EU Bid," *The Guardian*, May 8, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/may/08/turkey.eu> (accessed October 1, 2009).

⁸² According to Russett and R.Oneal, virtuous circles in world politics are peaceful interactions that are not seen as threatening but rather as mutually beneficial. These benefits can increase over time and expand in scope.

⁸³ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 28.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁸⁵ Institutions like the EU, whose existence serves and fulfills certain functions or needs, in many cases create the conditions for further cooperation in related areas of social life.

relations. The existence of additional possibilities for economic gains in both countries through continuous and enhanced interaction could influence in a very positive way their sensitive relations. It is the classical “wealth makes peace” argument, and as Russett argues, “for politically stable, economically advanced, and rapidly growing countries the cost/benefit ratio of any war fought on or near their home territories with another advanced state looks extraordinarily unpromising.”⁸⁶ Therefore, it is evident that Greece’s main scope was to support Turkey in entering not only the EU, but also the “Kantian triangle of peace.”⁸⁷ Democracy, international organizations and economic interdependence are located on the three corners and peace is located on the center of the Kantian triangle. Greece’s main purpose is to establish its position, along with Turkey, in the center of this triangle. According to Greek politicians, one way to achieve this goal is to support the European dream of Turkey.

⁸⁶ Russett, *Controlling the Sword*, 28.

⁸⁷ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 35.

IV. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND GRECO-TURKISH RELATIONS

This chapter will examine the economic relations between Turkey and Greece after the beginning of the rapprochement policy in 1999, and will try to evaluate them in order to conclude if the economic interdependence leg of the Democratic Peace Theory can explain the peaceful coexistence of the two countries. Specifically, this chapter will try to test one of the three hypotheses of the Democratic Peace Theory, namely, that “the probability two states will become embroiled in conflict is inversely related to the degree to which they are economically interdependent.”⁸⁸

A. THE ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE HYPOTHESIS AS AN ELEMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

Numerous research focused on the relation between economic interdependence and peace found a noteworthy inverse relationship between the interdependence of commerce or the common membership in commercial institutions and the possibility for the initiation of a military conflict.⁸⁹ Furthermore, Russett and Oneal concluded that, “countries that are interdependent bilaterally or economically open to the global economy, whether democratic or not, have an important basis for pacific relations and conflict resolution.”⁹⁰ Hence, it is widely accepted that “the spirit of commerce creates incentives for states to promote peace and to try to avert war.”⁹¹

⁸⁸ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 139.

⁸⁹ Edward D. Mansfield, Jon C. Pevehouse, and David H. Bearce, “Preferential Trading Arrangements and Military Disputes,” *Security Studies* 9, no.1 (2000): 477–513; Edward D. Mansfield, and Jon C. Pevehouse, “Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict,” *International Organization* 54, no.4 (2000): 775–808.

⁹⁰ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 155.

⁹¹ Michael W. Doyle, “Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace,” *The American Political Science Review*, 99, no.3 (August 2005): 463–466.

However, the view can be supported that the absence of military conflict exists not because of the strong commercial relations between states, but rather because it is easier to establish closer economic relations with states that desire peace. Thus, there is a question if this theoretically logical reverse causal argument is valid. According to the findings of Mansfield and Pevehouse, “military disputes generally do not have a strong short-term influence on whether states belong to the same economic arrangement.”⁹² Likewise, Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff proved that there is no causal mechanism between military conflicts and common participation in commercial institutions or trade agreements.⁹³ All of the above-mentioned studies point to the fact that “the stronger causal relationship runs from commercial institutions to peace, even if it also runs weakly in the other direction.”⁹⁴

The main question that arises is how economic interdependence promotes peace. In order to answer this question, a short reference must first be made to the potential causes of military conflict. To do that, a brief review of James D. Fearon’s work will be presented.⁹⁵ By using a rationalist approach, Fearon tried to explain how a bargaining failure between states could lead them to a military conflict. He concluded that there are the three main reasons that lead states to violence. First, if one of the states believes that a military conflict will not be costly for it, then it does not have any reason to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Second, there is a chance that one of the states will miscalculate the outcome of a conflict due to wrong or misleading private information concerning the military capabilities and intentions of the rival state. Third, if there is a feeling of mistrust among the political leaders of the two conflicting states, then it is

⁹² Mansfield and Pevehouse, “Preferential Trading Arrangements,” 798.

⁹³ Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and Peter Rosendorff, “Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements,” *International Organization* 56, no.3 (2002): 477–513.

⁹⁴ David H. Bearce, and Sawa Omori, “How Do Commercial Institutions Promote Peace?” *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no.6 (November 2005): 659–678.

⁹⁵ James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” *International Organization* 49, no.3 (1995): 379–414.

expected that commitment problems will emerge that will hinder the efforts for cooperation and will probably lead to a military conflict.

Cause of military conflict according to Fearon's rational bargaining model	Explanation for peace based on the "trade produce peace" hypothesis
States prefer to solve their problems by war because they believe that it is a low cost solution.	Economic interdependence raises the costs of a military conflict.
Ambiguous private information concerning the capabilities and intentions of the opponent lead to a miscalculation of the outcome of the potential conflict.	Economic interdependence provides secure information concerning the capabilities and intentions of the interacting states.
Commitment problems cause mistrust between state leaders and thus cooperation is obstructed. The possibility of a military conflict is bigger(Word choice. Consider: increased).	Economic interdependence brings high-ranked state actors closer and creates a more trusting environment, which facilitates the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Table 2. How Economic Interdependence Promotes Peace

The above-mentioned rationalist bargaining model is very helpful in understanding how economic interdependence via trade agreements and participation in common commercial institution can lead to peace. Again, there are three the main explanations. As Russett and Oneal argue, "individuals act rationally in accordance with their economic interests. It is hardly in a state's interest to fight another if its citizens sell their goods, obtain imports, or have financial investments or investors there."⁹⁶ Hence, it is evident that economic interdependence raises the cost of a military conflict. In addition, bilateral trade combined with participation in joint commercial institutions is a good source of reliable information concerning the military capabilities of each state. Therefore, it reduces the risk of misperceiving the outcome of a conflict due to wrong information relevant to the capabilities and intentions of the opponent. Finally, "trade exposes a state's citizens to the ideas and perspectives of citizens of other

⁹⁶ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 129.

countries on a wide range of issues.”⁹⁷ This is also very useful, especially in the level of high ranking state actors, since through their scheduled meetings, conferences, etc., it is possible to develop relations based on mutual trust that will facilitate the bargaining procedure. As Bearce and Omori suggest, “a more trusting state leader becomes more willing to bargain for peace in the present.”⁹⁸ Table 3 summarizes the findings of this section.

Nevertheless, many scholars support the view that economic interaction can also be a source of conflict.⁹⁹ The possibility of military conflict is higher in dyads consisting of a powerful state and a much weaker economic partner. The imbalance between the military, economic and political capabilities of the two states can create dependency of the weaker state on the stronger. This dependency will give the stronger state the opportunity to take advantage of its power in order to enforce its own terms. Consequently, “conflict can arise because the weaker party resists what it sees as unfair treatment and exploitation or because the stronger state seeks to enforce its advantage.”¹⁰⁰

In the next section of this chapter, a comparison between the macroeconomic and trade indexes of Greece and Turkey will be made in order to evaluate whether the rapprochement policy that was initiated by Greece after 1999 helped toward the improvement of the economic relations between the two countries.

⁹⁷ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 130.

⁹⁸ Bearce and Omori, “How Do Commercial Institutions,” 664.

⁹⁹ Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1977); John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” *International Security* 15, no.1 (1990): 5–56.

¹⁰⁰ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 132.

B. THE GREEK-TURKISH ECONOMIC RELATIONS. DID THE OLD ADVERSARIES BECOME NEW PARTNERS

In this section, an evaluation of the economic relations between Greece and Turkey after 1999 will be presented. It will become clear whether the post-Helsinki policy of all the Greek governments, which was based on the Democratic Peace Theory, has any practical results in their bilateral economic cooperation. Thus, the hypothesis to be proven is that since Greece is trying to apply the Democratic Peace Theory in its relations with Turkey after 1999, the economic data of the two countries must show that their economic interactions are more intense, and thus the two countries are becoming interdependent in the economic sector.

1. Economic Cooperation through the Ratification of Low Politics Agreements

After the Helsinki Summit of 1999 and the initiation of the rapprochement procedure between Greece and Turkey, numerous agreements concerning their economic cooperation were signed. More specifically, “the two countries started a new policy of promoting cooperation on the so-called ‘low politics’ issues.”¹⁰¹ In this framework, the following ten bilateral agreements were signed by Greece and Turkey, and came into force in 2001:

- 1) Agreement on cooperation in the field of tourism.
- 2) Agreement on reciprocal promotion and protection of investments.
- 3) Agreement on economic cooperation.
- 4) Agreement on cooperation on mutual assistance between customs administrations.
- 5) Agreement on cooperation in science and technology.

¹⁰¹ Angelos Kotios and George Petrakos, “The Industrial and Trade Structure of the Greek and Turkish Economies: Possibilities for Cooperation,” in *Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation. A Political Economy Perspective*, ed. Christos Kollias and Culay Cunluk-Senesun (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), 106.

6) Agreement on combating crime, especially in the fields of terrorism, organized crime, illicit drug trafficking, and illegal immigration.

7) Agreement on maritime transport.

8) Agreement on cooperation on environmental protection.

9) Agreement on cultural cooperation.

10) Protocol on technical, scientific and economic cooperation in the agricultural sector.¹⁰²

In addition, after 2001, three more agreements were signed by the two countries:

Agreement on the avoidance of double taxation (January 1, 2005).

Agreement on cooperation in the health sector (September 28, 2005).

Agreement on standardization, evaluation and testing (June 30, 2006).¹⁰³

The above-mentioned agreements show that great emphasis is given to the sectors of industry, energy, agriculture, tourism, communications, transportations, investments, environment and health. These “low politics” agreements took into account the already existent regulation of the EU as well as the obligations that the two countries have related to those regulations. Therefore, the presence of the EU in the economic relations of the two countries is important. As long as the economic integration between Turkey and the EU is moving forward, the bilateral economic relation between Greece and Turkey must improve. Combined with the geographical proximity of the two countries, an acceleration of their bilateral trade must also be expected.

¹⁰² Official website of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://old.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/bilateral.html (accessed October 10, 2009).

¹⁰³ Ibid.

2. Analysis of the Data Concerning the Bilateral Economic Relations of Greece and Turkey

After this brief review of the already signed bilateral trade agreements and comparison of Greece and Turkey's economies, it is now useful to compare the data that are relevant with the bilateral trade of the two countries. In the following paragraphs, trade data concerning the period from 1996 to 2007 will be compared in order to examine the effect that the rapprochement policy of Greece had in the trade sector of the two economies. If during this period a substantial increase in the bilateral trade is observed then the likelihood of a conflict will be lower and the prospects for a peaceful resolution of their bilateral problems will be more feasible.

The following analysis is based on data taken from the "Correlates of War Project."¹⁰⁴ In order to be consistent with the trade data, all the values are in U.S. dollars. In addition, according to Russett and Oneal's work, "we expect trade to influence dyadic relations to the degree that it is economically important. Only then will the economic agents involved be politically powerful and motivated to influence national leaders."¹⁰⁵ Therefore, in order to calculate the economic importance of trade, an introduction of the following indexes has been made:

Index	Description
X_{HE}	Exports of Greece to Turkey
M_{HE}	Imports of Greece from Turkey
Bal_{HE}	Balance of Trade between Greece and Turkey
Vol_{HE}	Volume of Trade between Greece and Turkey
$X_{HE(total)}$	Total Exports of Greece
$M_{HE(total)}$	Total Imports of Greece
$X_{HE} / X_{HE(total)}$	Turkish Share in Total Exports of Greece
$M_{HE} / M_{HE(total)}$	Turkish Share in Total Imports from Greece

Table 3. Description of the Data Indexes

¹⁰⁴ Data are available at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>.

¹⁰⁵ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 140.

Year	X_{HE} =Exports of Greece to Turkey (mil USD)	M_{HE} =Imports of Greece from Turkey (mil USD)	Bal_{HE}	Vol_{HE}
1996	274.33	233.1	41.23	297.43
1997	430.1	296.57	133.53	726.67
1998	319.8	362.16	-42.36	681.96
1999	287.56	264.64	22.92	552.2
2000	430.81	391.25	39.56	822.06
2001	266.25	492.3	-226.05	758.55
2002	312.46	600.9	-288.44	913.36
2003	427.74	885.56	-457.82	1313.3
2004	592.72	1235.81	-643.09	1828.53
2005	726.65	1190.71	-464.06	1917.36
2006	1041.23	1671.42	-630.19	2712.65
2007	762.6	2057.1	-1294.5	2819.7

Table 4. Trade between Greece and Turkey.¹⁰⁶

A quick look at Figures 1 and 2 reveals that the trade relationship between the two countries has become enhanced, especially after 2002, following Turkey's steady resurgence from the financial crisis that hit the country in 2001. As we can see in more detail in Table 4, in 1996 the trade volume ($X+M$) between Greece and Turkey was at 297.43 million USD. In 2002, this value had more than tripled, reaching 913.36 million USD, and by the end of 2007 it had more than tripled again, reaching 2819.7 million USD. However, in order to evaluate the economic importance of trade, an examination of the indexes X/XGR and M/MGR must be conducted¹⁰⁷. From Tables 4 and 5, it is evident that despite the rapprochement procedure in the context of the EU, the two countries' bilateral trade remains at a low level. The Turkish share in total Greek exports (X/XGR), even though having a faintly increasing trend since 1996, remains at the low value of 3.23 percent. On the other hand, the Turkish share in Greece's total imports (M/MGR) has almost tripled since 1996 but it also remains at the low-level value of 2.72 percent.

¹⁰⁶ From Source: Correlates of War Project. Trade Data Set.

¹⁰⁷ For a detailed description of these indexes, see Table 5.

Year	$X_{HE(total)}$ Total Exports from Greece (mil USD)	$M_{HE(total)}$ Total Imports from Greece (mil USD)	$X_{HE} / X_{HE(total)}$ Turkish Share in Total Exports of Greece	$M_{HE} / M_{HE(total)}$ Turkish Share in Total Imports from Greece	$B = Bal_{HE} / Vol_{HE}$ Index of Greek Competitiveness
1996	11949	28744.8	2.29%	0.81%	0.081
1997	11129.5	27046.3	3.86%	1.09%	0.183
1998	10733.7	28742.5	2.97%	1.26%	-0.062
1999	10477.3	28016.8	2.74%	0.94%	0.041
2000	10974.6	28323.5	3.92%	1.38%	0.048
2001	9710	28161	2.74%	1.74%	-0.298
2002	10331.6	31318.8	3.02%	1.91%	-0.315
2003	13379	44853.2	3.19%	1.97%	-0.348
2004	15336.2	52633.3	3.86%	2.34%	-0.351
2005	17144	53989.3	4.23%	2.20%	-0.242
2006	20364.7	63227.7	5.11%	2.64%	-0.232
2007	23574	75553	3.23%	2.72%	-0.459

Table 5. Trade between Greece and Turkey.¹⁰⁸

In order to get a clearer picture of the level of economic interdependence between the two countries, we will examine the importance of trade partners to the two countries. According to Turkish statistics for the year 2007, Greece keeps the 11th position as an export market for Turkish products.¹⁰⁹ In 2007, Turkey's total exports valued 107271.7 million USD, of this amount only 2057.1 million USD went to Greece. Iraq and Bulgaria are in the 10th and 12th positions respectively as export markets for Turkish products. These two countries have a lower GDP than Greece. In particular, Bulgaria's GDP is only 10.9 percent of Greece.¹¹⁰ For the same year, 2007, the value of Turkish imports from Greece was only 762.6 million USD out of 169,987 million USD imports. Greece was in the 34th position, while Israel was at the 33th and Canada at the 35th position in terms of the countries that import goods from Turkey.

¹⁰⁸ From Source: Correlates of War Project. Trade Data Set.

¹⁰⁹ Data available in the Turkish Statistical Institute, Turkstat, at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4 (accessed October 21, 2009).

¹¹⁰ World Bank, World Development Report 2009.




Figure 1. Trade between Greece and Turkey.




Figure 2. Trade between Greece and Turkey.

On the other hand, Turkey seems to be a more important trade partner since during 2007, it had the 9th place as an export market for Greek products, receiving 3.23 percent of Greece's total exports (Table 5). In the same year, the Greek imports from Turkey placed it in the 11th position among the countries that import goods to Greece.¹¹¹ Therefore, as seen again in Table 4, the bilateral trade balance is in Turkey's favor. Furthermore, as Figure 1 shows, the trade balance deficit of Greece concerning its bilateral trade relations with Turkey is continuously growing.

Moreover, Figure 3 shows that the level of competitiveness of Greece's economy weighed against Turkey's economy has been worsening since 1996.

¹¹¹ From Source: Pan-Hellenic Union of Exporters. Data available at <http://www.pse.gr/stats.asp> (accessed October 24, 2009).

More specifically, the index became negative in 2001 and since then continues to deteriorate with the last available value for 2007 equal to -0.459, which is the lowest value since 1996.




Figure 3. Index of Greek Competitiveness in its Trade Relations with Turkey.

Therefore, the overall picture seems to be a little disappointing. The data indicate low volumes of trade between the two countries for the period 1999-2007. It seems that the rapprochement procedure that Greece initiated after the Helsinki Summit of 1999 does not have any substantial effect on the bilateral trade relations. Thus, one of the three pillars of the Democratic Peace Theory, namely, economic interdependence, cannot be applied satisfactorily in the dyad of Greece and Turkey. The fact that the two countries are different in terms of size (economy, population, etc.) does not have any effect since Russett and Oneal proved that, “economically important trade between large states and small states increases the prospects for peace just as it does for states of equal size.”¹¹²

¹¹² Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 147.

In order to clarify further the causes of this slow development of economic relations between two countries like Greece and Turkey, which have close geographical proximity and lengthy common borders, we will examine how open the markets of the two countries are. This is best done by calculating each country's total exports plus total imports divided by its GDP. Thus, we will examine the economies of the two countries in the period from 1999-2007 to see if they became more open. If this is true, then the possibilities for a peaceful coexistence between the two countries are increasing because, as Russett and Oneal proved, "countries that are open to external economic relations are constrained from using force even against rivals with whom commercial ties are limited."¹¹³

Trade data from the Correlates of War Project will once again be used. All the values are again in millions [USD]. The following indexes will be analyzed:

Index	Description
GR	The Sum of Greece's Total Exports and Imports.
TU	The Sum of Turkey's Total Exports and Imports.
GR/GDP	Openness of Greece's economy.
TU/GDP	Openness of Turkey's economy.

Table 6. Description of the Data Indexes

The data that are necessary for testing the previous hypothesis are presented in Table 7.

Year	GR (mil USD)	TU (mil USD)	GR/GDP	TU/GDP
1999	38494.1	67256.6	0.27929	0.26922
2000	39298.1	77271.8	0.30797	0.29002
2001	37871	72722.3	0.28877	0.3719
2002	41650.4	87599	0.28159	0.37713
2003	58232.2	116571.8	0.30042	0.38439
2004	67969.5	160329.2	0.29415	0.40879
2005	71133.3	190013.3	0.2889	0.39366
2006	83592.4	223761	0.31225	0.42284
2007	99127	277141	0.31695	0.42695

Table 7. Openness of Greece and Turkey's Economies.

¹¹³ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 148.

It is evident that the Turkish economy is more open than the Greek economy. During the first year of the Greco-Turkish rapprochement (1999), Greece had a more open economy than Turkey (0.27929 against 0.26922). However, after 2001, the picture changed and the Turkish economy became more open than the Greek economy. The positive element of this analysis is that both countries managed to have a continuous increase of the openness index of their economies (the total trade-to GDP ratio). This phenomenon, according to Russett and Oneal's research, is associated with a reduced risk of conflict. In their words, this finding "indicates that states recognize the consequences of militarized disputes for their economic relations with third parties."¹¹⁴ In the case of Greece and Turkey, this implies that since both countries are becoming open economies with time, even when their bilateral trade does not have an analogous increase as the data shows, "they will be constrained by wider economic forces from taking military action."¹¹⁵ The great improvement of the openness index of the Turkish economy means also that Turkey is moving quickly towards its economic integration with the EU. Unfortunately, this trend cannot be observed in Turkey's economic relations with Greece. Despite the fact that there are some signs of increased economic activity in absolute numbers (see Figure 1 and 2) between the two countries, the analysis of their bilateral trade data shows that their economic relations remain limited. Consequently, both countries perform relatively poorly in terms of their economic interdependence. Hence, the conclusion is that according to the data up to 2007, "it is highly unlikely that economic relations will become so advanced in any domain as to assume a position of primacy in the bilateral relationship as a whole."¹¹⁶ In addition, since the two countries are not interdependent in the economic sector, the political influence of the domestic economic interests in both countries will not be powerful enough. Given that the volume trade between the two countries

¹¹⁴ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 154.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Papadopoulos, "Economic Cooperation," 290.

constitutes a small share of their national income, as Tables 4 and 5 indicate, the influential commercial interests in both countries will lack the political motivation to maintain good relations. Therefore, the economic interdependence pillar of the Democratic Peace Theory becomes weaker.

It seems that the rapprochement policy that Greece adopted after 1999 did not have the desirable results, at least in the economic sector. There is no meaning in examining which country is more responsible for the limited increase in their economic interactions during the period from 1999 to 2007. The fact is that both countries did not reach the expected threshold in their bilateral economic activities, beyond which the created economic interdependence would facilitate the establishment of the virtuous circles that are necessary for the peaceful resolution of their bilateral problematic issues.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V. THE PILLAR OF DEMOCRACY

A. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to examine if the second pillar of the Democratic Peace Theory, namely democracy, can explain the peaceful relations between Greece and Turkey after 1999, which was the year that Greece decided to support Turkey's European aspirations. Furthermore, this chapter will provide to the reader an epigrammatic factual background of the efforts that Turkey has made, up to nowadays, for accession in the European family and how Greece, as a permanent member of the European Union, reacted to these efforts.

Starting this chapter from the democratic pillar of the Democratic Peace Theory, is necessary to clarify that democratic consolidation means that democracy "becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, when all the losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost."¹¹⁷ Since it is evident that Greece, after the Helsinki Summit of 1999, is trying to apply the Democratic Peace Theory in its relations with Turkey, there was a hope among the Greek politicians that Turkey would become more democratic through the negotiation process with the EU. Turkey will have to fulfill the political criteria for accession as described by the Copenhagen criteria. As Grigoriadis noted, in order for Turkey to comply effectively and fully with the Copenhagen criteria, a transformation of Turkish political culture was necessary. He further stated, "citizens and state would have to modify their view of each other as well as their role in society."¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 26.

¹¹⁸ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, *Trials of Europeanization. Turkish Political Culture and the European Union* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 32.

When the EU adopted the Copenhagen Criteria, it sent a clear message to all the states interested in becoming EU members. If a state desires to become a member of the European family, it had to adopt the principal of political liberalism. Political liberalism advocates civil rights for all citizens irrespective of nationality, gender or class. Moreover, political liberalism is promoting the equality of all the citizens before the law and it considers the establishment of the rule of law as an indispensable part of the society. In addition, it gives great importance to the existence of an independent judiciary and does not favor the intervention of the state in any sector of the society.

Given these conditions, Greece as a *status-quo* country that desires peace and prosperity in its region had as the main motive for the support of Turkey's accession efforts the fact that "the influence of democratization is usually to lower the risk of disputes."¹¹⁹ Especially after the "Imia crisis" during 1996 that brought the two countries close to a full-scale conflict, Greece's political leaders understood that "the political character of the less democratic state in each dyad is primarily responsible for determining the likelihood of conflict."¹²⁰ In the Greco-Turkish dyad, the less democratic state during that period was Turkey.¹²¹ Hence, the only peaceful way for Greece to avoid similar problems with Turkey in the future was to pin its hopes entirely on Turkey's accession-driven Europeanization. Risse defines Europeanization as "the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance."¹²² Officially, Turkey entered the process of Europeanization after the Helsinki Summit of 1999. As Papadopoulos noted, "In the Greek view, the EU, with its offer of a common, comprehensive vision in which states' freedom of

¹¹⁹ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 120.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 114.

¹²¹ This statement is based on data that will be presented in the following section of this chapter.

¹²² Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles, and James Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction" in *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, ed. Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso, and Thomas Risse (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 3.

action is moderated by certain binding, yet ultimately fundamentally cooperative rules, provides the kind of setting that renders the incentives to a peaceful resolution of disputes overwhelmingly attractive.”¹²³

B. EU AND TURKEY. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. Period Prior to the Helsinki European Council (December 1999)

Turkey’s efforts to join the EU officially started in 1963 with the signature of the Ankara (or Association) Agreement, and continued with an Additional Protocol signed in November 1970. Both of these agreements determined the main objectives of the Turkey-EU relation, which were the continuous and balanced strengthening of their commercial and economic relations along with the creation of a custom union in three stages.

Unfortunately, for Turkey, the military coup in September 1980 had severely hampered EU-Turkey relations for almost five years. In 1987, during the Ozal administration, Turkey filed a formal application for membership that was rejected in 1989 by the Commission with the justification that it had not yet reached the appropriate economic level. These seven wasted years were crucial for Turkey because it lost the chance to be included in the EU’s enlargements procedures of 1981 and 1986. On the other hand, Greece succeeded in joining the EU as a full member in 1981. Furthermore, in 1990, the Republic of Cyprus submitted an application for full membership in the EU. In 1993, the Commission argued that the only issue preventing the entrance of Cyprus into the EU as a full member was the unresolved issue of the *de facto* partition of the island because of the Turkish invasion of 1974, and subsequently the inability to accomplish a viable constitutional settlement with the North (occupied) part of the island. However, the Commission stated that it would reexamine Cyprus’ application in January 1995, waiting for the results of the ongoing negotiations sponsored by the United Nations concerning this issue.

¹²³ Papadopoulos, “Economic Cooperation,” 312.

Greece did not stay out of the EU-Cyprus negotiations, and during the European Council meeting in the Greek island of Corfu (June 24–25, 1994), it managed to pass some important statements in the document of the Presidency Conclusions. In particular the European Council noted, regarding Cyprus, that, “an essential stage in the preparation process could be regarded as completed” and that “in these conditions the next phase of enlargement of the Union will involve Cyprus.”¹²⁴ It is widely accepted that politics in the EU level is a give-and-take procedure. EU’s history is filled with examples of tough bargaining between the member states. Therefore, Greece cannot be the exception to that rule. Almost one and a half years later, in December 1995, Greece supported by its vote the establishment of a custom union between EU and Turkey, and received in exchange for its “good” behavior a fixed date for the launching of Cyprus’ accession negotiations with the EU.¹²⁵ However, serious concerns over the economic performance of Turkey, along with the fear of an increased migration rate (due to freedom of movement within the EU), forced the European countries to reject an immediate full membership.

An additional unpleasant surprise for Turkey was the Commission’s publishing of the “Agenda 2000.” According to this document, which was describing the main axes of EU policy for the period 2000-2006, EU was planning to proceed with the enlargement procedure in two steps¹²⁶. Cyprus was included in the first of the two steps, but Turkey was excluded even from the second step of the enlargement. During the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997, the European Council verified the Commission’s proposal, thus deciding to put off Turkey’s full membership indefinitely by denying granting Turkey the status of a

¹²⁴ Corfu European Council Presidency Conclusions (24–25 June 1994), pg.10. The document with the Conclusions of the Presidency can be accessed through the following link: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EUROPEAN%20COUNCIL%20AT%20CORFU%20-%20Presidency%20conclusions.pdf> (accessed August 24, 2009).

¹²⁵ In particular, the accession negotiations between the EU and Cyprus would be opened six months after the completion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.

¹²⁶ The first group of candidate states consisted of Cyprus, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic; while the second one included Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia.

candidate member. “The Commission cited Turkey’s macroeconomic instability, poor record on human rights, continuing disputes with Greece in the Aegean, and failure to promote restoration of constitutional order in Cyprus.”¹²⁷ However, the EU did not want to close all the doors to Turkey and in order to prove its good intentions concerning Turkey’s European aspirations, it issued a Communication paper that described a program “of financial, technical, and legal assistance to help Turkey consolidate its customs union and to harmonize its legislative regime with that of the EU.”¹²⁸ Furthermore, the European Council asked the Commission to prepare the “European Strategy for Turkey” which would be the base for the development and progress of EU-Turkey relations.¹²⁹ In addition, the European Council decided to start the accession negotiations with the first group of candidate states, in which Cyprus was included, on March 30, 1998.¹³⁰

It is clear that Turkey was not very pleased with the outcome of the Luxembourg Summit. Greece was already a full member of the EU and a strong candidate for entrance in the Euro zone. Cyprus updated its relations with the EU by initiating accession negotiations, and on the other hand, Turkey’s relations with the EU, after the Luxembourg Summit, reached its lowest level. In contrast to Greece and Cyprus, Turkey’s future path towards Europe seemed long and uncertain.

Greece’s stance, until the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, concerning Turkey’s desire to become a member of the European family was not supportive. In fact, in numerous cases, Greece became the main obstacle to

¹²⁷ Robert McDonald, “Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Conflict,” in *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, ed. Dimitris Karidis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (Herndon, Virginia: Brassey’s, 2001), 131.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 132.

¹²⁹ “European Strategy for Turkey, the European Commission’s Initial Operational Proposals,” *Communication from the Commission to the Council*, (Brussels: COM, 4 March 1998). The entire document can be accessed through the following link: http://aei.pitt.edu/4356/01/001450_1.pdf (accessed August 24, 2009).

¹³⁰ Luxembourg European Council Presidency Conclusions (12-13 December 1997), paragraph 10. The entire document can be accessed through the following link: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0008.htm (accessed August 24, 2009).

Turkey's effort for the establishment of closer relations with the EU. In particular, right after the Luxembourg Summit, Turkey threatened to abandon the efforts for joining the EU if it did not receive the status of a candidate country during the Cardiff Summit of June 1998. Additionally, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, stated that Turkey would not participate in London's European Conference of March 12, 1998, under the United Kingdom's Presidency.¹³¹ The reaction of Turkey did not affect Greece's decision to keep vetoing its candidacy. Even the personal phone call of U.S. President Bill Clinton to Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, urging him to lift the Greek veto toward Turkey during the Cardiff Summit, did not manage to alter the Greek stance.¹³² During the Cardiff Summit, Greece kept on with its policy of blocking any financial help from the EU to Turkey, with the justification that a country that spends enormous amount of money in order to maintain 25 thousand troops in the occupied North part of Cyprus, does not need any financial assistance. Even when the Commission proposed the approval of a 135 million euro development aid package to Turkey, which could be approved not by a unanimous decision but by majority voting so that the evident Greek veto could be bypassed, the Greek government warned the Commission that it would send the case to the European Court of Justice.¹³³

At the same time, Cyprus officially opened the accession negotiations with the EU (March 31, 1998) despite the objections that some EU member states had concerning the ability of the Greek-Cypriot government to apply the *acquis communautaire* to the divided island.¹³⁴ Summarizing this section, we can conclude that besides Turkey's efforts to join the EU, Greece kept an obstructive

¹³¹ Pia Christina Wood, "Europe and Turkey; A Relationship Under Fire," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 21, no.1 (1999), 110.

¹³² McDonald, "Greek-Turkish Relations," 132.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 133.

¹³⁴ France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands feared that since Cyprus was still divided and a political solution to this issue had not been found yet, the best thing would be to cease the accession negotiations with Cyprus until a viable solution can be found regarding this issue. Greece immediately reacted, and threatened to block the entire enlargement procedure if Cyprus did not have the same treatment with the rest of the candidate countries.

stance and simultaneously did its best to promote the candidacy of Cyprus. At the end of 1998, no one could imagine the shift of the Greek policy during the Helsinki Summit of 1999.

2. Period of Greco-Turkish Rapprochement (1999 to the present)

Turkey's road towards the EU opened again during the meeting of the European Council in Helsinki. In December 1999, the European states agreed to grant Turkey the status of a candidate country. The most surprising fact during that meeting was Greece's decision to adopt a positive and supportive stance towards Turkey's European aspirations. As the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs stated, "Greece believes that if Turkey is willing to submit to the rigors of the process of candidacy, which apply equally to all candidate countries, then it should be accepted into the EU."¹³⁵ This change of stance did not happen all of a sudden. The climate between the two countries started to improve after the August earthquakes in Turkey that cost the lives of about seventeen thousand citizens. One of the first countries that offered help to the Turkish authorities was Greece. This unexpected disaster "has given moderate Greek leaders the cover they need to start normalizing relations with Turkey."¹³⁶ Furthermore, almost one month after the disastrous earthquakes in Turkey, the same fate hit Athens, but in a smaller scale. The powerful earthquake caused the death of 143 people. It was now Turkey's turn to reciprocate the aid to Greece.

These successive and disastrous earthquakes gave birth to the so-called "earthquake diplomacy," which in its turn generated sentiments of friendship and solidarity between the Greeks and the Turks. As the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs stated, "...the earthquake created an amazing climate. Because of this

¹³⁵ George Papandreou, "Greece Wants Turkey to Make the Grade," *The New York Times*, December 10, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/10/opinion/10iht-edgeorge.2.t.html> (accessed August 26, 2009).

¹³⁶ Martin Fletcher, "Quake softens Greek stance on ancient foe," *The Times*, September 7, 1999, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/> (accessed September 10, 2009).

tragedy there was a human warmth that came out between the two peoples.”¹³⁷ This “amazing” climate was the chance that Greece was looking for in order to initiate its rapprochement policy toward Turkey without paying a severe political cost in the domestic field.

Despite this friendly atmosphere between the two countries, Turkey’s road toward the EU was not going to be easy. The “rigors” to which Turkey had to submit at that time could be described by the Copenhagen Criteria, which had already been established since 1993. According to these criteria, every state that wants to become a part of the EU must fulfill the following conditions:

the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities,

the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the European Union, and

the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.¹³⁸

Nevertheless, Greece’s determination to promote Cyprus’ accession to the EU and to disconnect the solution of the Cyprus issue from the EU’s enlargement procedures was evident in the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council. More specifically the following paragraph officially locked Cyprus’ entrance to the EU:

¹³⁷ Fletcher. “Quake softens Greek.”

¹³⁸ Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union. An Introduction to European Integration* (Boulder CO & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 148.

The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the EU. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this, the Council will take account of all the relevant factors.¹³⁹

The message that the 15 European states sent to Turkey was very clear: a political solution that would put an end to the division of Cyprus by the Turkish Armed Forces must be found in the near future. If this cannot be accomplished, then Cyprus will become a member of the EU even if the island is still divided. Consequently, Turkey, which after the invasion of 1974 "illegally occupies the Northern part of the island, can no longer block the accession of Cyprus to the EU."¹⁴⁰ For the Turkish side, this was a very unpleasant development because now, in addition to all the other difficulties that they had to overcome in order to become a member of the EU, they also had to take into account the possibility of a Greek-Cypriot veto. In addition, the Helsinki European Council granted the status of a candidate state to Turkey, but it did not determine a specific date for the opening of the official accession negotiations.

After the initial shock, the Turkish officials realized that compared to their country, Cyprus was advancing very rapidly in its efforts for accession in the EU. Therefore, they decided to accept the candidacy status, but at the same time, they adopted a more aggressive stance toward the members of the EU. More specifically, on May 29, 2001 the Turkish National Security Council (NSC) made the following statement, "the full-membership of Southern Cyprus to the European Union as a result of its unilateral application will deepen the division in the island. Besides, peace and stability in Eastern Mediterranean will encounter

¹³⁹ Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions (10–11 December 1999), paragraph 9b. The entire document can be accessed through the following link: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm (accessed August 26, 2009).

¹⁴⁰ Panayotis J. Tsakonas, "Turkey's Post-Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greece and Cyprus," *Turkish Studies* 2, no.2 (Autumn 2001), 7.

uncertainties as a result of such a development.”¹⁴¹ In addition to the above-mentioned threats for instability in the region, Turkish officials in the same statement took a step further and warned the EU that it is very possible to annex the occupied northern part of Cyprus. “As a guarantor country, Turkey, within the framework of its commitments stemming from agreements and history, will continue to take every necessary step for prosperity and security of the Turkish Cypriot people and to make economic contributions, and it will speed up its efforts to strengthen and deepen the cooperation with the TRNC.”¹⁴²

Moreover, some high-ranking Turkish public officials supported the view that the EU must get the permission of Ankara before any decision to accept the Republic of Cyprus as a member of the European family. The statement of State Minister Sukru Sina Gurel on state channel TRT 1 is characteristic of Turkey’s view regarding the Cyprus issue. Namely, he asserted, “Cyprus’ membership depends on Turkey and they should become EU members at the same time.”¹⁴³

Despite the angry reaction of Turkey and the verbal threats that it would withdraw its application if the Republic of Cyprus entered the EU, the negotiation talks between Cyprus and EU, which had started in 1998, continued at the same pace. However, both the EU and the UN made efforts to promote a solution to the Cyprus issue before Republic of Cyprus’ signing of the EU Accession Treaty in April 2003. The longing for the accession of a united Cyprus in the EU was catholic. The negotiations started in January 2002 under the auspices of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. By the time the accession negotiations ended at the Copenhagen European Council of December 2002, no commonly accepted solution had been reached. Therefore, the EU announced the official invitation of

¹⁴¹ Anadolu Agency, “NSC Releases a Statement,” *Anadolu Agency News*, May 29, 2001, <http://www.hri.org/news/turkey/anadolu/2001/01-05-29.anadolu.html#02> (accessed August 26, 2009).

¹⁴² Anadolu Agency, “NSC Releases a Statement.”

¹⁴³ Metin Gurel, “Cyprus Can Enter the EU when Turkey Does,” *Turkish Press Review*, December 10, 2001, <http://www.hri.org/news/turkey/trkpr/2001/01-12-10.trkpr.html> (accessed August 26, 2009).

the Republic of Cyprus to enter the EU. Furthermore, during the negotiations that took place in Hague on March 10, 2003, between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, a new stalemate was reached. Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriots stated, “The plan was unacceptable for us. This was not a plan we could ask our people to vote for,”¹⁴⁴ and as a result, the talks terminated.¹⁴⁵

Despite the stalemate in the negotiations concerning the resolution of the Cyprus issue, the EU continued the accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus and issued the “Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty 2003.” According to this Protocol, “the application of the *acquis* shall be suspended in those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.”¹⁴⁶ Moreover, the EU stated clearly that the above-mentioned suspension would not affect the personal rights of Turkish Cypriots as EU citizens because they “are citizens of a Member State, the Republic of Cyprus, even though they may live in the northern part of Cyprus, the areas not under government control.”¹⁴⁷ Finally, on May 1, 2004, the Republic of Cyprus signed its official entrance in the EU and two months later, the Annan Plan ceased to be an option for a possible reunion of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot Community, after a referendum held on April 24, 2004, did not accept the fifth version of the Annan Plan and thus the plan became null.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ BBC, “Cyprus Peace Process Collapses,” *BBC News*, March 11, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2838535.stm> (accessed August 28, 2009).

¹⁴⁵ The leader of the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, was also against the current edition of the plan and he admitted that the talks did not produce an agreement between the two communities, but he was willing to continue the dialogue.

¹⁴⁶ European Union, “Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty 2003,” *Official Journal of the European Union*, September 23, 2003. The entire document can be accessed through the link: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_236/l_23620030923en09310956.pdf#page=25 (accessed August 28, 2009).

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 955.

¹⁴⁸ Only 24.17% of the Greek Cypriot Community approved the plan while the rest 75.83% disapproved it. On the North part of the island, the 65.1% of the Turkish Cypriot Community supported the plan and 34.9% was against it.

The entrance of the Republic of Cyprus in the EU without a prior settlement of the *de facto* division of the island was not a positive development for Turkey. First, the Republic of Cyprus as a permanent member of the EU will be capable of putting additional obstacles to the efforts of Turkey for accession since it will have full veto rights. Additionally, as the European Commission representative, Jean-Christophe Filori, observed, "We will be facing this rather weird situation where a candidate country knocking at the door does not recognize one of our own member states," which will have as a result that "it will appear difficult in this situation to envisage the start of accession negotiations with Turkey."¹⁴⁹

Meanwhile, the European Council at the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002 did not set a specific date for the commencement of the accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU. However, at the next European Council Summit of December 2004, the member states decided to set a date for the start EU-Turkey accession negotiations. This date was October 3, 2005. Turkey had only one thing to do before the commencement of the accession negotiations, and that was to sign the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement. By ratifying the Additional Protocol, Turkey would extend the Association Agreement, which was initially signed in 1963, to the ten new member states that had joined the EU after the completion of the 2004 enlargement procedure. One of the ten new member states was the Republic of Cyprus, which until that time (and since 1963) had not been officially recognized as an independent state by Turkey. and a trade embargo (by Turkey) was still in force against it. The EU's desire was for Turkey to sign this Protocol before the start of its accession negotiations. Indeed, Turkey signed the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement on July 29, 2005. Nevertheless, on the same day Turkey issued a "Declaration on Cyprus" emphasizing that, "signature, ratification and implementation of this Protocol neither amount to any form of recognition of the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol; nor prejudice Turkey's rights

¹⁴⁹ BBC, "Cyprus Peace Process Collapses."

and obligations emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment of 1960.”¹⁵⁰

This statement provoked many objections, especially from France, Austria and, of course, Greece and Cyprus. In order to mollify the distressed member states, the EU responded by issuing, on September 21, 2005, a separate declaration in which it stated in paragraphs 2 and 3 that,

The European Community and its Member States make clear that this declaration by Turkey is unilateral, does not form part of the Protocol and has no legal effect on Turkey’s obligations under the Protocol.

The European Community and its Member States expect full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol, and the removal of all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on means of transport. Turkey must apply the Protocol fully to all EU Member States. The EU will monitor this closely and evaluate full implementation in 2006. The European Community and its Member States stress that the opening of negotiations on the relevant chapters depends on Turkey’s implementation of its contractual obligations to all Member States. Failure to implement its obligations in full will affect the overall progress in the negotiations.¹⁵¹

It was clear that the EU was trying to remind to Turkey that if its political leadership had decided not to go along with the rules and obligations that are common for all the candidate states, then the negotiation process would be very long and uncertain. Until the signing of the Negotiation Framework Protocol on October 3, 2005, Turkey had not implemented the Additional Protocol regarding its relations with the Republic of Cyprus. Despite this fact, Greece and Cyprus had not raised any objections concerning the signing of the Negotiation Framework Protocol by Turkey, mainly because the text of the Protocol, besides

¹⁵⁰ “Press Statement Regarding the Additional Protocol to Extend the Ankara Agreement to All EU Members,” available at <http://www.turkishembassy.com/ii/O/ankext.htm> (accessed September 10, 2009).

¹⁵¹ European Union, “Enlargement: Turkey. Declaration by the European Community and its Member States,” *Council of the European Union*, September 21, 2005, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Europa/Erweiterung/TuerkeiErklaerung.pdf> (accessed September 9, 2009).

the Copenhagen Criteria, included some additional conditions that Turkey must fulfill. These conditions were relevant to the resolution of the Cyprus issue and to the problematic Greek-Turkish relations. The exact words of these additional conditions were the following:

Turkey's unequivocal commitment to good neighborly relations and its undertaking to resolve any outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, including if necessary jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice;¹⁵²

Turkey's continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded, including steps to contribute to a favorable climate for a comprehensive settlement, and progress in the normalization of bilateral relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus.

the fulfillment of Turkey's obligations under the Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol extending the Association Agreement to all new EU Member States, in particular those pertaining to the EU-Turkey customs union, as well as the implementation of the Accession Partnership, as regularly revised.¹⁵³

Unfortunately, Turkey did not alter its foreign policy toward Greece and Cyprus. However, regarding the fulfillment of Turkey's obligation under the Additional Protocol extending the Association Agreement to all new EU members (including Cyprus), Ankara played its last card by proposing to Cyprus free access to only one port and one airport facility in the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus and not in Turkey. More specifically, Turkey proposed to open for direct trade, and only for twelve months, Famagusta's port and Ercan's airport, which

¹⁵² This condition is clearly implying the dispute between the two countries concerning the Aegean Sea.

¹⁵³ European Union, *Negotiating Framework for Turkey: Principles Governing the Negotiations* (European Union: Brussels, 2005), para.6. The entire document can be accessed through the following link: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_TR_framedoc_en.pdf (accessed October 12, 2009).

was used until that time only for flights between the Northern, occupied, part of Cyprus and Turkey. Unfortunately, for Turkey, the Additional Protocol required that not one, but all the ports and airports must be opened in order to facilitate free trade.

As was expected, the response from Cyprus was negative. The Greek Cypriot foreign minister, George Lillikas, succinctly described Cyprus' view regarding Turkey's proposal by saying, "It is a mockery of the EU since it lacks any serious content."¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos added that, "Turkey should realize that it cannot push its way into the EU as it did with Cyprus in 1974."¹⁵⁵ Greece also backed Cyprus' position by emphasizing the fact that Turkey had to open all its ports and airports for Cyprus' commercial fleet and not only one. In addition, "Greek Foreign Ministry spokesmen, Georgios Koumoutsakos, described the proposal as vague and open to multiple interpretations."¹⁵⁶

On the other hand, Britain welcomed the Turkish proposal and Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, "has warned the EU against sending a negative signal to Turkey."¹⁵⁷ Moreover, Finland stated that the proposal was moving in the correct direction, thus it was encouraging for the future but not enough. Germany kept a neutral stance by proposing the arrangement of a new deadline for the application of the Additional Protocol by Turkey. Despite all the abovementioned contradicted opinions, on December 21, 2006, after a recommendation by the European Commission, the EU decided to suspend the negotiations with Turkey

¹⁵⁴ Nicholas Watt, "EU summit row looms over Turkish plan to break deadlock in talks: Greek Cypriots dismiss limited opening of ports: Athens calls for tougher sanctions on membership," *The Guardian*, December 8, 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/turkey?page=35> (accessed September 15, 2009).

¹⁵⁵ Andrew Borowiec, "Port offer not enough for Greece, Cyprus; Nations vow to block EU entry," *The Washington Times*, December 11, 2006, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/> (accessed September 15, 2009).

¹⁵⁶ Watt. "EU summit row."

¹⁵⁷ Borowiec. "Port offer not enough."

on eight of the 35 chapters¹⁵⁸ of the *acquis communautaire*. Moreover, the EU decided to prohibit any provisional closing of the already ten opened chapters¹⁵⁹ until the Commission confirmed that Turkey has fully implemented the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement. The main justification for this decision was the lack of progress concerning the Cyprus issue. Furthermore, EU informed Turkey that at the end of 2009, it would decide the fate of the eight chapters that have not yet been opened.

It is useful to make a short reference here to the idea of a “special relationship” or “privileged partnership” between the EU and Turkey instead of a full membership. The current Prime Minister of Germany, Mrs. Merkel, was the first European political leader to propose this idea. Mrs. Merkel made her intentions clear even before the Christian Democratic Party won the September 2005 national elections. “In a letter to the EU’s conservative heads of government Mrs. Merkel said negotiations with Turkey should not automatically lead to membership. They should instead lead to a privileged partnership and should be open-ended.”¹⁶⁰ Since then, Germany has been a strong supporter of the privileged partnership argument.

The other great opponent of Turkey’s European efforts is France. As early as 2005 and almost at the same time as Mrs. Merkel objections regarding Turkey’s accession talks, French President Jacques Chirac criticized Turkey’s decision to sign the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and kept insisting that it will not recognize Cyprus. President Chirac’s exact words were that, “this declaration poses political and legal problems and that it is not in the

¹⁵⁸ The eight chapters are, Free Movements of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations.

¹⁵⁹ The ten chapters that have already opened are the following: Company Law, Intellectual Property Law, Information Society and Media, Taxation, Economic and Monetary Policy, Statistics, Enterprise and Industrial Policy, Trans-European Networks, Financial Control and Consumer and Health Protection.

¹⁶⁰ Nicholas Watt and Luke Harding, “Turkey’s EU dream double blow as Chirac and Merkel raise doubts,” *The Guardian*, August 27, 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/aug/27/turkey.eu> (accessed September 16, 2009).

spirit expected of a candidate to the union.”¹⁶¹ The next president of France also moved in the same direction concerning Turkey’s ambitions to enter the EU. More specifically, during his visit in Washington in September 2006, Mr. Sarkozy stated the following:

I have often been asked about the place of Muslims in France, because of concern in the United States. My dear friends, let us be consistent. What is the point of worrying about our ability to integrate Muslims in France or in Europe if at the same time, and just as forcefully, the United States asks us to accept Turkey in Europe? Even if you consider that we have a problem with Islam, in which case you have to give us time to find the ways and means to create a European Islam and reject an Islam in Europe. But don’t then give equal support to the integration of a country like Turkey, with 75 million inhabitants. Consistency is part of the relations between Europe and the United States.¹⁶²

With this statement in mind, Mr. Sarkozy’s reaction to U.S. President Barack Obama’s suggestions right after his visit to Turkey in April 2009 was something that must have been expected by everyone. During his first official meeting with the leaders of the EU in Prague, Mr. Obama suggested that, “the US and Europe must approach Muslims as our friends, neighbors and partners in fighting injustice, intolerance and violence. Moving forward toward Turkish membership in the EU would be an important signal of your commitment to this agenda and ensure that we continue to anchor Turkey firmly in Europe.”¹⁶³ Mr. Sarkozy’s response to this statement was immediate and clear, “I have been working hand in hand with President Obama but when it comes to the EU it is up

¹⁶¹ Watt and Harding, “Turkey’s EU dream.”

¹⁶² Tulin Daloglou, “Debating Turkey and the EU; France continues cold shoulder,” *The Washington Times*, December 4, 2007, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/> (accessed September 15, 2009).

¹⁶³ Bruno Waterfield and Toby Harnden, “NATO; Sarkozy attacks US interference in EU,” *The Daily Telegraph*, April 6, 2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/> (accessed September 16, 2009).

to the member states to decide. I have always been opposed to this entry and I remain opposed. I think I can say that the immense majority of member states shares the position of France.”¹⁶⁴

At this point, it will be useful to make a short reference to the findings of the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) and *Istituto Affari Internazionali* (IAI) joint project named “Talking Turkey.” The conclusions of this research will facilitate us in understanding that “each member state holds different views for different reasons on the Turkey question . . . and the reasons for this are rooted in a diverse and dynamic set of interests and ideas.”¹⁶⁵ The following table presents the findings of this project. We can see what each country considers as the most important issue regarding the efforts of Turkey to join the EU. For example, Greece believes that the main issues regarding the EU-Turkey debate are the sectors of Human Rights, Democracy and Security, Foreign Policy. As it mentioned in Chapter II, Greece believes that the resolution of the bilateral problems that exist between the two countries is a precondition for Turkey’s entrance to the EU. In addition, from Table 8 we can also see that many countries are also concerned about the economic consequences of Turkish entrance. Six countries, namely, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Poland and United Kingdom have second thoughts about how Turkey’s membership will affect the trade relations between the states of the EU, the EU budget and the distribution of EU’s funding. Moreover, keeping in mind that Turkey has a population of 75 million; the effect of the free circulation of people is going to have a huge impact on the European labor market.

¹⁶⁴ Waterfield and Harnden, “Sarkozy attacks US.”

¹⁶⁵ Nathalie Tocci, ed., *Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy* (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2008), 5.

	Culture, Religion	EU Institutions	Human Rights, Democracy	Security, Foreign Policy	Immigration	Economy
Austria	X				X	X
Belgium		X	X	X		X
Denmark	X		X		X	
Finland			X	X		
France	X	X	X	X	X	X
Germany	X		X		X	X
Greece			X	X		
Poland	X	X		X		X
Slovenia				X		
UK				X		X

Table 8. Core Topics Regarding Turkey's EU Membership¹⁶⁶

Nevertheless, many EU members have expressed their full support to Turkey's membership, and thus they do not adopt the views expressed by France and Germany. For example, Britain, Portugal, Sweden and some of the recent EU members from Eastern Europe have openly supported Turkey's efforts for accession in the EU. However, the decision whether Turkey will become a member of the EU or not must have the unanimous support of all the EU's governments.

Finally, one factor that further complicated the relations between Turkey and EU was the political crisis that erupted in the country during 2008. Mr. Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is the governing party in Turkey, was accused by the Constitutional Court of violating Turkey's secular constitution by supporting pro-Islamic activities. More specifically, the crisis began in June 2008 when "the court overturned a constitutional amendment allowing female university students to wear head scarves. To many in secular Turkey, the headscarf is an Islamic political symbol. Mr. Erdogan retorted that the court had no authority to examine constitutional amendments."¹⁶⁷ This accusation could lead to closing down of the AKP and exclusion of Prime

¹⁶⁶ Tocci, *Talking Turkey*, 6.

¹⁶⁷ Andrew Borowiec, "Talks to resume over EU membership for Turkey," *The Washington Times*, June 16, 2008, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/> (accessed September 16, 2009).

Minister Tayyip Erdogan from political activities for at least five years. This incident threatened the political stability of Turkey, a fact that did not promote in a positive way its accession negotiations with the EU. Nevertheless, the crisis ended when the Constitutional Court decided not to ban the AKP, but to only impose financial penalties. EU leaders reacted positively to the decision of the court because it eliminated one more barrier to Turkey's already lengthy and problematic negotiations concerning its accession to the EU.

To summarize this section and try to clear the picture concerning the triad of Greece, Cyprus and Turkey in the context of the EU, we can emphasize the following facts. Today Greece and Cyprus are both members of the EU with full veto rights and with both countries still having unsolved problematic issues with Turkey. Until the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Greece was strongly opposing the Turkish efforts for entrance in the EU. After 1999 and until now, Greece shifted its stance dramatically and followed a rapprochement policy toward Turkey. Turkey is trying to join the EU and one of the main obstacles to its accession is the Cyprus issue. However, up to now, Turkey has not raised the *casus belli* against Greece, has not recognized the Republic of Cyprus as an independent state, and has not fully implemented the Additional Protocol that was signed in 2005. In addition, the European Commission in its last progress report stated that Turkey had achieved sufficient progress concerning the economic aspects of the *acquis communautaire* and was only adequately fulfilling the political part of the Copenhagen Criteria. Furthermore, the Commission is judgmental toward Turkey concerning minority issues, civil control over the military, freedom of expression issues and the Cyprus issue.¹⁶⁸ In addition, we must take into serious consideration the fact that some countries, such as France and Germany, are not supportive of Turkey's membership and they propose instead a "privileged partnership" between the EU and Turkey. The end of the year 2009 will be crucial

¹⁶⁸ Commission of the European Communities, Turkey 2008 Progress Report (Brussels: October 5, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key_documents/reports_nov_2008/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf (accessed August 29, 2009).

for the future of the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey since the EU will have to announce its decision concerning the fate of the negotiations.

C. TURKEY'S POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE START OF THE RAPPROCHEMENT PERIOD WITH GREECE (1999)

In order to evaluate whether Turkey's Europeanization process had positive effects on the level of democratic consolidation in the country, this section will conduct an examination of Turkey's political situation up to 1999. This will make the comparison with the contemporary level of Turkey's democratization easier. In addition, a brief comparison of the democratic levels of Greece and Turkey will be presented in order to understand why Greece decided to support Turkey's efforts for accession in the EU.

However, before we start with the evaluation of the level of democracy in Turkish politics, it is first necessary to give a brief description of the basic characteristic of a purely democratic regime. Robert A. Dahl proposed the following eight criteria that every state would have to fulfill in order to satisfy the requirements of a democracy:

- The permanent existence of free and fair elections.
- All adults have the right to vote.
- All adults have the right to be elected.
- The political leaders have the right to compete for support and votes.
- Every citizen enjoys freedom of expression.
- Every citizen enjoys freedom of association.
- There are always available alternative sources of information that are not monopolized by the government.
- Public institutions and officials depend on votes and other expressions of preference.¹⁶⁹

These eight main criteria for the characterization of a state as democratic also imply the development of additional social freedoms, such as the freedom of

¹⁶⁹ Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 3.

religion, the right to private life, etc. Although the above-mentioned criteria are not necessary for a political system to be democratic, they are always present in every contemporary Western-type democracy.

In order to compare the level of democratization in Greece and Turkey at the start of their rapprochement procedure, this thesis will follow the paradigm of many other researchers, and thus it will use the data provided by the Freedom House surveys.¹⁷⁰ Here it must be clarified that this thesis does not argue that Turkey is an authoritarian or undemocratic state. It is well known that the existence of free and fair elections accompanied by a multiparty political system has been a reality in Turkey since the early 1950s. However, as Grigoriadis argues, “a democratically consolidated state is not just a state where free democratic elections prevail but also the state where democratic values have been embraced by the majority of citizens after a long socialization process.”¹⁷¹ With this in mind, let us proceed with the comparison in terms of democratic consolidation between Greece and Turkey for the year 1999. The thesis will use the data provided by the Freedom House surveys.¹⁷² Freedom House measures the wider state of freedom in a country or territory, reflecting both governmental and non-governmental constraints. More specifically, in the Freedom House surveys, each country’s status can be “free,” “partial free,” or “not free.” These statuses are associated with two sets of criteria similar to those that Robert Dahl suggested. First, the political rights criteria consist of elements relevant with the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of the government. The second set of criteria is the civil liberties, such as freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy, and individual rights.

¹⁷⁰ For example Arend Lijphart in his book *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999) is using the same database.

¹⁷¹ Grigoriadis, *Trials of Europeanization*, 179.

¹⁷² Data available at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1> (accessed October 28,2009).

Each country and territory covered in the survey is assigned two numerical ratings, one for political rights and one for civil liberties, on a scale of 1 to 7; a rating of one indicates the highest degree of freedom and seven the least amount of freedom. Therefore, we can assume that the countries that are characterized by the Freedom House as “free” countries can also be regarded as democratic countries. Table 9 indicates the ratings for Greece and Turkey during the year 1999.

Country	Political Rights	Civil Liberties	Country's Status
Greece	1	3	Free
Turkey	4	5	Partly Free

Table 9. Comparison of Greece-Turkey Rating for the Year 1999.

As we can see from Table 10, Turkey has the status of a “partly free” country. The main reason for this status is the bad performance that Turkey had in the year 1999 in the sector of civil liberties, and also, in a smaller scale, in the sector of political rights. On the other hand, Greece seems to perform better in both sectors and especially in the field of political rights, where it achieved the highest degree of freedom.

To understand the deeper reasons for these indications of little freedom concerning the political rights and civil liberties of the Turkish citizens, we will first look at the political history of Turkey after the end of the Second World War. The first Turkish politician to talk publicly about the need for an opposition party in the political life of Turkey was Ismet Inonu. In one of his speeches on November 1, 1945, he emphasized the fact that the main problem of Turkish democracy was the absence of an opposition party.¹⁷³ Almost two months later a new party emerged in Turkey, the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*). In the elections of 1950, the Democrat Party, which had a more liberal agenda than its main opponent, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*), managed to

¹⁷³ Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 215.

win. When the Democrat Party came to power, its main purpose was to “broaden the scope of popular participation in Turkish politics and to show interest in the marginalized segments of Turkish society, especially the peasantry.”¹⁷⁴ Unfortunately, on April 27, 1960, a military coup erased all hope for the prevalence of a liberal regime in Turkey. Moreover, the 1960 coup was a good opportunity for the Kemalist bureaucracy to arrest many of the academics and officers that during the previous years had shown support toward the liberal regime of the Democrat Party. However, the Constitution that was announced on July 9, 1961, was more liberal than the previous one of 1924.¹⁷⁵ More specifically, under the new Constitution “the activities of new parties, trade unions, and religious groups enjoyed wider freedoms, and individual human rights were better protected”¹⁷⁶ On the other hand, the National Security Council (*Milli Guvenlik Kurulu*), as an official organ of the Turkish state, was incorporated into the 1961 Constitution. Initially, under the provisions of the 1960 Constitution, the National Security Council had the authority to offer information only to the elected government. However, the influence of the National Security Council’s recommendations “has gained strength over the decades by way of constitutional changes and amendments following military interventions.”¹⁷⁷ The Turkish military handed over the power to the politicians on October 1961 after the execution of the former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Zorlu, and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan, who were accused of violating the Constitution. Unfortunately, during the following years, the conflict between far left and far right groups did not stop, making political stability in Turkey very fragile.

¹⁷⁴ Grigoriadis, *Trials of Europeanization*, 29.

¹⁷⁵ For a succinct explanation of why the Turkish military decided to promote a new Constitution that included more liberal clauses, read, William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London: Routledge, 1994), 137–42.

¹⁷⁶ Grigoriadis, *Trials of Europeanization*, 29.

¹⁷⁷ Sevgi Drorian, “Turkey: Security, State and Society in Troubled Times,” *European Security* 14, no.2 (June 2005), 264.

The next intervention of the military in the political life of Turkey took place on March 12, 1971. The Turkish military released a three-point memorandum urging the elected government to impose strict measures in order to maintain public order. In the so-called “Coup of Memorandum,” military officials warned the government that if it was unable to bring stability to the country, then the military was ready to take power once again. The new regime that emerged in the political life of Turkey “rested on an unstable balance of power between civilian politicians and the military; it was neither a normal elected government, nor an outright military dictatorship which could entirely ignore parliamentary opposition.”¹⁷⁸ The main priority of the new regime was the restoration of law and order throughout the country. Therefore, it was important to repress any group viewed as leftist. Hence, the first step was to amend the Constitution of 1961 in order to restrict the range of political freedoms that already existed. Indeed, the new amended Constitution of 1971 made possible “the curtailment of constitutionally protected civil liberties by law, while press freedom, university and media autonomy were curbed.”¹⁷⁹ Alas, one more time, the civilian government failed to stop the clashes between militant leftist and rightist groups.

These unfavorable political conditions led to a new and more vigorous military intervention on September 12, 1980. This time the National Security Council headed by General Kenan Evren declared *coup d'état* and imposed a martial law. Furthermore, it dissolved the Parliament and the government, suspended all of the political parties and banned the trade unions. The military leadership changed the Constitution one more time and ratified it by referendum on November 7, 1982. The new Constitution limited the political rights and civil liberties that were granted by the 1961 Constitution. More specifically, “the constitutional protection of fundamental human, political, and social rights was made conditional, as these could be annulled, suspended, or limited on alleged grounds of national interest, public order, national security, or danger to the

¹⁷⁸ William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London: Routledge, 1994), 195.

¹⁷⁹ Grigoriadis, *Trials of Europeanization*, 30.

republican order.”¹⁸⁰ Additionally, the new Constitution increased the power and influence of the National Security Council, and the civilian government was obligated to “implement the decisions of the National Security Council to the letter.”¹⁸¹ Thus after 1982, the National Security Council constituted “the more powerful and decisive leg of a dual system of executive decision making, the council of ministers supplying the other leg.”¹⁸²

The end of the military junta in 1983 brought the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*) to the government. The main priority of the new government was the modernization of the Turkish economy by adopting liberal economic principles. Another important issue was the escalating conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which started in 1984 and reached its peak in 1994 when the PKK planned to declare its independence. Until 1997, there was no sign of efforts by the Turkish politicians moving toward the direction of political liberalization. On the contrary, on February 28, 1997 the military intervened again, this time by using “soft power” methods, in order to overthrow a coalition government led by pro-Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. In this case, the Turkish military leadership preferred not to directly intervene in the political life, for example, by declaring martial law or dissolving the Parliament, but instead started a propaganda campaign against the pro-Islamist coalition government using the media, intellectuals and academics. During the same year, the EU Summit in Luxembourg decided not to grant Turkey the status of a candidate country, and thus not to start the accession negotiations.

Until 1999, Turkey did not represent the best example of a Western-type democracy. The Constitution of 1982 did not promote a liberal approach to politics and it significantly constrained freedoms, political rights and civil liberties that in Europe were considered basic ingredients of a consolidated democracy. In the next section of this chapter, this thesis will present the efforts that Turkey

¹⁸⁰ Grigoriadis, *Trials of Europeanization*, 30.

¹⁸¹ Drorian, “Turkey: Security, State,” 264.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

made after 1999, when during the Helsinki Summit it officially became a candidate state, mainly through political reforms, in order to become a stronger democracy.

D. THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS IN TURKEY'S POLITICAL REFORM

In the following section, this thesis tries to evaluate whether Turkey's EU candidacy since 1999, which has been accompanied by strong support from Greece, has motivated the Turkish political leadership to adopt political and legal reforms that can further consolidate democracy in Turkey. The thesis does not claim that the Europeanization process, along with the change of Greece's stance toward Turkey's efforts for accession, was the only motive behind the decision of the Turkish political elite to initiate a democratization process. Interest groups within the Turkish society, supportive toward the consolidation of liberal democratic values, were preexisting, but they did not have the power to pressure more intensively towards this direction. After 1999, those interest groups "had a higher bargaining power due to the pressures coming from the EU and the necessity of meeting the EU's accession criteria."¹⁸³ The main argument of the thesis in this section is that the increased integration of liberal democratic norms in the political life of Turkey since 1999 is linked with the strengthening of the Turkish-EU relations, and with the new hope for membership that the rapprochement procedure between Greece and Turkey created the same year.

In the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit, the European Commission, through its 2001 Progress Report on Turkey, clearly stated:

¹⁸³ Meltem Muftuler Bac, "Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union," *South European Society and Politics* 10, no.1 (April 2005), 18.

the basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, but a number of fundamental issues, such as civilian control over the military, remain to be effectively addressed. Despite a number of constitutional, legislative and administrative changes, the actual human right situation as it affects individuals in Turkey needs improvement.¹⁸⁴

Indeed, Turkey in March 2001 submitted an ambitious National Programme for the adoption of the *acquis communautaire*. However, due to the severe economic crisis that hit the country at the end of 2000 and the disagreement that existed between the political parties of the coalition government regarding the range of the political reforms that they had to implement in order to fulfill the accession criteria, Turkey spent almost two years without proceeding to any significant political reforms.¹⁸⁵ There was no consensus about reforms that were touching issues that, according to the Turkish politicians, could affect in a negative way Turkey's sovereignty and security. This was probably the main reason behind the EU's decision during the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, to review after two years the case of Turkey concerning the start of the accession negotiation.

This decision alerted the Turkish political leadership, which during the next three years proceeded to important reforms, which included nine Constitutional packages, a new Civil Code, and a new Penal Code.¹⁸⁶ In order to evaluate if Turkey improved its democratic status, this thesis will examine what changes the Turkish government had applied concerning the freedom of association and the civil-military balance in Turkey's political life.

¹⁸⁴ Commission of the European Communities, *2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, (Brussels: European Union 2001), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/tu_en.pdf (accessed October 22, 2009).

¹⁸⁵ The political parties that had formed the coalition government in Turkey were the Motherland Party, the Democratic Left Party and the Nationalist Action Party.

¹⁸⁶ After the National elections of November 2002, the Justice and Development Party came in power and remains there until today. Prime Minister of Turkey since 2002 is Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

1. Freedom of Associations and the Evolution of Civil Society in Turkey

According to Diamond, “civil society is the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, self supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or a set of shared values.”¹⁸⁷ The existence of an active civil society is a strong proof of the establishment of a prospering liberal democratic system. The support of civil associations shows the willingness of the state to promote active citizen participation in the democratic procedure, and thus to consolidate democratic norms and values throughout the country.

One of the reasons that Turkey was considered to be a country with weak democratic values was the lack of a strong civil society. When Turkey became a candidate state, the EU started to pressure its political leadership toward the adoption of specific political reforms that would encourage the emergence of a vigorous civil society. Unfortunately, the civil society in Turkey during 1999 was non-existent. According to the 1982 Constitution (Article 33), “associations were prohibited from pursuing political aims, engaging in political activities, receiving support from or giving support to political parties, or taking joint action with labor unions or public professional organizations or foundations.”¹⁸⁸ Furthermore, according to the Law of Associations that was voted by the military junta in 1983, “founding an association for the purpose of engaging in any activity on the grounds of or in the name of any region, race, social class, religion, or sect was banned.”¹⁸⁹ In addition, the only language that the associations could use in their official contacts was Turkish.

As it was expected, the European Commission criticized this situation in its annual progress report on Turkey. More specifically, in its 1999 report, the European Commission commented that, “the actual uphold of civil and political

¹⁸⁷ Larry Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,” *Journal of Democracy* 5, no.3 (1994), 5.

¹⁸⁸ Grigoriadis, *Trials of Europeanization*, 56.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 57.

rights enshrined in the Turkish Constitution and law remains problematic.”¹⁹⁰ In the same report, the Commission also added that, “freedom of association is subject to certain limitations. Associations may not, for example, invite foreign associations to Turkey, issue public statements or organize any activities outside the premises without obtaining the prior permission of the authorities.”¹⁹¹ Finally, the European Commission, in its first report after the granting of the candidate country status to Turkey, reported, “major efforts are still required to guarantee freedom of association and assembly.”¹⁹²

After this intense criticism, the Turkish political leadership decided to proceed with the reforms shown in Table 10, with its main purpose to fulfill the EU’s accession criteria so that accession negotiations could begin.

¹⁹⁰ Commission of the European Communities, *1999 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession*, (Brussels: European Union 1999), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/turkey_en.pdf (accessed October 29, 2009) 14.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 16

¹⁹² Commission of the European Communities, *2000 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession*, (Brussels: European Union 2000), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2000/tu_en.pdf (accessed October 26, 2009), 17.

Date	Type of Reform	Major Change
October 2001	1 st Constitutional Reform	Freedom of association was guaranteed.
March 2002	2 nd Constitutional Reform	Removal of restrictions concerning the relations with international associations.
August 2002	3 rd Constitutional Reform	Permitted civil servants to establish associations. Permission granted for association activities concerning civil defense purposes.
January 2003	4 th Constitutional Reform	Permission granted free use of any language in their non-official contacts. Legal persons were allowed to join associations.
July 2004	New Law on Associations	Department of Associations was created within the Ministry of Interior. No restrictions on student associations. No limitations concerning race, ethnicity, religion, region for those who desire to establish or join an association. No need for permission to join foreign associations or open offices outside the country.

Table 10. Reforms Concerning the Freedom of Association

After the implementation of the above-mentioned reforms, the European Commission, in its latest report concerning Turkey, reported that the number of associations and their members increased, and the conditions for establishing an association were further simplified. According to the same report, “the legal framework on associations is broadly in line with European standards. However, considerable progress needs to be made as regards its implementation, as associations still face disproportionate scrutiny of their activities, which in some cases has led to judicial proceedings.”¹⁹³ Finally, the report referred to some

¹⁹³ Commission of the European Communities, *2009 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession*, (Brussels: European Union 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_en.pdf (accessed October 29, 2009), 19.

closure cases concerning associations related to educational issues, such as the opposition to the national security classes offered by military officers in schools.

Hence, the conclusion is that during the period from 1999 to 2009 a quantitative and qualitative growth of the Turkish civil society can be observed. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that there is room for further progress in this sector. In order for Turkey to come fully in line with the European legislation concerning issues such as freedom of association, the lack of trust between State institutions and civil organizations must be cease to exist.

2. Civil—Military Relations in Turkey

In all of the Western-type democracies, the sole responsibility for decisions on issues of national security is the democratically elected governments. The main role of the military leadership in every European country is only to obey and implement the decisions of the political leadership.

In Turkey, the civil-military relations are different because the Turkish military leadership can influence in a large extent the formulation of the national security agenda. As Drorian argues, “although it is widely acknowledged that the Turkish military accepts the ultimate legitimacy of civilian rule in principle, it has nevertheless been consolidating its political and economic autonomy through legal and constitutional provisions, thereby enabling the expansion of its powers into the policy agenda.”¹⁹⁴ The fact that the Turkish military has intervened four times since the end of World War II, in Turkey’s political life is a clear sign of the different perception that exists in Turkey about civil-military relations. According to the words of Kemal Ataturk, “whenever the Turkish nation has wanted to take a step up, it has always looked to the army as the leader of movements to achieve lofty national ideas. The Turkish nation...considers its army the guardian of its ideals.”¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ Drorian, “Turkey: Security, State,” 264.

¹⁹⁵ George Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics,” *The Middle East Journal* 19, no.1 (Winter 1995), 55.

Therefore, in this section, this thesis examines how the Europeanization efforts of Turkey after 1999 affected the influence that the Turkish military has in matters relating to political issues. As this thesis has already described, with the ratification of 1982 Constitution, the National Security Council became “the more powerful and decisive leg of a dual system of executive decision making, the council of ministers supplying the other leg.”¹⁹⁶ Moreover, the European Commission, in its progress report for Turkey clearly states,

there has been no changes in the role played by the National Security Council in Turkish political life. Its conclusions, statements and recommendations continue to strongly influence the political process. In addition, it appears that at present the views of the National Security Council in practice seriously limit the role played by the government. Moreover, there seems to be too little accountability to the Parliament with regard to defense and security matters.¹⁹⁷

Starting in 2001, the Turkish political leadership implemented political reforms with the main purpose to limit the political influence of the military leadership. More specifically, with the amendment of Article 118 of the Constitution, the number of civilian members in the composition of the National Security Council increased from five to nine, while the number of the military members remained at five. Additionally, the new Article clearly stated that the role of the National Security Council was only to provide recommendations to the elected government.

In July 2003, a new amendment to the Law on the National Security Council “abolished the extended executive and supervisory powers of the Council’s Secretary General.”¹⁹⁸ In addition, the same amendment removed the authority that the National Security Council had for unlimited access to any

¹⁹⁶ Drorian, “Turkey: Security, State,” 264. The National Security Council has been a part of the Constitution since 1961. Its influence increased during the 1980 coup. Many scholars consider it to be the institutionalization of the Turkish military’s influence over politics. Its main role is to develop the national security policy of Turkey.

¹⁹⁷ Commission of the European Communities 2000, 14.

¹⁹⁸ Grigoriadis, *Trials of Europeanization*, 83.

civilian agency. Finally, the new law stated, “the post of Secretary General would no longer be reserved exclusively for a military officer.”¹⁹⁹ Nevertheless, the most important reform concerning the National Security Council was implemented in 2004. Initially, the powers of the Council’s Secretariat General were limited. In particular, the National Security Council’s ability to autonomously investigate national security issues and independently manage the funds allocated to it came under the direct control of the Prime Minister. Furthermore, many services within the National Security Council were closed, and a significant staff reduction was conducted. Finally, for the first time in the history of the National Security Council, a civilian took the position of the Secretary General.²⁰⁰ As the European Commission commented, reforms over the last years concerning the functioning of the National Security Council have further shifted the balance of civil-military relations toward the civilians and encouraged public debate in this area”²⁰¹

Unfortunately, in the years that followed, reforms concerning the civil-military balance slowed down. This is evident from all the annual reports of the European Commission from the year 2004 and after. The main findings of these reports are the following:

- The armed forces have continued to exercise undue political influence via formal and informal mechanisms. Senior members of the armed forces have expressed on a large number of occasions their views on domestic and foreign policy issues going beyond their remit, including on Cyprus, ethnicity, the Southeast, secularism, political parties and other non-military matters.

¹⁹⁹ Grigoriadis, *Trials of Europeanization*, 83.

²⁰⁰ The first civilian Secretary General of the National Security Council was Mr. Yigit Alpogam, which was a high-rank diplomat.

²⁰¹ Commission of the European Communities, *2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession*, (Brussels: European Union 2004), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf (accessed October 25, 2009), 23.

- No change has been made to the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law or to the Law on the National Security Council. These define the roles and duties of the Turkish military and grant the military wide room for maneuver by providing a broad definition of national security.
- The 1997 EMASYA secret protocol on security, public order and assistance units remains in force unchanged. The protocol allows military operations to be carried out for internal security reasons under certain conditions without a request from the civilian authorities.
- No progress has been made on strengthening legislative oversight of the military budget and expenditure. Likewise, the Defense Industry Support Fund (SSDF), from which most procurement projects are financed, is still an extra-budgetary fund excluded from parliamentary scrutiny. Parliament has no mandate to develop security and defense policies.²⁰²

Overall, the EU's latest evaluation concerning civilian oversight of the military in Turkey stated specifically, "some progress has been made, in particular on limiting the jurisdiction of military courts. However, senior members of the armed forces have made statements on issues going beyond their remit, and full parliamentary oversight of defense expenditure needs to be ensured. The alleged involvement of military personnel in anti-government activities, disclosed by the investigation on Ergenekon, raises serious concerns."²⁰³

The civil-military relations in Turkey are a very complicated issue. Especially after the rise to power of Turkey's pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party, and despite all the legislative reforms that Prime Minister Erdogan and his government tried to implement, it seems as if the military

²⁰² Commission of the European Communities 2009, 10.

²⁰³ Ibid., 11.

leadership still enjoys its independency and the lack of direct control by the State. As Bac argues, “the military’s omnipotent power does not only come from the institutions, but from the fact that the Turkish military is still the most trusted institution in Turkey, and that declarations by military officials are still regarded as very important.”²⁰⁴

3. Overall Evaluation of Turkey’s Democratic Reforms

Turkey’s efforts for the adoption of rules and norms of liberal democracy did not stop at the strengthening of civil society or at the improvement of civil-military relations. The Turkish political leadership took further actions in order to bring the country closer to the Western democratic prototype. One of the most important reforms was the adoption of a new Civil Code in November 2001. According to the new code, “In case of divorce, a woman’s right to property accumulated during marriage would be recognized.”²⁰⁵ Overall, the new Civil Code was a major advance in terms of gender equality. Moreover, in August 2002, after an extensive constitutional reform, the Turkish political leadership decided to abolish the death penalty during peacetime, improved the previous “authoritarian” Anti-Terror law, and allowed free broadcasting of TV and Radio programs in languages other than Turkish. In addition, this constitutional reform package “opened the road for the retrial of all the cases that the European Court of Human Rights found to be in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights,”²⁰⁶ and recognized the Kurdish minority rights by increasing their freedom of expression and granting them additional cultural rights.

After the national elections of November 2002, the political scenery in Turkey changed radically. Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party won the elections and formed a majority government. The new government started its democratization attempts by ordering the retrial of all

²⁰⁴ Bac, “Turkey’s Political Reforms,” 27.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 22.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

the State Security Courts' cases. The most important case was that of the four Democracy Party Parliament Members who had been in jail since 1994, accused of supporting Kurdish separatism and terrorist acts in Turkey. The four politicians were released in June 2004 after the retrial of their case. This was a first sign of Turkey's decisiveness to implement reforms that would help toward the adoption of the EU accession criteria. Generally, Prime Minister Erdogan's government proceeds in many important reforms, such as the 2003 revision of the Penal Code that predicted severe punishment for torture and ill treatment cases. Another important reform was the adoption of Protocols 6 and 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights that lead respectively to the conversion of all death sentences to life imprisonment and to the abolishment of the death penalty even in wartime. Furthermore, the constitutional amendments of May 2004 led to the final abolishment of the State Security Courts, to the establishment of freedom of press, and above all, to the ratification of Article 90 of the constitution that grants priority to the international treaties ratified by the Turkish Parliament over the Constitutional Court. More specifically, Article 90 clearly states that, "international agreements duly put into effect carry the force of law. No appeal to the Constitutional Court can be made with regard to these agreements, on the ground that they are unconstitutional."²⁰⁷

In the period after 2005 and despite the initiation of the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey, the efforts of Turkey's political leadership toward EU accession declined. The main reason for this decreasing pace of the reform process was the domestic political instability produced by the conflict between Turkey's secularist establishment and the Islamist-rooted government of the Justice and Development Party. However, in November 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan's government announced its determination to grant additional rights to the Kurdish minority, such as allowing major Kurdish town names to be restored and allowing politicians to campaign to Kurds in their native

²⁰⁷The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Article 90, available at http://www.hri.org/docs/turkey/part_iii_1.html (Accessed October 16, 2009).

language.²⁰⁸ Moreover, the Turkish Minister of Interior Affairs Besir Atalay announced the establishment of an independent commission, whose main purpose will be to investigate human rights violations. More specifically, Atalay's speech on the Turkish Parliament emphasized that, "an independent anti-discrimination commission will be established and a bill related to this will be sent to parliament."²⁰⁹ The purpose of these reforms is to give back to Turkey the lost momentum and thus boost Turkey's hopes of EU membership.²¹⁰

The main conclusion of this section is that Turkey has made progress in the period after 1999 in the field of democratization and implementation of the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria. This is also evident from the Freedom House rating of Turkey for the year 2009. From the comparison in Table 11 between the 1999 and 2009 ratings yields a significant improvement in the sector of civil liberties and a sufficient improvement in the sector of political rights. Despite the fact that Turkey still has the status of a "partly free" state, the improvement of its democratic characteristics is evident. We can also see from Table 11 the comparison between Turkey and Greece for the year 2009. Greece remains a "Free" country according to Freedom House rating and it has improved its civil liberties sector during the last ten years.

²⁰⁸ Reuters, "Turkey Outlines Plans to Expand Kurdish Rights," *Deutsche Welle*, November 15, 2009, <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4891916,00.html> (accessed November 15, 2009).

²⁰⁹ Reuters, "Ankara Unveils Kurd Reforms," *Kathimerini*, November 14, 2009, http://www.ekathimerini.com/4Dcgi/4Dcgi/_w_articles_world_10_14/11/2009_112414 (accessed November 15, 2009).

²¹⁰ The main opposition parties fiercely oppose the reform process, arguing it threatens to undermine Turkey's unity.

Country	Year	Political Rights	Civil Liberties	Country's Status
Turkey	1999	4	5	Partly Free
Turkey	2009	3	3	Partly Free
Greece	1999	1	3	Free
Greece	2009	1	2	Free

Table 11. Comparison of Greece-Turkey Rating for the Years 1999–2009²¹¹

Thus, we can conclude that the rapprochement procedure had positive results in the field of democratization since both countries improved their democratic indexes. The important finding is that Turkey, which was the less democratic country of the dyad, and thus according to Russett and Oneal, the primary responsible for determining the likelihood of conflict, made important steps toward the adoption of liberal democratic norms and rules. As stated earlier in this section, “the influence of democratization is usually to lower the risk of disputes,”²¹² therefore the window of opportunity for a resolution of the Greco-Turkish disputes, namely the Cyprus issue and the delimitation of the Aegean Sea continental shelf, remains open. Of course, Turkey’s road to democratization and Europeanization is still long. As Grigoriadis noted, “the liberalization of Turkish political culture is far from complete but has achieved significant steps.”²¹³ Despite the important domestic political changes, an acceleration of the reform process is required in order for Turkey to receive, in December 2009, a positive answer from the EU concerning the fate of its accession negotiations.

²¹¹Data available at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15> (accessed October 28, 2009).

²¹² Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 120.

²¹³ Grigoriadis, *Trials of Europeanization*, 182.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VI. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE THIRD PILLAR OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

The third pillar of the Democratic Peace Theory is the common participation in intergovernmental organizations (IGO). Russett and Oneal, in their book *Triangulating Peace*, asked whether joint membership in IGOs also reduces the incidence of militarized disputes. Their hypothesis to be tested was the following, “the greater the numbers of IGOs in which both states of a dyad are members, the more forums there are for peaceful conflict resolution and the greater the prospects for peace.”²¹⁴ Their findings suggest that, “IGOs make an additional contribution to reducing the frequency of disputes above and beyond those of democracy and trade.”²¹⁵ Many scholars of international relations support the same argument.²¹⁶ More specifically, Boehmer emphasizes, “global politics is increasingly organized around institutions that foster cooperation by providing information and organizational structure, promoting norms and common belief systems, reducing transaction costs.....and leading to a decline in militarized violence.”²¹⁷

Since the purpose of this thesis is not to analyze the debate between functionalist, constructivists and institutionalists on the one side and realists on the opposite side, the thesis will accept the findings of the supporters of the Democratic Peace Theory. Thus, the full integration of Turkey in the EU is considered a positive step toward the establishment of peaceful relations between the two countries. Therefore, in this section the thesis will try to give an answer to the following set of questions:

²¹⁴ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 170.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 172.

²¹⁶ Ernst Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964); Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” *International Security* 20, no.1 (1995); Keohane and Nye 1989.

²¹⁷ Charles Boehmer, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom, “Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?” *World Politics* 57, (October 2004), 3.

- Why has the common participation of Greece and Turkey in NATO failed to produce the virtuous circles that can lead to a resolution of the Greco-Turkish disputes?
- Is the EU more capable of resolving these issues? Why does Greece prefer to transfer its bilateral problems with Turkey to the EU field? Does the EU offer more opportunities for peaceful resolution of the Greco-Turkish disputes than NATO?

1. The Greco-Turkish Relations in the Context of NATO

Greece and Turkey have common participation in many IGOs, such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the Union for the Mediterranean, and NATO. Unfortunately, and in contradiction with the findings of Russett and Oneal, the cooperation through these IGOs has not translated into a constructive force that would help the two neighboring countries bridge their differences. This section will examine why the common participation of the two countries in NATO failed to resolve the Greco-Turkish disputes.²¹⁸

As already mentioned in Chapter II, Greece perceives Turkey's intention to change the status-quo in the Aegean Sea as a major threat to its security. From the first years of its membership in NATO, Greece considered the Alliance as a very effective way of balancing Turkey.²¹⁹ Greek politicians realized a few years after the end of the Greek Civil War that the main threat for Greece's security was not the Warsaw Pact but Turkey. Thus their main efforts were to encourage NATO to "become more actively engaged in its defense and to turn it into a security providing organization."²²⁰ This is a natural reaction for a small state like Greece. As Krebs argues, "small states, whether primarily revisionist or

²¹⁸ Both countries have been members of NATO since 1952.

²¹⁹ Kenneth Mackenzie, "Greece and Turkey: Disarray on NATO's Southern Flank," *Conflict Studies* 154, (1983), 117.

²²⁰ Panayotis Tsakonas, and Antonis Tournikiotis, "Greece's Elusive Quest for Security Providers: The 'Expectations-Reality Gap,'" *Security Dialogue* 34, no.3, (2003), 302.

status quo, join alliances because they cannot attain their central values alone, and their success in achieving their aims depends less on their own capabilities than on the strength and credibility of their large patrons.”²²¹ In the case of Greece, this statement is not accurate, since Greece also made efforts to balance internally the Turkish threat by having one of the highest defense budgets of the members of the alliance. Greece’s policy *vis-à-vis* Turkey was based on a combination of internal (strong, well-equipped Armed Forces) and external (participation in IGOs, namely NATO) balancing.

Greece’s strategic thinking changed after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. This was the turning point in NATO-Greek relations. NATO’s inability to interfere in the Cyprus crisis bothered the new democratic leadership of Greece. Even if NATO was unable to play a substantial role, “paralyzed as it was at the prospect of a war between two of its members,”²²² the desire to avoid the internationalization of the crisis, supported by the United States and England, was provocative for Greece.²²³ More specifically, Greece after its military defeat and diplomatic humiliation understood that it had to reconsider its position in the alliance. Despite the neutral stance of NATO in the Cyprus crisis, in the following years Greece made unsuccessful efforts in order to get an official guarantee from NATO for their borders with Turkey. As Kalaitzaki noted, “Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou went further by asking NATO to guarantee Greece’s Eastern borders. The Greek demand for border guarantees was repeated for some years but then shelved, as neither Washington nor NATO (let alone Turkey) was inclined to accept this kind of an arrangement.”²²⁴

²²¹ Ronald Krebs, “Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict,” *International Organization*, 53, no.2, (Spring 1999), 350.

²²² Ivar-Andre Slengesol, “A Bad Show? The United States and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 54, (Spring, 2000), 126.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Theodora Kalaitzaki, “US Mediation in Greek-Turkish Disputes since 1954,” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 74, (Spring, 2005), 118.

Hence, the “expectation-reality gap” made its appearance and constituted one of the main reasons that led Greece to transfer its bilateral problems with Turkey to the EU field. According to Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, the term “expectation-reality gap”, refers to the gap “between Greece’s efforts to turn existing Euro-Atlantic institutions into security providers and cases indicating the inability of those security institutions to meet Greece’s expectations.”²²⁵ Therefore, Greece’s political leaders perceived NATO’s indifference concerning the problems that Greece had with Turkey, as a sign that the alliance considered Turkey to be a more important ally than Greece. The impression that within NATO the political balance of power favored Turkey forced Greece to search for alternative ways of balancing this deficit.

Furthermore, the common participation of Greece and Turkey in NATO did not manage to create the virtuous circles that could lead to a peaceful resolution of their bilateral problems because the alliance did not have an effective organizational procedure for resolution of conflicts between the member states. As retired British diplomat Rodric Braithwaite stated, “Greece and Turkey have more than once been on the verge of war. They were prevented from going over not by their common membership of NATO, but by the U.S pressure unilaterally applied.”²²⁶ For example, in the so-called “Aegean dispute,” that has been the main problem between the two countries since 1974, NATO “followed a hands-off policy intended to project the alliance impartiality and has encouraged both nations to settle their disputes bilaterally. It attempted neither to take a more active role as a mediator nor to take public positions on the bilateral dispute.”²²⁷ Until today, NATO did not succeed in helping toward a common acceptable solution of the Greco-Turkish disputes. However, according to Krebs, “despite the continual armed skirmishes and the virtually continuous war of words, the

²²⁵ Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, “Greece’s Elusive Quest,” 302.

²²⁶ Rodric Braithwaite, “Bringing Russia In,” *Prospect*, (June 1997), 36, quoted in David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed. The Alliance’s New Role International Security*, (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 52.

²²⁷ Kalaitzaki, “US Mediation,” 119.

dispute never did erupt into full-fledged war, and for that NATO deserves some credit.”²²⁸ The previous statement is true, but it was not enough to alter Greece’s political leadership decision to seek alternative ways of resolving these problematic issues.

At this point, it is useful to examine how the nature and the character of NATO, as one of the leading intergovernmental organizations, influence Greece’s decision to transfer the center of gravity concerning the Greco-Turkish disputes, from NATO to the EU. When Greece and Turkey joined NATO, they had only one common enemy, the Warsaw Pact. The factor that enhanced the resurrection of old conflicts that had been put aside by both countries was the security that the alliance provided against the common threat, regardless the contribution of each state to the alliance’s purposes. As Krebs argues, “with the deterrence of the primary security threat no longer falling on their shoulders, small-state decision makers turn inward and focus more intently on secondary concerns, particularly their long-standing conflicts with regional rivals.”²²⁹ Therefore, the common membership of Greece and Turkey in NATO, instead of creating an environment of cooperation, led to a shift in the foreign policy focus of both countries. From the Greek perspective, Turkey, having secured the threat from the Warsaw Pact, revealed its revisionist intentions concerning its borders with Greece. On the other hand, Greece stopped seeing the Warsaw Pact as the primary threat to its security and officially announced that the main security concern is the “threat from the East.”²³⁰

Moreover, the supplying of both countries with weapons by the alliance in order to build up their defenses, and thus contribute to the collective security of NATO, created additional problems in their relations. Unfortunately, Turkey had proved that it has no constraints in using military equipment provided by the

²²⁸ Krebs, “Perverse Institutionalism,” 369.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 350.

²³⁰ Greek fears that Turkey is capable of using military force, even against a NATO ally, were increased by the fact that the two countries have lengthy sea and land borders, thus a surprise attack was possible.

alliance for collective purposes against a European country (Cyprus in this case). Most of the Greek policymakers perceived the fact that “a NATO member, using NATO weapons, had taken 35,000 troops out of the NATO structure in order to occupy another democratic European country,”²³¹ as a sign of NATO’s ineptness or apathy to obstruct a military conflict between two of its members. Turkey’s punishment for the invasion and occupation of 37 percent of Cyprus’ territory was the imposition by the American Congress of an arms embargo that lasted from February 5, 1975, until September 13, 1978.²³² Therefore, Greece has no guarantee that Turkey will not use weapons intended for use against enemies of the alliance against an ally, especially now that NATO seems confused about who the enemy is and what its mission is.

Another characteristic of all intergovernmental organizations that NATO could take advantage of in order to contribute to the solution of the Greco-Turkish disputes was that of the “issue linkage.” According to neoliberalism institutionalism, intergovernmental organizations can promote cooperation “by linking issue areas, creating greater opportunities for side payments and compromise.”²³³ In Keohane words, “clustering of issues under a regime facilitates side payments among these issues: more potential quids are available for the quo.”²³⁴ The Greek perspective on this issue is that Turkey took advantage of the preferential treatment it received from the major forces in the alliance, namely the United States, and manipulated the issue-linking procedures of NATO in order to expand the conflict with Greece in issues that can produce

²³¹ Fotios Moustakis, and Michael Shenan, “Greek Security Policy after the Cold War,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 21, no.3 (2000), 96.

²³² This development, among others, created a sense of disappointment and distrust on the Greek side toward the United States. For more details read, Christos Kassimeris, “The Inconsistency of United States Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the Cyprus Invasion: The Turkish Arms Embargo and its Termination,” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 26, (2008): 91–114.

²³³ Krebs, “Perverse Institutionalism,” 354.

²³⁴ Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 91.

future gains. The Greek side maintains that it is not accidental that until 1974, the only problem between Greece and Turkey was Cyprus, and after the invasion of Cyprus, Turkey started to challenge Greece in numerous issues. More specifically, Turkey violated Greek airspace in the Aegean on a daily basis. Challenged the Aegean *status quo* by supporting the theory of “grey zones,” declared a *casus belli* against Greece in the case of an extension of its territorial waters from six to twelve miles, and refused to submit the dispute over the delimitation of the Aegean Sea continental shelf to the International Court of Justice. The neutral stance of NATO in all the above-mentioned issues allowed Turkey to harbor revisionist aspirations and disappointed or frustrated Greece.

In the post Cold War era, the international landscape changed dramatically. The international system transformed from a bipolar to a unipolar system. According to Walt, “a unipolar system is one in which a single state controls a disproportionate share of the politically relevant resources of the system.”²³⁵ In this new international environment, Greece had to rethink its strategy toward Turkey and NATO. The unipolar international system played an important role in this decision. As Walt argues, “alliances depend in part on credibility, and unipolarity is likely to have somewhat contradictory effects on the role that credibility plays in contemporary alliances. Thus, because the unipole has less need for allies, its partners have more reason to doubt any pledges it does make.”²³⁶ Therefore, Greece having the bitter experience of the Cold War era, and regarding the U.S. and NATO support concerning its bilateral disputes with Turkey, had one more reason to transfer all the problematic issues to the EU field.

Furthermore, due to the unipolar nature of the international system, Walt supports that, “medium and small powers will have less influence and leverage than they enjoyed under bipolarity...this will encourage them to rely on

²³⁵ Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” *World Politics* 61, no.1 (January 2009), 91.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 97.

alternative strategies of alliance maintenance.”²³⁷ Again, Greece had realized early on that Turkey, mainly due to its geographical position, population and religion, was a more valuable ally for NATO. Any advantage that Greece had *vis-à-vis* Turkey concerning their common participation in NATO was minimized. Hence, if it was difficult to influence the major power of the alliance during the Cold War era, in the contemporary unipolar world the chance of that happening was null. Thus, shifting the prime focus of its foreign policy toward the EU was an easy and logical decision for Greece’s policymakers.

Greece believes that the only threat for its security is Turkey. In order to deal with this threat more effectively, all the Greek governments, after the end of World War II, were trying to engage NATO in its balancing policy toward Turkey. Unfortunately for Greece, “numerous examples can be advanced to illustrate the expectations-reality gap that Greek governments have experienced in their efforts to turn NATO into security-providing bulwark.”²³⁸ Thus, Greece decided to alter its stance by seeking solutions to its long-lasting problems with Turkey in the EU field. The next section of this chapter will examine why Greece shifted the prime focus of its foreign policy to the EU level and whether the EU is more capable than NATO of contributing to a peaceful resolution of the Greco-Turkish disputes.

2. The Greco-Turkish Relations in the European Union’s Context

During the years before the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Greece’s stance toward Turkey’s aspiration for accession in the EU was not supportive. Greece kept an obstructive stance against Turkey’s candidacy and at the same time did its best to promote the candidacy of Cyprus. At the end of 1998, a shift of the Greek foreign policy concerning its bilateral relation with Turkey took place during the meeting of the European Council in Helsinki. In this meeting, Greece agreed in granting Turkey the status of a candidate country for the EU.

²³⁷ Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar,” 98.

²³⁸ Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, “Greece’s Elusive Quest,” 311.

The rationale behind Greece's change of stance is simple. Greek policymakers approached Turkey's quest for EU membership positively but always thinking in terms of security, mainly linked with the Aegean and Cyprus issues. Greece understood, especially after the "Imia crisis" of 1996, that the maintenance of a hostile atmosphere, or even worse, the initiation of a military conflict, would harm Greece's national interests. The "Imia crisis" also made clear to Greece that it can no longer rely on NATO and the United States for protection against the perceived "revisionist policy" of Turkey. In addition, it became evident that the internal balancing efforts that Greece made during the previous decades, mainly through enormous spending in defense equipment, were not enough to deter Turkey. Therefore, Greece, with the challenge of membership in the European Monetary Union ahead of it, would not be able to continue spending annually almost 4.5 percent of its GDP for defense purposes.²³⁹ Hence, the only way to improve its deterrence posture toward Turkey was the adoption of an alternative and more effective external balancing doctrine.

Greece decided to transfer its problematic relations with Turkey to the EU because, as Ifantis argues, "The EU was the best available forum for setting priorities and placing demands in accordance with European principles, on those countries wishing to become members."²⁴⁰ Furthermore, Greece, by supporting Turkey's EU vocation during the Helsinki Summit, attempted to take advantage of its "monopoly in the EU arena to garner political support in its bilateral dispute, and its capacity to block Turkish entry into the Community, has provided it with a powerful lever with which to wring concession from Turkey."²⁴¹ It was evident that for Greece, the Helsinki Summit "has been the departure point for engaging

²³⁹ In order for Greece to become a member of the European Monetary Union, the implementation of a very strict economic program, imposed by the EU, had to be fulfilled.

²⁴⁰ Kostas Ifantis, "Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations: A View from Greece," in *Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations*, ed. Nathalie Tocci (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2007), 61.

²⁴¹ Krebs, "Perverse Institutionalism," 366.

Turkey in a context in which Greece has enjoyed a comparative advantage, thus making the EU a major determinant in Greek-Turkish relations.”²⁴²

Greece adopted this new strategy for one more reason that is relevant with the nature of the EU as an intergovernmental organization. More specifically, from the birth of the EU, its members managed to remove one of the main obstacles to cooperation between them, namely “the fear that the greater advantage of one would be translated into military force to be used against the other.”²⁴³ Therefore, the main difference between NATO and the EU in terms of principles was that the members of NATO “are compelled to ask not ‘Will both of us gain?’ but ‘Who will gain more?’”²⁴⁴ While the EU member state clearly, that “by cooperation all can gain something even if all do not gain equally.”²⁴⁵ This different approach of international cooperation that the EU has as its main policy is what made Greece believe that “its own economic and strategic interests would not be properly served if Turkey was left isolated and pushed further away from the European sphere of influence. There was also a realization by the Greek political and business elites that as the two societies prospered, mutual economic gains in terms of expansion of trade, investment and tourism would be of mutual benefit.”²⁴⁶ Thus, Greece expected that by “increasing social, political and economic interaction with Turkey, with the latter’s adaption to European normative pressures, may eventually bring about a transformation of the Turkish

²⁴² Kostas Ifantis, and Eleni Fotiou, “Greek Stakeholders in the EU-Turkey Debate,” in *Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy*, ed. Nathalie Tocci (Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali, 2009), 86.

²⁴³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 70.

²⁴⁴ Waltz, *Theory of International*, 105.

²⁴⁵ Russett, *Grasping the Democratic*, 24.

²⁴⁶ Ziya Onis, “Luxemburg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations,” *Government and Opposition* 35, no.4 (2003), 473.

political system and foreign policy, rendering the country more democratic and less 'revisionist'. This would allow for a gradual convergence of bilateral security perceptions and interests."²⁴⁷

Finally, Greece preferred to transfer its bilateral disputes with Turkey to the EU level because the EU adopted Greece's view that the accession of Turkey to the Union is directly linked with the resolution of the "Aegean dispute" and the solution of the Cyprus issue.²⁴⁸ The EU proved its determination to adopt Greece's security concerns *vis-à-vis* Turkey in the Helsinki Summit. More specifically, the EU clearly stated in the Presidency Conclusion of the Summit that Turkish claims concerning the 'gray zones' in the Aegean and the dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf had to be submitted to the International Court of Justice, if all other efforts failed. In addition, the accession of Cyprus to the EU would not be conditional on the resolution of the Cyprus problem.²⁴⁹

Greece's support to Turkey's EU vocation was not without conditions. Greece desires Turkey's transformation to a purely liberal democracy since this event will create virtuous circles in their bilateral relation and will eventually lead to a peaceful coexistence and cooperation. "A stable, democratic and prosperous Turkey would be a reliable neighbor and partner to Greece."²⁵⁰ However as a prominent Turkish scholar observed, "After Helsinki the ball is firmly in Turkey's court in the sense that it has to undertake the radical reforms in the domestic sphere both in the arenas of democratization and economic policy reforms in

²⁴⁷ Ifantis, "Conditionality, Impact," 86–87.

²⁴⁸ According to the Negotiation Framework Protocol for Turkey that signed in October 3, 2005, Turkey, in addition to the Copenhagen criteria, had to fulfill three additional conditions relevant to the resolution of the Cyprus issue and to the problematic Greek-Turkish relations. For more details, see page 61 of this thesis.

²⁴⁹ Panayotis Tsakonas and Thanos Dokos, "Greek-Turkish Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century: A view from Athens," in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, ed. Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 101–126.

²⁵⁰ Ifantis, "Conditionality, Impact," 61

order to qualify for full membership. Stated somewhat differently, the door is open, provided the necessary conditions are satisfied.”²⁵¹

3. Progress on the Greek-Turkish “High Politics” Issues

In this section, the thesis will evaluate whether Turkey reciprocates Greece’s shift of policy by adopting a more cooperative stance on the issues that are poisoning the Greek-Turkish relations.

Starting with the Cyprus issue, Turkey has not changed its stance since 1999. Thus, until now, Turkey has not officially recognized the Republic of Cyprus as an independent state, and it maintains almost 25,000 fully equipped soldiers in the occupied Northern part of the island. Furthermore, despite the fact that Cyprus became a member of the EU in 2004, Turkey still refuses to implement the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement, signed on July 29, 2005, and hence, it does not open its ports and airports to the Cyprus commercial fleet, obstructing the free circulation of goods and people. Turkey also continues to veto Cyprus’ application for participation in intergovernmental organizations that it is already a member of, such as Partnership for Peace and NATO. It is evident that “without progress based on the reality of Cyprus being a sovereign member of the UN and a full member of the EU, the current rapprochement will be hard to sustain over time.”²⁵²

Furthermore, Turkey continues to violate daily the Greek national airspace. The following figure presents the numbers of violations as well as the number of Turkish Air Force’s fighter jets that have illegally entered the Greek national airspace annually since 1999.

²⁵¹ Onis, “Luxemburg, Helsinki,” 476.

²⁵² Ifantis, “Conditionality, Impact,” 65.




Figure 4. Violation of Greek National Airspace by the Turkish Air Force




Figure 5. Dogfights between Greek and Turkish Fighter Jets²⁵³

²⁵³ From: Unclassified data of the Hellenic Minister of Defense. Author's personal archive.

Figure 5 presents the number of dogfights between Greek and Turkish fighter jets. Both figures show that after 1999, Turkey, instead of reducing the number of violations, increased its illegal activity in the Aegean due to the shift of Greece's foreign policy, especially after 2001. More intense activity of the Turkish Air Force is observed during the years 2002, 2003 and 2005. However, even the numbers for the year 2008 is almost 10 percent higher in the number of violations, 30 percent higher in the number of dogfights and almost 230 percent higher in the number of fighter jets that performed violations, compared to the data of 1999. This data shows that Turkey not only upgraded its aggressive stance in the Aegean quantitative, but also in the qualitative since during the last year larger groups of fighter jets proceeded to violate Greece's national airspace. These actions must be avoided because, as the former US Ambassador to Greece stated, "I am convinced that Greece and Turkey want to avoid conflict, but when you have mock dogfights, you're going to run a little bit of risk."²⁵⁴ Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyanni expressed the disappointment of the Greek government for the continuous tension in the Aegean during one of the last meetings of the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council. More specifically, Mrs. Bakoyanni stated, "Turkey's accession negotiations were based on principles and a clear negotiating framework that clearly provide for an obligation to respect good neighborly relations and peaceful resolution of differences." She also added, "over the past few weeks, Turkey had been following a policy of provocation with successive overflights by Turkish military aircrafts over Greek territory and an attempt to establish claims to parts of Greece's continental shelf. This policy is unacceptable."²⁵⁵

²⁵⁴ Statement of Nicholas Burns. U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Athens News, October 31, 2009 available at <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/apeen/1998/98-10-31.apeen.html> (accessed August 25, 2009).

²⁵⁵ Clive Levier - Sawyres, "Air Space?" *The Sofia Echo*, July 31, 2009, <http://sofiaecho.com/2009/07/31/763573-air-space> (accessed September 22, 2009).

Overall, Greece's belief is that Turkey is not corresponding positively to its diplomatic openings. Despite the fact that Greece is a sincere supporter of Turkey's EU bid, Greek policymakers believe that the Turkish side has not made any efforts during the last ten years that can contribute to the resolution of the problematic bilateral issues.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VII. CONCLUSION

The European Council Helsinki Summit marked the initiation of the rapprochement procedure between Turkey and Greece, a dyad that for many decades was a source of instability in the Eastern part of Europe. After 1999, Greece abandoned the “Cold War rhetoric” in its relation with Turkey and shifted its foreign policy toward a more moderate stance by raising its veto regarding Turkey’s accession in the EU. Greece’s new foreign policy has many common elements with the Democratic Peace Theory of international relations. Hence, this thesis asks the following question: do the Greco-Turkish peaceful relations from 1999 until today fits the Democratic Peace Theory?

In Chapter IV, an examination of macroeconomic indexes and trade statistics of both countries revealed that the first pillar of the Democratic Peace Theory, namely economic interdependence, is very weak. More specifically the analysis of the data proved that both countries did not reach the expected threshold in their bilateral economic activities, beyond which the created economic interdependence would facilitate the establishment of the virtuous circles necessary for the peaceful resolution of their bilateral problematic issues.

The other two pillars of the theory, democratic consolidation and common participation in international organization, were examined in Chapter V and VI respectively. In the sector of democracy, Turkey has made important steps during the last ten years. However, improvement must be made in many sections of Turkey’s political rights, such as minority rights, gender equality, quality of civil society, freedom of expression, civil-military relation, etc. Turkey’s road to democratization and Europeanization is still long. Despite the important domestic political changes, an acceleration of the reform process is required in order for Turkey to receive, in December 2009, a positive answer from the EU concerning the fate of its accession negotiations. However, the findings of this thesis showed

that the democratic pillar of the Democratic Peace Theory is the element that plays a more significant role in the promotion of peace and stability between the two countries.

The common participation of Greece and Turkey in numerous intergovernmental organizations did not help toward a common acceptable solution of their bilateral disputes, namely the delimitation of the Aegean Sea continental shelf and the Cyprus issue. Unfortunately, Turkey continues until today to violate on a daily basis Greece's national airspace and territorial waters; it has not revoked the 1995 *casus belli* threat, and it continues to question the legal status of a large number of Aegean Sea's islands and islets by supporting its "grey-zones" theory. Moreover, despite the fact that Cyprus has been a member of the EU since May 1, 2004, Turkey insists on keeping its port and airport facilities closed to Cyprus' commercial fleet. Finally, Turkey refuses to recognize the Republic of Cyprus as an independent state.

The evidence leads to the conclusion that the Greco-Turkish rapprochement procedure lacks reciprocity. Turkey, instead of addressing the high politics issues that constitute the heart of the problem, is just articulating cooperative rhetoric and employing symbolic gestures concerning low politics issues. In contrast, Greece continues to support the European aspirations of Turkey, despite the fact that it had many opportunities during the last ten years to veto Turkey's negotiations with the EU. However, the maintenance of Greece's stance has inherent limits if not accompanied by reciprocal gestures. It may prove difficult for future Greek governments to sustain domestic support for Turkey in the long run. It is also very useful to examine what percentage the Greek public opinion supports Turkey's efforts for accession in the EU. According to the data available only for the period from 2000 to 2006, Greek public opinion does not support Turkey's EU bid. More specifically, the higher percentage of support was observed during 2000, right after the catastrophic earthquakes that

hit both countries, when it reached 40 percent. For the rest of the years, the public support for Turkey's efforts remained low, at around 20 percent.²⁵⁶

In the period from 1999 until today, Greece and Turkey avoid a major crisis that could bring them close to a military conflict.²⁵⁷ Thus, a conclusion of this thesis could be that the major finding of the Democratic Peace Theory, namely that democracies do not fight each other, is valid in the case of the Greco-Turkish dyad. However, as Jane Addams believed, "peace is not merely an absence of war."²⁵⁸ This is an unpleasant reality, especially in the case of Greece and Turkey, because it is difficult to claim that a peaceful relationship exists when the causes of all the previous crises are still present and one of the two states seems unwilling to contribute to a prosperous coexistence.

In sum, the evidence presented in this thesis prove that the rapprochement procedure that Greece initiated in 1999 has not yet produced the desirable virtuous circles, which the Democratic Peace Theory predicts, in the Greco-Turkish relations. On the contrary, the security concerns of Greece remain unaltered despite the efforts for rapprochement that all the Greek governments made after 1999. Therefore, the thesis concludes that the Democratic Peace Theory cannot explain the peaceful relations between the two countries since 1999 sufficiently.

The view of the author is that Greece has to act decisively and it must send a clear sign to Turkey. The best opportunity for Greece to demonstrate to Turkey that it must play by the EU's "rules of the game" that all the previous candidate states have followed, if of course it still wishes to become a member of the EU, is the European Council of December 2009. Since Turkey did not fulfill the criteria described in the Negotiating Framework Agreement and the

²⁵⁶ Antonis Kotsiaros, *The European Public Opinion and Turkey*, Research Unit: Turkey-Economy, Politics and International Relations (Athens: Institute of European Integration and Policy, 2007) available at <http://eeep.pspa.uoa.gr> (accessed August 10, 2009).

²⁵⁷ The last crisis that almost led the two countries to war was the "Imia crisis" in 1996.

²⁵⁸ Jane Addams. American Social Reformer, Peace Activist. 1931 Nobel Peace Prize Winner.

Accession Partnership document, Greece must propose the temporary freezing of the negotiation procedures for all the chapters of the *acquis*, at least until Turkey exhibits some feasible signs of response to the Greek efforts for rapprochement. A good start for Turkey's policymakers will be to accept the fact that the accession negotiations are not a bargaining procedure. The sooner Turkey understands that the road to the European family passes through the full implementation of all the changes required by the *acquis*, the better Greco-Turkish relations evolve.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Arapoglou, Stelios. *Dispute in the Aegean Sea, the Imia/Kardak Crisis*. Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, 2002.
- Athanasopoulos, Haralambos. *Greece, Turkey and the Aegean Sea: a Case Study of International Law*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2001.
- Bac, Muftuler, Meltem. "Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union." *South European Society and Politics* 10, no.1 (April 2005): 17–31.
- Baslar, Kemal. "Two Facets of the Aegean Sea Dispute: de lege lata and de lege ferende." In *Turkey and International Law*, edited by Kemal Baslar, 1–39. Ankara: Ozen Publications, 2001.
- Bearce, David H., and Sawa Omori. "How Do Commercial Institutions Promote Peace?" *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no.6 (November 2005): 659–78.
- Bennett, Scott. "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1985." *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 4 (1998): 1200–32.
- Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. "Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?" *World Politics* 57, (October 2004): 1–38.
- Bolukbasi, Deniz. *The Aegean Disputes, a Unique Case in International Law*. London: Cavendish Publishing, 2004.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.
- , James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." *The American Political Science Review* 93, no.4 (December 1999): 791–807.
- Chan, Steve. "In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise." *Mershon International Studies Review* 41, no.1 (May 1997): 59–91.
- Clifton, Morgan T., and Sally Howard Campbell. "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, (June 1991): 187–211.
- Commission of the European Communities. *1998 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*. Brussels: European Union 1998.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/turkey_en.pdf (accessed October 22, 2009).

- Commission of the European Communities. *1999 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*. Brussels: European Union 1999.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/turkey_en.pdf (accessed October 29, 2009).
- Commission of the European Communities. *2000 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*. Brussels: European Union 2000.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2000/tu_en.pdf (accessed October 26, 2009).
- Commission of the European Communities. *2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*. Brussels: European Union 2001.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/tu_en.pdf (accessed October 22, 2009).
- Commission of the European Communities. *2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*. Brussels: European Union 2002.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/tu_en.pdf (accessed October 27, 2009).
- Commission of the European Communities. *2003 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*. Brussels: European Union 2003.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/rr_tk_final_en.pdf (accessed October 25, 2009).
- Commission of the European Communities. *2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*. Brussels: European Union 2004.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf (accessed October 25, 2009).
- Commission of the European Communities. *2005 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*. Brussels: European Union 2005.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/package/sec_1426_final_progress_report_tr_en.pdf (accessed October 25, 2009).
- Commission of the European Communities. *2006 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*. Brussels: European Union 2006.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/tr_sec_1390_en.pdf (accessed October 21, 2009).
- Commission of the European Communities. *2007 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*. Brussels: European Union 2007.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf (accessed October 27, 2009).

- Commission of the European Communities. *2008 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*. Brussels: European Union 2008.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key_documents/reports_nov_2008/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf (accessed October 22, 2009).
- Commission of the European Communities. *2009 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*. Brussels: European Union 2009.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_en.pdf (accessed October 29, 2009).
- Couloumbis, Theodoros. *The United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle*. New York: Praeger Press, 1983.
- Dahl, Robert, A. *Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
- De Vries, Michael S. "Interdependence, Cooperation and Conflict: An Empirical Analysis." *Journal of Peace Research* 27, (1990): 429–44.
- Deudney, Daniel. "The International Sources of Soviet Change." *International Security* 16, no.3 (1991): 74–118.
- Diamond, Larry. "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation." *Journal of Democracy* 5, no.3 (1994): 5–27.
- Dinan, Desmond. *Ever Closer Union. An Introduction to European Integration*. Boulder CO & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.
- Dixon, William J. "Democracy and the Management of International Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, (1993): 42–68.
- Domke, William K. *War and Changing Global System*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.
- Dotas, Dimitris. "The Aegean Dispute and its Implications for the U.S. Policy." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2000.
- Doyle Michael W. "Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace." *The American Political Science Review*, 99, no.3 (August 2005): 463–66.
- Drorian, Sevgi. "Turkey: Security, State and Society in Troubled Times." *European Security* 14, no.2 (June 2005): 255–75.
- Fearon, James D. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88, (1994): 577–92.

———. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” *International Organization* 49, (1995): 379–414.

Gowa Joanne, and Edward D. Mansfield. “Power Politics and International Trade.” *American Political Science Review* 87, (1993): 408–20.

———. *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

———. “Democratic States and International Disputes.” *International Organization* 49, (1995): 511–22.

Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. *Trials of Europeanization. Turkish Political Culture and the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Haas, Ernst. *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964.

Hale, William. *Turkish Politics and the Military*. London: Routledge, 1994.

Harris, George. “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics.” *The Middle East Journal* 19, no.1 (Winter 1995): 45–59.

Ifantis, Kostas. “Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations: A View from Greece.” in *Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations*, edited by Nathalie Tocci, 58–65. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2007.

———, and Eleni Fotiou. “Greek Stakeholders in the EU-Turkey Debate.” in *Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy*, edited by Nathalie Tocci, 85–102. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2009.

Kalaitzaki, Theodora. “US Mediation in Greek-Turkish Disputes since 1954.” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 74, (Spring, 2005), 106–24.

Karamanlis, Konstantinos. “Greece: The E.U’s Anchor of Stability in a Troubled Region.” *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no.2 (Spring, 2000): 7–11.

Keohane, Robert. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little Brown, 1977.

- Kotios, Angelos, and George Petrakos. "The Industrial and Trade Structure of the Greek and Turkish Economies: Possibilities for Cooperation," in *Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation. A Political Economy Perspective*, ed. Christos Kollias and Cula Cunnuk-Senesun. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003.
- Krebs, Ronald. "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict." *International Organization*, 53, no.2, (Spring 1999), 343–77.
- Larrabee, Stephen F., and Ian O. Lesser. *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003.
- Lijphart, Arend. *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.
- Mackenzie, Kenneth. "Greece and Turkey: Disarray on NATO's Southern Flank." *Conflict Studies* 154, (1983), 110–32.
- Mansfield, Edward D. *Power, Trade and War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- , Jon C. Pevehouse, and David H. Bearce. "Preferential Trading Arrangements and Military Disputes." *Security Studies* 9, no.1 (2000): 477–513.
- , and Jon C. Pevehouse. "Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict." *International Organization* 54, no.4 (2000): 775–808.
- , Helen V. Milner, and Peter Rosendorff. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements." *International Organization* 56, no.3 (2002): 477–513.
- Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett. "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986." *American Political Science Review* 87, (1993): 624–38.
- McDonald Robert. "Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Conflict." In *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, edited by Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, 116–150. Herndon, Virginia: Brassey's, 2001.
- Melakopides, Costas. "Implications of the Accession of Cyprus to the European Union for Greek-Turkish and Euro-Turkish Relations." *Mediterranean Quarterly*, (Winter 2006):73–101.
- Mearsheimer, John. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War." *International Security* 15, no.1 (1990): 5–56.

- Mintz, Alex, and Nehemia Geva. "Why Don't Democracies Fight Each Other? An Experimental Assessment of the 'Political Incentive' Explanation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, (1995): 484–503.
- Mousseau, Michael. "Democracy and Compromise in Militarized Interstate Conflicts 1816-1992." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no.2 (1998): 210–30.
- Moustakis, Fotios, and Michael Shenan. "Greek Security Policy after the Cold War." *Contemporary Security Policy* 21, no.3 (2000), 92–106.
- Nixon, William J., and Bruce E. Moon. "Political Similarity and American Foreign Trade Patterns." *Political Research Quarterly* 46, no.3 (1993): 5–25.
- Oneal, John R., Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce M. Russett. "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-1985." *Journal of Peace Research* 33, (1996): 11–28.
- , and Bruce Russett. "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985." *International Studies Quarterly* 41, (June 1997): 267–93.
- , Bruce Russett, and Michael L. Berbaum. "Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992." *International Studies Quarterly* 47, (September 2003): 371–93.
- Onis, Ziya. "Luxemburg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations." *Government and Opposition* 35, no.4 (2003), 463–83.
- Owen, John M. "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace." *International Security* 19, no.2 (1994): 87–125.
- Page, Sheila. *Regionalism Among Developing Countries*. New York: St Martin's, 2000.
- Papadopoulos, Constantine. "Economic Cooperation: Guarantor of Détente or Hostage to Politics." in *the Long Shadow of Europe: Greeks and Turks in the Era of Post Nationalism*, edited by Othon Anastasakis, Kalypso Aude Nicolaidis and Kerem Oktem, 289–314. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009.
- Papandreou, George. "Greece Wants Turkey to Make the Grade." *The New York Times*, 10 December 1999.
- Polachek, Solomon W. "Conflict and Trade." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24, no.2 (1980): 55–78.

- Prescott, Victor, and Clive Schofield. *The Maritime Boundaries of the World*. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005.
- Przeworski, Adam. *Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Putnam, Robert. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42, (1988): 427–60.
- Raftopoulos, Evangelos. "The Crisis over the Imia Rocks and the Aegean Sea Regime: International Law as a Language of Common Interest." *The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law* 12, no.4 (November 1997): 427–46.
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas. "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies." *World Politics* 43, (1991): 479–512.
- Risse, Thomas, Maria Green Cowles, and James Caporaso. "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction" in *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, edited by Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso, and Thomas Risse. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.
- Rousseau, David L., Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth. "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918–1988." *American Political Science Review* 90, (1996): 512–33.
- Rummel, Rudolph J. "Libertarian and International Violence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, (1983): 27–71;
- Russett, Bruce. *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.
- . *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
- and John R. Oneal. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. New York: Norton & Company, 2001.
- . "The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992." *World Politics* 52, (October 1999): 1–37.
- Small, Melvin, and David J. Singer. "The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes." *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1, no.4 (1976): 50–69.

- Slengesol, Andre, Ivar. "A Bad Show? The United States and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 54, (Spring, 2000), 96–129.
- Starr, Harvey. "Why Don't Democracies Fight One Another? Evaluating the Theory-Finding Research Loop." *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 14, no.4 (1992): 41–59.
- Tocci, Nathalie, ed. *Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy*. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2008.
- Tsakonas, Panayotis and Thanos Dokos. "Greek-Turkish Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century: A view from Athens." in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, edited by Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, 101–126. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004.
- . "Turkey's Post-Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue." *Turkish Studies* 2, no.2 (Autumn 2001): 1–40.
- Tournikiotis, Antonis, and Panayotis Tsakonas. "Greece's Elusive Quest for Security Providers: The 'Expectations-Reality Gap.'" *Security Dialogue* 34, no.3, (2003), 301–40.
- Walt, Stephen M. "Alliances in a Unipolar World," *World Politics* 61, no.1 (January 2009), 86–120.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
- Wendt, Alexander. "Constructing International Politics." *International Security* 20, no.1 (1995): 35–74.
- Wood, Christina Pia. "Europe and Turkey; A Relationship under Fire." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 21, no.1 (1999): 100–18.
- Zurcher, Erik, Jan. *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1998.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
3. Professor Donald Abenheim
National Security Affairs Department
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
4. Professor Scott N. Siegel
National Security Affairs Department
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
5. LT Patsiaouras Konstantinos HN
Hellenic Navy General Staff
Athens, Greece