There Shall We Be Also: Tribal Fractures and Auxiliaries in the Indian Wars of the Northern Great Plains.

A Monograph
by
MAJOR Jason E. Warner
United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AY 2008

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
20-11-2008	Monograph	January 2008 - December 2008

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

There Shall We Be Also: Tribal Fractures and Auxiliaries in the Indian Wars of the Northern Great Plains

Unclassified

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

Lewis, Jeremy R.

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

US Army School of Advanced Military Studies
Eisenhower Hall
250 Gibbon Ave
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

ATZL-SWV

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Public Release

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

See Abstract

15. SUBJECT TERMS

tribe, tribes, tribal fractures, tribal competition, tribal warfare, auxiliaries, scouts, Indian Wars, Sioux, Pawnee, Crow, Cheyenne, US Army, insurgency, indigenous, internal defense, irregular warfare, Indian

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER *(include area code)*
Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified	Same as report	61	

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

MAJOR Jason E. Warner

Title of Monograph: There Shall We Be Also: Tribal Fractures and Auxiliaries in the Indian Wars of the Northern Great Plains

This monograph was defended by the degree candidate on 03-October 2008 and approved by the monograph director and reader named below.

Approved by:

Thomas A. Brusdino, Ph.D. — Monograph Director

Michael J. Johnson, LTC, AR — Monograph Reader

Stefan J. Banach, COL, IN — Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. — Director, Graduate Degree Programs

Abstract

THERE SHALL WE BE ALSO: TRIBAL FRACTURES AND AUXILIARIES IN THE INDIAN WARS OF THE NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS. by MAJOR Jason E. Warner, US ARMY, 58 pages.

From its beginning in the American Revolution to its current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States (US) Army has had to deal with tribal societies. In order to succeed in tribal societies it is essential that the US Army understand tribal structures and the fractures in tribal societies that present opportunities and possible solutions.

Tribal structures create an environment in which conflict over resources and status creates traditional enemies between the tribes. It further weakens internal tribal loyalty as loyalty resides at the lowest level within the tribe that can provide resources, increase the group's status and security. These characteristics create fractures within tribal societies that create an atmosphere in which it is possible to use tribal auxiliaries to resolve conflicts or issues within complex tribal environments.

The Indian Wars on the northern Great Plains from 1865 to 1890 provide some of the best examples in which tribal fractures created the opportunity to use tribal auxiliaries. By closely examining specific events during the Indian Wars, it is possible to identify the characteristics of tribal structures and societies that create the opportunity for using tribal auxiliaries as well as the fact that they provide a unique method for resolving conflict and issues within tribal societies. This study specifically focuses on events that occurred on the northern Great Plains as the US Army sought to subdue and bring into compliance the Sioux and Cheyenne tribes. By examining tribes that assisted the US Army, it is possible to identify tribal fractures and motivations behind why tribes such as the Crow and Pawnee faithfully served as allies to the US Army. It is also possible to identify what led to the collapse of the Sioux and Cheyenne alliance, which resulted in Sioux and Cheyenne bands turning on one another by supporting the US Army against others that refused to comply.

Tribal feuding and competition resulting from tribal structures prevented the Indians from forming effective coalitions against the US Army in the Indian Wars and even resulted in some tribes assisting the US Army. The US Army by forming alliances with tribes or using them as auxiliaries against their traditional tribal enemies was able to overcome some of the disadvantages such as unfamiliarity with terrain, lack of cultural knowledge, and filled gaps in the US Army's fighting capabilities.

The US Army as it conducts operations in tribal environment needs to look beyond traditional or conventional means to resolving conflict. A successful technique is to use tribal auxiliaries in order to take advantage of tribal structures and fractures in order to achieve desired results and objectives.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

> Intertribal warfare presents a sixth hinderance in the way of civilization. In view of the hostilities among the different tribes of Indians, and the frequent attacks by some of the tribes, requiring a constant state of defense on the part of others, an order has been issued that no Indians be allowed to leave their reservation without permit from the agent, and the Secretary of War has been requested to direct the commanders of military posts to prevent Indians from passing from one agency to another without such permit; and if they find Indians marauding, or engaged in any hostile expedition against any other tribe, to strike them without parley. A satisfactory execution of this arrangement will probably require either an increased enlistment of scouts from friendly Indians, or an increased military force in different portions of the Indian country.
>
> - Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Affairs, November 1, 1873[1]

Competition and warfare dominate tribal societies around the world. At the root of this competition and warfare is the tribal structure and fractures that exist in tribal societies. These characteristics of tribal societies are evident throughout history and specifically among the various tribes found in North America in the last half of the 19th century. However, they were not just a historical facet found in North America, but a worldwide issue as competition and warfare continue to dominate in contemporary tribal societies. One has to look no further than the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to see that tribes play a significant role in current operations. Tribal rivalries and competition play a critical role as each tribe decides to support either the insurgency or the United States (US). A common technique developed in both Iraq and Afghanistan is the use of tribal auxiliaries or militias to assist in providing security and stability.[2] Tribal structures play a significant role in how these societies function. Therefore, understanding tribalism is critical in order to bring stability and compliance from hostile tribes. By properly identifying the traits and characteristics of tribal societies, it is possible to identify their

---

[1] United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1873*, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1874), 8.

[2] For information regarding tribes in Iraq and Afghanistan to include their roles and activities see Hussein D. Hassan, *Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities* (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 2007), 1, 4; Seth G. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan* (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 31-33, 37-38, 46, 48-50.

weaknesses, strengths, and uncover opportunities for using tribal auxiliaries or proxies in support of operations in tribal societies.

Since the American Revolution, the US Army has fought with and alongside tribal auxiliaries in many conflicts. The US Army's use of tribal auxiliaries during the Indian Wars on the Northern Great Plains from 1865-1890 effectively demonstrated the feasibility of using tribal auxiliaries. Historical examples of weaknesses and fractures within tribal societies provided opportunities to leaders to use tribal auxiliaries. The characteristics of tribal competition and warfare created an environment in which tribes and bands allied or supported a force against their rivals and competitors. Therefore, a course of action for outside forces operating in tribal societies or involved in fighting tribes is to use traditional tribal enemies and competitors as auxiliaries. Indian scouts and auxiliaries filled gaps and shortcomings within the US Army that improved its ability to bring non-compliant tribes into compliance. Tribes or bands joined with the US Army to fight their competitors, who they were already in a state of war or to improve their own bargaining position with the US Government. The weaknesses and fractures within tribal society created an environment promoting tribes or bands to unite with an outsider against their rivals.

A strong sense of honor and pride based on a warrior culture permeates most tribal societies. These characteristics are the result of years of fighting for survival and resources. The only ally at such times was the family, which as it grew became the band and then the tribe. It is in that order that the loyalty of the individual rested: family, band, and tribe. Tribal structures often do not develop into states, as the basis for their formation is kinship and not territory or nationalism. Tribes at times rise to statehood if they can overcome the disunity created over competition for resources, create institutions beyond chieftainship, and establish permanent

boundaries.[3] Tribal conflict resulting from tribes not having the same social norms, values, customs, and languages also complicate tribal and band unity necessary for statehood. Combined, these issues caused great difficulty to western states operating in a Westphalia mindset, which stressed that unified groups compose states and that states follow established rules in dealing with one another. Tribal societies, or even states dominated by tribal politics, challenge the Westphalian concept. The lack of unity, rules, or structures within tribal societies makes it inherently difficult to resolve conflicts or conduct diplomacy in a Westphalian system. However, it is possible to study past dealings with tribal societies to identify possible techniques to resolve conflict with tribes.

The American Indian Wars in the last half of the 19th century on the northern Great Plains stand out in particular and contain numerous examples of the US military engaging with Indian tribes. One of the most common and successful techniques used by the US military in the Indian Wars was the employment of Indian scouts and auxiliaries. These scouts and auxiliaries took a variety of different forms, from allies with no official alliance to regular enlisted soldiers. Operations conducted with the Indian scouts and auxiliaries generally resulted in greater success against hostile Indian tribes when compared to operations without Indian allies. The possibilities of using tribal scouts and auxiliaries to gain an advantage in tribal societies should be recognized and explored. This study examines tribal auxiliaries during the Indian Wars from 1866 to 1890 in the northern Great Plains to identify how tribal structures and fractures present the opportunity to use tribal auxiliaries. It will further identify what the advantages and disadvantages that tribal auxiliaries bring through their application.

---

[3] Harold Robert Isaacs, *Idols of the Tribe : Group Identity and Political Change* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989; 1989), 38, 175-178; Isaac Schapera, *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies*, (New York, NY: Schocken Books, 1967), 2-11; Alan J. Clarke, "*Tribal Identity and Conflicts with Tribes*" (Monograph, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 2; Patrick Morgan, "How Tribal Societies Operate," *Quadrant Magazine* 49, no. 1 (2005), 55-56.

Studies of the American Indian wars are extensive. There are significant writings on the Indian Wars and the various American tribes, but few studies focus specifically on the use of tribes as auxiliary forces to the US Army. There is little discussion or examination of the fractures within and between the tribes that made them conducive to use as auxiliaries against each other. Most of the writings on the Indian Wars provide historical narratives or studies providing descriptions along with analysis of the events and people involved.[4] One book did stand out for its study of the US Army's use of tribal auxiliaries. *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers* by Thomas W. Dunlay looked specifically at Indian scouts and auxiliaries in order to revitalize the importance of the role that these auxiliaries played in American history. Dunlay's book takes the closest look at Indian auxiliaries in their entirety and provides great insight and information on the topic. The book presents a comprehensive view that exposes the Army's attitudes toward the Indians and why and how the US Army used auxiliaries during the Indian Wars. Dunlay does not stop there, but goes on to examine the motivations behind the Indians who supported the US Army, which ranged from tribal competition to boredom. By comparing the use of auxiliaries throughout the West from 1860-1890, he broadly identified the shortcomings and attitudes within the US Army that led to the need for Indian auxiliaries and touched on reasons for why some Indians supported the US Army. *Wolves for the Blue Soldier* provides an excellent starting point for launching into the details of tribal auxiliaries in the Indian Wars. This monograph builds on Dunlay by focusing on the details and specifics within the tribal structures on the Northern Great Plains that led to the successful use of tribal auxiliaries in order to add to the collection of knowledge on possible ways to deal with hostile tribes or societies.

---

[4] For the establishment of a good base of knowledge concerning the Indian Wars see Robert Marshall Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977); Robert Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1995); Andrew J. Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency And Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941,* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 2003).

Understanding of the historical context of the Indian Wars is essential in order to identify why the US Army used auxiliaries and why tribal societies presented the opportunity to use tribal auxiliaries against other noncompliant bands and tribes during the Indian Wars. Historical examples will then build on this knowledge through the examination of three studies in which tribes allied with the US Army against other tribes and bands. Tribal complexity makes dealing with tribal societies difficult, but it also presents opportunities such as the ability to recruit tribal auxiliaries. The opportunity to recruit auxiliaries follows the propensity of tribal competition and warfare. An outsider using auxiliaries gains access to tribal culture, knowledge, and capabilities. Tribal groups that become auxiliaries gain the advantage of a new ally against their rival tribes and an alternative way to relieve tribal pressures and needs. Tribal auxiliaries provide a method to overcome obstacles and address issues within tribal societies by both the outsider and tribal groups. As the United States continues to engage with tribal societies around the world, the use of tribal auxiliaries during the Indian Wars on the Northern Great Plains provides a useful approach to resolving tribal conflicts.

Historical Context of the Indian Wars

The US Army faced a complex situation in the American West following the end of the Civil War. The difficulties included terrain, hostile Indians, non-law abiding Americans, conflicting and weak policies, multiple missions, and internal Army issues. These complexities all played a role in the way that the Army addressed the mission of securing the West. As this study will focus only on the portion of the Indian Wars that occurred in the northern portion of the Great Plains from 1865 to 1890, discussion will only include points that specifically applied to this region of the Indian Wars.

The area of the Great Plains with which this study is concerned includes the states of Nebraska, Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota. The region consists of harsh barren grasslands interspersed with mountain ranges and bluffs. The climate of this

region is extreme, with torrid summers and frigid winters. The US Army possessed little geographic knowledge or real experience carrying out operations in this region.



[5]

Most of the US Army's knowledge came from frontiersmen and adventurers who crossed the area or worked the region as trappers and explorers. The Missouri and Platte rivers, along with their tributaries, served as the initial travel routes for explorers such as Lewis and Clark and fur traders who followed the waterways in search of beaver and other resources such as buffalo.[6] Buffalo were a critical resource and symbol of the Great Plains that the Indians required for their way of life, and the animal later would bring white hunters into direct competition with the Indians. Infrastructure in 1866 was largely nonexistent except for a few trails and forts. However, by 1890, roads, railroads, and telegraphs would cross the plains, shrinking the distances

---

[5] Charles D. Collins, *Atlas of the Sioux War*, 2nd ed., ed. Dr. William Glenn Robertson (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), Map 1.

[6] For accounts of the historical significance of the Platte and Missouri rivers and the emigration west along these trails see Merrill J. Mattes, *The Great Platte River Road: The Covered Wagon Mainline Via Fort Kearny to Fort Laramie* (Lincoln, NE : University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 4-6; Ralph K. Andrist, *The Long Death : The Last Days of the Plains Indian* (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1964), 16.

and response times of military operations. As the infrastructure improved the number of travelers and settlers increased. The increase in travelers and settlers led to more pressure on resources required by the tribes and more contact between the tribes and whites. Increased contact resulted in a rise in the incidents and hostilities between the groups requiring the US Government to take action to improve security and resolve the Indian situation.

Locating hostile tribes was even more complicated due to the lack of knowledge of the terrain, the customs of the tribes, and the limited mobility of US infantry. The US Cavalry lacked both the skill and endurance needed to track and engage hostile tribes and bands. The main reason for this was that US Army horses required grain and were unaccustomed to a diet of plains grass. This increased the demand on the logistics of any efforts against hostile tribes. The Soldiers had minimal horsemanship skills compared to their adversary. The cavalrymen therefore served more as mounted infantry then cavalry.[7] On the other side, Indian ponies were accustomed to surviving on the plains grasses. Indians proved to be some of the most skilled horseman as they grew up on horseback and their survival depended on being able to ride in order to hunt as well as travel the great distances. These discrepancies in skills only amplified the Indians' knowledge of the geography making it that much more difficult for the US Army to track or locate hostile Indians. Due to these difficulties of terrain, the US Army as a rule hired guides from the frontier men and Indian allies to assist them in crossing the terrain and locating hostile Indians. Thus, the difficulty of the terrain, US Army limitations, and lack of knowledge were factors that encouraged the Army to use Indian allies.

Although the terrain was an obstacle, the real complication was a result of the estimated 270,000 indigenous people in over 125 tribes, bands, and groups that lived in the West at this

---

[7] Clayton K. S. Chun and Dr Anderson Duncan, *Us Army in the Plains Indian Wars 1865-91*(Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2004), 9; Robert Marshall Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), 49.

time.[8] These American Indians relied on the land and its resources; specifically the hunting grounds for buffalo and other game for survival. An environment of competition resulted among the tribes as they sought to acquire and then secure regions with significant resources. Individual hunter and warrior skills were highly valued as these individuals provided the food and security to the band and family.[9] Tribal structure supported this competition and rivalry among and within tribes. Kinship is the cornerstone of tribal groups. Tribes or bands with close familial relationships exhibit stronger loyalty and social control within the group.[10] Successful families grew and formed into bands of extended family or allied with other bands in order to compete for resources. As bands grew they formed into large units, the tribe. Bands served as the primary unit of social control and governance as they were closest to the family bonds, and their actions directly affected the survival of the family. The nature of the environment tended to drive bands to operate independently due to limited resources and technology, which could not support larger conglomerations of multiple bands or tribes. Resources often determined a tribe's strength and ability to unite individual bands. Thus, bands usually came together as tribes only in specific circumstances, for example: religious ceremonies, large hunts, to settle disputes, to divide up territory, or for warfare.[11] This produced an environment in which bands united as tribes to fight for access to resources like buffalo. This united front was not strong as bands squabbled with other bands within the same tribe as each attempted to influence their position within the tribe or gain greater access to tribal resources.[12] The environment on the northern Great Plains produced a tribal society of Indian warriors and hunters of great skill in which instability was the norm.

---

[8] Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 4.

[9] Ibid., 6.

[10] Schapera, *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies,* 2.

[11] Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 3, 5-6; Thomas W. Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers : Indian Scouts and Auxilaries with the United States Army, 1860-90* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 130-131.

[12] Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers*, 131; Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 6.

Bands, due to this instability, followed their own agenda in doing what was best for them in order to survive. Tribal policies or treaties meant very little to bands if they did not benefit from them, especially if their leadership did not participate in the making of the policy or treaty.

Indians did not think of themselves as a collective, but in terms of tribe or band. A unique history, language, and custom defined each band and tribe.[13] It is necessary to identify the specific tribes and their circumstances or role that they played on the Great Plans in order to understand examples used later in this study. The tribes that this study focuses on are the Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapahoe, Arikara, Crow, Shoshone, and Pawnee. The Sioux originally were from Minnesota. They became the dominate tribe in the late 18th and early 19th century as they pushed westward into the Great Plains.[14] As the Sioux acquired more horses and weapons, their capabilities increased and they became the strongest tribe, pushing the Arikara, Crow, Shoshone, and Pawnee off their traditional hunting grounds. Simultaneously, they formed alliances with two other tribes, the Cheyenne and Araphoe, who were traditional adversaries of the Crow, Pawnee, and Shoshone.[15] In a state of constant warfare, the Crow and Pawnee suffered significantly from exposure to disease, weakening their abilities to resist Sioux expansion.[16] By the early 19th century, the Sioux, with their various bands and allies, had established themselves as the dominant tribe on the Great Plains.

The Sioux position as the dominant tribe occurred over several decades of fighting, which created staunch adversaries specifically of the Crow, Arikara, Shoshone, and Pawnee, all of whom sought to regain their territory, incur revenge, and gain honor through fighting the Sioux and their allies, even if it meant assisting the US Army. The Crow had a long history of friendly

---

[13] Utley, *Frontier Regular*, 5; Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers*, 109.

[14] James O. Gump, *The Dust Rose Like Smoke : The Subjugation of the Zulu and the Sioux* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 31.

[15] Ibid., 42, 43-44; Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers*, 111-112, 135, 148.

[16] Gump, *The Dust Rose Like Smoke*, 50-51; Andrist, *The Long Death*, 15.

interaction with frontiersmen, travelers, and the Army, so it was not hard for them to recognize the advantages gained by allying with the Army against their traditional enemies.[17] The Pawnee had signed a treaty in 1859 that moved them onto a reservation along the Republican River in Nebraska. The Pawnee realized their survival depended on security provided by the US Army against the aggressive Sioux.[18] The result was that tribes and even bands within tribes had undergone decades of warfare against each other prior to the arrival of large numbers of whites. This established bitter enemies among the tribes from which adversaries could draw allies.[19] The tribal structure created fractures among tribes and bands, which operated according to their own best interest. Traditions of tribal warfare and competition for resources amplified the tensions within the tribal structure's fractures.

The tribes saw themselves as independent and in charge of their own future, but in reality the policies coming out of Washington directly influenced their future more than their own decisions. It is important to address a few of the key events that influenced the situation and how the US Army dealt with the Indians. The biggest factor that affected US policies toward the tribes occurred in 1849 with the creation of the Department of the Interior, which took over the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) from the War Department.[20] The US Army no longer had a role in directly creating policy, only in enforcing it. The BIA's primary stance was to treat Indians as dependents of the state and remove them to reservations through the Indian Peace Commission of 1867-1868.[21] After six months of negotiating, the Indian Peace Commission secured the signing of numerous treaties, including the Fort Laramie treaty of 1868. The majority of northern plains tribal and band chiefs signed the Fort Laramie treaty by October 1868. The treaty essentially

---

[17] Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers*, 113.

[18] Ibid., 148, 149.

[19] Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 6; Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers*, 5.

[20] United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Federal Indian Policies, from the Colonial Period through the Early 1970's* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 1975), 5.

[21] Ibid., 5-6.

required the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of large permanent reservations for the various tribes. Tribes could leave the reservations to hunt in the unceded territory with the permission of their BIA agent and usually with an escort. The US, in return for compliance by the tribes, would provide payments and prevent encroachment by US citizens into Indian reservations.[22]

Several issues arose as both sides took liberties or interpreted the treaty in different ways. The BIA ran the reservations serving as the administrators of the treaty while the Army was responsible for removal of Indians to the reservations, securing the boundaries, and pursuing Indians who violated the treaty. The Army could not conduct operations against hostile tribes on the reservations without BIA approval.[23] Essentially, two departments were responsible for the implementation of the Indian policy. The BIA served as administers and policy creators, while the Army acted as the enforcers. The Army found itself in a difficult position of attempting to get compliance from tribes, but having no options available except force. This situation was further complicated due to corruption within the BIA, which caused many bands to abandon the reservations.[24] The BIA's inability to manage or account for the bands on the reservations allowed many young warriors to move freely. It was easy for these warriors to satisfy their warrior cultural requirements of honor and glory by escaping the reservation every summer to

---

[22] Paul L. Hedren, *Fort Laramie in 1876 : Chronicle of a Frontier Post at War* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 3-5.

[23] Robert Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 11-12; Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 190-191.

[24] For accounts and issues between the BIA and the US Army concerning the Indians see John Pope, "The Indian Question" in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V, the Army and the Indian*, ed. Peter Cozzens, 1st ed., Vol. V (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001), 139-141; Nelson A. Miles, "The Indian Problem" in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V*, ed. Cozzens, 157-160; Nelson A. Miles, "The Future of the Indian Question" in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V*, ed. Cozzens, 167-171; Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903*, 79; Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 7.

join or support hostile bands in fighting the US Army, but then return to the reservation if this activity became too dangerous or resources became too scarce.[25]

President Ulysses S. Grant's election in 1868 initially stifled and hampered Army attempts to deal with the Indians. President Grant implemented a peace policy to resolve the Indian situation. He believed the situation could be resolved without war and genuinely felt sympathy for the Indian's plight. This policy called for the assimilation and acculturation of the tribes into western society, and it garnered the support of numerous humanitarian and religious groups. President Grant pushed Indian legislation in 1869 that created a nonpartisan Board of Indian Commissioners to monitor the budget and the BIA. Further reforms included use of religious leaders and their organizations to fill key positions and administer the reservations.[26] The intent was that this new commission and the introduction of religious groups could curb the corruption within the BIA and any excess hostilities on the part of the Army or westerners. The reductions in the size of the Army, which previously filled many reservation positions, encouraged the BIA to use religious groups to fill the vacancies. Many of these religious groups perceived the military as the problem and too aggressive, citing many of the previous conflicts with tribes. As a result, religious groups and their members that administered reservations or operated within the BIA often limited the US Army's ability to interact, control, or monitor tribes and bands on the reservations. The US Army no longer had direct input or authority concerning

---

[25] Azor H. Nickerson, "Major General Crook and the Indians" in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V*, ed. Cozzens, 236-237. Major Azor Nickerson served on General Crook's staff for ten years and commented on young warriors leaving reservation to join hostile bands. Army officers expecting to find a few hundred hostile Indians instead could find themselves facing many times more then expected.

[26] Jean Edward Smith, *Grant* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 520-527; For President Grants's messages an letters concerning Indian policies and reforms see Ulysses S. Grant, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 20, November 1 - October 31, 1869-1870*, ed. John Y. Simon, Vol. 20 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003), 38-39; Ulysses S. Grant, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant Volume 21 November 1 - May 31, 1870-1871*, ed. John Y. Simon, Vol. 21 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003), 41, 44, 387-389.

Indian policies.[27] The conflict between the US Army and the BIA created a seam for the Indians to exploit within the US government and forced the Army to seek alternative methods to work around deficiencies in the policy.

The Fort Laramie Treaty of 1866 and 1868 provided the framework that the US thought would resolve the Indian situation in the west. However, it is important to note that this was not the case for a variety of reasons. The Indians, particularly the Sioux, did not necessarily see the treaty in the same manner as the US or many of the other tribes. They were the dominant tribe and took liberties with the treaty, which led to the majority of the conflicts that occurred during the Indian Wars on the northern Great Plains. The Sioux at the signing of the treaty saw themselves as victors and the dominant force. This view is evident in the Sioux chief Red Cloud's actions of only signing the treaty after the abandonment of the US forts along the Bozeman trail, which he immediately burned following the US Army's departure. In addition, some bands in the Powder River and Yellowstone regions of Wyoming and Montana, such as those under Sitting Bull, refused to sign the treaty and resisted attempts to force his bands and followers into compliance. Sitting Bull's band and others that resisted served as rallying points for other bands who wished to abandon their reservations.[28] Many Sioux bands and individual Indians departed the reservation or actively broke the treaty in response to what they considered US violations. These violations were the major drivers of conflict and included failure to meet Indian needs on reservations as stated in the treaties and encroachment into Indian lands by settlers, miners, and the railroads. Bands took great liberties with the hunting excursion clause, with many spending entire years off the reservation living their old lifestyle in the Powder River

---

[27] Smith, *Grant*, 534-535, 537, 539-541; Francis Paul Prucha, *Documents of United States Indian Policy* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 134; Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903*, 45; Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 191-192.

[28] Ibid., 135-137; Helen Hunt Jackson, *A Century of Dishonor: A Sketch of the United States Government's Dealings with some of the Indian Tribes* (Williamstown, MA.: Corner House, 1973), 176.

region, one of the last locations of significant buffalo herds.[29] Tribal warfare also continued despite the establishment of reservations, as tribes continued to fight over control of hunting lands and carried out traditional raiding of their enemies. Sioux not only fought against incursions by whites, but also continued to fight with their old tribal enemies, the Crow and Pawnee. The Pawnee in 1873 abandoned their Nebraska reservation following a Sioux attack and moved to the Oklahoma Indian Territory in an attempt to escape Sioux raids.[30] Conflict continued to be the norm on the northern plans as bands of Sioux continued to pursue aggressively their own policies. The result was that the conflict continued for another 30 years with Indian tribes and bands resisting the US until faced with complete extermination.

These complexities were just some of the external struggles that the Army faced. The Army had a variety of internal issues that added to the difficulties of resolving the situation. These struggles included a mixture of missions that consisted of reconstruction duties in the South, defense of the Nation, and execution of the Indian policy. Simultaneously, Congress reduced the size of the Army following the Civil War despite the requirements of these varied missions. Occupation duties in the South required initially 40% of the force in 1867, but dropped to 15% by 1876. Another 11-18% was required to garrison coastal fortifications and arsenals throughout this time.[31] The size of the Army following the Civil War went from an approximate authorized strength of 54,000 in 1866 to 27,000 in 1874.[32] At best, only 75% of the Army was available for duty in the Western theater. In 1874, the Army only had approximately 20,250 Soldiers to secure the frontier from Canada to Mexico between the Mississippi and the Pacific

---

[29] Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 137; Gump, *The Dust Rose Like Smoke*, 74.

[30] Ibid., 50.

[31] Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903*, 14-15.

[32] James A. Garfield, "The Army of the United States" in Cozzens, *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V*, 17. Article for the *North American Review* from March-April 1878 in which Congressman James A. Garfield discussed the reductions of the Army and its difficulties from 1868 to 1876.; Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 15.

Ocean. The standard policy at the time was to adjust the size of units, specifically companies, in order to reach the force size prescribe by Congress.[33] This resulted in units attempting to conduct missions with companies that were at times extremely under strength for their assigned missions.

The Army's own organization, doctrine, and command and control structure exacerbated the problem of its small size. There was no established written Army doctrine on how to fight or deal with the Indians.[34] Rather a doctrine and strategy for dealing with Indians developed out of an evolutionary process of experiences and techniques that developed over time fighting various tribes from the colonial period to the end of the Indian Wars in the 1890s. Strategy and doctrine developed through informal means as instructors or experienced officers shared their experience and knowledge with those who would serve on the frontier. Despite the lack of an established written doctrine, a mode of operations against Indians developed and existed through passed on knowledge and recorded orders from experienced officers who passed them on to their successors.[35] The command and control was inadequate as the Army established a hierarchical system based on geographical divisions. The area of the Great Plains with which this study is primarily concerned falls within the Division of the Missouri, which then split into three Departments known as Dakota, Platte, and Missouri. These geographical boundaries only served to complicate coordination between commanders as they attempted to take action against hostile tribes who did not observe boundaries. The lack of orders authorizing or instructing coordination between the departments further complicated efforts to synchronize. In some instances, commanders even executed operations in other departments without notifying the department where they were conducting missions. Rivalries and personality conflicts among individual

---

[33] Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 12, 16; United States War Department, Report of the General of the Army from the *Report of the Secretary of War; Being part of the Message and Documents Communicated to the Two Houses of Congress at the beginning of the First Session of the Forty-Seventh Congress*, Vol. I, 47th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1881), 32-34.

[34] Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 35-36, 46.

[35] Andrew J. Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency And Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*, (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 2003), 5, 12, 60, 63, 66.

officers and between line and staff officers further complicated command and control. An antiquated promotion system was largely to blame for this rivalry. The promotion system required a vacancy prior to promotion with many promotions selected based on seniority and favoritism with no check of qualifications or physical fitness.[36] Staffs located in Eastern cities often did not grasp the situation in the West and had difficulties meeting many requirements resulting in line officers feeling betrayed by those they saw as living safe and comfortable lives in the rear.[37] Further, the Army maintained its infantry and cavalry formations designed to fight conventional wars, although severely reduced in size.[38] These forces dispersed in forts and garrisons around the west found it extremely difficult to defeat their mobile Indian opponents.

The sharing of informal knowledge and experiences by frontiersman, veteran officers, and educators at West Point created a mindset as well as the successful strategies and techniques to deal with the Indians on the frontier to include utilizing tribal auxiliaries.[39] The US Army developed a defensive strategy based on dispersing forces to forts located at key locations in an attempt to provide coverage across the large area. These dispersed forts were to secure key terrain and shorten response times to hostile acts. Offensive efforts required linking or joining multiple commands and units in order to carry out an operation. The Army would then strike out in various columns from different forts in attempts to locate and engage hostile tribes. The semi-nomadic life, warrior culture, and rugged ponies of the various tribes and bands made them extremely difficult to fix and engage. As a result, attacking Indian villages became the unofficial

---

[36] Ibid., 19-21; Russell Frank Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), 169-170, 191; Robert Marshall Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865* (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1967), 31-35.

[37] Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903*, 18-20; Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 47-48.

[38] Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903*, 56; Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 11, 45, 46.

[39] For information regarding the Armies development of doctrine and implementation of strategy see , Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency And Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*, 5, 12, 60, 63, 66, 67-85.

target of operations. Villages presented targets, as they were one of the only means to force the warriors to fight. Warriors had to defend the villages in order to allow time for them to escape. In addition, the village contained the resources of stored food and shelter required to survive on the plains. Destroying an Indian village left the remaining Indians with few options other than to return to the reservation or face the harsh environment with out the required resources. In order to conduct these operations, conventional Army units required strategic placements of logistic depots as well as multiple wagons to sustain themselves on the march. This greatly reduced their mobility, and resulted in the Indians maintaining the initiative the majority of the time.[40] Many officers had to take the initiative and modify their formations and operations in attempts to overcome these challenges.

The lack of knowledge concerning geography, along with the Army's small size, limited mobility, doctrine, and training all contributed in some manner to the utilization of Indian auxiliaries by the Army during the Indian Wars. Auxiliaries in the form of scouts or allies likely would have naturally occurred due the need in both the Army and tribes to achieve their goals. The Army, recognizing the challenges facing it in the West, secured from Congress in the Army Act of 1866 permission to recruit 1,000 Indian allies.[41] This initial policy officially recognized and approved the use of Indian auxiliaries by the Army. Indian enlistments as auxiliaries would count against the overall size limits placed on the Army. This greatly complicated the issue, as the Army did not want to replace their already small force with large numbers of Indian auxiliaries. As a result, an administrative cap limited the enlistment size of Indian auxiliaries to 300 men. In 1876, Congress made this the legal limit through an appropriation. The disaster at the Battle of the Little Bighorn resulted in the number returning to 1,000, although the Army continued to restrict the number to keep slots open to the regular enlistment of white and black

---

[40] Oliver Knight, *Following the Indian Wars : The Story of the Newspaper Correspondents among the Indian Campaigners*, 1std ed. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960), 16, 20.

[41] Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903*, 128.

citizens.[42] This restriction on the number of auxiliaries complicated the ability of department commands to maintain auxiliaries, and auxiliary enlistments were often only for the campaign or for a few months. Division commanders dictated to each department commander the number of Indian auxiliaries that department was authorized. This assignment of authorized auxiliaries in each department therefore depended heavily on how the division commander perceived the situation in each of his departments. This had the effect of pitting department commanders against each other. Department commanders competed with each over who had the greatest need for auxiliaries in order to the get the division commander to authorize them to enlist more out of the division's allotted amount. These constant requests and resulting competition for auxiliaries demonstrated the inadequacy of this implementation policy and the Indian enlistment cap in meeting the US Armies need for manpower and capabilities.[43]

The normal structure for Indian auxiliaries consisted of the appointment of a US officer or civilian contractor to serve as commander to the auxiliaries. Due to the force restrictions, commanders developed bypasses to meet their need for more auxiliaries. One technique was to recruit them under the Quartermaster Department and use civilian contractors, known as the "chiefs of scouts." Commanders also took risks in order to secure the advantages of Indian auxiliaries. Some of these risks included: exceeding budgets or the utilization of Army logistics to support Indians, inaccurate reporting of the number of auxiliaries on hand, allowing Indians to loot or take prisoners, and unofficial alliances with Indians.[44] Despite these issues, the inclusion in the 1866 Army Act of the clause allowing for the enlistment of Indian auxiliaries along with the numerous other means in which Army commanders took to gain the advantage of Indian allies

---

[42] Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers*, 50-57; Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 53.

[43] William H. Powell, "The Indian as a Soldier" in Cozzens, *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V*, 390-395. Colonel Powell in an article for *The United Service*, March 1890, made the argument for forming all Indian units and the value of these scouts based on his experiences.; Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers*, 51-52; Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 53.

[44] Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers*, 54-56.

indicates the recognition of the advantages that they provided. Generals Henry Halleck and Frederick Steele in their 1867 reports both praised the Indian auxiliaries and recommended increases in their numbers. General Steele stated, "In the late expedition they have done most of the fighting and killing. They have also proved themselves very efficient when acting alone; ... It is my opinion that one hundred, in addition, to those employed, would exterminate the hostile bands before next spring."[45] The Army recognized the advantages of auxiliaries and their assistance greatly increased the opportunities for success. This required securing the support and active participation of friendly or neutral bands against hostile bands.

The US Army lacked in many areas concerning the capabilities needed to fight on the Plains and to deal with the various tribes. One way the US Army overcame the shortcomings or gaps was through tribal auxiliaries. Some of the key areas in which the US Army lacked included knowledge of terrain, culture, and the style of warfare. Indian auxiliaries provided intimate knowledge and skill in these areas that greatly assisted US Army commanders in their efforts on the Plains against noncompliant tribes or bands. These allies provided a way for Army commanders to work around organizational, doctrinal, and policy restrictions. Hostile tribes were relatively immune to the slow, cumbersome movements of the US Army as they searched for their adversary, but friendly Indian forces changed this by increasing the ability and mobility of the Army to locate and engage their adversary. Indian auxiliaries fighting in the same manner as their opponent increased the effectiveness of campaigns, as indicated by General Steele. The Indian allies therefore greatly increased the effectiveness of the Army in the Indian Wars. Examination of particular instances during the Indian Wars demonstrates how tribal society and structures present nature opportunities for using tribal auxiliaries to bring hostile tribes into compliance as well as several advantages and disadvantages of their use.

---

[45] United States War Department, Report of the Secretary of War, Part I from the *Message of the President of the United States and Accompanying Documents to the Two Houses of Congress at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Fortieth Congress*, 40th Cong., 2nd sess..., Executive Document 1 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1867), 79.

Historical Examples

The Crow in Red Cloud's War: Tribal Support

> On the eastern borders of Montana, there is a large tribe of Indians known as the Crow Indians, who in the days of the Lewis and Clark expedition were friendly to the whites, and still boast, and rightfully, that they have never killed a white man unless in self-defense. They have habitually warred with the Sioux, and thus screened the feeble white settlement from their incursions.
>
> -Colonel Henry B. Carrington in an address at the 45th meeting of the Geographical and Biological Sections of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1875.[46]

The Army's attempt to secure the Bozeman trail in 1866-1868 brings to light the first example of how tribal fractures and competition led to one tribe allying themselves with the US Army against another tribe hostile to the US Army. It also demonstrated how bands do not always follow the policy of their tribe or allies. The events surrounding the US Army's attempt to secure the Bozeman Trail brought the US Army into contact primarily with the Crow, Cheyenne, and Sioux tribes. The US Army in its operations failed to understand the complexities of the conflict and as a result did not take advantage of the tribal fractures and stresses that existed between the tribes involved. The Crow assisted the US Army against their traditional enemies the Sioux and Cheyenne, but the Army did not maximize their use or establish an official alliance with them.

The Bozeman trail was a short cut to the gold fields in Montana. John M. Bozeman, attempting to find an easier route to the Montana gold fields, located a pass to the east of Virginia City, Montana in 1862. This pass allowed travelers to go directly east from the gold fields and then by turning south after the Big Horn Mountains link up with the Oregon Trail only seventy miles east of Fort Laramie.[47] This route shaved off many miles of difficult terrain on the established routes. The problem with this new route was that it passed directly through Sioux and

---

[46] Henry B. Carrington, "The Indian Question" in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V, the Army and the Indian*, Vol. V, 102.

[47] Andrist, *The Long Death*, 101.

Cheyenne territory. In his initial exploration of the trail, Bozeman almost lost his life when captured by the Sioux, but they released him without horses, weapons, and clothes to find his way through the harsh terrain to safety. Undeterred, he successfully brought a freight wagon train through the trail in 1863, but only by traveling at night and doubling back at times to avoid contact with the Sioux. The Sioux contested and confronted any travel on this new route, but the profits in Virginia City proved too great and men risked their lives for the profits provided by this shorter and easier path. The continued use of the Bozeman Trail enraged the Sioux who increased their efforts to preserve this area for hunting and to prevent further white encroachment.[48]



[49]

Following the Civil War, the US government turned its attention to the West, which included the securing of the Bozeman Trail. Following the Harney-Sanborn treaty of 1865 and in

---

[48] Grace Raymond Hebard and E. A. Brininstool, *The Bozeman Trail: Historical Accounts of the Blazing of the Overland Routes into the Northwest, and the Fights with Red Cloud's Warriors* (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1922), 214-215, 220.

[49] Collins, *Atlas of the Sioux Wars,* Map 6.

the ongoing negotiations at Fort Laramie, the US government believed it had secured passage on the trail through the Sioux hunting grounds to the gold fields of Montana. However, many of the Sioux bands or chiefs did not recognize this treaty. For example, Red Cloud was one of these chiefs who did not recognize this treaty and his band's territory significantly overlapped with the Bozeman Trail.[50] Attempts by the military to subdue the Sioux, such as Brigadier General Patrick Conner's 1865 expedition to bring the non-treaty tribes into submission failed.[51]

In 1866, General William Tecumseh Sherman, Division Commander of the Missouri, issued orders to establish forts along the Bozeman trail believing that the dispute over access was resolved and that the ongoing peace talks at Fort Laramie could handle any outstanding issues. This was evident in his reports to General Grant, General of the Armies of the United States, that all was calm in the West and his encouraging of wives to accompany their husbands to duty on the Bozeman Trail.[52] General Order 33 issued on 10 March 1866 from the Department of the

---

[50] For information regarding the Harney Sanborn Treaty of 1865, the Chiefs that attended, the various tribal positions and the outcomes see Andrist, *The Long Death*, 103; George W. Kingsbury, *History of Dakota Territory*, Vol. II (Chicago, IL: The S.J. Clarke Publishing Company, 1915), 1431; George Bird Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915), 221; United States Senate, Letter of the Secretary of the Interior from the *Indexes to the Executive Documents of the Senate of the United States for the First Session Fortieth Congress, and for the Special Session, 1867*,40th Cong., 1st sess., Executive Document 13, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1868), 277.

[51] Oliver Knight, *Following the Indian Wars : The Story of the Newspaper Correspondents*, 30; Jacob Piatt Dunn, *Massacres of the Mountains : A History of the Indian Wars of the Far West* (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1886), 478-481; S. L. A. Marshall, *Crimsoned Prairie : The Wars between the United States and the Plains Indians during the Winning of the West* (New York, NY: Scribner, 1972), 46-48; Dorothy M. Johnson, *The Bloody Bozeman : The Perilous Trail to Montana's Gold*, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1971), 3, 21, 27-28, 49-50. Dorothy Johnson provides an excellent narrative concerning the establishment of the Bozeman Trail by John Bozeman.

[52] Marshall, *Crimsoned Prairie*, 46, 51; Dunn, *Massacres of the Mountains*, 483; William T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General William T. Sherman*, 2 ed., Vol. II (New York, NY: Appleton, 1886), 410-413; Ellis P. Oberholtzer, *A History of the United States since the Civil War*, Vol. I (New York, NY: The Macmillain Company, 1917), 359-361; William Tecumseh Sherman and others, Report of Major General Pope, Communication to Colonel R. M. Sawyer assistant adjutant general, military division of the Mississippi from the *Supplemental Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War*, Vol. II, 38th Cong. 2nd sess., Senate Report No. 2 (Washington: Government Printing Officce, 1866), 203-206; Margaret Irvin Carrington, *Absaraka, Home of the Crows : Being the Experience of an Officer's Wife on the Plains*, 1st Bison Book ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 39-41, 263; United States Senate, Letter of the Secretary of the Interior from *Indexes to the Executive Documents of the Senate of the United States for the First Session Fortieth Congress, and for the Special Session, 1867*, 40th Cong., 1st sess., Executive Document 13, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1868), 275-276.

Missouri established the Mountain District of the Department of the Platte, which included the Bozeman trail. Colonel Henry Carrington, commander of the 18th Infantry Regiment was designated the Mountain District Commander and instructed to secure the Bozeman Trail. Carrington received General Order 7 from the Department of the Platte on 23 June 1866 at Fort Laramie. This new order instructed him to garrison Fort Reno and to build two new forts along the trail. Carrington constructed Fort Phil Kearny approximately eighty miles north of Fort Reno and Fort C.F. Smith approximately 70 miles north of Fort Phil Kearny along the trail. Two companies were to garrison each fort and Forts Phil Kearny and C.F. Smith were specifically to provide security to the Bozeman Trail.[53]

Up to this point, Carrington's journey was uneventful, but his arrival at Fort Laramie brought the first indicators that all was not as General Sherman claimed. Carrington and his column of Soldiers arrived at Fort Laramie in June 1866 during the negotiations with the Sioux. The arrival of Carrington's column, which included soldiers, civilian contractors, family members, and all the equipment needed to establish multiple forts, was clearly visible to the Sioux. The Sioux perceived Carrington's arrival as a sign that the US was going to steal access to the Bozeman Trail and surrounding region regardless of the outcome of the negotiations. As a result, Red Cloud of the Sioux, Oglala band, and many of the other chiefs left the negotiations and declared their territory closed to whites and announced their resolve to fight to protect their territory.[54]

---

[53] Margaret Irvin Carrington, *Absaraka, Home of the Crows*, 262; United States Senate, Letter of the Secretary of the Interior from *Indexes to the Executive Documents of the Senate of the United States for the First Session Fortieth Congress, and for the Special Session, 1867*, 40th Cong., 1st sess, Executive Document 13, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1868), 335. Executive Document 13 contains the report by the special commission appointed by the President and associated documents concerning the Fetterman Massacre. It provides detail on the actions and events leading to the battle.

[54] Richard N. Ellis, *The Western American Indian : Case Studies in Tribal History* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), 30-32.; United States Senate, Letter of the Secretary of the Interior from *Indexes to the Executive Documents of the Senate of the United States for the First Session Fortieth Congress, and for the Special Session, 1867*, 40th Cong., 1st sess., Executive Document 13, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1868), 276, 285.

Red Cloud's band and his allies immediately set out to establish their intent along with their dominance by raiding Fort Reno shortly after Carrington's column arrived.[55] The Sioux and their allies, mostly Cheyenne, had already driven the Crow from most of the region in order to secure the prime hunting ground. The Crow found themselves pushed to the north and west of the Big Horn River.[56] Red Cloud sought to prevent the Crow and US Army from occupying this region rich in resources, but the Crow continued to hunt and live on the fringes of the area, especially near Fort C.F. Smith. Fort C.F. Smith was located further North along the trail closer to where the Crow displaced under Sioux and Cheyenne pressure. The Crow maintained a presence in this northern area as they sought ways to increase their capabilities to regain their former hunting grounds along the Big Horn Mountains and it served as a buffer with the Sioux and Cheyenne. The arrival of the US Army in the region provided an opportunity to shift the power from the Sioux and Cheyenne in the favor of the Crow. The Crow recognized this and actively supported the US Army. The desire of the Crow to continue to fight their traditional enemy while maximizing the presence of the US Army is evident in the statement by the Crow Chief, Old Crow, when he made the following statement in a military council, "The great white chief will hear his Indian brother. These are our lands by inheritance. The Great Spirit gave them to our fathers but the Sioux stole them from us. ... The great white chief sees that my young men have come to fight. No Sioux shall see their backs. Where the white warrior goes, there shall we be also."[57]

As members of the dominate Sioux tribe, Red Cloud's band and his allies sought to manipulate the other tribes in order to increase their numbers for the fight with the US Army over

---

[55] Carrington, *Absaraka, Home of the Crows*, 96-97.

[56] Ibid., 14; C. G. Coutant, *The History of Wyoming from the Earliest Known Discoveries*, Vol. I (Laramie, WY: Chaplin, Spafford & Mathison, Printers, 1899), 409.

[57] Grace Raymond Hebard and Earl Alonzo Brininstool, *The Bozeman Trail: Historical Accounts of the Blazing of the Overland Routes into the Northwest, and the Fights with Red Cloud's Warriors*, (Cleveland, OH: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1922), 156.

the Bozeman Trail.[58] The Sioux recognized that their traditional enemies posed a threat or weakness in their tribal unity and made multiple peace attempts with the Crow while maintaining pressure on their allies in order to keep them in line with the Sioux agenda. A truce between the Sioux and Crow at times was established, but it was only temporary and it only slightly limited the Crow from assisting the US Army.[59] Several Cheyenne bands, as the weaker members of the Sioux alliance, demonstrated an initial desire to establish a truce with the US Army with several bands meeting with Carrington at different times within the first few months of his arrival at Fort Phil Kearny.[60] Red Cloud's band thwarted these attempts through intimidation and shaming the Cheyenne into keeping their alliance. Cheyenne bands either supported Red Cloud or fled the area facing retaliation for not supporting the alliance.

An example of the Sioux enforcing their alliance occurred shortly after a group of Cheyenne visited Colonel Carrington seeking to establish a relationship. A group of Sioux came across Cheyenne chiefs returning to their villages and, recognizing what they had done, whipped them with their bows and chastised them. This pressure prevented the Cheyenne tribe as a whole from establishing a peaceful relationship with the US Army at Fort Phil Kearny, as to do so would mean warfare with the Sioux, who posed a more serious threat at the time to their security than did the Americans.[61] Sioux pressure along with many Cheyenne bands and warriors desiring to support the Sioux and fight against the US Army resulted in a Sioux-Cheyenne alliance that continued until the last half of the 1870s. However, this did not prevent some Cheyenne bands

---

[58] Barry J. Hagan, *"Exactly in the Right Place" : A History of Fort C.F. Smith, Montana Territory, 1866-1868* (El Segundo, CA: Upton and Sons, 1999), 53, 79-80.

[59] Andrist, *The Long Death*, 106; Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers*, 39;Thomas Bailey Marquis and William Henry White, *Custer, Cavalry, & Crows : Being the Thrilling Account of the Western Adventures of William White*(Fort Collins, CO: Old Army Press, 1975), 63-64.

[60] Carrington, *Absaraka, Home of the Crows*, 116-118,

[61] Federal Writers' Project, *Wyoming: A Guide to its History, Highways, and People* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1956), 272; Hebard and Brininstool, *The Bozeman Trail : Historical Accounts of the Blazing of the Overland Route*, 277-279; Coutant, *The History of Wyoming from the Earliest Known Discoveries*, 553-555; Carrington, *Absaraka, Home of the Crows*, 284, 164.

from trading and passing information to the US Army stationed along the Bozeman trail. A few bands, finding themselves trapped between the US Army, the Sioux, and their own Cheyenne tribe, but wishing to avoid the warfare, simply fled the area.[62] The tribal situation along the Bozeman Trail was very complicated as the Sioux sought to continue their dominance in the region and enforce their alliances. However, due to tribal fractures, the Sioux were unable to establish a collective Indian front against the US Army. The Crow refused to ally with their traditional enemies, while the Cheyenne largely supported the Sioux under the threat of retribution from the Sioux if they failed to live up to their alliance.

Colonel Carrington faced a difficult situation on the Bozeman Trail. Although told that trouble was not expected soon after Red Cloud's departure from Fort Laramie, it became obvious that the mission was not as simple as constructing a few forts along the Bozeman Trail. Colonel Carrington realized that he would need additional forces and Indian auxiliaries almost immediately. In June 1866 prior to leaving Fort Laramie, he attempted to recruit a group of Winnebago scouts who fought successfully the year earlier under General Conner in his punitive expedition to the Powder River country. However, the Sioux in the ongoing treaties demanded the Winnebago's removal from the area and he currently had no authority at the time to recruit any Indian auxiliaries.[63] In the first six months of the establishment of Fort Phil Kearny, the Sioux conducted at least 51 attacks along the Bozeman trail, killing 154 soldiers and citizens and capturing over 700 head of livestock. Throughout this time, Colonel Carrington constantly requested reinforcements and supplies in order to fight off the Sioux, secure the trail, and build

---

[62] Ibid., 117-118, 122, 161-164. Various Cheyenne bands met with Colonel Carrington and pledged peace. There is no reports or indications that these bands that pledged peace participated in any of the battles along the Bozeman Trail, but left the area to avoid the conflict.; Johnson, *The Bloody Bozeman*, 196.

[63] Carrington, *Absaraka, Home of the Crows*, 94-95.

the forts.[64] Shortly after arrival, he sent out his best guides to meet with the Crow and establish their disposition toward him. The Crow stated their friendship and offered 250 warriors to assist in fighting the Sioux. Carrington turned down the offer as he lacked the authority to recruit Indians at the time and he did not have the munitions to arm them.[65] In August, he received authorization to recruit 50 Indian auxiliaries and he sought to enlist the Winnebagos, as they were already well armed and proven.[66] The Winnebagos were not available due to their use elsewhere on the frontier. Carrington missed a great opportunity by failing to establish further relations with the Crow and his desire to recruit the Winnebagos over the Crow.

Similarly, Judge Kinney, a member of the Fetterman massacre investigation committee, in the summer of 1867 held a council with the Crow at Fort Phil Kearney. The intent was to establish and confirm the peaceful or neutral status of the Crow. He further sought to get the Crow to move their villages between the two forts in order to increase the security at both forts and along the trail. The Crow presence at Fort C.F. Smith reduced Sioux efforts against the post as to attack risked contact with the Crow as well. The Crow turned down the offer, likely due to failures of the US Army to curb Sioux actions and not wanting to place their families directly into the path of Sioux war parties. However, they offered to provide 500 warriors in an operation against the Sioux. The US Army turned down the Crow proposal and missed another opportunity

---

[64] Andrist, *The Long Death*, 105; Hebard and Brininstool, *The Bozeman Trail : Historical Accounts of the Blazing of the Overland Routes*, 285-286; United States Congress, Letter from the Acting Secretary of the Interior from the *Letter from the Acting Secretary of the Interior Concerning Indian Operations on the Plains*, 50th Cong., 1st sess., Executive Document 33 (Whitefish, Montana: Kessinger Publishing, 1887), 9, 14, 34, 36, 38.

[65] Carrington, *Absaraka, Home of the Crows*, 284, 132; Frances C. Carrington, *My Army Life and the Fort Phil Kearny Massacre with an Account of the Celebration of "Wyoming Opening"*, (Philadelphia, PA and London, England: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1910), 310-311; Hebard and Brininstool, *The Bozeman Trail : Historical Accounts of the Blazing of the Overland Routes*, 283-284; United States Congress, Letter from the Acting Secretary of the Interior from the *Letter from the Acting Secretary of the Interior Concerning Indian Operations on the Plains*, 20-21.

[66] Dee Brown, *The Fetterman Massacre: Formerly Fort Phil Kearny, an American Saga* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), 149; Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers*, 38.

with the Crow.[67] The result was that Indian allies, specifically the Crow, were never official allies of the US Army in its attempts to secure the Bozeman Trail.

Although the Crow were not official allies of the US Army, their past enmity for the Sioux and Cheyenne drove them to support the US Army as a way to improve their own position and hinder their tribal enemies. The lack of an agreement did not prevent tribal warfare from continuing or the Crow from attempting to benefit from the presence of the US Army. The Crow did this in a variety of ways, including providing intelligence on the Sioux and Cheyenne, serving as couriers, and even carrying out attacks in support of the US Army. Similarly, many American officers recognized the advantages of the Crow friendship. The attitude toward the Crow varied between the officers and commands, with some seeking to maximize their assistance while others viewed them suspiciously as enemies or sympathizers with the enemy. Many officers did not trust or maximize the use of the Crows out of fear or inability to see the Crows as a separate tribe who shared the same enemy, the Sioux and Cheyenne. Those who understood the complexity of the tribes and their dynamics gained significant advantages due to these tribal fractures.[68]

Some of the best examples of the US Army and Crow cooperation occurred at Fort C.F. Smith. Various Crow chiefs repeatedly visited Fort C.F. Smith and numerous villages remained in close proximity to the fort, providing early warning and protection from the hostiles. Sioux and Cheyenne war parties risked running into large numbers of Crow as they ventured closer to Fort C.F. Smith, which served as a significant deterrence. Crow provided critical information on tribal politics and activities among the various bands. Further, by monitoring the Crow villages and their movements, the officers at Fort C.F. Smith could deduce Sioux activities. Fort Phil Kearny lacked this advantage, as the Crow preferred to keep their villages farther north near Fort

---

[67] Hagan, *"Exactly in the Right Place" : A History of Fort C.F. Smith*, 8, 100-102, 288.

[68] Hebard and Brininstool, *The Bozeman Trail : Historical Accounts of the Blazing of the Overland Routes*, 140; Hagan, *"Exactly in the Right Place" : A History of Fort C.F. Smith*, 83, 85, 86, 100-102; Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers*, 38-39.

C.F. Smith and as a result, it suffered significantly more from raids by the Sioux and Cheyenne.[69] Colonel Carrington relied on information from Fort C.F. Smith and dispatched his guides, Jim Bridger and James Beckworth, to the Crow villages to collect intelligence only after learning of the Crow village's location through information passed from Fort C.F. Smith.[70] The Crow at times were the only means of passing information between the forts. At one point, Fort C.F. Smith was out of contact for two months. It was only through the arrival of a party of Crow at Fort Phil Kearny that communication between the two forts occurred.[71] An exceptional example of the Crow providing intelligence on an impending Sioux attack occurred in July 1867. Mr. Burnett, a civilian employee of the post sutler, A. C. Leighton, participated in the Hayfield Fight and recorded the events leading up to the fight. Burnett stated that while collecting hay several miles from Fort C.F. Smith, a group of Crow approached his work party multiple times in July and warned that the Sioux and their allies were planning attacks to destroy the two forts. This intelligence proved true as the Sioux and their allies launched their attacks against the two forts. One group of hostile Sioux and their allies attacked the hayfield working party from Fort C.F. Smith on 1 August 1867 while a second group attacked a wood working party from Fort Phil Kearny on 2 August 1867. Both groups of contractors and US soldiers were greatly outnumbered, but they successfully defeated the attacks known as the Hayfield and Wagon Box fights. Following the fighting at the Hayfield, the Crow assisted the leadership of Fort C.F. Smith in assessing enemy causalities by taking them to where the Sioux where burying their dead.[72] Lastly, the Crow actively participated in numerous engagements against the Sioux and their allies

---

[69] Ibid., 80-83, 101, 103, 111, 144.

[70] United States Congress, Letter from the Acting Secretary of the Interior from the *Letter from the Acting Secretary of the Interior Concerning Indian Operations on the Plains*, 20, 35.

[71] Hebard and Brininstool, *The Bozeman Trail : Historical Accounts of the Blazing of the Overland Routes*, 140; Hagan, *"Exactly in the Right Place" : A History of Fort C.F. Smith*, 83, 85, 86.

[72] Hebard and Brininstool, *The Bozeman Trail : Historical Accounts of the Blazing of the Overland Routes*, 159-161; Hagan, *"Exactly in the Right Place" : A History of Fort C.F. Smith*, 74.

in support of the US Army as part of their traditional tribal warfare. A typical action involving Crow supporting the US Army occurred following a Sioux raid on Fort C.F. Smith. Crow chief Iron Bull requested and received permission from Captain Kinney to pursue the war party. The Crow tracked the raiders and returned victorious with numerous Sioux scalps and a Sioux prisoner.[73]

Although there was no official alliance or treaty, the Crow clearly supported and allied themselves with the US Army. This union proved strong as the Crow consistently answered the call for support from the US Army. They continued on their own to attack their traditional enemies of the Sioux and Cheyenne right up to the end of the Indian Wars in the early 1890s. It was only the threat of Sioux retribution that kept Cheyenne bands from establishing peaceful relations with the US Army. However, a few Cheyenne bands did break from the Sioux and refused to participate in actions against the US Army.

The Pawnee in Securing Nebraska and the Railroads: Tribal Allies

> On the approach of Captain Murie with the Pawnee Company, the Indians advanced coolly to meet him thinking his command white men, as soon as they were near enough to recognize the Pawnee they broke in every direction with wild cries of Pawnee Pawnee. The fight was a complete success. Captain Murie and Lieutenant Isaac Davis and all the Scouts deserve the greatest credit.
>
> -Report of officer in charge of Plum Creek, August 1867.[74]

The Crow were not the only tribe who opted to support the US because of Sioux aggression. The Pawnee suffered greatly at the hands of the various Sioux bands and their allies who pushed into the Pawnee territory in Nebraska. The Pawnee provide another example similar to that of the Crow. The Crow although supportive of the US Army, never officially allied with them during the time of the Bozeman trail. However, during this time in Nebraska, the US

---

[73] Merrill J. Mattes, *Indians, Infants, and Infantry : Andrew and Elizabeth Burt on the Frontier* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 130-132; Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers*, 39.

[74] R. Eli Paul, *The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader, 1865-1877* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 78.

Army actively recruited the Pawnee, who willingly allied with the US Army to form auxiliary and scout units in order to assist in securing the frontier. The Pawnee fielded forces in support of US Army operations from 1864 to 1870 and again in 1876 to 1877.[75]

The Pawnee were a semi-nomadic tribe that lived along the Platte, Republican, and Loup rivers in Nebraska. Traditionally, they would execute several buffalo hunts a year into western Nebraska, specifically in the Platte and Republican valleys. The Sioux, primarily of the Brule band, and their allies, the Cheyenne and Arapahoe, ever searching for lucrative hunting lands, began to expand their control over the Platte valley. This expansion effectively denied the region to the Pawnee. Raids against Pawnee villages also served as a way for Sioux and Cheyenne warriors to increase their status and wealth. Pawnee hunting parties and villages were constantly under the threat of Sioux raids and attacks from the 1840s thru the 1870s. This pressure forced the Pawnee to concede parts of their territory and take a defensive stance against the superior numbers of the Sioux and their allies. This resulted in the forming of traditional enemies between the Pawnee and Sioux, as it did with the Crow.

---

[75] R. Eli Paul, *The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader, 1865-1877*, 74.



76

The Pawnee also faced the expansion of white settlers into eastern Nebraska. This expansion included the establishment of the overland routes to California and Oregon and the transcontinental railroad, all of which followed the Platte Valley through the Pawnee and Sioux hunting lands. The US government, although not at war with the Pawnee, wanted to remove them from the area of the trails to prevent any confrontations with the travelers. The Pawnee found themselves squeezed between the Sioux and US expansion. Eventually this pressure resulted in the Pawnee signing a treaty with the US and accepting a reservation on the Loup River in 1857. As part of this treaty, the US government would provide protection, payment, and

---

[76] Adapted from The History Department, United States Military Academy, "Indian Wars" http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/index.htm (accessed October 23, 2008)

logistical support to the Pawnee on their reservation.[77] The Pawnee found themselves dependent on the US Government for security as well as subsistence. Part of the treaty allowed them to conduct their traditional hunts as long as they received permission and did not confront settlers or interfere with travel.[78] Activities by the hostile tribes would soon make the efforts to restrict the Pawnee irrelevant as the Sioux and Cheyenne began to conduct raids throughout Nebraska on both the white and Pawnee villages.

The Sioux and their allies initially left white wagon trains, settlers, and the US Army alone, but this changed in the 1860s as several incidents led to open warfare.[79] The Minnesota Sioux war in the early 1860s increased the tension between white settlers on the frontier and the Sioux bands just as US Army forces began to withdraw from the region due to the need for forces in the East to fight the Confederacy. The US government relied on BIA agents, volunteer forces and their officers, such as Colonel John Chivington and General Patrick Conner, to handle any issues with the Indians. These officers and agents acted poorly or mishandled situations, increasing Indian grievances. Tensions grew as Sioux war parties continued to raid the Pawnee, with the occasional over eager war party attacking white travelers or settlers. These tensions all came to a head in 1864 as the hostile tribes took advantage of the lack of forces and launched devastating raids in Colorado and Nebraska.[80] This in turn led to the Sand Creek massacre, in

---

[77] United States Department of the Interior, *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties*, Vol. II (Treaties), ed. Charles Joseph Kappler (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), 764-765.

[78] United States Department of the Interior, Annual Report of the Northern Superintendency and Pawnee Agency from the *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1873* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1874), 186-187, 193-195.

[79] George E. Hyde, *Spotted Tail's Folk : A History of the Brule Sioux*, 1st ed. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), 88. Non-Cheyenne chiefs attempted to stay out of conflicts with whites, but a Ogalala war party became involved with a wagon train resulting in two white deaths. The chiefs punished the offenders, but the incident greatly increased the tension between whites and Indians.

[80] For information pertaining to the key players, raids, mismanagement and tensions that led to the raids in Nebraska see Ronald Becher, *Massacre Along the Medicine Road: A Social History of the Indian War of 1864 in Nebraska Territory* (Caldwell, ID: Caxton Press, 1999), 148-222, 251-273; Paul, *The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader*, 3-4; Hyde, *Spotted Tail's Folk : A History of the Brule Sioux*, 86-90; George Bird Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts and their Pawnee Battalion : The Experiences of Frank J. North*

which a force composed primarily of Colorado volunteers ambushed an unsuspecting and reportedly peaceful Cheyenne village led by Chief Black Kettle that resulted in the death of 150 Cheyenne, including women and children.[81] As the news of this battle spread across the plains, the hostile tribes united and renewed their attacks in 1865. These attacks primarily occurred throughout Nebraska against travelers on the overland route as well as the stations and settlements along the route. The Julesburg region of the overland trail specifically suffered multiple raids in January and February, as the hostile tribes sought vengeance for the Sand Creek massacre.[82] The US Army and white settlers found themselves under the constant threat of raids by hostile tribes allied with the Cheyenne, as did the Pawnee. This produced an environment in which the US government and the Pawnee shared a common enemy. This common enemy was the Pawnee traditional enemy composed of the Sioux and Cheyenne.

The problems of 1864 and 1865 resulted in the US Army searching for new techniques to assist in solving the problem of the hostile tribes who wrought havoc across the territory on both Pawnees and US citizens. The US Army developed the concept of recruiting and forming Pawnee auxiliary units to aid in their operations. The Pawnee and US Army needed the other to expand their capabilities to fight their shared foe. Major General Samuel Curtis, commander of the Department of Kansas, authorized the first recruitment of a Pawnee auxiliary unit with the support of the Pawnee Indian Agent Benjamin Lushbaugh.[83] The initial enlistment for a single company occurred in August 1864. The US Army utilized contractors to recruit and lead the

---

and Luther H. North, Pioneers in the Great West, 1856-1882, and their Defence of the Building of the Union Pacific Railroad (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1928), 69.

[81] Hyde, *Spotted Tail's Folk : A History of the Brule Sioux*, 92-93; Paul, *The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader*, 4. Colonel Chivington attacked a group of Indians at Sand Creek killing 150 Cheyenne to include women and children. The Cheyenne attacked were surprised and caught unprepared as they were in the process of negotiations with a nearby fort.

[82] Hyde, *Spotted Tail's Folk : A History of the Brule Sioux*, 94-97.

[83] United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, Number 207, Report of B.F. Lushbaugh, agent for Pawnees from the *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, for the Year 1864* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1865), 382-383.

Pawnee auxiliaries through the quartermaster. Joseph McFadden served as the commander and Frank North was his deputy commander. This first unit consisted of approximately 75 Pawnee from the reservation.[84]

General Curtis' efforts in 1864 produced minimal results against the hostile tribes.[85] In September 1864, he wrapped up his campaign and released the Pawnee auxiliaries. A month later, the territory of Nebraska recruited the Pawnee auxiliaries as a Nebraska Volunteer Cavalry unit as part of their requirement to field forces to secure the frontier during the Civil War. Captain Frank North replaced McFadden as the commander of the new Pawnee auxiliaries. North was a settler to Nebraska, who lived close to the Pawnee reservation and as a result understood their culture as well as spoke their language.[86] He served as commander of the Pawnees until their final decommissioning in 1877. The unit also grew to battalion size in 1867, with four companies of fifty Pawnees each under the command of a captain appointed by North. North received the rank of major as the commander due to the increase in size of the auxiliary unit.[87] In accordance with the Army policy concerning the recruitment of Indian auxiliaries, the Pawnee only served for one year at a time and the number of companies recruited depended on the need and the division commander's authorization.

In 1865, they participated in General Conner's punitive campaign against the Sioux bands in the Powder River country. The Pawnee company provided some of the few successes in General Conner's failed campaign to reduce Sioux aggression. On August 16, the Pawnee tracked down and fought a Cheyenne war party that had raided the Platte Bridge area. The

---

[84] Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts and their Pawnee Battalion*, 71; Becher, *Massacre Along the Medicine Road*, 305-306; Paul, *The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader*, 74.

[85]; Ron Field and Richard Hook, *US Army Frontier Scouts, 1840-1921*, Vol. 91 (Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2003) 20; Paul, *The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader*, 74.

[86] Becher, *Massacre Along the Medicine Road*, 303; Addison Erwin Sheldon, *History and Stories of Nebraska*, (Chicago, IL and Lincoln, NE: The University Publishing Co., 1914), 122-123.

[87] Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts and their Pawnee Battalion*, 73-74, 138; Paul, *The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader*, 76-77.

Pawnee returned to the main Army column having successfully defeated the war party and having taken at least four scalps, 29 horses, and a significant amount of plunder. They also scouted out and participated in the only successful attack on a hostile village during the campaign. Their actions were also critical in locating and assisting Colonel Nelson Cole's column. Colonel Cole was to link up with General Conner on the Rosebud River, but had become lost and harassed by the Sioux and Cheyenne to the point of exhaustion. The Sioux and Cheyenne likely would have destroyed Colonel Cole's command if the Pawnee scouts had not located the lost column.[88] Under North's leadership, the Pawnee matured and developed into an extremely effective force.

Treaty negotiations in 1866 brought a yearlong sabbatical to the fighting, but in 1867, following the events on the Bozeman trail, hostilities resumed. The Pawnee played a critical role from 1867 to 1870 in the mission to secure the railroads as it expanded westward into the hostile regions and then in campaigns against hostiles tribes that resumed raids along the Republican and Platte Rivers. General Grenville M. Dodge, the Union Pacific Railroad's senior engineer for the continental railroad, specifically requested the recruitment of the Pawnee auxiliaries to assist in securing the railroad in 1867.[89] This request ensured the Pawnee auxiliary units continued use and their expansion to a battalion-sized unit. Plans in 1876 to bring the hostile Sioux and Cheyenne into compliance and force them onto reservations resulted in the Army requesting that Major North form another Pawnee auxiliary unit for the 1876 campaigns. This led to Pawnees serving the US Army again in the years 1876 to 1877.[90] Throughout the years of service from 1867 to 1870 and their participation in the 1876 to 1877 campaigns, the Pawnee auxiliary units

---

[88] Henry E. Palmer, "The Powder River Indian Campaign of 1865" in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume IV, the Long War for the Northern Plains*, ed. Peter Cozzens, 1st ed., Vol. IV (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001), 24-25, 29-31, 34, 35-39; Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 88-92, 105-109, 115-122.

[89] Paul, *The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader, 1865-1877*, 76.

[90] Field and Hook, *US Army Frontier Scouts, 1840-1921*, 64, 21-22.

provided critical capabilities and skills to the US Army. The Pawnee served willingly as a way to fight their traditional enemy and maintain their warrior culture.

The US Army amplified the skills of the Pawnee by providing modern firearms, munitions, horses, as well as railroad transportation to get them to the right location to engage their traditional enemies on behalf of the US. Throughout their service from 1867 to 1870, the Pawnee proved to be exceptional fighters and loyal to the US. Two examples that demonstrate their use and success were their actions to secure the transcontinental railroad and the battle of Summit Springs in 1869. The US Army strategically placed the Pawnee companies at locations along the transcontinental railroad in order to patrol and protect the stations and construction teams. If a confrontation occurred in an area that lacked Pawnee auxiliaries, the railroad along which they served rapidly moved them to the troubled area. This tactic proved extremely effective and greatly reduced the threat to the transcontinental railroad. For example, in early August 1867 a Cheyenne war party sabotaged the tracks near Plum Creek, derailing a handcar and train. A second train following the first observed what occurred, reversed course, and reported the incident. Utilizing the telegraph, Major North issued instructions to Captain James Murie, one of his company commanders, to move his unit by rail to the site of the ambush and pursue the hostiles. The Pawnee Company under Captain Murie surprised a group of Cheyenne that were returning to plunder the train. The Cheyenne did not expect to find Pawnee auxiliaries and fled. Captain Murie pursued the Cheyenne out of the area. In the pursuit, the Pawnee killed at least 15 warriors and captured two prisoners.[91] Over the next two years, engagements similar to this cost the hostile tribes significantly in lives and property and wore them down. The hostile tribes could not sustain these losses and refrained from conducting attacks against the transcontinental railroad, the overland road, or nearby settlements and stations. The Pawnee

---

[91] William F. Bailey, *The Story of the First Transcontinental Railroad* (Pittsburg, PA: Pittsburg Printing Company, 1906), 74; Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 254-259; Sheldon, *History and Stories of Nebraska*, 125; Richard Irving Dodge, *Our Wild Indians: Thirty-Three Years' Personal Experience among the Red Men of the Great West.*, (Hartford, CT: A. D. Worthington and Company, 1882), 443-445.

auxiliaries had filled the US Army shortage of units and played a pivotal role in securing the railroads and Nebraska from hostile tribes.[92]

The battle of Summit Springs in 1869 marked the last significant battle to secure and deter hostile tribes along the Platte and Loup rivers. The Pawnee performed critical actions in the battle that led to the defeat of the hostile Cheyenne band. The majority of tribes in the southern and central plains returned to their reservations following their consistent losses and the 1867 campaign by General George Armstrong Custer in the Central Plains. However, one Cheyenne band under Chief Tall Bull, along with some Sioux bands, continued to resist and conduct attacks from the region of the Republican River valley. It was against this group that General Eugene Carr led the Fifth Cavalry and 150 Pawnees under Major North in the summer of 1869.[93] The Pawnee provided the critical scouting that screened and protected the column and located the hostile village at Summit Springs. The Pawnee and Major North led the charge into the village. The result of the attack devastated the hostile tribe, who lost significant property, livestock, and suffered many causalities including the influential tribal chief, Tall Bull. Accounts indicate that the Pawnee were ruthless in their attack as they killed indiscriminately, as was their custom.[94] In January 1871, the Pawnee's term of enlistment ended and the Army did not recruit another

---

[92] United States Congress, Papers Accompanying The Report of the General-in-Chief, Report of Brevet Major General C. C. Auger, Headquarters Department of the Platte from the *Message of the President of the United States and Accompanying Documents to the Two Houses of Congress at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Fortieth Congress.*, 40th Cong., 2nd sess., Executive Document 1 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1867), 59-60.

[93] "The Capture of a Cheyenne Village" in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume Three, Conquering the Southern Plains*, ed. Peter Cozzens, 1st ed., Vol. 3 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001), 410-412; Paul, *The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader, 1865-1877*, 80-82. Anonymous letter published in the Army and Navy Journal, July 1869, that gives an account of the Summit Springs battle it references the Pawnee battalion and their role specifically in tracking down a group of Cheyenne that raided the camp as well as scouting in the lead of the column.

[94] Phillip Henry Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan General United States Army*, Vol. II (New York, NY: Charles L. Webster & Company, 1888), 344-346; Bailey, *The Story of the First Transcontinental Railroad*, 74-76; C. F. Gordon-Cumming, "Our Own North West," *The Army and Navy Magazine*, 1883, 229, 475-476; Bailey, *The Story of the First Transcontinental Railroad*, 76-78; Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 299-307; Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts and their Pawnee Battalion*, 192-200.

Pawnee company again until the 1876 campaign against the Sioux in the Powder River country following the defeat of General Custer at the Battle of the Little Big Horn.[95]

The Pawnee companies in their time from 1865 to 1870 played a key role in deterring and punishing hostile tribes for their attacks on the railroad, the overland routes, and settlements as they quickly moved to the hotspots and pursued hostile tribes making them pay dearly for their aggression.[96] Their key role and success is noted in the comments and praise received by those who for whom they worked and protected. Following the Battle of Summit Springs, General Carr commented, "The Pawnee under Major Frank North were of the greatest service to us throughout the campaign. This has been the first time since coming west that we have been supplied with Indian Scouts and the results have shown value."[97] The Nebraska state legislature in 1870 passed a joint resolution thanking General Carr and the 5th Cavalry, but specifically went on to thank Frank North and the Pawnee Scouts for their service.[98]

Although, the Pawnee played a key role in ending hostile tribe's attacks against the railroad, overland route, and the settlements in Nebraska, Kansas, and Colorado, this did not end fighting between the Sioux and Pawnee. In 1873, tribal warfare raised its ugly head as the Sioux and Pawnee carried out hunts in the Republican River valley. During the winter hunt, the Sioux conducted a raid against a Pawnee village when the warriors were out hunting buffalo. As a result of the raid, the Pawnee lost 100 horses and significant property, but suffered only one

---

[95] Ibid., 213, 244.

[96] United States Congress, Papers Accompanying The Report of the General-in-Chief, Report of Brevet Major General C. C. Auger, Headquarters Department of the Platte from the *Message of the President of the United States and Accompanying Documents to the Two Houses of Congress at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Fortieth Congress.*, 40th Cong., 2nd sess., Executive Document 1 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1867), 59-60.; Bailey, *The Story of the First Transcontinental Railroad,* 67-68.

[97] Paul, *The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader*, 81.

[98] Nebraska Legislature, Memorials and Joint Resolutions from *Laws, Joint Resolutions, and Memorials Passed at the Sixth and Seventh Session of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Nebraska*, 6th and 7th sess., (Des Moines, IA: Mills & Co, 1871), 50.

death.[99] The real devastation occurred when 350 Pawnee went on their 1873 summer hunt. The Sioux discovered the Pawnee hunting party and joined their bands to attack the Pawnee. The combined Sioux bands greatly outnumbered the Pawnee and somewhere between 69 to 156 men, women, and children died. They further lost the majority of their property in the retreat including dried meat from the hunt and camp supplies.[100] The Pawnee had enough and moved to the Oklahoma Indian territory to put distance between them, their enemies, and white encroachment.[101]

The events of 1876 and 1877 demonstrated the US Army's desire to use Indian auxiliaries. The Army as they planned the 1876 campaign to bring the hostile Sioux and their allies into compliance requested their Indian allies to assist. Prior to the start of the 1876 campaign, the US Army actively recruited allies from the Shoshone and Crow.[102] These allied tribes proved themselves in every major effort during the 1876 campaign. At the Battle of the Rosebud with General George Crook, Indian auxiliaries proved themselves in providing early warning and fighting aggressively, that checked the hostile attack providing the time for the US forces to organize the defense.[103] General Custer's Indian scouts located the hostile tribe's village

---

[99] Paul, *The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader*, 245, 94.

[100] Ibid., 96-106.

[101] Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers*, 160 ; J. W. Powell, *Seventeenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution 1895-1896*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898), 169, 333-334.

[102] Nickerson, "Major General Crook and the Indians" in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V, the Army and the Indian*, 239. Major Nickerson outlines General Cook's expedition that started in May 1876 in support of the 1876 campaign against the Sioux. He identifies the force contained 100 Shoshone and that a dispatch to the Crow reservation requesting support resulted in the Crow providing an addition 150 warriors.; Fred H. Toby, "A 7th Cavalry Diary" in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V, the Army and the Indian*, 320. Fred Toby, a Soldier in the 7th Cavalry, accounts in his diary the arrival of 400 Crow warriors on 10 Aug 1876 to support General Terry's command in the 1876 Campaign following the defeat of Custer.; John Gregory Bourke *The Diaries of John Gregory Bourke*, ed. Charles M. Robinson (Denton, TX: University of North Texas, 2003), 340.

[103] Nickerson, "Major General Crook and the Indians" in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V, the Army and the Indian*, 239;George Crook and Martin F. Schmitt, *General George Crook : His Autobiography* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 9945), 193-194.

on the Big Horn River and even attempted to warn Custer of its size.[104] Following the defeat of General Custer, the US Army in an effort to bolster their forces and capabilities requested that North recruit a Pawnee auxiliary unit. The Pawnee provided the forces requested to strike one more time at their long time foes and as a means to escape from the poor conditions in the Oklahoma territory.[105] The Pawnee played a significant role in the Dull Knife Battle capturing the Cheyenne pony herd, the key to their livelihood.[106] Traditional enemies of the Sioux such as the Crow and Pawnee proved themselves as scouts and auxiliaries throughout the 1876-77 campaign to bring the Sioux and Cheyenne into compliance with US policy.

Collapse of the Sioux Alliance: Band First, Tribe Second

"Crazy Horse was a fool and Sitting Bull a coward. ... I ordered them in, but they have disobeyed me and defied my authority." After a pause, Hump added, "These people are rebels, General, and I want you to send your soldiers and destroy them; I will show the soldiers where to find them."

-Sioux Warrior and Chief Hump in conversation with General Miles.[107]

The actions of the Crow and Pawnee demonstrated the willingness of tribes to form alliances with the enemy of their enemy. However, not just historical tribal enemies became scouts or auxiliaries. Several Sioux and Cheyenne warriors and bands provided support to the US Army. Incidents of Sioux or Northern Cheyenne serving as scouts and auxiliaries remained relatively rare or intermittent in the early 1860-70s. Santee Sioux from Nebraska reservations assisted General Custer in his Black Hills expedition in 1874 in which no significant fighting

---

[104] Peter F. Panzeri, *Little Big Horn 1876: Custer's Last Stand* (Oxford, UK: *Osprey* Publishing, 1995), 49; Jerome A. Greene, *Battles and Skirmishes of the Great Sioux War, 1876-1877 : The Military View* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 43-47.

[105] Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts and their Pawnee Battalion*, 244-246; Bourke, *The Diaries of John Gregory Bourke*, 340.

[106] Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts and their Pawnee Battalion*, 246-248, 269-274.

[107] Peter R. DeMontravel, *A Hero to His Fighting Men Nelson A. Miles 1839-1925* (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1998), 100.

occurred.[108] The Santee Sioux forced out of Minnesota felt no allegiance or connection with their distance cousins the Lakota Sioux, who controlled the Black Hills.[109] Another account from Fort Abraham Lincoln, North Dakota, in 1873 stated that Sioux scouts from Fort Rice participated in fighting off a raid despite the fact that they were fighting their own people.[110] Incidents such as these remained few or unrecorded prior to 1876. However, following the campaign of 1876-77, the number of Sioux and Cheyenne serving as auxiliaries dramatically increased. This increaseresulted from bands surrendering. Surrendered bands needed an alternative way of livelihood and a way to improve their position and status. The 1879 Report of the Secretary of War to the second session of the US Congress referenced numerous times the employment of Sioux and Cheyenne auxiliaries against hostile bands.[111] These Sioux and Cheyenne auxiliaries were a few weeks or months earlier fighting the US Army, but now fought their former tribal allies.

---

[108] Ben Innis, *Bloody Knife : Custer's Favorite Scout* (Fort Collins, CO: Old Army Press, 1973), 102.

[109] Francis Paul Prucha, *The Great Father : The United States Government and the American Indians* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 143-145.

[110] James M. Burns, "Indians as Soldiers" in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V, the Army and the Indian*, 402. Major James Burns in an article published in the Army and Navy Journal urges the employment of Indians as Soldiers and references an account of Sioux scouts participating in the defense of Fort Abraham Lincoln.

[111] United States War Department, Reports of Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry, Colonel John Gibon, and Colonel N. A. Miles from the *Report of the Secretary of War being Part of the Message and Documents Communicated to the Two Houses of Congress at the Beginning of the Second Session of the Forty-Sixth Congress*, Vol. I, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1879), 55, 62, 71.



[112]

Hostile tribes following the Battle of the Little Bighorn began to surrender in significant numbers in the spring of 1877 due to significant losses in both personnel and property along with the constant threat from the US Army. Further, the policy toward the hostile tribes and reservations changed in 1876 as the BIA authorized the US Army to bring the hostile tribes into compliance. This effort focused on the hostile tribes that refused to reside on the reservation and those that supported them from the reservations.[113] The US Army conducted nearly continuous operations from the early spring of 1876 through the winter of 1877 in order to bring the hostile tribes into compliance. These pressures combined with the harsh winter of 1876-77 resulted in many bands surrendering or returning to the reservations.[114] Bands and warriors that surrendered began to take on positions as scouts and auxiliaries. By becoming scouts or auxiliaries, the warriors continued to maintain a semblance of their previous warrior nomadic life and could make a living. It also provided a means for some bands and chiefs to attempt to gain influence with the

---

[112] Collins, *Atlas of the Sioux Wars*, Map 13.

[113] Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903*, 162.

[114] Greene, *Battles and Skirmishes of the Great Sioux War, 1876-1877*, xv-xxvi.

Army in an attempt to improve the status of themselves and their band.[115] Others assisted the Army as they saw it as a means to bring other bands and individuals back to the reservation without bloodshed. Wooden Leg, a Cheyenne warrior who fought at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, reported such an encounter as he surrendered his band in the spring of 1877.

> Three strange Indians on horseback approached us ... We could see they were Indians, but they had on soldier clothing. This alarmed us. All of our men cocked their guns and went out in front of the women and children. We watched and waited. The three Indians stopped. At a distance, they made signs to us. They told us they were soldier scouts come out to help us find our way to the agency.[116]

These three scouts were from the Cheyenne and Sioux tribes that had already surrendered and now served as auxiliaries assisting in bringing in other surrendering bands.

Tension between bands always existed and as some began to surrender this tension only grew between the bands that surrendered and those that continued to resist. A letter from the Fort Peck Indian Agent W. Bird stated that the hostile bands, particularly of Sitting Bull's band that fled to Canada were returning and disrupting the ability of the reservation or compliant bands ability to hunt on their own reservation.[117] Bands of the same tribe that differed in views on whether or not to comply with US policies further competed for resources increasing the animosity between the bands. Bands that had supported one another now found themselves facing each other as some refused to surrender their way of life and others realized their best chance of survival was through allying with the US Army.

One of the first examples following the Battle of the Little Big Horn of Indian auxiliaries of one band fighting against formal allies occurred during the Dull Knife Battle on 25 November

---

[115] Eli S. Ricker, *Voices of the American West: The Indian Interviews of Eli S. Ricker, 1903-1919*, ed. Richard E. Jensen, Vol. 1 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 14, 18, 52.

[116] Wooden Leg and Thomas Bailey Marquis, *Wooden Leg : A Warrior Who Fought Custer* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1931), 303-304.

[117] United States War Department, Report of Colonel N. A. Miles from the *Report of the Secretary of War being Part of the Message and Documents Communicated to the Two Houses of Congress at the Beginning of the Second Session of the Forty-Sixth Congress*, 70.

1876. The Dull Knife Battle took place in the Powder River region and was a punitive campaign against Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse following the Battle of the Little Bighorn. The intent of the campaign was to keep the pressure on the hostile bands through the winter months in order to force them into compliance and onto the reservations.[118] The Army selected Sioux and Arapaho auxiliaries from the recently surrendered bands specifically for their past alliance with the hostile bands, which allowed them to get close and locate the hostile villages. The tactic worked as the Sioux and Arapaho scouts succeeded in capturing a Sioux warrior who approached their camp unsure of the scout camp's allegiance. This captured warrior provided the location of Dull Knife's village.[119] General Crook issued orders to Colonel Ranald Mackenzie to lead a mounted force to destroy this Cheyenne village. The mounted force selected was approximately 1,100 strong with a third of it composed of Indian auxiliaries from a variety of tribes.[120] The auxiliaries that participated in the campaign included the Pawnee Battalion lead by Frank North, Crow, and Shoshones, all groups known to be enemies of the Sioux and Cheyenne. However, significant numbers of Arapahoes, Sioux, and even several Cheyenne signed up as scouts and auxiliaries to fight their former allies.[121] The larger tribal bonds and alliances had broken under the pressure, as bands and individual warriors looked out for their own best interest. They proved extremely effective and expanded the US Army's capabilities.

Following the winter of 1876-1877, the majority of bands and hostiles surrendered in the spring as General Crook and General Miles pushed out peace proposals after the winter efforts to

---

[118] Fred H. Werner, *The Dull Knife Battle : "Doomsday for the Northern Cheyennes"*, 1st ed. (Greeley, CO: Werner Publications, 1981), 10.

[119] Ricker, *Voices of the American West: The Indian Interviews of Eli S. Ricker, 1903-1919*, 22-25.

[120] Werner, *The Dull Knife Battle : "Doomsday for the Northern Cheyennes"*, 17-18.

[121] Sherry Lynn Smith and William Earl Smith, *Sagebrush Soldier : Private William Earl Smith's View of the Sioux War of 1876* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), 20-23, 73; Cyrus Townsend Brady, *Indian Fights and Fighters*, 1971), 313; Jerome A. Greene, *Lakota and Cheyenne : Indian Views of the Great Sioux War, 1876-1877* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994; 1994), 114.

end the hostilities. Many prominent Cheyenne surrendered and became auxiliaries. White Bull, Brave Wolf, Two Moons, and Little Wolf were such Cheyenne warriors who served the US Army as tribal structures broke apart destroying the means by which the bands collected resources and security. Many enlisted as scouts with General Miles following their surrender. Cheyenne auxiliaries assisted General Miles in his effort to bring Lame Deer into compliance as one of the last remaining hostile Sioux bands still resisting. White Bull, Brave Wolf, and Two Moons specifically played roles in locating Lame Deer's village and in the following battle.[122] The destruction of Lame Deer's camp ended any organized resistance south of the Canadian border by Sioux or Cheyenne and General Sheridan reported the conflict with the Sioux and Cheyenne ended on 17 July 1877.[123] The end of major hostilities by the Sioux and Cheyenne did not end the use of Sioux and Cheyenne auxiliaries. Cheyenne and Sioux auxiliaries served the US Army against the Nez Perce from Idaho under Chief Joseph who refused to go on to a reservation and attempted to flee to Canada.[124]

At the end of 1877, the US Government relocated the majority of Northern Cheyenne to the Indian Territory on a reservation with the Southern Cheyenne. However, approximately 30 families remained behind due to their connections with the US Army as auxiliaries. White Bull and Brave Wolf were two who stayed behind and continued to serve as scouts. Little Wolf and

---

[122]. George W. Baird, "General Miles's Indian Campaigns" in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V, the Army and the Indian*,186-189. George Baird, former adjutant of the 5th Cavalry, recounts General Miles campaigns including the Lame Deer fight. In the article he specifically mentions using Cheyenne and Sioux auxiliaries who had just surrendered and that White Bull was their leader.; United States Senate, *Reports of Committees of the Senate of the United States for the First and Second Sessions of the Forty-Sixth Congress, 1879-1880.*, 46th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880), VII-VIII, IX, XII; Jerome A. Greene, *Yellowstone Command : Colonel Nelson A. Miles and the Great Sioux War, 1876-1877* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 194, 201-205.

[123] Ibid., 223; United States War Department, *Reports of Inspection made in the Summer of 1877 by Generals P. H. Sheridan and W. T. Sherman of Country North of the Union Pacific Railroad*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1878), 28.

[124] United States Senate, *Reports of Committees of the Senate of the United States for the First and Second Sessions of the Forty-Sixth Congress, 1879-1880.*, VII-VIII, IX, XII; John F. Finerty, *War-Path and Bivouac, Or, the Conquest of the Sioux*, (Chicago, IL: Donohue & Henneberry Printers and Binders, 1890), 346.

Dull Knife's band went to the Indian Territory. After two difficult years, both bands fled their reservations in an attempt to return to their previous territory in the Powder River country. Dull Knife's and Little Wolf's bands split and Dull Knife's band surrendered first. Dull Knife's band refused to accept the terms requiring that they return to the South and choose instead to attempt to break out of Fort Robinson by force. The breakout attempt resulted in the destruction of Dull Knife's band.[125] Little Wolf, eventually surrendered to Lieutenant W. P. Clark, who he apparently was familiar with from past service as an auxiliary. Clark wisely used the Cheyenne scouts, including Brave Wolf, to locate Little Wolf's band. He used the scouts to achieve first contact, establish the next meeting and pass the terms of surrender. Little Wolf accepted the terms trusting the Cheyenne scouts and Clark.[126] The US Army managed the situation by incorporating Little Wolf's band into the scouts and allowing them to stay under US Army supervision and not that of the BIA. Clark's use of the scouts to approach Little Wolf's hostile band as well as his own previous relationship with Little Wolf's band resulted in their successful surrender without further bloodshed. Clark understanding the tensions used his Cheyenne scouts and his own reputation to gain the trust of Little Wolf. This allowed him to resolve the situation peaceably and recruit more Cheyenne. Cheyenne would serve as auxiliaries for the US Army until the end of the Indian Wars. The US Army by modifying its policy and incorporating Little Wolf's band into the auxiliaries resolved the situation and Little Wolf's grievances.

The Cheyenne were not alone in this change in their attitudes. Numerous Sioux followed the same path. As many as 68 Sioux along with approximately 100 Arapaho enlisted as scouts and participated in the General Crook's winter efforts in 1876-1877. These scouts primarily

---

[125] Thomas R. Buecker, *Fort Robinson and the American West, 1874-1899*, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), 138-148.

[126] United States War Department, Papers Accompanying the Report of the Secretary of War, Report of Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry from *Message from the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Forty-Sixth Congress with the Reports of the Heads of Departments and Selections from Accompanying Documents*, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1879), 334-337.

came from Red Cloud's and Spotted Tail's bands which had been corralled and forced onto their reservation following the Battle of the Little Big Horn in order to closely monitor their activity and prevent them joining the hostiles. These scouts specifically participated in the Dull Knife Battle on 25 November 1876, which crushed the Cheyenne leading to their surrender in the spring of 1877.[127] The Sioux chief Hump provides a more specific example similar to that of the Cheyenne warriors Brave Wolf, White Bull and Two Moons. After his surrender, Hump became a scout and participated in campaigns against former allies and friends. Hump, like Brave Wolf, White Bull, and Two Moons, participated in the Lame Deer battle as well as the campaign against the Nez Perce.[128] Hump represents just one of the Sioux leaders and warriors that supported the Army as scouts and auxiliaries. The dropping of tribal or band allegiances within the major tribes supports that tribal structures contain fractures creating an environment of rivals.

The US Army's efforts against hostile tribes continued despite General Sheridan's claim of an end to hostilities in 1877. These efforts focused on hostile bands that largely operated out of Canada. General Miles played a key role in the military efforts from 1878 to 1880. Indian auxiliaries continued to support the US Army not only to improve their own positions, but to defend their resources, which raiding hostile bands threatened. The last major fight occurred in the vicinity of Beaver Creek, Montana, on 17 July 1879 against a group of approximately 400 hostile Sioux Indians of Sitting Bull's band that slipped south of the border to hunt buffalo. Cheyenne, Crow, and other friendly tribes commanded by LT Clark participated in the fight against the hostile Sioux. Most of the hostile Indians escaped into Canada, but they lost the

---

[127] Ricker, *Voices of the American West: The Indian Interviews of Eli S. Ricker, 1903-1919*, 9, 15, 18.

[128] George W. Baird, "General Miles's Indian Campaigns" in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V, the Army and the Indian*, 192-193; Finerty, *War-Path and Bivouac, Or, the Conquest of the Sioux*, 345; Uniteds States War Department, Report of Brigadier General Terry from the *Annual Report of the Secretary of War on the Operations of Department for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1877*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1877), 495-497.

majority of their property in their flight. This constant pressure was decisive. A few raids followed, but the bands and their villages now remained north of the Canadian border.[129]

Raids proved extremely risky and the results marginal at best for the hostile bands. Cheyenne scouts assisted the Army in preventing and pursuing these raids. One example occurred in the winter of 1880, when Cheyenne scouts with the 5th Infantry, assisted in tracking, fighting, and thwarting a Sioux and Nez Perce raid.[130] The Army shifted its focus to destroying the support networks to the hostile bands in Canada. Finally, in the summer and fall of 1880, the majority of hostile bands operating out of Canada began to surrender due to the difficulty of acquiring resources. Spotted Eagle, Broad Tail, Rain-in-the-Face, Kicking Bear, Short Bull, and others prominent Sioux broke ranks with Sitting Bull and surrendered to the US Army. Sitting Bull would surrender a year later in 1881 no longer able to resist with no support from any other bands of Sioux or Cheyenne.[131] The Sioux threat was gone on the northern Great Plains. There would continue to be small incidents that were more criminal in nature than acts of war. This remained the status quo for the next ten years.

The last major incident that came close to warfare or insurrection occurred in 1890 with the development of the Ghost Dance cult. This cult united various Indian tribes and bands in a messianic belief that would liberate them from their current dismal situation on the reservation and regain their previous station. This movement gained momentum and drew the attention of the BIA and US Army, which saw it as a threat to the established peace. The US Army moved to put down or limit the non-compliant Ghost Dance members, which violated orders and policies

---

[129] George W. Baird, "General Miles's Indian Campaigns" in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V, the Army and the Indian*, 194-197; United States War Department, Report of Colonel N. A. Miles from the *Report of the Secretary of War being Part of the Messages and Document Communicated to the Two Houses of Congress at the Beginning of the Second Session of the Forty-Sixth Congress*, Vol. I, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1879), 70-72.

[130] Hunter Liggett, "Scouting under Miles" in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V, the Army and the Indian*, 384-390.

[131] George W. Baird, "General Miles's Indian Campaigns" in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V, the Army and the Indian*, 194-197.

established to control the cult. These efforts culminated at the battle of Wounded Knee, in which Indian auxiliaries participated in tracking and fighting the non-compliant hostiles.[132]

The US Army continued utilizing Indian auxiliaries for their superior light cavalry capabilities in scouting and fighting until early in the 1890s. They even experimented with all Indian Army units recruited and trained as conventional units. This experiment was short lived for a variety of reasons including politics, racism, and cultural differences, but more likely died as the need declined as violence on the plains tapered off in the 1890s.[133] By hiring Indians as scouts, the US Army gained the advantage of their capabilities and prevented them from joining other hostile groups. Converting former hostile tribes into auxiliaries presented an alternate means to the US Army to resolve some of the issues involving the Indians. It also provided a means for the Indians to escape from the pressures of survival and the humiliation of surrender. Increased pressure on the hostile tribes resulted in the break down of the tribal factors or structures that did serve to unite the bands within the tribe. Tribes that previously presented a united front disintegrated as allegiances to band and family overrode those of tribes and tribal alliances. Thus, individuals and bands that surrendered or lived on agencies took the next logical step within the tribal structure to improve their position by joining with the tribe, the US Army, that could provide resources and security.

Conclusion

Examples from the Indian Wars upon the Northern Great Plains demonstrate that tribes and tribal structures in those instances were conducive to the use of tribes and bands as scouts and auxiliaries. Naturally occurring fractures and competition within tribal societies create an environment that can be exploited to gain an advantage in fighting and bringing noncompliant or

---

[132] Dee Alexander Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee : An Indian History of the American West* (New York: Henry Holt, 1991), 434-435, 439-445.

[133] Richard Upton, *The Indian as a Soldier at Fort Custer, Montana, 1890-1895 : Lieutenant Samuel C. Robertson's First Cavalry Crow Indian Contingent*, 1st ed., Vol. 1 (El Segundo, CA: R. Upton, 2750), 97-100.

hostile tribes into compliance. The skills and capabilities of the allied tribes filled gaps in the US Army's capabilities on the Great Plains. The Sioux acted according to the customs of their tribal society and structure, which created traditional enemies of the Crow and Pawnee. This made them willing to ally with the US Army in order to fight against a traditional enemy. Examples after the battle of the Little Bighorn show how pressures upon the tribes and bands resulted in former allies, the Cheyenne and Sioux, turning on one another in an attempt to maintain their way of life or improve their position with the US Army by becoming auxiliaries and scouts. All these examples exhibit features concerning tribes and tribal structures for the US Army to consider when conducting operations among tribal societies.

Competition for resources, and the lack of institutions within tribal societies to handle competition, often left warfare as the default option for tribes competing for resources. Tribal leaders or chiefs whose position within the tribal structure depended on their reputation as a warrior to provide security and resources supported the tradition of tribal warfare as a means to improve their reputation. The tribal structure created the environment that created traditional enemies by the need for constant warfare. The Sioux expansion and increase in power resulted in them clashing with the Crow and Pawnee over resources. As the Sioux expanded on the plains, the western bands that fell under Red Cloud pushed the Crow out of their hunting lands in Wyoming and Montana, while the southern bands mostly associated with Spotted Tail conducted raids against the Pawnee in Nebraska. This tribal warfare occurred over multiple decades and resulted in the creation of traditional enemies. The Crow and Pawnee, who suffered at the losing end of the Sioux and their allies expansion, sought allies to change the situation in their favor. The US Army filled that void and provided the Crow and Pawnee the opportunity to reduce the Sioux threat. The Crow claimed always to be friends of the whites and sought to use the US Army to regain their territory. Caught between the encroachment of the Sioux and whites, the Pawnee sought to use the strengths of the US Army to provide them security from the Sioux and the opportunity to fight back. Each believed that by supporting the US Army they would be able

to weaken their hereditary enemy while improving their own position. This is clearly an example of an enemy of my enemy is my friend. The example provided by the Crow, Pawnee, and Sioux demonstrate how tribal societies often produce enemies who will unite with an outside and possibly unknown entity in order to strike at their enemy.

Tribal societies create long lasting enemies willing to form alliances with an outsider in order to strike an enemy, but the tribal structure as found in the Great Plains was particularly susceptible to pressures and tensions. These pressures and tensions resulted from tribal alliances breaking down to their basic form where loyalty was the strongest, the band or family. These basic groups act in their best interest regardless of the effects on the rest of the tribe. Following the 1876 and 1877 campaigns conducted by the US Army, the Sioux and Cheyenne alliance disintegrated. Their alliance shattered and the tribes themselves fell apart as bands pursued their own best interests. The result was that non-compliant bands faced the US Army aided by their former allies and at times their own tribesman from different bands. Cheyenne and compliant Sioux participated in operations alongside the US Army and former enemy tribes against the noncompliant bands such as Lame Deer or tribes such as the Nez Perce. The limited resources required to survive complicated by the relentless pursuit of the US Army was too much pressure for the tribes to endure. Many bands opted to comply with the US Army and returned to the reservations to escape the warfare that cost them heavily in resources due to the destruction of their villages and as the resources became scarce. Once on the reservation the opportunity to serve as scouts and auxiliaries served as a means for the Indians to maintain their warrior life style as well as a way to improve their bargaining position with the Army. Hostile bands that were now compliant therefore found themselves engaged against former allies or bands of the same tribe that refused to comply. The tribal structure contributed to the collapse of tribal unity as the band took precedent over that of the tribe and chiefs acted to benefit their own band.

By using Indian scouts and auxiliaries, the US Army increased its capabilities in a variety of ways on the Great Plains. The Indians greatly increased the US Army's ability to carry out

operations on the plains due to their knowledge of the terrain, their ability to cross the cultural boundary that existed between the Army and the various tribes, and their assistance in communicating and in understanding the tactics and techniques of the non-compliant tribes. The US Army essentially acquired some of the best light cavalry in North America by the recruitment of compliant tribes. They also served to compensate for the shortage in Soldiers, increasing not only the capacity of fighting formations, but also the numbers available. Indian scouts and auxiliaries freed regular Soldiers from many tasks such as screening and scouting duties as well as communications. This not only increased the capabilities of the US Army, but also assisted in keeping compliant Indians or recently surrendered Indians employed. Instead of being tempted to join or support non-compliant bands, they found themselves busy supporting the US Army. By providing the opportunity to serve as scouts, the US Army created the opportunity for conflict resolution and a means around policy. Little Wolf's surrender demonstrated that by offering the opportunity to serve as auxiliaries, the US Army found a way to get around difficult BIA policies and resolve peacefully a situation with a non-complaint band. Little Wolf's band did not have to return to the Indian territory as long as they served as auxiliaries under the control of the US Army. The use of tribal auxiliaries by the US Army on the Great Plains demonstrated numerous advantages to the US Army from an increase in capabilities to providing alternative means to handle tribal conflict.

The current conflicts and the fact that tribal societies dominate large portions of the world indicate that the US Army needs to consider multiple ways to deal with conflict and issues in tribal societies. US Army doctrine is lacking when it comes to dealing with tribal structures or the possibility of using tribal auxiliaries. It should be an element of any doctrine that discusses counterinsurgency, irregular, or guerilla warfare as tribal societies dominate many regions of the world in which the US could use tribal auxiliaries to support these styles of warfare. Current doctrine on counterinsurgency, guerilla warfare, and foreign internal defense mention the population or indigenous forces as critical, but do not go into the depth or discuss how to exploit

tribal societies. The joint operations planning process (JOPP) and military decision-making process (MDMP) provide the opportunity to discover the availability or option to use auxiliaries during the mission analysis or course of action development, but there is no guidance to examine tribal societies with that in mind. It is up to commanders and staffs to develop the idea and concept on their own. Doctrine and the legality concerning the use of tribal auxiliaries must be developed and expanded. As demonstrated in this study of the Indian Wars on the northern Great Plains, this technique provides commanders a means to expand their own capabilities and knowledge and minimize risk by using tribal auxiliaries. Tribal auxiliaries could reduce the US foot print again minimizing risk to US forces both tactically and politically. It is essential that commanders and staffs recognize the role that tribes may play within their area of operations and opportunities as the US conducts military operations in regions of the world dominated by tribal societies.

The use of tribal auxiliaries by the US Army on the northern Great Plains identified several issues. These issues largely revolved around differences in culture between the tribes and the US Army and the need to understand these differences if utilizing tribal auxiliaries. Tribal warfare was unfamiliar and considered irregular by the most in the US Army. The actions of individual warriors superseded the requirement to act as a collective unit in combat. Tribal beliefs and customs developed over decades of tribal warfare resulted in brutal customs or actions that were strange to the US Army. The result was that discipline among the tribal auxiliaries was not the same or met the expectations of the US Army. Tribal auxiliaries fought as was their custom, which meant at times they killed women and children or tortured prisoners despite orders of the US Army. Similarly, if orders did not coincide with what they thought was best, warriors or chiefs would carry out their own actions given the situation, which could mean departing for home or launching an attack regardless of their orders depending on what appeared best at the time. Cultural requirements such as preparation for combat or other ceremonies often meant that commanders needed to display patience in using auxiliaries as well as cultural understanding.

Similarly, the Army needed to ensure that tribal auxiliaries understood their benefits or payment for service as tribal auxiliaries in order to avoid future conflict. If utilizing tribal auxiliaries, the US Army must closely examine the culture of the society in order to gain the best advantages of these auxiliaries.

This study focused on whether fractures and structures of tribal societies are susceptible to the utilization of tribal auxiliaries to bring hostile or non-compliant tribes into compliance. These leaders demonstrated unique qualities, traits, and styles that allowed them to adapt to the situation for which most were not trained or familiar. They succeeded in crossing between the cultural boundaries of the Indians, the US Army, and western culture to carry out successful operations using tribal auxiliaries. Expansion of the study to include other tribal societies to verify the findings and confirm the tribal characteristics and fractures that lead to their successful utilization as auxiliaries is required to further validate and establish when best to use such a strategy against non-compliant tribes.

The Indian Wars on the Great Plains from 1865-1890 clearly demonstrated that natural fractures and structures of tribal societies provide opportunities for the use of tribal auxiliaries. Prior to utilization of tribal auxiliaries, it is essential that the Army critically examine the culture and the tribes to identify the structures and fractures within the tribal society. These structures and fractures may identify course of actions to solve problems in tribal societies. The examples from the Indian Wars indicate that the struggle for resources and security created traditional enemies ready to support the enemy of their enemy. It also indicates that the application of pressure on pre-existing tensions can cause tribal alliances to collapse. These bands will then turn on each other in an attempt to improve their situation and survive. Tribal societies by their own structure and fractures present the opportunity to use auxiliaries from within the society as a way to bring the hostile or non-compliant tribes into compliance. The US Army has used this technique throughout its history and learned this lesson repeatedly. It is time that the relevance of

tribes and tribal auxiliaries be formally recognized and included as a means for the US Army to possible use in tribal societies where it is conducting operations.

Bibliography

Andrist, Ralph K. *The Long Death: The Last Days of the Plains Indian*. New York: Macmillan, 1964.

Bailey, William F. *The Story of the First Transcontinental Railroad*. Pittsburg, PA: Pittsburg Printing Company, 1906.

Becher, Ronald. *Massacre Along the Medicine Road: A Social History of the Indian War of 1864 in Nebraska Territory*. Caldwell, ID: Caxton Press, 1999.

Birtle, Andrew J. *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*. Washington, D.C.: Center Of Military History United States Army, 2003.

Bourke, John. *The Diaries of John Gregory Bourke*. Edited by Charles M. Robinson, Denton, TX.: University of North Texas, 2003.

Brady, Cyrus Townsend. *Indian Fights and Fighters*. New York, NY: McClure, Phillips & Co., 1971.

Brown, Dee. *The Fetterman Massacre: Formerly Fort Phil Kearny, An American Saga*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1971.

Brown, Dee. *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West*. New York: Henry Holt, 1991.

Buecker, Thomas R. *Fort Robinson and the American West, 1874-1899*. Norman OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003.

Carrington, Frances C. *My Army Life and the Fort Phil Kearny Massacre with an Account of the Celebration of "Wyoming Opening"*. Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1910.

Carrington, Margaret Irvin. *Absaraka, Home of the Crows : Being the Experience of an Officer's Wife on the Plains*. 1st Bison Book ed. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1983.

Chun, Clayton K. S. and Dr Anderson Duncan. *US Army in the Plains Indian Wars 1865-91*. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2004.

Clarke, Alan J. "Tribal Identity and Conflicts with Tribes." Master of Strategic Studies Degree Monograph, US Army War College, 2008.

Collins, Charles D. *Atlas of the Sioux War*, 2nd ed., ed. Dr. William Glenn Robertson, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.

Coutant, C. G. *The History of Wyoming from the Earliest Known Discoveries*. Vol. I. Laramie, WY: Chaplin, Spafford & Mathison, Printers, 1899.

Cozzens, Peter. *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume IV, the Long War for the Northern Plains*. 1st ed. Vol. IV. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001.

———. *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume Three, Conquering the Southern Plains*. 1st ed. Vol. 3. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001.

———. *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, Volume V, the Army and the Indian*. 1st ed. Vol. V. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001.

Crook, George and Martin F. Schmitt. *General George Crook : His Autobiography*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 9945.

DeMontravel, Peter R. *A Hero to His Fighting Men Nelson A. Miles 1839-1925*. Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1998.

Department of the Interior. *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1873*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1874.

Dodge, Richard Irving. *Our Wild Indians: Thirty-Three Years' Personal Experience among the Red Men of the Great West*. Hartford, CT.: A. D. Worthington and Company, 1882.

———. *The Plains of the Great West and their Inhabitants*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1877.

Dunlay, Thomas W. *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers : Indian Scouts and Auxilaries with the United States Army, 1860-90*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1982.

Dunn, Jacob Piatt. *Massacres of the Mountains : A History of the Indian Wars of the Far West*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1886.

Ellis, Richard N. *The Western American Indian : Case Studies in Tribal History*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1972.

Federal Writers' Project. *Wyoming: A Guide to its History, Highways, and People*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.

Field, Ron and Richard Hook. *US Army Frontier Scouts, 1840-1921*. Vol. 91. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2003.

Finerty, John F. *War-Path and Bivouac, Or, the Conquest of the Sioux*. Chicago, IL: Donohue & Henneberry Printers and Binders, 1890.

Gluckman, Max. *Politics, Law, and Ritual in Tribal Society*. Chicago, IL: Aldine, 1965.

Gordon-Cumming, C. F. "Our Own North West." *The Army and Navy Magazine*, Volume VI, May to October 1883.

Grant, Ulysses S. *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 20, November 1 - October 31, 1869-1870*. Edited by John Y. Simon. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003.

Grant, Ulysses S. *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant Volume 21 November 1 - may 31, 1870-1871*. Edited by John Y. Simon. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003.

Greene, Jerome A. *Lakota and Cheyenne : Indian Views of the Great Sioux War, 1876-1877*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994.

———. *Battles and Skirmishes of the Great Sioux War, 1876-1877 : The Military View*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

———. *Yellowstone Command : Colonel Nelson A. Miles and the Great Sioux War, 1876-1877*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1991.

Grinnell, George Bird. *The Fighting Cheyennes*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915.

Grinnell, George Bird. *Two Great Scouts and their Pawnee Battalion : The Experiences of Frank J. North and Luther H. North, Pioneers in the Great West, 1856-1882, and their Defence of the Building of the Union Pacific Railroad*. Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1928.

Gump, James O. *The Dust Rose Like Smoke: The Subjugation of the Zulu and the Sioux*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994.

Hagan, Barry J. *"Exactly in the Right Place" : A History of Fort C.F. Smith, Montana Territory, 1866-1868*. El Segundo, CA: Upton and Sons, 1999.

Hassan, Hussein D. *Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities*. Washington, D. C.: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 2007.

Hebard, Grace Raymond and Earl Alonzo Brininstool. *The Bozeman Trail: Historical Accounts of the Blazing of the Overland Routes into the Northwest, and the Fights with Red Cloud's Warriors*. Cleveland, OH: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1922.

Hedren, Paul L. *Fort Laramie in 1876: Chronicle of a Frontier Post at War*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1988.

Hyde, George E. *Spotted Tail's Folk : A History of the Brule Sioux. Civilization of the American Indian*. 1st ed. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961.

Innis, Ben. *Bloody Knife: Custer's Favorite Scout*. Fort Collins, CO: Old Army Press, 1973.

Isaacs, Harold Robert. *Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989; 1989.

Jackson, Helen Hunt. *A Century of Dishonor : A Sketch of the United States Government's Dealings with some of the Indian Tribes*. Williamstown, MA: Corner House, 1973.

Johnson, Dorothy M. *The Bloody Bozeman: The Perilous Trail to Montana's Gold. American Trails Series*. 1st ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971.

Jones, Seth G., *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan* Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2008.

Kappler, Charles Joseph, ed. *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties*. Vol. II. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1904.

King, Charles. *Campaigning with Crook*. 3rd ed. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983.

Kingsbury, George W. *History of Dakota Territory*. Vol. II. Chicago, IL: The S.J. Clarke Publishing Company, 1915.

Knight, Oliver. *Following the Indian Wars: The Story of the Newspaper Correspondents among the Indian Campaigners*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960.

Marquis, Thomas Bailey and William Henry White. *Custer, Cavalry, & Crows : Being the Thrilling Account of the Western Adventures of William White*. Fort Collins, CO: Old Army Press, 1975.

Marshall, S. L. A. *Crimsoned Prairie : The Wars between the United States and the Plains Indians during the Winning of the West*. New York, NY: Scribner, 1972.

Mattes, Merrill J. *The Great Platte River Road: The Covered Wagon Mainline Via Fort Kearny to Fort Laramie*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1988.

———. *Indians, Infants, and Infantry : Andrew and Elizabeth Burt on the Frontier*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1988.

Morgan, Patrick. "How Tribal Societies Operate." Quadrant Magazine 49, no. 1 (2005): 54-56.

Nebraska Legislature. *Laws, Joint Resolutions, and Memorials Passed at the Sixth and Seventh Session of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Nebraska*. 1st and 2nd sess. Des Moines, IA: Mills & Co, 1871.

Oberholtzer, Ellis P. *A History of the United States since the Civil War*. Vol. I. New York, NY: The Macmillain Company, 1917.

Panzeri, Peter F. *Little Big Horn 1876: Custer's Last Stand*. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 1995.

Paul, R. Eli. *The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader, 1865-1877*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1998.

Powell, J. W. *Seventeenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898.

Pressfield, Steven. "Tribalism is the Real Enemy in Iraq." http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/274138_focustribes18.html (accessed 4/27/2008, 2008).

Prucha, Francis Paul. *Documents of United States Indian Policy*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000.

———. *The Great Fathe : The United States Government and the American Indians*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1984.

Ricker, Eli S. *Voices of the American West: The Indian Interviews of Eli S. Ricker, 1903-1919*, edited by Richard E. Jensen. Vol. 1. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2005.

Schapera, Isaac. *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies*. New York: Schocken Books, 1967.

Sheldon, Addison Erwin. *History and Stories of Nebraska*. Chicago, IL and Lincoln, NE: The University Publishing Co., 1914.

Sheridan, Phillip Henry. *Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan General United States Army*. Vol. II. New York, NY: Charles L. Webster & Company, 1888.

Sherman, William Tecumseh, George H. Thomas, John Pope, J. S. Foster, A. Pleasanton, E. A. Htichcock, P. H. Sheridan, James B. Ricketts, and Norman Wiard. *Supplemental Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War*. Vol. II. 38th Cong. 2nd sess., Senate Report No. 2. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Officce, 1866.

Sherman, William T. *Memoirs of General William T. Sherman*. Vol. II. New York, NY: Appleton, 1886.

Smith, Jean Edward. *Grant*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2002.

Smith, Sherry Lynn and William Earl Smith. *Sagebrush Soldier : Private William Earl Smith's View of the Sioux War of 1876*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989.

The History Department, United States Military Academy "Indian Wars" http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/index.htm (accessed October 23, 2008)

United States Bureau of Indian Affairs. *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1873*. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1874.

———. *Federal Indian Policies, from the Colonial Period through the Early 1970's*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975.

United States Congress. *Letter from the Acting Secretary of the Interior Concerning Indian Operations on the Plains*. 50th Cong., 1st sess.., Executive Document 33 Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 1887.

———. *Message of the President of the United States and Accompanying Documents to the Two Houses of Congress at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Fortieth*

Congress. 40th Cong., 2nd sess., Executive Document 1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1867.

———. *Reports of Committees of the Senate of the United States for the First and Second Sessions of the Forty-Sixth Congress, 1879-1880.*, 46th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880.

———. *Indexes to the Executive Documents of the Senate of the United States for the First Session Fortieth Congress, and for the Special Session, 1867.* 40th Congress, 1st sess. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1868.

United States War Department, *Reports of Inspection made in the Summer of 1877 by Generals P. H. Sheridan and W. T. Sherman of Country North of the Union Pacific Railroad.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1878.

———. *Report of the Secretary of War being Part of the Message and Documents Communicated to the Two Houses of Congress at the Beginning of the Second Session of the Forty-Sixth Congress.* Vol. I. 46th Cong., 2nd sess., Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1879.

———. *Message of the President of the United States and Accompanying Documents to the Two Houses of Congress at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Fortieth Congress.* 40th Cong., 2nd sess., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1867.

Upton, Richard. *The Indian as a Soldier at Fort Custer, Montana, 1890-1895 : Lieutenant Samuel C. Robertson's First Cavalry Crow Indian Contingent.* Montana and the West Series. 1st ed. Vol. 1. El Segundo, Calif.: Upton and Sons, 1983.

Utley, Robert Marshall. *Frontier Regulars : The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891.* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977.

———. *Frontiersmen in Blue : The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865.* New York, NY: Macmillan, 1967.

Weigley, Russell Frank. *History of the United States Army.* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984.

Werner, Fred H. *The Dull Knife Battle : "Doomsday for the Northern Cheyennes".* 1st ed. Greeley, CO: Werner Publications, 1981.

Wooden Leg and Thomas Bailey Marquis. *Wooden Leg : A Warrior Who Fought Custer.* Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1931.

Wooster, Robert. *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903.* Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1995.