

EFFICACY OF REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS FOR NATIONAL
GUARD CIVIL SUPPORT AND HOMELAND
DEFENSE MISSIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
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Homeland Security Studies

by
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement).

ABSTRACT

EFFICACY OF REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS FOR NATIONAL GUARD CIVIL SUPPORT AND HOMELAND DEFENSE MISSIONS, by Major Steven Moe, 90 pages.

The purpose of the study is to determine whether a regional headquarters concept would improve the National Guard's ability to accomplish Homeland Defense and Civil Support with greater efficiency and effectiveness. In order to make that determination, this paper begins by reviewing the works of authors advocating regional headquarters in the National Guard. It then notes experiences of other organizations with a regional structure. Once the theoretical benefit of a regional structure has been established, the researcher attempts to identify areas where greater efficiency or effectiveness could be achieved if the National Guard was organized with a regional structure. Finally, interviews with state-level senior leaders of the National Guard add their perspectives for consideration.

If this paper shows the regional headquarters concept could add efficacy for National Guard Civil Support and Homeland Defense missions, it could be an impetus for a major organizational and structural change in the National Guard. This study has the potential to demonstrate potential benefits to participating individual states, as well as refining the focus for future planning, training, and exercises.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS.....	viii
ILLUSTRATIONS	x
TABLES	xi
CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND	1
Primary Research Question	4
Secondary Research Questions	4
Assumptions.....	5
Limitations	6
Delimitations.....	6
Significance of Study	8
Summary and Conclusion.....	8
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	9
Introduction.....	9
Three Areas of Review	9
Significant Works	10
Research Related to Secondary Questions.....	13
Other Organizations with Regional Structure.....	15
Opposition and Other Viewpoints	18
Summary and Conclusions	21
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	22
Introduction.....	22
Chapter Three Organization.....	22
Criteria Selected.....	23
Rubric Scoring Criteria Defined	27
Survey Method and Secondary Questions	28

Analysis Method.....	29
Summary and Conclusions	30
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS.....	31
Introduction.....	31
Existing NG Headquarters Evaluated.....	31
Proposed Regional Headquarters Evaluated.....	43
JCD Analysis	53
Comparison of the Two Courses of Action	56
Secondary Research Questions Answered.....	57
Primary Research Question Answered	59
Summary and Conclusions	59
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	60
Organization.....	60
Summary of Findings.....	60
Expected and Unexpected Findings.....	62
Implications	62
For Further Study.....	63
Things That Could Have Been Done Differently	63
Summary and Conclusions	63
ILLUSTRATIONS	65
GLOSSARY	66
APPENDIX A CONSENT AND USE AGREEMENT FOR ORAL HISTORY MATERIALS.....	68
APPENDIX B THE TEN CORE CAPABILITIES	69
APPENDIX C THE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVE (SAEI).....	72
APPENDIX D INTERVIEW QUESTIONS	73
APPENDIX E DOMESTIC ALL-HAZARDS RESPONSE TEAM (DART) CONCEPT	74
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	76
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	79

ACRONYMS

COA	Course of Action
CRF	Civil Response Force
CS	Civil Support
CSF	Civil Support Forces
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DCO	Defense Coordinating Officer
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOT	Department of Transportation
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (US DoD)
DSCA	Defense Support to Civil Authorities
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
HD	Homeland Defense
HLS	Homeland Security
INS	Incidents of National Significance
IRR	Independent Ready Reserve.
JCD	Joint Capabilities Database
JCSSP	Joint Combined State Strategic Plan
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPO	Metropolitan Planning Organizations

NG	National Guard
NGB	National Guard Bureau
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
PNWER	Pacific Northwest Economic Region
PRIS	Partnership for Regional Infrastructure Security
RRF	Rapid Response Force
SAEI	Situational Awareness Enhancement Initiative
SRP	Strategy Research Paper
TAG	The Adjutant General
USARNORTH	United States Army North
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Map of Federal Emergency Management Agency.....	18
Figure 2. JCD, Level Two NG Current Force	55
Figure 3. Notional Relationship Between HD, CS, and Homeland Security Missions....	65
Figure 4. Proposed DIV/HQ Rotation.	75

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. DOTMLPF Rubric for Current NG Organizational Structure	28
Table 2. DOTMLPF Rubric for Regional NG Headquarters Organization	28
Table 3. DOTMLPF Rubric for Current NG Organizational Structure	43
Table 4. DOTMLPF Rubric for Regional NG Headquarters Organization	52

CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND

The National Guard (NG) has necessarily transitioned from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve.¹ The current and foreseeable operational tempo (optempo) is not possible for the Active Army to maintain without reliance on NG forces. However the NG can also be activated by the Governor of a State or the President for Homeland Defense (HD) and Civil Support (CS). The requirement to be prepared for full-spectrum operations, including HD and CS, is challenging for a part-time force.

Adding to that challenge, the United States is presently suffering from an economic downturn many have declared a recession, if not an actual depression. As tax revenues have decreased, efforts to reduce expenses are necessary at all levels of government. While the federal government has the luxury of operating with a deficit, state governments do not. They are faced with the difficult proposition of balancing a budget with less money than previously needed to fund even existing programs. One Adjutant General recently tasked some in his senior leadership to discuss possible changes that might result in economic savings.² A suggestion brought forth was to eliminate some of the state's joint planners in favor of a more regional approach for multiple states. While doubtful the Adjutant Generals (TAG)s would be willing to give up primary staff, the leadership questioned the necessity of having 54 state NG headquarters,

¹Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve as an Operational Force*, 29 October 2008, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives> (accessed 25 April 2009).

²All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. E-mail conversation with a member of the Army National Guard, 7 March 2009.

thinking it might be possible to consolidate operations centers, various staff and planners, and use of forces across borders.

However, monetary savings from reductions in personnel may not be enough to justify such a change to the current organizational structure. The primary objective must always be to provide ready Soldiers and ready units. Therefore analysis should include more than payroll savings to determine the merit of any proposed changes. Are there additional economic or non-economic benefits or conversely, potential drawbacks to a regionally structured joint headquarters for the NG? The purpose of this study is to examine the regional headquarters concept from a states' perspective, determining whether it would improve the NG's ability to accomplish HD and CS with greater efficiency and effectiveness.

Before an answer can be derived for that question, definitions for efficiency and effectiveness must be described for this paper. CDR Jeffrey J. Bernasconi, in his monograph "Military Effectiveness: A Reappraisal," discussed these terms in great detail. He turns to thermodynamics to define efficiency. "Efficiency is the percentage of useful work extracted from the heat of a system generated by the burning of a fuel source, divided by the total heat generated by the combustion processes. In any system, there is an amount of waste heat consumed in the process that does not provide any useful work. One hundred percent efficiency would have all of the energy put into a system come out as useful work."³ Using this definition, an efficient organizational headquarters would yield greater useful work from equivalent dollars than an inefficient headquarters. Additionally, minimizing redundant efforts and sharing products and resources would contribute to greater efficiency.

³Jeffrey J. Bernasconi, CDR, U.S. Navy, "Military Effectiveness: A Reappraisal" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 2007), 1.

Bernasconi finds more difficulty defining effectiveness. He states that authors Millet, Murray, and Watman identified four horizontal components of military effectiveness: political, strategic, operational and tactical. The political level concerns itself with all aspects of national power, and the strategic level refers to policy setting for the respective nation.⁴ “At the operational level, military effectiveness pertains to the proper synchronization and utilization of forces in time and space. At the tactical level, military effectiveness concerns itself most with the conversion of potential combat power into applied combat power.”⁵

This paper is concerned with military effectiveness at the operational and tactical levels. Creation of regional headquarters to manage the NG for HD and CS may have political and strategic ramifications. However, the thesis intent is to determine from an operational and tactical level if a regional headquarters could better synchronize and utilize forces, or commit resources to action.

Bernasconi notes that “in addition to the four horizontal aspects, military effectiveness possesses multiple vertical levels. These include resources, training, doctrine, recruitment, civil-military relationships, leadership, education, and socio-cultural factors.”⁶ He states that these vertical components can influence military effectiveness, and even run counter to overall military effectiveness. Many of the Bernasconi’s vertical levels are encompassed in the acronym DOTMLPF, which stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel,

⁴Millet, Murray, and Watman quoted in Jeffrey J. Bernasconi, CDR, U.S. Navy, “Military Effectiveness: A Reappraisal” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2007), 2.

⁵Bernasconi, 2.

⁶Ibid., 5.

and Facilities. As will be shown in chapter 3, the rubric depicting the results of this study utilized these criteria.

There is still a problem with answering the thesis question, even after defining the terms efficient and effective. Regional headquarters for NG units do not currently exist. Therefore only a theoretical determination of efficiency and effectiveness can be construed when compared to the current organizational structure. To ascertain a credible determination, this paper reviews the works from authors on this subject, and discusses the experience of other organizations with regional headquarters structures. The paper continues the analysis of potential efficiencies and effectiveness the states may experience from the regional headquarters concept by evaluating the states' self-assessed capabilities in the Joint Capabilities Database (JCD). The intent is to identify redundancies that could be eliminated or unique capabilities that could be shared if managed by a regional headquarters. Finally, the paper considers interviews with NGs' state-level senior leaders to add insight or other viewpoints to consider in the final assessment.

Primary Research Question

Would creation of regional Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) improve the NG's ability to accomplish HD and CS with greater efficiency and effectiveness?

Secondary Research Questions

There are subordinate questions to this thesis. Are there any other benefits or drawbacks to the concept from an individual states' perspective? Is creation of some variant of what one author dubbed Civil Support Forces (CSFs), comprised of Soldiers with a dedicated HD/CS rotating mission between participating states within a region, a necessary component to the

regionally managed concept?⁷ Is the suggestion of altering the Global Force Management cycle to include one year of non-deployment for CSF obligation as suggested by the July 2006 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) a necessary component for CSFs?⁸ Could a regional headquarters adequately manage missions and resources for multiple states? What affect would this new organization have on the current responsibilities and structure of the National Guard Bureau (NGB)? What changes would result to TAGs authorities and responsibilities?

Assumptions

This thesis will assume that current organizational structure and relevant policies associated with planning, preparing and utilizing NG units to perform HD and CS missions will not change during the course of completing this paper, which would make the thesis irrelevant. It must be assumed that the threats to the United States persist against the backdrop of fiscal budget shortfalls for the Federal Government and the States, making efforts towards efficiency and effectiveness of paramount importance. Finally, it will be assumed that regional headquarters would save money for participating states by eliminating various positions and thereby reducing payroll. It is unreasonable given current budget shortfalls that additional money would be available to stand up another headquarters without reductions at the state level. Therefore potential efficiencies noted in this paper will be through identification of resource redundancies between states within a region.

⁷Christine Wormuth, Michele A. Flourney, Patrick T. Henry, and Clark A. Murdock, *The Future Of The National Guard And Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report* (Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS. July 2006), xi.

⁸Ibid., 77.

Limitations

This research paper includes the missions of HD and CS for the Army and Air NG. The efficacy of the current NG organizational structure for planning and executing training, exercises, and missions were evaluated in the research by comparing to other organizations with regional organizational structures, consideration of the conclusions of previous authors on the subject, opinions of selected interviewees within the NG, and the author's own subjective inferences from evaluation of the JCD.

This paper is concerned with military effectiveness and efficiency gained at the operational and tactical levels. National and strategic implications from changes to command and control and the current organizational structure are beyond the scope of this paper.

Finally, this paper considered only the relevant works and studies discovered by the author during his research, or brought to attention by committee members, between March and October of 2009. The Master's of Military Arts and Sciences (MMAS) program recommends submission of the final chapter to the committee and a thesis defense by November; prohibiting further analysis beyond that date.

Delimitations

This research does not intend to evaluate the thesis topic using every possible evaluation criteria that could be considered across the DOTMLPF spectrum. The researcher and committee reached agreement on the criteria to be considered before the research was conducted. The selection process identified what the committee believed to be the most critical components with sufficient relevant material accessible for research at this location.

There are seven reserve components- the Army and Air NG, the Army Reserve, the Air

Force Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve and the Coast Guard Reserve.⁹ The decision was made for this paper not to include the Army Reserves or the other reserve forces mentioned. Rather the paper will address only the Army and Air NG because of their unique role in HD and CS under Title 10, Title 32, and State Active Duty (SAD) authorities. The research will not consider the Independent Ready Reserve (IRR); a manpower pool rarely tasked for HD or CS and so would not alter the outcome.

The research will not consider regional headquarters for response to incidents able to be resourced and managed internally with available assets. These localized incidents would not utilize or require a regional headquarters regardless of availability, and so will not be included in this paper. “States habitually deal with domestic emergencies, many that are within the capabilities of their state assets, and occasionally may have to deal with a worst-case catastrophic domestic emergency that requires significant outside support. That is the conceptual difference between what is defined in the JCD as a Level 1 or a Level 2 requirement.”¹⁰

Level 1 Requirement: Missions traditionally conducted by the NG of each state or territory in the past 10 years.

Level 2 Requirement: Capability required to respond to any extraordinary natural or man-made event without external forces.

“By examining requirements this way, states will be able to perform gap-analysis on their capability to provide support for domestic emergencies.”¹¹ Thus this paper will only include the

⁹Ibid., vii.

¹⁰National Guard Bureau, *Joint Capabilities Database (JCD) Handbook* (Arlington, VA: Government Printing Office, 2009), 28.

¹¹Ibid.

states' capabilities to conduct Level 2 requirements and will exclude Level 1 capabilities.

This paper will not include evaluation of Non-Guard (state) assets. NGB does request the states to assess and report these capabilities, but an on-going software revision to the JCD precludes the reporting from being available at the time of this paper. Future analysis should consider whether the inclusion of these assets would have impact on this thesis.

Significance of Study

CSIS says the Department of Defense (DOD) needs to accept CS as a central mission and act accordingly, recommending using the NG to form the backbone of regional CSFs.¹² If this paper shows that regional headquarters contributes efficiency and effectiveness of such a concept, it could be the impetus for a major organizational and structural change in the NG. This study has the potential to demonstrate potential benefits to participating individual states, as well as refining the focus for future planning, training, and exercises.

Summary and Conclusion

The purpose of the study is to determine whether the regional headquarters concept would improve the NG's ability to accomplish HD and CS with greater efficiency and effectiveness. In order to accomplish this, the paper will begin chapter 2 reviewing works from authors advocating regional headquarters in the NG. It will then note the experience of other organizations with a regional structure. Once the theoretical benefit of a regional structure has been established, the paper attempts to identify areas where greater efficiency or effectiveness could be achieved if the NG was organized with a regional structure. Finally, interviews with senior leaders at the NG state- level will add their perspectives for consideration.

¹²Wormuth et al., 74

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of the study is to examine the regional headquarters concept from a states' perspective, determining whether it would improve the NG's ability to accomplish HD and CS with greater efficiency and effectiveness. A regional headquarters organization for the NG has not been thoroughly studied. Publicized work has advocated only generalized concepts for regional structures. The intent of chapter 2 is to familiarize the reader with what has been published which might support or contradict the research thesis. The author adds further credibility by noting success in other organizations with a regional focus. Once the merits for regional headquarters are understood, chapter 3 will discuss the methodology used to more critically evaluate the value of the concept from the states' perspective of performance of mission both efficiently and effectively.

Three Areas of Review

The review of literature for this thesis can be divided into three areas. These areas are: (1) the significant previous works related to the author's secondary questions or advocating various regional approaches for NG organization, (2) success of other organizations with regional structures, and (3) noted disadvantages and arguments citing a lack of necessity for a regional approach. Chapter 2 will follow this sequence by beginning with reviews of the works of authors discussing various regional headquarters structures for the NG. This will be followed by noting other organizations who have found benefits in a regionally headquartered organizational structure. The author will then present opposing viewpoints arguing that a

regional structure is unnecessary or has disadvantages that outweigh any potential benefits. These adversarial views will be further elaborated on during the analysis portion of chapter 4. Chapter 2 will culminate with a short synopsis of the important points discussed in the chapter.

Significant Works

Sufficient articles advocating regional responses to incident management exist to facilitate this research. While there were variations in the proposed regional headquarters structure, and some difference in rationale justifying the need, there was also much consensus. A common agreement was that regional organization of the NG would better manage the coordinated response to a catastrophic event.

One such author was Barbara A. Nuismer who, in her Strategy Research Paper (SRP), *Regional Civil Support Forces for Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions*, offered three different courses of action all suggesting various operating regions to respond to a domestic crisis. She acknowledged the “three courses of action presented in the paper did not resemble an Army solution in that criteria were not defined or weighted for importance. Instead they were three general solution sets to be further evaluated by others who would add cost analysis and other detailed information.”¹³ Jill Rhodes expressed similar views in her thesis, “Breaking the 72 Hour Barrier: The Regional Emergency Management Support System: A Regional Approach to Incident Management.” She made a strong argument for a Regional Emergency Management Support System (REMSS); citing after-action reports from 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina which

¹³Barbara A. Nuismer, COL, “Regional CS Forces for HD and CS Missions” (Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 2007), 13.

recommended a regional response approach. She claims that the Pentagon response was regionally based and therefore much more successful.¹⁴

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) with principal author Christine Wormuth discussed the advantages of State NGs utilizing Civil Response Forces (CRFs) with regional headquarters in “The Future of the National Guard and Reserves.” The basic concept was for Regional Joint Force Headquarters (RJFHQ) to co-locate with the Regional Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Headquarters to better manage and share resources and capabilities for training, exercises, and incident management.¹⁵ The co-location with FEMA was a popular suggestion, and seemingly simplifies command and control and unity of command issues.

A second reason suggested for regional headquarters had more to do with proactive risk mitigation rather than timely reactive response. Brandon Hardenbrook’s article, “The Need for a Policy Framework to Develop Disaster Resilient Regions,” is an example of this argument. Hardenbrook points out that many agencies, like “FEMA, state and county departments of emergency management and the first responder communities,” focus on preparedness strategies and response plans to implement when crisis strikes.¹⁶ He goes on to say that “not only must

¹⁴Jill D. Rhodes, J.D. and LL.M., and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., “State and Regional Responses to Disasters: Solving the 72-Hour Problem,” *Heritage Studies, Backgrounder #1962*, 21 August 2006): 3. <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Homelandsecurity/wm2406.cfm> (accessed 23 October 2009).

¹⁵Wormuth et al., 74.

¹⁶Brandon Hardenbrook, “The Need for a Policy Framework to Develop Disaster Resilient Regions,” *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 2, no. 3 (2005): 1. <http://www.bepress.com/jsem/vol2/iss3/2> (accessed 7 July 2009).

emergency management agencies respond to disasters, but they must now establish comprehensive and effective strategies to prepare for and prevent disasters.”¹⁷

Hardenbrook was particularly concerned with critical infrastructure security, concluding that the federal government needs to recognize that critical infrastructure security planning must be conducted on a regional level.¹⁸ With more than 80,000 infrastructure assets currently in a classified database, it is not realistic to expect sufficient resources will be available to adequately protect all critical infrastructure. Organization and prioritization are therefore necessary to mitigate risk, and that can best be accomplished on the local and regional levels.¹⁹

A related justification for regional headquarters in support of the proactive approach is more effective cooperation with private enterprise to protect critical infrastructure. Eighty-five (85 percent) of the nation’s infrastructure is controlled by the private sector, a strong argument for encouraging their participation.²⁰ Public-private partnerships could assist with determining vulnerabilities and identifying relationships that exist between infrastructures; an observation already noted at the highest levels of government. Both the Clinton and Bush Administrations have acknowledged that without private sector participation, very little can be done to address critical infrastructure security.²¹ Moreover, a 2004 report released by the Government Accountability Office entitled *Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency*

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., 15.

¹⁹Ibid., 5 and 15.

²⁰Ibid., 3.

²¹Ibid., 6.

Preparedness, stated that “the federal government is capable of providing much needed guidance and support for regional coordination.”²²

Research Related to Secondary Questions

A few secondary questions, notably the other benefits and drawbacks from an individual states’ perspective; whether CSFs are a necessity to a regional concept; and alterations of the Global Force Management cycle, will be discussed later during the analysis portion of this paper. The remaining secondary questions were addressed by reviewing the cited literature, and are discussed in this section.

What changes would result to TAG authorities and responsibilities? A monograph by MAJ Johnson entitled “Active Component Rapid Response Force (RRF); The Answer to the Military’s Issues with Efficient and Effective Support during Response to and Recovery from Incidents of National Significance (INS)” provides suggestions for the dilemma of command and control. His suggestion was for RRFs to be comprised of active component/reserve component (AC/RC/NG) forces assigned on a rotational basis under Title 10 authority to an RRF Commander. This would solve the funding issues related to training, equipping, and exercising. Additional NG troops could serve under tactical control (TACON) to the RRF Title 10 Commander with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between TAGs.²³ The MOU would facilitate unity of command and permit Title 32 forces with law enforcement capabilities to perform those missions. Title 10 forces do not have those authorities as a result of the Posse

²²Ibid., 8.

²³William W. Johnson, MAJ. USMC, “Active Component Rapid Response Force; The Answer to the Military’s Issues with Efficient and Effective Support during Response to and Recovery from Incidents of National Significance” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2007), 64.

Comitatus Act. Johnson recommends any Title 32 forces be predominantly Military Police and Engineers because of the patrolling and rebuilding likely necessary after an Incident of National Significance (INS).

What affect would this new organization have on the current responsibilities and structure of the NGB? According to one anonymous source at the NGB, their primary focus is on working with the State JFHQs and Joint Task Forces (JTF)s.²⁴ The latter is set up to handle emergencies or special events like the Olympics, National Party Conventions, G8 Summits, etc. Therefore while some change in mission would inevitably occur for the NGB as a result of regional headquarters, a need likely would still exist working with remaining state headquarters staff and newly formed regional headquarters staff, assisting with planning training and exercises, facilitating coordination and synchronization between regions, and preparing for the aforementioned special events. NGB would remain the agency administering to the needs of the Army NG and the Air NG; providing liaison between the Army and the Air Force and the various NG units. However, a regional headquarters would undoubtedly serve under United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) for catastrophic events. “As the main command and control entity for Homeland Security (HLS), USNORTHCOM must maintain the capability to coordinate, across component and agency lines, all activities concerning any Incidents of National Significance (INS).”²⁵

²⁴All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. E-mail conversation with a member of National Guard Bureau, 1 July 2009.

²⁵Johnson, 51.

Other Organizations with Regional Structure

Could a joint regional headquarters adequately manage missions and resources for multiple states? Certainly many private and public organizations have achieved success utilizing regional headquarters, but there is more applicability looking at the federal government's involvement with regional headquarters. The federal government has many programs with management from a regional level. This section will reference a few of these to further the argument that the potential value of a regional headquarters concept for the NG is practical and of potential value.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) both coordinate regional activities and spending through Regional Planning Organizations and Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO).²⁶ An MPO has a large population center with interdependent adjacent communities. Identifying the economic and social interdependencies of communities in proximity to one another, "MPOs were created to help ensure that issues, which ultimately affect other nearby jurisdictions, could be addressed equitably."²⁷ "The federal government has recognized that many of the nation's major cities depend on shared economies that cross local government boundaries and state lines."²⁸

The federal government has also seen value with regional planning when working in partnership with private organizations towards a common objective. "One successful model comes from a northwest organization called Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER)."²⁹

²⁶Hardenbrook, 9.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., 11.

It is a statutory public-private organization including the northwest states of Alaska, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and the Canadian Provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, and Yukon Territory.³⁰ “The first of this organization’s initiatives to address regional infrastructure security issues was through the creation of the Partnership for Regional Infrastructure Security (PRIS) in November 2001. The partnership brought together representatives from the electric power sector, liquid fuel producers, pipeline carriers and telecommunication system operators together with federal, state, and provincial officials responsible for emergency management and safety.”³¹ Various Partnership for Regional Infrastructure Security exercises have illuminated local and regional interdependencies and preparedness gaps in their objective of creating a more disaster resistant and resilient region.

Other regional public-private partnerships exist throughout the United States. The Gulf Coast Regional Partnership for Infrastructure Security in the New Orleans region concentrates on port security, tourism and commercial enterprise. The Iowa Partnership for Homeland Security, which includes other states in the region and Canada, focuses on infrastructure interdependencies and effects on public and private sectors from prolonged outages. Other regional partnerships “include the Great Lakes Region, San Diego, Pittsburgh and Long Island and Great Britain. While each partnership differs in structure and design, all aim to accomplish the same result, the creation of a more disaster resilient region.”³²

One of the most well known government organizations with a regional structure is FEMA, which became part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in March, 2003.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid., 12.

³²Ibid., 14.

FEMA is responsible for directing the federal response to the nation's natural and man-made disasters. "There are 10 regions³³ that fall under the FEMA umbrella and each region is assigned a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to plan, coordinate, and integrate Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) with local, state, tribal, and federal agencies. FEMA also initiates mitigation activities, trains first responders, works with state and local emergency managers, and manages the National Flood Insurance Program and the U.S. Fire Administration."³⁴

DHS published the National Response Framework (NRF) in 2008. The NRF is used by all participating elements to provide a unified and coordinated response. "In the case of a catastrophe or major disaster, FEMA coordinates emergency food and water, medical supplies and services, search and rescue operation and transportation assistance with the help of twenty-eight (28) federal partners, the Red Cross and local emergency management crews."³⁵ The DCO assigned to the region plans for active-duty Title 10 military assistance if requested. The NG may be activated for employment in support of a State Governors' disaster support requirements however, under state active duty or Title 32, DCOs only have a coordinating relationship with no authority to direct use of NG units for forces. The NG could be federalized under Title 10 or Title 6, but the Posse Comitatus Act would then preclude assistance with law enforcement operations. This potential unity of command problem between Title 10 and 32 authorities is one of the cited justifications for the proposed NG regional headquarters structure.

³³Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Organizational Structure Regional Operations," <http://www.fema.gov/about/structure.shtm> (accessed 6 July 2009).

³⁴Vivian Larene McBride-Davis, "Responding Logistically to Future Natural and Man-Made Disasters and Catastrophes" (Monograph, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 2008), 14.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 15.



Figure 1. Map of Federal Emergency Management Agency

Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency “Organization Structure Regional Operations,” 26 February 2008, <http://www.fema.gov/about/structure.shtm> (accessed 16 July 2009). NOTE: The ten FEMA regions include: Region I (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont); Region II (New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands); Region III (Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and W. Virginia); Region IV (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, N. Carolina, S. Carolina, and Tennessee); Region V (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin); Region VI (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas); Region VII (Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska); Region VIII (Colorado, Montana, N. Dakota, S. Dakota, Utah and Wyoming); Region IX (Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, American Samoa, Guam, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Federated States of Micronesia); Region X (Alaska, Idaho, Oregon and Washington).

Opposition and Other Viewpoints

The review would not be complete without noting there are oppositional views. An anonymous source at NGB recently stated there was currently no serious talk regarding regional headquarters organization.³⁶ Rather, more emphasis was being placed on multi-state joint planning scenarios and exercises to facilitate cooperation and interaction. The specific focus has

³⁶All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. E-mail conversation with a member of National Guard Bureau, 1 July 2009.

been on the National Response Framework, which provides a way for government organizations, private-sector entities, and local communities, to develop a coordinated response. Multiple states participating in planned exercises such as a major earthquake or flood often have similar concerns and can learn from each other and practice working together, diminishing any need for a regional headquarters.

Another possible reason for NGB not seriously considering the regional headquarters concept at this time is the success they have had facilitating educational development courses, with numerous states sending employees to participate in offered instruction. An example was the recent “J5 101 Training” and “Plans Development/Writing Training” held this August (2009) in Missouri. NGB also holds monthly video teleconferences with the J5 section representatives from multiple states to discuss issues, receive updates, and synchronize work efforts.

Another argument against NG regional headquarters claims they are unnecessary because much of the job is already being accomplished by USNORTHCOM. Its mission is to “anticipate and conduct HD and CS operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests.”³⁷ United States Army North (USARNORTH) based at Fort Sam Houston, Texas is a Service component of USNORTHCOM, and is focused on supporting civil authorities. “It assigns DCOs to all 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regional offices to streamline DOD coordination. During crisis response, DCOs are augmented by additional personnel to facilitate USNORTHCOM support.”³⁸

³⁷Command and General Staff College, A504 Homeland Security Advance Sheets and Readings (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 2009), 155.

³⁸Ibid., 156.

“The DCO has a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) consisting of a staff and military liaison officers to facilitate coordination and support to activated Emergency Support Functions (ESF).”³⁹ The DCO is the subject matter expert for all state and federal emergency response plans and builds relationships with FEMA staff, state emergency responders, TAGs and JFHQ-State staff. However, as previously noted the DCO has no authority over the TAG, is subordinate in rank, and cannot compel the use of NG forces. Additionally, the DCO is not currently acting as a regional headquarters; responsible for planning, training, execution, allocation and logistics of NG forces. Rather, their primary responsibility is the use of Title 10 forces, with only coordination responsibilities with NG headquarters and staff.

Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC) may be another reason why some may believe regional headquarters are unnecessary. Many states already have voluntary agreements in place to assist one another if an emergency overwhelms their own capabilities. EMAC is “a national mutual aid partnership agreement that allows state-to-state assistance during Governor or federally declared emergencies.”⁴⁰ Many states regularly use EMAC agreements; such as the author’s home state of Minnesota and neighboring states of North and South Dakota combating the Red River’s relatively frequent flooding. As in the above example, EMAC relationships do not always align with FEMA regions but aside from familiarity from previous experience, this is not an inhibiting factor; NG units nationwide can fill shortfalls. “Hurricanes Katrina and Rita showcased the largest deployment of state-to-state aid in history

³⁹Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) /Defense Coordinating Element (DCE),” http://www.fema.gov/about/regions/regionv/dco_dce.shtm (accessed 7 July 2009).

⁴⁰National Guard Bureau, “The National Guard’s Role in Homeland Defense,” <http://www.ng.mil/features/homelanddefense/index.html>. EMAC (accessed 9 August 2009).

and stands as a testament to EMAC's effectiveness and efficiency in sharing of resources through mutual aid agreements."⁴¹

Summary and Conclusions

The previous works on this subject identify general solution sets requiring further evaluation, adding validity to this research which evaluates the merits of regional headquarters systems by ascertaining efficiencies created or effectiveness demonstrated through sharing of resources. Successes and failures of other regional organizations can be extrapolated to further evaluate the potential outcome of implementing a regional organization within the NG. Finally, disadvantages already noted in those works, along with concerns and opposition voiced during interviews of selected leaders within the NG add balance, perspective, and specific points of contention to help define the evaluation criteria used to support or refute the thesis question. The discussion of the most important schools of thought regarding regional headquarters demonstrates why this study is a needed addition to the available knowledge for those who someday may need to further consider this topic. The study could foster further consideration for a major organizational and structural change in the NG.

⁴¹Ibid.

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The preceding review of literature was meant to inform the reader of the current debate regarding the merits of regional headquarters for NG HD and CS missions. The purpose of the thesis however, is not to add another voice to this strategic level question. Rather the intent is to evaluate the question from an operational and tactical level. From the perspective of individual states, would efficiencies or additional effectiveness materialize from regional headquarters that would benefit a state in accomplishing those specific missions? If it can be shown the theoretical concept contributes efficacy for the states for HD and CS missions, some states may then be more inclined to consider whether this approach would be of value in resolving other issues, notably cost reductions through sharing of resources or reductions to staff and personnel at the state level.

Chapter Three Organization

Chapter 3 is organized by first explaining the thought process behind determining the criteria selected to determine the efficacy of regional headquarters for HD and CS missions. The criteria are defined so readers understand exactly what was evaluated and how the analysis was conducted. Chapter 3 continues by discussing the steps taken to address the remaining secondary research questions, including an explanation of how interviews were conducted and with whom, and a listing of what questions were asked. A blank copy of the consent form presented to interviewees is included for informational purposes as Appendix A: Consent and Use Agreement

for Oral History Materials. Finally, a brief summation reiterates the methodology used to analyze the research findings and prepares the reader for the subsequent analysis chapter.

Criteria Selected

The criteria selected to evaluate the efficacy of a NG regional headquarters for HD and CS missions considers Bernasconi's definitions for efficiency and effectiveness discussed earlier. An efficient organizational headquarters would yield greater useful work with equivalent dollars than an inefficient headquarters. Additionally, minimizing redundant efforts and sharing products and resources may contribute to greater efficiency. Therefore, potential efficiencies noted in this paper will be through identification of resource redundancies between states within a region, or by surmising greater output may be obtained by one headquarters structure or the other assuming similar costs.

“At the operational level, military effectiveness pertains to the proper synchronization and utilization of forces in time and space. At the tactical level, military effectiveness concerns itself most with the conversion of potential combat power into applied combat power.”⁴² Military effectiveness also possesses multiple vertical levels. These include resources, training, doctrine, recruitment, civil-military relationships, leadership, education, and socio-cultural factors.”⁴³ Bernasconi states that these vertical components can influence military effectiveness, and even run counter to overall military effectiveness.

The Department of Defense (DoD) uses the acronym DOTMLPF to remind planners to consider any combination of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and

⁴²Bernasconi, 2.

⁴³Ibid., 5.

facilities when considering solutions to problem sets. The components of efficiency and effectiveness identified by Bernasconi integrate well with DOTMLPF planning considerations, and will serve as criteria for this study.

Doctrine: The criteria will be named 'Utilization.' The study will consider from a states' perspective whether the organizational structure provides effective utilization of forces in time and space, and the ability to convert potential combat power into applied combat power for response to incidents greater than those able to be resourced and managed internally with available assets (Level Two requirement).

Organization: 'Unity of Effort.' This refers to the ability of the state or regional headquarters to "cooperate and collaborate"⁴⁴ with representatives from both governmental and non-governmental organizations in order to provide the proper synchronization of forces in time and space. "Since we know we will interact with these organizations here in the homeland, it makes sense to bring them in early on during the planning process to ensure unity of effort."⁴⁵

Training: 'Emergency Preparedness.' The ability of the headquarters being considered to conduct efficient and effective training and educate NG Soldiers on roles and responsibilities for both HD and CS missions. "Emergency Preparedness is considered a part of DOD's overall preparedness activities. It spans HD, CS and Homeland Security and includes DOD's lead,

⁴⁴United States Northern Command and North American Security Cooperation (PowerPoint Presentation, A504, Homeland Security U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2009), Slide 21.

⁴⁵Ibid.

support, and enable functions.”⁴⁶ See figure 3, Notional Relationship Between HD, CS, and Homeland Security Missions.

Material: ‘Resources.’ Refers to whether the organizational structure being considered manages allocated resources with efficacy. This may include identifying redundancies that could be eliminated or unique capabilities that could be shared. NGB monitors the capabilities of every state and territory on ten core capabilities for HD readiness.⁴⁷ The intent is for every governor to have each of the following “essential 10” capabilities available: command and control; chemical, biological, and radiological detection; engineering assets; communications; ground transportation; aviation; medical capability; security forces; logistics; and maintenance capability.⁴⁸ The ten core capabilities are measured as part of a database called the JCD. The descriptions of the measurable components comprising the ten core capabilities were taken from the Joint Capabilities Handbook and are included in this document as Appendix B: The Ten Core Capabilities.

“In order to fully assess the impact of the National Guards Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) commitment and future force structure changes, the NG initiated the development of a Joint Combined State Strategic Plan (JCSSP) to ensure governors have well developed plans and sufficient capabilities to support domestic missions.”⁴⁹ “The team further improved the JCSSP after its implementation by developing a new web-based database in September 2005 that

⁴⁶Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-27, *Homeland Defense*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 115.

⁴⁷National Guard Bureau, *Joint Capabilities Database*, 21.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*

⁴⁹National Guard Bureau, NGB-J5, *Joint Capabilities State Strategic Plan 06-01* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 1.

allowed each state/territory/district to make revisions electronically. This was then called the JCD. In March 2006, the team developed the Situational Awareness Enhancement Initiative (SAEI) Section of the JCD which was concerned with a state's ability to respond to specific events. Today, all 54 states, territories and district are participating in this program."⁵⁰ The SAEI events are listed in Appendix C.

The JCD analyzes the states' capability to provide the necessary resources, and as such needs to be evaluated as part of this thesis. If redundancies exist, it stands to reason greater efficiency could be achieved by sharing resources and eliminating excess, or by reallocation for use elsewhere. If a unique capability exists within a state of a region, potentially greater effectiveness could be achieved by making the resource available for regional use.

However, this alone will not justify the value of a regional headquarters. Economical and effective use of resources could be achieved through existing cooperation between the states or more formal constructs such as EMAC. Comparing the capabilities reported in the JCD may provide analysis as to whether regional organization and cooperation is of value, but not necessarily whether or not a regional headquarters is needed. To decide this, all duties and responsibilities of a headquarters must be considered, utilizing criteria under the remaining components of DOTMLPF.

Leadership: 'Unity of Command.' The study will attempt to ascertain if the headquarters structure under consideration contributes to visualization of lines of authority and ensure clear assignment of duties and responsibilities. "Effective unified command is indispensable to

⁵⁰National Guard Bureau, *Joint Capabilities Database*, 7.

response activities and requires a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each participating organization.”⁵¹

Personnel and Facilities: ‘Availability.’ The study will subjectively assess whether the states would potentially benefit from increased access to qualified personnel to serve in the key positions within the headquarters. In similar manner, the theoretical availability of adequate facilities and equipment will be surmised for each headquarters’ structure being considered.

Rubric Scoring Criteria Defined

‘Optimal’ refers to the selected criteria being performed by the evaluated headquarters with no discernable omissions from the aforementioned definitions, and no perceived means of improvement in efficiency or effectiveness. ‘Desirable’ is defined as the selected criteria are expected to be accomplished, with potential inefficiencies or means to improve effectiveness possible. ‘Less than Desirable’ refers to a definitive shortcoming identified with regard to either efficiency or effectiveness from an individual states’ perspective. Once each course of action (COA) has been evaluated for strengths and weaknesses against the selected criteria, the author will tally the results of each COA and make a subjective assessment of the better COA; explaining any non-apparent considerations affecting the outcome. The rubrics shown below are labeled as table 1: DOTMLPF Rubric for Current Organizational Structure, and table 2: DOTMLPF Rubric for Regional Headquarters Structure.

⁵¹U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Introduction to National Response Framework,” January 2008, about_nrf(1).pdf. 4 (accessed 15 November 2009).

Table 1. DOTMLPF Rubric for Current NG Organizational Structure

Selected evaluation criteria (DOTMLPF) Current Organizational Structure For HD and CS missions	Optimal	Desirable	Less than Desirable
Doctrine: Utilization			
Organization: Unity of Effort			
Training: Emergency Preparedness			
Material: Resources			
Leadership: Unity of Command			
Personnel and Facilities: Availability			

Source: Created by author.

Table 2. DOTMLPF Rubric for Regional NG Headquarters Organization

Selected evaluation criteria (DOTMLPF) Regional HQ Organizational Structure For HD and CS missions	Optimal	Desirable	Less than Desirable
Doctrine: Utilization			
Organization: Unity of Effort			
Training: Emergency Preparedness			
Material: Resources			
Leadership: Unity of Command			
Personnel and Facilities: Availability			

Source: Created by author.

Survey Method and Secondary Questions

Interviewees were deliberately selected from the author’s professional contacts, and were selected because of their experience in the NG and their duty positions. Their participation was voluntary, and only after reviewing a consent form. To retain confidentiality names are not revealed; only responses to questions were shared. The open-ended questions were asked via

Army Knowledge Online (AKO) email, and are listed as Appendix D: Interview Questions. The questions asked them to reflect on existing and proposed command and control relationships for missions extending beyond state borders. One such question refers to a memorandum from NGB regarding a concept of operations and initial sourcing for Domestic All-Hazards Response Teams (DART). The memorandum is included as Appendix E: Domestic All-Hazards Response Team (DART) Concept. The purpose of the interview questions was to gather information and opinions to assist with answering remaining secondary questions and to contribute to analysis of the selected criteria.

While admittedly these professional contacts may have preconceived opinions regarding the thesis, it should not degrade their contributions. *Doing a Successful Research Project* by Martin Brett Davies states “that small sample research can be carried out in such a way that it is exempt from the imperative that the principle of grounded theory imposes. Studies in both the public and private sector that use qualitative methods to obtain user or customer feedback on service provision are widely believed to have value, even if their theory base is ‘given’ rather than being subject to grounded exploration.”⁵²

Analysis Method

The process of Inductive Reasoning was used to evaluate the viewpoints of authors from the associated writings, the JCD, and the interviewees’ answers. Inductive Reasoning is “the philosophical idea that is related to the style of research in which the investigator employs a doctrine of curiosity to gather data relevant to a predetermined subject area, analyses it, and on

⁵²Martin Brett Davies, *Doing a Successful Research Project using Qualitative or Quantitative Methods* (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 237.

the basis of that analysis, postulates one or more theoretical conclusions.”⁵³ The author’s analysis was entered into the rubrics for each headquarters structure (COA), in order to compare each COA against the evaluation criteria. “The goal is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of COAs so that a COA with the highest probability of success can be selected or developed.”⁵⁴

Summary and Conclusions

The criteria selected to evaluate the efficacy of a NG regional headquarters for HD and CS missions are components of the definitions of efficiency and effectiveness, as well as DOTMLPF planning considerations for deriving solutions. Rubrics were constructed by the author to evaluate each COA against the selected criteria to ascertain areas of strength and weakness. The author will begin chapter 4 with analysis of the current NG headquarters organizational structure with regards to the selected criteria. This will be followed by the author’s analysis of the proposed regional NG headquarters organizational structure. The analysis will consider the opinions of authors from the principal works in this field, the JCD, and consideration of the information and opinions provided from professional contacts working for the NG.

⁵³Ibid., 238.

⁵⁴Jack D. Kem, Ph.D., *Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade*, 3rd ed. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Government Printing Office, 2009), 107.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Would creation of a regional JFHQ improve the NG's ability to accomplish HD and CS missions with greater efficiency and effectiveness at the state level? In this thesis the author individually assesses both the current NG headquarters and the proposed regional headquarters utilizing the selected evaluation criteria to ascertain the strengths and weaknesses of each COA. The analyzed data comes from the cited key works related to the thesis, relevant observations from the JCD by FEMA regions, and the interviewees' answers to the author's questions. A comparison of the two COAs and answers to the author's secondary questions continues the analysis. The author then uses inductive reasoning to determine which course of action achieves greater efficiency and effectiveness from the individual states' perspective, permitting the thesis's primary question to be answered. Chapter 4 ends with a brief synopsis of the conclusions that were derived from the analysis.

Existing NG Headquarters Evaluated

'Utilization:' The challenge for existing NG headquarters to effectively utilize forces in HD and CS missions is evident in a recent request for the Army NG to provide manning to support two Regional Joint Task Force (RJTF) Headquarters and provide additional 5-man planning teams to three other regions in support of H1N1 Pandemic Influenza Regional Joint Task Force Planning Teams.⁵⁵ The request sought NG Officers to fill these planning cells. "The

⁵⁵E-mail correspondence with author, "Implementation Guidance ISO CJCS H1N1 EXORD 281200ZAUG09," 2 November 2009.

planning cells will provide direction to ARNG regarding Pre Pandemic, Transitional, and Post Pandemic Influenza operations and support to USNORTHCOM. The Army NG will be fully involved at the local, state, and federal levels in the planning and execution of the nation's response to a potential pandemic outbreak.”⁵⁶

The orders for the NG Officers were in a voluntary status under Title 10, in an Active Duty Operational Support-Active Component (ADOS-AC) status. The NG planners were to be under operational control (OPCON) to the DCO or the Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC). As such, the memorandum requesting the planners stipulated that the NG Officers would not be able to participate in “civilian law enforcement-type activities that constitute search, seizure, or arrest of individuals, participation in pursuit or surveillance activities, investigation, interrogation, evidence collection, and/or security patrols or functions, crowd or traffic control, or any similar law enforcement activities.”⁵⁷

The apparent irony of the above example is that in order for the NG Officers to plan for the use of NG Soldiers in support of regional efforts, they themselves had to be federalized, thereby losing the inherent support to law enforcement that they undoubtedly would be planning for the use of NG Soldiers. Moreover, it highlights the command and control difficulties that could exist should NG Soldiers be activated for such a mission. In order for the Regional Joint Task Force (RJTF) Headquarters to command those NG Soldiers, they would have to be activated under Title 10 authority. If the Soldiers were to be in a State Active Duty or Title 32 status, the states would have to retain command authority, with only a coordinating

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid.

relationship with the Regional Joint Task Force (RJTF) Headquarters. Such was the case during Hurricane Katrina and initially resulted in confusion and lack of efficacy.

The responses received from the author's email questions, however, point in another direction, as all stated from their experience that the EMAC process worked well and provided for effective utilization of all resources available. The noted examples of solid relationships with counterparts in neighboring states, and previous successes working together, convinced this author to rate the existing NG Headquarters structure as desirable with regards to utilization of forces.⁵⁸

'Unity of Effort:' The 2008 spring flooding and bad weather affecting the Midwest states of Indiana, Wisconsin, Illinois, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska seem to indicate that unity of effort can exist without unity of command. A FEMA update posted 13 June 2008 describes FEMA's support activities with each of the affected states; everyone working towards a common goal of recovering from the domestic disaster. FEMA was able to provide tailored support to each affected state impacted from tornados or the flood. They deployed Incident Management Assistance Teams to Indiana and Iowa, a Mobile Emergency Response Vehicle to Iowa, staffed a disaster assistance hotline, and numerous other engagements to provide situational awareness.⁵⁹ According to the same update, entitled *Federal Response to Midwest Storms*, the NG supported civil authorities in domestic operations with more than 4,200

⁵⁸All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. E-mail conversation with a member of the Army National Guard, 31 October 2009.

⁵⁹Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Federal Response to Midwest Storms," FEMA Update on Federal Activities. Release Number HQ-08-101, Release Date: 13 June 2008, <http://www.fema.gov/about/structure.shtm> (accessed 16 July 2009).

personnel.⁶⁰ Soldiers from Kansas, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Iowa all provided various storm recovery operations.

This author notes the above event to be a recent example of multiple states and agencies working together successfully on a regional disaster without the existence of a NG regional headquarters. There have been, however, regional disasters in recent history where unity of effort between participating states and agencies was not as integrated as would have been ideal. Again, Hurricane Katrina was the most notable example, and a driving reason behind regionalism becoming “the primary intergovernmental organizational structure for planning and implementing intergovernmental homeland security and emergency management.”⁶¹ In 2005, Louisiana’s Congressional Representative Bobby Jindal commented that he “walk(s) away from Katrina with an even stronger belief that a regional structure is important to the defense of our homeland.”⁶² The importance of a regional approach for HD was also evident in the works researched by the author. As an example, the Government Accountability Office 2004 homeland security report stated “the most effective responses (to terror threats) are coordinated and planned regionally.”⁶³

Due to the volume of research advocating a regional approach for HD and CS response, the credibility of the sources and the merit of their arguments, the author finds that the existing

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Kiki Caruson and Susan MacManus, “Designing Homeland Security Policy within a Regional Structure: A Needs Assessment of Local Security Concerns,” *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 4, no. 7 (2007): 1, <http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol4/iss2/7> (accessed 6 July 2009).

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Ibid.

NG headquarters is less than desirable in contributing to unity of effort. Unquestionably, NGB has had success facilitating cooperation and improving coordination between State NG headquarters, and those headquarters are effectively participating in planning and training events that are improving readiness. However, the author concludes the existing headquarters structure does not contribute to those successes, and more than likely complicates progress.

‘Emergency Preparedness:’ Training and preparation for HD and CS missions have improved in recent years. In 2008, the National Exercise Program Implementation Plan (NEP I-Plan) was approved by the President and distributed by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The plan “describes a new ‘tier’ system of exercises and mandates the use of Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) policy and guidance for all National Evaluation Program (NEP) tiered exercises.”⁶⁴ Consequently, DHS has initiated annual regional training and exercise plan workshops (TEPWs) within each of the ten FEMA regions. “The FEMA Regional workshops provide an opportunity for synchronization and prioritization of exercise requirements and objectives and coordination among federal, state, local, tribal, and territory emergency response entities within a FEMA region to ensure collaboration on the development of realistic regional exercises.”⁶⁵

On 22 January 2008,” the National Exercise Division officially announced the implementation of the new Regional Exercise Support Program (RESP). Through this program the National Exercise Program (NEP) will provide exercise technical assistance to all ten (10)

⁶⁴FEMA; Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program, HSEEP Newsletter, no. 7 (Winter 2008): 2. http://www.vdem.state.va.us/programs/trainex/HSEEP_newsletter_winter2008.pdf (accessed 24 October 2009).

⁶⁵Ibid., 3.

FEMA regions.⁶⁶ “The program is designed to support local, state, and regional exercise initiatives and, once developed, the regional multi-year training and exercising plan.”⁶⁷ The participating states in such exercises often invite participation of agencies and communities to the extent they are able. Effort is also made to link the training objectives of the military, such as Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration (RSOI) of Title 10/Title 32 forces, and military exercises such as “Vigilant Guard.”

Clearly a concerted emphasis is being made at the national level to improve emergency preparedness through implementation of the above programs. There is also clear guidance dictating training and exercises at the regional level. Much of the initiative for change had its roots in the findings of the *Nationwide Plan Review: Phase II Report* written in 2006. In part, the findings reported: “the majority of the Nation’s current emergency operations plans and planning processes cannot be characterized as fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable to manage catastrophic events as defined in the National Response Plan (NRP); states and urban areas are not conducting adequate collaborative planning as a part of “steady state” preparedness; assumptions in basic plans do not adequately address catastrophic events; basic plans do not adequately address continuity of operations and continuity of government; The most common deficiency among State and urban area Direction and Control Annexes is the absence of a clearly defined command structure.”⁶⁸

⁶⁶Ibid., 8.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸U.S. Department of Homeland Security in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation, *Nationwide Plan Review: Phase II Report* (16 June 2006): ix. www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Prep_NationwidePlanReview.pdf (accesses 15 November 2009).

Although these findings do not directly reflect the command structure of the NG or its preparedness to conduct HD and CS missions, it is worthwhile to note that current capabilities measured by the JCD do not include response to the national planning scenarios, but may do so in the future.⁶⁹ This implies that the degree of preparedness of the NG for catastrophic events may not be adequate as of this date. Efforts are being made by individual NG State headquarters and through NGB to incorporate training and exercises for a region's NG Soldiers. However, given the increasing emphasis on regional preparation, it seems illogical to conclude that the existing NG State headquarters structure provides any advantage to training as measured by emergency preparedness. Difficulty incorporating objectives and accommodating schedules only increases with the number of entities involved.

Moreover, since the NG headquarters organization has remained largely unchanged, it is unlikely that the organizational structure itself can explain any positive or negative impacts to emergency preparedness. Rather, any improvements are likely attributable to efforts of the planners and their increased impetus on Homeland Security. Deterioration of any capabilities is also probably due to external factors, such as conflicting events and priorities. Therefore the author finds that training as defined by emergency preparedness is less than desirable utilizing the existing headquarters structure.

'Resources:' FEMA is the primary agency for logistics management and serves as the coordinating agency. Ms. Vivian Larene McBride-Davis, in *Responding Logistically to Future Natural and Man-made Disasters and Catastrophes*, identifies logistical problems that can exist from responding agencies having little or no interoperability. These can include: "redundant service supply and distribution chains, no cross-agency inventory or in-transit visibility,

⁶⁹National Guard Bureau. *Joint Capabilities Database*, 34.

disjointed and disparate request and support procedures, incompatible information technology systems and databases.”⁷⁰

The DoD is one of several potential responding agencies, although DoD resources are not used unless other FEMA resources have either been expended or cannot respond in the required time.⁷¹ USNORTHCOM provides “command and control of Department of Defense HD efforts and coordinates defense support of civil authorities.”⁷² Through their Army component command, USARNORTH they are fully integrated within the ten FEMA regions. A DCO is assigned to each region who “plans, coordinates, and integrates Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) with local, state, tribal, and federal agencies.”⁷³ “The DCO coordinates and processes all requests for military assistance with the exception of US Army Corps of Engineer (USACE) support, or NG forces in state active duty status or Title 32.”⁷⁴

The DoD has clearly recognized and implemented an organizational structure designed to work closely within FEMA’s regional framework. However, “particularly important to FEMA is the role of the NG who is available for activation and employment in support of the State Governors’ disaster response requirements. . . .”⁷⁵ A state’s NG use is coordinated thru a State Coordination Officer (SCO), and FEMA coordinates individually with each state involved in an

⁷⁰McBride-Davis, 2.

⁷¹Ibid., 13.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid., 6.

⁷⁴Richard A. Rabe, MAJ, “Command Relationships of Active and National Guard Forces During Domestic Disaster Response in California” (Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2007), 32.

⁷⁵McBride-Davis, 13.

event. As each states' headquarters responds independently to requests, it seems plausible that some of the problems mentioned by Ms. McBride-Davis; redundancies, differing reporting procedures, and systems incompatibility, may become more likely.

As part of an answer to interview questions, multiple responses mentioned that EMAC agreements seem to work well and provide for effective utilization of resources available. However, it was also noted that while the NG has effectively cross-leveled materiel resources between states as they prepare for their war-time missions, no process has been implemented to enhance preparation for potential HD and CS missions.⁷⁶

With regard to monetary resources, Source A responded to the question on participation in multi-state exercises that no dedicated funding existed for participation in those events. Funding for exercises such as "Vigilant Guard" are the responsibility of the state, and justifying committing resources to such training was difficult when preparing for the next deployment.⁷⁷

The rationale for this author finding the current organizational headquarters structure less than desirable with respect to resources is as follows: unlike the active component, the NG organizational structure is not currently designed to work closely within FEMA's regional framework; monetary resources may not be sufficiently allocated to support HD and CS multi-state exercises; and a plausible argument exists for potential logistical inefficiencies with multiple individually responding state headquarters.

'Unity of Command:' "Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing,

⁷⁶All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. E-mail conversation with a member of the Army National Guard, 31 October 2009.

⁷⁷Ibid.

coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.”⁷⁸ In the NG, that authority rests with the Governor through the Adjutant General, who may call into active service any portion of a state's NG Soldiers deemed necessary. Under State Active Duty or Title 32 authorities command authority is never relinquished, but control to direct activities and operations of the NG forces may be passed to other Adjutant Generals when those Soldiers are working outside their native state. Such was the case responding to Hurricane Katrina, when “the Adjutant Generals of Louisiana and Mississippi were given operational control over the NG forces responding to the disaster in their areas.”⁷⁹

The command relationship between active and NG forces during the Katrina response utilized separate chains of command for both organizations. “USNORTHCOM established Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF-Katrina) to coordinate the growing military response to the disaster and deployed DCOs to all the potentially affected states.”⁸⁰ For the NG, “LTG Blum, Chief of the NGB, held a conference call on 31 August with all fifty-four TAGs to distribute requests for forces and equipment to all TAGs.”⁸¹ Once forces arrived in the area, they fell under separate command structures rather than one single command.

Some of the disadvantages identified with the command relationship during Hurricane Katrina was “there was no unity of command binding all military forces supporting the operation. Requests for military assets and assistance were run over several different chains of command. Additionally, the NGB had no command or tasking authority over NG forces in any

⁷⁸Rabe, 8.

⁷⁹Ibid., 16.

⁸⁰Ibid., 59.

⁸¹Ibid.

state. Requests for additional NG forces were managed by the NGB, but accepting mission request for assets was up to the individual state's governors and TAGs to approve or decline. Requests for forces were often sent out as a blanket requests for any state to accept.”⁸²

“The (Katrina) response would eventually entail more than 22,000 active-duty Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, the activation of Title 32 status for more than 40,000 NG Soldiers and Airmen, and hundreds of ships, fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft.⁸³ According to a report by the US Congress in 2006, “it took a considerable amount of time to achieve a unified military command structure under JTF-Katrina, and to provide a clear understanding of where, when, and how military assets were being employed in the relief effort.”⁸⁴

The review of the Hurricane Katrina response does indicate problems with unity of command. However, this author previously noted other examples of existing NG state headquarters commanding available forces favorably. Therefore, the existing headquarters structure is designated as desirable when commanding forces for HD and CS significant events, reiterating that the definition of desirable acknowledges potential inefficiencies or means to improve effectiveness.

Personnel and Facilities ‘Availability;’ Bernascoli’s thesis discussed previously cited the works of Millet, Murray, and Watman, who stated “At the tactical level, military effectiveness concerns itself most with the conversion of potential combat power into applied combat

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Allan Selburg, MAJ, “The Adequacy of Current Interagency Doctrine” (Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2007), 44.

⁸⁴Ibid., 43.

power.”⁸⁵ Facilities currently exist to support the current NG headquarters and those leaders have successfully applied the state’s combat power in numerous CS missions in recent history. According to Source C, the author’s own state headquarters effectively managed personnel resources this last spring during the floods of the Red River valley, of which the Minnesota NG provided logistical support.⁸⁶

However, one indication that further efficacy might be possible is the recent introduction and implementation of the Domestic All-Hazards Response Team (DART) referenced in Appendix E. The teams are to conduct “contingency planning; coordinates with participating states on existing Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC) and Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD); mobilizes and deploys scalable modular force packages to an affected area in support of a JFHQ-State to provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) capabilities in order to mitigate the impact of a significant event.”⁸⁷ The implementation of such teams may indicate NGB believes potential for further efficacy exists, leading to this author’s finding that the current organizational headquarters structure is desirable without being optimal.

⁸⁵Millet, Murray, and Watman quoted in Jeffrey J. Bernasconi, CDR, U.S. Navy, “Military Effectiveness: A Reappraisal” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 2007), 2.

⁸⁶Source C is referring to the Red River flooding in the spring of 2009, which brought record flood levels to the Fargo, ND and Moorhead, MN area. All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. E-mail correspondence with a member of the Army National Guard, 31 October 2009.

⁸⁷Electronic correspondence with author, 25 July, 2009, “NGB memorandum for the Adjutants General of all States, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Commanding General of the District of Columbia,” 8 July 2009.

Table 3. DOTMLPF Rubric for Current NG Organizational Structure

Selected evaluation criteria (DOTMLPF) Current Organizational Structure For HD and CS missions (COA 1)	Optimal	Desirable	Less than Desirable
Doctrine: Utilization		X	
Organization: Unity of Effort			X
Training: Emergency Preparedness			X
Material: Resources			X
Leadership: Unity of Command		X	
Personnel and Facilities: Availability		X	

Source: Created by author.

Proposed Regional Headquarters Evaluated

‘Utilization:’ This thesis hypothesizes what affect on efficacy would occur at the state level from standing up NG regional headquarters. However, while the national and strategic level considerations of standing up regional NG headquarters is not addressed in this thesis, it cannot be ignored that it exists. Consequently, perhaps the weakest case for any of the DOTMLPF criteria selected can be made for utilization. A regional headquarters may contribute to situational understanding of regional events, and thus the ability to utilize available forces efficiently and effectively. However, no potential benefits outweigh the concern that regional headquarters proposals relieve State Governors and their Adjutant General of control over at least some of their states’ Soldiers. Any centralization of power away from the Governor detracts from states’ rights and is contrary to Title 32 of the United States Code, and is therefore unconstitutional in premise.

Several ideas have circulated as to how to overcome this barrier, such as discussed in “Active Component Rapid Response Force; The Answer to the Military’s Issues with Efficient

and Effective Support during Response to and Recovery from Incidents of National Significance?” by Major William W. Johnson of the United States Marine Corps. In this thesis he mentioned a solution of voluntary memorandums of understanding allowing NG forces of multiple states to operate under the authority of a headquarters comprised of Soldiers from other states.⁸⁸

Regardless of the feasibility of such solutions, it is surmised that Governors would be hesitant to relinquish control of any of their Soldiers for domestic response. Doing so could potentially reduce their potential to respond to their own state’s emergencies. For instance, “a state adjacent to the requesting state may be reluctant to commit personnel and equipment to a regional response for fear of needing its resources in a delayed or probable follow-on incident. Some states withheld needed resources, such as ambulances, from assisting with (Hurricane) Katrina to ensure they were prepared just in case they had an unforeseen requirement.”⁸⁹

Arriving at a consensus between states regarding authorities granted a regional headquarters for NG HD and CS missions would be difficult, but would have to be decided before effective and efficient utilization of forces could be expected. Assuming the constitutional challenges could be overcome, the potential for disagreements, the anticipated unwillingness of some governors to participate, and even non-compliance with directives from a regional headquarters during a serious incident, all contribute to the author determining a regional headquarters is less than desirable with regard to utilization of forces.

⁸⁸William W. Johnson, MAJ. USMC, “Active Component Rapid Response Force; The Answer to the Military’s Issues with Efficient and Effective Support during Response to and Recovery from Incidents of National Significance” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2007), 64.

⁸⁹Nuismer, 15.

‘Unity of Effort:’ Perhaps the strongest case for any of the DOTMLPF criteria selected can be made for unity of effort. Three strong arguments exist regarding shortfalls in current HD and CS preparation; the resolution of which would be facilitated by a NG regional headquarters: (1) critical infrastructure protection; (2) importance of working with the private sector; (3) intergovernmental coordination. Each argument will be briefly discussed to provide further clarity.

The Need for Policy Framework to Develop Disaster Resilient Regions by Brandon Hardenbrook was one of the key works describing the first argument citing a current shortfall in planning and preparation regarding critical infrastructure protection. More than 80,000 sites have been identified as critical infrastructure already, with the number likely to increase.⁹⁰ Each state is responsible for mitigating the risk to its critical infrastructure. However, while the quantity and criticality varies between states, availability of resources required may or may not correspond accordingly. There undoubtedly are limited assets available for this mission, and the amount is far inadequate to protect all critical infrastructure.

The question becomes which critical infrastructure to dedicate assets to? The answer is about balancing risk. When military students study tactical defense, a frequent lesson is that if you try to protect everything, you will protect nothing. That same lesson is applicable with protection of critical infrastructure, resources have to be used wisely to minimize the threat. Theoretically this means that resources (planning, training, and execution) from other states may need to be expended on protection of infrastructure outside of state boundaries. This theory may be especially relevant during a multi-state incident. While the advantage to any individual state is

⁹⁰Hardenbrook, 5.

arguably dependant on whether they are on the giving end or the recipient of resources, the cumulative benefit of a reduced threat to the states comprising the region is paramount.

An extension of the first argument is the need to work more with the private sector. Because the influence of many businesses in the private sector extends beyond state borders, coordination should be conducted on a regional level. A handful of regional public-private partnerships exist today, along with various fusion centers and Regional Information Sharing Analytical Centers (ISACs), one example being the Surface Transportation and Public Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST/ PT ISAC). These partnerships and centers demonstrate feasibility and value to a regional approach. Additionally, the Department of the Interior's (DOI) Regional Emergency Coordination Centers (RECC) has been of great assistance during crisis situations that can cross jurisdictional boundaries. The benefit to the states' NG resulting from regional cooperation with the private sector is reduction in risk through sharing of responsibility.

Finally, an argument can be rationally made that a regional approach would improve intergovernmental coordination and improve homeland security readiness. Key works demonstrating this correlation are found in *Designing Homeland Security Policy within a Regional Structure: A Needs Assessment of Local Security Concerns* by Kiki Caruson and Susan MacManus and *Improving the National Response to Catastrophic Disaster* by Dr. James Carafano. A somewhat amusing yet potentially disturbing quote from Carafano states "if you have seen what one city or state are doing about emergency preparedness and response, you have seen what one city or state are doing about emergency preparedness and response."⁹¹ The

⁹¹James Jay Carafano, Ph.D, "Improving the National Response to Catastrophic Disaster," Statement before the Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives, *The*

implication being that efforts must be made to create more uniformity, but also perhaps that working together and becoming familiar with each other is crucial to ensuring understanding. “Transitions from routine to crisis mode are smoothed by familiarity with regional interagency organizations and policy. Regional responses are more easily coordinated and timely than federal response, because of proximity and stake in recovery efforts.”⁹² For all of these reasons, the author finds that a regional headquarters is optimal for unity of effort.

‘Emergency Preparedness.’ In their article, “State and Regional Responses to Disasters: Solving the 72-Hour Problem” by Rhodes and Carafano, regional offices were said to have four key missions: facilitating regional planning; organizing regional exercises and training; helping states and local communities to prepare for catastrophic events; and coordinating critical infrastructure protection.⁹³ The authors state these missions cannot be carried out without key partnerships and leaders should work with state, local, and private authorities in their regions to identify critical gaps in preparedness and critical infrastructure protection.⁹⁴ “Through regional programs, states could learn the capabilities of their partnering states and quickly tap or merge resources as needed.”⁹⁵ Other key works, included in the bibliography of this paper, came to

Heritage Foundation, 2005, <http://www.edgeweb.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/tst091505a.cfm?renderforprint=1> (accessed 6 July 2009), 4.

⁹²Nuismer, 24.

⁹³Rhodes and Carafano, 4.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, 3.

similar conclusions on the importance of a regional focus. “Effective regional coordination can enhance emergency preparedness.”⁹⁶

A second justification offered to explain the need for a regional headquarters was that insufficient planning and preparedness levels currently exist to prevent or mitigate potential threats. For example, EMAC and FEMA interface with response and recovery divisions.⁹⁷ Less emphasis is placed on the preparedness and mitigation divisions. Many authors advocated the need to be more proactive rather than reactive, and many felt a regional headquarters would facilitate the necessary planning to improve emergency preparedness.

As noted previously, a concerted effort is being made at the national level to improve emergency preparedness through policy and guidance for tiered exercises. There is also clear guidance dictating training and exercises at the regional level, such as the regional training and exercise plan workshops (TEPWs) within each of the ten FEMA regions and the National Exercise Program (NEP), providing exercise technical assistance to all ten (10) FEMA regions and designed to support local, state, and regional exercise initiatives. Therefore, the author concludes that overwhelming evidence suggests that training as defined by emergency preparedness is optimal utilizing the regional headquarters structure.

‘Resources:’ In 2006, the *Nationwide Plan Review: Phase II Report* describes resource management as the “Achilles’ heel” of emergency planning.⁹⁸ Problems associated with resource management were noted when planning and preparation for events had regional implications.

⁹⁶Hardenbrook, 8.

⁹⁷Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Organization Structure,” <http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=43848> (accessed 6 July 2009).

⁹⁸U.S. Department of Homeland Security in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation, 10.

“These findings indicate that states tend to struggle most with issues surrounding broader regional planning where planning requirements exceed their customary planning scope and require intricate coordination across state boundaries.”⁹⁹ “The critical capability to effectively manage resources is also limited. This is particularly acute where resource management spans jurisdictional boundaries and resource management transactions involve incompatible resource management systems.”¹⁰⁰

In addition to summarizing the findings, the report made recommendations for improving those problems. The recommendations included strengthening regional cooperation and collaboration. “Regional planning capabilities, processes, and resources should be strengthened in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal’s National Priorities to expand regional collaboration and strengthen planning and citizen preparedness capabilities.”¹⁰¹ The study also suggested that planning conducted at a regional level would contribute to efficacy. “Regional planning should meld specific jurisdictional plans and pooled resources into combined outcomes. These plans can be used in turn for more precise and effective resource allocation decisions.”¹⁰²

In partial response to a related email question, one interviewee mentioned that sufficient resources were not allocated to effectively participate in regional HD and CS exercises.¹⁰³ However, a suggestion in the Phase II report was that resources be allocated proportionately to

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Ibid., 73.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. E-mail conversation with a member of the Army National Guard, 31 October 2009.

the needs identified from regional planning. “Plans identify requirements for specific operational capabilities to drive multi-year planning, programming, and budgeting. Resource allocation is conditioned on and measured against delivery of specific operational capabilities as required by homeland security plans.”¹⁰⁴

In determining the efficacy of a regional headquarters with regard to utilization of resources, this author notes that the evaluations that led to the 2006 Phase II report cited serious concerns regarding resource management at a regional level. Since that time, NGB has responded by assisting states with information sharing, provided states with regional educational opportunities, and facilitated participation in various regional exercises. However, at the state level, the existing NG headquarters still has resource challenges inhibiting regional participation.

While monetary resourcing may not automatically improve with implementation of a regional headquarters, it seems likely that it would initially be properly sourced and funded. Once operational, it would likely influence multi-year planning, programming, and budgeting. Furthermore, if the recommendations of the Phase II report were followed, future resources would be allocated based on the likely improved homeland security plans produced by the regional headquarters. The author therefore concludes that a regional headquarters is desirable with regards to resources. While a regional headquarters may not reduce the expenditure of total resources, it seems likely it would contribute to a more effective allocation of those resources in planning, preparing, exercising, and responding to HD and CS missions.

‘Unity of Command:’ USNORTHCOM provides command and control of DoD HD efforts and coordinates Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA). Through their Army

¹⁰⁴U.S. Department of Homeland Security in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation, 79.

component command, USARNORTH, they also plan for and participate in exercises and are fully integrated within the 10 FEMA regions. “The Active Army recognizes the importance of working with regions.¹⁰⁵ While simple comparison to the active army’s more integrated relationship with FEMA regions does not justify a change in NG headquarters structure, it does show the seeming importance military planners placed on regional relationships. A logical extension to that thought process would deduce similar benefits through a more integrated relationship between FEMA and the NG.

The Domestic All-hazards Response Team (DART) memorandum shown in Appendix E states that NGB will further consider realigning Division Headquarters with FEMA regions for the years 2011 and 2012. This implies that NGB sees the possibility of improved efficacy derived from a division headquarters aligned by FEMA region, responsible for command and control of Soldiers with a regional responsibility. From this analysis, the author concludes that a regional headquarters would be desirable with respect to unity of command.

Personnel and Facilities ‘Availability:’ *In Regional CS Forces for HD and CS Missions*, it is suggested that “NG assets that reside in the state where FEMA regional headquarters are located may logically be designated the NG CSF (regional) headquarters for that region.”¹⁰⁶ Since FEMA regional headquarters are aligned with major population bases, they are most likely to be centrally located to most significant events requiring a large response. Regional headquarters advocates also speculate that creation of a regional headquarters would reduce manpower requirements at the state level, and regional headquarters personnel vacancies could

¹⁰⁵Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)/Defense Coordinating Element (DCE).”

¹⁰⁶Nuismer, 11.

be filled with well-qualified candidates from a larger personnel pool. However, it is likely some states would object to a regional headquarters continuously located in only one state of the region, and may prefer a rotational headquarters such as envisioned in the current Domestic All-hazards Response Team (DART) concept.

There are other complications associated with personnel and facilities availability if NG regional headquarters were to be aligned by FEMA region. Figure 1, FEMA’s Organization Structure Regional Operations, shown earlier depicts the FEMA regions, and how some regions have noncontiguous states or territories. Some regions also span large geographical distances. These obstacles would likely inhibit representative staffing from participating states of a regional headquarters, as well as future participation in planned exercises and response to actual events. This author concludes that a regional headquarters is desirable, but decisions regarding locations and rotation of personnel need to be addressed before the rating would change to optimal.

Table 4. DOTMLPF Rubric for Regional NG Headquarters Organization

Selected evaluation criteria (DOTMLPF) Regional HQ Organizational Structure For HD and CS missions (COA 2)	Optimal	Desirable	Less than Desirable
Doctrine: Utilization			X
Organization: Unity of Effort	X		
Training: Emergency Preparedness	X		
Material: Resources		X	
Leadership: Unity of Command		X	
Personnel and Facilities: Availability		X	

Source: Created by author.

JCD Analysis

“The JCD is intended to provide situational awareness of state-level domestic emergency response capabilities.”¹⁰⁷ “Currently, the JCD is the only functioning and operational system capturing NG preparedness to respond to domestic support missions.”¹⁰⁸ In addition to other JCD reporting requirements, all fifty-four (54) states and territories assess the capabilities of their current force to respond to Level One and Level Two requirements on a quarterly basis. “The analysis of NG current force is the most critical element of the JCD. An accurate evaluation informs the NG and State officials of whether they have adequate equipment and personnel stationed within the state to respond to domestic emergencies or whether they need to make plans and agreements pre-arranging outside support.”¹⁰⁹

For Level One requirements, Non-Guard State agencies and a state’s NG units provide the vast majority of requirements from organic assets.¹¹⁰ Level Two requirements are those “required to respond to any extraordinary natural or man-made events without external forces.”¹¹¹ Consequently, this thesis is most interested in the capabilities of the state with regards to Level Two requirements. The JCD mentions Level Two may someday include the NRF eight (8) scenario sets: explosive attack, nuclear attack, radiological attack, biological attack, chemical attack, natural disasters, cyber attack and pandemic influenza. All of these scenarios may have regional implications.

¹⁰⁷National Guard Bureau. *Joint Capabilities Database*, 5.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, 33.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, 28.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, 34.

The current force portion of the JCD is prepared by a state's designated Action Officer (AO) and approved by the TAG or designated representative. The capability is determined by the "status of the individual units available to perform emergency duty as well as any existing state or regional agreements. The TAG or designated representative provides an overall rating for both Levels One and Two within the JCD."¹¹² The JCD may be used by other states and outside organizations (NGB, USNORTHCOM, DHS, and others) to determine whether a state has a particular capability.¹¹³

The author's analysis of the JCD is not meant to re-evaluate accumulated data or second-guess capabilities of reporting states. Other than reading the process for determining a state's capabilities, as directed in *The Joint Capabilities Database (JCD) Handbook*, the author has not received training or accumulated relevant experience. Moreover, NGB evaluates the submitted assessments from the states and determines mitigation required. The author's purpose in analyzing the JCD for this thesis was to determine whether the existing NG headquarters contributes to efficacy in planning, preparation, and utilization of resources for HD and CS missions, and predict whether a regional headquarters would do so as well.

Figure 2, JCD, Level Two NG Current Force, is shown below, and graphically demonstrates the capabilities of the states to respond to Level Two requirements as of their last reporting period. Thirty-nine (39) out of fifty-four (54) states and territories, or seventy-two (72 percent), categorize themselves as 'Red' in at least one of the ten essential capabilities listed in Appendix B, The Ten Core Capabilities. The first number on top of each state represents the quantity of essential ten capabilities the state assesses as inadequate. The second number

¹¹²Ibid., 36.

¹¹³Ibid., 37.

represents the quantity of essential ten capabilities the state assesses as mitigated. Compiling the total number of inadequate assessments for the red color-coded states yields two hundred thirty (230) deficiencies. Another fifty four (54) deficiencies are assessed as mitigated. Therefore, this snapshot in time depicts a total of two hundred eighty four deficiencies with nineteen (19 percent) mitigated.



Figure 2. JCD, Level Two NG Current Force

Source: National Guard Bureau, <https://ngbjcd.xservices.com/> (accessed 4 November 2009).

The author concludes from his assessment that while current NG headquarters may be effective in responding to Level One requirements, greater deficiencies exist in response to Level Two requirements. The author is not aware if further mitigation efforts exist at NGB, and cannot make an accurate determination if actual shortfalls exist. However, noting the number and

variety of deficiencies within each region, it seems likely that conducting further assessments at the regional level may result in fewer deficiencies without mitigation. Further, since the TAG or his designated representative is responsible for considering the status of the state's units to perform emergency duty including regional agreements, it may be of benefit for the states in a region to further assess capabilities after all states have reported. Since all states simultaneously report their capabilities quarterly, it seems plausible that a state may not be aware of a neighbor's deficiencies or the extent of assistance required for mitigation. Therefore, the author finds that his JCD analysis supports the assessment that the existing headquarters structure is less than desirable with regard to resources, and a regional headquarters would be desirable.

Comparison of the Two Courses of Action

The two distinct courses of action evaluated for efficacy were the current NG headquarters structure as COA1 and a regional headquarters structure as COA2. The author subjectively assessed the extent each contributed to the previously selected DOTMLPF criteria. If the author determined from his research that the course of action contributed to a criterion with no perceived means of improvement in efficiency or effectiveness, he annotated it as optimal. If he determined it did not contribute to efficacy regarding the selected evaluation criteria, he marked it as less than desirable in the rubric. If the selected criteria were expected to be accomplished, with potential inefficiencies or means to improve effectiveness possible, the rating was marked as desirable.

COA 1 (existing headquarters) rated higher in only one criterion- utilization of forces. The rationale given for this desirable rating noted the successfulness of current EMAC agreements and good working relationships between counterparts in neighboring states. COA 2 (regional headquarters) scored optimal or desirable in all criteria except utilization of forces. The

rationale given for the less than desirable rating noted the required changes to current laws to uphold constitutionality, the voluntary agreements that would be necessary between Governors to provide authority to regional headquarters, and the likely aversion to loss of control by the State Governor over some or all of their Soldiers. However, the theoretical benefits of a regional headquarters with respect to utilization of forces are evident in numerous readings if these obstacles were overcome. Regional headquarters could utilize forces at their disposal using many of what the military considers the principles of war: Objective-directing every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective; Mass-massing the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time; Economy of Force- employing all combat power available in the most effective way possible and allocating minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts; Maneuver- exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability; Unity of Command- all forces under one responsible commander.

COA 2 scored substantially better (Optimal versus Less than Desirable) in the criteria 'Unity of Effort' and 'Emergency Preparedness'. COA 2 also scored higher (Desirable versus Less than Desirable) in the criteria 'Resources'. Both COAs were equal with regards to 'Unity of Command', and 'Availability' of personnel and facilities. Therefore COA 2, the regional headquarters, decidedly outperformed the current headquarters structure and is the recommended course of action from this analysis.

Secondary Research Questions Answered

Are there any other economic or non-economic benefits or drawbacks to the concept from an individual states' perspective? The clear answer to this secondary question is yes: closer adherence to the principles of war during planning, preparation, and execution of mission; better

sharing of responsibility and cooperation with the private sector; improved protection of critical infrastructure; more efficient and effective coordination with interagency; and reduction in risk through improved readiness, are all benefits the states may realize.

Is creation of some variant of what one author dubbed CSFs, comprised of Soldiers with a dedicated HD and CS rotating mission between participating states within a region, a necessary component to the regionally managed concept?¹¹⁴ Whether the responding forces to CS and HD missions were dubbed CSFs, Civil Response Forces (CRF), Active Component Rapid Response Force (RRF), Rapid Reaction Units (RRU), or another acronym, the consensus in most literature reviewed was that identification of some group to be commanded by the regional headquarters was necessary. The challenges associated with a regional headquarters having the appropriate authorities and availability of troops to command were the reasons for the less than desirable rating for the criteria ‘utilization of forces’. This remains the largest stumbling block in the opinion of this author and will need to be resolved if a regional headquarters structure is to be implemented.

Is the suggestion of altering the Global Force Management cycle to include one year of non-deployment for CSF obligation as suggested by the July 2006 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) a necessary component for CSFs?¹¹⁵ This question was not able to be fully answered in this paper due to the additional research that would be necessary, and the strategic implications of such a change. This author recommends this question as deserving of further study. However, most of the literature reviewed did not mention this to be a necessity. Additionally, interviewee Source A mentioned there is a significant amount of our doctrine,

¹¹⁴Wormuth et al., xi.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 77.

facilities, and training that crosses over into the domestic mission set.¹¹⁶ This author speculates that a change to the Global Force Management cycle may not be justified if the rationale was only for the purpose of providing additional training time.

Primary Research Question Answered

The author concludes that a regional headquarters structure could provide greater efficacy with regard to the selected evaluation criteria than the existing NG headquarters structure. The proposed regional approach scored equal or better in five (5) out of six (6) criteria; scoring less than desirable in one criterion, 'utilization of forces'. This author further speculates that potential benefits could materialize from a regional headquarters that could negate this lone adverse finding.

Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 4 records the process of analysis through evaluation of the viewpoints of authors, the JCD by FEMA regions, and the interviewees' answers to email questions. Limited criteria were analyzed as defined in the rubric tables shown in chapter 3. A subjective assessment for efficiency and effectiveness of a regional headquarters for HD and CS missions and answers to secondary questions culminates chapter 4, and will be followed by conclusions and recommendations in chapter 5.

¹¹⁶All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. E-mail conversation with a member of the Army National Guard, 31 October 2009.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Organization

The purpose of the study is to examine the regional headquarters concept from a states' perspective, determining whether it would improve the NG's ability to accomplish HD and CS with greater efficiency and effectiveness. Chapter 5 is organized by first reiterating the findings of the analysis, and noting the author's expected and unexpected findings. The author postulates what the results mean and their implication to the NG. This is followed by the author's recommendations for action and further study.

Summary of Findings

Three of the author's secondary questions related to this thesis were surmised during the author's review of research material in chapter 2. These questions included: changes to TAG authorities and responsibilities- a legitimate concern to the states requiring either voluntary agreements between Governors and TAGs or mandated legislative changes; changes to current responsibilities and structure of the NGB- NGB would remain the agency administering to the needs of the Army NG and the Air NG, providing liaison between the Army and Air Force and the various NG units; feasibility of managing missions and resources for multiple states- definitely feasible, "the successes of other regional collaborations must be reviewed to determine whether these examples could be appropriated to address homeland security issues. Until this happens, the nation will continue down the path where individual agencies and jurisdictions prepare and respond to disasters on their own terms."¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷Hardenbrook, 15.

Other secondary questions were answered during the analysis conducted in Chapter 4, during consideration of how each COA would score with regard to the selected evaluation criteria. The answer to the question of other benefits from an individual states' perspective was yes: closer adherence to the principles of war during planning, preparation, and execution of mission; better sharing of responsibility and cooperation with the private sector; improved protection of critical infrastructure; more efficient and effective coordination with interagency; and reduction in risk through improved readiness. There was also one disconcerting drawback; centralization of power away from the Governor detracts from states' rights and is unconstitutional in premise.

The question of whether CSFs or something similar in design was essential to a regional concept was not necessary to answer when considering only creation of the regional headquarters itself. However, identification of forces to be task organized under the authority of the regional headquarters would certainly behoove implementation and execution. Numerous authors suggested some variant of this organizational structure, and further study is recommended. Similarly the question of whether an alteration of the Global Force Management cycle is necessary was beyond the scope of this paper due to the additional research required and the strategic implications of such a change. However, most of the literature reviewed did not mention this to be a necessity.

In chapter four's COA comparison, the author answered the thesis primary question by concluding that a regional headquarters structure could provide greater efficacy with regard to the selected evaluation criteria than the existing NG headquarters structure. The proposed regional approach scored equal or better in all criteria other than utilization; and the author speculates that potential benefits could materialize from a regional headquarters that would

counter this adverse finding. However, the challenges associated with providing a regional headquarters with command authorities and the corresponding loss of authority at the state level are significant issues to be resolved.

Expected and Unexpected Findings

The author's findings were mostly expected. The vast majority of material discovered and researched by the author emphasized the need for a regional approach. One likely explanation is that people are less inclined to write articles advocating status quo. Therefore, the author realizes the difficulty in remaining unbiased and suspects his results may be less definitive than they appear. Moreover, the author admits material existed in his research that could have permitted him to form a contrary opinion with some justification. However, the author did not expect the overwhelming degree that COA 2 outperformed COA 1. The results add validity to his thesis and should therefore encourage others to seriously consider the merits of a regional headquarters structure for the NG.

Implications

This thesis provided sufficient justification for a discussion of a regional approach to ensue at the state level. The original impetus for this thesis question came from the deliberations of senior, state-level NG Officers trying to ascertain ways to cut operating expenses to conform to budget restraints. The assumption was made that a reduction in state staffing would occur if a regional headquarters was implemented, since some positions would be redundant. However, this author stated that monetary savings should not be the sole reason for such a significant change, and conducted research to ascertain how the states' HD and CS missions would be affected. This thesis demonstrates that additional efficacy may be realized by the state in

planning, preparing, and executing those missions; resulting in additional benefits to the state beyond the potential savings to payroll.

For Further Study

The secondary questions relating to a regional headquarters command authority of troops, where those troops would come from, and how they would be task organized, is still a subject for debate and requires further analysis if a NG regional headquarters concept is pursued. Likewise, if HD and CS becomes a higher priority, changes to the Global Force Management cycle may be worth considering. This paper did not include evaluation of Non-Guard (state) assets. NGB does request the states to assess and report these capabilities. Future analysis should consider whether the inclusion of these assets would have impact on this thesis.

Things That Could Have Been Done Differently

This author conducted an oral history via Army Knowledge Online (AKO) email with a few chosen senior leaders who serve full-time for the NG to obtain their opinions on questions related to this thesis. The author realizes their opinions may have been influenced by their profession, and that the limited number of respondents prohibits it from being any type of credible sampling. In contrast, the author could have conducted an actual interview to obtain more thorough responses, or conducted an actual survey with a more diverse group of participants constituting a greater sampling size. This may have yielded additional responses and provided more credibility to the results.

Summary and Conclusions

Creation of regional JFHQ could improve the NG's ability to accomplish HD and CS with greater efficiency and effectiveness. Benefits from an individual states' perspective include:

closer adherence to the principles of war during planning, preparation, and execution of mission; better sharing of responsibility and cooperation with the private sector; improved protection of critical infrastructure; more efficient and effective coordination with interagency; and reduction in risk through improved readiness.

This thesis provides sufficient justification for discussion of regional NG headquarters to continue at the state level. In addition to the assumed monetary savings likely resulting from reductions in state JFHQ staffing, this thesis demonstrates that additional efficacy may be realized by the state in planning, preparing, and executing HD and CS missions; resulting in additional benefits to the state beyond potential savings to payroll.

ILLUSTRATIONS




Figure 3. Notional Relationship Between HD, CS, and Homeland Security Missions
 Source: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-27, *Homeland Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), Appendix A, 115.

GLOSSARY

Civil Support (CS) - Department of Defense support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities.¹¹⁸

Civil Support Forces (CSF) - Operational units that would comprise each CSF would be drawn from NG forces in the states that make up each FEMA region. When not actually responding to an event or training as a cohesive unit, the operational elements of the CSF would report to the adjutant generals and governors of the states in which they are located. “The CS Forces would have two key tasks: first, to lead NG planning, training, and exercising for CS at the regional level; and second, to provide a sizable operational response force that could deploy to an incident within 12 to 24 hours; establish an initial command, control, and communications capability; provide initial reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) services; and augment state and local first responders performing management tasks.”¹¹⁹

Critical Infrastructure - “Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would be a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”¹²⁰ (Section 1016(e) of the Patriot Act).

FEMA Regions- FEMA has ten regional offices, and two area offices. Each region serves several states, and regional staffs work directly with the states to help plan for disasters, develop mitigation programs, and meet needs when major disasters occur.

Homeland Defense (HD) - Protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. An “external” threat or aggression is an action, event, or circumstance that originates from outside the boundaries of the homeland. Threats planned, prompted, promoted, caused, or executed by external actors may develop or take place inside the boundaries of the homeland. The reference to “external threats” does not limit where or how attacks could be planned and executed.¹²¹

¹¹⁸Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, *Civil Support* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007).

¹¹⁹Wormuth et al., 74.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, 2.

¹²¹Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-27.

Joint Capabilities Database (JCD) - An unclassified database of the states' assessments of their ability to support domestic operations. The Joint Capabilities Database (JCD) is an offshoot of the JCSSP and is intended to provide visibility of state-level domestic emergency capabilities. The JCD is a relational database. A relational database operates by maintaining numerous pieces of information, data, and applies electronic tags to connect the data. The JCD is accessible from any computer with internet access. The web site is: <https://ngbjcd.xservices.com>.

Joint Capabilities State Strategic Plan (JCSSP) - State plans that included a capabilities snapshot of NG Current and Future Forces, Non-Guard (State) Assets, and Other Reserve Components.

Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) - "A core area containing a large population nucleus, together with adjacent communities having a high degree of economic and social integration with that core."¹²² (U.S. Census Bureau 1999).

Rubric- A rubric as "a scoring tool that lists the criteria for a piece of work or 'what counts'." Generally rubrics specify the level of performance expected for several levels of quality. These levels of quality may be written as different ratings (e.g., Excellent, Good, Needs Improvement) or as numerical scores (e.g., 4, 3, 2, 1) which are then added up to form a total score which then is associated with a grade (e.g., A, B, C, etc).¹²³

¹²²Hardenbrook, 9.

¹²³4Teachers.org, See Rubistar, Create Rubrics for your Project, Definition cited from "Heidi Goodrich, a rubrics expert." <http://rubistar.4teachers.org/index.php?screen=WhatIs&module=Rubistar> (accessed 25 April 2009).

APPENDIX A

CONSENT AND USE AGREEMENT FOR ORAL HISTORY MATERIALS

You have the right to choose whether or not you will participate in this oral history interview, and once you begin you may cease participating at any time without penalty. The anticipated risk to you in participating is negligible and no direct personal benefit has been offered for your participation. If you have questions about this research study, please contact the student at: _____ or Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Director of Graduate Degree Programs, at (913) 684-2742.

To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Room 3517, Lewis & Clark Center
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

1. I, _____, participated in an oral history interview conducted by _____, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science

Degree Program, on the following date [s]: _____ concerning the following topic: _____.

2. I understand that the recording [s] and any transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director, Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the recording for my professional records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete edited transcript of this oral history, I will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the recording [s] with the following caveat:

_____ None _____ Other: _____

I understand that my participation in this oral history interview is voluntary and I may stop participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the tapes and transcripts resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

Name of Interviewee Signature Date

Accepted on Behalf of the Army by Date

APPENDIX B

THE TEN CORE CAPABILITIES

1. Command and Control (C2)

- Provides command, control, communications, computers, (C4)
- Provides command and control for all forces assigned an HLD/S mission (through a dual-hat T10/T32 Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander, if authorized)
- Improves coordination with federal military responders
- Provide Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI)
- Plans for training, exercises and manage HLD/HLS operations
- Coordinate/liaison with state and federal agencies
- Directs access to State Emergency Management Agency
- Directs access to first responders
- Operates the Joint Operations Center (JOC) 24/7
- Focal point of the NG Homeland Security response
- Processes intelligence data and information from all sources
- Provides technical expertise (C2, Comm, CST, CBRNE, Medical, etc.)
- Provides Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR)
- Provides information collection and threat recognition
- Conducts hazard and vulnerability analysis
- Conducts reconnaissance

2. Aviation / Airlift

- Provide aircraft to transport personnel and cargo during times of emergency
- Provide military aircraft to facilitate reconnaissance, command and control and communications during emergencies
- Deploy the force and support the first responders using air assets (ARNG/ANG rotary/fixed wing, leased, etc.)
- Provide airborne fire-fighting support
- Assist in airborne medical evacuation
- Provide air search and rescue

3. CBRNE - Chemical/Biological/Radiological/Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive

- Identify CBRNE agents/substances
- Assess current and projected consequences
- Provide medical and technical advice
- Advise responders on measures to take
- Provide critical protection to the force
- Assist with requests for additional military support personnel
- Support local and state authorities at incident site

4. Communications

- Provides secure and non-secure communications support (voice, video, data) for mobilization of resources during existing or potential emergency conditions
- Throughout all phases of response (en-route, reach-back, tactical), establish and maintain interoperable communications with local, state, federal agencies, and volunteer organizations as necessary respond to domestic missions
- Utilizes established communication organizations, processes, and procedures to coordinate and disseminate information before, during, and after an impending or actual emergency
- Layers-in unique equipment, as required, to allow interface with federal, state, and civil emergency response agencies in support of domestic security missions and disaster response

5. Engineering

- Infrastructure damage assessment
- Debris removal
- Hasty road construction
- Hasty bridge construction
- Construction of emergency housing facilities/base camps
- Water purification
- Power generation
- Ground firefighting
- Explosive ordinance disposal (EOD)
- Search and rescue

6. Logistics

- Support deployment and redeployment of forces and equipment during all phases of support operations at multiple operating locations
- Support civil authorities
- Sustain deployed forces
- Provide mass shelter (temporary)
- Conduct warehousing operations
- Provide procurement, management, re-supply, distribution operations
- Provide mortuary support

7. Maintenance

- Provide assigned unit equipment in support (either direct or general) of state missions
- Ensure unit equipment is operational and available for state missions throughout the fiscal year
- Sustain assigned unit equipment during all phases of state missions

8. Medical

- Support Civilian Emergency Medical System during mass casualty operations to include emergency life saving steps, evacuation, etc.
- Crisis Intervention Stress Management (CISM)
- Assist/support the Public Health System in the distribution and administration of vaccines and antidotes to the public
- Assist in the implementation of the State Emergency Medical Response Plan

9. Security

- Provides an organized, trained and equipped military force capable of supporting civilian law enforcement agencies in maintaining law and order (Defense Support to Civil Authority (DSCA)).
- Provides general security, area, point, route, critical infrastructure protection (CIP)
- Provides a military force capable of conducting security operations and providing deterrence by presenting a viable military presence

10. Transportation (Surface)

- Transport heavy equipment
- Provide assets to transport personnel from the affected area.
- Provide assets to transport cargo:
 - Bulk
 - Palletized
 - Water
 - Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL)

Source: National Guard Bureau. Joint Capabilities Database (JCD) Handbook (Arlington, VA: Government Printing Office, 2009), 22.

APPENDIX C

THE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVE (SAEI)

There are currently 18 categories within the SAEI. They are:

1. Attack on Food Source (Food Contamination)
2. Civil Disturbance
3. Contagious Disease Outbreak (Biological Incident)
4. Cyber-Attack
5. Drought
6. Earthquakes
7. Floods
8. Hoof & Mouth Disease (Foreign Animal Disease)
9. Hurricanes/Typhoons
10. Landslides/Mudflows
11. Nuclear Power Plant Protection/Response
12. Strategic National Stockpile
13. Tornado
14. Tsunami
15. Volcanic Activity
16. Wildland Fires
17. Winter Storm
18. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Response

Source: National Guard Bureau. *Joint Capabilities Database (JCD) Handbook* (Arlington, VA: Government Printing Office, 2009), 43.

APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Does State JFHQ provide Soldiers with adequate Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities to prepare and perform HD and CS missions? Why or why not?
2. Do NG Soldiers participate in sufficient multi-state exercises and conduct adequate training related to potential missions resulting from catastrophic events? (Incidents of National Significance such as the Department of Homeland Security's HD planning scenarios) Why or why not?
3. Are coordination responsibilities for active duty Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs) with multiple NG commands from numerous affected states problematic? Why or why not?
4. Does voluntary participation in EMAC agreements between states provide adequate resources and command and control for HD and CS missions? Why or why not?
5. Referencing the attached memorandum from NGB regarding the Concept of Operations and Initial Sourcing of Domestic All-Hazards Response Teams (DART);
 - a. What benefits or drawbacks do you foresee to a rotational command at Division Headquarters?
 - b. What benefits or drawbacks do you foresee with potentially realigning with FEMA regions at a future date?

APPENDIX E
DOMESTIC ALL-HAZARDS RESPONSE TEAM (DART) CONCEPT



NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
1636 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301 1636

JUL 08 2009

NGB-ZA

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANTS GENERAL OF ALL STATES, PUERTO RICO,
THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS, GUAM, AND THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SUBJECT: All States Log Number 09-0008 Concept of Operations and Initial Sourcing of
Domestic All-Hazards Response Team (DART)

1. Reference. National Guard Regulation 500-1/ANG: 10-8101 National Guard Domestic
Operations, June 2008.

2. Purpose. Approval and implementation of the DART concept and initial sourcing to
support Joint Force Headquarters-State (JFHQ-S) for FY09 domestic responses.

3. Background. The DART concept was developed by the National Guard Bureau
(NGB) to provide a Joint Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG)
regionalized, decentralized approach to provide support for significant all-hazards events.
Key to the concept is providing Adjutants General with operational flexibility for
augmenting their existing forces with modular and scalable force packages that are
supportable, sustainable and affordable, while promoting unity of effort.

4. DART Mission Statement. When requested by an Adjutant General, DART conducts
contingency planning; coordinates with participating States on existing Emergency
Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs) and Time Phased Force Deployment
Data (TPFDD); mobilizes and deploys scalable modular force packages to an affected
area in support of a JFHQ-S to provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)
capabilities in order to mitigate the impact of a significant event. When requested,
DART conducts Joint Reception, Staging, Onward-movement & Integration (JRSO&I) of
inbound forces, and establishes Base Support Installations and Forward Operating
Bases as required in coordination with JFHQ-S for sustaining operations.

5. Discussion. To establish DART initial operational capability, the ARNG Division
Headquarters (HQs) listed below are selected for the DART mission starting in FY 09.
DART subordinate units will be published separately after further mission analysis and
coordination with the States.

- a. 35th Infantry Division (ID), Kansas ARNG (Western Region)
- b. 28th ID, Pennsylvania ARNG (Eastern Region)
- c. 29th ID, Virginia ARNG (Reinforcing Division)

PROPOSED DIV/HQ ROTATION




Figure 4. Proposed DIV/HQ Rotation.

Source: NGB Memorandum For The Adjutants General of all States, Puerto Rico, The U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, And The Commanding General Of The District Of Columbia. Subject: All States Log Number 09-008 Concept of Operations and Initial Sourcing of Domestic All-Hazards Response Team (DART).

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