

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction

OCT 30
2009



QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS



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Cover Captions (clockwise from left):

An ink-stained finger marks one of an estimated 15.3 million Afghan citizens who voted in the first Afghan-run elections on August 20. About 58% of voters were men. (U.S. Embassy Kabul Photo, Dan Wilkinson)

Afghan contractors produce concrete at the construction site for the eight-room Haish Saidqi Girls School in the Rokha District of Panjshir Province. (U.S. Air Force photo, Capt. Stacie N. Shafran)

Afghan children receive backpacks from U.S. service members at Rhey village. Five hundred backpacks, 20 five-pound bags of flour, 20 liters of cooking oil, and various school supplies were transported from Camp Stone. (U.S. Air Force photo, SrA Marc I. Lane)

Non-commissioned officers of the Afghan National Police recite an oath of honor at a graduation ceremony at the ANP Academy in Kabul, Afghanistan. (U.S. Air Force photo, SSgt Beth Del Vecchio)

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The National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181) established the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).

SIGAR's mission is to enhance oversight of programs for the reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of taxpayer dollars and related funds and by keeping the Congress, as well as the Secretaries of State and Defense, currently informed of reconstruction progress and weaknesses. Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the U.S. government that involves the use of amounts appropriated, or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan with any private entity to build or rebuild physical infrastructure in Afghanistan; establish or re-establish political or societal institutions of Afghanistan; and provide products or services to the people of Afghanistan.

Source: P.L. 110-181 "National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008," 1/28/2008.

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN





Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

October 30, 2009

I am pleased to submit to the Congress the fifth quarterly report of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). In compliance with the requirements outlined in Section 1229 of P.L. 110-181, this report documents SIGAR's activities since the July 30, 2009 report and provides an update on the status of reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. Since 2002, the Congress has appropriated approximately \$39 billion for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Funding requests for FY 2010 appear likely to increase this amount to \$50 billion.

During this quarter SIGAR continued to grow, expanding its capacity to conduct vigorous oversight through audits, inspections, and investigations. Since our last report, our professional staff has grown from 44 to 57. Our office issued five audit reports and five inspection reports over the past three months. These reports cover a wide variety of individual projects and large programs in the areas of security, governance, and development. We have another 10 audits and 7 inspections under way. SIGAR's investigations team initiated seven new criminal investigations and contributed to the indictment of two individuals and one company accused of bribery.

It has been one year since SIGAR received its initial funding, enabling it to begin to recruit staff and establish offices in the Washington area and in Afghanistan. Based on the work we have done to date, personal observations in Afghanistan, and conversations with U.S., Afghan, and international officials, SIGAR has identified four issues that must be addressed to improve the effectiveness of the reconstruction program. First, U.S.-funded programs need to be more accountable. Second, additional emphasis should be placed on building Afghan capacity to sustain projects. Third, to achieve reconstruction objectives, U.S. and internationally funded projects need to be better integrated. Fourth, greater consideration should be given to developing effective strategies to deter corruption. Lack of accountability, insufficient attention to capacity building and sustainment, inadequate integration of projects, and corruption all lead to waste and undermine the reconstruction effort.

The U.S. Government is particularly concerned that corruption puts at risk our investment in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. As a result of conversations with U.S. and Afghan government officials, SIGAR has launched a series of audits to assess what the United States and other international donors are doing to build capacity within Afghan institutions to deter corruption. During this quarter, SIGAR began to conduct reviews of the performance and capability of various Afghan government institutions to apply internal controls, mitigate the risk of corruption, and

improve accountability for U.S. and other donor funds. SIGAR issued the first of these reports in the area of justice reform. If SIGAR receives sufficient funding, it will expand the anti-corruption initiative to cover Afghanistan's provincial governments as well as its national governing institutions.

On August 20, 2009, Afghans voted in the first Afghan-run presidential and provincial council elections. The United States, which considered the elections an important step in building a legitimate government, provided \$263 million in reconstruction funds to support the electoral process. Allegations of widespread fraud delayed the certification of the results. However, Afghanistan's election bodies—the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC)—developed a process to evaluate the extent of the fraud, and on October 20 the IEC announced that President Karzai won 49.7% of the vote, just shy of the 50% needed to avoid a runoff election. The runoff is scheduled for November 7. SIGAR issued two audit reports related to these elections during this quarter and will assess the entire elections process, including lessons learned.

In August, the Afghan government published its first annual report on the status of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul issued a new civilian-military campaign plan to achieve U.S. strategic goals in Afghanistan. Although the Afghan government reported some progress across most of the ANDS pillars and sectors, it warned that the government and its international partners continue to face extraordinary challenges, particularly in the areas of governance and security. The U.S. plan emphasizes building Afghan capacity to govern at the local, provincial, and national levels. Section 1 of this report includes a summary of both documents.

In testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs in September, I outlined the steps SIGAR has taken to ensure oversight of the new inter-agency strategy in Afghanistan. The full statement is available on our Web site: www.sigar.mil. Although the U.S. strategy is evolving, the reconstruction effort continues and SIGAR is providing sustained and comprehensive oversight to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse of reconstruction dollars.

Very respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Arnold Fields". The signature is fluid and cursive, written over a white background.

Arnold Fields
Major General, USMC (Ret.)
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction



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Afghanistan Presidential Election

Voting ballots are organized and arranged for counting by Afghan presidential election workers at a local school in the Nawa District of Ghazni. The school was used as a polling site. (U.S. Marine Corps photo, SSgt William Greeson)

1 AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW



“Despite [the] very difficult conditions, what we’ve seen is elections take place, we have now seen the IEC and the ECC complete their work, we have seen the candidates expressing a willingness to abide by constitutional law, and there is a path forward in order to complete this election process.”

—*U.S. President Barack Obama*

AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW

During this quarter in Afghanistan, overall security continued to deteriorate, with insurgent attacks spiking during the period leading up to the August 20 presidential and provincial council elections. Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced preliminary results in September, but allegations of widespread fraud prevented certification of the results. The Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), together with the IEC, developed and carried out an audit process to determine the extent of the fraud. On October 20, the IEC announced the results of this audit, which showed that President Karzai received 49.7% of the vote, just short of the 50% plus one needed to secure a first-round electoral victory. The IEC announced that it would conduct a runoff election on November 7 between President Karzai and the second-place finisher, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, who received 30.6% of the vote.

In August 2009, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) released its first annual report on the implementation of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), and the U.S. Government issued a new integrated civilian-military campaign plan to stabilize Afghanistan. The ANDS report described Afghan government efforts to align budgets to ANDS priorities and establish mechanisms to monitor and evaluate progress toward achieving ANDS goals. According to the report, gains across most of the ANDS pillars and sectors have been limited because of security issues and a lack of governing capacity to manage programs. The new U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan, building on the broad strategic objectives outlined by President Obama earlier this year, identified 11 key counter-insurgency “transformative effects” to improve security and governance at the community, provincial, and national levels.

Developments during this quarter underscored the enormous challenges that the reconstruction effort continues to face in Afghanistan. Two issues—the lack of security and the need for governing capacity—remain the greatest obstacles to progress. In addition to the problems posed by deteriorating security and weak governance, SIGAR—through its audits, inspections, investigations, and observations on the ground in Afghanistan—has identified four major oversight concerns: lack of accountability, insufficient attention to capacity building and sustainment, inadequate integration of projects, and corruption.

AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW



Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, speaks with an IEC worker on Election Day. (U.S. Embassy Kabul photo, Dan Wilkinson)

SECURITY

The lack of security in Afghanistan has a negative impact on every aspect of reconstruction, from building and repairing infrastructure to promoting good governance. The U.S. strategy to restore security is focused on developing significantly larger Afghan military and police forces capable of leading the counterterrorism fight and protecting the Afghan population from insurgents. A substantial portion of U.S. reconstruction funds—\$18.67 billion—has been provided for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to train and equip the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and the Afghanistan National Police (ANP).

Because of the importance of security and the size of the U.S. investment in building the Afghan security forces, SIGAR expanded its oversight of the security sector during this quarter, launching two new security sector audits. The first is evaluating the reliability of the ANA and ANP capability milestone assessments, which are used to gauge progress in developing independent security forces. The second is assessing progress in developing personnel management systems for the ANA and ANP, including continued efforts to stem fraudulent payments to “ghost” personnel. In addition to these audits, SIGAR is inspecting ANSF facilities in Kandahar and Farah that were funded through the Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CTSC-A). The inspections will determine whether the facilities were built in accordance with contract specifications and are being maintained properly.

Because serious security problems exist throughout much of Afghanistan, both the U.S. Government and reconstruction contractors implementing U.S.-funded projects employ security personnel through private security firms. Several complaints, including one received through the SIGAR Hotline from a U.S. contractor, allege that some of this private security is being provided by people connected to the Taliban. SIGAR has begun an audit reviewing how the U.S. Government and reconstruction contractors are providing for their security. SIGAR is looking at how each U.S. agency contracts for its security needs and at the degree of oversight each agency exercises over its contractors.

SIGAR’s preliminary work indicates that at least 14,000 private security contractors are working directly for U.S. agencies. The U.S. government, however, does not know how many other private companies or individuals are providing security services to reconstruction contractors. Over time, SIGAR auditors expect to identify policy issues associated with the use of private security contractors.

GOVERNANCE

The new U.S. civilian-military campaign plan emphasizes “promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan” and calls for greater Afghan participation in the reconstruction of the country.¹ During this reporting period, the United States focused on two aspects of good governance: supporting a credible and secure election process, and developing a strategy to deter corruption. The U.S. Government viewed the August 20 presidential and provincial council elections, the first to be managed by Afghans, as an important

AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW

step in establishing a government that is legitimate in the eyes of its people. At the same time, the U.S. Government has expressed great concern about corruption, which not only erodes trust in government but also undermines every other aspect of the reconstruction effort.

SIGAR is providing oversight in both of these areas. During this quarter, SIGAR issued two audit reports related to the election process and began a series of audits to evaluate the performance and capability of various Afghan public institutions at the national and provincial levels. These audits will assess the ability of Afghan ministries and government offices to apply internal controls, mitigate the risk of corruption, and improve accountability over U.S. and other donor funds.

The Presidential and Provincial Council Elections

SIGAR has followed the elections closely because of the importance the U.S. government attached to them and the significant funding provided by the United States and the international community in support of the election process. The United States and its international partners view elections as critical to the development of a sustainable, accountable government. SIGAR issued one audit report this quarter that identified international assistance and the extent to which that assistance was used to strengthen the capacity of the IEC to conduct elections. A second audit assessed the participation of women in these elections.

By the end of August 2009, the United States had contributed \$263 million (more than half) of the \$488 million provided by the international community to support secure and credible elections. The United Nations (UN) managed \$331 million of the funds provided by the international community. It used these funds to cover the administrative costs of the entire process, from voter registration to the conduct of elections and resolution of disputed ballots. The UN provided support to the IEC and to the ECC.

One of the UN objectives was to build the capacity of the IEC to hold elections. The IEC faces significant challenges in doing so, particularly in 2010 when it is supposed to conduct district and parliamentary elections, because it lacks the expertise and resources to carry out elections without international support. Although the UN recognized the need for capacity development, it has not developed a long-term capacity-building strategy.

In the August elections, the IEC reported that about 38.8% of those who voted were women. SIGAR could not independently verify this figure. SIGAR found that women confronted numerous obstacles to exercising their right to vote. The lack of a secure environment, coupled with cultural constraints, limited their ability to register, campaign, and vote. Many observers reported that men were voting on behalf of women, even though proxy voting is a violation of the electoral law. Because polling stations are segregated by gender, a shortage of female polling officials across the country also reduced the number of women who were able to cast ballots.



U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry discusses election support issues with U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair John Kerry. (U.S. Embassy Kabul photo)



U.S. Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal stands with Afghanistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta, as the two survey the damage caused by a suicide bomber, near ISAF Command Headquarters. (U.S. Army photo, SGT David Alvarado)

AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW

SIGAR has recommended that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan work with the GIRoA, the UN, and other key stakeholders to develop an overall strategy and detailed plan for building and sustaining electoral capacity. This strategy and plan should address the challenges that confront female candidates and voters.

After the elections are concluded, SIGAR will conduct a final audit that will provide an analysis of the conduct of the elections and the procedures established to detect and discard fraudulent ballots. This report will identify lessons learned for future elections.

Anti-Corruption Oversight

Strengthening Afghanistan's ability to prevent corruption is a priority of the U.S. reconstruction program, as well as the international community and the GIRoA itself. The GIRoA has appealed to various U.S. government officials to help strengthen its capacity to establish controls and improve accountability, both of which are important deterrents to corruption. SIGAR has launched an audit initiative to review what the United States and other international donors are doing to build capacity within Afghan institutions to deter corruption. This work will also assess the internal controls and accountability procedures exercised by key Afghan government institutions at the provincial and national levels. Although SIGAR will not conduct training of Afghan officials, SIGAR's audits are intended to help Afghan officials as well as U.S. and other international donor personnel to better understand the importance of having internal controls, accountability, and strong anti-corruption measures.

In August, SIGAR published the first in what will be a series of reports on aspects of the U.S. effort to deter corruption and strengthen the rule of law. This report found that insufficient funding and inadequate access to utilities had delayed the construction of detention facilities urgently needed at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center in Kabul. This center, a critical component of U.S. and Afghan counter-narcotics efforts, has exclusive nationwide jurisdiction over significant narcotics cases. Delays in expanding its size could adversely affect U.S. and Afghan government efforts to combat the illicit drug trade in Afghanistan. In response to the SIGAR report, the Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers indicated that they would work together to overcome obstacles so that the construction of the facilities can proceed.

In September, SIGAR began an audit of U.S. and other donor efforts to strengthen the capabilities of the GIRoA's High Office of Oversight (HOO), an entity implementing the country's anti-corruption efforts that reports to the President of Afghanistan. This audit will assess the capacity of the HOO to meet its anti-corruption mission and identify U.S. and other donor efforts to build its capabilities.

Sustainment of Infrastructure

Billions of dollars have been spent to build infrastructure—everything from schools and health clinics to roads, water systems, and power generation plants—in Afghanistan since 2002. U.S.-funded construction continues in many

AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW

parts of the country. SIGAR has hired engineers, inspectors, and auditors to work together, not only to determine whether these projects are being built according to contract specifications and used as intended, but also to evaluate the capacity of Afghan authorities to sustain them.

SIGAR's initial observation is that too little attention has been paid to sustainment of these projects following their turnover to Afghan authorities. SIGAR is not alone in this observation. For example, in two separate reports, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has pointed out that the GIRoA lacks the capacity to maintain U.S.-funded infrastructure projects.²

Regulations governing the use of Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds require that the USFOR-A Commander ensure that an appropriate GIRoA authority is prepared to sustain a project after it has been transferred. USFOR-A reported that during project review it requires a written document from a GIRoA official agreeing to sustain and maintain the project. The letter is usually provided by a provincial-level official and signals the "intent of commitment on the part of the GIRoA."³ According to USFOR-A, however, "the evidence is overwhelming that Afghanistan cannot sustain the projects we complete." USFOR-A added, "There is an unwritten obligation to make progress with respect to reconstruction efforts. We continue to build and meet the sustainment requirement of the [Financial Management Regulation] by gracefully expecting the GIRoA to one day be able to fulfill its share of the bargain by maintaining the projects they said they would when transferred to them." SIGAR will further examine this issue of sustainability because of the potential waste of taxpayer dollars in building projects that cannot be maintained.

PROJECT INTEGRATION

The U.S. civilian-military campaign plan calls for better integration of reconstruction projects, not only between U.S. agencies but also with the international donor community. The absence of an effective management information system or other means to provide a complete view of programs undertaken by various entities in Afghanistan makes it very difficult to coordinate the reconstruction effort effectively. SIGAR has recommended that U.S. civilian agencies and military commands work together to develop an integrated management information system that would provide a common operating picture of reconstruction programs and projects.

The GIRoA and the international community established the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) in 2006 to coordinate and oversee the implementation of the Afghan Compact. The JCMB, whose 28 members include 7 representatives of the GIRoA and 21 representatives of the international community, is now responsible for coordinating the formulation of development policies between the GIRoA and the international community. The GIRoA and its international partners coordinate through the JCMB to review progress toward achieving ANDS objectives. When the JCMB met in July 2009 to review the status of the ANDS, the international community said then that the ANDS needed to be better focused and that the GIRoA should develop an unambiguous set of priorities and programs.⁴


AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW

SIGAR has initiated a series of performance audits for individual development sectors. The first of these audits, which will be published during the next quarter, is a review of U.S. and other donor assistance to the energy sector. The audit will assess the degree to which U.S. and international projects complement each other and determine how effective they have been in expanding Afghan access to electricity.

COORDINATION OF OVERSIGHT

The inspector general community is acutely aware of the need to coordinate its work to maximize oversight, avoid duplication, and minimize demands on the implementing agencies. SIGAR is a member of the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group and its Pakistan/Afghanistan subcommittee, which coordinates oversight activity in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The subcommittee is composed of SIGAR, GAO, and the Inspectors General from USAID, DoD, and DoS.

SIGAR is also a member of the International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF), the principal organization coordinating federal criminal and civil cases that involve procurement fraud and corruption related to U.S. government spending in Southwest Asia. SIGAR's investigators and attorneys work closely with their colleagues at other federal law enforcement agencies in both the United States and Afghanistan.



Maj. Gen. Arnold Fields (Ret.), Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, in testimony before the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, September 9, 2009. (C-SPAN)

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEGRATED CIVILIAN-MILITARY CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN

In August, the U.S. Embassy, Kabul and USFOR-A issued a new integrated civilian-military plan aligning mission activities to achieving the broad U.S. strategic goal to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qaeda. Emphasizing that “every action must help secure, mobilize and support the Afghan people to defeat the insurgency and establish effective governance,” the plan describes 7 core principles, identifies 11 counter-insurgency (COIN) “transformative effects,” and outlines strategies to be executed over the next three years in each of the 11 areas to stabilize Afghanistan. In addition to the new U.S. strategy, the plan draws on guidance from the ANDS, the Afghanistan Compact, and NATO operational plans.


The core principles include 1) developing Afghan capacity; 2) paying greater attention to the subnational levels, where the insurgency is drawing strength through coercion and by exploiting dissatisfaction with the government; 3) integrating civilian and military planning and operations at the national and subnational levels to assist Afghanistan; 4) working in close collaboration with the international community; 5) providing guidance, resources, and authority to civilian and military teams working in the field; 6) demonstrating tangible progress to the Afghan populations; and 7) fostering government accountability and transparency.

The 11 Transformative Effects

- Population Security
- Elections and Continuity of Governance
- Expansion of Accountable and Transparent Governance
- Claiming the Information Initiative
- Access to Justice
- Action Against Irreconcilables
- Creating Sustainable Jobs
- Agricultural Opportunity and Market Access
- Countering the Nexus of Criminality, Corruption, Narcotics, and Insurgency
- Government and Community-Led Reintegration
- Border Access for Commerce, Not Insurgents

The plan’s 11 transformative effects, establish U.S. reconstruction priorities in the security, governance, and development pillars. U.S. personnel, in partnership with Afghans, are to implement programs simultaneously at the community, provincial, and national levels. The plan gives particular importance to the first three transformative effects: population security, elections and continuity of governance, and expansion of accountable and transparent government.

The plan takes into account the different dynamics in each of four regions—north, south, east, west—and Kabul. It establishes priorities and identifies the civilian-military action needed in each region, as shown in the map at right.



The U.S. effort to provide security for the Afghan population will concentrate on the key provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Khowst, Paktiya, and Paktika, where the insurgency is most active. In addition to refocusing combat operations, the plan calls for a larger, more capable, and more professional ANSF. Greater emphasis will be placed on working with local communities on their own protection.

The international community has provided significant assistance for elections as a vehicle for establishing a government that is legitimate in the eyes of its citizens. Under the campaign plan, a new program to build institutional capacity and promote accountability will be developed to help the Afghan government set a clear agenda for change. This will require a new partnership between the United States, the international community, and the GIROA, as well as between the GIROA and the Afghan people. Greater attention will be given to working toward a political solution that would involve granting amnesties and developing a reintegration program.

FIRST ANNUAL REPORT ON THE ANDS

The Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), approved in April 2008 by the President of Afghanistan and endorsed in June 2008 by the international community, is organized under three broad pillars—Security, Governance, and Economic and Social Development—with 8 sub-pillars, 17 sectors, and 6 cross-cutting issues. In its first annual report on the implementation of the ANDS, the GIRoA reported some progress across most of the pillars and sectors but warned that the government and its international partners continue to face extraordinary challenges, particularly in governance and security.

Over the past year, the GIRoA has focused on creating institutional frameworks to manage, monitor, and evaluate a national effort to achieve the ANDS objectives. Line ministries have established “sector results frameworks” that identify development activities together with their outputs and outcomes. According to the report, these ministries are now aligning their programs to contribute to realizing the ANDS objectives.

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (ANDS)

	SECURITY	GOVERNANCE	DEVELOPMENT
REGIONAL COOPERATION			
COUNTER-NARCOTICS			
ANTICORRUPTION			
GENDER EQUALITY			
CAPACITY			
ENVIRONMENTAL			

Noting that effective execution of sector strategies requires close coordination of multiple line ministries, public agencies, and other domestic and international partners, the report observes, “This is a complex undertaking that requires capable leadership at all levels of management of the process.” It adds that “the current capacity within the government to undertake managing for results, embracing planning, implementation management, and monitoring for results is not adequate to successfully undertake these tasks.” The annual report highlighted achievements in the ANDS pillars.

SECURITY

The ANDS considers security a precondition for economic development. The report acknowledges a decline in the security situation over the past year but identifies some positive developments:

- A national security policy has been developed, to promote coordination between Afghan and international security forces for improved security delivery.
- Strengthening the ANA and ANP process is progressing as planned, with training opportunities expanded at both the national and provincial levels
- Coordination of the Afghan Security Forces improved because of a new national security policy and the establishment of 15 subnational coordination centers.
- Mines and unexploded ordnance were cleared from 25% of the targeted area.

GOVERNANCE

Governance priorities include strengthening democratic processes, improving the delivery of public services, establishing the rule of law, increasing access to justice, and deterring corruption. According to the report, modest progress has been made in the following areas:

- The National Assembly passed 53 new laws, including a water law and an anti-corruption law as well as laws relating to corporations, arbitration, intellectual property, and patents.
- The government registered voters and conducted presidential and provincial council elections.
- The Independent National Legal Training Center was established to provide technical legal training.
- The Independent Bar Association was established to provide legal aid to the public.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The largest component of the ANDS, this pillar has 6 sub-pillars and 13 sectors. The sub-pillars include Infrastructure and Natural Resources, Education and Culture, Health, Agriculture and Rural Development, Social Protection, and Economic Governance. The report identifies the greatest gains in health and education. Noting positive developments in the high-priority sectors of energy, water resource management, transport, and mining, the report highlights the following:

- The Basic Package of Health Services is now reaching 85% of the population.
- 291 health sub-centers and mobile centers have been established.
- Immunization programs cover 95% of children under the age of five.
- The number of schools increased to 11,000, including 6,072 primary, 3,062 middle, and 1,866 high schools.

- About 61 million textbooks—38 million for primary schools and 22.8 million for secondary schools—were published and distributed.
- Approximately 317,000 Afghans, of whom 36% were female, graduated from literacy programs.
- The total electricity supply has increased from 485 MW in 2007 to 630 MW (including imports) in 2009.
- Detailed studies for the construction of several large dams have been completed.
- Some 13,000 water supply networks have been established and are providing access to potable water to 2.8 million rural people.
- Improvements in small-scale irrigation systems in 1,891 villages have benefitted 644,777 households.
- Agricultural gains include 53,000 metric tonnes of wheat seed and fertilizer delivered to farmers, 770 orchards established, 588 pistachio forests rehabilitated, and 3.2 million saplings planted.
- Land surveys of a 339-square-km area identified 500 gas fields and 400 mineral deposits.

The ANDS puts a high priority on building a road network that facilitates the movement of people within Afghanistan and connects the country to its neighbors. Approximately 2,961 km of regional roads have been completed. However, the ANDS report observes that there has been no progress in the development of a fiscally sustainable system for road maintenance.

According to the report, the GIRoA spending priorities are now in line with the ANDS but donor financing is not, in part because international grants to the development budget have fallen. In 2008, the international community pledged approximately \$21 billion in support of the ANDS, but about \$7 billion of this was a restatement of earlier pledges. That left only \$13.9 billion in new resources. The GIRoA estimates that it will have a funding shortfall of approximately \$3.2 billion in the development budget in 2009/2010.

Training ANA Soldiers

An Afghan officer explains the coordinates used during a live-fire exercise incorporating the Afghan National Army's 4th Kandak forward observers, fire direction control personnel, and artillerymen on Forward Operating Base Kalagush in Nuristan. (U.S. Army photo, Sgt. Matthew Moeller)

2 SIGAR OVERSIGHT



“U.S. and donor funds are essential to rebuilding Afghanistan....Program coordination is becoming more difficult as the amount of funding for reconstruction increases and the number of...organizations involved... expands. The need for oversight, not only of the contracting process, program management, and quality assurance, but also of how U.S.-funded programs are aligned to advance U.S. policy goals..., has also increased.”

—*Maj. Gen. Arnold Fields (Ret.)*
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Source: Testimony before the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 9/9/2009.

AUDITS

SIGAR issued 5 audit reports during this quarter and has 10 audits under way. These audits address a range of issues that are critical to the effective implementation of the reconstruction program. They include not only contract oversight, program management, and contractor performance, but also the degree to which reconstruction projects funded by taxpayer dollars are helping the United States achieve its strategic objectives in Afghanistan. Two of the audit reports published over the past three months assessed aspects of the August 20 presidential and provincial council elections, which the United States had identified as essential to establishing a sustainable government.

COMPLETED AUDIT REPORTS

Four of the audit reports completed this quarter assessed facets of U.S. efforts to improve governance. They include two reports on aspects of the presidential and provincial council elections and two related to the anti-corruption effort. The fifth audit report evaluates the accountability of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), a program intended to fund primarily small-scale projects to meet urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs in the provinces.

Strategy and Resources Needed To Sustain Afghan Electoral Capacity, SIGAR Audit 09-06 (Elections)

The international community provided \$488 million in assistance to support the August 20 presidential and provincial council elections. The United States contributed \$263 million, more than half the total amount. The United Nations (UN), which managed the majority of the international funding, focused its efforts on fulfilling immediate and operational needs. These efforts included supporting the development of regulations and procedures, hiring temporary staff, procuring electoral equipment and supplies, and coordinating security planning.

Developing Afghanistan's institutional capability to conduct credible elections is essential to building and sustaining a government that its citizens see as legitimate. The Afghan Independent Election Commission (IEC), which must also conduct parliament and district council elections in 2010, faces significant challenges; without international support, it lacks the resources to manage elections. Conducting credible elections depends not only on the integrity of the election process but also on the willingness and ability of the next Afghan government to build the Commission's capabilities so that democratic principles and the electoral process are sustained. SIGAR found that while the UN recognizes the

need for capacity development, it has not developed a long-term strategy to build elections capacity.

SIGAR recommended that the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, in consultation with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in developing a strategic plan to build Afghan capacity to conduct elections. The plan should include an Afghan budget and human resource structure capable of supporting sustainable election processes. SIGAR also recommended that U.S. officials urge the UN to hire a capacity development advisor or appoint an executive agent to coordinate an overall strategy with the IEC, the UN, and major donors and stakeholders for monitoring the status and progress of all capacity-building efforts in Afghanistan. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul and USAID concurred with the recommendations and stated they will work through diplomatic and aid channels to implement them.

Barriers to Greater Participation by Women in Afghan Elections, SIGAR Audit 10-1 (Elections)

SIGAR reviewed the level of women's participation in the August 20 elections and the extent to which the GIROA created an environment in which women could vote freely. Although the Afghan constitution mandates equal rights for men and women and the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) puts a priority on increasing the participation of women in public affairs, SIGAR found that women candidates and women voters faced numerous obstacles. The insecure environment, coupled with cultural and structural constraints, limited the ability of women to register, campaign, and vote in the elections. Election observers reported a low turnout of women voters. They noted that those who did go to the polls sometimes voted on instructions from their families or from people present at the polling station. Moreover, election observers witnessed incidents of men voting as proxies for women.

Many groups, including national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the UN, and GIROA institutions, mounted civic education programs in the months preceding the elections, to encourage women to participate. However, the IEC and the UN did not focus sufficiently on women's issues. For example, the IEC recruited only half of the 80,000 staff members it needed for polling centers. As a result, there were no women electoral workers present at as many as 650 polling centers (slightly more than 10%).

SIGAR recommended that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in conjunction with the UN, urge the IEC to recruit and train additional female election workers; communicate to all IEC staff the importance of following the electoral law, which prohibits proxy voting; and reprimand and report violators of the law. To guarantee that women can register and vote free from intimidation, the IEC should ensure that registration and polling center locations are secure and accessible, and that polling centers have female staff. Broad civic education programs are needed to raise awareness of the right of women to participate fully in the electoral process.

USAID/Afghanistan and the U.S. Inter-agency Elections Team endorsed the recommendations in the SIGAR report. The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan will urge the IEC, in conjunction with the UN, to implement the necessary corrective actions.

Actions Needed To Resolve Construction Delays at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center, SIGAR Audit 09-4 (Justice Reform)

The Counter-Narcotics Justice Center in Kabul, a key component of the U.S. and Afghan counter-narcotics efforts, opened earlier this year and has already reached capacity. The \$11 million center, which houses Afghanistan's sole court for the prosecution and appeal of significant narcotics cases, urgently needs additional detention and support facilities.

SIGAR found that plans to expand the center have been delayed for 18 months because of insufficient funding and inadequate utilities. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has not been able to secure any construction bids within the amount approved by the Department of State (DoS) under a \$2 million inter-agency support agreement. Moreover, expanding the facilities requires upgrading the water, sewer, and electrical utilities. Although \$1.4 million remained of the funds originally obligated to this project, the Corps was reluctant to use this money to make upgrades that were not included in the original scope of work. It also had concerns about whether the funding was still available.

Given the importance of the Center to the counter-narcotics effort, SIGAR recommended that DoS amend the original scope of work of the inter-agency support agreement to include the utility upgrades. SIGAR also recommended that DoS either increase the amount of funding under that agreement to cover the additional costs of building the detention and support facilities or issue a new agreement to include the needed funding.

The DoS's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) generally concurred with the report's findings and recommendations but objected to the provision that funding be limited to a specific inter-agency support agreement. SIGAR did not intend to restrict the funding mechanism and modified the recommendation accordingly. The Corps of Engineers concurred with the report's recommendations and indicated that it would work closely with INL to ensure completion of the expansion of the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center after execution of an amended or new inter-agency support agreement.

Documenting Detention Procedures Will Help Ensure Counter-Narcotics Justice Center Is Utilized as Intended, SIGAR Audit 09-07 (Justice Reform)

While assessing the causes for the delays in expanding the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center, SIGAR auditors identified that all detention cells were occupied by low-profile detainees in July 2009. According to officials from DoS and the Department of Justice (DoJ), the Center, which consists of a detention building, a courthouse, offices for judges and prosecutors, and related support facilities, was built to deal with higher-profile drug traffickers. INL officials indicated that

several factors, including overcrowding at the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) detention centers in Kabul, accounted for the detention of mostly low-level drug traffickers.

DoJ officials indicated that as of September 25, 2009, the Center was housing three high-value criminals and has housed several other important targets in the past. Some DoJ officials said that the prosecution of low-level drug traffickers has provided useful information about higher-value targets. Moreover, DoJ and INL officials maintained that no high-value detainees had been turned away for lack of space. However, the Center has no written procedures for ensuring the availability of detention cells for the mid- to high-level drug traffickers.

The conduct of effective investigation and prosecution of criminals depends upon investigators and prosecutors having good access to the detainees. If major narcotics offenders are not present at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center, it becomes more difficult for the Criminal Justice Task Force to investigate them and for the Central Narcotics Tribunal to prosecute them successfully.

SIGAR recommended that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan work with the appropriate U.S. and Afghan officials to formalize and document procedures to ensure that the detention facilities at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center give priority to mid- to high-level drug traffickers. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul concurred with SIGAR's recommendation to formalize evaluation procedures for detainees at the Center. The Embassy's Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs indicated that, based on SIGAR's recommendations, a process is now under way to formalize the evaluation procedures conducted by Afghan police investigations and prosecution staff and the Central Prison Directorate command, in conjunction with their respective mentors.

Increased Visibility, Monitoring, and Planning Needed for Commander's Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan, SIGAR Audit 09-05 (Commander's Emergency Response Program)

Since 2004, the Congress has provided \$1.6 billion to the Department of Defense (DoD) for the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Afghanistan. CERP was created to fund primarily small-scale projects to meet urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs at the community and provincial levels.

SIGAR found that while DoD has established procedures to account for CERP funds, it has not established adequate mechanisms for monitoring and executing CERP projects. Program managers told SIGAR that their primary focus was on obligating funds for projects rather than monitoring their implementation. Program managers have limited visibility over the execution of CERP projects in part because U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A), which oversees CERP, has no central system for retaining the physical files in Afghanistan and electronic records are either incomplete or nonexistent. For example, during the audit, program officials at USFOR-A were unable to identify the number of ongoing CERP projects funded before FY 2009.

SIGAR also found that CERP funds increasingly are being obligated for large-scale projects that cost \$500,000 or more. While these large-scale projects account for only 3% of all projects, they consume 67% of CERP funds. These projects pose increased risks for CERP because they are usually more complex than the small projects and require several years to complete. Most CERP program managers have been trained to implement smaller-scale projects. Moreover, troop rotation schedules result in a lack of continuity in the management of large, long-term projects.

SIGAR recommended that the Commander of USFOR-A develop and implement, 1) a process to systematically collect and track information on CERP projects, 2) a centralized system for maintaining records, and 3) a plan that addresses how to manage the heightened risks associated with projects costing \$500,000 or more.

USFOR-A agreed with the first two findings of the report and outlined several actions it plans to take to address the deficiencies identified. These actions include adding project managers for CERP administration, strengthening electronic record requirements, adding civilian information managers to facilitate record keeping, setting limitations on the numbers of projects by region, and reducing monetary approval authorities. These actions, if fully implemented, will lessen program risk.

USFOR-A disagreed that projects of \$500,000 or more pose a risk for CERP. In its response to the SIGAR draft report, USFOR-A indicated that most of its large-scale projects were roads. “We have executed enough roads that we understand those better than many smaller projects,” USFOR-A wrote. “With our history of projects we know exactly how much a kilometer of grading costs, how much a ton of gravel costs, how much a culvert costs, and so on. The contractors at this point are known quantities in terms of abilities and performance.” The USFOR-A response concluded, “Smaller projects can be very diverse, some being scoped for the first time, and many involve vertical construction requiring the PPO [Project Purchasing Officer] to have a working knowledge of utilities, building codes, and land ownership issues. These issues are far more complex than road work.”⁵

ONGOING AUDITS

SIGAR has 10 additional audits under way. They address issues of security, governance, and development. Auditors are evaluating agency procedures, contractor performance, U.S. and international assistance, and Afghan institutional capabilities.

Review of Agencies’ Management Oversight, Procedures, and Practices for Reconstruction Funds and Projects

SIGAR is conducting a series of audits to evaluate how implementing agencies are managing the reconstruction program. These audits examine an agency’s ability to develop and manage projects, establish performance metrics, and control and account for funding flows. SIGAR previously reported on the Combined

Security Transition Command - Afghanistan's (CSTC-A's) oversight of its own programs. In the audit currently under way, SIGAR is reviewing oversight at USAID.

Review of Contractor Performance and Agency Oversight of USAID Contracts in Afghanistan with Louis Berger Group

This audit will identify the contracts that USAID has with the Louis Berger Group and assess USAID's oversight of this contractor. As part of its review, SIGAR is analyzing the USAID Inspector General's findings of the work performed by the Louis Berger Group.

Review of U.S. and International Donor Programs To Assist Afghanistan's Energy Sector

In the first of a series of audits assessing reconstruction projects within a sector, SIGAR is examining the U.S. and international programs in the energy sector.

The audit will

- identify U.S. and international goals for the reconstruction and sustainment of Afghanistan's energy sector
- determine what performance metrics are used to evaluate whether project milestones and outcomes are adequately tracked
- assess the progress and results of energy sector reconstruction efforts against the ANDS and other criteria
- assess coordination between U.S. and international agencies in the energy sector
- assess Afghan participation in decisions and in the implementation of reconstruction programs

Review of U.S. Assistance for the Preparation and Conduct of Presidential and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan

The last in a series of reports on the election process, this audit will

- identify all U.S. and international assistance for the election process
- assess the overall effectiveness of that assistance in areas such as voter registration, voter education, polling center security, ballot box integrity, vote tallying, and resolution of allegations of fraud
- identify the strengths and weaknesses of the entire process and the lessons learned for future elections

Review of U.S. and Other Donor Efforts To Address and Build Afghanistan's Capacity to Address Corruption

SIGAR has initiated a series of audits to review the oversight and anti-corruption capabilities of GIRoA institutions at the national level. These audits will assess U.S. and donor efforts to strengthen Afghan capacity to implement internal controls and account for funds. SIGAR will focus particularly on the ability of Afghan officials to account for U.S. funds used by selected ministries. SIGAR is evaluating the capability of the High Office of Oversight (HOO) to execute its

mission as Afghanistan's top oversight agency. This audit will identify U.S. and donor assistance to the HOO and determine the degree to which this assistance has been effective.

Review of U.S. and Other Donor Efforts To Address and Build Afghanistan's Capacity To Address Corruption in the Provincial Governments

SIGAR has initiated a series of audits to review the oversight and anti-corruption capabilities of GIRoA institutions at the provincial level. These audits will evaluate U.S. and donor efforts to strengthen the capacity of provincial offices to implement internal controls and account for funds. SIGAR will assess the capacity of provincial offices to account for U.S. funds used to support provincial activities.

Review of Agencies' Use of Contractors To Provide Security for Reconstruction Programs in Afghanistan

SIGAR is conducting a review to identify the number and volume of contracts to provide private security services in Afghanistan. This assessment will

- identify the number of security contractors and personnel
- assess agencies' management of security contractors and personnel
- determine the extent to which GAO and the inspector general community have conducted audits of private security contracts

Assessment of the Capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces

SIGAR is conducting this audit to determine the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to provide security for the Afghan population. The audit will

- identify the procedures by which ANSF capabilities are measured and verified
- assess the extent to which readiness assessment methods vary between and within the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP)
- determine the degree to which the capability rating system provides a reliable profile of ANSF capabilities
- identify the extent to which challenges have impeded the United States' ability to assess ANSF capabilities

Review of Afghan National Security Forces Personnel Management

SIGAR is conducting this audit to evaluate the capacity of the ANSF to manage personnel. It will describe and assess

- the extent to which ANA and ANP personnel have been counted and validated
- actions taken by the United States and international donors to support the development of ANSF personnel accounting systems

- challenges associated with the completion and maintenance of routine systems for personnel accounting
- the extent to which inaccurate personnel numbers have led to additional challenges, including the fraudulent collection of ANSF salaries

Review of the Use of Funds Earmarked for Afghan Women and Girls

SIGAR is conducting this audit to identify how U.S. funds earmarked by Congress for women and girls have been used and the extent to which their use has complied with U.S. legislative requirements. SIGAR is also assessing how agencies measure the effectiveness of these programs and what agencies are doing to ensure their sustainability.

INSPECTIONS

SIGAR conducts inspections of Afghanistan reconstruction projects to determine whether U.S. funds are being used appropriately, contract terms are met, adequate oversight is provided, and the project will be sustained following its turnover to Afghan authorities. SIGAR issued five inspections reports during this quarter and has seven inspections under way.

The inspection reports issued during this quarter cover one road and four school projects in Kapisa Province. SIGAR looked at road and school construction because both have been long-standing reconstruction priorities. SIGAR inspections have identified concerns about the capacity of Afghans to sustain completed projects.

The United States, through DoD and USAID, has provided approximately \$1.7 billion for road construction projects in Afghanistan since 2002. More than \$800 million of this amount was funded through CERP between 2005 and 2009. Since 2005, road construction has accounted for 63% of all CERP funds.

In support of Afghanistan's educational goals, the United States has built hundreds of schools and educational facilities across the country since 2002. In 2008, Regional Command East—which covers 14 provinces—approved a major school construction initiative using CERP funds. As part of this initiative, 12 school construction projects have been started in Kapisa over the past 18 months. The four schools that SIGAR inspected are located in Nijrab District, a remote, rugged, mountainous area in the heart of the province.

Ongoing inspections are assessing the capacity of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to manage reconstruction efforts as well as at the implementation of individual infrastructure projects. Because PRTs are on the front line of the reconstruction effort, these inspections will determine whether a PRT is

- staffed adequately to conduct its reconstruction mission
- coordinating U.S. reconstruction efforts with inter-agency partners, coalition partners, Afghan authorities, and other stakeholders

- adequately executing project management and contract oversight responsibilities
- complying with applicable guidelines from CERP and the International Security Assistance Force guidelines
- facilitating the ability of the GIRoA to sustain the infrastructure improvements provided by U.S. funding
- ensuring effective handover and transfer of tasks to successor PRT commanders and staff

COMPLETED INSPECTIONS

During this quarter, SIGAR completed five inspections of infrastructure projects in Kapisa. One looked at a road project and four at school construction projects.

Inspection of Mahmood Raqi to Nijrab Road Project in Kapisa Province: Contract Requirements Met; But Sustainability Concerns Exist, SIGAR Inspection 09-2

SIGAR inspected a CERP-funded project that is building a 28.5-km road to connect Kapisa's provincial capital, Mahmood Raqi, with Nijrab, a town in an isolated area of the province. The Kapisa PRT developed the road construction plan in coordination with Afghan provincial officials in 2008 as part of a larger program to build 13 CERP-funded asphalt roads in the province. The PRT awarded a \$6.6 million fixed-price contract to an Afghan company to build the road. By mid-August, when SIGAR conducted its inspection, the road was about 60% complete.

SIGAR found that the construction was on schedule and within the original cost estimates. The Afghan contractor was using acceptable quality control procedures. However, SIGAR is concerned that the project will not be sustained. Although the Kapisa PRT had received assurances from the Kapisa Province Ministry of Public Works (MoPW) that it would maintain the road, SIGAR found that the ministry lacks the equipment, materials, and personnel needed to maintain and repair paved roads. The road is being built to last five years before serious repairs are needed, but heavy traffic, including overweight trucks and armored vehicles, is likely to significantly degrade large sections of it before five years have passed. The DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) does not allow CERP funds to be used for the maintenance and sustainment of infrastructure projects such as this road. CERP funds cannot be used for military purposes. Although the primary purpose of the roads is to facilitate transportation and communication for Afghans, the U.S. military also uses the roads.

SIGAR recommended that the Kapisa PRT and other appropriate U.S. authorities, in partnership with the Kapisa Province MoPW, develop a sustainability plan to provide for preventive maintenance and repairs.

In its comments on the draft report, USFOR-A partially concurred with the information in the report. It pointed out that although the FMR requires the Commander to ensure that appropriate Afghan authorities are prepared to maintain completed projects, "the evidence is overwhelming that Afghanistan cannot



The Mahmood Raqi to Nijrab Road in Kapisa Province before construction. (Kapisa PRT photo)



Placement of asphalt on the Mahmood Raqi to Nijrab Road. (Kapisa PRT photo)

sustain the projects we complete.”⁶ “There is an unwritten obligation to make progress with respect to reconstruction,” wrote USFOR-A. “We continue to build and meet the sustainment requirement for the FMR by gracefully expecting the GIRoA to one day be able to fulfill its share of the bargain by maintaining the projects they said they would when transferred to them.”⁷

Inspection of the Farukh Shah School Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Project Completion Approved Before All Contract Requirements Met, SIGAR Inspection 10-1

Construction of the Farukh Shah Secondary School, which is designed to serve an isolated community with a growing population of children who previously did not have access to adequate school facilities, has been delayed for two years owing to repeated problems with contractors. The Kapisa PRT approved this \$150,000 school project using CERP funds in January 2007. The work completed by the first contractor was deemed substandard. A second company took over the contract in February 2009 but also proved unable to complete the project to contract standards within the budget. The PRT terminated the second contract in May 2009 and engaged a third contractor to finish the construction. PRT officials issued a Project Closure Report on August 8, 2009.

SIGAR found that the PRT had closed out the project before all the work required by the statement of work was completed. The remaining work includes completing the school building, latrine, guardhouse, power plant, and water pump, and cleaning up the site. SIGAR also found two project flaws that could affect the long-term viability of the school’s infrastructure. Improper grading, which includes a lack of terracing to mitigate the effects of soil erosion, and the absence of a retaining wall increase the risk that landslides will eventually damage the various structures in the school compound. SIGAR believes both these items should have been anticipated and included in the project’s scope of work.

SIGAR recommended that the Commander of the Kapisa PRT

- issue a follow-up contract to address the construction deficiencies noted in the report
- place greater emphasis on developing detailed scopes of work which anticipate and address critical design issues that are particular to each construction project rather than relying solely on standard design plans

The Kapisa PRT generally concurred with the information and recommendations presented in the report.

Inspection of Abdul Manan Secondary School Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Insufficient Planning, Safety Problems, and Poor Quality Control Affect Project Results, SIGAR Inspection 10-2

In the summer of 2008, the Kapisa PRT developed a project to build a two-story school building to accommodate 800 students in a remote part of Nijrab District. In addition to the school, the CERP-funded project called for the construction of

a building to house a 10-kilowatt diesel fuel generator, a 10-stall latrine, a hand-operated water pump and reservoir, a stone masonry perimeter wall for security, a guardhouse, and concrete walkways. The contractor was also responsible for site preparation, removal of rubble and refuse, and the fabrication and installation of bench desks for 800 students.

SIGAR found the project was significantly behind schedule, over budget, and not in compliance with the quality standards required in the statement of work and the national Ministry of Education design plans. SIGAR inspectors also raised concerns about the structural integrity of the school building, which was located on a steep slope. The contractor had not installed a proper retaining wall to protect the school from the water runoff, rock falls, and mudslides that occur every spring.

SIGAR noted that problems began with the award of a contract in September 2008 to the Provincial Director of Education. Revised guidelines prepared in the fall of 2008 by the U.S. Central Command prohibited line ministries from receiving contracts for CERP-funded projects. The Kapisa PRT had to cancel the contract, which delayed the project for several months. A new contract was issued in January 2009. The cost of the project increased from \$208,000 to \$250,000 by May 2009 because the original scope of work had not included several structural components, such as a guard building and perimeter wall, that the national Ministry of Education requires for every school.

SIGAR identified serious flaws in the design plan and documented several instances of poor construction. One of the more serious issues is that, in the current design, the 10-stall latrine empties above a stream that provides potable water for the local community. Although the PRT repeatedly raised this problem with the contractor, construction of the latrine is continuing at the original site.

SIGAR recommended that the Commander, USFOR-A and the Commander, Kapisa PRT

- take actions to correct the multiple deficiencies noted in this report, including ensuring both the statement of work and the design plan for this project reflect specific construction requirements such as site location and contractor capabilities
- develop standardized quality assurance guidelines that can be used to manage this and other CERP-funded projects

USFOR-A and the Kapisa PRT concurred with the first recommendation. USFOR-A concurred with the second recommendation. The Kapisa PRT partially concurred but stated that quality assurance plans need to be flexible enough to allow PRT engineers to tailor specifics to each project's unique requirements.

Inspection of Habib Rahman Secondary School Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Design and Safety Issues Require Attention, SIGAR Inspection 10-3

The design plan for the Habib Rahman Secondary School called for a two-story, 24-classroom building to accommodate 2,000 students. After a series of contract award problems, the PRT awarded the current \$312,000 contract in December 2008. In addition to the school building, the contract calls for the construction of a power generation house to accommodate a 10-kilowatt diesel fuel generator, a latrine, a hand-operated water pump and reservoir, and concrete walkways. The contractor is to remove all rubble and refuse.

SIGAR found that the PRT's management and quality assurance program was inadequate during the early phases of this project's implementation. The project suffered from a number of contracting missteps, a lack of project documentation, and insufficient quality control measures. However, SIGAR noted general improvements during on-site visits in June and August 2009. SIGAR found that construction was largely on time and within budget, and generally met the contract's quality requirements as a result of improved project oversight by the PRT.

SIGAR found two areas of concern that required attention. First, unfinished work left over from earlier construction at the site continues to cause major design and safety issues. The contract does not require the removal of the prior construction, and currently there are no plans to remove it. SIGAR believes the abandoned construction occupies valuable space that could be used for a num-



Unfinished work not removed from earlier construction at Habib Rahman Secondary School, causing major design and safety issues. (SIGAR photo)

ber of other purposes. Additionally, it presents an unsafe environment for school children in its current state. Second, the lack of a reinforced retaining wall and the associated earth removal work needed in the rear of the school, which is adjacent to the base of a hill, could pose a hazard to building occupants from potential rock and mudslides.

USFOR-A and the Kapisa PRT concurred with the information in the report and partially agreed with the recommendations. For example, the PRT agreed with the need to address some deficiencies, particularly the rear retaining wall. However, it indicated that the local government and community leaders did not want the partially constructed structure demolished.

SIGAR recommended that the Commander, USFOR-A, and the Commander, Kapisa PRT, initiate a CERP project to correct the design and safety deficiencies identified in the report.

Inspection of Kohi Girls' School Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Construction Delays Resolved, But Safety Concerns Remain, SIGAR Inspection 10-4

The Kapisa PRT, after receiving a request from the provincial government in the summer of 2008, developed a proposal for the Kohi Girls' School construction project. The intent was to build a school compound for young girls who resided in an area where they had no access to formal education.

A series of contracting problems, including an improper award to the Provincial Director of Education which was in conflict with revised CERP guidelines, forced the PRT to execute a revised bid process in January 2009. The current \$220,000 contract was signed in January 2009. It calls for a two-story, 16-classroom school building to accommodate 500 students in the ethnically polarized Afghaniya Valley area of Nijrab District. In addition to the school building, the contract calls for the construction of a power generation house to accommodate a 10-kilowatt diesel fuel generator; a latrine, a hand-operated water pump and reservoir, and concrete walkways. The contractor is to remove all rubble and refuse.

The project was about 30% complete at the time of SIGAR's first site visit in June 2009. SIGAR noted the project experienced significant construction delays because the contractor had reduced his work force as a result of a shortage of operating capital during the early stages of construction. Subsequent to SIGAR's follow-up visit in August, the contractor received the next scheduled payment, following certification by the PRT that 40% of the project work had been completed. This payment allowed the contractor to hire the additional workers need to accelerate the pace of construction. Consequently, SIGAR found the work to be generally meeting the contract's time, budget, and performance requirements. SIGAR also observed potentially hazardous war-related debris on property that is shared by the new girls' school and an adjoining boys' school. SIGAR believes that removal of this war-related debris and other hazardous material should have been included in the original statement of work for the contract.



Back wall of Habib Rahman Secondary School showing the lack of a reinforced retaining wall, posing a hazard from potential rock and mudslides. (Kapisa PRT photo)

SIGAR OVERSIGHT



SIGAR recommends removal of potentially hazardous war-related debris from Kohi Girls' School. (SIGAR photo)

SIGAR recommended that the Commander, Kapisa PRT, in partnership with the Kapisa provincial authorities, develop a plan for the removal of war-related debris from areas adjacent to the Kohi Girls' school construction project that it shares with other Provincial Ministry of Education facilities.

The Kapisa PRT partially concurred with SIGAR's recommendation. However, USFOR-A and the Kapisa PRT questioned whether CERP guidelines allowed the removal of war-related debris from an area that was not the project site.

ONGOING INSPECTIONS

SIGAR's seven ongoing inspections are assessing PRT capabilities and examining infrastructure projects.

Inspections of the Management and Operational Capabilities of PRTs

SIGAR is currently inspecting the management and operations of two PRTs: the Kapisa PRT and the Farah PRT. At the same time that SIGAR is assessing the overall capabilities of a PRT, it conducts inspections of individual PRT-managed projects. In Kapisa, for example, SIGAR conducted the five inspections discussed in the preceding section. The final report on the management and operations of the Kapisa PRT will be issued during the next quarter. In addition to the Farah PRT assessment, SIGAR will issue inspection reports on two individual projects: the Farah Radio and Television Broadcast Studio and the Togj Bridge.

Inspections of Large Infrastructure Projects

SIGAR is currently inspecting three large infrastructure projects worth about \$400 million: two ANSF facilities funded through CSTC-A and the Kabul Power Plant, funded by USAID. In each case SIGAR will determine whether

- the contract reflects the requirements identified during the development of the project
- implementation of the project has been coordinated with the GIRoA and interested members of the Afghan public
- the work complied with the terms and conditions of the contract
- the U.S. government provided adequate oversight and quality assurance
- the GIRoA has the capacity to maintain the infrastructure following handover


THE SIGAR HOTLINE

SIGAR operates a hotline with physical locations in Afghanistan and the United States to enable U.S. and coalition military and civilian personnel, contractors, and Afghan citizens to lodge complaints and allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse related to the reconstruction effort. Hotline complaints can be lodged by telephone, on the SIGAR Web site (www.sigar.mil/fraud), by letter, or in person. Every complaint is entered in a management database.

SIGAR OVERSIGHT

FIGURE 2.1

SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS RECEIVED THIS QUARTER



Source: SIGAR Inspections Directorate, 10/22/2009.

SIGAR has established a Hotline Complaints Review Committee (HCRC), which is responsible for the initial consideration of all complaints. The HCRC conducts a weekly review of complaints and takes one of these actions:

- assigns the complaint to a SIGAR directorate to gather additional information
- refers the complaint to another agency or inspector general
- closes the complaint, either because it is found to have no merit or because SIGAR is unable to obtain the minimal information needed to assess the complaint

During this reporting period, SIGAR received 37 complaints. Of these, 16 have been assigned to SIGAR directorates for further investigation, 7 have been referred to other agencies or inspectors general, one is still under review by the Inspections Directorate, and 13 have been closed. SIGAR has assigned 12 of the 16 complaints to its Investigations Division to review for potential criminal activity. The remaining four have been assigned to other SIGAR directorates. Allegations include election fraud, contract fraud (bid rigging and price fixing), theft, non-payment for goods and services delivered, unfair hiring, whistleblower retaliation, and waste of U.S. taxpayer dollars.

Since the hotline's launch in May 2009, SIGAR has received a total of 73 complaints. Of these, 27 have been referred to other agencies, 22 have been assigned for further assessment within SIGAR, one is still under review by the Investigations Directorate, and 23 have been closed. Figure 2.1 shows how the complaints were submitted.

INVESTIGATIONS

The Investigations Directorate conducts criminal and civil investigations of corruption, fraud, waste, and abuse involving the use of reconstruction funds in Afghanistan. SIGAR investigations support the criminal prosecution of individuals through the DoJ and the offices of the Judge Advocates General. They also facilitate the civil recovery of U.S. reconstruction funds through federal and military judicial remedies.

SIGAR OVERSIGHT


During this quarter, SIGAR focused on building a robust investigations team and developing a comprehensive investigative strategy to combat fraud, waste, and abuse; initiated seven new criminal investigations; and contributed to the indictment of two individuals and one company accused of bribery. SIGAR is currently involved in the investigation of 30 pending criminal matters and evaluating 5 other allegations.

EXPANSION OF INVESTIGATIONS STAFF

With the additional funding provided for SIGAR in the FY 2009 Supplemental Appropriation in June, SIGAR has been able to hire 10 former special agents, including an assistant inspector general to oversee the Investigations Directorate, from the federal law enforcement and inspector general communities. SIGAR is building a team of investigators who have experience relevant to uncovering criminal activities related to reconstruction. SIGAR investigators have expertise in addressing procurement and government contract fraud, corruption, financial crimes, and money laundering. They represent a cross-section of the federal law enforcement and inspector general communities, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Criminal Investigation Division of the U.S. Department of Army, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigations Division, and the offices of the inspectors general offices of the Department of Interior and DoS. SIGAR is currently evaluating candidates for seven additional special agents, two prosecutors, two forensic intelligence analysts, and a program manager. Figure 2.2 shows how the investigations team is organized and deployed.

FIGURE 2.2

INVESTIGATIONS DIRECTORATE ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 10/16/2009.

INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGY

SIGAR has developed a multifaceted strategy to ensure the effective and efficient utilization of its investigative resources. SIGAR is a member of the International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF), the principal organization coordinating federal cases that involve contract fraud and corruption related to U.S. government spending in Southwest Asia.⁸ As the only member of the ICCTF whose sole mandate is to investigate criminal activity related to the use of U.S. reconstruction funds in Afghanistan, SIGAR is establishing a dominant presence at key locations across Afghanistan. SIGAR special agents are being deployed throughout provinces where the highest value and volume of reconstruction contracts are being managed. Special agents are developing investigative leads and intelligence through direct contact with the full spectrum of public and private entities involved in the reconstruction effort: U.S. government officials, contractors, and Afghan nationals. SIGAR investigators are aggressively exploiting all information provided through the organization's hotline. They are also leveraging the expertise in SIGAR's audit and inspections divisions to identify contract irregularities and suspicious activities. Equally important, SIGAR is continuing to collaborate with the ICCTF to develop intelligence, share resources, and conduct joint investigations.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT CORRUPTION TASK FORCE

The ICCTF, which has offices in Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar, investigates and refers cases for prosecution to the International Sub-Committee of DoJ's National Procurement Fraud Task Force. SIGAR has deployed special agents to these ICCTF offices to collaborate with task force members on joint investigations throughout Afghanistan. As of September 30, 2009, the ICCTF was actively investigating 38 criminal matters. SIGAR is the lead investigative agency or a joint participant in 30 of these cases. In addition, SIGAR is working closely with the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) to identify targets of SIGIR inquiries and investigations who may be operating in Afghanistan. The current distribution of the pending case load is depicted in Figure 2.3.

INVESTIGATIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS


During this reporting period, joint ICCTF investigations resulted in the conviction of two individuals accused of attempting to bribe a U.S. official. In another case, the U.S. government entered into plea agreements with two individuals and a company indicted for bribery and conspiracy.

On August 7, two dual Afghan-U.S. citizens pleaded guilty to one count of offering a \$1 million bribe to a U.S. Army contracting official in Afghanistan. The bribery charge carried a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison and a fine of \$250,000 or up to three times the value of the bribe. The two men are scheduled to be sentenced on November 13, 2009.

On August 18 and 19, two individuals entered into plea agreements that would restore losses to DoD. On September 24, the company that employed the two individuals also entered into a plea agreement. The defendants agreed

FIGURE 2.3

SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS BY CLASSIFICATION



Note: Numbers affected by rounding.
Source: SIGAR, 10/15/2009.

SIGAR OVERSIGHT

to pay combined restitution of more than \$600,000 and could also be subject to court-imposed criminal fines totaling more than \$1 million. The plea agreements followed criminal indictments filed in May 2009 that charged the defendants with conspiracy to inflate negotiating payments, known as Requests for Equitable Adjustments, and to bribe a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers official responsible for managing military contracts for goods and reconstruction services.

SIGAR BUDGET

Congress has provided \$23.2 million to SIGAR to conduct oversight of the expanding U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. This includes \$7.2 million that was approved in June 2009 as part of the FY 2009 supplemental appropriation. That amount, which was made available for a 16-month period, enables SIGAR to hire additional auditors, inspectors, and investigators as well as local Afghan staff (interpreters) in FY 2010.

The President's budget request for FY 2010 includes an additional \$23 million for SIGAR. Combined with the \$7.2 million already appropriated, this would bring SIGAR's total budget for FY 2010 to \$30.2 million. The funding is necessary for SIGAR to continue to hire the staff it needs in the United States and Afghanistan to detect and prevent waste, fraud, and abuse of taxpayer dollars. Table 2.1 provides a funding summary.

TABLE 2.1

SIGAR FUNDING SUMMARY (\$ MILLIONS)					
Appropriation	Public Law	Appropriated	Made Available	Expires	Amount
Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2008, HR2642	PL. 110-252	6/30/2008	6/30/2008	9/30/2009	\$2.0
Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2008, HR2642	PL. 110-252	6/30/2008	10/1/2008	9/30/2009	\$5.0
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009	PL. 110-329	9/30/2008	9/30/2008	9/30/2010	\$9.0
Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2009, HR2346	PL. 111-32	6/24/2009	6/24/2009	9/30/2010	\$7.2
Total					\$23.2

SIGAR STAFF

Since its last quarterly report to the Congress, SIGAR has increased the number of federal employees from 44 to 57.⁹ This includes 53 staff hired under the 3161 authority, 3 DoD detailees, and 1 person detailed to SIGAR from another government agency. Table 2.2 provides a breakdown of the staff. In order to fulfill its oversight mission, SIGAR plans to expand its staff to 118 during FY 2010.

SIGAR has an agreement with the U.S. Embassy in Kabul to station up to 32 staff at the Embassy and at three satellite offices in Afghanistan. About half of the staff are permanently based in the country. To make the best use of the limited spaces available, the remaining billets are reserved for auditors, inspectors, and investigators who are deployed on temporary duty to conduct specific missions. Once their work in Afghanistan is completed, these individuals return to SIGAR headquarters to finalize their written reports.

TABLE 2.2

SIGAR STAFFING			
Function	October 2008	Current	FY 2010 (planned)
Staffing Levels, Total			
Front Office	2	3	6
Special Staff	0	6	6
Forward Support	2	4	4
Chief of Staff	3	7	16
Subtotal	7	20	32
Audit	0	16	28
Inspection	0	9	21
Investigation	0	7	22
Information Management	0	5	15
Subtotal	0	37	86
Total	7	57	118
Staffing Levels, Afghanistan*			
Forward Support	0	4	
Subtotal	0	4	
Audit	0	6	
Inspection	0	5	
Investigation	0	3	
Subtotal	0	14	
Total	0	18	

Note: *Includes permanent TDY.


Source: SIGAR, 10/13/2009.

Women Voting

A polling center worker dips a voter's finger in indelible ink, to show that the woman has cast a ballot. Polling stations are segregated by gender. (U.S. Embassy Kabul photo, Dan Wilkinson)

3 RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE





“Overall, [the GIROA’s] spending priorities are in line with the ANDS. But donor financing is not appropriately aligned with [the GIROA’s] priorities.”

—*First annual report on the implementation of ANDS*

Source: GIROA, “The Afghanistan National Development Strategy: First Annual Report, 1387 (2008/09),” 8/1/2009.

OVERVIEW

Section 3 provides a holistic view of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, including an overview of the conditions on the ground. This overview of the state of the nation provides a broad context for the accomplishments and challenges experienced during reconstruction.

The section is organized by the three pillars of reconstruction, as laid out in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS): Security, Governance, and Economic and Social Development. Counter-Narcotics and gender equality, two cross-cutting issues that affect all three pillars, are also discussed. See the Graphics Key page for information about how graphics are used to highlight the discussion of the ANDS.

TOPICS

Section 3 discusses four broad topics: funding, security, governance, and economic and social development. Quarterly highlights—short pieces that focus on a single aspect of reconstruction—add detail or context about pertinent issues within these topics.

The Status of Funds subsection provides a comprehensive look at monies pledged and spent for Afghanistan reconstruction. It gives specific information about major U.S. funds, international contributions, and the Afghan government budget.

The Security subsection details the activities of the Afghan National Security Forces, including the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. It also discusses U.S. and international efforts to bolster security in Afghanistan. Where possible, it provides updates on progress against established goals for security.

The Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights subsection details the elections of 2009, including the results, election security issues, and other challenges experienced. Where possible, it provides updates on progress in the areas of the rule of law, justice, and human rights. It also includes two quarterly highlights: one about the 2009 audit process and one about the preparations for the 2004 and 2009 elections.

The Economic and Social Development subsection discusses reconstruction activities in areas ranging from agriculture to transportation to health services. Where possible, it provides updates on progress in the specific area being addressed. It also includes a quarterly highlight about the women of Afghanistan.

METHODOLOGY

Section 3 is based on information provided by outside sources. Except where SIGAR audits, inspections, or investigations are specifically referenced, none of the data in this section has been audited, inspected, or investigated by SIGAR; nor does this information reflect SIGAR's opinions. The information was obtained through U.S. agency responses to a data call and through open-source research. All data is sourced to the reporting organization in endnotes or within tables and figures. For SIGAR audits, inspections, and investigations, see Section 2.

Data Call

The data call is a series of questions posed to U.S. agencies. The questions focus on reconstruction programming and the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. U.S. agencies that participated in the data call for this quarterly report include the following:

- Department of State
- Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Department of Defense
- U.S. Agency for International Development
- U.S. Treasury
- Overseas Private Investment Corporation

A preliminary draft of the report was provided to the responding agencies before publication to allow them to clarify or update information.

Open-Source Research

Open-source research is the most current, publicly available data from a variety of published reports and data:


- All U.S. agencies represented in the data call
- United Nations (and relevant branches)
- World Bank
- International Monetary Fund
- International Security Assistance Force
- Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan
- Electoral Complaints Commission
- Central Intelligence Agency
- White House

The majority of the open-source data was included in the preliminary draft sent to the U.S. agencies that participated in the data call for review before publication.

UNDERSTANDING THE GRAPHICS


BAR CHARTS

This report deals with many funds and projects with dollar values ranging from millions to billions. To provide an accurate graphical representation of these numbers, some bar graphs appear with a break (a wavy line) to indicate a jump between zero and a higher number.




PROVINCE MAPS

Province maps indicate locations discussed in the text. Referenced provinces are highlighted.




DISTINGUISHING BILLIONS AND MILLIONS

Because this report details funding in both billions and millions of dollars, it uses a visual cue to distinguish the two measurement units. Dollars reported in billions are represented in blue, and dollars reported in millions are depicted in brown.




ANDS GRAPHIC

The graphic represents the three pillars of the ANDS and the six cross-cutting issues affecting them. Throughout this section, the pillar or cross-cutting issue being discussed is highlighted in the margin.



FUNDING MARKERS

Funding markers identify individual funds discussed in the text. The agency responsible for managing the fund is listed in the tan box below the fund name. These markers are displayed in the margin.



STATUS OF FUNDS


STATUS OF FUNDS

As of September 30, 2009, the United States has appropriated approximately \$39.33 billion to the relief and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. This total has been allocated as follows: \$20.18 billion for security, \$11.56 billion for governance and development, \$3.27 billion for counter-narcotics efforts, \$1.92 billion for humanitarian aid, and \$2.39 billion for oversight and operations, as identified in Appendix B.

The cumulative appropriated funding as of September 30, 2009 (\$39.33 billion) is more than the previously reported cumulative funding as of June 30, 2009 (\$38.07 billion). This change resulted from updated agency reported data, an updated accounting of the Supplemental Appropriations Act signed on June 24, 2009, and inclusion of associated operating expenses, including Inspector General oversight, for Afghanistan reconstruction. Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the major U.S. funds that contribute to these efforts.

FIGURE 3.1

U.S. FUNDS SUPPORTING AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS (\$ BILLIONS)



- ASFF:** Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
- CERP:** Commander's Emergency Response Program
- ESF:** Economic Support Fund
- DA:** Development Assistance
- INCLE:** International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
- Other:** Other Funding

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. ^aDoJ, DoD, DoS, Treasury, USDA, USAID, and other agencies.

Sources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009, 10/14/2009, and 10/15/2009; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009; DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2009 and 10/16/2009; DoJ/DEA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/8/2009; USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2009; OMB, responses to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2008 and 7/16/2009.

STATUS OF FUNDS

Reconstruction funds can be grouped into five broad categories based on their primary objectives. However, funds can support more than one objective.


Cumulative Appropriations

As of September 30, 2009, cumulative appropriations in FY 2009 were \$39.33 billion. This amount can be divided into five major reconstruction categories: Security, Governance and Development, Counter-Narcotics, Humanitarian, and Oversight and Operations. Figure 3.2 provides a breakdown of cumulative appropriations by funding category. For a complete breakdown of U.S. appropriations, refer to Appendix B.

Between FY 2007 and FY 2009, cumulative appropriations increased by 71%—from \$23.04 billion in FY 2007 to \$39.33 billion in FY 2009. As of FY 2009, security efforts have received the largest cumulative appropriations. Including funds for the ASFF, security appropriations account for over 51.3% (\$20.18 billion) of total U.S. reconstruction assistance. Until FY 2007, governance and development amassed the largest amount of cumulative appropriations; security had the second largest cumulative appropriations. But in FY 2007, appropriations of \$7.41 billion to the ASFF propelled security ahead. Including this appropriation, cumu-

FIGURE 3.2

CUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers affected by rounding.

Sources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009, 10/14/2009, and 10/15/2009; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009; DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2009 and 10/16/2009; DoJ/DEA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/8/2009; USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2009; OMB, responses to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2008 and 7/16/2009.

STATUS OF FUNDS

lative funding for security through FY 2007 surpassed the cumulative amounts for all other categories combined over that same time period.

Appropriations by Fiscal Year


In FY 2009, \$10.08 billion was appropriated for Afghanistan reconstruction efforts, making it the year with the highest amount of appropriations. The second highest level of appropriations was \$10.03 billion in FY 2007.

Security received a 103% increase in funding in FY 2009 over FY 2008 levels. Out of total appropriations for FY 2009, security initiatives constitute 55.6%, followed by governance and development programs with 27.4%. Between FY 2006 and FY 2009, security funding accounted for the majority of U.S. appropriations for Afghanistan reconstruction efforts.

Figure 3.3 shows annual appropriations by funding category between FY 2002 and FY 2009. The bars show the amount of appropriations by category, while the pie charts represent the proportion appropriated for each.

FIGURE 3.3


APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR, AMOUNT, AND PERCENTAGE (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers affected by rounding.

Sources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009, 10/14/2009, and 10/15/2009; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009; DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2009 and 10/16/2009; DoJ/DEA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/8/2009; USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2009; OMB, responses to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2008 and 7/16/2009.

STATUS OF FUNDS



ASFF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

DoD reported ASFF funds as available, obligated, or disbursed.

Available: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009.

AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND

The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is the primary organization responsible for building the ANSF.¹⁰ CSTC-A uses ASFF monies to provide the ANSF with equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction.¹¹ The international community's plan is to gradually decrease international funding for this effort and increase the ANSF's ability to secure the country through the use of revenue from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), in accordance with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).¹²

Status of Funds


Since FY 2005, almost \$18.67 billion has been made available to the ASFF.¹³ This accounts for approximately 47.5% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan.

This amount includes the nearly \$3.61 billion provided in the FY 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act signed by the U.S. President on June 24, 2009.¹⁴ As of September 30, 2009, over \$17.30 billion has been obligated, with nearly \$16.58 billion of that amount disbursed.¹⁵ Figure 3.4 displays amounts made available for the ASFF by fiscal year.

Between June 30 and September 30, 2009, DoD obligated nearly \$2.4 billion and disbursed more than \$1.88 billion to support ANSF initiatives.¹⁶ Figure 3.5 provides a cumulative comparison of amounts made available, obligated, and disbursed for the ASFF.

FIGURE 3.4

ASFF AVAILABLE FUNDS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ BILLIONS)




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009.

FIGURE 3.5

ASFF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE
COMPARISON (\$ BILLIONS)



Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Sources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009 and 10/9/2009.

STATUS OF FUNDS

ASFF Budget Activities

DoD allocates funds to three **budget activity groups** within the ASFF: Defense Forces (Afghan National Army, or ANA), Interior Forces (Afghan National Police, or ANP), and Related Activities, which consists primarily of Detainee Operations. Funds for each budget activity group are further allocated to **sub-activity groups**: Infrastructure, Equipment/Transportation, Training and Operations, and Sustainment.¹⁷

Funding by Budget Activity Group

As of September 30, 2009, a total of \$16.58 billion has been disbursed. Of this amount, \$10.75 billion (64.85%) was disbursed for the ANA, \$5.76 billion (34.73%) for the ANP, and the remaining \$0.07 billion (0.42%) focused on related activities.

As shown in Figure 3.6, the majority of funds for the ANA have been disbursed for Equipment and Transportation (\$4.43 billion), followed by Sustainment efforts (\$2.81 billion). The majority of funds for the ANP have been disbursed for Infrastructure (\$1.59 billion), followed by Sustainment efforts (\$1.55 billion), as shown in Figure 3.7.


Budget Activity Groups: Categories within each appropriation or fund account that identify the purposes, projects, or types of activities financed by the appropriation or fund.

Sub-Activity Groups: Accounting groups that break down the command's disbursements into functional areas.

Source: DoD, "Manual 7110.1-M Department of Defense Budget Guidance Manual," www.fas.org/man/docs/basic/man4.html, accessed 9/28/2009; Department of the Navy, "Medical Facility Manager Handbook," www.med.navy.mil/.../BUMEDFacilityManagerHANDBOOK2002.DOC, accessed 10/2/2009, p. 5.

FIGURE 3.6

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANA
By Sub-Activity Group,
FY 2005–September 2009 (\$ BILLIONS)




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Numbers are as of September 30, 2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009.

FIGURE 3.7


ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANP
By Sub-Activity Group, FY 2005–September
2009 (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers affected by rounding. Numbers are as of September 30, 2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009.

STATUS OF FUNDS



CERP FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

DoD reported CERP funds as funded, obligated, or disbursed.

Funding: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/14/2009.

COMMANDER'S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM

CERP funds enable U.S. commanders in Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements in their areas of responsibility by supporting programs that will immediately assist the local population. Funding under this program is intended for small-scale projects costing less than \$500,000 each. Projects costing more than \$2 million are permitted but require approval from the Commander of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) or designees.¹⁸


Status of Funds

Since FY 2004, USCENTCOM has funded nearly \$1.64 billion for CERP, accounting for almost 4.2% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan. As of September 30, 2009, over \$1.61 billion has been obligated and approximately \$0.96 billion disbursed.¹⁹ Figure 3.8 shows CERP funding by fiscal year.

Since June 30, 2009, DoD has obligated an additional \$162.38 million and disbursed \$150.67 million for CERP projects. Figure 3.9 provides a cumulative comparison of the amounts of funds appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for CERP projects.

FIGURE 3.8

CERP FUNDING BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)




Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. CERP funding terms (funded, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/14/2009.

FIGURE 3.9

CERP FUNDS, CUMULATIVE
COMPARISON (\$ BILLIONS)



Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. CERP funding terms (funded, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Sources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2009 and 10/14/2009.

STATUS OF FUNDS


CERP Concerns

SIGAR auditors have highlighted several concerns about CERP projects in Afghanistan. The SIGAR audit report on CERP noted deficiencies in the monitoring and execution of CERP-funded projects.²⁰ Although the main purpose of CERP is to fund small-scale projects that can be sustained by the local population, SIGAR noted that large-scale projects in excess of \$500,000 are increasingly being funded under the program, reducing the resources available to execute small-scale projects. SIGAR also noted that although the proportion of large-scale projects is minimal (3% of total projects), they consume a majority of the funds (67%).²¹ Figure 3.10 displays CERP fund usage by project scale.

U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A), which assumed responsibility for and management of CERP in May 2009, has outlined specific procedures to correct the deficiencies highlighted in the audit. Some of these procedures include adding a project manager to the CERP administration team and limiting the number of projects managed at any given time to 10. USFOR-A also indicated that it will develop a central record-keeping database, limit the number of open projects in specific regional commands, and increase the approval authority of the Combined Joint Task Force 101 Commander and USFOR-A Deputy Commander to include projects costing over \$1 million.²²

FIGURE 3.10


**LARGE-SCALE PROJECTS,
FY 2005–JUNE 2009 (PERCENT)**
By Proportion and Allocation



Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Large-scale projects are defined as those costing \$500,000 or more. Total obligations amount differs from amount reported by DoD because of rounding and timing differences.

Source: SIGAR, Audit-09-5, "Increased Visibility, Monitoring, and Planning Needed for Commander's Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan," 9/9/2009, pp. 4, 14.

STATUS OF FUNDS



ESF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

USAID reported ESF funds as appropriated, obligated, or disbursed.

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009.

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

ESF programs advance U.S. interests by helping countries meet short- and long-term political, economic, and security needs. Programs range from supporting counter-terrorism to bolstering national economies, to assisting in the development of effective, accessible, independent legal systems for a more transparent and accountable government.²³


Status of Funds

Since FY 2002, the Congress has appropriated approximately \$7.70 billion to ESF programs in Afghanistan.²⁴ These appropriations account for nearly 19.6% of total U.S. assistance to the reconstruction effort. As of September 30, 2009, over \$6.97 billion has been obligated and over \$4.59 billion disbursed.²⁵ Figure 3.11 displays ESF appropriations by fiscal year.

Since June 30, 2009, USAID obligated over \$883.90 million and disbursed nearly \$419.61 million to support ESF programs.²⁶ Figure 3.12 provides a cumulative comparison of the amount of ESF funds appropriated, obligated, and disbursed.

FIGURE 3.11

ESF APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ BILLIONS)




Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. ESF funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by USAID except as specified.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009.

FIGURE 3.12

ESF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE
COMPARISON (\$ BILLIONS)



Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. ESF funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by USAID except as specified.

Sources: USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/16/2009; USAID, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009 and 10/9/2009.

STATUS OF FUNDS


DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Primarily managed by USAID, DA programs are designed to advance sustainable, broad-based economic progress and social stability in developing countries, including Afghanistan.²⁷ DA funds finance long-term projects to provide humanitarian assistance, address environmental issues, improve governance, and promote socio-economic development.²⁸

Status of Funds

Since FY 2002, the Congress has appropriated nearly \$891.78 million to support DA programs in Afghanistan.²⁹ This constitutes nearly 2.3% of total U.S. assistance for Afghanistan reconstruction support. As of September 30, 2009, approximately \$884.14 million has been obligated and over \$720.01 million disbursed.³⁰ Figure 3.13 depicts DA appropriations by fiscal year.

Since June 30, 2009, USAID has obligated almost \$1.58 billion, with almost \$46.08 million disbursed.³¹ Figure 3.14 provides a cumulative comparison of the amount of DA funds appropriated, obligated, and disbursed.



DA FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

USAID reported DA funds as appropriated, obligated, or disbursed.

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments


Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009.

FIGURE 3.13

DA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)




Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. DA funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by USAID except as specified.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009.

FIGURE 3.14


DA FUNDS, CUMULATIVE
COMPARISON (\$ MILLIONS)



Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. DA funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by USAID except as specified.

Sources: USAID, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009 and 10/9/2009.

STATUS OF FUNDS



INL FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

INL reported INCLE and other INL funds as allotted, obligated, or liquidated.

Allotments: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Liquidations: Monies that have been expended

Source: DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2009.

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

The International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) fund is managed by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to advance the rule of law and to combat narcotics production and trafficking. INCLE funds support several INL program groups, including police, counter-narcotics, and rule of law and justice.³²


Status of Funds

Since FY 2002, over \$2.03 billion has been allotted for INCLE initiatives.³³ This amount represents almost 5.2% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan. As of September 30, 2009, more than \$1.92 billion has been obligated and over \$1.55 billion liquidated.³⁴ Figure 3.15 displays INCLE allotments by fiscal year. Figure 3.16 displays INCLE allotments, obligations, and liquidations as of June 30, 2009, and as of September 30, 2009.

Since June 30, 2009, more than \$140.59 million has been obligated and over \$74.40 million liquidated.³⁵ Figure 3.16 provides a cumulative comparison of the amount of INCLE funds allotted, obligated, and liquidated.

FIGURE 3.15

INCLE ALLOTMENTS BY FISCAL YEAR (\$ MILLIONS)




Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. INCLE funding terms (allotted, obligated, liquidated) reported as provided by DoS and INL except as specified.

Source: DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2009.

FIGURE 3.16

INCLE FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON (\$ BILLIONS)



Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. INL funding terms (allotted, obligated, liquidated) reported as provided by DoS and INL except as specified.

Sources: DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009, and 10/13/2009.

GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING

In addition to the international donations that the GIROA receives for reconstruction efforts, the GIROA also provides funding for that purpose. The GIROA Ministry of Finance (MoF) is responsible for the management and execution of the budget, which includes Afghan funds for reconstruction efforts. The MoF is also accountable for international funds when they are routed through government ministries.³⁶

Domestic Budget

The U.S. Treasury (Treasury) estimates the GIROA budget for FY 2009 to be \$7.5 billion, an increase of more than 2.7% over FY 2008. The budget is split into two major categories: the \$2.6 billion core budget and the \$4.9 billion external budget.³⁷ Figure 3.17 displays a breakdown of budget amounts by category.

Core Budget

The core budget consists of two sub-categories: the operating budget, which accounts for \$1.6 billion, and the development budget, which accounts for the remaining \$1.0 billion.³⁸

OPERATING BUDGET

Since FY 2008, the operating budget has increased more than 14%, from \$1.4 billion to \$1.6 billion. According to Treasury, the operating budget consists mainly of recurrent costs such as wages and salaries.³⁹ The GIROA has identified the following as contributors to the increase in the FY 2009 budget:⁴⁰

- the expected addition of 23,500 recruits in the ANA, in addition to a salary increase of Afs 1,000 per member (approximately \$20.15)
- an anticipated addition of 12,500 teachers and associated salary increases of Afs 1,300 (approximately \$26.22) per teacher
- salary increases for university professors
- salary increases for judges

DEVELOPMENT BUDGET


According to Treasury, the FY 2009 development budget has remained consistent with FY 2008 levels at \$1.0 billion. Capital expenditures in the areas of governance, rule of law, infrastructure, education, health, agriculture and rural development, social protection, and private sector development make up the development budget.⁴¹

External Budget

For FY 2009, the GIROA's external budget was approximately \$4.9 billion. The external budget is composed primarily of security expenses, though some development funding is included. The external budget is entirely dependent on international assistance.⁴²

FIGURE 3.17

GIROA BUDGET, 2009–2010 (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers affected by rounding.

Source: Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2009.

Recurrent Cost Window: a funding mechanism that provides for accelerated disbursements of civil servant salaries, as well as operating and maintenance costs.

Source: World Bank, "Discussion Note: The ARTF Recurrent Cost Window," 9/2008, <http://sitere-sources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Resources/3059841201489063036/46083531220998199117/RWindowNote.pdf>, accessed 10/20/2009.

Investment Window: a funding mechanism that provides grant financing for national development programs.

Source: World Bank, "The World Bank in Afghanistan: Quarterly Country Update," 10/2009.

International Contributions to the Core Budget - Operating

In addition to funds contributed by the GIRoA, the international community provides support in the form of grants to the core budget. Support for the operating budget comes from three main sources:⁴³

- Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund – **Recurrent Cost Window** (ARTF-RC)
- Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA)
- CSTC-A

The ARTF-RC finances the operating costs of the government, as well as maintenance expenses. Over \$1.7 billion has been disbursed to date to ensure that the government continues to function and deliver essential services such as education and health care.⁴⁴

LOTFA supports the rehabilitation of police facilities, salaries, training and capacity building, and procurement of non-lethal equipment. Grants for LOTFA are expected to reach Afs 20 billion (approximately \$403.39 million).⁴⁵

Grants from CSTC-A support a series of salary increases for ANA personnel. The increases amount to \$20 per month since 2008. Support is also provided for meals for the ANA, military high school, and incentive payments in areas such as medicine and reenlistment.⁴⁶

International Contributions to the Core Budget - Development

The ARTF **Investment Window** provides a significant amount of support for the development budget. Support is provided for the rehabilitation of school buildings, as well as for the provision of textbooks and school supplies. Programs financed under the ARTF Investment Window are those the GIRoA determines are most important. A total of \$1.2 billion has been committed for these efforts since 2002.⁴⁷

Contributions to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

As of September 30, 2009, the World Bank reports that 30 international donors have contributed a total of \$3 billion to the ARTF. Of these donors, approximately half contribute on an annual basis.⁴⁸ See Figure 3.18 for details on the amounts contributed by donor country.

The ARTF is the largest contributor to the Afghan budget, for both operating and development costs.⁴⁹ Contributions provide support to the GIRoA through the Recurrent Cost Window, which helps build the capacity of the MoF by providing a predictable source of funding that is administered through the government.⁵⁰ Contributions also provide support for development efforts through the Investment Window, which assists the GIRoA in aligning its development planning with available resources.⁵¹

The ARTF is the leading source of multi-donor funding in Afghanistan, according to the World Bank.⁵² Donors agreed in 2008 to extend the fund through June 2020. In addition, the ARTF Incentive Program was established in December 2008. The purpose of the program is to provide for a "phased and predictable exit from the Recurrent Cost Window."⁵³ As of August 22, 2009, donors pledged over \$607 million to the fund, of which more than \$234 million (38.6%) has been paid in.⁵⁴

STATUS OF FUNDS

Domestic Revenue

For FY 2009, Treasury estimates the GIROA's revenue to be approximately \$980 million. As shown in Figure 3.19, tax revenues constitute nearly 78% of domestic revenue and fees make up the remaining 22%.⁵⁵


Revenue from external sources fund 60% of the core budget. The majority of this external revenue, 53.6%, is supplied by multi-donor trust funds, followed by international financial institutions with 28.1%. The United States and other donor sources account for the remaining 18.4%.⁵⁶

International Organizations at Work in Afghanistan

In addition to U.S. assistance, a variety of international organizations contribute to the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. Assistance is provided across a multitude of sectors including security, governance and development, and humanitarian aid. This subsection highlights international organizations that are providing assistance to Afghanistan.⁵⁷

FIGURE 3.19


GIROA DOMESTIC REVENUE, 2009-2010 (\$ MILLIONS)



Note: Numbers affected by rounding.
Source: Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2009.

FIGURE 3.18

ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS FOR 2009, AS OF AUGUST 22, 2009 (\$ MILLIONS)



Note: Numbers affected by rounding.
Source: World Bank, "ARTF: Administrator's Report on Financial Status as of August 22, 2009," p. 1.



UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

Officials from the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) stated that the mission's FY 2009 budget was \$168 million.⁵⁸ According to the UN Secretary-General, the General Assembly approved a 70% increase in UNAMA's budget for FY 2010. This increase can be attributed to a 1,000-person increase in staff (including 170 international staff) and an increase in the number of field offices.⁵⁹

The mandate for UNAMA, established in 2002 and renewed on March 23, 2009, highlights the organization's efforts to improve governance and the rule of law, and fight corruption.⁶⁰ UNAMA is charged with managing all humanitarian relief, recovery, and reconstruction activities provided by the international community in Afghanistan.⁶¹



UNDP/ELECT

One of the SIGAR audit reports on the elections noted that the international community invested \$331.2 million to support the United Nations Development Programme/Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (UNDP/ELECT) project. UNAMA established UNDP/ELECT to provide technical assistance and build the capacity of Afghanistan's Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to conduct the 2009 presidential and provincial elections.⁶²

UNDP/ELECT created a basket fund—a joint financing mechanism—to manage the donor contributions from the international community. The United States contributed \$143.1 million to the basket fund. Other international contributors included Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.⁶³



World Bank

In the World Bank's October 2009 "Quarterly Country Update," officials stated that since 2002, more than \$1.89 billion has been committed to Afghanistan for emergency reconstruction and development projects and budget support operations. The World Bank currently has 26 active projects in the country. Support for reconstruction consists of \$1.45 billion in grants and \$436.4 million in no-interest loans, known as "credits." A number of projects have been completed in various sectors including education, emergency public works, infrastructure, and health care.⁶⁴



Asian Development Bank

At the Paris Conference in June 2008, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) extended its commitment to Afghanistan by pledging \$1.3 billion between 2008 and 2013. Since 2002, the ADB has consistently pledged funds at conferences for the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. In 2002, it pledged \$500 million over two and a half years. In 2004, it pledged up to \$800 million for 2005 through 2008. In 2006, it pledged an additional \$200 million through 2010. With respect to overall donor pledges between 2002 and 2013, the ADB ranks as the fourth largest donor behind the United States, the United Kingdom, and the World Bank.⁶⁵

STATUS OF FUNDS

The ADB's assistance focuses on a variety of sectors, including energy, road transport, and agriculture and natural resource management. The ADB also provides assistance to Afghanistan's governance, financial, and private sectors.⁶⁶


International Monetary Fund

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), current assistance to Afghanistan (\$120 million) is provided under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility loan program. This assistance is set to expire in March 2010.⁶⁷ The IMF began providing assistance to the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan in 2002, aiming to build the financial capacity of the country.⁶⁸ To enable governments to take advantage of opportunities, the IMF tracks global trends and performance, alerts member countries of potential issues, provides a forum for policy dialogue, and shares knowledge of how to handle economic difficulties.⁶⁹



SECURITY

According to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, “[i]nsecurity [inadequate security] continues to be the single greatest factor impeding progress in Afghanistan.”⁷⁰ This section provides information about Afghan and international community efforts related to security. It describes the status of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and the international forces in Afghanistan. It also addresses reconstruction efforts in the security sector, including removing unexploded ordnance, disarming illegal armed groups, and carrying out counter-narcotics activities.



SECURITY GOALS

The Security Pillar of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) provides metrics to measure progress related to security. Since the release of the ANDS, certain metrics for security were updated, as shown in Table 3.1. Explanations of these metrics are provided throughout this each section.

TABLE 3.1

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES FOR SECURITY				
ANDS Security Pillar	ANDS Target	Updated Target	Status	ANDS Completion Date
Afghan National Army	80,000 troops (plus 6,600 in training)	134,000 troops (by September 2010)	93,980 troops	End of 2010
Afghan National Police	82,180 professional policemen	109,000 professional policemen (by September 2010)	81,509 professional policemen	End of 2010
Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups	All illegal armed groups disbanded in all provinces		84 of 119 targeted districts declared cleared	March 20, 2011
Removing Unexploded Ordnance	Land area contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance reduced by 70%		ANDS Update: 25% of target area cleared	End of 2010
	90% of all known mine- or Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)-contaminated areas cleared		DoS: 1.70 billion square meters cleared, 690 million square meters remain	2012
	All emplaced anti-personnel mines cleared			2013
Counter-Narcotics	Areas under poppy cultivation reduced by half compared with 2007 levels		Areas under poppy cultivation reduced by 36% compared with 2007 levels	2013


Note: Numbers affected by rounding.

Sources: GfRoa, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy, Executive Summary,” p. 6; NATO, “International Security Assistance Force and Afghan National Army Strength & Laydown,” www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf, accessed 9/30/2009; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009; DoD, “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” 6/2009, p. 28; GfRoa, “ANDS First Annual Report 1387 (2008/2009), Part II – Appendices,” 8/1/2009, p. 36; DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009; UNODC, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009: Summary Findings,” 9/2009, p. 2.

FIGURE 3.20


CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

By Province



By Month

Total Wounded: 696
Total Killed: 453



Legend for Figure 3.20 (By Month):

- Wounded
- Killed

Notes: Civilians include Afghans and foreigners. No casualty data was provided for Daykundi.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

SECURITY INCIDENTS

The Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) reported casualties for the ANSF, coalition forces, foreigners, and Afghans. Between July 1 and September 20, 2009, 150 troops from coalition forces were killed in action and 1,020 were wounded in action.⁷¹

In that same period, there were 1,103 Afghan casualties, making up nearly all of the 1,149 civilian casualties shown in Figure 3.20.⁷² The majority of civilian casualties occurred during August—almost double the number killed in July. More than twice as many casualties occurred in Kandahar between July 1 and September 20 than in any other province, with 305 recorded. The next greatest numbers of casualties occurred in Helmand (148) and Kabul (146).⁷³

THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY


The ANA's target troop strength is 134,000 by September 2010, according to CSTC-A.⁷⁴ Its strength in September 2009 was 93,980 troops, according to NATO.⁷⁵ For 2009, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that approximately 4.37 million Afghan men age 16 to 49 are fit for military service. They also estimate that over 382,700 become available for service annually.⁷⁶

ANA Training Status

ANA graduates are trained in one of 12 military specialties, each serving a particular function within the ANA. The greatest number of soldiers graduated into the infantry, as shown in Figure 3.21.⁷⁷

FIGURE 3.21

ANA TRAINING GRADUATES BY SPECIALTY



Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.


It is a goal of the ANDS to maintain a regional and ethnic balance within the ANA.⁷⁸ The distribution of ethnicities in the ANA is not dissimilar to those of the country as a whole, as shown in Figure 3.22, except that in the ANA the leading ethnicity is Tajik, while in the country the leading ethnicity is Pashtun.⁷⁹

CSTC-A oversees training for the ANA. From July 1 to September 30, 2009, ANA training organizations graduated 13,890 soldiers.⁸⁰ The majority graduated from the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC), as shown in Figure 3.23. The KMTC is used primarily for training kandaks (battalions) and military leaders. The KMTC training includes basic training, combat training, marksmanship, battle drills, various combat conditions, and land mine warfare. The KMTC offers leadership and sergeant training courses that develop tactical skills and leadership capacity. Particular specialties of officer training courses include infantry (heavy weapons and reconnaissance), field artillery, engineering, signals, transportation, and ordnance. Advanced combat courses develop skills in logistics, heavy weapons, field artillery, reconnaissance, maintenance, engineering, transportation, medical, and signals.⁸¹

Another ANA training program is the Logistics School, which offers specialized training in the maintenance, transport, and supply skills required by an officer or squad leader. The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) offers staff and officer courses in the military decision-making process, tactical operations, and the application of advanced military concepts and problem-solving models for use in military operations. Students taking the Higher Command and Staff Course at CGSC study foreign military, police, and governmental organizations within the geographic region and compare them with their own institutions.⁸²

FIGURE 3.23


ANA TRAINING GRADUATES BY PROGRAM



Note: The Consolidated Fielding Center is not a training program. See ANA Training section for additional details.
Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

FIGURE 3.22

ETHNIC REPRESENTATION: ANA TRAINING GRADUATES COMPARED WITH AFGHAN POPULATION (PERCENT)




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Numbers are as of 9/30/2009. "Other" category for ANA graduates includes Arab, Nuristani, Turkman, and unspecified ethnicities. "Other" category for the population includes Aimak, Turkmen, Baloch, and unspecified ethnicities.

Sources: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009; CIA, "The World Factbook Afghanistan," www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html#top, accessed 9/20/2009.

FIGURE 3.24

ANA TRAINING GRADUATES BY UNIT ASSIGNMENT



Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

The Counterinsurgency Training Center - Afghanistan teaches the principles of counterinsurgency and their application to operations in Afghanistan. The Explosive Ordnance Disposal organization trains in the handling and disarming of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ordnance.⁸³

Two additional programs are used for ANA training but had no graduates during this period. The Kabul Military High School (KMHS) and the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA) are schools for the ANA. The KMHS is a three-year academic program that prepares students for further training and for attendance at the NMAA or a civilian university. At the NMAA, students earn a bachelor's degree and are trained and educated according to four pillars of development: academic, military, physical, and personal character. Three majors are offered: civil engineering, computer science, and law.⁸⁴

The Consolidated Fielding Center (CFC), though not a training course, is a place where units form, equip, and conduct initial collective training to bolster effective fielding and to maintain a common training standard. At the CFC, units prepare to deploy to their designated areas of operations.⁸⁵


All ANA soldiers are given one of 21 unit assignments. Between July 1 and September 30, 2009, the largest group of soldiers was assigned to the 205th Corps, as shown in Figure 3.24. Unit assignments can also include the Air Corps, the Commando Brigade, and the Counter-Narcotics Infantry Kandak.⁸⁶

ANA Readiness

CSTC-A uses Capability Milestone (CM) ratings for the ANSF to express the incremental improvements in the capability of the forces.⁸⁷ Four additional units were rated this quarter.⁸⁸ As of September 13, 2009, CSTC-A reported 44

FIGURE 3.25

ANA UNIT CM RATINGS, PERIOD-TO-PERIOD COMPARISON



Note: CM1 = All criteria adequately met, quantitative measures >85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role >85%. CM2 = Most criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 70–85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 70–85%. CM3 = Few criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 50–70%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 50–70%. CM4 = No criteria adequately met, quantitative measures <50%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role <50%. May not include fire support, close air support, and MEDEVAC.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009; DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/8/2009.

ANA units at CM1, representing approximately 35% of the units rated for this quarter.⁸⁹ Last quarter, approximately 38% of ANA units were rated CM1.⁹⁰ There was a decline in CM1 ratings of approximately 6% from last quarter, as shown in Figure 3.25. Based on the ANA CM ratings, an average CM rating was calculated for each of the nine ANA corps represented in the data. Three of the corps were rated CM1, four were rated CM2, and two were rated CM3. No corps had an average rating of CM4.⁹¹

ANA Infrastructure Status

According to CSTC-A, 18 ANA infrastructure projects worth \$176.98 million were completed between July 1 and September 30, 2009. Infrastructure contracts include such projects as garrisons, hospitals, troop medical clinics, and troop training ranges. Between July 1 and September 30, contracts were awarded for 27 such projects worth \$239.21 million.⁹²

ANA Equipment Status


According to CSTC-A, the ANA classifies equipment as the critical weapons, vehicles, and tactical communication equipment required to support growth to its targeted strength of 134,000 by September 2010. ANA personnel are equipped with M16 A2 rifles and M24 sniper rifles; M203A2 grenade launchers; and M2,

The security forces in Afghanistan use convoys to transport equipment and supplies. In a particular convoy operation on September 8, 2009, a platoon of U.S. Marines joined members of the ANA and their security mentors in a convoy departing from Camp Leatherneck to deliver building supplies and mechanical parts to Forward Operating Base Dwyer. The convoy consisted of more than 40 vehicles, ranging from seven-ton trucks loaded with metal containers to small pickup trucks.

Source: DoD, "Face of Defense: Marine Leads Convoy in Afghanistan," 9/14/2009.

FIGURE 3.26

ANA EQUIPMENT




Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

FIGURE 3.27


ANA CASUALTIES

By Province



By Month

Total Wounded in Action: 331
Total Killed in Action: 113



Note: No casualty data was provided for Daykundi.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

M240, and M249 machine guns. For transportation, the ANA uses light and medium tactical vehicles (LTVs and MTVs), armored high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), and ambulances. For communication, the ANA uses base-station, portable, vehicle-mounted, and handheld radios. Between July 1 and September 30, 2009, the ANA fielded 2,040 weapons, 927 vehicles, and 2,147 radios, as shown in Figure 3.26.⁹³

CSTC-A distributes weapons to the ANSF. The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command and the Navy International Programs Office procure the weapons for Afghan forces, and then DoD and its contractors ship the weapons by air to Kabul. CSTC-A stores these weapons in separate storage units for the ANA and the ANP and then issues them to the respective forces.⁹⁴

ANA Casualties

Between July 1 and September 20, 2009, CSTC-A reported that 331 ANA soldiers were wounded in action and 113 were killed in action. The majority of casualties occurred in the southern and eastern border regions; the most casualties occurred in Helmand, as shown in Figure 3.27.⁹⁵

Afghan National Army Air Corps

The Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) is a growing branch of the ANA.⁹⁶ The ANAAC has several roles:

- providing presidential airlift capabilities
- logistic support and transport of the armed forces of Afghanistan and other organizations in Afghanistan
- air transport for humanitarian efforts in case of a natural disaster
- air support and air cover for armed forces on the battlefield
- security for ANAAC aircraft⁹⁷

The ANAAC uses MI-17 and MI-35 helicopters, AN-26 and AN-32 fixed-wing aircraft, and L-39 jet aircraft.⁹⁸ The inventory currently consists of a total of 36 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft; it is expected to grow to 139 aircraft by 2016.⁹⁹

Four ANAAC units were given CM3 ratings as of September 13, 2009. The ratings indicate that these units are partially capable of conducting operations with international support.¹⁰⁰

THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

The target end strength for ANP personnel is 109,000 by September 2010, according to CSTC-A.¹⁰¹ The ANP stood at 81,509 personnel as of May 2009, according to DoD.¹⁰² The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniformed Police, the Afghan Civil Order Police, the Afghan Border Police, the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, and additional specialized police with responsibilities that include criminal investigation, counter-terrorism operations, and customs enforcement.¹⁰³

The Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), a civilian police program, was initiated in March 2009 as a pilot program to contribute to security efforts in Wardak. The AP3 is part of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and is controlled by the district chief of police. Afghans are chosen for AP3 by village *shuras* and then undergo a three-week training session. Once trained, they provide security on roads and at schools and public buildings, and serve other functions like those of a “neighborhood watch.” As of August 20, 2009, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reports that 548 AP3 personnel have been trained and positioned in communities. U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A) is currently reviewing the program and will decide whether to replicate it in other areas.¹⁰⁴

ANP Training Status

According to CSTC-A, 8,270 personnel graduated from ANP training organizations between July 1 and September 30, 2009.¹⁰⁵ The program with the most graduates was the Kabul Security Acceleration Uplift/10k Growth program as shown in Figure 3.28. This program provides Basic 8 training, which is an eight-week program taught by ANP instructors with contractor oversight. Trainees learn first-responder responsibilities, tactical training, IED awareness, surveillance and intelligence gathering, field training, civil disturbance, and shooting techniques. The ANP is also trained through several other programs.¹⁰⁶




Shura: Afghan leadership meeting.

Source: DoD, “Education Moves Forward in Eastern Afghanistan,” 6/23/2009.

FIGURE 3.28

ANP TRAINING GRADUATES BY COURSE



Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

The Mizan District Chief addresses questions during a shura held with local Afghan town elders to discuss security issues with the ANP chief and U.S. soldiers. (U.S. Army photo, SGT Kris Eglin)

The Focused District Development program consists of Advanced 8 training, Leadership and Management Development training, and an Officer and Non-commissioned Officer (NCO) Basic course. Advanced 8 training is an eight-week course that introduces advanced police tactics and night operations, and gives an overview of terrorist tactical operations. The Leadership and Management Development program teaches problem solving, planning, goal setting, and incident management skills. It also develops leadership capabilities and teaches how to best handle operational and personal issues that police leaders may encounter. The Officer and NCO course teaches police station defense, firearms and marksmanship, leadership, and anti-terrorism tactics.¹⁰⁷

The ANP Academy Officer Training program is a three-year program taught at the Afghan National Police Academy, where officers earn a bachelor's degree. The ANP Academy Non-commissioned Officer Training program, which runs four and a half months, is also taught at the Academy.¹⁰⁸

The Afghan Civil Order Police program consists of eight weeks of patrolman instruction and eight weeks of advanced training. This program is taught by ANP instructors with contractor oversight.¹⁰⁹


The Focused Border Development program is a six-week, contractor-led border training instruction, with two weeks dedicated to mentoring in the field. Training is focused on survival and interdiction skills. Instruction is given in marksmanship and advanced shooting skills as well as small-unit tactics and vehicle operations.¹¹⁰

CSTC-A reported that 2,611 ANP graduates were assigned to 11 provincial police headquarters between July 1 and September 30, 2009. The majority of graduates were assigned to the southern region. The largest group was fielded to the Kandahar Police Headquarters, as shown in Figure 3.29.¹¹¹

Several challenges to training exist. The U.S. Agency for International Development reported that 50% of Afghan men over age 15 are illiterate.¹¹² This means that roughly half of men fit for military service cannot read or write. According to trainers from the U.S. Marine Corps, other challenges to training include the language barrier between trainers and trainees and the limited education of Afghan trainees.¹¹³

FIGURE 3.29

ANP TRAINING GRADUATES BY PROVINCIAL ASSIGNMENT



Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

ANP Readiness


As of September 13, 2009, CSTC-A reported CM1 ratings for 11 ANP units, which represents approximately 12% of the units rated for this quarter.¹¹⁴ As reported last quarter, approximately 4% of units were rated CM1 as of May 23.¹¹⁵ The majority of units rated this quarter were given CM2 or CM3 ratings, as shown in Figure 3.30.¹¹⁶

ANP Infrastructure Status

According to CSTC-A, ANP infrastructure is defined as the buildings and permanent equipment necessary for support, redeployment, and operations of police personnel. It includes such buildings as barracks, headquarters, training buildings and ranges, administrative spaces, warehouses and storage buildings, and maintenance facilities. Infrastructure contracts active from July 1 to September 30, 2009, were

FIGURE 3.30

ANP UNIT CM RATINGS



Notes: CM1 = All criteria adequately met, quantitative measures >85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role >85%.
 CM2 = Most criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 70–85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 70–85%.
 CM3 = Few criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 50–70%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 50–70%.
 CM4 = No criteria adequately met, quantitative measures <50%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role <50%

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

for such projects as battalion headquarters, district headquarters, and provincial headquarters.¹¹⁷

CSTC-A reported 269 active ANP infrastructure contracts as of September 30, 2009. Of those, 32 contracts, with a collective value of \$58.83 million, were scheduled to be completed between July 1 and September 30.¹¹⁸ During the same period, 14 infrastructure projects, collectively valued at \$55.40 million, were awarded.¹¹⁹ The greatest number of active infrastructure projects with expected completion dates during this period was in Badakhshan. The highest collective value of projects with expected completion dates during this period was in Samangan.¹²⁰ Eleven contracts with a collective value of \$23.10 million were terminated.¹²¹

ANP Equipment Status

According to CSTC-A, the ANP classifies equipment as critical weapons, vehicles, and tactical communication equipment required to support growth to the ANP's targeted strength of 109,000 personnel by September 2010.¹²² From July 1 to September 30, 2009, CSTC-A reported that the ANP fielded 6,437 new individual and crew-assigned weapons.¹²³ CSTC-A supplies the ANP with weapons and equipment through the same process as it uses for supplying the ANA. Donations and U.S.-funded purchases of Warsaw Pact weapons contribute to the ANP weapon supply.¹²⁴ ANP personnel are equipped with 9mm pistols; AK-47, PKM, and RPK




ANP officers maintain security during a patrol with U.S. Marines in the Garmsir district of Helmand. The Marines are deployed to train and mentor the ANP in counter-insurgency operations. (U.S. Marine Corps photo, Sgt Pete Thibodeau)


FIGURE 3.32

ANP CASUALTIES

By Province




By Month



Note: No casualty data was provided for Daykundi.
Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

FIGURE 3.31

ANP EQUIPMENT



Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

machine guns; and RPG-7, GP-25, and GP-30 rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) weapons.¹²⁵

From July 1 to September 30, the ANP fielded 476 Ford Ranger trucks, referred to as LTVs, and four International Harvesters, referred to as MTVs, according to CSTC-A.¹²⁶ The ANP also uses all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) but did not field any vehicles of this type during this period. As of September 30, the ANP is planning for 574 additional vehicles in the future.¹²⁷ The ANP is expected to be supplied with armored HMMWVs in the late fall of 2009, according to CSTC-A. The Afghan Civil Order Police and Afghan Border Police units also want to acquire ambulances.¹²⁸

During this quarter, the ANP fielded 2,450 radios, according to CSTC-A. The ANP procured 4,162 radios during this period, as shown in Figure 3.31. As of September 30, the ANP is not planning for any additional radios.¹²⁹

In another communications effort, CSTC-A is building an Internet Protocol-based network and a wireless radio network for the ANP and the Afghan MoI, according to DoD. These networks will connect the five regional commands and units in all 34 provinces, and as many districts as possible. CSTC-A is also installing network and radio systems in Regional and Provincial Operational Coordination Centers that will link the MoI's National Police Command Center and the Ministry of Defense's National Military Command Center. CSTC-A plans to complete the radio networks by 2012.¹³⁰

ANP Casualties

CSTC-A reported that 350 ANP personnel were wounded in action and 184 were killed in action between July 1 and September 20, 2009. The majority of casualties occurred in the border regions, as shown in Figure 3.32. The largest number occurred in Helmand.¹³¹

DISARMAMENT OF ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS

It is an ANDS goal that all illegal armed groups will be disarmed by March 20, 2011.¹³² This section provides the status of illegal armed groups in the country and the progress of the efforts under way to disarm them.

According to the Congressional Research Service, illegal armed groups are “illegal militias that were empowered by Afghanistan’s years of warfare.”¹³³ These groups pose a direct threat to national security, according to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). According to the GIROA, many of the commanders of these groups have close links with the police or are members of local governments. This contributes to the issue of corruption in the country; it is also considered a key obstacle in eliminating the narcotics industry. The threat of illegal armed groups will persist until the government is able to provide adequate security in the country, according to the GIROA.¹³⁴

Status

The effort to disarm illegal armed groups in Afghanistan is led by the **Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme** (ANBP). The ANBP supports the GIROA’s **Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups** (DIAG) program, which continues the efforts of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program.¹³⁵

According to the Department of State (DoS), ANBP and DIAG have targeted 119 districts for the disarmament of illegal armed groups. From July 1 to September 30, these programs disarmed 44 such groups.¹³⁶ In total, they have disarmed 685 of the 987 groups in the targeted districts. The majority of these disarmaments occurred in the northern half of the country, as shown in Figure 3.33.¹³⁷ Once disarmed, former members of these groups are monitored by DIAG regional offices to ensure they do not re-form into illegal armed groups.¹³⁸ Currently, 84 districts of the 119 targeted have been declared compliant by the ANBP and DIAG. Since the beginning of the programs, the ANBP and DIAG have collected 45,576 weapons from illegal armed groups.¹³⁹

ANSF Operations


According to DoS, the ANA and the ANP contribute to DIAG efforts but do not lead any other programs to disarm illegal armed groups.¹⁴⁰

Challenges

DIAG faces several challenges in continuing its efforts. According to the UNDP, its activities are restricted because the unstable security situation in many provinces makes access for disarmament efforts difficult. DIAG’s limited information on illegal armed groups and the rampant trafficking of weapons that occurs in the country make it difficult to maintain accurate records. The weak governance at the provincial and district levels, combined with varying levels of political commitment to DIAG, has made it difficult for the program to gain traction.¹⁴¹

FIGURE 3.33

NUMBER OF ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS DISARMED



Source: DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme:

established under the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in April 2003 to assist the GIROA in the disbandment, demobilization, and reintegration of the Afghan Military Forces.

Source: UNDP, “Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme (ANBP),” www.undp.org.af/WhoWeAre/UNDPinAfghanistan/Projects/psl/prj_anbp.htm, accessed 10/9/2009.

Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups:

a program that the MoI is developing the capacity to implement. The MoI is expected to have full capabilities to do so by March 2010. In April 2009, provincial governors conducted mapping of illegal armed groups in their jurisdictions, enabling DIAG to get information on their locations.

Source: UNDP Afghanistan, “DIAG Second Quarter Project Progress Report – 2009,” pp. 3, 6, 9.

On September 16, 2009, a resident of Kunar's Sarkani District turned in nine mines to the Manogai district center. Soldiers from the U.S. Army's Task Force Lethal went to the district center to safely remove and dispose of the mines. The resident who turned in the mines was rewarded through the Small Rewards Program, which provides incentives to Afghans who turn in weapons and ordnance and who provide tips and information on insurgent activity.

Source: DoD, "Civilians, Soldiers Work Together for Change in Afghanistan," 9/28/2009.

REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

The primary ANDS goal for the removal of unexploded ordnance is to reduce the land area contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance by 70% before the end of 2010.¹⁴² This section describes the progress of organizations involved in the mine clearing effort.

Afghanistan is one of the most heavily land-mined areas in the world, according to the UN.¹⁴³ The work to remove this unexploded ordnance has involved a large community effort. The GIROA and local and international NGOs continue the tasks of clearing explosive remnants of war (ERW), caring for survivors of ERW accidents, and destroying or securing recovered munitions to prevent their use by insurgents in future attacks.¹⁴⁴

According to the UN Secretary-General, community-based demining is an effective approach in the very insecure areas of the country, particularly the south and east, because it is difficult to bring in international organizations. This effort brings salaries to locals while clearing villages of dangerous unexploded ordnance.¹⁴⁵

Status

The Mine Action Program of Afghanistan (MAPA) is the primary organization responsible for removing land mines and other ERW, according to DoS. MAPA is made up of more than 20 humanitarian partners from Afghanistan and the international community. The UN-assisted Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan and the Afghan Department of Mine Clearance work with MAPA to coordinate strategy, planning, and activity.¹⁴⁶

According to the "ANDS First Annual Report," 25% of the targeted area has been cleared.¹⁴⁷ According to DoS, MAPA has cleared approximately 1.70 billion square meters of hazardous area across Afghanistan from the program inception in 1988 through September 30, 2009. In total, MAPA removed 12.39 million land mines and other ERW from all provinces.¹⁴⁸

DoS contributes to the removal of unexploded ordnance through its Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD) program, which directly funds five Afghan NGOs, three international NGOs, and one U.S. government contractor. Through this program, these groups clear ERW and destroy or secure abandoned or otherwise at-risk munitions and explosive ordnance that could be used by insurgents to construct roadside bombs and IEDs. Of the area reported cleared by MAPA, a portion was cleared by DoS-funded organizations. From 1993 to September 30, 2009, DoS-funded organizations cleared more than 160.50 million square meters of land and destroyed approximately 3.06 million land mines and other ERW. These organizations also destroyed or removed more than 11,585 **metric tons** of stockpiled, abandoned, at-risk, or unserviceable ordnance and ammunition.¹⁴⁹

Metric ton: equivalent to 1.1 tons, or 2,205 pounds.

ANSF Operations

CSTC-A and U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A) are responsible for training and monitoring ANA and ANP forces engaged in the removal of mines and ERW. Training and monitoring activities are conducted through the ANSF Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Program and the ANA Engineer School.¹⁵⁰ As described earlier in the section on ANA training, the EOD C-IED program trained 116 ANSF personnel between July 1 and September 30, 2009. The program includes an eight-week course on Improvised Explosive Device Defeat. The ANSF are trained to be EOD technicians in a 12-week course on how to undertake demining and unexploded ordnance removal operations. A five-day course trains ANSF members to be instructors in C-IED awareness.¹⁵¹

Challenges

According to DoS, 60 casualties per month are associated with unexploded ordnance. Children constitute the majority of the victims.¹⁵² According to the “ANDS First Annual Report,” 75% of the targeted area remains to be cleared.¹⁵³ According to DoS, approximately 690 million square meters of land is still considered hazardous, as of September 30, 2009. These areas adversely affect 2,090 communities.¹⁵⁴

The UN is educating Afghan citizens on unexploded ordnance for the purpose of safety. It has provided mine risk education to more than 750,000 citizens in the past 12 months.¹⁵⁵

COUNTER-NARCOTICS

This section describes the challenge posed by the narcotics industry in the country. It outlines the efforts to remove existing narcotics and eliminate the potential for further development of the industry by eliminating the crop source. It also shows the progress made in these efforts.

Status

The ANDS target for poppy eradication is a 50% reduction from the 2007 level by 2013.¹⁵⁶ Based on figures from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), this equates to 96,500 hectares (ha). From January to July 2009, approximately 5,400 ha of poppy were eradicated, reducing the total poppy level to date by approximately 36% from the 2007 level. The Poppy Eradication Force, the GIRoA’s national eradication force, was responsible for approximately half the eradicated poppy reported. The Governor-Led Eradication was responsible for the other half.¹⁵⁷ The Poppy Eradication Force is staffed and directed by the MoI. The Governor-Led Eradication program is supported by the Counter-Narcotics Advisory Team to eradicate poppy in the key provinces where most of the cultivation occurs.¹⁵⁸

The Kunar Project is a community-based initiative to remove land mines and unexploded bombs that threaten the local population in the province. This project is managed by the Organization for Mine Action and Afghan Rehabilitation, based in Kabul.

Source: DoS, “Community-Based Demining Links Development and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” 6/23/2009.





FIGURE 3.34

**POPPY ERADICATION BY PROVINCE,
JANUARY–JULY 2009 (HECTARES)**



Source: UNODC, "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009: Summary Findings," 9/2009, p. 2.

Approximately 82% of poppy eradication from January to July took place in the southern and western regions, where 99% of poppy was cultivated in 2009.¹⁵⁹ During this period, the greatest area—4,119 ha—was eradicated in Helmand, as shown in Figure 3.34.¹⁶⁰ Poppy cultivation decreased 22% from 2008 to 2009. During that period, the number of poppy-free provinces increased from 18 to 20.¹⁶¹

ANSF Operations

According to DoD, the ANSF is targeting drug production facilities and traffickers in their counter-narcotics efforts.¹⁶² This year, the ANA Counter-Narcotics Infantry Kandak has provided protection for the GIROA's poppy eradication efforts.¹⁶³ The Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan is the ANP component responsible for counter-narcotics efforts.¹⁶⁴

From January to July 2009, combined ANSF and ISAF forces conducted counter-narcotics operations in seven provinces (Badakhshan, Farah, Helmand, Herat, Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Uruzgan), focusing mainly on Helmand and Nangarhar, according to UNODC. In these operations, these forces seized 459 tons of poppy seed and 50 tons of opium, with the vast majority coming from Helmand. They seized narcotics-producing materials, including 5,480 liquid tons of acetic anhydride (a chemical used in narcotics production), as well as 94 tons of other narcotics precursors and chemicals. They also destroyed 27 narcotics labs, 17 located in Helmand, 8 in Nangarhar, 1 in Farah, and 1 in Kandahar.¹⁶⁵

“The trafficking of illegal drugs and narcotics continues to threaten the people of Afghanistan and the country as a whole.”

—*Special Inspector General Arnold Fields*

Source: SIGAR, "Inspector General Audit Report Aims To Ensure Counter-Narcotics Justice Center Is Utilized as Intended," 10/1/2009.



U.S. Marines pour gasoline on bags of poppy seeds after a bazaar raid in Helmand. (ISAF photo)

Challenges

Criminals, insurgents, and corrupt officials engage in the trade of opium from poppy cultivation, according to UNODC.¹⁶⁶ From January to July 2009, there were 34 security incidents related to counter-narcotics activities including attacks, demonstrations, and mine explosions. The highest number occurred in Helmand, as shown in Figure 3.35, where the UNODC reported 52 wounded and 21 killed as a result of these incidents.¹⁶⁷

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE

The ISAF, mandated by the UN and under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is a key component of the international community's involvement in Afghanistan.¹⁶⁸ It commands 67,700 security forces throughout the country.¹⁶⁹ According to NATO, 42 nations contribute military forces to the ISAF. The United States is the largest contributor with 31,855 troops, as of September 30, 2009. The next largest contributors are Britain, Germany, France, Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands.¹⁷⁰


In leading the international efforts in the country, NATO's main role is to assist the GIRoA in reconstruction activities and in establishing the GIRoA's authority and influence across the country for effective governance. NATO executes this role through the ISAF.¹⁷¹ The ISAF assists with initiatives that include disarming illegal armed groups and implementing counter-narcotics efforts. It supports the GIRoA in counter-narcotics through intelligence sharing and conducting a public information campaign. It also supports the ANSF in its operations, with over 90% of all ISAF operations conducted in conjunction with the ANA.¹⁷²

Challenges

Increased levels of violence in Regional Command-South (RC-South; see Figure 3.36) have led U.S. Marines to deploy to conduct "clear and hold" operations in a region that is traditionally a Taliban stronghold, according to OSD. In July 2009 in Helmand, 4,000 U.S. Marines and sailors partnered with the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) and launched Operation Khanjar ("Strike of the Sword"). According to OSD, the objective of this operation was to clear the area of insurgents and secure the population, protecting it from violence and intimidation. After the clearing operations, U.S. forces remained stationed in the area to conduct the hold phase of the operation, which maintains security and encourages the eventual transfer of security responsibilities to the ANSF. This allows the opportunity for reconstruction and development activities to occur. According to OSD, the ANP is particularly necessary for maintaining security.¹⁷³

FIGURE 3.35


SECURITY INCIDENTS DURING POPPY ERADICATION, JANUARY-JULY 2009



Notes: Incidents reported include attacks, demonstrations, and mine explosions. Data not reported for every province.
Source: UNODC, "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009: Summary Findings," 9/2009, p. 22.

FIGURE 3.36

ISAF REGIONAL COMMANDS




Source: NATO, "International Security Assistance Force and Afghan National Army Strength & Laydown," www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf, accessed 9/30/2009.

GOVERNANCE, RULE OF LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

This section addresses recent developments in Afghanistan in the areas of governance, rule of law, and human rights.

On August 20, 2009, Afghanistan held the first Afghan-run presidential and provincial council elections. Despite international concerns about low voter turnout, initial results indicated that approximately 38% of Afghan voters participated in the election process. Investigations into allegations of electoral fraud delayed certification of results for the presidential election.¹⁷⁴

Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission (IEC), which is responsible for ensuring legitimate, free, and fair elections, and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), which is responsible for investigating allegations of electoral irregularities, developed an audit and recount process designed to ascertain an accurate count of legitimate votes.¹⁷⁵ On October 20, 2009, the IEC announced the results, which prompted a runoff election between the two leading presidential candidates. The runoff election is scheduled for November 7.¹⁷⁶



ELECTIONS

The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), adopting the benchmarks in the Afghanistan Compact, identified two specific metrics regarding Afghan elections.¹⁷⁷ Table 3.2 provides an update on these goals, as of September 30, 2009. Because the IEC postponed the elections to accommodate greater voter turnout, the actual date for the presidential and provincial council elections was later than the target date.¹⁷⁸

TABLE 3.2

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES FOR ELECTIONS		
Afghanistan Compact Goal	Status	Target Completion Date
The Afghanistan IEC will have the high integrity, capacity, and resources to undertake elections in an increasingly fiscally sustainable manner with the GIRoA contributing to the extent possible to the costs of future elections from its own resources.	Presidential and provincial council elections held on August 20, 2009	March 2009
A permanent civil and voter registry with a single national identity document will be established.	No update reported	March 2010

Source: GIRoA, "The Afghanistan Compact," 1/31-2/1/2006, p. 7.



Incumbent President Hamid Karzai.
(AP photo)



Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. (AP photo)

According to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, the elections have had both positive and negative effects on Afghanistan. Some of the positive effects included the following:¹⁷⁹

- Public engagement in the elections went far beyond initial expectations.
- Despite the security and logistics challenges, the IEC successfully opened, equipped, and staffed thousands of polling stations across the country.

Negative effects of the elections included the following:¹⁸⁰

- A “campaign of intimidation” conducted by the Taliban resulted in limited voter turnout, especially in the southern provinces.
- Voting “irregularities” (potential fraud) sparked political turmoil within Afghanistan.

Presidential Elections


According to the IEC, only 32 of the 41 candidates listed on the presidential election ballot received votes.¹⁸¹ Of these candidates, only President Hamid Karzai and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah received a significant percentage. Each claimed victory.¹⁸² The initial election results suggested that President Karzai had received more than 50% of the votes.

Final certification of the results was delayed while the IEC and ECC investigated allegations of fraud. On October 18, 2009, the ECC issued three separate decisions related to the certification of the results.¹⁸³ One of these decisions affected the distribution of the votes reported for each candidate in the preliminary uncertified results. That decision ordered the IEC to invalidate a specified percentage of each candidate’s votes based on the proportion of fraud identified in the audit.¹⁸⁴

The ECC’s audit findings reduced President Karzai’s share of the total votes below the 50% threshold required for the IEC to declare him the victor, as shown in Figure 3.37.¹⁸⁵ On October 20, 2009, the IEC announced that a runoff election is scheduled for November 7 between President Karzai and Dr. Abdullah, in accordance with Article 62 of the Afghan Constitution.¹⁸⁶

FIGURE 3.37

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FINAL RESULTS For 2 Leading and 30 Other Candidates



Note: Percentages as announced by the IEC on October 21, 2009.

Sources: IEC, press release, “Reference to Announcement of Preliminary Results of 2009 Presidential Election,” 9/16/2009; IEC, “Presidential & Provincial Council Elections Afghanistan 2009 Elections,” www.iec.org.af/results/leadingCandidate.html, accessed 10/22/2009.

To be elected president, a candidate must receive the majority—50% plus one or more—of the valid votes cast. If no candidate receives that amount, a runoff (second round) election is to be held approximately six weeks after the original election. Only the two candidates with the highest number of votes in the initial election may compete in the runoff election. The candidate who receives the most votes in the runoff is declared president.

Source: IEC Fact Sheet, “Presidential Election,” www.iec.org.af/assets/PDF/FactSheet/eng/fs4E.pdf, accessed 10/19/2009.

Voter Turnout

The IEC initially estimated that 38.7% of the approximately 15.3 million eligible Afghans voted on August 20, 2009.¹⁸⁷ The majority of voters in the 2009 elections were male, as shown in Figure 3.38.¹⁸⁸ On October 21, the IEC reported that 4,597,727 valid votes were cast in the presidential elections.¹⁸⁹ It determined that 225,363 (4.7%) of all the votes cast were invalid.¹⁹⁰

Presidential Election Fraud

Complaints about ballot stuffing and other voting irregularities began on Election Day.¹⁹¹ Election complaints are the responsibility of the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), an independent five-member panel that investigates allegations of election fraud. Figure 3.39 provides an overview of the ECC. The ECC received over 3,000 complaints of electoral fraud during the elections and the tallying period. Approximately 29% (893) were classified as “Priority A” (high priority) complaints which, if determined to be valid, would have a material effect on the final results.¹⁹²


Allegations of fraud included the following:¹⁹³

- ballot box stuffing
- premature closing of centers
- opening of unauthorized centers
- underage voting
- multiple voting
- proxy voting
- campaigning by candidate agents inside polling centers
- prohibiting candidate agents from voting observation

In response to the complaints, the ECC conducted an investigation of several polling stations and concluded that sufficient evidence existed of fraudulent activity to warrant an audit of the results.¹⁹⁴ On October 5, 2009, the IEC and ECC began the audit and recount of 3,498 questionable ballot boxes.¹⁹⁵

FIGURE 3.38

ELIGIBLE VOTERS BY PARTICIPATION AND BY GENDER



Note: Among participating voters, remaining 2.8% represents Kuchi. Data for Kuchi not available by gender.
Source: UNDP/ELECT, *ELECT Weekly*, 9/8–9/21/2009, p. 10.

FIGURE 3.39

ECC STRUCTURE



Source: ECC, “Commissioners,” www.ecc.org.af/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=61, accessed 10/17/2009.

The ECC has independent authority and jurisdiction to adjudicate complaints related to electoral offenses. The ECC’s term expires 30 days after certification of the election results. The IEC, however, is responsible for managing the electoral process. The IEC must adhere to the decisions of the ECC.

Source: GIRoA, “Electoral Law,” Articles 7, 52, 5/31/2004.

The IEC created an audit checklist to facilitate the examination of each ballot box.¹⁹⁶ The audit team had to visually inspect each ballot box for physical irregularities, in the presence of accredited party agents and electoral observers. After each inspection, the contents were replaced in the box, the box was resealed, and new serial numbers were assigned and recorded.¹⁹⁷ The ECC completed the audit process on October 8, 2009, and announced its findings on October 19.¹⁹⁸

International Observations on Fraud

Representatives of the international community were present as observers of the integrity of the election process. They included organizations such as Democracy International, the National Democratic Institute, the European Union Election Observation Mission, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Election Support Team, and the Free and Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA).¹⁹⁹

The IEC established the National Tally Center as the depository of the election results in Kabul. Before Election Day, the IEC conducted tours of the Center and briefed visitors. UNDP/ELECT estimated that approximately 40 stakeholders—as well as some 5 to 10 election observers or candidate agents who would be present on the viewing platform to oversee the ballot tabulation process—visited the Center daily in the weeks preceding Election Day.²⁰⁰ The IEC-reported observers included 21 domestic observer groups, 30 international observer organizations, 51 national media organizations, 149 international media houses, and 31 political parties.²⁰¹ Representatives from the OSCE Elections Support Team, FEFA, and the top four presidential candidates were also frequent visitors.²⁰²

The U.S. Embassy Kabul, which monitored the election process closely as an observer, found “many of the anti-fraud mechanisms put in place by the IEC with [the] support of UNDP to be robust by international standards,” but also found that many were severely constrained on Election Day. Some of these constraints included the following.²⁰³

- poor security
- shortage of female staff
- widespread illiteracy
- voter intimidation

The U.S. Department of State (DoS) expressed confidence in the ECC’s fraud investigation capabilities to remove remnants of fraud from the final tally.²⁰⁴

Women’s Participation

Of the 41 candidates for president, only two were women: Dr. Fana Frozan and The Hon. Shahla Ata.²⁰⁵ Neither has held an elected position or been affiliated with a party; both were independent. Dr. Frozan, the widow of the late Afghan aviation minister Abdul Rahman, is a surgeon from Balkh Province.²⁰⁶ Shahla Ata is from Kandahar and holds an appointed position in the upper house of Parliament.²⁰⁷

According to UNDP/ELECT, female candidates reported that they received insufficient media attention and were not viewed as viable candidates.²⁰⁸ The UN’s Gender Unit and Public Outreach Department (Gender Unit) also reported that



Karl W. Eikenberry, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, right, along with Richard C. Holbrooke, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, center, look at the voter list during their visit to the IEC office in Kabul. (AP Photo)

female journalists were turned away from polling stations, whereas male journalists at the same stations were permitted entry.²⁰⁹

Although the IEC's Gender Unit conducted voter education seminars for women, female voter participation was low. Many women voters received instructions from their families or from people present at the polling station on how to cast their votes, according to the Gender Unit.²¹⁰

In July, according to UNDP/ELECT, the Gender Unit and the IEC commissioners hosted a session on developing strategies to recruit women as body checkers or to serve in other temporary polling staff positions for the elections. Participants included representatives from the Ministry of Women's Affairs, the Ministry of Rural Development, the Ministry of Interior, the United Nations Development Fund for Women, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), local women's groups, and international organizations.²¹¹

The UN Gender Unit identified challenges that must be overcome in order to improve female participation in the next elections:²¹²

- Women need greater awareness of political processes. Many illiterate women relied on male opinions and the advice of others at polling stations.
- More thorough planning is needed for the security of female candidates. Planning should take place earlier, more training should be provided, and more bodyguards allocated.
- An early warning system relating to security for female IEC and polling center staff members needs to be designed.
- Voter registration cards should have photographs of women, in order to prevent fraud.
- Collection of data on the breakdown of voters by needs to be improved, and this may necessitate addressing how to gather this information in a more thorough way.
- A clause in any agreement with key ministries that employ women (Women's Affairs, Health, Education) should be written to smooth the way for their female staff members to work in polling centers on voting day.

Election Security

The IEC identified a lack of security during the elections as a significant concern.²¹³ DoD reported that the Taliban's attempts to derail and disrupt the election process through fear and intimidation of Afghan voters adversely affected voter turnout.²¹⁴ The difficult security environment affected the elections in several ways:

- It caused the IEC to reduce the number of polling sites that it was able to open.²¹⁵
- It stifled voter turnout.²¹⁶
- It hampered candidates' ability to stand for office and campaign freely.²¹⁷
- It limited freedom of association and peaceful assembly, amplifying the challenges women faced in participating in the electoral process.²¹⁸

Neither female candidate garnered more than 1% of the valid votes—Dr. Frozan Fana received approximately 21,512 votes (0.5%), and the Hon. Shahla Ata received approximately 10,687 votes (0.2%).

Source: IEC, "Presidential & Provincial Elections, Afghanistan 2009 Elections," www.iec.org.af/results/leadingCandidate.html, accessed 10/14/2009.



Indelible ink stains the forefinger of an Afghan woman after she cast her vote at a polling center. (UNAMA photo, Jawad Jalali)

The IEC, in close coordination with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the international forces, worked to secure access to polling locations for voters, IEC staff, observers, and agents of candidates.²¹⁹ The Afghan National Police (ANP), and in some instances, community members, provided additional security for voters.²²⁰ Over 160,000 police and soldiers provided security by manning polling stations and patrolling travel routes for Afghan voters, according to the Department of Defense (DoD).²²¹ The Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) provided additional weeks of training to the ANP in anticipation of the elections.²²² According to DoD, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A) made these elections their primary mission and worked closely with their Afghan partners.²²³

The international community also recognized the security challenges that the elections presented to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). For example, DoD reported that Great Britain deployed an additional 700 troops to assist with the elections, Hungary provided an additional 40 troops, and Greece added two additional 20-member medical teams.²²⁴

Security Incidents

According to UNDP/ELECT, over 100 violent incidents occurred on Election Day.²²⁵ Eighteen ANP members were killed and 27 were wounded. Thirty civilians were killed and 31 wounded.²²⁶ Many of the incidents were rocket and mortar attacks that did not directly target Afghan voters.²²⁷

UNDP/ELECT reported that the geographical distribution of increased levels of Election Day violence was consistent with previous observations of violence in Kunduz, Kandahar, Khowst, Kunar, and Nangarhar, as shown in Figure 3.40. Election-related incidents continued after Election Day, with a number of attacks reported on polling centers and vehicle convoys in attempts to destroy ballot materials or exact retribution against IEC staff.²²⁸

According to UNDP/ELECT, allegations of incidents targeting civilians—including intimidation, abductions, and assassinations—occurred countrywide. Threats to cut off fingers that were marked with indelible ink—representing that the person had voted—were reported, as were increased numbers of faction-inspired incidents of intimidation.²²⁹


The transport of ballot materials to provincial centers in some of the provinces (such as Faryab, Nuristan, Uruzgan, and Wardak) was a significant challenge, according to UNDP/ELECT. Some convoys were attacked and ballot materials destroyed.²³⁰

Provincial Council Elections

On September 26, 2009, the IEC announced the preliminary results for the provincial council elections in 30 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.²³¹ There were 3,339 candidates for 420 positions; 251 men and 106 women won seats.²³² The results of the elections in the remaining provinces—Paktika, Nangarhar, Kandahar, and Ghazni—had not been released as of October 21, 2009. According to DoS, one of the main challenges in the provincial election process was the large number of

FIGURE 3.40

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTION DAY VIOLENCE



Note: Highlights violence in select provinces, but does not include all reported incidents and attacks on Election Day.

Source: UN, Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security," 9/22/2009, p. 8.

GOVERNANCE


candidates competing for each seat, which produced exceptionally long ballots that were likely difficult for voters to comprehend.²³³

Seat Allocation

The number of seats in a provincial council is determined by the province's population.²³⁴ The highest concentration of the Afghan population is in Kabul, followed by Balkh, Ghazi, Herat, and Nangarhar. Figure 3.41, depicts the allocation of provincial council seats in the 2009 elections.

FIGURE 3.41

ALLOCATION OF SEATS FOR PROVINCIAL COUNCILS




Note: Ranges for provincial population as reported by IEC.
Source: IEC, "Seats Allocation for Provincial Council," www.iec.org.af/SubContent.asp?sect=4&Page=seatallocation, accessed 10/14/2009.

GOVERNANCE

FIGURE 3.42

CANDIDATES ON PROVINCIAL COUNCIL ELECTION BALLOT



Note: No information reported on the provincial elections in Ghazni, Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Paktiya.

Source: IEC, "Final Uncertified Provincial Council Results," www.iec.org.af/results/Provincial/resultsVoteOrder.html, accessed 10/14/2009.

Figure 3.42 identifies the number of candidates on each ballot in the provincial council elections. Each council has between 9 and 29 seats.²³⁵ In each council, 25% of the seats are reserved for female candidates. Men and women compete against each other, but if not enough women win the reserved seats in each province, those seats are assigned to female candidates to ensure that women hold the number of seats reserved for them by law.²³⁶ In all the provinces except Uruzgan and Kandahar, there were enough female candidates to fill the seats reserved for women.²³⁷

Provincial Election Fraud

In the provincial elections, allegations of voter fraud such as ballot stuffing and bribes were made, but observers were unable to identify concrete evidence to support such allegations. The Provincial Electoral Complaints Commissions (PCCs) serve as representative extensions of the ECC to address allegations of electoral fraud within each province.²³⁸ Anyone who has a legitimate interest and who alleges that there has been a violation of Electoral Law may file a complaint with the ECC and PCCs.²³⁹

Voter Education


Before the elections, civic educators worked to raise voter awareness of election procedures. Afghan media outlets covered campaigns and election events across the country.

Campaigning

The last official campaign day for the presidential and provincial council elections was August 17, 2009.²⁴⁰ To encourage Afghans to vote, over 1,600 IEC civic educators traveled throughout the country prior to the elections, distributing information, including the location of polling centers. Mobile theater teams conducted educational performances in two languages (Dari and Pashtu) in 24 of the 34 provinces, as illustrated in Figure 3.43.²⁴¹

FIGURE 3.43

CIVIC EDUCATION: MOBILE THEATER TEAMS



Source: UNDP/ELECT, *ELECT Weekly*, 9/1–9/7/2009, p. 3.

ELECTION PREPARATIONS AND CHALLENGES

Conducting elections in a country entrenched in conflict, with weak institutions, weak infrastructure, a high illiteracy rate, and 41 presidential candidates, is challenging from many perspectives, according to the UN Secretary-General.²⁴² This quarterly highlight discusses the preparations and challenges that the GIRoA encountered in preparing for both the 2004/2005 and 2009 elections. Some of these challenges included voter registration and turnout, security, and fraud.

REGISTRATION AND TURNOUT

In 2004 and 2005, voter registration activities failed to assign voters to specific districts or polling centers, making voter turnout unpredictable.²⁴³

2004/2005 Election Preparation

For the 2004/2005 elections, voter registration was conducted in two phases and resulted in approximately 10.6 million registrants.²⁴⁴ To educate potential voters on registration and election processes, the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) Secretariat established a Public Outreach Office.²⁴⁵ The Public Outreach Office included a public information unit, which disseminated information on voter registration and electoral processes. Public outreach efforts incorporated initiatives such as organized marches and media events to encourage and promote the importance of the participation of women.²⁴⁶

2009 Elections Preparation

For the 2009 elections, voter registration was conducted in four phases and resulted in approximately 4.4 million new registrants. Voter registration data for 2009 linked new registrants to specific provincial polling centers, allowing for better predictability of voter turnout.²⁴⁷ According to the IEC, over 1,600 civic educators traveled throughout the country and distributed information, including the location of polling centers.²⁴⁸

Outcome for 2009 Election

Although new registrants were linked to specific provinces, lenient procedures contributed to multiple registrations and registration of ineligible voters. Having substantially more voters registered than were actually eligible had an adverse effect on the credibility of the elections.²⁴⁹ An unusually high number of female registrants were reported to be registered in less secure and more traditionally conservative provinces. Electoral officials interpreted the high number of female registrants as an indication of “proxy voting,” a form of fraud in which men in traditional areas voted in the place of the women in their families.²⁵⁰

SECURITY

Afghanistan's security environment has deteriorated considerably since the 2004/2005 elections, possibly having an adverse effect on the electoral process.²⁵¹

2004/2005 Election Preparation

For the 2004/2005 elections, overall security objectives included protecting electoral staff, securing JEMB facilities, and providing security for the transport and counting of sensitive polling materials.²⁵² The United States deployed several hundred additional troops to reinforce the 18,000 U.S. troops stationed in Afghanistan. European countries such as Spain and Italy provided an additional 2,500 troops through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).²⁵³ The U.S.-trained Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police forces also had prominent roles in election security missions.

2009 Elections Preparation

For the 2009 elections, several new security measures were implemented in response to the deteriorating security environment. The European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan provided training to the Afghan National Police on security provisions for the election, with an emphasis on human rights. Furthering this security effort, the Joint Security Planning Group was established to bolster joint and coordinated security planning

QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT

between the entities that were offering security assistance during the elections.²⁵⁴

Outcome for 2009 Election

Despite the IEC's concerted efforts to secure the electoral facilities, security posed significant challenges on Election Day 2009. These challenges included intimidation, threats, abduction, and assassination of election workers and monitors, according to a SIGAR audit report on the elections.²⁵⁵

FRAUD PREVENTION

Weak capacity, limited safeguards, and lack of understanding of electoral procedures can have an adverse effect on electoral credibility.²⁵⁶

2004/2005 Elections Preparation

For the 2004/2005 elections, the JEMB implemented several safeguards to deter fraud, including the use of indelible ink and the punching of holes in voter registration cards, both actions signifying that an individual had voted.²⁵⁷

2009 Elections Preparation

For the 2009 elections, initiatives to safeguard the electoral environment included the implementation of the ECC and political rights monitoring. The ECC was responsible for adjudicating all challenges and complaints related to a candidate's eligibility and the electoral process.²⁵⁸ The Afghanistan Independent

Human Rights Commission, in partnership with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, noted the limitations placed on freedom of movement by the lack of security, as well as the disadvantages faced by women.²⁵⁹

Outcome for 2009 Election


Despite efforts to safeguard the electoral environment, the UN Secretary-General noted that the ECC received over 3,000 complaints regarding allegations of ballot stuffing and other irregularities during the electoral process, including Election Day.²⁶⁰

LESSONS LEARNED

During the interim period following the 2005 elections, attempts to build the capacity and resources of the IEC were met with difficulty.²⁶¹ Although specific issues were identified during the previous election cycle, limited preparatory actions were taken. Issues not addressed included assessing security needs, conducting a census, and reconstructing the voter registry.²⁶²

One of the SIGAR audit reports on the elections indicated that despite international advisor input, the IEC did not create a strategic plan that could enhance capacity building or devise measurable benchmarks.²⁶³ The IEC faces significant challenges as it strives to become a self-sustaining institution. SIGAR's audit report recommended an increased focus on capacity building to better position the IEC to fully assume technical duties and lessen dependence on international support in future elections.²⁶⁴


AFGHANISTAN'S ELECTORAL HIGHLIGHTS



Sources: IEC, "Phases & Mobile Update," www.iec.org.af/subContent.asp?sect=4&page=phases, accessed 10/20/2009; IEC, "Key Dates," www.iec.org.af/subContent.asp?sect=4&page=keydates, accessed 10/20/2009; ECC, "Statistics," www.ecc.org.af/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50&Itemid=65, accessed 10/20/2009; UNDP/Elect, "Background," www.afghanelections.org/index.php?page=en_Background, accessed 10/19/2009.

FIGURE 3.44

EMC RESPONSIBILITIES



- Monitors coverage by the mass media
- Addresses violations of the Mass Media Code of Conduct
- Oversees Sponsored Advertising Program
- Verifies media silence for 48 hour before polling starts

Source: IEC, "Electoral Media Commission," www.iec.org.af/Content.asp?sect=2&page=electoralmedia, accessed 10/13/2009.

Media Coverage

Afghanistan's media presented issues for debate during the presidential campaigns, providing Afghans with information about the candidates.²⁶⁵ The IEC established the Electoral Media Commission (EMC) to monitor fair reporting in the media and the media coverage of all the candidates during the campaigns.²⁶⁶ The EMC also organized presidential roundtables and debates, and held press conferences before and after the election to provide updates on election activities.²⁶⁷ Figure 3.44 provides information about EMC election responsibilities.

PRE-ELECTION DAY COVERAGE

Starting on July 16, 2009, the EMC reported the percentage of coverage for each political candidate. The IEC requested that the media cooperate with the EMC to educate citizens on the following:²⁶⁸

- the importance of voting
- the platforms of the candidates
- the basic issues of the campaign
- how to participate in elections

According to UNDP/ELECT, the GIRoA, through the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior, prohibited media coverage of violence in the lead-up to the elections.²⁶⁹ During the 48 hours before the election and during the polling day, the media is prohibited by law from covering any candidate's political activity. This prohibition included publishing or broadcasting results from opinion surveys, opinion polls, or exit polls.²⁷⁰ The EMC monitored activities during the media silence period on August 18 and 19, 2009, as well on Election Day between 7 a.m. and 8 p.m.²⁷¹

ELECTION DAY COVERAGE

According to UNDP/ELECT, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan requested that the GIRoA allow the media free access to cover all aspects of the elections. The IEC selected 10 international and national media representatives to visit polling center openings in Kabul to ensure coverage to Election Day activities, including setup of the polling stations and images of Afghans voting throughout the day. The Office of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General coordinated the media visits with the arrival of the UN Secretary-General.²⁷²

On Election Day, the IEC held daily press conferences to provide updates to the international community regarding the status of events throughout the day, such as the number of polling stations opened, the number of security incidents, and allegations of ballot stuffing.²⁷³ After Election Day, the IEC continued to host daily press conferences, to provide updates on Election Day events as well as on the counting and retrieval of the ballots. The press conferences also covered voter turnout, candidate claims of victory, the timing for the release of results, and the audits. Between 100 and 150 representatives from the media and international observers attended each press conference.²⁷⁴

Election Capacity

According to one of the SIGAR audit reports on the elections, hosting credible elections depends on the integrity of the election process, as well as the commitment of the next Afghan government to continue to build electoral capabilities. The IEC's long-term elections capacity will require the participation and coordination of the UN, international donors, and the GIROA to assist Afghanistan in sustaining a legitimate and fairly elected government. This SIGAR audit noted that the "IEC faces significant challenges as it strives to become a self-sustaining institution free from dependence on international support." The IEC must develop its own qualified staff to orchestrate the election cycle. Once institutional capabilities are established, such capabilities will also be needed at the ECC, should it be established as a permanent electoral institution.²⁷⁵

BUILDING GOVERNANCE CAPACITY

Fortifying and increasing the capacity of central and subnational administrative structures across all levels of government in Afghanistan, according to USAID, is essential to establishing a strong government presence.²⁷⁶ The electoral process, however, crowded out almost all other political activity during this quarter, according to the UN Secretary-General.²⁷⁷ Table 3.3 shows the target completion dates for the public administration reform goals.²⁷⁸

USAID reported that the GIROA's legitimacy as a functional government entity is predicated on the integrity and effectiveness of the civil service. For a re-emerging state like Afghanistan, the development of capacity in the government structure is fundamental to successful state building. According to USAID, an efficient and competent civil service is paramount in helping stabilize the country, restore the rule of law, implement reforms, and deliver services to the Afghan people.²⁷⁹

TABLE 3.3

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM		
Afghanistan Compact Goal	Status	Target Completion Date
Government machinery (including the number of ministries) will be restructured and rationalized to ensure a fiscally sustainable public administration.	No update reported	March 2011
Clear and transparent national appointments mechanism will be established within 6 months, applied within 12 months, and fully implemented within 24 months for all senior-level appointments to the central government and the judiciary, provincial governors, chiefs of police, district administrators, and provincial heads of security.	No update reported	June 2009–June 2010
Review of the number of administrative units and their boundaries will be undertaken with the aim of contributing to fiscal suitability.	No update reported	March 2007
Merit-based appointment, vetting procedures, and performance-based reviews will be undertaken for civil service positions at all levels of government, including central government, the judiciary, and police, and requisite support will be provided to build the capacity of the civil service to function effectively.	No update reported	March 2011

Source: GIROA, "The Afghanistan Compact," 1/31–2/1/2006, p. 7.

INVESTIGATION OF ELECTION RESULTS

This quarterly highlight describes the audit and recount process developed by the IEC and ECC in response to clear and convincing evidence of fraud in Afghanistan’s first democratic presidential election.

ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD

According to the UN Secretary-General, complaints of ballot stuffing and other electoral irregularities prompted the ECC to investigate allegations of fraud.²⁸⁰ UNDP/ELECT reported that the IEC quarantined certain polling stations and provided all pertinent information related to these stations to the ECC for further investigation. These stations included those in polling centers for which results forms were either missing or inaccurate.²⁸¹

After examining the results from several polling stations, the ECC concluded that sufficient evidence existed of fraudulent activity, such as “either an exceptionally high number of presidential votes cast per station in relation to the number of ballots available; or an exceptionally high percentage of ballots cast for only one candidate; or both.” The ECC also invalidated ballots from certain polling stations. It observed that in a significant number of stations in which fraud was identified, the number of ballots that were cast

exceeded expectations, based on credible observer reports of voter turnout.²⁸²


At the conclusion of its preliminary investigation, the ECC instructed the IEC to conduct an audit and recount of ballots to address electoral irregularities in 3,498 questionable ballot boxes.²⁸³

AUDIT PROCESS

Because it would have been impossible to investigate all the allegations of voter irregularities in a timely manner, the two commissions agreed to conduct an audit and a recount on the basis of sampling of polling stations where there were indicators of serious electoral irregularities.²⁸⁴ This approach would permit sufficient time to conduct a runoff election if necessary.²⁸⁵ The sample reflects approximately 10% of the estimated number of ballot papers included in the 3,498 ballot boxes.²⁸⁶

On October 19, 2009, the ECC announced that a certain percentage of votes initially designated to the candidates would be invalidated. As a result, no candidate received the 50% plus one vote required to be declared the winner and a runoff election was scheduled between the two candidates with the most votes.²⁸⁷

FRAUD INVESTIGATION: AUDIT CATEGORIES



Sources: IEC, “Fact Sheet on the Audit Process in Response to ECC Order of 8 September 2009,” www.iec.org.af/assets/pdf/factsheet/eng/fs14E.pdf, accessed 10/14/2009; IEC, “Universe of Polling Stations of the First Three Categories,” www.iec.org.af/assets/pdf/audited/random_first_sample_audit.pdf, accessed 10/14/2009; IEC, “Universe of Polling Stations of the Second Three Categories,” www.iec.org.af/assets/pdf/audited/random_first_sample_audit.pdf, accessed 10/14/2009.

GOVERNANCE ADMINISTRATION

The limited institutionalized structures and administration in Afghanistan underscore the need for competent leadership in public administration positions, according to the UN Secretary-General. Distrust and a lack of confidence in public administration undermine the GIROA's authority and legitimacy, "playing into the hands of the insurgency."²⁸⁸

Afghanistan's current public administration system lacks capacity and is under-resourced as a result of a shortage of qualified civil servants who are capable of implementing necessary reforms and delivering services to the public, according to USAID. Widespread deficiencies in managerial, legal, and organizational competencies hinder the effectiveness of administrative reforms. Civil servants continue to be recruited for or keep positions on the basis of patronage.²⁸⁹

USAID supports GIROA initiatives to reform public administration. USAID provides financial assistance for public administration programs, such as a Civil Service Capacity Development and Civil Service Reform program, to educate and train civil servants for strengthening government administration.²⁹⁰

The UNDP also assists in public administration reform, with a capacity-building program.²⁹¹ According to USAID, the goal of this capacity-building program is to support an Afghan-led effort to increase the effectiveness of ministries. Specifically, the program has three objectives:²⁹²


- improve the competencies of Afghan civil servants to offset years of war, Taliban rule, and corruption
- modernize, institutionalize, and harmonize common administrative systems across ministries
- promote a capacity for change, revitalization, and staff development within the GIROA

According to DoS, the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has 35 advisors working with the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics (MCN) through the Counter-Narcotics Advisory Team program and the Colombo Plan's Counter-Narcotics Public Information Program. These advisors are responsible for building MCN capacity to support counter-narcotics programs both centrally and provincially.²⁹³

Challenges

Lack of security and corruption throughout Afghanistan continue to affect the reform of public administration, according to the UN Secretary-General. The United States and the international community have made significant investments in strengthening Afghanistan's governance capacity, but after eight years, progress remains minimal. The UN Secretary-General identified several challenges to establishing a stable Afghan state:²⁹⁴

- insufficient number of trained and qualified Afghans
- tolerance for patronage and corruption



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- lack of an administrative culture
- tendency of Afghan politicians to perpetuate old rivalries rather than to focus on needs of state-building

In addition to a deteriorating security environment, which interferes with the development of law-based institutions, qualified Afghans are not attracted to public service positions because of the lower compensation and the patronage-based promotion systems. As a result, public administration reform programs focus on increasing government salaries, evaluating the competencies of existing personnel, and creating opportunities for merit-based career advancement.²⁹⁵

RULE OF LAW

As shown in Table 3.4, the target completion date for the ANDS Rule of Law goals, adopted from the Afghanistan Compact, is March 2011.²⁹⁶ No progress related to these goals was reported during this quarter.

Justice Reformation

The Afghanistan National Justice Sector Strategy is the road map for reforming the justice system; it is implemented through the National Justice Program.²⁹⁷ Determining the effectiveness of the National Justice Program requires an assessment of how many courts and prosecutors' offices are needed, as well as a determination of staffing priorities, according to the UN Secretary-General.²⁹⁸

According to INL, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, USAID, and CSTC-A serve as mentors for Afghan ministries to support the GIROA's efforts to enforce Afghan criminal law.²⁹⁹

Legislative Updates

More than 15 key Afghan criminal laws have been passed since the enactment of the Constitution in 2004, as shown in Table 3.5.³⁰⁰

TABLE 3.4

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES FOR RULE OF LAW		
Afghanistan Compact Goal	Status	Target Completion Date
The legal framework required under the constitution, including civil, criminal, and commercial law, will be put in place, distributed to all judicial and legislative institutions, and made available to the public.	No update reported	March 2011
Functioning institutions of justice will be fully operational in each province of Afghanistan, and the average time to resolve contract disputes will be reduced as much as possible.	No update reported	March 2011
Review and reform of oversight procedures relating to corruption, lack of due process, and miscarriage of justice will be initiated.	No update reported	March 2007
Review and reform of oversight procedures relating to corruption, lack of due process, and miscarriage of justice will be implemented.	No update reported	March 2011
Reformations to strengthen the professionalism, credibility, and integrity of key institutions of the justice system (the Ministry of Justice, the Judiciary, the Attorney-General's Office, the Ministry of Interior and National Directorate of Security).	No update reported	March 2011

Source: GIROA, "Afghanistan National Development Strategy: Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights," www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf, p.65; GIROA, "The Afghanistan Compact," 1/31-2/1/2006, p. 8.

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The most recent laws passed were the Anti-Terrorism Law and the Anti-Kidnapping and Human Trafficking Law, both in 2008. The Interim Code of Criminal Procedure for Courts was enacted in 2004, but the official criminal code has not been released, according to DoS.³⁰¹

INL reported that it continues to provide advisors to assist the GIRoA in correctly applying the current laws enacted. Because Afghanistan’s Criminal Procedure Code has been adopted in various forms, INL advisors are assisting the GIRoA in ensuring that new legislation is adopted, as well as ensuring that existing laws for arrests, prosecutions, and trials conform to the existing adopted legislation.³⁰²

For example, the 33 advisors from INL’s Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) constantly update their curriculum materials to conform to the latest Afghan legislation and conduct special training sessions to update prosecutors and criminal investigative police.³⁰³ The JSSP advisors also provide special training on newly enacted legislation as well as old laws that the Attorney General or the Minister of Justice have identified as not being followed appropriately.³⁰⁴

During this reporting period, DoS reported that the **Taqnin** of the Ministry of Justice would be reviewing every existing law (enacted prior to the adoption of the current 2004 Constitution). In addition, the Taqnin drafts and reviews proposed new laws as needed.³⁰⁵

The Criminal Law Reform Working Group, JSSP, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) presented a revised draft of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) to the Taqnin during the past quarter, but the draft has not been

Taqnin: the Ministry of Justice’s (MoJ’s) legislative drafting department, according to INL. It was established in Solar Year 1341 (1962) to assist the then-Office of the Prime Minister in drafting and reviewing all national legislation, primarily for compliance with the Constitution, Islamic law, and international legal standards, and to remedy conflicts.

Source: MoJ, www.moj.gov.af, accessed 10/19/2009.

TABLE 3.5

AFGHAN CRIMINAL LAWS PASSED, 2004–2009	
Legislative Title	Year Enacted
Anti-Money Laundering Law	2004
Counter-Narcotics Law	2003, amended 2006
Law Combating the Financing of Terrorism	2005
Law on the Campaign Against Money Laundering and Its Proceeds	2004
Interim Code of Criminal Procedure for Courts	2004
Law on the Campaign Against Bribery and Administrative Corruption	2004
Law on Prisons and Detention Centers	2005
Police Law	2005
Law on Firearms, Ammunition, and Explosives	2005
Military Court Reform Law	2005
Military Courts Law	2005
Military Criminal Procedure Code	2006
Military Penal Code	2006
Anti-Terrorism Law	2008
Anti-Kidnapping and Human Trafficking Law	2008

Source: INL, response to SIGAR data call, 10/5/2009.

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submitted to Parliament, according to INL. The revised draft of the CPC was several hundred pages long and was available in both Dari and English. The revised draft was also delivered to the U.S. Embassy Kabul and to INL.³⁰⁶

According to INL, the Taqin collaborates with the JSSP and UNODC regarding the content and intent of the revised CPC draft as needed. The Taqin is responsible for deciding which proposed revisions should be adopted.³⁰⁷

Some of the challenges that INL observed in drafting the CPC included the following:³⁰⁸

- a patchwork of old and new laws, requiring extensive review and analysis before comprehensive revision of the CPC
- consistency of provisions with the 2004 Constitution, including rights not presented before Afghan courts
- limited analytical legal precedent, requiring additional dialogue with Afghan justice sector partners for clarification
- drafting in multiple languages, English and Dari, to ensure that Afghan justice sector representatives and international legal advisors have a comprehensive understanding of the proposed legislation
- having to provide accurate translations of technical legal terms, principles, and concepts within specific time constraints
- understanding of pertinent Islamic legal principles and the effect of international conventions to which Afghanistan is a party

HUMAN RIGHTS

As identified in the Afghanistan Compact, the GIRoA intends to improve its human rights record. No progress was reported related to these goals. Table 3.6 provides a list of the GIRoA's metrics for improving human rights.³⁰⁹

The rights of women in Afghanistan captured the attention of the international community during this quarter with the signing of the Shia Personal Status law. Concerns from the international community about the gradual erosion of existing rights moved to the forefront with the controversy surrounding the

TABLE 3.6

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS		
Afghanistan Compact Goals	Status	Target Completion Date
The government's capacity to comply with and report on its human rights treaty obligations will be strengthened.	No update reported	March 2011
Government security and law enforcement agencies will adopt corrective measures including codes of conduct and procedures aimed at preventing arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, extortion and illegal expropriation of property.	No update reported	March 2011
Human rights monitoring will be carried out by the government and independently by the AIHRC.	No update reported	March 2011


Source: GIRoA, "The Afghanistan Compact," 1/31-2/1/2006, p. 7.

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law. On July 19, 2009, the President of Afghanistan signed legislation intended to reduce violence against women. According to the UN Secretary-General, the law criminalizes sexual violence, including rape, forced and underage marriage, forced labor, and prostitution.³¹⁰

Violence against women in public life and sexual abuse of women and girls undermines efforts to attain gender equality. According to the UN Secretary-General, cultural tolerance for rape perpetrators encourages the acceptance of pervasive violence against women, reinforced through customs, attitudes, and practices that oppress women or force women into subservient roles in society.³¹¹ For more information about the women of Afghanistan, see the quarterly highlight in the Economic and Social Development section.

During this reporting period, the UN assisted the MoJ in establishing a Human Rights Support Unit. The unit is intended to support the GIROA in developing and implementing programs and policies in accordance with Afghanistan's international human rights obligations. For example, the UN visited several detention centers in and around Kabul to view the conditions of the detention centers to ensure that the detainees were able to contact family members and were provided access to legal advice. The UN continues to support Afghan justice institutions in improving their capacity to adhere to international human rights standards.³¹²



Cultural and legal barriers hinder women's full participation in Afghan society. (U.S. Air Force photo, Capt. Stacie N. Shafran)

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) stresses the importance of economic development, listing it as one of the three pillars of reconstruction progress.³¹³ Elements of economic and social development discussed in this section include economic growth, essential services, industry, counter-narcotics, and the women of Afghanistan.

ECONOMIC GROWTH


The ANDS strategy for economic growth anticipates an increased reliance on the private sector.³¹⁴ In order to create a stable macroeconomic environment and supportive financial system, the ANDS lists certain priorities that may bolster the economy, including inflation control and regulation reforms—both the responsibility of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA).³¹⁵

Afghan Currency


Since its introduction in 2002, the exchange rate for the Afghan currency (the Afghani) has remained fairly stable against the U.S. dollar, according to the U.S. Treasury (Treasury). However, inflation rates experienced a double-digit increase in 2008 and 2009 because of high global fuel prices and a drought that affected cereal crop production.³¹⁶ Figure 3.45 shows how consumer price inflation varied between 2002 and 2009.

FIGURE 3.45

AFGHANI: CONSUMER PRICE INFLATION (PERCENT)



Source: Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2009.



The Afghani is accepted throughout Afghanistan; on the borders, the Iranian Rial and the Pakistani Rupee are also used extensively, as reported by Treasury.

Source: Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2009.

The foreign-owned banks based in Afghanistan have their head offices in countries around the world: India (Punjab National Bank of India), Iran (Aryan), Pakistan (Brac, Habib, National Bank of Pakistan), the United Arab Emirates (Alfalah), and the United Kingdom (Standard Chartered).

Source: Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2009.

Banking

Treasury reported that the banking system has been growing rapidly since the Afghan Parliament passed the banking law in 2004. The Afghan banking system is composed of two state-owned banks, seven foreign-owned banks, and eight Afghan-owned banks.³¹⁷

The system is regulated by Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), the central bank of Afghanistan. DAB is responsible for the health and stability of the country's financial sector.³¹⁸ In 2009, DAB published a strategic plan for 2009 to 2014, based on a five-pillar strategy.³¹⁹ Table 3.7 details the actions associated with the five pillars.

According to Treasury, chief executive officers (CEOs) for Afghan banks cited security as the number one challenge to the banking sector. Related problems include underdeveloped laws against money laundering and inadequate regulations to prevent terrorist organizations from using the banks.³²⁰

Traditionally, Afghanistan has not had a "banking culture," which, combined with a fear of long-term deposits, the prevalence of inconsistent and inadequate credit information, and limited access to foreign capital, has caused additional problems for the sector.³²¹ Bank CEOs also cited the inadequate support of DAB as a central banking structure, saying that the weakness of banking supervision leads to difficulties. Despite the fact that the private banks all use the Gregorian calendar, DAB continues to use the solar calendar.³²²

Gross Domestic Product

For 2009/2010, the growth in Afghanistan's real gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to be 8.3%, compared with 3.4% in 2008/2009.³²³ Treasury reported that the services industry contributed the largest percentage of GDP between 2008 and 2009, primarily through financial services and telecommunications, but also

TABLE 3.7

DAB FIVE-PILLAR STRATEGY		
Pillar Number	Pillar Title	Activities
Pillar 1	Improve the effectiveness of monetary policy	Incorporate more monetary tools, including open market operations, reserve requirements, and lending facilities
Pillar 2	Deepen financial intermediation	Bolster the financial sector by diversifying and improving financial products and services; focus on small and medium enterprises; introduce medium- to long-term lending mechanisms
Pillar 3	Accelerate capacity building	Enhance organizational efficiency by designing an efficient organizational structure and providing qualitative and quantitative resources and goals
Pillar 4	Enhance information management	Strive to collect information efficiently and brief decision makers in a timely manner
Pillar 5	Promote good corporate governance	Implement best practices in relationships with the Supreme Council and the government

Source: DAB, "Strategic Plan 2009–2014: Fostering Price Stability and Building a Robust Financial System," 2/22/2009.

through translation and transportation services for donor agencies. The second largest contribution came from the agriculture sector, predominantly through wheat production. Industry (primarily manufacturing) contributed the third largest amount.³²⁴ Figure 3.46 depicts the approximate contributions of these groups to GDP.

Employment

Although no detailed information is available, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reported that approximately 40% of Afghans are believed to be unemployed, out of the total population of 25 million people. USAID has identified unemployment as a factor driving the country toward increased instability.³²⁵

Unemployment percentages are not tracked because of capacity constraints at the Afghan ministry level and the challenges associated with implementing a national census. Neither the International Monetary Fund nor the World Bank tracks Afghan employment on a regular basis.³²⁶

ESSENTIAL SERVICES

Essential services combine the “hard infrastructure” elements of the ANDS (such as energy, transportation, and water) with “soft infrastructure,” which describes human and institutional capacities (including education and health services). According to the ANDS, limitations in these areas must be addressed for sustainable economic growth to take place.³²⁷

Energy

Information about how many Afghans have access to electricity is limited, which the GIRoA has acknowledged as a concern. By best estimates, as of September 30, 2009, approximately 15 to 17% of Afghans had access to the isolated electricity grid systems in different parts of the country.³²⁸

The ANDS describes energy development as “critical to economic growth.”³²⁹ Table 3.8 provides a list of several metrics by which the ANDS measures progress in this sector.

TABLE 3.8


STRATEGIC PRIORITIES TO GROW THE ENERGY SECTOR		
ANDS Goal	Status	ANDS Completion Date
Electricity will reach at least 65% of urban households and 90% of non-residential urban establishments.	Approximately 15 to 17% of households are connected to isolated grid systems.	March 2010
Electricity will reach at least 25% of rural households.	Approximately 5.5 to 6% of Afghans in rural provinces are connected to isolated electric systems.	March 2010

Note: USAID defines “rural provinces” as “provinces wherein less than 25% of the population lives in market centers.”

Source: GIRoA, “The Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf, pp. 79–80; SIGAR audit, response to energy questions, 9/16/2009. Some data sourced to USAID.

FIGURE 3.46

COMPOSITION OF AFGHANISTAN'S GDP, 2008–2009



Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Numbers are estimates. Source: Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2009.

TABLE 3.9

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES TO STRENGTHEN EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES		
ANDS Goal	Status	ANDS Completion Date
Allow at least 1.8 million Afghans access to literacy programs, including 60% women, minorities, nomads, or people with disabilities.	Approximately 18% of adult women are literate; 50% of adult men.	March 2010
Millennium Development Goal: All Afghan children will have access to a complete course of primary education.	Approximately 53.5% of Afghan children attended school in 2009.	2020

Sources: GfRoa, "The Afghanistan National Development Strategy," www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf, pp. 79–80; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009. USAID sources these numbers to the MoE Planning Department.


Education

The main ANDS goal in this sector is to see that every Afghan has equal access to education. As stated in the ANDS, "An education sector that engenders a healthy workforce with relevant skills and knowledge is key to long-term economic growth."³³⁰ Table 3.9 provides an overview of the educational goals established in the ANDS.

Approximately 53.5% of Afghan children (6.7 million) attended school in 2009. The Afghan Ministry of Education (MoE) has estimated that 37% of the children attending school are girls. According to USAID, there are still an estimated 5.3 million Afghan children who are not enrolled in any education program.³³¹ Figure 3.47 shows a breakdown of grade enrollment by gender.

FIGURE 3.47

FEMALE STUDENTS IN AFGHAN SCHOOLS, GRADES 1–12 (THOUSANDS)



Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Numbers are estimates. USAID sources numbers to the Afghan Ministry of Education.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

Education by Province

According to USAID, Afghanistan has one central education system, managed by the MoE. This system covers primary and secondary schooling, youth and adult literacy, and technical and vocational education.³³²

The southern provinces tend to face greater challenges in providing education. USAID reported that the education systems in Kabul, Herat, and Nangarhar tend to be more functional than those in other provinces.³³³

According to USAID, one way to increase access to education is through computers. The United States is supporting a program through which nine provinces have received a new e-learning training program for midwives. The first module focuses on managing the third stage of labor. Along with the training module, USAID has provided 51 computers for the program. Computers and training programs will be used in Badakhshan, Bamyan, Ghor, Herat, Jowzjan, Kabul, Khowst, Paktiya, and Takhar. USAID also plans to provide e-learning training for midwives on counseling skills and newborn care.³³⁴

Challenges to Education

The educational system in Afghanistan faces multiple challenges, according to USAID.³³⁵ Some of these challenges include the following:

- security, including attacks on schools
- illiteracy
- the threat of violence against girls in schools
- the low education levels of teachers, including limited teaching credentials

Instability in the country continues to affect Afghan education. In the past two years, more than 673 schools were burned, attacked, or closed down because of security concerns. The MoE has estimated that these closings deprived more than 300,000 Afghan students of education.³³⁶

Access to female teachers is also a challenge. Of 415 educational districts in the country, approximately 200 have no female teachers. The limited availability of female teachers diminishes the chance that girls can attend school.³³⁷

U.S. Efforts

USAID supports a wide range of educational initiatives. All projects are focused on improving the quality of education across Afghanistan.³³⁸ Table 3.10 lists ongoing projects, as described by USAID.

Health Services

According to the Afghan Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), the health of the Afghan people is among the worst in the region; USAID has classified it as among the worst in the world.³³⁹ Some representative statistics:

TABLE 3.10

USAID EFFORTS IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR	
Project Title	Description of Activities
Building Education Support Systems for Teachers (BESST)	BESST implements the MoE's National Program for In-service Teacher Training (NPITT) and provides ongoing training support to more than 50,000 teachers (approximately one-third of the teaching force) in 11 of Afghanistan's provinces, mainly in methodology and pedagogy. The program also trains principals in school management strategies, produces video and radio educational programs for teachers, and supports the MoE in creating competency and credentialing systems and strengthening its Human Resources and Planning departments.
Partnership for Advancing Community-based Education in Afghanistan (PACE-A)	PACE-A assists the GiRoA in strengthening and increasing high-quality community-based education in areas where there are no governmental schools. PACE-A is currently reaching over 50,000 students in 18 provinces and has been administering rapid reading and numeracy tests to its students every year to track students' learning achievements.
Literacy and Community Empowerment Program (LCEP-2)	LCEP-2 implements the MoE's National Literacy Program and uses literacy and productive skills training as tools to enhance human capital and improve livelihood opportunities for youth and adults in Afghanistan. The project has established 3,916 learning centers in 994 communities of 44 districts in 20 provinces.
Afghan e-Quality Alliances (AeQa)	AeQa is working to build the capacity of 19 Afghan higher education institutions to meet standards of excellence and quality assurance. It establishes e-learning centers for teaching and learning. It also joins university experts from the region, Europe, and the United States with Afghan university leaders to build core competencies in digital libraries, teaching and learning software platforms, English language, student preparation, facilities management, and higher education leadership and management.
International School of Kabul (ISK)	The ISK provides high-quality American-style K-12 education in Afghanistan. The program has received a full 5-year accreditation by the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools and has been granted a 20-year registration as a private international school by the MoE and the Presidential Cabinet of Afghanistan.
Higher Education Project (HEP)	HEP assists the GiRoA in improving the quality of higher education, particularly through teacher training. The project focuses on improving the teaching skills of professors through training in pedagogy, subject knowledge, and professional attitudes. A key aspect is to institutionalize structures and develop an academic culture that supports high-quality teaching and professional activities. The project covers 16 faculties of education in provincial universities.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

- Afghanistan is one of only four countries in the world where polio remains endemic.³⁴⁰
- Infant, under-five, and maternal mortality rates are among the highest in the world.³⁴¹
- More than half of all Afghan children are “stunted”—their height-to-age ratio is underdeveloped.³⁴²

Health and Nutrition Sector Strategy:

a health care policy based on studies compiled and completed by the MoPH. The strategy is meant to enhance the ministry’s ability to address a series of problems within the Afghan health care system.

Source: GfRoa, “The Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf, p. 12.

According to the ANDS, implementation of the HNSS would aid the MoPH in addressing some key health care issues:

- inadequate financing for many key programs
- reliance on external sources of funding
- inadequately trained health workers
- lack of qualified female health workers in rural areas
- dispersed population and geographical barriers
- low levels of utilization for certain health services
- variable levels of service quality
- poor security in some provinces
- lack of effective financial protection mechanisms

Source: GfRoa, “The Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf, pp. 11–12.

In order to enhance the MoPH’s ability to provide competitive and cost-effective health services, the ANDS recommends the adoption of a **Health and Nutrition Sector Strategy** (HNSS). Under the HNSS, the MoPH would study the regulatory and legal instruments governing health care. The MoPH would also conduct research studies to create new policies, strategies, and plans for the health care sector.³⁴³

In its 2009 annual report, the MoPH announced that it had completed an HNSS for 2009 to 2013 and expanded on the basic health care priorities in the ANDS. The MoPH has adopted an integrated strategic health planning and budgeting strategy. This strategy is expected to use existing GfRoa structures and models to reach the following objectives:³⁴⁴

- provide a direction and mechanism for introducing meaningful decentralization
- link the focus of action with the implementation of national strategies
- provide a management tool for implementation planning and monitoring
- include all budget sources while supporting the Ministry of Finance (MoF) program budgeting structure and terminology
- use GfRoa accounting codes (to align with current financial management systems)
- eventually contribute to the start of national health accounts development

Improved conditions in the Afghan population are measured by several indicators, as identified by the ANDS. Table 3.11 lists some of the goals that the ANDS established in this sector, and the status of the metrics as of September 30, 2009.

Maternal and Infant Mortality

The ANDS lists maternal and infant mortality as two of the indicators of progress in the health sector. However, information on both mortality rates is very limited. Infant mortality rates are available only as of 2006, and maternal mortality rates have not been measured since 2002. According to USAID, it is common global practice to measure maternal mortality every 8 to 10 years; a survey is planned for 2013, three years after the ANDS goal deadline. USAID reported that it measures progress with proxy indicators including prenatal care, assisted delivery, and conception prevalence rates.³⁴⁵

Challenges

Progress in health care is still being stymied by the security situation, as reported by USAID. Other challenges include a lack of qualified health workers and inadequate health care funding. Social determinants have also affected the health of

TABLE 3.11

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES TO ENHANCE HEALTH SERVICES		
ANDS Goal	Status	ANDS Completion Date
At least 90% of Afghans will have access to the Basic Package of Health Services .	67% have access to health care within two hours' walking distance; 85% have access four to six hours away.	March 2010
Maternal mortality will be reduced.	Survey will be completed in 2013. See text for further discussion.	March 2010
All children under 5 years of age will be immunized.	95% of children have been immunized against polio; 83% against six other major diseases: pertussis, tuberculosis, measles, tetanus, diphtheria, and Hemophilus influenza B.	March 2010
Infant mortality will drop by 20%.	Data not available past 2006. See text for further discussion.	March 2010
Millennium Development Goal: reduce infant mortality to one-third of 2003 levels.	Data not available past 2006. See text for further discussion.	2020
Millennium Development Goal: halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV and AIDS in Afghanistan.	The World Bank and the GfRoA are collaborating on a \$10 million HIV/AIDS Prevention Project (2007–2010). The Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is providing an additional \$10.08 million for prevention, treatment, care, and support activities (2008–2012).	2020

Source: GfRoA, "The Afghanistan National Development Strategy," www.and.s.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf, pp 111–112; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

Basic Package of Health Services: a standard level of health care that should be available to all Afghan people

Source: GfRoA, "The Afghanistan National Development Strategy," www.and.s.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf, p. 112.

individual Afghans; issues such as poverty, illiteracy, secure access to food, poor sanitation, and limited access to water all affect health.³⁴⁶

To overcome these challenges, USAID has reported that it is working more closely with community elders to encourage ownership and protection of health services. USAID has also increased training for health care workers.³⁴⁷

Water and Sanitation

The ANDS strategic vision for the water sector emphasizes the management and development of water resources through the implementation of an Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) system.³⁴⁸ However, an IWRM system requires cohesive support from social, political, and economic elements. The limitations on all three of these elements in Afghanistan have led international donors and Afghan ministries to focus on specific tasks instead of a national system, as reported by USAID.³⁴⁹ Table 3.12 lists ANDS metrics for the water sector.

Transportation

The ANDS metrics for transportation focuses on road reconstruction, airport development, and railway construction.³⁵⁰ No updates were provided for airports or railways this quarter. Table 3.13 provides updates on some ANDS metrics.

The World Bank has classified Afghanistan's road system as one of the worst in the world. The Ring Road, a series of roads that connected the country's major

TABLE 3.12

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES FOR WATER AND SANITATION		
ANDS Goal	Status	ANDS Completion Date
The GiRoA will develop and use an Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) System.	Currently, activities are locally focused.	Ongoing
Approximately 50% of Kabul residents and 30% of other Afghans will have access to piped water and improved sanitation.	Urban population: over 60% have access to safe water; 12% to adequate sanitation.	March 2010
	Rural population: 30% have access to safe water; 10% have access to adequate sanitation.	
At least 30% of the Afghan water supply will come from large waterworks.	Availability of piped water remains limited.	March 2010
Millennium Development Goal: 50% more Afghans will have access to a sustainable water supply.	See percentages of access to safe water, above.	2020

Source: GiRoA, "The Afghanistan National Development Strategy," www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf, pp. 84–85; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009. USAID references the ANDS and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.

TABLE 3.13

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES TO REHABILITATE THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM		
ANDS Goal	Status as of September 30, 2009	ANDS Completion Date
The "Ring Road" project will be fully operational, connecting roads around Afghanistan and roads to neighboring countries.	Approximately half of the roads have been fully repaired.	March 2008
Kabul International Airport and Herat Airport will be fully compliant with International Civil Aviation Organization standards.	No update reported.	March 2010
The GiRoA will launch the Afghanistan Railway Project.	No update reported.	Ongoing

Source: GiRoA, "The Afghanistan National Development Strategy," www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf, pp. 95–96; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

Among landlocked developing countries, Afghanistan is one of the farthest from a seaport—more than 2,000 km over rough terrain.

Source: World Bank, "Afghanistan Transport Sector," <http://web.worldbank.org>, accessed 10/9/2009.

cities in a large circle around the entire country, was partially destroyed by war, leaving many Afghans with no access to well-maintained roadways.³⁵¹ When it is fully rebuilt, approximately 60% of Afghans will live within 50 km of the road.³⁵²


USAID leads the Ring Road project, which aims to reconnect the loop of roads. The ANDS had set completion of the project for March 2008; however, some pieces of the road have yet to be repaired. In the west, the Laman–Bala Murghab (143 km) and Armalik–Laman (50 km) projects are at 0% completion. In the northeast, the Doshi–Pul-i-Khomri (50 km) project is only 3% complete. By comparison, the Herat–Mazar-e Sharif (511 km) project is 90% complete.³⁵³ Figure 3.48 depicts the Ring Road and its state of completion as of September 30, 2009.

Increased access to roads has improved conditions in village markets, according to USAID. In the case of the Baharak Bazaar, a remote market in Badakhshan,

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

FIGURE 3.48

AFGHANISTAN RING ROAD STATUS



Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Numbers are estimates. Outstanding projects are currently overdue; therefore target completion dates are unknown at this time.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

the number of traders selling produce has increased from 3 to 30. Walnut exports (to Kabul and overseas) increased from 270 tons last year to 2,000 tons this year.³⁵⁴

USAID reported that paving roads in the region improved travel times and enabled farmers to get their produce to market without damage. In the past, farmers had to pay all-terrain vehicle drivers to carry their produce to market over the unpaved roads; now they can make the trip themselves for much less money.³⁵⁵

Communications

The ANDS metrics for communications focus on providing affordable communication services to every district and village.³⁵⁶ Table 3.14 lists some of the goals associated with the communications sector.

Approximately 33% of Afghans (10 million people) subscribe to basic voice services; 100,000 of these are land-line subscribers, and the rest are cell (mobile) phone users. However, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) believes that the number of Afghans with access to telecommunications services is higher: close to 75% of the population. The MCIT believes that Afghans share phone service with family and friends, and have access to public call offices.³⁵⁷

Access to telecommunications varies by province, according to USAID. Mobile service companies have built communications infrastructure in places with larger populations. The major urban areas of Afghanistan have a strong communications infrastructure, as does the northern part of the country (between Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Jalalabad, and Kabul).³⁵⁸

Extending communications services to rural areas is one of the biggest challenges to communications development, according to USAID. The GIRoA has established a Telecom Development Fund to bolster communications infrastructure in rural areas. As of September 30, 2009, the fund has collected approximately \$25 million for distribution and has provided \$2.5 million to 20 districts.³⁵⁹

USAID supports the Afghanistan Economic Governance and Private Sector Strengthening program, which provided over \$1.5 billion for communications development between 2003 and September 30, 2009. The program also aided in the initial establishment of the independent telecommunications sector for Afghanistan in 2003 by issuing licenses to four private telephone companies.³⁶⁰

USAID also provided \$1 million to assist the MCIT in building public Web sites for all the Afghan ministries and provincial governments; these sites were written in local languages in order to provide Afghans with better information about government resources.³⁶¹ Many of the sites have an English language component.³⁶²

USAID also provided funding for the national satellite system, operated by the MCIT. The system connects the President of Afghanistan with the 34 governors of the provinces. They have a weekly videoconference meeting; according to USAID, the weekly meetings have brought “enormous political cohesion” to the GIRoA.³⁶³

National Identity Management Initiative: GIRoA regulations require that telecommunication subscribers provide highly detailed information about themselves in order to receive service. Because there are about 10 million subscribers (as of September 30, 2009), a large amount of information has already been amassed. According to USAID, this information could be very valuable to the National Identity Management Initiative, which seeks to compile Afghanistan demographic statistics.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

TABLE 3.14

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES TO DEVELOP THE COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR		
ANDS Goal	Status	ANDS Completion Date
Increase access to telecommunications services to include at least 80% of Afghans.	33% of Afghans subscribe to voice services; approximately 75% are estimated to have access to telecommunications.	2010
Extend satellite services (mobile cellular devices) to reach at least 3,000 villages.	3,000 communities have operating mobile towers.	2010

Source: GIRoA, “The Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf, pp. 98–99; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

INDUSTRY

The United States has provided support to Afghan industry through several programs. For example, the Afghanistan Small and Medium Enterprise Development project has received approximately \$40 million for distribution among smaller businesses in Afghanistan.³⁶⁴ This section provides an overview of some larger Afghan industries.

Agriculture

The Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) has recently implemented a new policy for agriculture called the National Agriculture Development Framework (NADF). This framework builds on the strategic vision set forth in the ANDS through the Agricultural and Rural Development Zones (ARDZ) program. According to USAID, the NADF is more detailed than the ANDS and the ARDZ, and therefore supersedes both. As such, international donors are no longer contributing to the ARDZ.³⁶⁵

According to MAIL, the NADF focuses on four key program areas:³⁶⁶

- natural resource management
- agricultural production and productivity
- economic regeneration
- program support and change management

The proportion of agriculture kept for the family (versus what is sold to the public) varies greatly by province, district, and product. For example, in Nangarhar, an estimated 98% of wheat would be kept on the farm, but only about 10 to 20% of vegetables and 5% of onions (because they are considered a cash crop). By comparison, in Balkh, only approximately 60 to 70% of wheat would be kept for personal consumption, because farms are larger.³⁶⁷

U.S. Support for Agricultural Development

The United States supports programming to expand agricultural opportunities in rural areas and develop agribusiness across Afghanistan. USAID has provided approximately \$402.8 million in support of agribusiness.³⁶⁸ Table 3.15 describes some of the efforts USAID currently supports.

Challenges to Agricultural Development

USAID reported that between 75 and 85% of Afghans (27 to 35 million people) are involved in the agriculture sector labor force.³⁶⁹ Of that number, approximately 4.8 million are currently unemployed. According to USAID, the implications of high unemployment in agriculture include these risks:³⁷⁰

- Unemployed and marginalized youth are potential recruits for the insurgency.
- Low incomes perpetuate the intergenerational “cycle of poverty.”
- Unemployment in rural areas leads to a high rate of urbanization.
- Lack of income to enroll children in the formal Afghan education system leads to increased enrollment in fundamentalist institutions.



An Afghan beekeeper tends to one of his hives in Panjshir. The man's original two colonies were given to him during a bee-keeping program sponsored by the Panjshir Ministry of Agriculture. (U.S. Air Force photo, Staff Sgt. Michael B. Keller)

The high threat environment in Afghanistan and consequent instability of the security situation raise challenges to the implementation of agricultural programming, according to USAID. As a result, USAID has focused its development programming in stable areas, increased the use of private security contractors, and reworked programming to reduce the risk.³⁷¹

Private Sector Development

Afghanistan ranked 160 of 181 countries in the World Bank's 2010 Doing Business survey.³⁷² The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) reported that investment in Afghanistan is expanding, but not as quickly as anticipated; pervasive insecurity, corruption, and delays in passing key business legislation have deterred more rapid growth.³⁷³

TABLE 3.15

ONGOING USAID AGRICULTURE PROJECTS	
Project	Description
Village-Based Watershed Restoration in Ghor Province	This project is designed to launch restoration projects in seven watersheds in Ghor. The project plans to catalyze community restoration of watersheds through the re-establishment and enhancement of local systems for natural resource management. Women's groups will promote women's participation.
Advancing Afghan Agriculture Alliance	The alliance works to build an agriculture knowledge system that improves agriculture education, research, and extension. The project is focused on enhancing the capabilities of the Afghan faculties of agriculture and veterinary science and the MAIL.
Afghanistan Water, Agriculture, and Technology Transfer	The transfer is working to identify feasible, sustainable, natural resource-based technologies that improve water management and increase agricultural production. The program is also planning to identify water and land use policies and institutional frameworks that encourage individuals—in the local, provincial, and national governments—to increase sustainable economic development from the agricultural and natural resource sectors. Finally, the program plans to improve the capabilities of the professional staffs of Afghanistan's ministries and universities by partnering with them on information-based decision-making and outreach projects to benefit the people and economy of Afghanistan.
Agro-Enterprise Development Alliance Afghanistan	The goal of this three-year program is to enable rural and peri-urban households to expand and improve sustainable agriculture-based livelihoods through market-oriented agricultural development. The program provides extension, materials, and other agriculture services to small-scale farmers, traders, and processors in Herat, Ghor, and Bamyan. The objectives of the program are to increase on-farm and off-farm incomes of resource-poor rural households in western and central Afghanistan and to increase local capacity in market-led agriculture.
Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives: North, East, and West	This program represents a \$150 million, five-year (March 2009–March 2104) cooperative agreement with DAJ and subgrantees ACDI-VOCA and Mercy Corps to implement alternative development programs focused in the provinces in the north, east, and west formerly targeted by ADP-E and ADP-N (Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar, Nuristan, Badakhshan, Balkh, Takhar, Badghis).
Afghanistan Farm Services Alliance	This alliance is working to establish a network of six farm service centers (FSCs) in six targeted provinces—Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Laghman, Kunar, and Zabul—benefiting over 20,000 Afghan farmers through increased access to agricultural inputs, training, and output markets. The FSCs will be profit-oriented, privately owned enterprises intended to provide the agricultural inputs, services, and market linkages Afghan farmers need to transition to successful commercial agriculture.
Accelerating Sustainable Agriculture Program (ASAP)	The goal of this program is to create a vibrant and diversified commercial agriculture sector that provides alternatives to poppy production by providing employment opportunities for rural Afghans. ASAP facilitates trade opportunities by providing linkages between buyers and farmers. The project will actively identify and make investments to overcome factors that constrain the growth of local product sales.
Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture (AVIPA) Plus	AVIPA Plus is an expansion of USAID's successful wheat seed voucher program. The program will provide counter-insurgency stability programming in Helmand and Kandahar within an agricultural framework. Adjacent southern provinces will be assisted as required. AVIPA will directly employ over 500 Afghans and will capitalize on its close working relationship with MAIL's national, provincial, and district authorities, and continue using private sector Afghan business distribution networks.
Alternative Development Program – Southwest	This program aims to reduce the economic dependence of Farah, Uruzgan, Nimroz, and Helmand on opium production, processing, and trade. USAID will help communities identify and seize meaningful opportunities to increase incomes and create sustained jobs through the licit economy, while reinforcing the social and economic infrastructure on which these opportunities depend. The anticipated results include improved infrastructure with significantly increased local employment opportunities for landless laborers, poor farmers, widows, and others susceptible to opium production, processing, or trade, as well as opportunities seized by these same groups to start or expand local businesses, work for growing local enterprises, or raise farm or firm revenue through a range of marketing, processing, and business development improvements.

Sources: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009; USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2009.

According to Treasury, the biggest challenges to private sector development are weak and discretionary applications of the rule of law, and lackluster government regulation.³⁷⁴ USAID reported additional challenges: reliable power, obtaining tenure of land, access to credit, and corruption.³⁷⁵ OPIC also noted the expense of private security contractors, as well as unreliable physical infrastructure (including electricity) and services infrastructure (including basic banking services).³⁷⁶

In response to concerns about the weakness of regulation in Afghanistan, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) has established the Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility (AIGF). Through the AIGF, MIGA acts as an insurance organization, reimbursing up to 90% of business losses that may arise from transfer restrictions and expropriation, war and civil disruption, and breach of contract.³⁷⁷

USAID reported that its programs also address many of the challenges facing private investment. USAID's Office of Economic Growth (OEG) focuses on three areas of private sector development:³⁷⁸

- **Economic Policy and Trade:** works to develop commercial law, regulatory reform, monetary policy and banking supervision, trade policy and facilitation, and customs modernization
- **Financial Sector Development:** supports the development of microfinance institutions, commercial banks, credit cooperatives, and non-bank financial institutions
- **Business Competitiveness:** provides firm-level support to small- and medium-sized businesses, privatization of state-owned enterprises, improvement in land tenure, and industrial parks

OPIC reported that it works closely with American investors and their partners to provide financing and insurance products, enabling investments that “otherwise would not be made.”³⁷⁹

OPIC cited its pending program to assist the Insurance Corporation of Afghanistan, the only private commercial insurance company in the country, as a sign of incremental improvements in the Afghan private sector. The growth of insurance and banking products enhances the services available for businesses, which can increase employment opportunities and bolster the economy as a whole.³⁸⁰

COUNTER-NARCOTICS

The ANDS classifies counter-narcotics as a “cross-cutting issue” because if the drug problems in Afghanistan are not addressed, “the overall success of the ANDS will be in jeopardy.”³⁸¹ Cross-cutting issues also affect more than one pillar of the ANDS. According to the ANDS, counter-narcotics efforts are designed to achieve four objectives:³⁸²

- disrupt the drug trade
- bolster legal rural livelihood
- reduce demand for illicit drugs (and provide treatment for drug addicts)
- strengthen counter-narcotics organizations within central and provincial governments

Additional private sector development support is provided by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) through its Trade and Private Sector Development Program, which works to bolster economic growth, create employment opportunities, and reduce poverty. The World Bank provides support through its Private Sector Development Support Project, which focuses on enhancing capacity for delivering electricity, land services, water, and communication in order to promote a better business investment environment.

Source: Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2009.

Because the ANDS identifies counter-narcotics as a cross-cutting issue, this report discusses counter-narcotics efforts in more than one place. Please see the Security section for details on poppy eradication, narcotics seizure, and related security issues.

	SECURITY	GOVERNANCE	DEVELOPMENT
REGIONAL COOPERATION			
COUNTER-NARCOTICS			
ANTICORRUPTION			
GENDER EQUALITY			
CAPACITY			
ENVIRONMENTAL			

Under the Economic and Social Development Pillar, alternative development and public information are the two primary counter-narcotics programs.

According to USAID and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghan drug activity is decreasing. Poppy cultivation is down 22% in 2009, and opium production is down 10%. Prices are at a 10-year low.³⁸³

In addition, UN statistics indicate decreases in the drug work force, revenue, and exports. The number of **poppy-free provinces** continues to grow, as does the number of drug seizures; however, the UNODC cautions that drugs remain a serious threat to Afghan development initiatives.³⁸⁴ It estimates that 123,000 hectares (ha) of land are still being used to grow poppy.³⁸⁵

The drug trade also encourages government corruption, which undermines public faith in government services. The money laundering associated with the drug trade has affected the strength of Afghan banks.³⁸⁶

In addition to these large-scale problems, the drug trade continues to recruit addicts, many of whom are classified as “vulnerable,” meaning they are refugees or severely impoverished. With drug use come overdoses, HIV, and AIDS.³⁸⁷

Alternative Development

According to USAID, there is evidence that alternative development programs have played a role in reducing opium production. USAID manages alternative development programming for the United States. As of September 30, 2009, two such programs are operating; one for all northern, eastern, and western provinces, and one for the southwest. All alternative development programs aim to increase the number of legal employment opportunities and to promote the sale of legitimate produce in the region. However, USAID reported that adjustments are made for the specific economic and geographical conditions of each location.³⁸⁸ Table 3.16 details ongoing USAID programs for alternative development.

Public Information

The United States has supported counter-narcotics public information programming in Afghanistan since 2006. Figure 3.49 shows the development of these programs over time. According to the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), it is difficult to measure the effect that public

Poppy-free Provinces: provinces are declared “poppy-free” when less than 100 hectares of provincial land is being used to produce opium.

Source: UNODC, “Afghanistan Opium Survey: 2008,” 8/2008, p. 4.


TABLE 3.16

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES	
Activity	Description
Improving infrastructure programs	Provide construction and rehabilitation of irrigation and drainage systems and district roads
Cash-for-work programs	Work to address high unemployment rates
Farmer training and technology transfer	Provides farmers with access to improved technologies and farm management practices
Support for high-value crops	Encourages farmers to grow produce, including vegetables, fruits, nuts, tree crops, and wheat
Distribution of inputs	Provides farmers with improved seeds and fertilizer
Fruit and forestry tree distribution	Provides farmers with access to new fruit and forestry trees, planting, nursery development, and orchard services
Animal health and veterinary services	Promotes healthy animals through livestock and poultry programs

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.

FIGURE 3.49

COUNTER-NARCOTICS PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES, 2006–2010



Source: INL, response to SIGAR data call, 10/5/2009.

information programming has on counter-narcotics efforts because it is impossible to know how much poppy was not planted owing to these efforts. However, UNODC statistics indicate that the reasons that nearly 55% of farmers cited for not growing poppy included one of the INL-funded public information message themes:³⁸⁹

- respect for the government ban on poppy cultivation (33% of responders)
- Islamic prohibitions against poppy cultivation (16% of responders)
- shura or elders' decision-making processes
- the danger of opiates to humans

Between July 1 and September 30, 2009, public information campaigns were planned and approved for 25 Afghan provinces. These were “pre-planting” campaigns, designed to reduce public support for poppy cultivation.³⁹⁰

The Message Multipliers program, another public information initiative, is ongoing. It provides Afghan community leaders with counter-narcotics messages and training on how to convey the messages.³⁹¹

Poppy-Free Provinces

UNODC reports that 20 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces are now poppy-free. Three others (Badakhshan, Herat, and Nimroz) are expected to become poppy-free in the next farming season.³⁹²

Poppy-free and low-poppy-producing provinces still receive counter-narcotics programming. INL reported that in these provinces, public information campaigns work to sustain low poppy production and shape public opinion against the narcotics trade. Counter-Narcotics Advisory Teams, supported by INL, work closely with the Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics to support provincial initiatives.³⁹³

Demand-reduction activities also continue in these provinces. Treatment clinics for addicts operate in several poppy-free provinces; addiction remains a national problem.³⁹⁴

WOMEN OF AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is one of the most dangerous places in the world for women, according to the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). Afghan women have limited access to property, education, and information, especially in the more rural provinces.³⁹⁵ Some basic statistics:

- Over 87% of married women in the country are victims of domestic abuse.³⁹⁶
- Only 18% of women over age 15 are literate (compared with 50% of adult men).³⁹⁷
- Only 10% of women in rural areas are literate (higher than rural men: 7%).³⁹⁸
- Approximately 13% of Afghan women are widows; 94% of widows are illiterate.³⁹⁹


EQUALITY UNDER THE LAW

The Constitution of Afghanistan prohibits discrimination and privilege for any group of Afghan citizens. Article 22 of the Constitution states that men and women “have equal rights and duties before the law.” However, the rights afforded to women in theory do not always translate into practice.⁴⁰⁰

Shia Personal Status Law

The Shia Personal Status Law (2009) is an example of the life lived by Shia women in Afghanistan. Shia people make up approximately 15% of the Afghan population.⁴⁰¹ According to USAID, the law requires that women gain permission from their husbands to work and enables rapists to avoid prosecution if they pay “blood money” to women who are injured in the act of rape.⁴⁰²

The Shia Personal Status Law also regulates marriage, divorce, remarriage (in the event of spousal death), inheritance, rights of movement, sexual relations within marriage, and bankruptcy. According to USAID, some human rights groups believe that the law directly contradicts elements of the Constitution, specifically Article 22. The first draft of the law was signed by the President of Afghanistan in March 2009; USAID reported that although the current draft has been revised, the restrictions on women remain intact.⁴⁰³



National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan

Approved by the Council of Ministers in April 2009, the National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA) is a 10-year policy framework for the GIRoA. According to USAID, NAPWA is expected to support continuity and consistency in GIRoA action to protect women’s citizenship rights.⁴⁰⁴

NAPWA is being implemented by all ministries through the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA), the lead institution for women’s advocacy in Afghanistan.⁴⁰⁵ Partnering with government ministries and international organizations, the MoWA advocates that government policies, budgets, and services include consideration of their effects on both men and women. The MoWA has been implementing NAPWA by signing agreements with ministries and international organizations to support gender equality programs.⁴⁰⁶ Table 3.17 lists some of the agreements signed with the MoWA in 2009.

TABLE 3.17

NAPWA AGREEMENTS, 2009	
MoWA Partner	Goal
Afghanistan Civil Service Commission	Promote women’s participation in government and political positions
Ministry of Haj and Religious Affairs	Raise gender equality awareness nationwide and conduct public information campaigns
UNIFEM and the Afghan Women’s Network	Strengthen civil society institutions in implementing NAPWA
Afghan Ministry of Education	Increase enrollment rate of girls and adult women in schools and universities

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2009.



At a Kabul home, a woman makes rugs and embroiders table cloths to sell at the market. (SIGAR photo)

FREEDOMS BY GEOGRAPHY

Opportunities for women vary greatly depending on where they live. According to the MoWA, the more secure the province, the more women are found in the public sphere. In safer provinces, USAID reported that more girls attend school and more women have access to health care.⁴⁰⁷ Major cities tend to be more secure; women living in urban areas (including Kabul, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif) have greater opportunities to participate in public life. Basic freedoms and rights have improved in these areas in the past few years, according to USAID.⁴⁰⁸

Women in more remote provinces (such as Helmand, Paktika, Zabul, Uruzgan, and Khowst) are less likely to have access to the same rights and freedoms seen in urban areas. As reported by USAID, the lives of rural women tend to be governed by traditional roles and responsibilities, rather than the dictates of the Constitution. For example, although women in rural areas may help with agricultural labor or work in the home, the traditional perception that the man supports his family means that women's labors must be defined as "household duties," which do not need to be compensated. Women in rural areas are also more likely to be at risk for a forced marriage or an early marriage. Greater restrictions

on women's personal lives are also more common in remote regions.⁴⁰⁹

Table 3.18 provides examples of U.S. efforts to promote women's equality.

TABLE 3.18

USAID SUPPORT FOR WOMEN OF AFGHANISTAN


Activity or Program	Potential Impact
USAID has supported Afghan women and girls with at least \$445 million in U.S. funding, as of July 2009.	This funding has the potential to make a national impact on the lives of Afghan women and girls.
"Learning for Life" classes provide women with information about literacy, numeracy, and good health and hygiene practices.	More than 8,000 women have participated in "Learning for Life" classes.
USAID provides training for female journalists, supporting the independent media network in Afghanistan.	Since 2002, over 500 female journalists have received training from USAID.
According to USAID, the Afghan Midwives Association "works with the GfRoA to promote the skills of midwives and to ensure that midwives are part of the policy development process."	Over 1,000 Afghan women are members of the Afghan Midwives Association.

Source: USAID, "Afghanistan: Cross-Cutting," <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Program.33.aspx>, accessed 10/23/2009; SIGAR Audits Directorate, response to questions, 10/23/2009; Data sourced to USAID; USAID, "Minister Fatimi Opens Afghan Midwives Association Annual Congress," 5/4/2008.

Educating the Next Generation

Two Afghan boys show off their new school supplies at the Nawa schoolhouse in Helmand. U.S. Marines distribute the school supplies as a part of the counterinsurgency operations in partnership with Afghan security forces in southern Afghanistan. (U.S. Marine Corps photo, LCpl Jeremy Harris)

4 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT



OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

Each quarter, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) requests updates from other government agencies on the number of oversight activities completed and the number of ongoing oversight activities currently being performed. The following agencies are currently performing oversight activities in Afghanistan and providing results to SIGAR:

- Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG)
- Department of State Office of Inspector General (DoS OIG)
- Government Accountability Office (GAO)
- U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG)
- U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA)

COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Table 4.1 lists the eight reconstruction or security-related oversight projects that were completed this quarter.

TABLE 4.1

RECENTLY COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U.S. AGENCIES			
Agency	Project Number	Date Issued	Project Title
DoD OIG	D-2009-113	9/30/2009	Medical Equipment Used to Support Operations in Southwest Asia
DoD OIG	D-2009-100	9/30/2009	Afghanistan Security Forces Fund Phase III-Accountability for Equipment Purchased for the Afghanistan National Police
DoD OIG	D-2009-109	9/25/2009	Contracts Supporting DoD Counter-Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office
DoD OIG	D-2009-099	8/12/2009	Afghanistan Security Forces Fund Phase III-Accountability for the Equipment Purchased for the Afghanistan National Army
DoS OIG-MERO	09-MERO-3006	8/31/2009	Diplomatic Security (DS) Management of WPPS - Afghanistan
DoS OIG-MERO	09-MERO-3005	8/31/2009	Personal Security Detail (WPPS) Contracts - Afghanistan
GAO	GAO-09-1015T	9/9/2009	Afghanistan and Pakistan: Oversight of U.S. Interagency Efforts
GAO	GAO-10-01	10/1/2009	Contingency Contracting: DoD, State, and USAID Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan

Note: MERO = Middle East Regional Office.

Source: DoD OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 9/3/2009; DoS OIG-MERO, response to SIGAR data call, 9/3/2009; GAO, response to SIGAR data call, 9/3/2009; USAAA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/3/2009; USAID OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 9/3/2009.

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

ONGOING OVERSIGHT

As of September 30, agencies had 28 oversight activities in progress. These activities are listed by agency, and the descriptions appear as they were submitted to SIGAR, with these mechanical changes for consistency with the preceding sections of this report: acronyms and abbreviations in place of repeated full names;

TABLE 4.2

ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U.S. AGENCIES			
Agency	Project Number	Date Initiated	Project Title
DoD OIG	D2009-D000LC-0237.000	6/11/2009	Air Cargo Transportation Contracts in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom
DoD OIG	D2009-D000JB-0230.000	6/5/2009	Inter-agency Audit on DoD Obligations and Expenditures of Funds Provided to DoS for the Training and Mentoring of the Afghan National Police
DoD OIG	D2009-D000AE-0102.000	12/9/2008	DoD Countermine and Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Systems Contracts
DoD OIG	D2007-D000FD-0198.001	10/10/2008	Reannouncement of the Audit of Funds Appropriated for Afghanistan and Iraq Processed Through the Foreign Military Sales Trust Fund
DoS OIG-MERO	09-MERO-3004	April 2009	Effectiveness of Counter-Narcotics Programs in Afghanistan
DoS OIG-MERO	09-MERO-3009	June 2009	Afghanistan National Police Training and Mentoring Program (Joint with DoD OIG)
GAO	351399	9/17/2009	DoD's Oversight of Operational Contract Support in Afghanistan
GAO	320712	9/2/2009	U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan National Army (ANA) Forces
GAO	351395	8/21/2009	Supply and Equipment Support for U.S. Military Operations In Afghanistan
GAO	351393	8/21/2009	DoD Health Care Requirements for Contingency Operations
GAO	320709	8/17/2009	Afghanistan's Security Environment
GAO	351385	8/11/2009	Combat Skills Training for Support Units
GAO	351376	7/30/2009	Readiness of Air Force Combat and Expeditionary Combat Support Forces
GAO	351387	7/30/2009	Army and Marine Corps Training Capacity
GAO	351388	7/26/2009	Availability of Trained and Ready Forces to Support Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
GAO	320680	5/8/2009	Potable Water, Sanitation, and Crop Irrigation Projects in Afghanistan
GAO	320662	3/16/2009	USAID's Alternative Development and Agriculture Projects in Afghanistan
GAO	320657	1/29/2009	U.S. Counter-narcotics Activities in Afghanistan
GAO	120790	11/25/2008	Afghanistan and Iraq Contracting
USAAA	A-2008-ALL-0531.000	7/26/2009	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) - Afghanistan
USAAA	A-2009-ALL-0106.000	2/2/2009	Contracting Operations at the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan—Kabul and Jalalabad (Afghanistan)
USAAA	A-2008-ALL-0401.000	9/1/2008	Contracting Operations at the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan—Kandahar and Salerno (Afghanistan)
USAAA	A-2008-ALL-0320.000	1/28/2008	Contracting Operations at the Joint Contracting Command—Iraq/Afghanistan (Bagram)
USAID OIG	Not provided	Not provided	Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Oversight of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan
USAID OIG	Not provided	Not provided	Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's School and Health Clinic Buildings Completed Under the Schools and Clinics Construction and Refurbishment (SACCARP) Program
USAID OIG	Not provided	Not provided	Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Afghan Civilian Assistance Program
USAID OIG	Not provided	Not provided	Audit of Selected Power Sector Activities Funded Under USAID/Afghanistan's Infrastructure and Rehabilitation Program
USAID OIG	Not provided	Not provided	Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Building Education Support Systems for Teachers Project

Source: DoD OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 9/3/2009; DoS OIG-MERO, response to SIGAR data call, 9/3/2009; GAO, response to SIGAR data call, 9/3/2009; USAAA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/3/2009; USAID OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 9/3/2009.

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

standardized capitalization, hyphenation, and preferred spellings; and third-person instead of first-person construction.

Table 4.2 lists the ongoing reconstruction or security-related oversight activities being performed by other government agencies as of September 30, 2009.

Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

In May 2009, the DoD OIG, on behalf of the member DoD and Federal oversight agencies, issued an update to the statutorily required Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Southwest Asia, including the additional FY 2009 statutorily required oversight.

The Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Southwest Asia includes the individual oversight plans of the Inspectors General for the DoD, DoS, and USAID; the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction; and the SIGAR. It also includes the oversight work of the Army Audit Agency, Naval Audit Service, Air Force Audit Agency, and Defense Contract Audit Agency because of the major contributions they make to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of support to the military. The comprehensive plan was expanded beyond the statutorily mandates to include other functional areas that DoD OIG believes are germane to supporting operations in Southwest Asia, including Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), such as contract administration and management, reset of equipment, financial management, and reconstruction support effort. In addition, the update issued in May 2009 includes the Commander, U.S. Central Command's request for DoD OIG and the Service Audit Agencies to review asset accountability within Southwest Asia. DoD OIG is in the process of updating the Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Southwest Asia.

The DoD OIG-led Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group coordinates and de-conflicts Federal and DoD OCO-related oversight activities. The Group held its tenth meeting in August 2009. Several representatives from the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan attended and discussed the oversight efforts and some of the issues and concerns that they identified through their initial work. The representatives from the DoD Inspector General, the SIGAR, and Army Audit Agency agreed to coordinate their oversight efforts related to the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Afghanistan to better maximize use of oversight resources and to lessen the burden for support from the coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The DoD OIG expanded its Southwest Asia presence, deploying additional auditors and investigators to Iraq and Afghanistan. The additional staff support the increased oversight workload required by statutory requirements, Congressional requests, senior DoD and military officials requests, and as DoD OIG determines based on high-risks and challenges in the operations. DoD OIG field offices in Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan enhance the office's ability to provide audit, inspection, and investigative support to DoD operations in support to OCO.

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

For the quarter ending September 30, 2009, the DoD OIG had 49 ongoing oversight activities, and issued 13 reports that support Operation Enduring Freedom. Of those 49 ongoing projects, four directly relate to reconstruction or security operations in Afghanistan and are incorporated in this quarterly report. Of the 13 issued reports, four directly relate to reconstruction or security operations in Afghanistan and are incorporated in this quarterly report.

Overall, during FY 2009, the DoD OIG completed and ongoing OEF-related oversight activities addressed the following areas:

- the use and accountability of Afghanistan Security Forces Funds (ASFF)
- adequacy of building materials
- accountability of property
- contract administration
- contractor common access cards
- armoring capabilities
- management of fuels
- procurement and use of non-tactical vehicles
- disposal of IT equipment
- and transportation of goods and material

In response to a request from the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD OIG initiated an audit addressing the construction of the New Kabul Compound Facilities for U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A). Additionally, in response to a congressional request, DoD OIG has initiated a joint audit with the DoS OIG, to review the status of ASFF money that DoD has provided to DoS for the training of the Afghan National Police (ANP).

OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Air Cargo Transportation Contracts in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom

(PROJECT NO. D2009-D000LC-0237.000, INITIATED JUNE 11, 2009)

The DoD OIG is determining whether air cargo transportation contracts in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and OEF are administered in accordance with applicable Federal and DoD regulations. Specifically, the DoD OIG will determine whether the decision to use air transportation was justified, whether delivery orders were awarded in accordance with vendor selection criteria, and whether the cargo transported by air was delivered within required time frames.

Inter-agency Audit on DoD Obligations and Expenditures of Funds Provided to DoS for the Training and Mentoring of the Afghan National Police

(PROJECT NO. D2009-D000JB-0230.000, INITIATED JUNE 5, 2009)

The Inspectors General of DoD and DoS are performing this joint audit in response to a congressional request. The objective is to review the status of ASFF

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

money that DoD has provided to DoS for the training of the ANP. Specifically, the DoD OIG will review the contract, appropriate task orders, statements of work, and any contract or task order modifications for training and mentoring to ensure they comply with all relevant Federal regulations and meet the needs of DoD. Further, the DoD OIG will review contractor invoices to ensure that claimed costs are allowable, allocable, and reasonable for the services received. The DoS OIG will be assisting DoD OIG on this audit and will be assessing the staffing, training, contract management, and contract effectiveness of the civilian police trainers.

DoD Countermine and Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Systems Contracts

(PROJECT NO. D2009-D000AE-0102.000, INITIATED DECEMBER 9, 2008)

The DoD OIG is determining whether DoD procurement efforts for countermine and improvised explosive device defeat systems for use in Iraq and Afghanistan were developed, awarded, and managed in accordance with Federal and Defense acquisition regulations.

Reannouncement of the Audit of Funds Appropriated for Afghanistan and Iraq Processed Through the Foreign Military Sales Trust Fund

(PROJECT NO D2007-D000FD-0198.001, INITIATED OCTOBER 10, 2008)

Based on observations during audit fieldwork under the originally announced project (D2007-D000FD-0198.000), the DoD OIG determined an additional project was required to separately discuss relevant issues identified during fieldwork. Accordingly, the DoD OIG addressed the transfer of funds to the FMS Trust Fund and the collection of administrative fees from these funds in Report No. D-2009-063. Under the second announced project (D2007-D000FD-0198.001), the DoD OIG is determining whether the funds appropriated for the security, reconstruction, and assistance of Afghanistan and Iraq and processed through the Foreign Military Sales Trust Fund are being properly managed. However, the DoD OIG has reduced the sub-objectives to determining whether the appropriated funds transferred into the Foreign Military Sales Trust Fund are properly accounted for, used for the intended purpose, and properly reported in DoD financial reports.

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

Department of State Office of Inspector General– Middle East Regional Office

OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Effectiveness of Counter-Narcotics Programs in Afghanistan

(PROJECT NO. 09-MERO-3004, INITIATED APRIL 2009)

Objective: To assess U.S. efforts to plan and manage counter-narcotics activities in Afghanistan, including an analysis of (1) U.S. obligations and expenditures, (2) results of assistance projects, (3) assistance coordination mechanisms and strategy, and (4) major obstacles that affect the achievement of U.S. goals.

Afghanistan National Police Training and Mentoring Program (Joint w/DODIG)

(PROJECT NO. 09-MERO-3009, INITIATED JUNE 2009)

Objective: To provide an overall review and summary of the requirements, provisions, and costs of the ANP Training and Mentoring Program contract; objectives of the contracts and task orders; what indicators have been established to measure performance; and how DoS administered the contract to oversee DynCorp's performance and costs of the contract. The work will also assess the status of contract records, management controls, costs, and value of this contract to the mission of DoS and DoD.

Government Accountability Office

During the last quarter, GAO testified at a hearing concerning oversight of U.S. interagency efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The testimony included a discussion of key issues GAO identified in its April 2009 transition report to the Congress and the President (GAO-09-473SP), as well as details about past GAO work, findings, and recommendations; how GAO coordinates its efforts with other members of the accountability community; and the steps GAO takes to mitigate the challenges it faces in carrying out its oversight work in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In addition, GAO began 10 new Afghanistan-related engagements on a wide variety of topics:

- Afghanistan's changing security environment
- Developing a capable Afghan National Army (ANA)
- Availability of trained and ready forces to support military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
- Readiness of Air Force combat and expeditionary combat support capabilities
- DoD efforts to adjust training capacity to support ongoing operations
- Combat skills training for military support units
- Supply and equipment support for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan
- DoD health care requirements for contingency operations
- DoD's oversight of operational contract support in Afghanistan
- U.S. military burns of solid waste in open pits at some locations in Iraq and Afghanistan

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

DOD's Oversight of Operational Contract Support in Afghanistan

(PROJECT NO. 351399, INITIATED SEPTEMBER 17, 2009)

This review will focus on DoD's ability to provide sufficient numbers of trained oversight personnel, the challenges facing DoD in providing oversight, and the department's implementation of lessons learned from Iraq.

U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan National Army (ANA) Forces

(PROJECT NO. 320712, INITIATED SEPTEMBER 2, 2009)

This review will focus on what the U.S. goals for the ANA are; how much the U.S. has obligated and expended, as well as estimated costs to complete and sustain, the ANA; what progress the U.S. has made in developing ANA forces; and how other donors have assisted the ANA.

Supply and Equipment Support for U.S. Military Operations in Afghanistan

(PROJECT NO. 351395, INITIATED AUGUST 21, 2009)

This review will focus on identifying DoD organizations and processes for moving supplies and equipment to/within/from Afghanistan, challenges that may have affected distribution, and lessons learned from other operations.

DoD Health Care Requirements for Contingency Operations

(PROJECT NO. 351393, INITIATED AUGUST 21, 2009)

This review will focus on the extent to which DoD and the services identified wartime health care personnel requirements for current operations; what challenges they are encountering meeting those requirements; and to what extent they have the tools needed to meet those requirements.

Afghanistan's Security Environment

(PROJECT NO. 320709, INITIATED AUGUST 17, 2009)

This review will focus on changes in U.S. troop presence, the security situation as gauged by trends in enemy-initiated attacks, and challenges for U.S. reconstruction efforts posed by security conditions.

Combat Skills Training for Support Units

(PROJECT NO. 351385, INITIATED AUGUST 11, 2009)

This review will focus on how the services determine appropriate training for support forces, including the extent that this training is consistent with service and theater training requirements and reflects lessons learned from ongoing operations.

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

Readiness of Air Force Combat and Expeditionary Combat Support Forces

(PROJECT NO. 351376, INITIATED JULY 30, 2009)

This review will focus on the Air Force's ability to provide combat and expeditionary combat support forces to support ongoing operations, including in Afghanistan, and its plans to address gaps, including adjustments to force structure and manning authorizations.

Army and Marine Corps Training Capacity

(PROJECT NO. 351387, INITIATED JULY 30, 2009)

This review will focus on the extent to which DoD, the Army, and the Marine Corps have identified differences in ground force training requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan, and developed plans to adjust training capacities to meet requirements for changing force levels in Afghanistan in Iraq.

Availability of Trained and Ready Forces to Support Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan

(PROJECT NO. 351388, INITIATED JULY 26, 2009)

This review will focus on the extent to which DoD has identified requirements for supporting ongoing operations, developed an approach to manage deployment of forces to meet requirements, and DoD's ability to meet other commitments.

Potable Water, Sanitation, and Crop Irrigation Projects in Afghanistan

(PROJECT NO. 320680, INITIATED MAY 8, 2009)

This review will focus on U.S. efforts to assist with the development of the Afghan water sector and achieve the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) goal of supplying clean water, sanitation, and irrigation services in Afghanistan.

USAID's Alternative Development and Agriculture Projects in Afghanistan

(PROJECT NO. 320662, INITIATED MARCH 16, 2009)

This review will focus on USAID agriculture programs' funding, goals, results, monitoring, and evaluation efforts.

U.S. Counter-narcotics Activities in Afghanistan

(PROJECT NO. 320657, INITIATED JANUARY 29, 2009)

This review will focus on U.S. efforts to assist with interdiction, elimination, judicial reform, public information, and demand reduction counternarcotics efforts.

U.S. Army Audit Agency OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) - Afghanistan
(Project Code A-2009-ALL-0531.000, INITIATED JULY 26, 2009)

This audit will determine if the CERP in Afghanistan had adequate internal controls in place to ensure commanders and unit personnel implemented the program properly.

**Contracting Operations at the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan—
Kabul and Jalalabad (Afghanistan)**

(Project Code A-2009-ALL-0106.000, INITIATED FEBRUARY 2, 2009)
This audit is being performed in Afghanistan. It will determine if goods and services acquired under contract were properly justified, awarded, and administered.

**Contracting Operations at the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan—Kandahar
and Salerno (Afghanistan)**

(Project Code A-2008-ALL-0401.000, INITIATED SEPTEMBER 1, 2008)
This audit is being performed in Afghanistan. It will determine if goods and services acquired under contract were properly justified, awarded, and administered.

Contracting Operations at the Joint Contracting Command—Iraq/Afghanistan (Bagram)
(Project Code A-2008-ALL-0320.00, INITIATED JANUARY 28, 2008)

This audit is being performed in Afghanistan. It will determine if goods and services acquired under contract were properly justified, awarded, and administered.

U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General

OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Oversight of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan
Objective: Determine how much money has been spent by USAID/Afghanistan's implementing partners for private security services, and has there been effective oversight of these security costs. Determine if USAID/Afghanistan's oversight of private security firms contracted by the mission's implementing partners ensured that those private security contractors employed only responsible, armed personnel. Determine what types of serious security incidents have been reported by private security firms, contracted with USAID/Afghanistan's implementing partners, during the period from October 1, 2006, through June 30, 2009.

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's School and Health Clinic Buildings Completed Under the Schools and Clinics Construction and Refurbishment (SACCARP) Program

Objective: Determine whether the school and health clinic buildings completed under the program are being used for their intended purposes, and measure the impact of the program on the provision of educational and health services to the people of Afghanistan.

Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Afghan Civilian Assistance Program

Objective: Determine if USAID/Afghanistan's humanitarian assistance service, provided through the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program, is achieving its main goal.

Audit of Selected Power Sector Activities Funded Under USAID/Afghanistan's Infrastructure and Rehabilitation Program

Objective: Determine if USAID/Afghanistan's main goal for power sector activities, provided under the Afghanistan Infrastructure and Rehabilitation Program, is being achieved.

Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Building Education Support Systems for Teachers Project

Objective: Determine if USAID/Afghanistan's Building Education Support Systems for Teachers project is achieving its main goals.

OTHER AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS

SIGAR regularly coordinates with other government agencies conducting investigations in Afghanistan, in an effort to monitor the progress of those investigations. As of September 30, 2009, five open cases were being investigated by the Department of State Office of Inspector General Investigations (DoS-OIG-INV). Table 4.3 lists the number of open and closed investigations as of September 30, 2009.

TABLE 4.3

INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES: OTHER AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS			
Agency	Open Cases	Closed Cases	Total Cases
DoS-OIG-INV	5	0	5
Total	5	0	5

Source: DoS-OIG-INV, response to SIGAR data call, 9/3/09.

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

OTHER AGENCY INSPECTIONS

COMPLETED INSPECTIONS

Table 4.4 lists inspections completed as of September 30, 2009. One inspection was completed by the Department of State Office of Inspector General Inspections (DoS OIG-ISP) during the last quarter.

ONGOING INSPECTIONS

SIGAR also coordinates with other agencies that are conducting inspections in Afghanistan. During the past quarter, DoS OIG-ISP initiated one new inspection, listed in Table 4.5.

TABLE 4.4

COMPLETED INSPECTION ACTIVITIES: OTHER AGENCY INSPECTIONS				
Agency	Project Number	Date Initiated	Project Title	Objective
DoS OIG-ISP	09-ISP-3059	April 2009	Review of Radio Deewa	To review and determine whether policy and program goals of Radio Deewa are being effectively achieved and to provide analysis and recommendations for systemic improvements in policy implementation and program management.

Source: DoS-OIG-ISP, response to SIGAR data call, 9/3/2009.

TABLE 4.5

ONGOING INSPECTION ACTIVITIES: OTHER AGENCY INSPECTIONS				
Agency	Project Number	Date Initiated	Project Title	Objective
DoS OIG-ISP	09-ISP-3051	April 2009	De-mining Programs in Afghanistan	To evaluate the implementation and effectiveness of de-mining programs in Afghanistan.

Source: DoS-OIG-ISP, response to SIGAR data call, 9/3/2009.

The Official Seal of the SIGAR

The Official Seal of the SIGAR represents the coordination of efforts between the United States and Afghanistan to provide accountability and oversight in reconstruction activities. The phrase along the top side of the seal's center is in Dari and, translated into English, means "SIGAR." The phrase along the bottom side of the seal's center is in Pashtu and as translated into English, has the same meaning.

APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES



APPENDIX A CROSS-REFERENCE OF REPORT TO STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

This appendix cross-references the pages of this report to the quarterly reporting and related requirements under SIGAR’s enabling legislation, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. No. 110-181, § 1229 (Table A.1), and to the reporting requirements prescribed for semiannual reporting by inspectors general, generally under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. 3) (Table A.2).

TABLE A.1

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER P.L. NO. 110-181, § 1229			
Public Law Section	SIGAR Enabling Language	SIGAR Action	Section
Supervision			
Section 1229(e)(1)	The Inspector General shall report directly to, and be under the general supervision of, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense	Report to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense	All sections
Duties			
Section 1229(f)(1)	OVERSIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION.— It shall be the duty of the Inspector General to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of the treatment, handling, and expenditure of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and of the programs, operations, and contracts carried out utilizing such funds, including—	Review appropriated/ available funds Review programs, operations, contracts using appropriated/ available funds	All sections
Section 1229(f)(1)(A)	The oversight and accounting of the obligation and expenditure of such funds	Review obligations and expenditures of appropriated/ available funds	Section 2.0 – SIGAR Oversight Section 3.1 – Funding
Section 1229(f)(1)(B)	The monitoring and review of reconstruction activities funded by such funds	Review reconstruction activities funded by appropriations and donations	Section 2.0 – SIGAR Oversight
Section 1229(f)(1)(C)	The monitoring and review of contracts funded by such funds	Review contracts using appropriated and available funds	Note 1

APPENDICES

TABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER P.L. NO. 110-181, § 1229			
Public Law Section	SIGAR Enabling Language	SIGAR Action	Section
Section 1229(f)(1)(D)	The monitoring and review of the transfer of such funds and associated information between and among departments, agencies, and entities of the United States, and private and nongovernmental entities	Review internal and external transfers of appropriated/available funds	Appendix B
Section 1229(f)(1)(E)	The maintenance of records on the use of such funds to facilitate future audits and investigations of the use of such fund[s]	Maintain audit records	Section 2.0 - SIGAR Oversight Appendix C Appendix D
Section 1229(f)(1)(F)	The monitoring and review of the effectiveness of United States coordination with the Governments of Afghanistan and other donor countries in the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy	Monitoring and review as described	Section 2.1 - Audits
Section 1229(f)(1)(G)	The investigation of overpayments. . .and any potential unethical or illegal actions of Federal employees, contractors, or affiliated entities, and the referral of such reports, as necessary, to the Department of Justice. . .	Conduct and reporting of investigations as described	Section 2.4 - Investigations
Section 1229(f)(2)	OTHER DUTIES RELATED TO OVERSIGHT.— The Inspector General shall establish, maintain, and oversee such systems, procedures, and controls as the Inspector General considers appropriate to discharge the duties under paragraph (1)	Establish, maintain, and oversee systems, procedures, and controls	All sections
Section 1229(f)(3)	DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978.— In addition, . . .the Inspector General shall also have the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978	Duties as specified in Inspector General Act	All sections
Section 1229(f)(4)	COORDINATION OF EFFORTS.— The Inspector General shall coordinate with, and receive the cooperation of, each of the following: (A) the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, (B) the Inspector General of the Department of State, and (C) the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development	Coordination with the inspectors general of DoD, DoS, and USAID	Section 4.0 - Other Agency Oversight

APPENDICES

TABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER P.L. NO. 110-181, § 1229			
Public Law Section	SIGAR Enabling Language	SIGAR Action	Section
Federal Support and Other Resources			
Section 1229(h)(5)(A)	ASSISTANCE FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES.— Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance from any department, agency, or other entity of the Federal Government, the head of such entity shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing law, furnish such information or assistance to the Inspector General, or an authorized designee	Expect support as requested	All sections
Reports			
Section 1229(i)(1)	QUARTERLY REPORTS.— Not later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal-year quarter, the Inspector General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report summarizing, for the period of that quarter and, to the extent possible, the period from the end of such quarter to the time of the submission of the report, the activities during such period of the Inspector General and the activities under programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Each report shall include, for the period covered by such report, a detailed statement of all obligations, expenditures, and revenues associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Afghanistan, including the following –	Report – 30 days after the end of each calendar quarter Summarize activities of the inspector general Detailed statement of all obligations, expenditures, and revenues	All sections Appendix B
Section 1229(i)(1)(A)	Obligations and expenditures of appropriated/donated funds	Obligations and expenditures of appropriated/donated funds	Appendix B
Section 1229(i)(1)(B)	A project-by-project and program-by-program accounting of the costs incurred to date for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, together with the estimate of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development, as applicable, of the costs to complete each project and each program	Project-by-project and program-by-program accounting of costs. List unexpended funds for each project or program	Section 3.1 – Funding Note 1
Section 1229(i)(1)(C)	Revenues attributable to or consisting of funds provided by foreign nations or international organizations to programs and projects funded by any department or agency of the United States Government, and any obligations or expenditures of such revenues	Revenues, obligations, and expenditures of donor funds	Section 3.1 – Funding

APPENDICES

TABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER P.L. NO. 110-181, § 1229			
Public Law Section	SIGAR Enabling Language	SIGAR Action	Section
Section 1229(i)(1)(D)	Revenues attributable to or consisting of foreign assets seized or frozen that contribute to programs and projects funded by any U.S. government department or agency, and any obligations or expenditures of such revenues	Revenues, obligations, and expenditures of funds from seized or frozen assets	Section 3.1 - Funding
Section 1229(i)(1)(E)	Operating expenses of agencies or entities receiving amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan	Operating expenses of agencies or any organization receiving appropriated funds	Section 3.1 - Funding Appendix B
Section 1229(i)(1)(F)	In the case of any contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism described in paragraph (2)* – (i) The amount of the contract or other funding mechanism; (ii) A brief discussion of the scope of the contract or other funding mechanism; (iii) A discussion of how the department or agency of the United States Government involved in the contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism identified and solicited offers from potential contractors to perform the contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism, together with a list of the potential individuals or entities that were issued solicitations for the offers; and (iv) The justification and approval documents on which was based the determination to use procedures other than procedures that provide for full and open competition	Describe contract details	Note 1
Section 1229(i)(3)	PUBLIC AVAILABILITY. — The Inspector General shall publish on a publically-available Internet website each report under paragraph (1) of this subsection in English and other languages that the Inspector General determines are widely used and understood in Afghanistan	Publish report as directed	www.sigar.mil Dari and Pashtu in process
Section 1229(i)(4)	FORM. —Each report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if the Inspector General considers it necessary	Publish report as directed	All sections

APPENDICES

The table below lists the reporting requirements prescribed for semiannual reporting by inspectors general, generally under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. 3) (Table A.2).

TABLE A.2

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SEMIANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE IG ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED (5 U.S.C. APP.3)			
Public Law Section	SIGAR Enabling Language	SIGAR Action	Section
Section 5(a)(1)	“Description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies...”	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports List problems, abuses, and deficiencies from SIGAR audit reports, investigations, and inspections	Section 4.0 – Other Agency Oversight See letters of Inquiry at www.sigar.mil
Section 5(a)(2)	“Description of recommendations for corrective action...with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies...”	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports List recommendations from SIGAR audit reports	Section 4.0 – Other Agency Oversight See letters of Inquiry at www.sigar.mil
Section 5(a)(3)	“Identification of each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports on which corrective action has not been completed...”	List all instances of incomplete corrective action from previous semiannual reports	In process
Section 5(a)(4)	“A summary of matters referred to prosecutive authorities and the prosecutions and convictions which have resulted...”	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports List SIGAR Investigations that have been referred	Section 4.0 – Other Agency Oversight
Section 5(a)(5)	“A summary of each report made to the [Secretary of Defense] under section 6(b)(2)...” (instances where information requested was refused or not provided)	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports List instances in which information was refused SIGAR auditors, investigators, or inspectors	Section 4.0 – Other Agency Oversight
Section 5(a)(6)	“A listing, subdivided according to subject matter, of each audit report, inspection report and evaluation report issued...” showing dollar value of questioned costs and recommendations that funds be put to better use	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports List SIGAR reports	Section 4.0 – Other Agency Oversight
Section 5(a)(7)	“A summary of each particularly significant report...”	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports Provide a synopsis of the significant SIGAR reports	Section 4.0 – Other Agency Oversight A full list of significant reports can be found at www.sigar.mil

APPENDICES

TABLE A.2 (CONTINUED)

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SEMIANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE IG ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED (5 U.S.C. APP.3)			
Public Law Section	SIGAR Enabling Language	SIGAR Action	Section
Section 5(a)(8)	"Statistical tables showing the total number of audit reports and the total dollar value of questioned costs..."	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports	See reports of SWA/JPG members
		Develop statistical tables showing dollar value of questioned cost from SIGAR reports	In Process
Section 5(a)(9)	"Statistical tables showing the total number of audit reports, inspection reports, and evaluation reports and the dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use by management..."	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports	See reports of SWA/JPG members
		Develop statistical tables showing dollar value of funds put to better use by management from SIGAR reports	In Process
Section 5(a)(10)	"A summary of each audit report, inspection report, and evaluation report issued before the commencement of the reporting period for which no management decision has been made by the end of reporting period, an explanation of the reasons such management decision has not been made, and a statement concerning the desired timetable for achieving a management decision..."	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports	See reports of SWA/JPG members
		Provide a synopsis of SIGAR audit reports in which recommendations by SIGAR are still open	None
Section 5(a)(11)	"A description and explanation of the reasons for any significant revised management decision..."	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports	See reports of SWA/JPG members
		Explain SIGAR audit reports in which significant revisions have been made to management decisions	None
Section 5(a)(12)	"Information concerning any significant management decision with which the Inspector General is in disagreement..."	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports	See reports of SWA/JPG members
		Explain SIGAR audit reports in which SIGAR disagreed with management decision	No disputed decisions during the reporting period
Section 5(a)(13)	"Information described under Section 804 [sic] of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996..." (instances and reasons when an agency has not met target dates established in a remediation plan)	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports	See reports of SWA/JPG members
		Provide information where management has not met targets from a remediation plan	No disputed decisions during the reporting period

Note 1: This information is not included in this quarterly report. The list of contracts is available at www.sigar.mil.

* Covered "contracts, grants, agreements, and funding mechanisms" are defined in paragraph (2) of Section 1229(i) of P.L. No. 110-181 as being—
 "any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism that is entered into by any department or agency of the United States Government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan with any public or private sector entity for any of the following purposes:
 To build or rebuild physical infrastructure of Afghanistan.
 To establish or reestablish a political or societal institution of Afghanistan.
 To provide products or services to the people of Afghanistan."

APPENDICES

APPENDIX B U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATED FUNDS (\$ MILLIONS)

Table B.1 lists appropriated funds by program, per year, for Afghanistan reconstruction efforts.

U.S. FUNDING SOURCES	AGENCY	TOTAL
SECURITY		
Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)	DoD	18,666.47
Train & Equip (DoD)	DoD	440.00
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	DoS	1,058.51
International Military Education and Training (IMET)	DoS	6.85
NDA Section 1207 Transfer	Other	9.90
Total: Security		20,181.73
GOVERNANCE & DEVELOPMENT		
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)	DoD	1,639.00
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	USAID	7,703.84
Development Assistance (DA)	USAID	891.78
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA)	DoD	550.00
Child Survival & Health (CSH + GHAI)	USAID	392.12
Commodity Credit Corp (CCC)	USAID	25.87
Freedom Support Act (FSA)	USAID	5.00
USAID (other)	USAID	30.64
Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, & Related (NADR)	DoS	309.06
Provincial Reconstruction Team Advisors	USDA	5.70
Treasury Technical Assistance	DoT	5.71
Total: Governance & Development		11,558.72
COUNTER-NARCOTICS		
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	DoS	2,032.34
Drug Interdiction & Counter-Drug Activities, (DoD CN)	DoD	1,114.02
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)	DoJ	127.37
Total: Counter-Narcotics		3,273.73
HUMANITARIAN		
PL 480 Title II	USAID	673.81
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	USAID	343.54
Transition Initiatives (TI)	USAID	34.03
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	DoS	502.23
Voluntary Peacekeeping (PKO)	DoS	69.34
Emergency Refugee & Migration Assistance (ERMA)	DoS	25.20
Food for Progress	USDA	109.49
416(b) Food Aid	USDA	95.18
Food for Education	USDA	50.49
Emerson Trust	USDA	21.60
Total: Humanitarian		1,924.90
OVERSIGHT AND OPERATIONS		
Oversight		42.64
Other		2,343.35
Total: Oversight and Operations		2,385.99
TOTAL FUNDING		39,325.07

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Data may include inter-agency transfers. Funding is based on agency-reported data for monies made available for Afghanistan reconstruction. If an agency did not report monies made available, funding is based on agency-reported obligation or expenditure data. If an agency did not report obligation or expenditure data, funding is based on OMB allocations.

Sources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/1/2009, 10/14/2009, and 10/15/2009; DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2009; DoS/INL, response to SIGAR data call, 10/16/2009; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009; OMB, responses to SIGAR data call, 4/2009 and 7/16/2009; USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/2009; DoJ/DEA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2009.

APPENDICES

	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009
	0.00	0.00	0.00	995.00	1,908.13	7,406.40	2,750.00	5,606.94
	0.00	0.00	150.00	290.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	57.00	191.00	413.71	396.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.18	0.33	0.60	0.80	0.79	1.14	1.62	1.40
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	9.90	0.00
	57.18	191.33	564.31	1,682.60	1,908.93	7,407.54	2,761.52	5,608.34
	0.00	0.00	40.00	136.00	215.00	209.00	488.33	550.67
	117.51	239.29	894.82	1,280.29	473.40	1,210.71	1,399.51	2,088.32
	18.30	42.54	153.14	169.58	191.58	166.81	149.43	0.40
	0.00	165.00	135.00	250.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	7.52	49.68	33.40	38.00	41.45	100.77	63.07	58.23
	7.30	1.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	13.02	4.22
	0.00	0.00	5.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.00	0.50	5.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	22.32	2.81
	44.00	34.70	63.77	36.62	18.22	36.58	26.63	48.55
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.70
	0.70	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.62	1.39	0.00	0.00
	195.33	534.04	1,331.13	1,911.49	940.26	1,725.26	2,162.31	2,758.90
	60.00	0.00	220.00	709.28	232.65	251.74	320.67	238.00
	0.00	0.00	71.80	224.54	108.05	290.97	189.62	229.04
	0.58	2.87	3.72	16.77	23.66	20.38	40.59	18.80
	60.58	2.87	295.52	950.59	364.36	563.09	550.88	485.84
	159.50	46.10	49.20	56.60	60.00	60.00	177.00	65.41
	197.09	86.67	11.16	4.24	0.04	0.03	17.02	27.29
	8.65	11.69	11.22	1.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.87
	135.77	63.00	67.10	47.10	41.80	54.00	43.46	50.00
	23.94	9.90	20.00	15.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	25.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20
	0.00	4.96	9.08	30.10	23.24	9.47	20.55	12.09
	46.46	14.14	34.58	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.00	9.27	6.12	10.02	25.08	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	21.60	0.00
	596.41	245.72	208.46	165.16	150.16	123.50	279.63	155.86
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.49	14.30	25.85
	155.05	32.83	203.51	130.25	131.90	207.71	434.45	1,047.64
	155.05	32.83	203.51	130.25	131.90	210.20	448.75	1,073.49
	1,064.55	1,006.79	2,602.93	4,840.08	3,495.61	10,029.59	6,203.08	10,082.44

APPENDIX C SIGAR AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS

Completed Audits

SIGAR issued five audit reports as of October 30, 2009, as listed in Table C.1.

TABLE C.1

SIGAR COMPLETED AUDITS, AS OF OCTOBER 30, 2009			
Agency	Report Identifier	Date Issued	Report Title
SIGAR	SIGAR Audit-10-01	10/27/2009	Barriers to Greater Participation by Women in Afghan Elections
SIGAR	SIGAR Audit-09-07	9/30/2009	Documenting Detention Procedures Will Help Ensure Counter-Narcotics Justice Center is Utilized as Intended
SIGAR	SIGAR Audit-09-06	9/22/2009	Strategy and Resources Needed To Sustain Afghan Electoral Capacity
SIGAR	SIGAR Audit-09-05	9/9/2009	Increased Visibility, Monitoring, and Planning Needed for Commander's Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan
SIGAR	SIGAR Audit-09-04	8/27/2008	Actions Needed To Resolve Construction Delays at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center

Ongoing Audits

SIGAR has 10 audits in progress, as listed in Table C.2.

TABLE C.2

SIGAR ONGOING AUDITS, AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2009			
Agency	Audit Identifier	Date Initiated	Project Title
SIGAR	SIGAR-013A	September 2009	Review of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Personnel Management
SIGAR	SIGAR-012A	September 2009	Review of the Capabilities Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
SIGAR	SIGAR-010A	August 2009	Review of the Use of Funds Earmarked for Afghan Women and Girls
SIGAR	SIGAR-009A	July 2009	Review of Agencies' Use of Contractors to Provide Security for Reconstruction Programs in Afghanistan
SIGAR	SIGAR-008A	July 2009	Review of U.S. and Other Donor Efforts To Address and Build Afghanistan's Capacity To Address Corruption in the Provincial Governments
SIGAR	SIGAR-007A	July 2009	Review of U.S. and Other Donor Efforts To Address and Build Afghanistan's Capacity to Address Corruption
SIGAR	SIGAR-006A	April 2009	Review of U.S. Assistance for the Preparation and Conduct of Presidential and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan
SIGAR	SIGAR-004A	April 2009	Review of U.S. and International Donor Programs To Assist Afghanistan's Energy Sector
SIGAR	SIGAR-003A	March 2009	Review of Contractor Performance and Agency Oversight of U.S. Government Contracts in Afghanistan with Louis Berger Group
SIGAR	SIGAR-002A	March 2009	Review of Agencies' Management Oversight, Procedures, and Practices for Reconstruction Funds and Projects

Completed Inspections

SIGAR has completed five inspections as of October 30, 2009, as listed in Table C.3.

TABLE C.3

SIGAR COMPLETED INSPECTIONS, AS OF OCTOBER 30, 2009				
Agency	Report Identifier	Date Issued	Report Title	Assessment Type
SIGAR	SIGAR Inspection 10-4	10/26/2009	Inspection of Kohi Girl's School Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Construction Delays Resolved, But Safety Issues Remain	Infrastructure
SIGAR	SIGAR Inspection 10-3	10/26/2009	Inspection of Habib Rahman Secondary School Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Design and Safety Require Attention	Infrastructure
SIGAR	SIGAR Inspection 10-2	10/26/2009	Inspection of Abdul Manan Secondary School Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Insufficient Planning, Safety Problems, and Poor Quality Control Affect Project Results	Infrastructure
SIGAR	SIGAR Inspection 10-1	10/26/2009	Inspection of the Farukh Shah School Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Project Completion Approved Before All Contract Requirements Met	Infrastructure
SIGAR	SIGAR Inspection 9-2	10/2/2009	Inspection of Mahmood Raqi to Najrab Road Project in Kapisa Province: Contract Requirements Met, But Sustainability Concerns Exist	Infrastructure

Ongoing Inspections

SIGAR has seven ongoing inspections as of October 30, 2009, as listed in Table C.4.

TABLE C.4

SIGAR ONGOING INSPECTIONS, AS OF OCTOBER 30, 2009				
Agency	Inspection Identifier	Date Initiated	Project Title	Assessment Type
SIGAR	SIGAR-010-I	October 2009	Joint Regional Afghan Security Forces Compound— Infrastructure Vicinity Farah	Infrastructure
SIGAR	SIGAR-008-I	September 2009	Joint Regional Afghan Security Forces Compound—Vicinity Kandahar Airfield	Infrastructure
SIGAR	SIGAR-004a-I	August 2009	Kabul 105-MW Power Plant and Switching Station Construction	Infrastructure
SIGAR	SIGAR-002-I	June 2009	Management and Operations Aspects of the Farah Provincial Reconstruction Team	Management
SIGAR	SIGAR-002a-I	June 2009	Farah Radio/TV Studio Infrastructure Project	Infrastructure
SIGAR	SIGAR-002b-I	June 2009	Tojg Bridge Project	Infrastructure
SIGAR	SIGAR-003-I	June 2009	Management and Operations Aspects of the Kapisa-Parwan Provincial Reconstruction Team	Management


APPENDIX D SIGAR HOTLINE

Reported Complaints

Of the 37 complaints received last quarter, 16 complaints have been assigned to a SIGAR directorate, 7 have been referred to other agencies, 1 complaint is under review, and 13 have been closed, as listed in Figure D.1.

FIGURE D.1

SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS RECEIVED THIS QUARTER




Source: SIGAR Inspections Directorate, 10/22/2009.

Since the hotline's official launch in May 2009, SIGAR has received a total of 73 complaints. Figure D.2 provides a breakdown of the sources of these complaints.

FIGURE D.2

SOURCE OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS



APPENDIX E ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Acronym	Definition
ABP	Afghan Border Police
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADF	Asian Development Fund
ADP	alternative development programs
ADT	Agribusiness Development Team
AEG & PSS	Afghanistan Economic Governance and Private Sector Strengthening
AFP	Annual Funding Program
AFSA	Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
AGO	Attorney General's Office
AGOAS	Attorney General's Office Assistance Section
AIGF	Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility
AIG Audits	Assistant Inspector General for Audits
AIHRC	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
AJIS	Access to Justice and Integration Section
AMF	Afghan Military Forces
AMSP	Afghan Municipal Strengthening Program
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANAAC	Afghan National Army Air Corps
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
ARDZ	Agricultural and Rural Development Zones
ARSIC	Afghan Regional Security Integration Command
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ARTF-RC	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund - Recurrent Cost
ASFF	Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
ASMED	Afghanistan Small and Medium Enterprise Development
AUP	Afghan Uniformed Police
BAF	Bagram Airfield
BWT	Basic Warrior Training
CARD	Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development
CCC	Commodity Credit Corp
CDC MRE	Centers for Disease Control Mine Risk Education
CEO	chief executive officers
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency

Acronym	Definition
CID	United States Army Criminal Investigation Command
C-IED	counter-improvised explosive device
CJTF	Criminal Justice Task Force
CJTF Phoenix	Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix
CJTF-101	Combined Joint Task Force-101
CM	Capability Milestones
CNAT	Counter-Narcotics Advisory Team
CNJC	Counter-Narcotics Justice Center
CNT	Central Narcotics Tribunal
COMPRI-A	Communication for Behavior Change: Expanding Access to Private Sector Health Products and Services in Afghanistan
CPC	Criminal Procedure Code
CSH	Child Survival and Health
CSRP	Civil Service Reform Project (World Bank)
CSSP	Corrections Systems Support Program
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan
CTAG	Combined Trainers Advisory Group
CTC-A	Counterinsurgency Training Center - Afghanistan
CWD	conventional weapons destruction
DA	Development Assistance
DAB	Da Afghanistan Bank
DAD	Development Assistance Database
DC&P	Disease Control and Prevention
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DEA CN	Drug Enforcement Administration Counter-Narcotics
DFR	Donor Financial Review
DIAG	Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (program)
DICE	Data and Intelligence Collection and Exchange
DoD	Department of Defense (U.S.)
DoD CN	Department of Defense Counter-Narcotics (U.S.)
DoD E&EE	Department of Defense Emergency and Extraordinary Expense (U.S.)
DoD IG	Department of Defense Inspector General (U.S.)
DoD OHDACA	Department of Defense Overseas Disaster, Humanitarian and Civic Aid (U.S.)

APPENDICES

Acronym	Definition
DoD OMA	Department of Defense Operations and Maintenance (U.S.)
DoD T&E	Department of Defense Train and Equip (U.S.)
DoJ	Department of Justice (U.S.)
DoN	Department of the Navy (U.S.)
DoS	Department of State (U.S.)
ECC	Electoral Complaints Commission
EMC	Electoral Media Commission
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
ERMA	Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance
ERW	exploding remnants of war
ESF	Economic Support Fund
ETT	Embedded Training Team
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDD	Focused District Development
FEFA	Free and Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FMR	Financial Management Regulation (DoD)
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FSA	Freedom Support Act
FY	fiscal year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GDP	gross domestic product
GHAJ	Global HIV/AIDS Initiative
GIROA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HCRC	Hotline Complaints Review Committee
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
HMMWV	high-mobility, multi-purpose wheeled vehicle
HNSS	Health and Nutrition Sector Strategy
HOO	High Office of Oversight
HSSP	Health Services Support Project
IARCSC	Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
ICCTF	International Contract Corruption Task Force
IDA	International Development Association
IDEA-NEW	Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for North, East, and West
IEC	Independent Election Commission
IED	improvised explosive device
IET	Initial Entry Training
IG	Inspector General

Acronym	Definition
IMET	International Military and Educational Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INCLE	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
INLTC	Independent National Legal Training Center
IO&P	International Organizations and Programs
IRI	International Republican Institute
IRP	Infrastructure and Rehabilitation Program
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IWRM	integrated water resource management
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
JSSP	Justice Sector Support Program
KAF	Kandahar Airfield
KMTC	Kabul Military Training Center
LBG/B&V	Louis Berger Group/Black & Veatch Joint Venture
LGCD	Local Governance and Community Development
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
LTV	light tactical vehicle
MACCA	Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan
MAD	Mothers Against Drugs
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (Afghan)
MAPA	Mine Action Program in Afghanistan
MCIT	Ministry of Communication Information and Technology (Afghan)
MCN	Ministry of Counter-Narcotics (Afghan)
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MoD	Ministry of Defense (Afghan)
MoE	Ministry of Education (Afghan)
MoF	Ministry of Finance (Afghan)
MoI	Ministry of Interior (Afghan)
MoJ	Ministry of Justice (Afghan)
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health (Afghan)
MoPW	Ministry of Public Works (Afghan)
MoTCA	Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation (Afghan)
MoWA	Ministry of Women's Affairs (Afghan)
MRA	Migration and Refugee Assistance
MRAP	Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
MTV	medium tactical vehicles

APPENDICES

Acronym	Definition
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NADF	National Agriculture Development Framework
NADR-ATA	Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs-Anti-Terrorism Assistance
NADR-CTF	Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs-Counterterrorism Finance
NADR-EXBS	Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs-Export and Border Security
NADR-HD	Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs-Humanitarian Demining
NADR-NDS	Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs-Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
NADR-SALW	Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs-Small Arms Light Weapons
NADR-TIP	Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs-Terrorist Interdiction Program
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
NDAA	National Defense Appropriations Act
NGO	non-governmental organization
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NPCC	National Police Command Center
NSP	National Solidarity Program
OCO	Overseas Contingency Operations
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OEG	Office of Economic Growth (USAID)
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OMAR	Organization for Mine Action and Afghan Rehabilitation
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OMLT	Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
OoP	Office of the President (Afghan)
OPIC	Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSI	U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PMT	Provincial Management Team
PMT	Police Mentoring Team
POMLT	Police Organizational Mentor and Liaison Team
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility

Acronym	Definition
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC	private security contractor
QIP	quick impact projects
RPG	rocket-propelled grenade
RTC	Regional Training Center
RUF	Rules for the Use of Force
SCoG	Support for the Center of Government
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SOG	Special Operations Group
U.S.	United States
UN	United Nations
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNCAC	United Nations Convention Against Corruption
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDP/ELECT	Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (UNDP)
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID OE	United States Agency for International Development Operating Expense
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USFOR-A	United States Forces - Afghanistan
USMS	United States Marshals Service
VOA	Voice of America
VIT	Validation Tracking Team

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As a part of the 2009 Peace Day celebration, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan commissioned calligraphy pieces from Kabul University. This drawing, produced by Abdul Haq Noori Ghaznawi, a Kabul Fine Arts faculty member, represents a peace tree.

SIGAR
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