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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

To examine the need of Creating a Civil Affairs Officer Basic Course

By

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Executive Summary

Title: To examine the need to create a Civil Affairs Officer Basic Course for Army Reserve Officers.

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Thesis: This paper will suggest that Civil Affairs as a branch in the Army has not fully achieved equality of other branches in terms of credibility, skills sets, and personnel that would give commanders a broad understanding of how to utilize Civil Affairs forces. Furthermore, this essay proposes an officer basic course for the Civil Affairs branch to train and populate its force to meet the needs of current and future operations.

Discussion: Effective 16 October 2006, Civil Affairs was established as a basic branch of the Army, pursuant to the authority of Section 3063 (a)(13), Title 10, United States Code (HQUSA-GO 29-signed Secretary of the Army). It is due to this recent and important change in the Civil Affairs structure, that I will attempt to propose the need to create a Civil Affairs Officer Basic Course for Army Reserve Officers. This examination will explore if Civil Affairs as a branch can meet the needs of persistent conflicts in support of the Global War on Terrorism in the complex of stability, security, transition, and reconstruction, operations, irregular warfare and counter-insurgency.

Conclusion: Today, the Civil Affairs force is drastically diminished in its ability to provide adequate Civil Affairs support to combatant commanders. The OPTEMPO, insufficient training and education institutions and lack of modern equipment has given the total force the ability to succeed in a civil-military environment. This is why it is imperative for the Civil Affairs Community to raise, train, and give its CA officers the right skills to perform peace and stability operations so that the conventional U.S. officer can do his or her job.

Table of Contents

DISCLAIMER.....	i
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS & TABLES	ii
PREFACE	iii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
HISTORY.....	3
CIVIL AFFAIRS	6
THE PROBLEM	8
ACCESSION.....	8
THE SCHOOL	11
Diplomacy.....	14
Foreign Language	14
Regional & Cultural Study.....	15
Infrastructure.....	15
Economics.....	15
PERSONNEL.....	17
COST AND BENEFITS	20
CONCESSION.....	22
CONCLUSION	22
ENDNOTES.....	24
BIBLIOGRAPHY	26

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Illustration and Tables

Figures

Figure 1. Civil Affairs Operational Support Structure	7
Figure 2. Civil Affairs Battalion Structure	18
Figure 3. Civil Affairs Company Structure	19
Figure 4. Civil Affairs Team Concept.....	19

Photograph

Photograph. Students between Classes.....	13
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Preface

I would like take this opportunity to acknowledge several individuals who have provided guidance, direction, support and encouragement to think outside the box and propose a controversial topic to the Civil Affairs Community. To the Civil Affairs Community we must make a radical change if we are going to be relevant in the future. Dr. Bradford A. Wineman, a special debt of gratitude is owed for valuable insight, informational support, and determination to produce a quality thesis. To the Master of Military Art and Science committee thank-you for the opportunity. To Major William Carter and Robert Farmer thank you for providing valuable knowledge of the Civil Affairs community's structure and leadership that has help shaped my thesis. I also would like to thank Major Ricardo Warfield for his guidance, knowledge, and friendship in assisting me in this entire endeavor.

An exceptional debt of gratitude is owed for the sacrifices of my loving and always supportive wife, Tammy. Additionally and equally, as contributing to the successful completion of this thesis are the countless sacrifices made by the world's best sons, DJ, Dakota, and Deyton.

"The US military can expect challenges from ever-increasing missions in a civil-military environment. As such, CA [civil affairs] forces offer unique capabilities that not only enhance the mission but also ultimately advance the US political and economic interests."

FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations

Introduction

Civil Affairs (CA) is the heart of the American military's postwar and peace operation capability. The CA civil administration mission is the highest level of that capability in the military. Nearly 58 years after the end of World War II, the Marshall Plan the program where Civil Affairs gained its prominence has been celebrated as the model that led to stability and eventual prosperity in war-torn Europe.¹ In a seamless Total Force, civilian Soldiers are not "just Reservists," but full partners serving with their full-time counterparts as an extension of both the U.S. military and the diplomatic corps. Much of the opposition to "operations other than war" has to do with their unconventional nature, which requires the unique leadership found in Civil Affairs that combines the characteristics of both the warrior and the diplomat. Post-Cold War strategy requires military capabilities that are as constructive during peacetime as they are destructive during wartime.²

Civil Affairs is at the cross roads of making itself relevant for future conflicts and nation building operations. The Civil Affairs Community must adapt to the changing environments and make serious steps to rebalance and transform the Civil Affairs Corps. The CA community has to look at the future, to recruit, organize, train, and equip Civil Affairs Soldiers who will operate as members of joint, interagency, and multinational teams across the globe. The current state of Civil Affairs is in peril of the lack of highly trained officers, equipment, and leadership. Civil Affairs Community must provide Combatant Commanders the forces and capabilities they need to operate in peace and stability operations and major combat operations. It is vital that our Soldiers and Civil Affairs units have the right capabilities to accomplish their mission.

This paper suggest that Civil Affairs as a branch in the Army has not fully achieved equality of other branches in terms of credibility, skills sets, and personnel that would give commanders a broad understanding of how to utilize Civil Affairs forces. Furthermore, this essay proposes an officer basic course for the Civil Affairs branch to train and populate its force to meet the needs of current and future operations.

In the post 9/11 era, the scope of modern warfare has undergone considerable changes. Among these changes is how to fight in an asymmetric battlefield that encompasses the civilian population and affects the overall strategy of the military objective. Prior to post World War II and 9/11, the focus of winning wars was the ability to apply military power and capability to ensure victory. In the current era of irregular warfare, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have changed the way the US fights current and future conflicts.

The civilian population has proven to be a vital part of the full spectrum of the battlefield. With the discovery that the civilian populace is considered the “center of gravity” in unconventional conflicts, understanding the civilian population has helped determine how success will be won in stabilizing these conflicts. Commanders have formally recognized the need to, control, and influence, the population prior to, during, and after combat operations. This acknowledgment has been a challenge in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It has taken years after President George W. Bush announced the end of combat operations that the center of gravity was the *people*, according to General David Petraeus commander of operations forces in Iraq. Civil Affairs has become a key component of the military strategy, as combat multiplier utilized in both operations in Afghanistan and Iraq particularly in relation to civilians. There is no evidence of the current global operational environment slowing down, but only remaining persistent to more future conflicts. This pattern places a premium on CA skills to meet these

challenges in playing a vital role in impending wars and conflicts. Civil Affairs capabilities are increasingly important in current and future missions in the ability to meet the commander's objectives in support of national security goals. Moreover, there are concerns about the military providing the right capability in terms of people and equipment to ensure CA assets can execute the responsibility to maneuver commanders.

History

Civil Affairs legacy can be traced back far as the American War for Independence. The American-Mexican War is considered to be the origin of Civil Affairs in terms of its founder Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, the "Father of Civil Affairs" in his role during the post war occupation of Mexico.³ During World War II, Civil Affairs became a symbol and institution of post war occupation, where it first received its charter during World War II. In 1943, the Pentagon activated the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division (CAD). The CAD was responsible for 80 million European civilians, securing their lost national treasures, and providing thirty thousand tons of civilian supplies each month during the post war occupation.

The post World War II period was the first planned use of Civil Affairs by the modern United States Army. During the Korean War, the US Army Civil Affairs involved itself for the first time in a subsistence agrarian society. Civil Affairs objectives in the Korea War included conditions that would impact military operations and constructive efforts to obtain maximum utilization of indigenous resources.⁴ The first Civil Affairs efforts were in the fields of public health, welfare, and sanitation, for the purpose of preventing disease, starvation, and unrest. The significant difference between the Korean War and World War II as Civil Affairs began to evolve was that the US Army was not an occupying government because Korea still had a functional government.

For Civil Affairs companies in the Vietnam War success came by working with the U. S. Special Forces units and gaining trust of local villages. The CA companies built roads, bridges, and schools; helped local markets, provided health care; and facilitated the pacification program of the US State Department. In these actions the Civil Affairs teams coined the phrase “winning the hearts and minds of the people” and it became popular slogan in securing support of the Vietnamese people.⁵ The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) created the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program in 1967 to integrate US civilians and military support of the South Vietnamese government and people.⁶ CORDS were a unique hybrid of Civil Affairs teams comparative to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. The distinctive differences in CORDS and PRT were CORDs had extensive training and were not targets of the enemy, which allowed CORDs to be uniquely successful. CORDS achieved considerable success in supporting and protecting the South Vietnamese population and in undermining the communist insurgents influence and appeal, particularly after implementation of accelerated pacification.⁷ The CORDS functioned at every level of society in Vietnam and was the priority of effort for the non-lethal mission for the MACV commander and United States in 1968. The success of CORDS and its pacification work met the needs of the populace which led to improvement of intelligence and infrastructural of the political structure of the Viet Cong. The CORDS was a successful synthesis of military and civilian efforts.⁸

CA unit's deployment in Operation Urgent Fury provided tactical support to military commanders in 1983 during Grenada, as Civil Affairs work was in restoration of infrastructure and in 1989, Operation Just Cause in Panama, CA's motto “Secure the Victory” took on a whole new significance and importance in military operations while supporting the restoration of the Panamanian government infrastructure. In 1991, Civil Affairs companies deployed in support of

Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm in Southwest Asia by providing fuel, water, and food through cooperation of the Saudi government. In the same year in northern Iraq, Operation Provide Comfort was the largest humanitarian relief operations since 1948. The CA units successfully worked with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to help the Kurdish refugees escape the wrath of Saddam Hussein by providing establishing displace camps in northern Iraq. In late 1994, Operation Restore/Uphold Democracy in Haiti, Civil Affairs Teams provided city clean programs, school programs, electrical projects, and helped revamp the judicial system. Active and Reserve CA Units have also participated in the ongoing NATO peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Civil Affairs units have also deployed in support of natural disaster assistance in the aftermath of Hurricanes Andrew and Tsunami.

The post 9/11 era has put the Civil Affairs Soldiers and teams at 100% utilization and created a burden of force management of Civil Affairs personnel in support on the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Civil Affairs units have deployed in numerous rotations to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa (HOA) in support of combatant commander's objectives with a force of less than 9,000 Soldiers that has left a heavy burden on the CA community. Civil Affairs units in Afghanistan are building schools, wells, and providing food to local populace as some of many impacted efforts to secure the population. In Iraq the tasked was larger in the earlier stages of the war when the efforts were concentrated on public utilities (water, electricity, sewer), public health (hospitals and clinics), public administration (governmental offices), and public safety (police and fire). In HOA, the focus has been the inculcation of animals and developing infrastructure of the community as one of several civil military efforts ongoing in this region. The presence of CA Soldiers is ever needed in a time of persistent conflicts throughout

the world. These conflicts will continue to rely on Civil Affairs forces as the main effort to help resolve and prevent use of kinetic force as a primary solution. The question remains how the Civil Affairs community prepares for the challenges of ahead in lieu of its rich history to the world?

Civil Affairs is

“Civil Affairs (CA) is one of the most complex and sensitive operations in which the U.S. Army can engage, involving interface between our soldiers and the civilians in the area of operations...its soldiers bridge the dangerous gap between the end of the war and the establishment of a stable foreign government capable of providing essential services.” GEN (RET) Gordon Sullivan⁹

CA forces are the designated Active Army and United States Army Reserve (USAR) forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) and to support the commander in planning and conducting civil military operations.¹⁰ The mission of CA forces is to engage and influence the civil populace by planning, executing, and transitioning Civil Affairs's operations in Army, joint, interagency, and multinational operations to support commanders in engaging the civil component of their operational environment, in order to enhance civil-military operations or other stated U.S. objectives before, during, or after other military operations.¹¹ Civil Affairs provides the military commander with expertise on the civil component of the operational environment. The commander uses CA's capabilities to analyze and influence the human terrain through specific processes and dedicates resources and personnel. As part of the commander's civil-military operations, CA conducts operations nested within the overall mission and intent. CA significantly helps ensure the legitimacy and credibility of the mission by advising on how to best meet the moral and legal obligations to the people affected by military operations. The key to understanding the role of CA is recognizing the importance of leveraging each relationship between the command and every individual, group, and organization in the operational environment to achieve a desired

effect.¹² Civil Affairs common operating picture is conducted within the scope of five core tasks and may occur simultaneously or sequentially with combat operations, depending on the operational environment. These tasks are the focus for all CA forces training, planning, and execution, they are not solely the responsibility of CA forces. As part of the larger category of CMO, these core tasks are nested within the maneuver commander's overall responsibility for planning and conducting CMO. CA forces focus on these core tasks, planning and executing them across full spectrum operations. As such, CA forces are the maneuver commander's primary asset to planning, coordinating, supporting, and executing CMO. The below figure illustrate the functions of Civil Affairs's core tasks.¹³




Figure 1. CA operational support structure

With a brief understanding of Civil Affairs history and its core tasks in how it supports a maneuver commander and other objectives deem necessary to accomplish the mission, Civil Affairs problem lies in its ability to provide enough skilled operators to mission abroad.

The problem

Effective 16 October 2006, Civil Affairs was established as a basic branch of the Army, pursuant to the authority of Section 3063 (a)(13), Title 10, United States Code (HQUSA-GO 29-signed Secretary of the Army).¹⁴ This recent act has given the Civil Affairs community the ability to continue development of the war-fighting capability of the United States Army but has not developed an accession to populate the branch. For Reserve CA officers, units draw manpower from other branches such as Transportation, Engineers, Field Artillery, Infantry, and Quartermaster Corps.

The problem with these manpower procedures is that officers can move back and forth between Civil Affairs assignments and their respective basic branch, which leaves a strong lack of continuity, CA skills, experience, and capability within the Civil Affairs forces. By allowing officers to have this freedom to go back and forth between Civil Affairs and non-Civil Affairs assignments causes instability within Civil Affairs forces that hinders the top Civil Affairs Commander ability to provide adequate CA forces to specific operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Horn of Africa (HOA) and the combatant commanders. The other problems with Civil Affairs as a branch, is that there is no accession to bring in officers from their commissioning sources such as Officer Training School (OCS), Reserve Training Officer Corps (ROTC), and the military academies. Moreover, there is no officer basic course to train these potential officers. Accession and creating a branch is where the problem for the future of Civil Affairs in the reserves lies.

Accession

Civil Affairs is a branch but not an Accession Branch. Becoming an Accessions Branch requires a Military Occupation Classification and Structure (MOCS) and Notification of Future Change (NOFC).¹⁵ The development and implementation has a series of actions that articulate the requirements and procedures for submission and staffing. The components of these actions

would have to go through the Deputy of Staff of Operations (DSOP) at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School and Course headquarters at Ft. Bragg. Then it must go through the Department of the Army G1, a world- wide staffing, an adjudication proceeding, and then to a notification of future changes published. The Military Occupation Classification and Structure and Notification of Future Change typically takes four years, but can be shortened to two with an Out of Cycle Request.¹⁶ The Military Occupation Classification and Structure for CA would require a complete update to developmental and regulatory manuals and development of grade tables, with DA G1 approval of personnel standards and career path and growth data, specifically a promotion pyramid.¹⁷

Historically, Civil Affairs has received its officers from other branches upon them having completing their respective advance course, leadership positions, and reaching the rank of first lieutenant promotable or captain through major. This was done because Civil Affairs skills are thought of as a more mature functional skill by the Civil Affairs institution. The current process that Civil Affairs receives officers is through "word of mouth" or officers soliciting positions because of the inverted triangle of slots by rank. Civil Affairs has no first and second lieutenant positions, all positions are from captain through colonel. Whereas in other branches which have sufficient of number of lieutenant and captain positions and one of two major positions and one lieutenant colonel and one colonel position. For this very reason, this attracts officers to Civil Affairs because in order to be promoted in the Reserves one needs to have a vacant slot to the next higher grade. For a Reserve officer to be promoted in the next higher grade he or she has to be assigned to that higher grade or find a higher grade position to be promote into.

The primary reasons of officers coming into the Civil Affairs positions historically have been driven by a desire for promotion to the next grade. Additionally, officers were attracted to

the Civil Affairs community because CA was aligned under the Army Special Operations Command (ASOC); therefore it was thought of as being "special" without the Special Forces training. The potential to work with Special Forces Soldiers and deploy and conduct unique missions makes CA very attractive to officers. With the increase operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and deployment, officers can now be promoted if they are mobilized regardless of if he or she is assigned to the next higher grade and because of the OPTEMPO positions have become more available in non-civil affairs positions for promotion advancement.

In recent years, Civil Affairs positions have become less competitive with the only qualification an officer needing is to attend or have completed the Mobilization Civil Affairs Qualification Course if being mobilized or attend the standard reserve Civil Affairs Qualification Course. The lack of competitiveness in positions selection is due to the OPTEMPO and manning requirements for deployment rotations, which has resulted to quantity versus quality. The Mobilization Civil Affairs Qualification course is a three week course at John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School, which gives officers a very broad definition of the mission of Civil Affairs. The Civil Affairs Qualification Course is a 13 month distance learning and resident course. The problem in this contemporary operational environment is that officers would need to have completed their basic branch Captain Career Course which is typically two weeks and the Civil Affairs Qualification Course. This is not attractive for potential officers and it is a slow progress to maintain qualified Civil Affairs Officers to meet the demands of the Civil Affairs Officers on the current battlefield. In order for an officer to enroll into the Civil Affairs Qualification Course he or she has to complete their respective basic branch Captain Career Course. In essence, this extends the timeline of an officer receiving Civil Affairs qualification and reduces the unit readiness.

Ninety-Six percent of the Civil Affairs capabilities reside in the Army Reserves. In order to maintain a more well trained and skillful force of Civil Affairs operators is to create a Civil Affairs Officer Basic Course that will train newly appointed officers and assessed second lieutenants. These officers will attend school immediately following their graduation from their perspective commission source and college. They enroll in the Civil Affairs Diplomat Warrior Officer Basic Course (CADWOBC) for nine months ideally before they began their careers in the civilian sector. The length of course gives the acceptable minimum in good governance that the complexity of modern warfare requires than just character and firm leadership. The difficulty of a conventional and COIN environments demands knowledge, comprehension, application and evaluation of a myriad of activities across a broad spectrum of stability and reconstruction functions.

Establishing a CADWOBC would provide the foundational basis and legitimacy to well trained lieutenants to take charge and utilize all available resources military, non-military, and indigenous to stabilize areas suffering upheaval, both during combat operations and in the critical weeks and months post-hostilities. This represents a departure from the traditional Special Operation Forces belief in maturity, and represents a fundamental shift in CA mentality, so long as the Civil Affairs community is willing to embrace lieutenant's mistakes in training, and their growth, then CA may be ready for lieutenants as part of the community.

The School


A Civil Affairs Diplomat Warrior Officer Basic Course would allow for a robust pipeline of Civil Affairs Officers to meet the needs of the current battlefield and future operational requirements. This course should provide a rigorous study that will create and give newly commissioned Civil Affairs Officers an understanding of events, places, economics, leadership,

and a rich history of the world. The foundation of the curriculum is to make officers global experts in providing analytical and practical skills and critical thinking to support maneuver commanders on battlefield as it relates to the populace. Additionally, the course would provide theoretical tools and methodological approaches to cultural analysis, political identify, and religious systems of belief. The CA community can derive historical experience from the School of Military Government established at the time at the University of Virginia in 1942.¹⁸ After completion of the Military Government School officers would attend the Civil Affairs Training School (CATS) at colleges such as Harvard, Yale, Stanford, and Northwestern. The follow-on schools at these particular universities were six months of advance and intense studies of language, economics, local governance, and the educational system of the U.S. adversaries.¹⁹ While varying in content and emphasis, depending upon the needs of the students and the type of work for which they are being trained, all of these courses contain some training in the following subjects: army organization, tactics, and staff work; police and security; and government. The course at the school of University of Virginia which ran for twelve weeks, was divided into following principal types of instruction:

1. Army organization and procedure, including staff work, tactics, supplies etc.
2. Principles of military government and the administration of occupied territories.
3. The law of and applying to occupied territory, and the conduct of military commissions and tribunals.
4. Experiences in military government, including brief historical accounts of previous military occupations, and actual experience in the present war.

5. Training in the major Axis countries and special areas, including geography, population, economic, political, governmental and social institutions, psychology, history, and recent trends.
6. Language training.
7. Miscellaneous training relating to economic, social, military and other problems in occupied areas.

Bankus/ Kievit.8



Students between classes
School of Military Government, Charlottesville, VA

At the School of Military Government and also at the Civil Affairs

Training Schools in the various universities, officers were assigned to a section of from eight to twelve o'clock for problem work.²⁰ These sections made survey prepare plans for setting up

military government in specified area or countries, and work out solutions of hypothetical problems. Given specific, practical situations of problems which have arisen in this field, the sections were asked to prepare plans, actions, orders, proclamations, and ordinances to deal with the situation, and ordinances to deal with the situation, making use of the instruction on military government and the special study of the area.²¹ The training programs of the Civil Affairs

Training Schools at the cooperating universities are similar to those at University of Virginia, with somewhat more emphasis on area and language instruction. The course of instruction ran for twelve weeks, each university specializing in a particular area and the language of the area.

The officers assigned to the universities were of the ranks of the ranks of second lieutenant through lieutenant colonel and those assigned to School of Military Government were ranks of captain through colonel. The School of Military Government is designed for principal administrators and headquarters staff, while the universities train officers for specialist, staff, and field positions.²²

The Civil Affairs Diplomat Warrior Officer Basic Course would resemble the institutional instructions that were established during the School of Military Government as a framework of instructional knowledge. The CADWOBC would be built on five pillars: Diplomacy, Foreign Language, Regional & Cultural Study, Infrastructure and Economics. The following are broad description and example of the five pillars that would be use in developing the program. These examples are no means the complete requirements in developing the curriculum.

Diplomacy

The officers will learn diplomacy in how it should be applied to the strategic objective of the combatant commander as it relates to the maneuver commander's mission in order to create a comprehension plans to meet, enhance, or support the mission at the unit level. The diplomacy instruction will immerse officers in a global framework by sharpening their negotiation skills, fostering leadership, and preparing officers for specific challenges within a region.

Foreign Language

Officers will be required to be proficient in a language that is aligned with their Regional and Cultural Study. The proficiency would be measured by the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) and officers would be required to test based on the difficulty of learning the language. Officers will be required to be proficient at 2/2. The languages will consist of the major language use in that region of the world. The language dialects will be an overview to understand the different subcultures or people living in that region. The foreign language capability would tie to promotions to the next rank by demonstrating language proficient throughout the officer's career.

Regional & Cultural Study

The Regional and Cultural Study is an analytical framework that will address the cultural awareness of the geographical politics, strategy, society, and religion themes in the region. It will explore the links between cultural identity and questions of power and authority in society. It will cover history and will be cross disciplinary, drawing on philosophy, cultural anthropology, and religion to illuminate difference in societies and sub-cultures.

Infrastructure

The infrastructure of urban and rural austere environments will examine water, transportations, sewage, and housing as it relates through the political, cultural, and economics of the populace it serves. Officers will also get a basic understanding of these systems work and what is needed in event of problems or failures. This course will be less about engineering and more about understanding process and options to create a sustainable infrastructure. Additionally, officers would learn, meet, and understanding non-governmental agencies, such as Doctors without Borders, International Red Cross and working with governmental agencies such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Economics

The economic course will explore the relationship between governance and economic development and the role of the state in development of sound economic means. Economics will give officers the principles of finance and analytical tools of trade and industry, and economic theories to trouble markets. The instruction will address and prepare officers for understanding of poverty and the management of the global climate and other transnational resources to create good governance.

By not creating an accession into an officer basic course, the Civil Affairs community will not be able to sustain the current fight with adequate skills that support Civil Affairs operations and will not meet the demands of future operations in support on Global War on Terrorism and operations other than war. Lieutenant Colonel William Florig states in his article, "Theater Civil Affairs Soldiers a Force at Risk" that the current Reserve CA specialties are too frequently filled with Soldiers who have little if any experience in the necessary skill sets.²³ For years, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command have claimed that CA skills are so specialized that they can only be found in the Reserve force. This idea has been oversold to the Army and the Department of Defense as a whole.²⁴ In reality, the current state of Civil Affairs is composed of mostly generalists and not specialists. Florig states that too often units are satisfied just to have bodies of the correct rank simply to fill slots, regardless of the civilian skills brought to the table.²⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Mark Kimmey in "Transforming Civil Affairs" states that CA officers are currently pressed into jobs they might know something about, but too often the CA community expects a reservist who works for a bank to know how to set up a banking system.²⁶


There are reserve officers who do have specialized skills that are not found on the active duty force. For example, there are many Reserve officers who possessed skills in law enforcement, school administration, teaching, engineering, fire-fighting, social work, city planning, and other skills that can be employed in nation building. Kimmey goes on to say the CA does not manage skill sets. Instead, CA manages by slots and bodies, matching officers up as best they can.²⁷ The problem is not that CA has an over abundance of generalists in CA, but CA units do not manage their officer's civilian skills. One underlining issue with skill sets is that when an officer holds a prominent skill in his or her community and is paid very well it is hard to

have that officer serve in the reserves with the potential of having a financial loss. Fortunately, several great patriotic officers have and would take a pay cut temporarily to serve their nation in a time of crisis, but at some point this becomes a burden and is one of the contributing factors why the Reserves do not have abundance of specialize skills at the strategic level. By having a CADWOBC it would inherently reduce the time in theater by have a better trained CA force that could do more in less time. More importantly, the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) headquartered at Fort Bragg, NC does not track the individual skill sets of its force in order from which when a particular specialization are needed in current and future operations. The current educational system for Civil Affairs officers does not offer any specialized skills that an officer can obtain. With the creation of the CADWOBC it will give a foundation of a comprehensive skill sets that will be standard across the board and give CA units a better trained force. With CADWOBC capabilities commanders would not have to continue to designate branch career officers to conduct CA mission as was done in Iraq and Afghanistan due to shortage of CA officers. Additionally, it would create the pipeline of dedicate, skillful, professional officers that will meet the challenges of enabling the maneuver commanders to accomplish their mission.

Personnel

Civil Affairs units do not have first and second lieutenants positions in their current Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). The correct solution would be to change the Civil Affairs MTOE to reflect the accession of lieutenants into the current Civil Affairs Branch. Implementing this change to the Civil Affairs's MTOE would cause a systematic change to the Civil Affairs structure to include a methodical change to the Army Reserve's manpower overall strength. If this asset is important to the military nation building capabilities

and stability and reconstruction operations as a “non-kinetic spear” than the Army Reserve should allocate newly commissioned officers to meet need of diplomacy in future conflicts. Lieutenants are the origins of all professional military branches and if the Civil Affairs is going to continue to call itself a branch its needs a path to populate its organization. CA must reorganize the team concept to an eight man team instead of four and provide to teams with the latest equipment. This change is an internal change with no cost and minimum effort to the organization. CA units must be able to organically sustain itself in order to support maneuver commanders. Below is a picture of a Reserve Civil Affairs Battalion structure.



one CLT, a functional specialty cell, and four CA companies, each with a Civil Military Operation Center (CMOC) and five Civil Affairs Teams (CATs). Each CA line company can provide C2 to the assigned CATs and can provide planning, coordination, and assessment at the tactical level. –FM 3-05.40




Figure 3 – To the left is illustration USAR and Active Army CA companies. It has four CA line companies, each with a C2 Section, Planning Section, a CMOC, and five Civil Affairs Teams (CATs). The CMOC provides tactical CA support, to include assessment, planning, and coordination. FM 3-05.40




Figure 4 (left).-Civil Affairs Concept

The Civil Affairs Battalion has 20 Civil Affairs Teams (CAT) with man each. Recommendation is to combine teams into eight man teams, convert one Captain Positions into LT positions, ending with 10 Civil Affairs Teams. This recommendation would be the most cost effective. A Battalion has fewer teams but in the current operation environment they could conduct their mission without security/resources from the maneuver unit.

The future of Civil Affairs would be better served by combining the CATs into eight man teams in order to support Civil Military Operations without the support of the maneuver infantry companies, in which most time is hindered to their operations. Moreover, combining teams would allow for CA teams to operate in austere environments in parallel with Brigade Combat Teams or Special Forces Teams. Florig recommends that the Civil Affairs Battalions CA Teams expand to 8 personnel –an additional 512 Soldiers.²⁸ This would be sufficient only if lieutenants are added to those numbers.

Cost and Benefits

There are several reasons why adding lieutenants to the Civil Affairs Corps would help enhance the Civil Affairs overall mission in nation building operations and the fight against terrorism.

1. The cost of adding a lieutenant to the Battalion's CAT would be minimal or no cost at all. The overall cost would come from total army manpower of accessing 280 lieutenants to fill 28 Civil Affairs Battalions.
2. It would be more cost effective to build a robust manpower of accessioning lieutenants into CA Corps over the long term than waiting for officers to branch over to Civil Affairs based off promotions and available positions.
3. With the creation of Civil Affairs Diplomat Warrior Officer Basic Course, the CA community creates a solid foundation of skills and capability that can deploy and be a true force enabler in supporting Brigade Combat Teams.
4. Adding lieutenants to the CA Corps can eliminate officers from going back and forth between branches.
5. Most CA operators who have combat experience agree that eight man teams are the way to go, this would reduce the number of CATs on paper but it does not reduce the capability.
6. The major initial cost would come from civilian personnel to meet the new requirements and curriculum for the school.

This would be a counter argument to reducing the reserve CA force and creating more Active Duty CA units in which the cost would be much greater than accessing lieutenants into the Civil Affairs branch. There are several different views to the future of Civil Affairs. One is that the current CA structure should cease to exist. Major Darnell Martin, a Civil Affairs officer, recommends that the Army eliminate Reserve Component Civil Affairs units and have only individual reserve augmentees to support Civil Affairs active duty units. Major Martin believes that maneuver units can perform their own CMO and the Civil Affairs officers assigned will perform on the staffs as advisors only. He argues that the Army is redundant in its structure with regard to many of the Civil Affairs skill sets.²⁹ For example, he states that CA capabilities can very easily be replicated by Soldiers from maneuver units and in the current operational environment that maneuver Soldiers and CA Soldiers are performing many of the same tasks which is cause a waste in time and resources.³⁰ The problem with MAJ Martin's recommendation is that he fails to mention active duty commanders have a very lack of understanding of CA forces and how to implement these forces, which causes the redundancy in CMO efforts.

Lieutenant Colonel William Florig, suggest that active duty CA battalions should be created and allocated to support geographic combatant commanders. These battalions must be larger than current proposals call for and assigned directly to the combatant commanders. The Reserve CA force must also be redesigned and downsized to reflect recruiting and retention realities.³¹ Lieutenant Colonel Mark L. Kimmey argues to move, most if not all, Civil Affairs slots from the Reserve to the active component.³² The point is not to necessary resize the force but to have flag officers representing CMO activities at the combatant commander level commands. In addition, the true focus should be educating the conventional forces on Civil

Affairs Operations as do in other branches early in an officer's professional development, to include mandatory educational stops such at Command and General Staff College and senior staff college.

Concession

Length of School: The proposal of school length has not been study to determine if nine months is too excessively or insufficient. The average Army's officer branch basic course is four months. The length would have to be determined by the curriculum's goals and the cost to run school during normal calendar year. Additionally, it may be difficult to evaluate diplomacy skill compare to tactical skills by other branches.

Curriculum: The proposal curriculum is a draft reflected of what several officers in the community believed should be change to train the new branch and add creditability and legitimacy to overall Civil Affairs Corps. This proposal has not been evaluated through the Doctrine and Training Branch at the JFK Special Warfare center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Cost: The cost has not been determined for what it would take to reorganize the current Civil Affairs Qualification Course. In addition, the costs of revamping it to a first class diplomacy learning center for newly commissioned lieutenants and if it is more suitable at Fort Bragg, North Carolina as the home or move to a location were the Department of Army can share resources with other similar organization to facilitate the school requirements.

Conclusion

Civil Affairs is by far the most qualified/skilled and capable entity in the inventory of the U.S. government to go into troubled areas immediately after the end of hostilities and guide a country in a starting the recovery and reconstruction process.³³ The Civil Affairs mission is the bridge to that stability. The war in Iraq brings back to life an old concept not expected to ever be seen again: "occupation." This debate over the scope and extent of the CA mission has repeated

itself for every major deployment, but can CA be sure that necessity will again propel policy? The Executive Branch will someday again direct the U.S. military to “restore the legitimate government of [insert country name here]” or to “establish a safe and secure environment and promote conditions for economic growth.” Like it or not, the Army will comply. It will engage its CA experts to bridge the gap and establish a stable foreign nation’s government in order to avoid war or recover from chaos.³⁴

The strategic lessons learned from U.S. military history, especially since Vietnam, have proven that occupation is not an obsolete concept and operations other than war by whatever name are essential to protect U.S. interests postwar and in peacetime. Painful lessons have proven that traditional combat capabilities are unsuited for these noncombat operations. Dr. Stanley Sandler, a historian, said the fact that conventional U.S. officers find themselves adrift in such operations is not without a touch of irony, in that these undertakings are nothing new. Rather, the U.S. military has engaged in nontraditional peace and stability operations throughout its history.³⁵ This is why it is imperative that the Civil Affairs Community raise, train, and gives its CA officers the right skills to perform peace and stability operations so that the maneuver force can do their job.

Endnotes

¹Bingham, Bruce, Daniel L. Rubini, and Michael J. Cleary, "U.S. Army Civil Affairs-The Army's Ounce of Prevention," *Land Warfare Paper* no. 41 (March 2003): 23.

²*Ibid.*, 23.

³Civil Affairs Association. <http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org> (accessed 14 November 2007).

⁴Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Groves, "Always There: Civil Affairs in Korea," *Special Operations Technology* 4, no. 1 (19 February 2006). <http://www.special-operations-technology.com/special-operations-technology>. (accessed 15 October 2008).

⁵Richard A. Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Heart and Minds*. (Boulder Colorado, Westview Press):1995, 45-47.

⁶*Ibid.*, 80.

⁷*Ibid.*, 80-84.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹Bingham, Rubini, and Cleary, "U.S. Army Civil Affairs-The Army's Ounce of Prevention," 5

¹⁰Department of Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, FM 3-05.40 (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 2006) 1-3.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 2-20.

¹²*Ibid.*, 2-22.

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴Secretary of the Army, *Establishment of the United States Army Civil Affairs Branch* January 12, 2007, 29. <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/go29.pdf>. (accessed 5 October 2008).

¹⁵Department of Army Regulation, *Military Occupational Classification Structure and Development and Implementation*, AR 611-1 (Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, DC 30 September 1997) 3-5.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 5-6.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸LTC (R) Brent C. Bankus & Professor James Kievit, "The Army and Marines and Military Government," *Small Wars Journal*. Online edition.

<http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/bankuskievit.doc>. (accessed 7 November 2008) 8.

¹⁹John P. Harris, "Selection and Training of Civil Affairs Officers," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 7, no.4 (Winter, 1943): 698.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 698-699.

²¹Bankus and Kievit, "The Army and Marines and Military Government," 9.

²²Harris, "Selection and Training of Civil Affairs Officers," 699.

²³Lieutenant Colonel William R. Florig, "Theater Civil Affairs Soldiers A Force at Risk," *Joint Force Quarterly*, 43 (4th Quarter 2006) 61.

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶Lieutenant Colonel Mark L. Kimmey, "Transforming Civil Affairs," *Army Magazine*, 55, no.3 (March 2005) <http://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/KCAT-6CPHQG>.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 2.

²⁸Florig, "Theater Civil Affairs Soldiers A Force at Risk," 62.

²⁹Martin, Darnell, "The Restructuring of the United States Army Civil Affairs" (master's thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2004) 46.

³⁰*Ibid.*

³¹Florig, "Theater Civil Affairs Soldiers A Force at Risk," 61.

³²Kimme, "Transforming Civil Affairs," 2.

³³Bingham, Rubini, Cleary, "U.S. Army Civil Affairs-The Army's Ounce of Prevention," 18.

³⁴Ibid, 20.

³⁵Ibid, 22.

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